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Introduction

ÌýFor the first time since 1972,ÌýwhenÌýSALT I negotiations yielded the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the Interim Agreement on offensive arms, the strategic relationship between Washington and Moscow is entirely unconstrained by a legal framework.Ìý.ÌýAs the current normative vacuum is unprecedented in the modern era, theÌýNorth Atlantic TreatyÌýOrganizationÌý(NATO)ÌýAlliance facesÌýa new ‘strategic trilemma’:Ìýthe simultaneous and often contradictory imperativesÌýof maintaining credible extended deterrence;Ìýenhancing conventional defence against hybrid and missile threats;Ìýand reconstructing a confidence-building, risk-reduction framework to prevent accidental escalation. The central policy problem is that the traditional tools of strategic stabilityÌý– quantitative and qualitative ceilings, inspections, and transparencyÌý–Ìýhave been discarded in favour of verticalÌýnuclearÌýproliferation. NATO must navigate an environment whereÌýthe absence of constraints increases the risk of miscalculations, potentially leading to an unmanaged arms race that reduces the securityÌýfor allÌýNATO Allies.ÌýÌý

Context: The Long Transition and the Paradox of the New STARTÌý

TheÌýinternationalÌýarms control regime, which persisted through various systemic shifts from 1972 until 2026, has finally fractured. However, a rigorous assessmentÌýof its lifespanÌýsuggests that the final pillar of this regime,Ìýthe New START,Ìýwas already flawed.ÌýÌýThis omission allowed Moscow to channel its modernization efforts toward lethal, MIRV-capable systems,Ìýwhile remaining formallyÌýcompliant toÌýthe treaty limit of 1,550 warheads.Ìý,ÌýMoscow’s StrategicÌýRocketÌýForces (RVSN) and the missile industry exploited this normativeÌý‘shield’Ìýto initiate a massiveÌý‘re-MIRVing’Ìýprocess. This modernization was driven by aÌýÌýwithin the Russian military-industrial complex. By focusing on systems that exploited New START’s qualitative loopholes, institutional actors, such as theÌý, secured long-term funding and development pathways for a new generation of delivery vehicles. This momentumÌýfacilitatedÌýthe emergence of a direct nexus between treaty-compliant modernization and the later deployment of advanced long-range capabilities on the Ukrainian battlefield.Ìý

The Strategic Trilemma between Extended Deterrence and the ‘Upload’ DisparityÌý

The end of New START has transformed the re-MIRVing process into a catalyst for a new arms race. In this new unconstrained environment, the US possesses a significant technical advantage. . If the US opts to utilize its technological edge, it would effectively out-deploy Moscow, potentially doubling its arsenal to levels above the failed treaty’s limits.  In response, Moscow may prioritize asymmetrical offset centred on long-range theatre strike capabilities. This likely reaction is deeply rooted in the bureaucratic momentum of Russian military-industrial complex, favouring dual capable systems that operate in regulatory grey zones.   

Defence, Resilience, and the Hypersonic Decision Gap

ÌýUnlike traditionalÌýICBMs, which allow for a 25-plus minutes warning window, a hypersonic system launched from central Europe can reach critical command nodes in Moscow in less than 10 minutes. ThisÌýÌýin decision time undermines de-escalatory signalling and placesÌýÌýon the adversary’s early warning systems, potentially triggering automated ‘launch on warning’ responses. Even a conventional strike on communications, command-and-control (C3) centres would be strategically relevant. Therefore,Ìýthe deployment of such systems in substantial numbers would create a ‘launch-on-warning’ incentive for Moscow, further destabilizing the offensive-defensiveÌýbalance and increasing the risk of automated nuclear response.ÌýÌý

Managing UncertaintyÌýin a Multipolar SystemÌý

Emerging from a Cold War environment coalesced around a bipolar international power-distribution, traditional arms control has proven ill-suited for the asymmetrical, multipolar international disorder of the last two decades.  In a world without inspections, stability depends on predictability. To achieve this goal, the international community must work to prevent accidental escalation through transparency and launch notifications. The reconstruction of a stabilizing framework is currently stymied by two primary structural hurdles: Russia’s current lack of trustworthiness and China’s strategic intentions.  

The main obstacle to reopening dialogue with Russia is the paradox of negotiating limits on the same systems being employed in the current war in Ukraine. It would be politically fraught for the US to engage in fresh negotiations, while Russia utilizes these assets as tool of active coercion and battlefield destruction. . This move puts Washington in an uneasy negotiating position, forcing it to negotiate over assets that France and the United Kingdom (UK) consider non-negotiable. This is hardly a novel tactic:  Putin’s proposal risks to exacerbate infra-systemic fault lines, foster suspects of decoupling, and ‘fears of abandonment’ between the US and its European Allies. Simultaneously, China’s strategic stalling (and its own ambitions to increase its arsenal) prevents the necessary transition toward a trilateral framework. By hiding behind the rhetoric of minimal deterrence, Beijing refuses to accept any oversight while rapidly expanding its nuclear and conventional inventory.  

While the American and Russian nuclear stockpiles greatly exceed those of all other nuclear-weapon states, the strategic equation has irrevocably shifted from a bipolar to a multipolar calculus through China’s ambitions to drastically increase its own arsenal.  These missiles provide Beijing with a high-precision, non-nuclear capability to hold regional strategic assets in the mire, including forward air bases, carrier strike groups, and command-and-control (C2) nodes.  This scenario of ‘conventional entanglement’ complicates the global force posture of NATO’s primary security provider, the US.   

Technological Acceleration: The AI-Hypersonic NexusÌý

The ‘Strategic Trilemma’ is further complicated by the integration ofÌýÌýand launch-control systems. As theÌýÌýthrough the deployment of Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs), the decision-making window for political leaders has shrunk from thirty minutes to mere seconds.Ìý.ÌýHowever, the ‘black-box’ nature of neural network-based AI introduces unprecedentedÌý. Because these models recognize patterns in ways that are non-replicable and often incomprehensible to human operators, they are prone to hallucinations or false positives – interpreting unusual atmospheric phenomena or cyber-spoofing as an incoming strike. In a strategic environment dominated by fast-flying systems like theÌýDark EagleÌýorÌýOreshnik, the reliance on AI-driven recommendations could lead to a ‘compressed escalation’ where a machineÌýinitiatesÌýa retaliatory strike before human deliberation even occurs. This technological entanglementÌýnecessitatesÌýthat any futureÌýarmsÌýcontrol negotiations must deal not only with warheads and delivery systems, but also with the algorithms governing their employment.ÌýÌý

The Shift towards Integrated DeterrenceÌý

In response to this acceleration, NATO has transitioned toward a posture of integrated deterrence. With the expiration of New START in sight, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) moved to solidify the Alliance’s defensive architecture.  This strategic shift was codified on February 12, 2026, when several NATO Allies launched  to develop next-generation sensors designated to counter ballistic and hypersonic threats (like the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS)). These initiatives, alongside a new  for drone-based deep precision strike capability, signal a move away from static, treaty-based stability, toward a dynamic denial posture. Furthermore, the  reinforces this approach by emphasizing trans-regional deterrence, acknowledging that while NATO remains a regional alliance, its security is inextricably tied to the ‘two-peer’ challenge.  

Policy Recommendations:ÌýÌý

1. Rediscover a dual approach: Combine military modernization with a standingÌýnegotiatingÌýofferÌýto both Russia andÌýChinaÌýon Strategic Stability Dialogue,Ìýwhich wouldÌýlikely benefitÌýNATOÌýAlliance cohesion by reassuring the most risk-adverse NATOÌýmemberÌýstates.ÌýÌý

2. Prioritize Qualitative Limits: Advocate for a Multilateral MIRV-freeze to mitigate first-strike incentives and neutralize the advantage of rapid uploading.ÌýÌýIn the post-START environment, the primary risk is no longer aggregate warheads counts, but the rapid surgeÌýinÌýcapacity,Ìýafforded by US upload potential and Russia’s modernization of MIRV-capable systems.ÌýA ‘freeze’ approach would be aimed at neutralizing the perceived advantages of rapid arsenal expansion, signalling a commitment to strategic sufficiency rather than theÌýrecklessÌýpursuit of superiority.ÌýÌý

3. EstablishÌý‘Cold WarÌýPlus’ÌýCommunication Channels: Strengthen secure, real-time links between military headquarters to manage crisis in an era of hypersonic weapons.ÌýNATO should strengthen secure, real-time links between military headquarters – specificallyÌýthe Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)Ìýand the Russian Ministry of Defence – to manage crisis in an era defined by HGVs. These channels must be hardened against cyber-interferences and electronic warfare to ensure theyÌýremainÌýviableÌýduring high-intensity grey zone friction or hybrid confrontations.ÌýÌý

4. Manage AI Integration in Command and Control:ÌýEstablishÌý‘human-in-the-loop’ standards between launch commands and early warning systems toÌýpreventÌýAIÌýsystemsÌýfrom triggering accidental escalation during high-speed hypersonic encounters.ÌýWhile AI may become indispensable for processing massive data streams from next-generationÌýsensors like the HBTSS, it must neverÌýpossessÌýthe autonomous authority toÌýinitiateÌýa response. Hence, theÌýNATOÌýAlliance should champion an international protocol that mandatesÌýa ‘’ for human commanders, even in high-speed hypersonic confrontations.Ìý

5. Define a Clear Doctrine for Conventional Hypersonic: Clarify that systems likeÌýDark EagleÌýare forÌý,Ìýwhile acknowledging thatÌýÌýremainsÌýinherently destabilizing.ÌýNATO should explicitly disavow ‘decapitation’ or strategic nuclear roles for these assets to reduce the risk of Russia misperceiving conventional precision strikes as existential threats to itsÌýC2Ìýarchitecture.Ìý

6. Strengthen Hybrid Resilience: Protect undersea and digital infrastructure as a coreÌýcomponentÌýof strategic stability to preventÌýhybrid,Ìýnon-kinetic bypassing of deterrence.ÌýBy neutralizing low-cost, high-impact hybrid threats, theÌýNATOÌýAlliance prevents adversaries from bypassing deterrence thresholdsÌýand undermining stability at the lowest level of the escalation ladder. This approach ensures that the emerging new capabilities in air, missile, and drone-defence would not beÌýcompromisedÌýby asymmetric disruption aimed at eroding domestic resilience and political will during a crisis.ÌýÌý