Developing International Implications of the Ukraine War ­– by Robert Eales

Internationally, Western and allied nations consistently operate to aggressively support the defence of Ukraine in the name of promoting and protecting the sacred concept of sovereignty critical to the stable functioning of the Liberal International Order (LIO). Conversely, many countries within the Global South, a dividing international geopolitical term that groups former Cold War-era non-aligned – and often historically colonial – states, primarily advocate for diverging diplomatic approaches, variably shifting invasion blames to multiple parties and thereby indirectly legitimising Russian aggression. Such ill-defined and incoherent grandiose diplomatic plans, as proposed by Global South countries and other non-traditional international actors, are predominantly focussed on countering the United States’ and West’s geopolitical dominance, rather than suggesting good-faith attempts to aid Ukraine’s defence or restore regional stability.[1]

An example of this somewhat-nefarious phenomenon is Brazil’s recent call for Ukraine to compromise with Russia and accept partial defeat in the form of territorial concessions in order to end the conflict, and for an international clique of pre-selected Global South actors, primarily of BRICS – a lose counter-Western international organisation composed of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa – origin, to oversee the peace process.[2] Such a coalition explicitly excludes Western nations in a status-driven posturing attempt to advance Brazilian and BRICS nations’ own geopolitical relevancies at the expense of Ukraine and the LIO.[3]

This divisionary trend will continue to define future geopolitics as the Cold War-era non-aligned movement returns to the international mainstream. As seen via Sweden and Finland’s recent decisive moves to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the organisation and broader Western community are presently experiencing a uniting period of galvanisation and unity, drawing an end to the past two decades’ identity crisis, while parts of the rest of the world arguably drift into more fractured circumstances.[4] Furthermore, due to the flawed nature of United Nations inaction at the start of the invasion, mainly due to the Russian role in the Security Council, the institution’s reputation and broader legitimacy have been irreparably harmed, negatively reflecting upon the rules-based LIO.[5]

Concluding the revived Cold War theme: European and Western nations, as well as other close international observers, have become, and will continue to be, significantly warier of economic and resource dependency with potentially-hostile adversarial powers. Instead, conscious policy shifts will prioritise immediate national security concerns over traditionally-established economic-oriented globalisation goals. This sweeping trend is currently unfolding in the form of deliberate future-oriented decoupling agendas pursued between the US and China, and between EU nations and Russia.[6]

[1] Krickovic, Andrej, and Richard Sakwa. “War in Ukraine: The Clash of Norms and Ontologies.” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 22, no. 2 (2022).

[2] “Will Brazil’s Plan for Peace Talks on Ukraine Take Root?” The Dialogue. Accessed April 10, 2023. https://www.thedialogue.org/analysis/will-brazils-plan-for-peace-talks-on-ukraine-take-root/.

[3] Prange, Astrid. “A New World Order? BRICS Nations Offer Alternative to West – DW – 04/10/2023.” dw.com. Deutsche Welle, April 10, 2023. https://www.dw.com/en/a-new-world-order-brics-nations-offer-alternative-to-west/a-65124269.

[4] Forsberg, Tuomas. “Finland and Sweden’s Road to NATO.” Current History 122, no. 842 (2023): 89-94.

[5] Sayapin, Sergey. “Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: a test for international law.” Nature Human Behaviour 6, no. 6 (2022): 768-770.

[6] Garcia-Herrero, Alicia. “Slowbalisation in the Context of US-China Decoupling.” Intereconomics 57, no. 6 (2022): 352-358.

Robert Eales is a Global and International Studies (BGInS) undergraduate student, ĐÓ°ÉÔ­´´ University

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Annexation of Chernobyl – by Sean Coombs

In the first days of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, the capital Kyiv was in full sight of the Russian invaders. Due to the propagandist’s demands that Kyiv be taken in three days, the invaders were progressing at full speed to overwhelm the Ukrainian capital. However, one stumbling block that lay between the invaders and the capital was the infamous nuclear exclusion zone surrounding Chernobyl, an area so ubiquitous in modern culture that it needs no explanation. This exclusion zone was a factor that the invaders underestimated to put it lightly, and it can be argued that their follies within the zone spelled the beginning of the end for their offensive.

The annexation of the exclusion zone by the invaders was completed relatively quickly, as like many Ukrainian areas bordering Belarus, it wasn’t adequately safeguarded from invasion. The invaders, many of whom were unfamiliar with the risks associated with radiation, soon fashioned the exclusion zone into a forwarding base for supplies and troops. The staff at the Chernobyl nuclear plant were violently subjugated, abandoned apartment buildings were made into temporary accommodations, and invaders dug trenches in the fields and valleys of the zone without wearing any sort of protective equipment.

Very soon and quite predictably, things started going wrong for the invaders in the exclusion zone. Radiation readings and air samples within the exclusion zone began to rise dramatically to dangerous levels, as the masses of invading tanks, trucks, and troops kicked up decades worth of radioactive dust that the invaders were unaware of.

Troops digging trenches ignored warning signs and came into contact with highly radioactive water and soil deposits, with many of those troops soon succumbing to severe radiation sickness.

Reports show that emergency medical flights from the Belarus border to Moscow were soon after conducted. The sickened troops were sent to the very same Moscow radiation hospital where Chernobyl survivors were treated in 1986, which is ironic considering that unlike the survivors, the invading troops had willingly exposed themselves to radiation while ignoring the warnings put in place by Ukrainians.

Due to the mass numbers of troops being sickened within the exclusion zone, the invading Russian offensive in the region was considerably weakened as a result.

And thus only a few weeks later, the exclusion zone and the entire north of the Kyiv region were liberated after a complete collapse of Russian forces. While the events in the exclusion zone may only be a small component of the failures of the Russian invaders, the reasons why so many troops were sickened are telling of what battle tactics they used.

Sources

“Unprotected Russian Soldiers Disturbed Radioactive Dust in Chernobyl’s ‘Red Forest’, Workers Say.” Reuters, March 29, 2022.

.

Marder, Michael. “What Did the Russians Dig up When They Dug Trenches in Chernobyl? .” Aeon, November 11, 2022.

Peter, Laurence. “Ukraine War: Chernobyl Scarred by Russian Troops’ Damage and Looting.” BBC News, June 3, 2022. .

Sean Coombs is a Journalism undergraduate student, ĐÓ°ÉÔ­´´ University

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The Western Will and Ability to Continue Aiding Ukraine – by Robert Eales

Arguably significantly fuelling Ukraine’s defence against the Russian invasion are the unprecedented levels of lethal aid provided by the Western world, which ballooned last month to total $111 billion from the United States (US) and €52 billion from combined European Union (EU) member contributions.[i] This assistance has proven instrumental in Ukraine’s defence and directly correlates with Russian battlefield losses. Although the sustained provision of such assistance is presently vastly politically popular across the Western world and set to continue for the near future, many prominent vocal individuals criticise the importance of investing in Ukrainian sovereignty, particularly those in the US: The nation that has spearheaded aid contributions to Ukraine by providing more assistance than every other nation combined.[ii]

Based on present political rhetoric, should an aid-critic, such as isolationist-oriented right-wing Republican candidates Trump or DeSantis, triumph in the crucial upcoming 2024 US Presidential Election, US foreign policy could be forced to endure foundational alterations resulting in the de-prioritisation of supporting the defence of Ukraine. This would be a tangible shift that could see the first nail of defeat hammered in Ukraine’s looming proverbial coffin. The extent of this hypothetical and predictive policy change, and the resulting effects upon Ukraine’s military performance, remain to be observed. However, due to the current overwhelmingly-effective results of US aid donations, it may be compelling to establish that such an outcome would drastically harm Ukrainian defence capabilities and severely hinder the struggling nation’s ability to persevere.[iii]

Outside the US, the last month has seen numerous well-attended anti-lethal aid demonstrations throughout the Western world, most recently in Berlin and Halifax, the rising popularity of which establishes another legitimate, this time left-wing-oriented, population opposed to aiding Ukraine’s defence.[iv] Such protests are usually pacifist and peace-oriented in nature, but pander to Russian propaganda claims by blaming multiple parties equally for contributing to the Russian invasion and perpetuating the war.[v]

When coupling this threatening potential scenario with the realities of the West’s rapidly-depleting military stockpiles and presently-brewing, and long-predicted, munitions manufacturing shortages and supply chain hiccups, the Ukraine War becomes more multi-dimensional than many casual observers have been led to believe.[vi] To complement this cocktail of compounding obstacles, many experts argue that Russia has merely scraped at the tip of the vast Cold War-era Soviet stockpiles, located in innumerable warehouses and bases scattered across the former Soviet Union.[vii] Furthermore, Russia has experienced significant success re-fielding ex-Soviet military material and in transitioning to a total war-like economy, while the West remains incapable of full commitment due to global and regional escalatory security concerns and is facing severe munitions manufacturing and supply chain concerns, as well as the possibility of wavering domestic political appetites.[viii] Each of these factors hints that the Western role in the Ukraine War is far from its final form, and will need to be expanded and enhanced if the defending nation is to achieve victory in the face of Russian onslaught.

[i] “How Much Aid Has the U.S. Sent Ukraine? Here Are Six Charts.” Council on Foreign Relations, 2023.

[ii] Antezza, Arianna, AndrĂŠ Frank, Pascal Frank, Lukas Franz, Ivan Kharitonov, Bharath Kumar, Ekaterina Rebinskaya, and Christoph Trebesch. The Ukraine Support Tracker: Which Countries Help Ukraine and How?. No. 2218. KIEL working paper, 2022.

[iii] Jaeger, Markus. “Why America Won’t Turn to Isolationism.” German Council on Foreign Relations, 2022.

[iv] Arif, Hafsa. “Anti-War Protesters in Halifax Urge Canadian Government to End Military Aid to Ukraine.” Atlantic. CTV News, February 26, 2023.

[v] “Thousands Protest in Berlin against Giving Weapons to Ukraine.” The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, February 25, 2023.

[vi] Schifrin, Nick, and Dan Sagalyn. “Arms Manufacturers Struggle to Supply Ukraine with Enough Ammunition.” PBS. Public Broadcasting Service, March 10, 2023.

[vii] “WSJ News Exclusive | Ukraine War Is Depleting U.S. Ammunition Stockpiles, Sparking Pentagon Concern.” The Wall Street Journal. Dow Jones & Company, August 30, 2022.

[viii] PÉRIA-PEIGNÉ, LĂŠo. “Military Stockpiles: A Life-Insurance Policy in a High-Intensity Conflict?” French Institute of International Relations No. 113 (2022).

Robert Eales is a Global and International Studies (BGInS) undergraduate student, ĐÓ°ÉÔ­´´ University

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New-Technologies: Drones Above Ukraine – by Calum McPhee

The contemporary battlefield is defined by advances in technology (Jones et. al 2022, 34). This is no different for the War in Ukraine; at no point in history has warfighting been more digitally-networked, precise, and intelligent (United States Air Force Research 2005, 6). While this takes many forms, the spotlight often falls on the Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA), or drone. In the War in Ukraine, drones are used as an inexpensive, effective, and versatile asset to enable, observe and fight every stage of the conflict to-date.

The War in Ukraine is a snap-shot of a new era of drone usage of interstate conflict (Jones et. al 2022, 5). The stepping-stones were laid during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 2020. Azerbaijan was able to decisively employ Turkish-supplied Bayraktar TB-2 and Israeli drones against Armenia which drastically influenced the course of the war (Jones et. al 2022, 11-12). Prior to this, modern drone usage was costly and primarily limited to great powers in asymmetric conflicts, such US counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan and Syria (Jones et. al 2022, v). While unmanned vehicles had been involved in conflict since as early as the late 20th century, the concept of a medium to high altitude digitally-networked and armed drone is a uniquely 21st century practice (United States Air Force Research 2005, 6).

Russia’s usage of drones in Ukraine consists of intelligence-collection, electronic warfare and kinetic-strike capability, i.e. lethal force. The collection of intelligence — such as taking photos, intercepting cell-phone traffic, or other forms of electronic-emissions — directly enables all aspects of the Russian war effort in Ukraine (Asymmetric Warfare Group 2017, 26-28). This manifests predominantly through the Reconnaissance Strike Complex, or the “…coordinated employment of high-precision, long range weapons linked to real-time intelligence data and accurate targeting.” (Jones et. al 2022, 19). Through this, drones feed information to artillery which is then able to accurately fire upon a target. This offers several advantages, predominantly it is performed rapidly and remotely without risk to personnel. Drone usage in this fashion allows for strikes well beyond the frontline, such as an attack on the International Center for Peacekeeping and Security near Lviv in 2022 (Bachega 2022).

Ukraine operates drones in a similar fashion with an increasingly diverse pool of foreign-supplied assets (Jones et. al 2022, 40-44). Much like Azerbaijan, Ukraine has utilized Turkish drones with great effect including in the sinking of the Moskva, flag-ship of the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BBC 2022). The War in Ukraine has equally shown degrees of improvisation in drone technology such as commercial-off-the-shelf quad-copter style drones fitted with explosives (Asymmetric Warfare Group 2017, 28). Drones additionally offer a counter to air-defenses as the loss of a drone is far more palatable than manned fighter-aircraft (Jones et. al 2022, 14-15).

Drones in Ukraine are but a case-study in the rapidly evolving way of war. Even as a microcosm, drone usage has evolved significantly since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. With promises of newer and more capable systems to Ukraine, there are no signs of stopping (Jones et. al 2022, 32-24).  The trickle-down proliferation of drone systems to regional and localized powers is but a new standard of how war will be fought in the coming decades of the 21st century.

Bibliography

 Bachega, Hugo. “Ukraine War: ‘Sky Turned Red’ as Missiles Hit Lviv Military Base.” BBC News. March 13, 2022. . Accessed 7 Feb. 2023.

“How Are ‘Kamikaze’ Drones Being Used by Russia and Ukraine?” BBC News. January 3, 2023. . Accessed 7 Feb. 2023.

Jones, Seth G., Jake Harrington, Christopher K. Reid, and Matthew Strohmeyer. “Combined Arms Warfare and Unmanned Aircraft Systems.” Center for Strategic and International Studies. Rowman & Littlefield, November 10, 2022. .

Asymmetric Warfare Group. “(U//FOUO) Asymmetric Warfare Group Russian New Generation Warfare Handbook: Public Intelligence.” Public Intelligence, September 18, 2017. .

United States Air Force Research. “The U.S. Air Force Remotely Piloted Aircraft and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Strategic Vision.”. University of Nebraska – Lincoln, 2005 n.d. .

Calum McPhee is a second year undergraduate student in the Bachelor of Global and International Studies, ĐÓ°ÉÔ­´´ University.

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The Realities and Survival Strategies of Evacuated Universities in Ukraine – by Dr. Milana Nikolko in conversation with Dr. Illia Kononov

Part 1. 2014 – 2022

War is bringing enormous stress to people and social institutions, changing the lives of millions forever. Among many victims of Russian aggression were Ukrainian universities and, in some cases, this dreadful experience of the war and forced relocation first appeared in 2014 and once again was repeated in 2022, but with much more devastating consequences. During the war, universities may also be targeted for attack or destruction (Kharkiv University in 2022), leading to damage or destruction of buildings, equipment, and educational materials. This results in the loss of valuable resources, as well as the disruption of academic programs, leading to damage or destruction of buildings, equipment, and educational materials. Furthermore, the social and political instability that often accompanies times of war can lead to divisions within university communities and a breakdown of trust and cooperation between students, faculty, and administration and mass migration.

The life on of T. Shevchenko Luhansk National University was first dramatically shaken during the winter of 2014. The regular university routine was disrupted by Euromaidan when the university public was divided into two camps, some students and professors were in support of Revolution of Dignity, others were frightened and didn’t feel connected to the event. With growing separatism and the appearance of military personnel without insignia on streets of Luhansk, the university community was disoriented, many felt abandoned and lost. That year the university term was shorter than usual, but the staff managed to complete the educational process, and many believed that the conflict would be over by the time of beginning of new term in the fall.

The summer of 2014 become a decisive moment for many professors and students. The front line was moving dramatically and in the beginning of the fall, the Ministry of Education issued an order to evacuate universities and other higher institutions from the un-controlled zone. The slow process of the evacuation can be explained by many factors, including the genuine hope among political elites of Ukraine to regain control over the territories of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts in short time, but also because of lack of funds, and specific administrative procedures. For example, Ukraine’s Ministry of Education would only issue an evacuation order once an initiative group of students, teachers and administrators had been set up at the university level that could take responsibility for the move.

All together sixteen universities and ten higher education institutes were relocated in 2014, and majority of them were starting their new chapter in Eastern part of Ukraine[1].  The Luhansk National University suffered dramatically from relocation, leaving behind the established material base, large campus and many students and professors.  During the summer 2014, the university “clone” occupied the campus in Luhansk and started to simulate the work under the separatist’s administration.

It took a long time for evacuated university to start a new life in Starobilsk. From 2014 to 2022 many new buildings, including dormitory for students and professors were erected and the educational process was finally getting back on track.

The brutality of Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 had much more severe consequences for Luhansk National University’s staff and students. This time evacuation was much more chaotic, the part of administration was evacuated, but many professors and students were left behind. The city of Starobilsk was occupied on March 02, less than ten days from the beginning of occupation.

[1] Pidgora, Nikita. 2017.Ukraine’s displaced universities. Source https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/ukraine-s-displaced-universities/

Dr. Milana Nikolko is an Adjunct Research Professor in the Institute of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, ĐÓ°ÉÔ­´´ University.

Dr. Illia Kononov is a Visiting Professor in the Institute of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, ĐÓ°ÉÔ­´´ University. 

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The Mriya and Ukrainian Aviation – by Sean Combs

The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine has had many damaging effects on sectors of the Ukrainian technology sector. From the destruction of factories to the hacking of websites, all faucets of Ukrainian innovation have suffered lasting damage at the hands of invading forces.

However, one sector of Ukrainian innovation that has suffered the most throughout this invasion has been the aviation sector, which has overall been decimated by air strikes and the closing of Ukrainian air space. One of the biggest losses that the Ukrainian aviation sector has suffered is the destruction of the AN-225 Mriya, which before the war was the world’s largest and most powerful aircraft. This aircraft was an invaluable and unique asset to the Ukrainian aviation industry and economy, as its unmatched payload capacity meant that it was the perfect aircraft for use in private and military operations. Without such an aircraft, the Ukrainian aviation sector faces a tough future ahead as its airspace continues to be closed and militarized.

However, there is some hope that the Ukrainian aviation sector will one day return to its former state. Ukrainian airlines such as Antonov Airlines, SkyUp, and Cavok Air have continued their operations by running charter flights outside of Ukraine, with their profits contributing to the Ukrainian economy as it tries to survive the war. Antonov Airlines in particular has surprisingly become one of the few Ukrainian businesses to turn a profit during the war, as sanctions against Russian airlines have made Antonov Airlines one of the only unsanctioned operators of large Soviet aircraft like the AN-124 Ruslan. Antonov Airlines have also become an effective propaganda tool for the Ukrainian government, which has renamed several Antonov Airlines aircrafts after Ukrainian cities.

Moreover, there is growing hope that the Mriya will take to the skies in the future. Alongside promises made by Antonov Airlines that an uncompleted version of the Mriya will begin to be assembled, Microsoft has recently announced the release of a virtual Mriya available to play on the popular Microsoft Flight Simulator game. All proceeds of the virtual Mriya will be put towards its reconstruction, and Ukrainian aviation fans have expressed hope that the Mriya’s legacy will live on despite the war.

However, no matter how much money is raised for the reconstruction of Mriya and the Ukrainian aviation industry, the war must end before all of that can happen.

Sources:

CNN, World’s largest plane destroyed in Ukraine, February 28, 2022. https://www.cnn.com/travel/article/antonov-an-225-largest-plane-destroyed-ukraine-scli-intl/index.html

Sean Coombs is a Journalism undergraduate student, ĐÓ°ÉÔ­´´ University

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The Environmental Costs of War – by Robert Eales

Resulting in tens of thousands of casualties and millions of refugees, decimated economies and damaged infrastructure, alongside nuclear threats amid risky international interventions, the currently-ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine is the largest and most destructive continental conflict in generations. Direct and indirect implications are felt around the world and will continue to reverberate long into the future, perhaps permanently reshuffling the composition of international politics. An often-overlooked factor is that of the war’s environmental impacts, which range from directly-observable conflict-related pollution, such as terrain contamination and immediate wartime emissions, to more indirect environmental costs relating to conflict-induced changes to international energy consumption priorities (Rawtani et al. 2022).

Since the outbreak of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, much of Europe’s energy market has been deliberately starved of Russian resources, forcing unprecedented European policy changes. Germany’s situation is perhaps the most prolific, having deliberately – and permanently – shifted to importing United States (US) Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) products via tanker in order to end the ramifications of being reliant on hostile resources (Holz et al. 2022).  This policy shift was personified by the speedy construction and operational integration of Europe’s three newest LNG import terminals, each located along the nation’s northern North Sea coastline (Holz et al. 2022). Such shifts have been echoed across the continent, stemming from the developing newfound defence-oriented necessity for energy security, and are characteristically reflected in broader global resource and economic self-sufficiency trends: Such as the escalating de-coupling agenda presently pursued between Europe and Russia, and China and the United States, where the economic benefits of liberal globalisation are weighed against those of national security (Garcia-Herrero 2022, 352-358).

Domestically, the destructive and prolonged conflict has resulted in innumerable tangible instances where Ukraine’s natural environment has suffered manipulation and devastation. This has occurred in rural areas in the form of spoiled and contaminated farmland, razed forests, and poisoned rivers, all of which are often due to shelling and the construction of defensive fortifications. Urban areas have not escaped unscathed either, with many instances of damaged industrial sites contributing to local ground, irrigation, drinking water, and air-based pollution, in some cases even exposing regional residents to poisonous substances and tainted water. These human-oriented effects are well documented, however less is known about the effects inflicted upon Ukraine’s animal populations: Such rapid environmental changes have the ability to physically alter regional migration and food-chain patterns for generations to come (Serhii et al. 2022, 36-53).

Over 2,000 cases of severe Russian military-caused environmental damage have been recorded amounting to an estimated cost approaching €50 billion, according to Ukrainian Environment Minister Strilets (Guillot 2022). Now-infamous examples include Russian missile attacks on energy infrastructure at the Ladyzhynska thermal power station in October 2022, the Russian shelling of the Kalininski industrial waste facility for the Kalinin mine in August 2022, and the Russian targeting of the Pechenihy reservoir dam in September 2022, as well as the militarisation, and ongoing resulting targeting, of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power station. This damage has the capacity to cloud Eastern Europe with atomic pollution (Guillot 2023). Whether this environmental targeting has been purposeful or not remains to be discovered.

Sources:

Holz, Franziska, Robin Sogalla, Christian R. von Hirschhausen, and Claudia Kemfert. “Energy supply security in Germany can be guaranteed even without natural gas from Russia: Special issue on the war in Ukraine.” DIW Focus, #7, 2022.

Garcia-Herrero, Alicia. “Slowbalisation in the Context of US-China Decoupling.” Intereconomics 57, no. 6 (2022): 352-358.

Guillot, Louise. “How Ukraine Wants to Make Russia Pay for War’s Environmental Damage.” POLITICO. POLITICO, June 16, 2022. https://www.politico.eu/article/how-ukraine-want-make-russia-pay-for-war-environmental-damage.

Guillot, Louise, Antonia Zimmermann, and Giovanna Coi. “The Environmental Scars of Russia’s War in Ukraine.” POLITICO. POLITICO, February 22, 2023. https://www.politico.eu/article/environment-scars-russia-war-ukraine-climate-crisis/.

Serhii, A. Shevchuk, Viktor I. Vyshnevskyi, and P. Bilous Olena. “The Use of Remote Sensing Data for Investigation of Environmental Consequences of Russia-Ukraine War.” Journal of Landscape Ecology 15, no. 3 (2022): 36-53.

Rawtani, Deepak, Gunjan Gupta, Nitasha Khatri, Piyush K. Rao, and Chaudhery Mustansar Hussain. “Environmental damages due to war in Ukraine: A perspective.” Science of The Total Environment 850 (2022): 157932.

Robert Eales is a Global and International Studies (BGInS) undergraduate student, ĐÓ°ÉÔ­´´ University

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The Cost of War Hits Close to Home for ĐÓ°ÉÔ­´´ Students – by Matthew Selinger

Starting in the early morning of March 2, 2023, a travelling exhibit named “Unissued Diplomas” made its way to the Atrium of NideyinĂ n (formerly the University Centre). Run by students from Ukraine and co-sponsored by the Ukrainian Canadian Students’ Union (SUSK), the project aims to draw global attention from students across approximately 70 universities worldwide. It highlights the stark differences between ĐÓ°ÉÔ­´´ and Ukrainian students. Unlike facing the anxiety of rushing from the bus to class, Ukrainians run towards shelters away from incoming Russian artillery and missiles.

The venue served as a convenient place to capture the attention of passersby heading about the ĐÓ°ÉÔ­´´ University campus. Andrii Bukvych, Ukraine’s Deputy Head of Mission to Canada, even arrived on campus to acknowledge the event. Three rows of stands displayed 36 stories of Ukrainian students who, due to the war, would never see their convocation day (hence “unissued diplomas”). Some were killed as frontline soldiers, having handed over their pencils for weapons in defence of their country. Others were ordinary civilians who got caught in the crosshairs of the invading Russian forces. The event’s conversation continued to a nearby room where scholars and students from ĐÓ°ÉÔ­´´ and the broader Ottawa community discussed topics such as the humanitarian situation, fighting Russian propaganda, and how students could maintain Canada’s attention on the conflict. On March 22, three weeks after the event and subsequent dialogue took place, the exhibit reappeared near the MacOdrum Library entrance.

Bringing this exhibit to ĐÓ°ÉÔ­´´ and other campuses increases the much-needed awareness of the human cost of the war. We recently marked the first—and hopefully last—anniversary of the Russian reinvasion of Ukraine. Naturally, thanks much to the fast-paced digital age in which we live, the longer this war rages on, people become detached, numb, and fatigued by a once-dominant current event. Recall how Ukraine fell off the radar after the Minsk negotiations in 2015. Even though the violence subsided, civilians and soldiers still perished in the Donbas. Global attention faded. There’s also the Syrian Civil War which, despite the heavy death toll of 500,000 civilians, is rarely a discussion point anymore. Same with the humanitarian situation in Venezuela or the insurgency in Mali. Events like “Unissued Diplomas,” however traumatic the content may be, still expose us to the real issues facing people in our world. To us, February 24, 2022, might be one year ago, but to Ukrainians, it is a daily reminder of the genuine threat facing themselves and their nation.

For this reason, we must continually remind ourselves of these crises and conflicts, or we risk losing the momentum to respond practically. “Unissued Diplomas” is one example of how we can keep the conversation going regarding the Russo-Ukrainian War. We owe it to ourselves as students and faculty to amplify the voices of those whose only dream was the go to university, gain wisdom, contribute to their community, and rebuild their country. Sadly, thousands of other killed Ukrainian students will not get that opportunity.

Matthew Selinger is a NPSIA MA candidate and Political Director of the ĐÓ°ÉÔ­´´ Ukrainians executive team

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Does Ukraine Mark a Shift in Refugee Treatment? – by Felix Nicol

As the war in Ukraine continues, the difficulties of migrants fleeing from Ukraine remain at the forefront of discussion. Examples include the European Union’s temporary protection for displaced persons, which permits a flexible and simplified process in fleeing the country. In a similar sense, looking at Canadian efforts to assist migrants, we’ve witnessed the implementation of priority measures, which ensure Ukrainians are able to enter the country as quickly as possible. With this, we’ve seen a drastic shift from the problematic treatment of migrants which presented themselves in the refugee crises of the past. In particular, countries like Hungary who have rigorously defended their anti-immigrant policies in the past seem to invite Ukrainians with open arms. Is it then alright for us to consider these shifts in migration policy a marked improvement and shift away from problematic migrant treatment of the past?

Certainly, a first point of comparison comes from the Afghan refugee crisis, which started not even a year before the breakout of the war in Ukraine. Despite the short time frame between the two, the differences in policies are striking. For example, while Canada was willing to offer 14-day expedited processing for visa applications of Ukrainian refugees, no such loosening of processes was offered to Afghan refugees. We need to then wonder, are Ukrainian refugees treated better because of their cultural similarities?

Even looking at the treatment of different refugees from Ukraine can give us insights in this regard. By focusing on the experiences of Romani refugees from Ukraine, we can see that improvements are not necessarily present for all citizens. As a group which has been historically discriminated against in Europe, it comes to no surprise that though border crossing has been improved due to loosened migrant policies, many still face significant discrimination in accessing services in neighbouring countries. This includes access to lodgment, accusations of theft and requests for segregation.

In discussing these issues, it is important to recognize that the West’s improvements in migration policies should not be purely placed upon cultural similarities. However, if we are to continue to build on compassionate migration policies, we need to recognize that our efforts are not sufficient, as they do not work towards the safety of all refugees.

Sources:

Mirga-Wójtowicz, Elzbieta et al. “Human rights, needs and discrimination – the situation of Roma refugees from Ukraine in Poland.” Central Council of German Sinti & Roma. 2022.

Felix Nicol is a 4th year EURUS BA student, ĐÓ°ÉÔ­´´ University

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