Friend or Faux? Managing the End of the “Special Relationship”
Published in Hill Times Friend or Faux
Friend or Faux? Managing the End of the “Special Relationship”
Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s as leader of the Liberal party in response to growing political and public pressure comes at a crucial time for Canada, both domestically and internationally. Donald Trump’ss have forced Trudeau’s government to regroup and select a leader to counter the Conservatives in the next election and push back against Trump’s protectionist trade agenda.
These dynamics set the stage for intensified competition between two front- runners, former Finance (and Foreign) Minister and Conservative party leader.
The race is now Polievre’s to win, , his party carries a commanding lead over the liberals. Poilievre, has stated that a response to Trump’s tariffs would require working with “” to put pressure on Washington to back down. Poilievre is opposed to retaliatory tariffs that would impact Canada’s petroleum industry, arguing that Canadat. To his thinking, Trump would then be compelled to buy oil from countries such as Venezuela and Iran.
When he does dip a toe into broader foreign policy it is hawkish. Back in October, Poilievre said that an Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities would be, in his words, “,” a position more extreme than that held by many members of the U.S. Congress.
Like the new President in the White House Poilievre has consistently opposed, such as the carbon tax, and, like Trump, he is enthusiastic about fossil fuel exports. He has been critical of work related to corporate interests that is not conducive to the exploitation of energy and real estate while the core issues are the decline of Canadian innovation and competitiveness including investments in and where the country is lagging.
Poilievre’s populist approach to small government and divisiveness to the last Conservative prime minister, Stephen Harper. Harper reduced Canada’s presence in multilateral institutions while extolling the virtues of becoming a “.”
As Foreign Minister, Freeland did not play any s. Nor did she provide guidance on how Canada could when it was most. Canada failed to secure free trade agreements with both, while also losing a seat on.
Today, Canada’s foreign policy positions and policies have become of US interests, whether these pertain to regime challenges in ,and , sanctioning geopolitical rivals and or more recently implementing a common . There are of course some exceptions, such as Canada’s long- standing opposition to the U.S. embargo on.
This lack of independent diplomatic engagement comes at a time when America is either withdrawing from or scaling back its contributions to key organizations and global compacts such as the World Health Organization, the Paris Climate Agreement, the United Nations, and the World Trade Organization.
Today, Canada’s foreign policy establishment finds itself desperately playing catch- up to an ambitious Trump agenda, coming to terms with the fact that its southern neighbor, which Freeland described as the,” is now in a position to inflict on the Canadian economy.
As Finance Minister, Freeland chose a particular strategy, post-COVID, to more the Canadian economy with the U.S. through “,” while at the same time committing Canada to in support of delinking from China in favor of building “F.”
Freeland has been openly critical of Donald Trump which did not help Canada’s cause during the CUSMA negotiations. Although continues to play well domestically, the . Canadian perceptions of Trump’s threats of as distinctly anti-Canadian, overlook their roots in broader U.S. self-interest that existed
For example, within the G7, the U.S. share of wealth over the last 20 years has risen significantly from 33% to over 55%. This shift drives foreign investment toward the U.S., to the detriment of other G7 nations, including Canada. The . Over the past two decades, the BRICS economies have grown to match G7 economies in global GDP share.
At the same time, Canada’s GDP per capita has declined relative to the U.S. Regional supply chains tied to America have increased dependency, but fail to address Canada’s weak manufacturing base and l. Despite promises to leverage immigration for growth, Canada struggles to retain, marking a of economic policy.
In a nutshell, there are some obvious and important distinctions between Pierre Poilievre and Chrystia Freeland. But there are also some very significant and . Indeed, the diplomatic approach taken by both individuals is likely to be more of the same in on defense and security.
One overlooked question, is whether a Canadian Prime Minister will act as a for a Trump administration that has the potential to become bellicose and divisive. On the one hand, Trump has signaled a mixed message of bringing restraint to U.S. foreign policy, by ending its forever wars, a goal Joe Biden proved incapable of reaching.
A positive shift from Trump could become an opportunity for Canada to renew its developing agenda better matched to the realities of a more polycentric and regional world involving the U.S. and its allies.
On the other hand, there is the close-knit relationship between neo-conservative U.S. elites and whose opinions on China, Iran, and Russia are , and the support and endorsements political leaders like Freeland and Poilievre from these t and elites.
Canada’s next Prime Minister must take Canada towards self-assured and more statecraft. If Trump stays true to his promise of ending it is not at all clear that Pierre Poilievre and Chrystia Freeland are up to this challenge because of their close ties to American thato over shared responsibility.
Unlike Pierre Poilievre whose capacity for responsible statecraft is untested , Chrystia Freeland has shown a , in contrast to engaging in real with those adversaries. Not only does reflect a zero-sum framing and a pack mentality that rewards ideology and Manichaean thinking, it is also inherently
David Carment