By Calum Carmichael.
(The full, five-part series is downloadable as a pdf: What Can the Philanthropic Sector Take from the Downfall of Samuel Bankman-Fried and His Ties to Effective Altruism, a five-part series by Calum Carmichael (2023).)
Setting the stage for parts 3, 4 and 5 of this series
In September 2022, the prescient but pseudonymous anticipated the fallout that Effective Altruism (EA) would experience before year鈥檚 end:
鈥淏y relying heavily on ultra-wealthy individuals like Sam Bankman-Fried for funding, 鈥 the Effective Altruism community does not appear to recognize that this creates potential conflicts with its stated mission of doing the most good by adhering to high standards of rationality and critical thought鈥. [A]ttacks on the image of SBF, FTX and even crypto as a whole carry the risk of tarnishing EA鈥檚 reputation. Were SBF to be involved in an ethical or legal scandal (whether in his personal or professional life), the EA ecosystem would inevitably be damaged as well.鈥
In November 2022, following the bankruptcy of FTX International and the criminal charges against Samuel Bankman-Fried (SBF), referred to that fallout:
鈥淭he downfall of Mr Bankman-Fried, who has been apparently dedicated to the [EA] cause since his time at university, has led to a reckoning. Not only has effective altruism lost its wealthiest backer; its reputation has been tarnished by association. Many inside and outside the community are questioning its values, as well as the movement鈥檚 failure to scrutinise its biggest funder鈥攕omething particularly painful for a group that prides itself on logically assessing risk.鈥
In the same month, described EA鈥檚 reckoning as the one bright spot in the downfall of SBF:
鈥淭his rethinking of effective altruism may be the one bright spot in an otherwise depressing crash 鈥. It鈥檚 good that FTX鈥檚 collapse is finally making people rethink Bankman-Fried and effective altruism.鈥
Also in the same month, speculated on whether such rethinking would lead to the demise of EA:
鈥淪am Bankman-Fried, affectionately known as SBF, was until recently effective altruism鈥檚 鈥. If in a decade barely anyone uses the term 鈥榚ffective altruism鈥 anymore, it will be because of him鈥.鈥
Part 3: Questioning the philosophical foundations of Effective Altruism
Introduction
Part 1 of this series summarized criticisms of Effective Altruism.
Late in 2022 the bankruptcy of FTX International and the criminal charges brought against the crypto entrepreneur SBF re-focused and intensified existing criticisms and suspicions of EA 鈥 the approach to philanthropy with which he was closely associated. Part 1 of this series summarized those criticisms under seven points: two each for the philosophical foundations and ultimate effects of EA, and three for its analytical methods. Part 2 described EA: its origins, ethos, analytical methods, priorities and evolution. Parts 4 and 5 of the series will focus on the criticisms and their rejoinders that apply to the analytical methods and ultimate effects of EA. Here in part 3, I focus on the two criticisms and their rejoinders that apply to its philosophical foundations. Before discussing each criticism, I provide several references to it that were made in reaction to the downfall of SBF.
Throughout, my goal isn鈥檛 simply to present contending views on the foundations, methods and effects for EA, but to derive from them implications and questions for the philanthropic sector as a whole 鈥 so that regardless of our different connections to the sector, we can each learn or take and possibly apply something from the downfall of SBF and his association with EA.
Criticism #1: The ethical bases of EA rely on a narrow version of utilitarianism to the exclusion of other ethical theories or considerations, such that it encourages its adherents 鈥 through their philanthropy 鈥 to pursue purportedly good ends using potentially harmful or corrupting means.
鈥淭he question is: was the FTX implosion a consequence of the moral philosophy of EA brought to its logical conclusion?鈥 —, November 2022
鈥淭he problem for effective altruists is not just that one of their own behaved unethically. There is reason to believe that the ethos of effective altruism 鈥 enabled and even encouraged the disaster at every step along the way鈥. [I]t is little more than a fancy way of saying 鈥榯he ends justify the means鈥.鈥 —, November 2022
鈥淥ne key feature of utilitarianism is that it doesn鈥檛 rule out any kinds of actions unilaterally. Lying, stealing and even murder could, in certain situations, yield the overall best consequences鈥. That doesn鈥檛 mean that an effective altruist has to say that stealing is okay if it leads to the best consequences. But it does mean that the effective altruist is engaged in the same style of argument.鈥 —, November 2022
鈥淚f there鈥檚 a lesson to be learned from the collapse of FTX, it鈥檚 this: ethics is not the result of calculated consequences. If there鈥檚 any good to emerge from the rubble, it鈥檚 this: the demise of utilitarianism as a spiritual guide.鈥 —, November 2022
Holden Karnofsky, a thought leader in the EA community, voiced mild concerns that utilitarianism could weaken the trustworthiness of effective altruists.
This first line of criticism against the philosophical foundations of EA focuses on their connections with and its premise that actions are moral to the extent their consequences promote total well-being. Sure enough, utilitarianism informs EA, whether through the writings of thought leaders such as or , the outlooks of the majority of effective altruists as in 2017, or the analytical methods used to identify the philanthropic causes or interventions capable of doing 鈥渢he most good.鈥 And sure enough, SBF aligned himself with utilitarianism early on. At the age of 20 鈥 perhaps by his , both of whom are professors at Stanford Law School 鈥 he himself as 鈥渁 total, act, hedonistic/one level (as opposed to high and low pleasure), classical (as opposed to negative) utilitarian; in short, I’m a .鈥 Both parentheses are original.
According to some critics, the presence of utilitarianism has 鈥溾 or 鈥溾 EA, in part by 鈥溾榚nds justify the means鈥 reasoning, 鈥 [and a] maniacal fetishization of 鈥榚xpected value鈥 calculations, which can then be used to justify virtually anything鈥, ranging from all the way to such things as . Even within the EA community there are some thought leaders 鈥 being one 鈥 who have voiced milder concerns that utilitarianism could weaken the trustworthiness of effective altruists: 鈥淒oes utilitarianism recommend that we communicate honestly 鈥 [or] say whatever it takes 鈥 stick to promises we made 鈥 [or] go ahead and break them when this would free us up to pursue our current best-guess actions? 鈥. My view is that 鈥 for the most part 鈥 people who identify as EAs tend to have unusually high integrity. But my guess is that this is more despite utilitarianism than because of it.鈥
“The Reluctant Prophet of Effective Altruism,” a New Yorker article, shows how William MacAskill鈥檚 movement set out to help the global poor, but how his followers now fret about runaway A.I. The article asks: have the followers seen our threats clearly, or lost their way?
Among external critics of EA, the unease around utilitarianism often focuses on the 鈥溾 strategy 鈥 the idea promoted by that for some effective altruists a career with social impact might involve their working not in positions tackling major problems directly, but rather in high-paying jobs that allow them to donate more to organizations tackling those problems effectively. As noted in parts 1 and 2, it was this strategy that MacAskill to the undergraduate SBF, and of which SBF came to be the most prominent and praised . Some argue, however, that 鈥.鈥 This could take several forms.
First, the strategy could place well-intentioned people in work environments likely to erode those intentions. : 鈥渢he idea that getting rich is good (or even obligatory) so long as you鈥檙e giving enough of it away, can become a justification for embracing a soul-corroding competitiveness while telling yourself you鈥檙e just doing it for the greater good.鈥 , 鈥渢he Spartan tastes and glittering ideals of dogooder college students rarely survive a long marinade in the values and pressures and possibilities of expansive wealth.鈥
Second, it could encourage people to accept careers that are high-paying but socially harmful, or to undertake business practices that are : 鈥淸i]t鈥檚 easy to see how this could translate to: Go work in crypto, which is bad for the planet, because with all that crypto money you can do so much good.鈥
‘The experience of SBF is a warning that if you are the type to try and make billions, you should worry that your ethics are vulnerable along the way,’ says internet writer Zvi Mowshowitz of SBF (pictured above).
Finally, the strategy might attract or at least characters from the get-go: 鈥淸the experience of SBF] is also a warning that if you are the type to try and make billions, you should worry that your ethics are vulnerable along the way.鈥 Italics are original. According to one commentator, the italicized warning could also have applied to : 鈥淚t is possible that MacAskill and his peers recognized that running a crypto exchange was inherently unethical, but concluded that it was nevertheless justifiable given the scale of the good that SBF鈥檚 fortune would do.鈥
Rejoinders to criticism #1
There are rejoinders to these criticisms of the role and effects of utilitarianism and the earning-to-give strategy. First, as an ethical theory, utilitarianism , but rather a general framework for thinking about what makes actions moral. Like , it provides sufficient latitude for people holding different moral outlooks or priorities to partake.
Second, 鈥 despite SBF labeling it 鈥.鈥 EA makes no claim that one must sacrifice one鈥檚 own interests or those of another to serve the 鈥済reater good,鈥 nor does it specify or insist upon what the 鈥済reater good鈥 comprises. Sure enough, as noted in part 2 the EA organization encourages members to donate at least 10% of their income in perpetuity to the charities found to be most effective. But such a standard isn鈥檛 unique to EA: it鈥檚 present in . Moreover, in 1996 philosopher developed arguments akin to those of from 1972 鈥 鈥 but unlike Singer, he did so disavowing any particular ethical theory, including utilitarianism.
For more about ethical theories, read “What does Batman have to do with philanthropy? A series about ethics (or lack thereof) in our sector,” by Calum Carmichael: /panl/ethics.
Third, effective altruists aren鈥檛 all utilitarian: although MacAskill is thought to be, his co-founder of , , isn鈥檛; and although the majority in 2017 said they were, a sizable minority said they weren鈥檛, affiliating instead with another ethical theory (e.g., deontology or virtue ethics) or none.
Fourth, the underlying principles of any ethical theory, if carried to the extreme, could be used to justify abhorrent behaviour. Sure enough, as some critics of EA argue, fanatical utilitarianism could be used to justify the murder of one to save the lives of two. But then again, fanatical deontology could be used to justify . And fanatical virtue ethics could be used to justify . Thus, using extreme extrapolations to declare utilitarianism 鈥 or deontology, or virtue ethics 鈥 a 鈥溾 that has 鈥溾 EA isn鈥檛 only a logical fallacy, but also 鈥 if carried to the extreme 鈥 a line of reasoning that would dismantle Western ethical thought.
Fifth 鈥 turning to the dangers of recommending the 鈥渆arning-to-give鈥 strategy 鈥 such recommendations are infrequent, made perhaps to of effective altruists. For most, careers combining social impact with a better personal fit would come from 鈥 whether through nonprofits, charities, social enterprises, universities, think tanks, government or political organizations.
Sixth, when recommended, earning-to-give comes with : , don鈥檛 pursue a career that violates the rights of others or that entails fraud, such things being bad both in themselves and in their ; where 鈥渢here is a large gap between your daily conduct and your core commitment鈥; , 鈥渁void doing anything that seems seriously wrong from a commonsense perspective鈥; and 鈥渋n the vast majority of cases鈥 don鈥檛 pursue 鈥渁 career in which the direct effects of the work are seriously harmful, even if the overall benefits of that work seem greater than the harms.鈥 To be sure, by the donations that would compensate for the harmful aspects of a career or by inserting phrases like 鈥渁 large gap鈥 or 鈥渁 commonsense perspective鈥 or 鈥渋n the vast majority of cases,鈥 the guidelines could set up slippery slopes toward profitable but bad behaviour or lucrative but harmful careers. And admittedly such warnings may , who 鈥淚 would never read a book. I鈥檓 very skeptical of books.鈥
Nevertheless, the insertion of such 鈥渇udge factors鈥 within the guidelines provides the agency that effective altruists would need to make their own moral decisions around actions that might be bad in themselves but good in their side effects: actions akin to spanking a child to discourage cruel behaviour, or telling a lie to protect an innocent life. and credible, moral decisions regarding them aren鈥檛 necessarily categorical.
Criticism #2: EA excludes human emotion or relationship as guides to philanthropic choice, such that it undercuts philanthropists鈥 agency and overlooks or opposes key aspects of human motivation.
鈥淢any EA folks come from tech; many also consider themselves 鈥榬ationalists,鈥 interested in applying Bayesian reasoning to every possible situation. EA has a culture, and that culture is nerdy, earnest, and moral. It is also, at least in my many dealings with EA folks, overly intellectual, performative, even onanistic.鈥 —, November 2022.
鈥淲hat the 鈥榚ffective altruism鈥 types believe in is that they can replace the inferior, subjective standards of the plebs with the superior, objective standards of the ruling class鈥. Armed with these tools, 鈥 [they] feel empowered to do an unhinged collection of immoral things because, frankly, they .鈥 —, November 2022.
Eliezer Yudkowsky, AI researcher, argues that charitable giving shouldn’t be about human feelings. “A human life, with all its joys and all its pains, adding up over the course of decades, is worth far more than your brain鈥檚 feelings of comfort or discomfort with a plan.”
This second line of criticism against the philosophical foundations of EA focuses on their undercutting donors鈥 agency by discouraging them from choosing philanthropic causes freely in response to their own unfiltered emotions, interests or relationships. Instead, EA uses impartial and impersonal criteria to pre-select causes and interventions that are cost effective in saving or improving lives and then asks donors to choose from these. As explained by : most charitable donations are 鈥済iven on the basis of emotional responses to images of the people, animals, or forests that the charity is helping. Effective altruism seeks to change that by providing incentives for charities to demonstrate their effectiveness.鈥 Or as put more bluntly by the effective altruist : 鈥淭his isn鈥檛 about your feelings. A human life, with all its joys and all its pains, adding up over the course of decades, is worth far more than your brain鈥檚 feelings of comfort or discomfort with a plan. Does computing the expected utility feel too cold-blooded for your taste? Well, that feeling isn鈥檛 even a feather in the scales, when a life is at stake. Just shut up and multiply.鈥 Indeed, SBF endorsed such reasoning even in choosing among the cost-effective causes pre-selected by EA 鈥 eschewing those he considered 鈥,鈥 such as global poverty and health that threaten millions of lives at present, preferring instead those he considered more intellectually driven, such as runaway artificial that could conceivably exterminate trillions in the distant future.
EA鈥檚 use of impartial and impersonal criteria to pre-select causes has been criticized for both what it overlooks in the world and denies in the individual. In terms of what it overlooks, the criteria used by EA on concepts 鈥渙f individual needs and welfare, rather than power, inequality, injustice, exploitation, and oppression鈥. By omitting the latter set of concepts, EA gives short shrift to conditions that are inherently important to our quality of life.
Philosopher Bernard Williams argued, in 1973, that the impartiality prescribed by utilitarianism is neither possible nor desirable.
In terms of what it denies, EA鈥檚 reliance on utilitarianism and impartiality requires individuals to 鈥渢he things that constitute us as humans: our personal attachments, loyalties and identifications鈥 along with 鈥渢he complex structure of commitments, affinities and understandings that comprise social life.鈥 Moreover, imposing a 鈥減oint-of-viewless鈥 鈥渄eprives us of the resources we need to recognise what matters morally.鈥 The social world is 鈥渋rreducibly,鈥 鈥渋rretrievably鈥 and 鈥渋neluctably鈥 normative such that acting morally does not require 鈥渁cting with an eye to others鈥 well-being鈥 but rather acting with a 鈥渏ust sensitivity to the worldly circumstances in question.鈥 As a result, EA鈥檚 鈥渋mage of the moral enterprise is bankrupt and 鈥 [the] moral assessments grounded in this image lack authority.鈥 Such concerns echo those of the philosopher Bernard Williams who in 1973 that the impartiality prescribed by utilitarianism is neither possible nor desirable: it鈥檚 not possible given that individuals cannot step outside their own skin; and it鈥檚 not desirable if, like Williams, one assumes that our individual well-being depends upon our ability to decide and act freely in accord with our own concerns, purposes or deepest convictions and not become a conduit for the initiatives or claims of others 鈥 including the claim that we should replace our own convictions with the 鈥渋mpartial point of view鈥 needed to maximize total utility.
Rejoinders to criticism #2
Peter Singer
There are rejoinders to the criticisms of what EA overlooks and denies. First, when it comes to overlooking justice or equality or freedom, admits that effective altruists 鈥渢end to view values 鈥 [like these] not as good in themselves but good because of the positive effects they have on social welfare.鈥 And yet, within EA there鈥檚 no 鈥溾 on that front. Indeed, given EA鈥檚 commitment to cause neutrality and means neutrality, claims in principle that if it can be demonstrated that advancing such values directly is a 鈥渃ourse of action that will do the most good 鈥 then it鈥檚 the best course of action by effective altruism鈥檚 lights.鈥 That said, putting this principle into practice is difficult: it would require agreement at the outset on what justice or equality or freedom entails, for whom, and how it and its effects can be measured. To date, such difficulties have limited EA initiatives to ones that advance equality or justice : say, countering inequality by alleviating the effects of poverty; or addressing injustice by promoting election reform, criminal justice reform or international labour mobility.
Second, directly pursuing justice or equality or freedom internationally could introduce forms of cultural domination and colonization by imposing Western concepts on non-Western societies and exercising , as well as challenge the of host-nations.
Third 鈥 turning to the denial of donor agency and the suppression of emotion 鈥 argues that EA seeks to harness such things, not eliminate them. Some effective altruists may to adopt an impartial perspective if given evidence that this would allow their philanthropy to do more good for more people. Moreover, as proposed by economist , 鈥渁n inescapable feature of human psychology means at the normative level, there鈥檚 just no way we can fully avoid partiality of some kind.鈥 In order to recognize and respond to a cause or need, we need first to identify with it and with the people or entities involved. The direction and degree of such identification differ across donors, and to honour these differences EA presents a menu of alternative cause areas and interventions deemed cost effective.
And fourth, the critics of EA who echo Williams鈥 insistence that morality is essentially first-personal rather than impersonal risk undermining the responsive regard for others that is the very basis for, and indeed the original meaning of, philanthropy: according to philosopher , 鈥渢he importance to oneself of one鈥檚 own projects and attachments limits the extent to which morality can demand that one provide assistance to others.鈥
What can we take from the downfall of Samuel Bankman-Fried with regard to the philosophical foundations of Effective Altruism?
Journalist Kelsey Piper was surprised by the willingness of SBF to be interviewed on Twitter after news broke that his cryptocurrency exchange had collapsed, with billions in customer deposits apparently gone.
Is SBF the exception that proves the general rule that the philosophical foundations of EA are sound? Or is he the example that demonstrates they aren鈥檛? Or is he neither? How did the utilitarianism he as a student in 2012 apply in his professional life a decade later? Did he use it as an ethical theory to guide and justify his actions, or as a smoke screen to obscure them? Did he consider his own ethical protestations sincere, whereas those of his competitors a marketing ploy? Or was he just like the others? Such questions weren鈥檛 answered definitively in his infamous with journalist Kelsey Piper, soon after he came under investigation in November 2022:
Piper: 鈥淪o the ethics stuff – mostly a front? People will like you if you win and hate you if you lose and that鈥檚 how it all really works?”
SBF: 鈥淵eah. I mean that’s not *all* of it. But it鈥檚 a lot鈥.鈥
Piper: 鈥淵ou were really good at talking about ethics for someone who kind of saw it all as a game with winners and losers.鈥
SBF: 鈥淵a. Hehe. I had to be. It鈥檚 what reputations are made of, to some extent. I feel bad for those who get fucked by it. By this dumb game we woke westerners play where we say all the right shiboleths (sic) and so everyone likes us.鈥
By 鈥檚 account: 鈥淚 don鈥檛 think anyone fully understands what motivated Sam (or anyone else who was involved). I don鈥檛 know how much of it was greed, vanity, pride, shame, or genuinely trying to do good鈥. [If he remained a utilitarian, then] it increasingly seems he was that most dangerous of things 鈥 a naive utilitarian 鈥 making the kind of mistakes that philosophers (including the leading utilitarians) have warned of for centuries鈥. [T]he sophistications that he thought were just a sop to conventional values were actually essential parts of the only consistent form of the theory he said he endorsed.鈥
To my mind, it鈥檚 unclear what role the philosophical foundations of EA played in the professional decisions of SBF. Hence, to judge those foundations by those decisions would be misleading. Nevertheless, his downfall revived two lines of criticism that raise issues and questions relevant to not only EA but also the philanthropic sector as a whole. I select three.
1. What are or what should be our ethical anchors?
David Z. Morris, a writer about crypto topics and author of “Bitcoin is Magic,” wrote: “The problem for effective altruists is not just that one of their own behaved unethically. There is reason to believe that the ethos of effective altruism鈥 enabled and even encouraged the disaster at every step along the way…”
As noted above, EA has been criticized for its ties to utilitarianism and the premise that actions are moral to the extent their consequences promote total well-being.
But what gives meaning or moral worth to our engagement with the philanthropic sector 鈥 whether as donors, volunteers, workers, advisors, collaborators or beneficiaries? Has it to do with the outcomes of our actions and whether they鈥檙e good, or the duties and rules fulfilled by our actions and whether they鈥檙e right, or the personal qualities underlying our actions and whether they鈥檙e virtuous? How do we assess, perhaps question and possibly improve that goodness, rightness or virtue? Are there limitations or dangers in the standards we use? How do we work with others or in contexts that value standards different from or contradictory to our own? To what extent can we temper or change our own standards without losing our way?
If these questions seem irrelevant to how and why you engage with the philanthropic sector, why is that? Would you feel challenged by someone who sees them as fundamentally important?
2. How do we decide upon actions that on the one hand could be harmful or problematic in themselves, but on the other hand could allow us to do more and better things?
As noted above, EA has been criticized for tolerating actions that might be intrinsically bad but instrumentally good: say, accepting donations from crypto, or recommending 鈥 albeit with cautionary guidelines 鈥 that some effective altruists pursue high-paying but perhaps corrupting or socially-harmful careers that would nevertheless enable them to donate more.
The Guardian newspaper reported that Harvey Weinstein offered $5 million to support female filmmakers (following multiple claims of sexual harassment against him), an offer rejected after widespread criticism. Photo is courtesy of David Shankbone.
But how do or should we manage similar situations? For example, when and why should a charity ? Or when and why should a charity ? Should we share , who co-founded the Salvation Army in 1865, that 鈥渢he trouble with tainted money is t鈥檃int enough of it鈥? If not, then where do we draw the line? By what criteria does 鈥渢ainted鈥 become 鈥渦nacceptable鈥 鈥 apart from being criminal? What sources of donations would violate your own values, or either oppose the mission of a charity you deal with or trigger irreparable reputational harm in the eyes of the public or key stakeholders: tobacco, alcohol, cannabis, extractive industries, nuclear power, social media, airlines, crypto, the pharmaceutical industry, a religious foundation? Would the size or purpose of the donation make a difference to your decision?
Consider the following timeline for SBF. By 2013 he had affiliated with EA. , working at and donating half his salary. He started to build his crypto empire in 2017. Although crypto may be of disputed social value, it鈥檚 not illegal. And although Bankman-Fried鈥檚 promotional strategies may have been questionable (e.g., placing ads during the Super Bowl or in The New Yorker and Vogue magazines), they鈥檙e not unprecedented. Sure enough, starting in 2018 that he was duplicitous, refused to implement standard business practices, and had inappropriate sexual relations with subordinates. But these reports weren鈥檛 circulating publicly, didn鈥檛 allege any criminal activity and could simply have been rumours spread by disgruntled associates. Few if any foresaw the devastating events of November 2022. Certainly investors like the didn鈥檛 see them coming.
At what point during that timeline, would you or a charity you deal with have refused or returned, say, a $1 million donation from SBF?
3. What ways should or should not be used to influence donors鈥 decisions on how much and where to give?
“Perhaps you know of campaigns that have been truly ‘donor-centric’ in the sense of not resorting to practices that could sway or nudge their prospects into acting against their interests or priorities.” –Calum Carmichael. Photo is courtesy of Christine Roy.
As noted above, EA has been criticized for constraining the agency of donors in deciding the amounts and destinations of their giving. It recommends , discourages acting on personal relationships and emotive appeal, and encourages a reliance on impersonal indicators of cost-effectiveness. As a result, some claim it both denies individuals the ability to decide and act on their own concerns, purposes or deepest convictions, and it overlooks normative but hard-to-pin-down goals such as liberty or justice.
But if the charge against EA is that it tries to donors 鈥 in other words, alter their conception of their own interests in ways that would have them act in a contrary manner 鈥 then could the same charge by leveled against other if not all fundraisers or fundraising campaigns in the sense of their doing the same thing albeit on different terms? Such campaigns might employ and techniques designed to persuade. Such techniques might work on emotive rather than cognitive grounds, providing only selective information and relying on narratives or verbal or visual images that evoke rather than document. They might adjust the goalposts of 鈥渋mpact鈥 to match what can be evoked emotively, and encourage compliant donors to think of themselves as 鈥済enerous鈥 or 鈥渧isionary鈥 and their gifts as 鈥渢ransformative鈥 or 鈥渋nspired.鈥
Could such campaigns be faulted for tampering with donor agency?
Perhaps you know of campaigns that have been truly 鈥渄onor-centric鈥 in the sense of not resorting to practices that could sway or their prospects into acting against their interests or priorities. If so, then 鈥 as suggested by the taxonomy constructed by 鈥 could such campaigns be at the expense of important considerations apart from donor agency, including what EA emphasizes: the well-being of actual or potential beneficiaries? Consider, for example, the decision of Leona Helmsley to establish in her will a for her Maltese dog, Trouble. Or consider the reassurance offered by that 鈥淸i]n philanthropy, there are no wrong answers鈥. You might want to fund an antigravity machine or a museum for dust mites. There may be more constructive uses for your money, and these objectives may sound crazy, but there is nothing wrong with them. In philanthropy, the choices are not between right and wrong, but between right and right.鈥
In closing
The need for reflection has been both identified by critics of EA and acknowledged by its leaders, such as William MacAskill, who said: “I had put my trust in Sam, and if he lied and misused customer funds he betrayed me, just as he betrayed his customers, his employees, his investors, & the communities he was a part of. For years, the EA community has emphasised the importance of integrity, honesty, and the respect of common-sense moral constraints.” Photo is courtesy of Nigel Stead.
The downfall of Samuel Bankman-Fried has elicited calls for renewed and greater reflexivity within Effective Altruism 鈥 the approach to philanthropy with which he was closely associated. The need for such reflection has been both identified by critics of EA and acknowledged by its and members 鈥 all seeing this as an occasion to reconsider and perhaps revise its philosophical foundations and analytical methods in the hope of improving its ultimate effects.
To my mind, the process of reflection required within EA is something in which the wider philanthropic sector could participate 鈥 or, indeed, should participate.
In part 3 of this series, I鈥檝e summarized the criticisms of EA and their rejoinders as they relate to its philosophical foundations. From these I鈥檝e drawn out several questions that apply to the philanthropic sector more broadly. My intent here, as for the forthcoming parts 4 and 5, isn鈥檛 to castigate or exonerate EA. Instead, it鈥檚 to point out that the issues on which EA is or should be reflecting are ones that could guide more of us across the sector in reconsidering and perhaps revising our own outlooks and ways of engaging with philanthropy, in our shared hope of improving its ultimate effects.
Banner photo is courtesy of Valdemaras D.
Friday, July 21, 2023 in EA, For homepage, News & Events
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