Policy Impact Archives - IDRC Research Chairs Network on Forced Displacement

New Policy Brief published by IDRC Research Chair, Myriam Cherti, Mohammed VI Polytechnic University, Morocco

SHUCHIKARIM — Mon, 08 Dec 2025 16:42:08 +0000

A new policy brief has been published on “Cities as key policy actors: strengthening urban responses to displacement in the global South’, led by Dr Myriam Cherti, the IDRC Research Chair on Forced Displacement at the University Mohammed VI Polytechnic (UM6P) in Rabat. The brief is based on the contributions and discussions we had during our webinar in April.

You can read the policy brief here:

New Policy Brief published by IDRC Research Chair, Dr. Paula Banerjee

SHUCHIKARIM — Wed, 29 Oct 2025 13:23:04 +0000

IDRC Research Chair, Prof. Paula Banerjee, publishes a ‘Scoping study on promoting labour market reintegration in the context of climate mobility in Pacific Island countries’. This study contributes to the implementation of the Pacific Regional Framework on Climate Mobility, which advocates for proactive, humane, and sustainable solutions that uphold the dignity and resilience of Pacific communities in the face of climate-induced mobility.

The report was prepared for the International Labour Organization (ILO) by Dr Paula Banerjee and Katarina Atalifo, with technical review by Nilim Baruah, ILO Senior Specialist on Labour Migration in the Decent Work Technical Support Team in Bangkok. This report has been produced under the Pacific Climate Change, Migration and Human Security (PCCMHS) – Phase II programme. The PCCMHS programme is implemented by the ILO, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), and the Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), along with the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS) and the Platform on Disaster Displacement (PDD).

You can read the report here: https://www.ilo.org/sites/default/files/2025-10/FINAL_ilo%20-%20Scoping%20study%20on%20promoting%20labour%20market%20reintegration%20in%20the%20context%20of%20climate%20mobility%20in%20Pacific%20Island%20countries%20A4%202025-10-16%20web2.pdf

Revolutionary resistance against full autocratization: Actors and strategies of resistance after the 2021 military coup in Myanmar

beatricemarievillade — Wed, 24 Jan 2024 01:18:35 +0000

Authors: Kristian Stokke, Nyi Nyi Kyaw

Abstract

Resistance against autocratization is an important contemporary issue that calls for increased scholarly attention. The global wave of autocratization has generated a proliferation of research on the drivers of autocratization, but fewer studies on the possibilities, strategies, spatialities, and effectiveness of resistance. This article responds to these knowledge needs through a case study of revolutionary resistance against full autocratization in Myanmar after the 2021 military coup. The article examines the junta’s strategies for autocratic control, trace the development of the resistance movement and analyze its strategies, spatialities and effectiveness. The article shows that the coup has been followed by a mass resistance movement that is remarkably successful in countering the regime strategies for authoritarian consolidation and survival. We argue that this effectiveness rests on the movement’s ability to deploy mutually reinforcing strategies of economic, symbolic, political, and armed resistance to contest the military’s claims on state authority, legitimacy, economic resources, and monopoly of armed force. The Myanmar case thus confirms the centrality of civil resistance under full autocratization, but also points to the importance of insurgent political institutions and armed resistance to counter authoritarian repression, legitimation, and co-optation strategies. The case study also shows that the spatialities of resistance strategies – being both embedded in places and territories and extended through spatial networks and scalar strategies – are key contributors to the effectiveness of the movement. This broad mobilization behind a common revolutionary goal offers the best prospect for defeating military dictatorship in Myanmar and provides relevant lessons for similar cases elsewhere.

Luisa Feline Freier: A snapshot of Latin American legal protection frameworks

beatricemarievillade — Wed, 24 Jan 2024 01:16:27 +0000

Authors: Marta Castro Padrón and Luisa Feline Freier

The Latin America region is facing several complex emergencies, including the internal and regional impacts of the crisis in Venezuela, the humanitarian consequences of the resurgent armed conflict in Colombia, persistent high levels of generalised violence across Central America and Mexico, and the adverse impacts of climate change.

These conditions combine to create some of the world’s highest forced displacement numbers, and we are currently seeing an unprecedented number of refugees and migrants on the move across the region in search of protection.

While a number of Latin American countries are rightly recognised as having progressive and humane refugee laws and policies, their application can be inconsistent and protection oftentimes difficult to access. NRC has analysed the legal protection frame works in several Latin American countries to identify key protection challenges and has identified a number which apply across the region:

Inconsistent and discriminatory assessment of asylum claims
Challenges in accessing complementary protection schemes due to irregular means of arrival
Lengthy Refugee Status Determination (RSD) procedures and overall absence of accessible legal migration pathways
Denial of work opportunities to those undergoing RSD
Limited attention on the additional protection needs of highly vulnerable groups, including children
USA border policies being a major driver of displacement and having adverse impact on levels of humanitarian needs

NRC hopes this briefing report can help to better inform national, regional and international response strategies and promote the need for more support to regional governments responding to dynamic migration flows and increasing numbers of displacement-affected people.

The report’s recommendations suggest steps that can be undertaken to better affect positive protection outcomes for refugees and migrants across the region.

Myanmar’s Military Reaches into Migrant Pockets

beatricemarievillade — Wed, 24 Jan 2024 00:53:34 +0000

Author: Nyi Nyi Kyaw

Tougher times await Myanmar migrant workers in Southeast Asia. Two recent orders issued by Myanmar’s junta State Administration Council (SAC) in September will result in higher costs of moving, living and working abroad for migrant workers and a fall in their disposable income and savings.

The first is the order that Myanmar migrant workers who migrate from September 2023 with the assistance of employment agencies will have to remit at least 25 per cent of their salaries every month. These remittances must be sent through the official channel recognised by the SAC at an exchange rate significantly lower than the market rate.

The World Bank estimated the volume of remittances at US$1.9 billion in 2022, down from US$2 billion in 2021 (the year that followed the coup) and US$2.67 billion in 2020 (the year before the coup). Hundreds of millions of dollars or more are remitted informally and via unknown channels.

This forced remittance order by the SAC may not affect all Myanmar external migrant workers. It is practically impossible to force every one of about four million migrant workers to remit a quarter of their incomes through official channels.

The second order is the amendment of Union Tax Law 2023. It orders Myanmar nationals abroad to pay taxes, in the foreign currency they earn, starting from 1 October 2023. These taxes will be calculated at a flat rate of 2 per cent on their total incomes or at up to 25 per cent of their chargeable incomes (incomes after deducting tax exemptions and tax reliefs) — whichever is lower.

These forced taxes effectively amount to double taxation for Myanmar migrants who also pay income taxes where they work. This order will affect all Myanmar migrant workers, as every national abroad must show proof of tax payments or pay a lump-sum income tax when they renew their passports, which are only valid for five years. The same requirement has to be fulfilled by those who renew their passports in Myanmar.

The September orders will generate a substantial amount of foreign currency for the SAC. Though not explicitly stated, they have two targets. First, the military junta wants to discipline and punish external Myanmar migrants who are seen as major financial supporters of the resistance against the military regime.

Second, the SAC needs additional funds to support its war machine against the resistance. UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Tom Andrews, reported that the junta has imported war materials worth at least US$1 billion since the coup. Since 2021, the junta has become increasingly cash-strapped due to international economic sanctions and the mass boycott of goods and services produced by military-affiliated enterprises in Myanmar.

Prior to these two new orders, Myanmar migrant workers in Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore were already subject to a growing set of securitised regulations issued by the SAC. These regulations included suspensions and delays in renewing and obtaining Myanmar passports and new migration documentation requirements introduced after the coup, such as the Overseas Worker Identification Card. As a result of these new regulations and an increase in corruption after the coup, brokerage services have thrived in both within Myanmar and in Thailand and Malaysia, resulting in additional costs for Myanmar migrant workers.

The case of Myanmar migrant workers in Thailand is particularly important. Thailand is home to at least 2 million Myanmar workers, not including several hundreds of thousands of workers who have entered and stayed irregularly. Only 350,000 of them are employed through the official Memorandum of Understanding between Myanmar and Thailand.

Faced with forced remittances and income taxes, many Myanmar workers, who might have otherwise regularised their status in Thailand and obtained documentation from Myanmar immigration and labour authorities, may choose the irregular, undocumented pathway. Aspiring migrants who are still in Myanmar and would also have chosen the official pathway might now consider irregular migration. The porous border between the two countries facilitates irregular migration.

Despite the unavoidable deduction from their incomes abroad, hundreds of thousands of people remain driven to emigrate from Myanmar. The situation at home seems increasingly grim, with no visible end to the unprecedented domestic political conflict and humanitarian crisis, as well as their severe impacts on the country’s economic situation and labour market.

While there is some irregular migration from Myanmar to Malaysia, it is not as big as in Thailand, and there is no irregular migration from Myanmar to Singapore. Documented workers, such as those in Singapore, cannot simply opt for the undocumented pathway like their counterparts in Thailand and Malaysia. They have already faced or will face the SAC rules and regulations.

Brokerage services will further thrive because many Myanmar migrant workers will have to seek passport, embassy and consulate brokers, resulting in higher fees. A significant portion of incomes and savings of Myanmar migrant workers will be lost from forced remittances, income taxes and increasing brokerage fees.