ÐÓ°ÉÔ­´´

As Canada looks to build a renewed vision of sovereignty and economic independence – divorced from the influence, reliance, and hegemony of the United States (US) – the nation is increasingly seeking foreign capital to develop an economically viable Canada for tomorrow. The urgent need to develop a sovereign wealth fund – the – is the structural result of the . In a bid to attract capital and develop the Canada Strong Fund while facing a , Prime Minister Mark Carney is hosting the in Toronto, Ontario, from September 14-15, 2026. 

Attending the summit will be the world’s leading investors who have been invited to identify opportunities for investment in Canada. The government’s ambition is to catalyse $1 trillion in total investment across Canada over the next five years, supported by approximately $280 billion in federal capital investments and incentives. The summit is being in partnership with the federal government, the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board (CPP Investments), and the Public Sector Pension Investment Board (PSP Investments). It will build upon Canada’s economic developments of the , as the government seeks to diversify Canada’s economic relationships, attract foreign capital, and reduce the country’s historical dependence on the US. Yet this drive for investment raises two important questions: how prepared is Canada to protect the infrastructure and strategic assets that this investment will create, expand, and place under private ownership? And does Canada have the institutional guardrails to responsibly place constraints upon private entities?

The Question of Investment and Strategic Infrastructure

The question of foreign investment in strategic infrastructure and resources is particularly relevant given the Carney government’s growing interest in private investment in Canadian transportation infrastructure. The explicitly announced that the government would , alongside measures intended to attract . The same budget also identifies continued engagement with investors to increase private investment in .

The rationale for investment in this infrastructure is straightforward. Airports and ports are essential to Canada’s economic growth and trade diversification. . At the same time, airports facilitate the movement of high-value cargo and connect Canadian communities both domestically and to . These are attractive opportunities for private investment that will generate revenue for Canada, enabling the modernisation and development of this infrastructure, boosting trade efficiency, without increasing public debt.

In Canada, there are and . These airports and ports, managed by private not-for-profit local authorities, and . These are not merely economic assets; they sustain the livelihoods of approximately half a million Canadians while serving as critical infrastructure and strategic nodes of sovereignty. They facilitate the movement of people, goods, energy, information, and, when necessary, military and emergency resources. Their worth extends beyond their commercial value and contributes to the public good of Canadian society.

Canada’s move towards the privatisation of transportation infrastructure does not make it the first state to do so – that position would belong to the . In 1987, the United Kingdom’s Conservative government’s privatisation of airports successfully generated revenue for a while simultaneously offloading the cost of airport upgrades from the state onto private firms. However, private ownership quickly poorer working conditions and lower pay for the thousands of employees.

In Canada in 2026, a similar pattern risks manifesting itself again: the auctioning off of infrastructure that provides a public service may occur at a discount price – much to the chagrin of private investors – while costs for services charged by these private entities may be able to escalate with no public accountability. Without state oversight, it may be more than solely price gouging that harms Canadians, but service interruption. If, through a callous calculation, a foreign-owned private entity decides to reduce service or even close an airport to maximise profits, this would be a corporate decision without government input or public accountability.

While the federal government may not be focused on the impact that privatisation could have upon the everyday lives of ordinary Canadians, the broader geopolitical realities of 2026 – characterised by a return to and , alongside a decline of American hegemony – make for a compelling case for the federal government to reconsider. The more Canada relies upon private and foreign capital to operate and develop these assets, the more important it becomes that the government establishes who is responsible for their security when a threat emerges. The core question to ask of the federal government is whether Canada’s security architecture and institutional capacity can keep pace with growing technological complexity and the change of ownership created by private investment.

This inquiry strikes at a weakness in Canadian governance: institutions are organised around jurisdictional responsibilities while the infrastructure and threats they must protect operate across those jurisdictions. Threats to critical infrastructure do not fit neatly within the pre-existing institutional mandates of the confederation. Radio-frequency interference, jamming, cyberattacks, hostile drones, physical intrusion, and other forms of disruption involve responsibilities spanning across institutional bodies such as (ISED), the (RCMP), the (DND), , and .

When a Threat Emerges, Who Responds?

Consider a hypothetical incident at a Canadian airport or marine port. A drone is detected approaching the facility, but its purpose is initially unknown. It may be a negligent operator, indicate criminal activity, surveillance of the facility, or something more nefarious. The distinction matters, but in the first few minutes, authorities may not have enough information to know what they are facing. The immediate problem is determining who has the authority and capability to respond while the nature of the threat is still being established.

This is particularly apparent as counter-drone systems rely upon radio-frequency interference or jamming. , and it states that the use of jammers is prohibited unless a ministerial exemption applies. Such exemptions have been granted to the , , and the . The result is a critical distinction between possessing counter-drone capability and possessing the authority to use it in a particular circumstance.

This critical distinction becomes more consequential when the infrastructure itself is privately operated. An airport or port operator may be the first to detect an intrusion and may have sophisticated security personnel and detection systems, but it does not possess the jurisdictional authority exercised by Canada’s institutional and legal bodies. Provincial or municipal police may be positioned to respond to an immediate criminal threat, but federal authorities possess jurisdiction over aviation, spectrum management, national security, and defence. The institution with the most appropriate capability may therefore not be the institution that can immediately employ it. But the first few minutes of a security incident have no respect for time nor institutional boundaries. A threat does not wait for federal, provincial, municipal, and private actors to determine whose mandate applies.

As Canada attracts private and foreign investment for critical infrastructure projects and investment, if a threat consequently emerges in the privately-owned scenario, this begs the question of who possesses both the authority and the capability to act immediately. If the answer depends upon transferring responsibility between multiple institutions before an effective response can begin, then the vulnerability is institutional. The challenge is to proactively determine who is responsible for detecting the threat, assessing it, who has authority to intervene, who possesses the necessary capability, and who assumes command. As strategic infrastructure becomes increasingly privately operated, these questions cannot be left unresolved.

Inconvenient Timing: Canada’s Policing Transition

Institutional fragmentation is becoming more consequential as Canada approaches a broader transition in the organisation of policing itself. identifies the modernisation of federal policing as an ongoing priority. At the same time, the federal government is preparing for the , which expire in . This approaching deadline is particularly important as policing responsibilities are already . and maintain their own provincial police services, while Canada’s eight other provinces and three territories contract out police services to the RCMP; but in recent years, the mandate of the RCMP is changing. In the city of Surrey, British Columbia, a has recently concluded.

Alberta provides perhaps the clearest example of where this trend could lead: the province has continued to consider the establishment of an , and the . These developments raise a question extending beyond ordinary policing, located at the core of Canadian federalism and problematising the privatisation of critical infrastructure: as provinces increasingly seek greater sovereignty and enhanced control over policing, who is ultimately responsible for protecting infrastructure that is provincially located, nationally significant, but privately owned?

Crucially, Alberta is home to infrastructure whose significance extends beyond provincial boundaries, particularly in the energy sector. If policing authority becomes increasingly provincial while infrastructure is increasingly privatized, responsibility for its protection becomes convoluted. This is further complicated by in greater provincial autonomy and potential separation, which could create additional uncertainty around the long-term governance of nationally significant infrastructure. At the same time, Alberta’s energy resources – identified as for the upcoming Canada Investment Summit –  and make the province particularly attractive to foreign private investment. While such investment can generate significant economic value, foreign ownership of strategically important energy and infrastructure assets can also create new dependencies and avenues for .

Alberta therefore provides a useful stress test for Canada’s emerging investment model: what happens when nationally significant infrastructure is provincially located, privately owned, attractive to foreign capital, and situated within a province increasingly questioning its relationship with Ottawa?

Invest if You Must, But Know Who Protects It

This highlights a tension at the heart of Canada’s investment strategy. The government is asking foreign and private investors to place capital into infrastructure that Canada considers essential to its economic sovereignty, while the frameworks governing the protection of that infrastructure remain unevenly distributed. Canada should therefore treat security governance as an essential component of its investment strategy rather than as a separate policy concern. Before encouraging significant private or foreign investment in airports, ports, telecommunications networks, energy infrastructure, critical-mineral supply chains, and other strategically important assets, Ottawa should ensure that there are clear lines of responsibility for their protection, establish mechanisms for interagency coordination, and clearly define the responsibilities of respective authorities for responding to emerging threats.

The renegotiation of the Police Service Agreements ahead of their 2032 expiry provides an opportunity to address this problem at the federal level. Ottawa and the provinces should clarify how provincial, municipal, and federal policing authorities will coordinate when locally situated infrastructure has national-security implications. Canada cannot build economic sovereignty merely by diversifying who provides capital. It must ensure that the infrastructure built with that capital remains secure, resilient, and subject to a clear Canadian security architecture. Canada should therefore enter this new era of investment with a simple principle: before deciding who will own or finance strategic infrastructure, Canada must know who will be responsible for protecting it.

But the question of who protects infrastructure is only one part of the larger challenge. Canada must also ask who operates it, who maintains it, who regulates it, who works within it, and who ensures that essential services continue when normal systems are disrupted. A resilient nation cannot rely upon conventional security capabilities while allowing the social and institutional foundations of resilience to erode.

Economic sovereignty requires investment. Conventional security requires protection. But national resilience requires both to be built alongside the public goods and institutions that allow Canadian society to withstand disruption.