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Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s as leader of the Liberal party in response to growing political and public pressure comes at a crucial time for Canada, both domestically and internationally. Donald Trump’ss have forced Trudeau’s government to regroup and select a leader to counter the Conservatives in the next election and push back against Trump’s protectionist trade agenda.

These dynamics set the stage for intensified competition between two front- runners, former Finance (and Foreign) Minister and Conservative party leader.

The race is now Polievre’s to win, , his party carries a commanding lead over the liberals. Poilievre, has stated that a response to Trump’s tariffs would require working with “” to put pressure on Washington to back down. Poilievre is opposed to retaliatory tariffs that would impact Canada’s petroleum industry, arguing that Canadat. To his thinking, Trump would then be compelled to buy oil from countries such as Venezuela and Iran.

When he does dip a toe into broader foreign policy it is hawkish. Back in October, Poilievre said that an Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities would be, in his words, “,” a position more extreme than that held by many members of the U.S. Congress.

Like the new President in the White House Poilievre has consistently opposed, such as the carbon tax, and, like Trump, he is enthusiastic about fossil fuel exports. He has been critical of work related to corporate interests that is not conducive to the exploitation of energy and real estate while the core issues are the decline of Canadian innovation and competitiveness including investments in and where the country is lagging.

Poilievre’s populist approach to small government and divisiveness to the last Conservative prime minister, Stephen Harper. Harper reduced Canada’s presence in multilateral institutions while extolling the virtues of becoming a “.”

As Foreign Minister, Freeland did not play any s. Nor did she provide guidance on how Canada could when it was most. Canada failed to secure free trade agreements with both, while also losing a seat on.

Today, Canada’s foreign policy positions and policies have become of US interests, whether these pertain to regime challenges in ,and , sanctioning geopolitical rivals and or more recently implementing a common . There are of course some exceptions, such as Canada’s long- standing opposition to the U.S. embargo on.

This lack of independent diplomatic engagement comes at a time when America is either withdrawing from or scaling back its contributions to key organizations and global compacts such as the World Health Organization, the Paris Climate Agreement, the United Nations, and the World Trade Organization.

Today, Canada’s foreign policy establishment finds itself desperately playing catch- up to an ambitious Trump agenda, coming to terms with the fact that its southern neighbor, which Freeland described as the,” is now in a position to inflict on the Canadian economy.

As Finance Minister, Freeland chose a particular strategy, post-COVID, to more the Canadian economy with the U.S. through “,” while at the same time committing Canada to in support of delinking from China in favor of building “F.”

Freeland has been openly critical of Donald Trump which did not help Canada’s cause during the CUSMA negotiations. Although continues to play well domestically, the . Canadian perceptions of Trump’s threats of as distinctly anti-Canadian, overlook their roots in broader U.S. self-interest that existed

For example, within the G7, the U.S. share of wealth over the last 20 years has risen significantly from 33% to over 55%. This shift drives foreign investment toward the U.S., to the detriment of other G7 nations, including Canada. The . Over the past two decades, the BRICS economies have grown to match G7 economies in global GDP share.

At the same time, Canada’s GDP per capita has declined relative to the U.S. Regional supply chains tied to America have increased dependency, but fail to address Canada’s weak manufacturing base and l. Despite promises to leverage immigration for growth, Canada struggles to retain, marking a of economic policy.

In a nutshell, there are some obvious and important distinctions between Pierre Poilievre and Chrystia Freeland. But there are also some very significant and . Indeed, the diplomatic approach taken by both individuals is likely to be more of the same in on defense and security.

One overlooked question, is whether a Canadian Prime Minister will act as a for a Trump administration that has the potential to become bellicose and divisive. On the one hand, Trump has signaled a mixed message of bringing restraint to U.S. foreign policy, by ending its forever wars, a goal Joe Biden proved incapable of reaching.

A positive shift from Trump could become an opportunity for Canada to renew its developing agenda better matched to the realities of a more polycentric and regional world involving the U.S. and its allies.

On the other hand, there is the close-knit relationship between neo-conservative U.S. elites and whose opinions on China, Iran, and Russia are , and the support and endorsements political leaders like Freeland and Poilievre from these t and elites.

Canada’s next Prime Minister must take Canada towards self-assured and more statecraft. If Trump stays true to his promise of ending it is not at all clear that Pierre Poilievre and Chrystia Freeland are up to this challenge because of their close ties to American thato over shared responsibility.

Unlike Pierre Poilievre whose capacity for responsible statecraft is untested , Chrystia Freeland has shown a , in contrast to engaging in real with those adversaries. Not only does reflect a zero-sum framing and a pack mentality that rewards ideology and Manichaean thinking, it is also inherently

David Carment

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U.S.-Russia Proxy War in Ukraine Is a Case of Deterrence Failure

cuthemeedtr5 — Sun, 29 Dec 2024 12:55:56 +0000

U.S.-Russia Proxy War in Ukraine Is a Case of Deterrence Failure

Published on September 12, 2026

Time to read: 9 minutes

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U.S.-Russia Proxy War in Ukraine Is a Case of Deterrence Failure

decision to allow Ukraine to strike deep within Russia using advanced American missile technology is but the latest step in the ladder. Vladimir Putin has stated such actions would place Russia with NATO. Biden’s risky decision is symptomatic of a larger set of problems related to deterrence failure and the absence of in a multipolar world. Adding to the complexity, , including its proposed deployment of advanced missile systems to Belarus, signals a significant escalation in technological capabilities that undermine traditional .

Deterrence has long been the cornerstone of international security. Yet, in a multipolar world, where power is fragmented and alliances shift unpredictably, maintaining its effectiveness is increasingly complex and difficult. This does not mean that multipolarity and deterrence are incompatible. Rather new strategies of deterrence must be developed, that are consistent with today’s gray zone conflict environment characterised by

The foundational works of political scientists such as and explain how in a multipolar system, power asymmetries and shifting alliances form and dissolve rapidly. These shifts create uncertainty about the strength and resolve of adversaries, making it harder to assess risks accurately. Stronger states are less deterred by weaker adversaries, further emboldening aggression. In addition, technological advancements like , including the innovative and deadly , make threat escalation strategies even more tempting. Near-zero-miss technologies blur the lines between strategic doctrine, while emerging capabilities like (EMP) weapons and pose challenges in terms of broader military strategy and tactics.

Alliance Entrapment and Absence of a Shared Strategy

In today’s , significant shifts in the balance of power seldom result from military conquest. Put differently, while major powers continue to rely heavily on their conventional armed forces, they often fall short of achieving their overarching geopolitical . Examples of these shortcomings are evident in instances such as the U.S. military intervention in in 2001, in 2003, and Libya in 2011, as well as Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine in 2022.

One of the difficulties in gauging U.S., NATO, and EU resolve in confronting Russia — which ultimately resulted in a move from a deterrence position, to , to a proxy war — lies in the and the that each member in the North Atlantic alliance assigns to particular goals. Not to mention, their (un)willingness to bear and share in the and costs of a specific action (such as the continued arming of Ukraine) that they did not particularly choose.

A related impediment is simply the within any alliance coalition regarding the primary end goal and the actions that are to be prioritized. As the strongest member and leading party in the North Atlantic alliance, the United States believes that all other member states must follow its lead in opposing Russia, having very little regard for others’ . Other states, such as Poland and the UK, meanwhile, are far more hawkish than Washington, even courting with Russia — although for different reasons. Still others, like Turkey and Hungary, have chosen to pursue a more balanced and multi-aligned strategy so as to not unnecessarily antagonize Moscow. Through various provocations and escalatory tactics — often coordinated with Kyiv — the more bellicose states in the former camp have effectively the more reluctant nations in the latter group as well as those in the middle like Germany into a proxy war with Russia with no clear diplomatic solution in sight. In this way by more belligerent NATO members has contributed to the rapid escalation of the conflict both vertically in terms of intensity and horizontally in terms of geographic spread and across domains.

Bad Policy

To make matters worse, Washington’s Ukraine policy under President Biden has suffered from inconsistency and incoherence. Biden’s foreign policy team under former Hilary Clinton advisors Anthony Blinken, Jake Sullivan, and Toria Nuland came into office intent on against both Russia and China. With regard to Russia, these resented how the Ukraine crisis was handled under Presidents Obama and Trump. In line with Neoconservative Republicans like Lindsey Graham and Ted Cruz, not only did Blinken and company, view tolerance for Russia’s pre-emptive takeover of Crimea as unacceptable, they were also concerned about deeper economic between West-Central Europe (i.e. Germany) and Russia.

U.S. objection against Europe-Russia interdependence was most evident in the Biden administration’s stated goal of terminating Nord Stream II. Thus, even before Moscow’s “special military operation” against Kyiv in the winter of 2022, the Biden administration sought to Russia through increasing economic sanctions almost immediately after coming to power in 2020.

Coercive actions such as economic sanctions fall outside direct military confrontation. They constitute the “gray zone” of major power conflict. In gray zone conflicts, states rely on low-intensity — such as propaganda and information warfare, sanctions, use of ideological or identity-based non-state actors, as well as cyber space and social media — to achieve . Weaponizing the gray zone can often lead to .

Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict

For example, in the Russia-Ukraine war, ethnic dynamics play a significant role in the conflict. Russia’s justification for its actions often centers on reclaiming territories like Crimea and the Donbas, where it and Russian-speaking populations. From Russia’s perspective, the risks of acting now are outweighed by the potential long-term consequences of inaction, such as permanently losing control over Crimea and the Donbas to Ukraine. Over time, intensifying ethnic divisions in Ukraine, particularly in the Donbas region, became a in Russia’s decision to intervene. Moscow framed its actions as a to from alleged threats posed by far-right Ukrainian nationalists. However, this narrative served more as a strategic aims, including maintaining influence over Ukraine and countering its shift toward Western alliances. In this context, both Kyiv and Moscow saw war as a means to resolve the security dilemma created by Ukraine’s geopolitical realignment. For Russia, intervention offered a chance to secure its strategic objectives without needing prolonged military preparation, while a weak Ukraine sought to and resist Russian aggression.

Lure of Escalation

A key aspect of the breakdown in deterrence between Russia and the U.S. is the appeal of the logic of escalation to both sides. Although the threat of escalation and higher cost is supposed to motivate both sides to to military conflict and compromise at the negotiating table, both Moscow and Washington repeatedly find themselves in a game of chicken, trying to demonstrate their superior ability to tolerate the ever higher risks and costs of conflict.

As costly and problematic as this might be for each side, the outcome could be even worse as the process is not controlled and is mired with uncertainty. Indeed, the more escalatory spirals are repeated in an uncoordinated setting, the higher the probability of a disastrous outcome eventually occurring. Coordination and engagement regarding “red lines” are key to stable relations between rival powers. Failures of deterrence ultimately stem from failures in coordination and communication.

The change in U.S. policy under Biden to confront Russia through increasingly escalatory gray zone strategies was a major contributing factor to the Ukraine war. For example, in the lead-up to the Russian intervention in 2022, there were 3,000 close-contact between U.S. and Russian forces. These flashpoints, some of which were deliberately escalatory, created room for military accidents, miscalculations, and errors. If Russia’s responses were indeed based on crossed ‘red lines’, then the advanced military equipment and training supplied by the West only made Russia’s intervention in 2022 more likely.

Absence of Strategic Empathy

Another important cause of deterrence breakdown is the absence of strategic empathy. Strategic empathy is necessary to avoid or remedy basic errors in analyzing an adversary’s behavior. Misunderstandings, biases, and faulty assumptions can result in poor analysis leading to heightened tensions. offers a way to counter such missteps, making it crucial for accurately interpreting adversary actions and calibrating responses. Strategic empathy requires a cognitive shift: simulating or imagining another’s experience, mindset, and . Unfortunately, what has guided U.S. strategy on Russia, so far, is driven by thinking. Indeed, the U.S. foreign policy establishment has committed attributing Russia’s behavior to , a and even Putin’s rather than to situational and geopolitical factors. As a result, Washington and its allies have systematically underestimated their own role in provoking a Russian response and the wider war that has ensued.

One critical conceptual shift that must occur within the transatlantic security community is the recognition that competing great powers like Russia are no longer adversaries that can be decisively defeated; instead, they must be constructively and . Such an understanding is crucial for avoiding the pitfalls , the and that the policy of absolute victory entails. Deterrence, as a strategy, aims instead to dissuade adversaries from taking hostile actions by convincing them that the costs or consequences of such actions would outweigh any potential benefits. This is achieved through the credible threat of retaliation or punishment, rather than seeking their total destruction and elimination as geopolitical competitors through decisive victory.

Conclusion

In practical terms, policies that seek the total defeat of enemies typically not only demand the decisive and to attain specific objectives to undermine the adversary, they also . Such strategies prioritize military preparedness, force modernization, and operational planning to ensure the capability to secure victory in conflict scenarios and the . But they come at a much higher , especially when involving nuclear powers.

While diplomacy may still play a role in these strategies, it often with the actual adversary and focuses instead on international and garnering . Not only does exclusion that rewards ideology and thinking, it is also inherently risky and destabilizing. Furthermore, exclusion may not even be feasible and practical in today’s highly geopolitical, interest-based, and .

Conversely, policies centered on improving deterrence strategies better match of a more polycentric and regional world by constant wars involving the U.S.. Traditional deterrence strategies prioritize the maintenance of a credible and strong military, having both robust defensive and offensive capabilities. However, in today’s conflict environment deterrence must equally prioritise diplomacy, negotiation, and the establishment of clear communication channels with rivals and adversaries to manage gray zone conflict effectively and to mitigate the risk of misperception or miscalculation.

emphasizes the complementary , seeking to harmonize rather than oppose these forces. Central to this shift is the process of weaning the U.S. and its allies off institutions deeply rooted in unrestrained and . This transformation requires fundamental changes in the mandates and purposes of core —including diplomatic, foreign aid, intelligence, and defense departments—that have repeatedly demonstrated i in foreign interventions and war fighting .

David Carment and Dani Belo

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Foreign Interference in a Geopolitical Context: Transnational Linkages, Diaspora Mobilisation and Grey Zone Conflict

cuthemeedtr5 — Tue, 03 Sep 2024 14:38:28 +0000

Foreign Interference in a Geopolitical Context: Transnational Linkages, Diaspora Mobilisation and Grey Zone Conflict

Published on September 12, 2026

Time to read: 1 minutes

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Foreign Interference in a Geopolitical Context PIFI Submission

The threat of foreign interference continues to grow and evolve as the geopolitical structure of the world changes. Canada is often targeted by adversaries, and allies, who seek to advance their interests through transnational means, such as mobilising diaspora groups and hybrid tactics. These actions are typically not considered a type of open warfare, but they are efforts to both influence and interfere in a country’s internal economic and political processes. As we know, democratic states, like Canada, cannot guarantee complete immunity from interference without becoming the enemies of their own open societies. To make open societies fully resistant to harmful influences would render them closed societies. At the same time, the risks that interference poses from both friend and foe should not be an excuse to foreclose on opportunities for growth and investment. Canada is, ultimately, a trading nation and, as a middle power, has a degree of agency that should be fully exploited to advance economic and political opportunities. The desire for a strong, secure Canada need not undermine the country’s competitiveness and productivity.

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