Sanctions, Russia, and the International System – by Dane Rowlands

There has been a lot of discussion, and sometimes confusion, about the use of sanctions against Russia because of its invasion of Ukraine. Economic sanctions have been an instrument of foreign policy for centuries, and disrupting an enemy’s international commerce is a common practice during wartime. After the First World War, the threat of sanctions imposed by the League of Nations was supposed to deter countries from using military power against one another; it did not work then, and clearly has not worked now. It is useful to consider why the threat of sanctions did not deter Russia, why they have not yet brought an end to the horrific violence in Ukraine, and what their current application means for the future.

To work, any deterrence must be credible (the target must know it will be punished in response to a transgression) and effective (the target must assess the punishment as being worse than any gain from the transgression). In this case it is likely that Russia knew it would face some form of sanctions, but probably calculated that they would not be extensive, which was their experience after annexing Crimea and its “proxy invasion” of Eastern Ukraine. The U.S., and to a lesser degree Europe, did clearly signal that extensive economic sanctions would be imposed if Russia carried through with its threat of invasion, but the details were vague. The damage of sanctions depends critically on their form, how many countries implement (or avoid implementing) them, and the dependence of the target country on international commercial relations. In addition, sanctions are a two-edged sword in that they damage the economies of both the target and the countries that impose them. The Russian government may well have calculated that many important countries (China, India) would not join in the sanctions, and that European dependence on Russian hydrocarbons would dilute the extent of the economic punishment. A quick win in Ukraine may well have discouraged Russia’s opponents from implementing severe and enduring sanctions, discounting their expected impact even further. The failure to deter Russia does not mean that sanctions, or their logic, are faulty. It just means that in this instance the threat was, correctly or not, deemed insufficient.

The list of general economic sanctions against Russia, and those targeting specific individuals, has been extensive. Why have they not brought the Russian economy to its knees and stopped the war? Economic sanctions work according to a cycle. The initial impact is often muted, as the target country uses up inventories and financial reserves to avoid disruption. As these disappear, and substitute sources become harder to find, firms and consumers are forced to adjust their behaviour and the pain increases. While adaptation can take some time, eventually domestic producers can shift activity to fill in some of the space left by foreign suppliers, leading to a respite. If the target economy is dependent on key foreign inputs that are harder to replace, however, there may well be a further economic decline as missing parts or other production inputs become scarce. Finally, if sanctions are imposed for an extended period (such as in Iran) the economy adjusts further to compensate for the loss of traditional suppliers and markets, reducing the effectiveness of the punishment. Russia is probably somewhere in the middle of this cycle, running out of some key inputs and seeking alternatives. Calculating these costs ex ante, though, is incredibly challenging, as it entails knowing the level of inventories, the dependence on key inputs, and the availability of substitutes.

The financial aspect of the sanctions caused considerable confusion in so far as the initial collapse of the Russian currency was eventually reversed, despite the lack of access to its foreign reserves. Part of the reversal was due to capital controls that limited the amount of foreign currency Russians could buy with rubles. Ultimately, however, Russia was in an advantageous position of having a large current account surplus due to a high volume of hydrocarbon exports that were only modestly affected by sanctions. As prices for this commodity increased, and as imports of foreign goods declined under sanctions, Russia’s external position remained strong, as has its hydrocarbon-based government budget. If the volume of exports collapses quicker than the price rises, Russia’s financial situation will soon deteriorate again.

The current tragedy also highlights serious deficiencies in the international system, such as it is. One of the key problems with economic sanctions as a tool has been the ad hoc nature of sanctions regimes, making it difficult to predict which countries will participate, how extensive the sanctions will be, and how long they will be maintained. As Ukraine’s allies have attempted to ratchet up the economic pressure on the Putin regime, sanctions have broken new, and potentially troubling, ground. Seizing sovereign assets, or those of foreign citizens, is understandably popular in states that impose sanctions, but may need to be more clearly defined and circumscribed by courts. More problematic, however, is whether the imposition of sanctions by large groups of countries on primary targets (and possibly secondary states that refuse to participate) will hasten the fracturing of the global economy and community into adversarial blocs.

Until recently, and due to humanitarian concerns, broad-based economic sanctions were eschewed in favour of targeted ones. Not all the catastrophic effects of war, however, are due to sanctions. The threat of an imminent global food crisis caused by the invasion of Ukraine is a reminder of how tragic the consequences of war can be for the countries involved, as well as for non-participants, and especially for the poor. There is no upside to the invasion of Ukraine, but it would be beneficial to learn from its horrors to reconsider the place sanctions should have in the international system, the rules that govern their use, and how to protect vulnerable people from the violence and disruption of war.

~ Dane Rowlands

Professor, Norman Patterson School of International Affairs, �Ӱ�ԭ�� University

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After Bucha: Reflecting on Images and Establishing the Narratives of War – by Milana Nikolko

Two weeks have passed since the town of Bucha, a comfortable and cozy suburb of Kiev, where large pine trees were integrated into the modern cityscape, was liberated by Ukrainian forces. I know Bucha quite well; on many occasions I visited a warm and welcoming house of my friends, where we spent countless nights sharing the stories of our camping trips and dreaming about the future. I always thought of Bucha as a place of two dimensions. One closely follows the rhythm of a megapolis (Bucha is connected by railway to Kyiv’s train station and a large part of its population commutes daily to the Ukrainian capital). The second is a place for the quiet country life. At least that is how I remembered Bucha until recently.

Images of this war

Today, every mention of Bucha brings to life different pictures: images of destruction, chaos, devastation and death. The photographs of bodies on the streets, fragments of corpses, and motionless images of civilian figures lying on the ground dominated our imagination. The first shock, an immediate reaction to the seeing images of so many civilians killed on the streets of this small town[i], provoked a predictable physical reaction— many felt sick. It is a transformative experience not just for survivors, but for spectators of the war as well. The physicality of “war images” creates a belief, that everyone, who sees this evidence of death, will share the same feelings: grief, compassion and overwhelming sadness for the people portrayed in these images. The simplicity of the images—capturing a dead person beside a bike, the perfectly manicured hand of a killed woman, and many, many other visual pieces of evidence of death and suffering— must erase any doubt about what this war is about and who is right and is wrong. Since images of Bucha’s ruins, the perpetrators and victims of this war will be cemented in their permanent roles.

The day after the majority of the world media shared the visual evidence of Bucha’s killings of civilians, the counter-narrative spread quickly via social networks. This narrative included stories of falsifications of the civilian deaths in Bucha, and rumours about bringing corpses from morgues to mimic killings, days after Russian troops had withdrawn from the scene. These stories didn’t last long.  A journalistic investigation (New York Times[ii]) showed satellite images of bodies lying on the streets of Bucha when Russian troops were still in control of the town, thereby disproving the counter-narrative. The most striking fact about this brief spread of Russian propaganda was how very easy it is to twist stories behind images, but the fact that there is an audience for such stories, believers in this alternative reality. The idea of the universal moral unity, a collective “We”, where everyone stands in support of the suffering of the Ukrainian people, proved to be an illusion, again. The narratives for the images of war are the part of the war itself.

Narratives of this war

This war has many distinctive features. Some of them lie in the field of visualization and media transcription of events. As time passes, individual emotional connections to the images of war become less strong, but war images transform themselves into icons, symbols and crucial markers of war narratives. These icons could be characterized as axiomatic units of tales of war. The interpretations of the war continue and we are now learning a new vocabulary of atrocities, war crimes and genocide[iii], where they have given unique names: “Bucha”, “the Bucha massacre.” Nowadays, military conflicts are guaranteed wide and uninterrupted media attention and the iconography of suffering, devastation and death impact the war in many different dimensions.

The first feature, which is important for our analysis, is that this war has also actively engaged new mediums, new technology to deliver images. Livestreaming, drone recordings, volunteer’s notes transmitted and multiplied via social networks, satellite images, recordings of cellphone conversations of military personnel: these streams of images are not easy to process immediately, but they serve an important role in putting the image of the war puzzle together. The engagement of a broad spectrum of technologies creates a new dynamic visual and audio stream of narratives of crimes, perpetrators and victims.

The second feature involves the changing role of images in modern military conflict. Let me mention a few:

• The images of war alarm the public more than any of other media— visual content is effective in bringing global attention to the suffering of civilians. The picture of death globalized, and delivered to every screen, is aimed to change the behaviour of political and military actors to prevent this from happening in the future[iv].
• Visual evidence serves to mobilize the global and national public for further actions to stop the war.
• Images are important documents of the war. Hundreds of Ukrainian prosecutors and many representatives of the International Criminal Court are investigating the multiple crime sites in Bucha, which were captured on photos. Images of crime are helping to advocate for reparation (often symbolic), retribution, and bringing justice[v] to the victims.
• Images are powerful vehicles for political changes. The Bucha images have influenced the political decisions of many countries in the world, Canada among them, witnessed by the recent decision to provide Ukraine with heavy weapons.[vi] Collective political decisions and sanctions policies are affected[vii] and peace negotiations redirected.

This war continues and we must brace ourselves for more devastating images. Looking ahead, I don’t know what I fear the most, to see the devastating images of people’s suffering and death in Mariupol, or worse, to never see them. There is a significant chance that after the occupation of Mariupol by Russian troops, the shreds of evidence of the horror of war will be erased.

[i] Anastasiia Lapatina. Nearly 2 weeks after liberation, search for dead bodies continues in Bucha // The Kyiv independent,

[ii] “Satellite images show bodies lay in Bucha for weeks, despite Russian claims.”

[iii] Genocide.

[iv] Sontag, Susan. Regarding the Pain of Others. 1st ed. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003.

[v] Hearty, Kevin. “Problematising Symbolic Reparation: ‘Complex Political Victims’, ‘Dead Body Politics’ and the Right to Remember.” Social & legal studies 29, no. 3 (2020): 334–354.

[vi] Canada will send heavy weapons to Ukraine, Trudeau says.

[vii] “Killings in Ukrainian city of Bucha are ‘clearly war crimes,’ says Joly”,

~ Milana Nikolko

Adjunct Research Professor, Institute of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, �Ӱ�ԭ�� University (milana.nikolko@carleton.ca)

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Ukrainian Humanitarian Crisis – When Will EU Solidarity End? – Agnieszka Weinar

Four million Ukrainian escapees [1] came to the European Union within five weeks of the Russian invasion, with daily numbers reaching over 100,000 per day in the first two weeks. Such flow is unprecedented – at the height of the Syrian crisis in 2015, the EU saw 10,000 crossings per day. At the same time, the reaction to this wave has also been unprecedented, with the EU evoking a long-forgotten Temporary Protection Directive and all Member States agreeing not only to implement it but also to set up some form of internal burden-sharing – all in merely a couple of weeks. Central and Eastern European countries stepped up their reception capacities, with governments allowing the people to take action and welcome those fleeing the war.

Such human flows pose serious risks to the longer-term stability of the region. All lies in a delicate balance between the goodwill of people and politicians and the socio-economic reality of the prolonged conflict. Can the European Union stand with Ukrainians?

Factors going for Ukrainian escapees include the following. 1. Legal clarity. Ukrainian escapees have few advantages over other asylum seekers in Europe: they do not need a visa to enter the Schengen area, so they do not need to ask for asylum to be let in; they do not need to go through a safe third country to get to the Schengen border; because they do not enter as asylum seekers, Dublin Convention does not apply to them – it means that they do not need to stay in any procedure to move around Schengen; the temporary Protection Directive gives them the right to remain and work in the EU for up to three years. In part, it was applied to recognize that the Ukrainians are using their mobility rights in any case and need to be traceable by some unified system. 2. Social acceptance. Ukrainians have found a warm welcome in the EU, in part because they form a part of the larger European family of nations. However, other factors have also been at play: Ukrainian evacuees are primarily women, children, and the elderly (ca. 95%). This demographic falls squarely within the European historical experience with war, and thus media reporting evokes atavistic subconscious reactions. After all, countless generations of European families knew the drill: women, children, and the elderly flee to safety while men return to fight; Ukrainians have the largest immigration network across the EU, with millions engaging in circular migration for decades before the war. On the one hand, transnational ties now support the escape: many families came to stay with relatives in the first weeks. As an additional perk, many Europeans personally know a Ukrainian: this makes the ties more meaningful; and Ukrainians flee a threat that feels very real to millions of Europeans: bombs falling 10 kilometers from the EU border, and the perpetrator is Russia, the historical butcher of the nations East of Berlin (Berlin included).

Factors undermining European solidarity include the following. 1. Duration of the war. This is the most critical factor. EU solidarity was activated on the expectation that the war would end in a few months. As this outcome seems less and less likely, the following factors will occur and play a crucial role in destabilizing the EU’s response to the crisis. 2. Russian propaganda. Russian disinformation has had some spectacular wins during the Syrian refugee crisis and later during the battle for Aleppo and Idlib. Russian trolls skillfully dehumanized Syrian refugees and framed them as rapists and terrorists. They are still struggling with the right angle to turn the tide of solidarity with Ukrainians – after all, it is difficult to sow fear in the face of nearly four million women and children. Until now, the only successful narratives that have emerged were those that try to install self-doubts in the EU response, such as the popular narrative of “white privilege”, which disregards the salient legal, geopolitical, and social facts. However, the longer the war lasts, the more fake news and skewed narratives will emerge. 3. Social burden. The escapees are primarily single mothers. This is not exactly the best material for flexible workers EU needs. Immigrant single mothers are the most vulnerable category of migrants, with substantial social security needs. For the moment, the Ukrainians are in limbo between the hope of return and the fear that the return will not be possible. If the war lingers on, likely, many will not integrate the labour market well, posing important integration and social cohesion problems in the long run.

The EU put its bets on a short war, which might not materialize now. A prolonged conflict will most likely bring an end to European solidarity.

Endnotes

[1] I do not use the term “refugee” on purpose, to underline the different legal status of Ukrainian citizens who escape the war. Most are not covered by the Geneva Convention on Refugees and use a special set of laws allowing them to come and stay in the European Union.

~ Agnieszka Weinar

Adjunct Research Professor, Institute of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, �Ӱ�ԭ�� University (agnieszka.weinar@carleton.ca)

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South Caucasus and Russia’s War in Ukraine – by David Sichinava

The countries of the South Caucasus watch Russia’s war on Ukraine with much trepidation. For some, it leaves an eery and acute sense of déjà vu, conjuring not-so-distant memories of regional warfare. For others, it further exacerbates a chronic and widespread feeling of uncertainty. In one way or another, Russia’s military adventurism in Ukraine has shaken the societies of the South Caucasus, with many consequences to shape the future of this already volatile region in years to come.

The recent events in Ukraine have caught the South Caucasus’ political class by surprise and elites are now scrambling to devise effective responses. Two words, ‘reluctance’ and ‘caution,’ best describe how the leaders of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia have approached this war as they work to not only articulate their diplomatic stances but also consider the ramifications for their own countries and citizens. Despite being geographic neighbours, the three South Caucasian countries actually have quite disparate positions. Politically, Armenia is Russia’s main ally in the region. The country depends on Russia both economically and from a security perspective. Azerbaijan has a less robust but still formidable relationship with Russia, one buttressed just two days before the invasion of Ukraine on 22 February 2022, when Russia and Azerbaijan signed a . As some observers noted, the timing of the Declaration and the start of the war put the , since they were unaware of the impending Ukrainian invasion. Despite these allyships, both Armenia’s and Azerbaijan’s stances at international platforms have appeared cautious; representatives of both countries either abstained from or did not attend the numerous UN votes related to issues in Ukraine.

Taking the least supportive stance toward Russia, Georgia stands apart from its neighbours. There is very little support for the Putin regime in the country since Georgians vividly remember Russian bombs falling over their cities and villages—most recently in August 2008—but also relative to a longer history of Soviet and Imperial Russian intervention in the country. Such a painful experience made many Georgians wonder if in the case of a Russian success—or even of a failure—the Putin regime might decide to again turn its gaze toward Georgia. Even without an outbreak in local fighting, Russia’s war on Ukraine has undermined the government’s policy of a more balanced (or for others, ) stance toward Russian foreign policy, pursued since 2012. While both Georgian citizens and select politicians openly support Ukraine, the government has been reluctant to join Western sanctions, justifying its . On the Ukrainian side, this neutrality was not well received and has worked to strain relations between the once-close Georgian and Ukrainian leaderships, the latter its ambassador from the country on March 31 2022.

A large part of Georgian society was equally displeased with their government’s stance. In the very first days of the war, crowded protests in support of Ukraine took place in major Georgian cities, volunteers scrambled to gather humanitarian aid and assisted Ukrainian refugees locally in finding accommodations. Some Georgians even travelled to Ukraine to join the country’s defence forces. of the war showed that the Georgian public expected their government to do more to support Ukraine’s cause. When asked whether or not Georgia should enact sanctions, two-thirds of Georgians felt their country should take at least some measures. Civic protests and oppositional calls for the government’s resignation in the face of inaction are just two examples of the political ripple effects destabilizing the local situation. Nonetheless, Georgian president Salome Zourabichvili, has . Likewise, many Georgian politicians and celebrities have taken a clear pro-Ukrainian position.

The stance is less clear-cut in Georgia’s two breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which de-facto remain under . Local authorities in both regions initially the recognition of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics. Yet, when service personnel from local Russian bases were moved to , this caused local resentment, especially after reports serving in the Russian army were publicized. After public outcry and apparent , part of the South Ossetian units pulled out from the Ukrainian front and returned to Tskhinvali. In the South Caucasus other breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh, the war in Ukraine has also exacerbated tensions. For example, an important gas pipeline supplying Karabakh was damaged, temporarily leaving locals without heat. social media stated that Russia was withdrawing its peacekeeping mission from the region, leading to .

Moving forward, how might Russia’s unprovoked war against Ukraine further affect the South Caucasus? First, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia are impacts. All three countries have close trade ties with Russia and Ukraine. Sanctions imposed on Russia and the sinking ruble have meant that Armenians, Azerbaijanis, and Georgians living in Russia will see their incomes reduced, in turn diminishing the flow of remittances. Some may lose their employment altogether and have to emigrate back to their home countries. Second, from a humanitarian perspective, there is already a significant increase in the number of refugees, and and Belarusian migrants who are fleeing because of the war, sanctions, or political repression in their home countries. Third, there is uncertainty regarding Russia’s continued ability to serve as a local geopolitical moderator. In the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, Russia acted as the key mediator, bringing fragile peace to the region. Finally, yet another factor that could further undermine the stability in the region on joining the territory to the Russian Federation. While local authorities in Tskhinvali have multiple times made calls for uniting with Russia, the current context makes such claims potentially explosive.

In short, the South Caucasus has entered uncharted territory following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. While it is certain that there is no point of return to the situation, major questions are on analysts’ radars, including: Will the war increase Russia’s geopolitical and economic grip over the South Caucasus? Will it feed the country’s appetite for greater regional control, perhaps even through militaristic means? Is there a risk of ‘thawing’ previously ‘frozen’ regional conflicts? Even without the threat of warfare, how will the events in Ukraine reshape the domestic politics of each South Caucasian country? These are questions those in the region are now having to grapple with.

~

Research Director at , Contract Instructor with EURUS, �Ӱ�ԭ�� University (davidsichinava@cunet.carleton.ca)

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Western Sanctions and Increasing the Costs of War to Russia – by Joan DeBardeleben

We are all well aware of the high cost that the war has imposed on Ukraine – catastrophic loss of life, health, homes, and infrastructure, and psychological stress. As a nation Ukraine is also at risk of losing its territory and its sovereignty. In this context, it may seem strange to ask about Russian losses, as the Russian state is the perpetrator. Why should we care? We should care because assessing Russian losses may help reveal incentives that Russia might have for a negotiated settlement.

One of the objectives of Western sanctions is to impose high costs on Russia. These costs are of various types but primarily economic. Western sanctions and aid also bolster Ukraine’s capacity to exact high military costs on Russia. Imposing high costs on Russia seems to be the best tool that the West has to influence the outcome. If the war imposes high costs on Russia, this should strengthen the hand of Ukraine at the negotiating table, or, less likely, encourage Russia to withdraw without a settlement. This also may make it too costly for Russia to undertake aggressive action against other countries in the region, whether NATO or non-NATO members.

But will the high costs imposed by Western sanctions actually make a negotiated settlement that is more favourable to Ukraine more likely? So far it doesn’t seem to have worked.

But it could, assuming Putin’s choices are based on a rational analysis of costs and benefits. (This is a big assumption, I realize.) For Russia, any settlement that results in a neutral status for Ukraine (i.e., that sees Ukraine renouncing its NATO ambitions) and/or that changes the international status of Crimea and Donbas in Russia’s favour, even minimally, could be sold to the Russian public as a victory. Such a ‘minimalist’ settlement would be consistent with Russia’s war narrative (i.e., that it is ‘special military operation’ to demilitarize Ukraine and protect Russians in the Donbas). In other words, such a negotiated settlement could provide an off-ramp for Putin and reduce further losses to the country. If, with the help of Western sanctions, the costs of a protracted war for Russia are kept high, that may incentivize Russia to seek an earlier settlement that is more favourable to Ukraine.

A protracted war, where Russia seeks to subjugate all of Ukraine, will impose ever higher costs on Russia, in part due to sanctions but also for other reasons. Such a war will likely be increasingly difficult to sell to the Russian public. Over time, information about the Russian military’s brutal attacks on Ukrainian civilians will likely seep inside Russia; the death toll for Russian soldiers will grow; and conscription will be an unpopular necessary. And, alongside all of this, sanctions will take an ever higher economic toll; this could be the straw that breaks the bear’s back and puts regime legitimacy at risk.

Other costs will also damage the country: a brain drain is already underway, in part due to the crippling effect of sanctions and the exit of Western businesses; managing and controlling conquered territory in the face of a resistant population will be costly in lives and rubles; and possibly irreparable damage will be done to Russia’s international reputation and soft power capacity. As countries in Russia’s ‘near abroad’, including members of the Russian-dominated Eurasian Economic Union (except Belarus), observe Russia’s aggressive behavior toward Ukraine, they will likely find close association with Russia less attractive, even as Russia will likely continue to use economic carrots and sticks to induce compliance. The threat of military invention will be lurking in the background. Exclusive reliance on hard power will impose further stress on an already faltering Russian economy. Other countries that have sat on the fence (such as China, South Africa, and India) will likely find the association with Russia less compelling and less beneficial.

The more protracted the war is or the worse the outcome for Ukraine, the longer the punishing Western sanctions will stay in place. We must hope for a negotiated settlement that is acceptable to Ukraine, remembering that only Ukraine can decide what ‘acceptable’ means. In the meanwhile, increasing the costs of the war on Russia remains, in my view, of critical importance.

~ Joan DeBardeleben

Chancellor’s Professor and Jean Monnet Chair in Politics and Society in Russia and the European Union, Institute of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, �Ӱ�ԭ�� University (joan.debardeleben@carleton.ca)

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No Winners in This War – by Jeff Sahadeo

We enter the second month of the war in Ukraine with Russian advances largely (but not completely) stalled and Ukrainian defenders holding fast, even retaking some territory. As the battlefield settles into a back-and-forth for now, civilian casualties mount relentlessly as the Russians adopt a strategy to bomb cities without regard for human life. This lack of regard for life includes their own conscripts and soldiers, without proper food and equipment, who have been ground up in a battle that is not their own. As this toll on the battlefield rises, however, both Russia and Ukraine feel they can, indeed must, win this war. In Moscow, a loss would be the end for Putin’s image as a strong, successful leader. In Kyiv, Zelenskyy has courageously rallied a nation and talks primarily of full victory, of driving Russia out and restoring Ukraine’s strength and sovereignty. Both leaders—if we dismiss the slight possibility of some kind of palace coup against Putin or a successful assassination of Zelenskyy—will, sooner or later, have to face the reality that they cannot achieve complete victory.

And both will have to make compromises they had not imagined at the beginning of this invasion. Putin cannot win—in the sense that even if he destroys Ukraine and is able to defeat its army, which is plausible if not probable—he will face a failed state and likely an active insurgency on his borders and will lack the ability and funds to rebuild it. Zelenskyy, even if he is able to push the Russian army back to its positions before the invasion—plausible but not probable given the still substantial Russian military advantage—will never inflict a defeat on Russia itself. So it will face a larger, richer, aggrieved and revanchist nuclear state on its borders. The question is what might bring either leader to seriously negotiate a painful peace? Putin especially, but Zelenskyy also, likely considers now that a peace deal would be the end of their political careers. Would Putin accept a Ukraine with Zelenskyy still as leader and potentially with the possibility of EU membership? Zelenskyy has signalled he might accept renouncing NATO ambitions, but would he formally yield Crimea and the Donetsk and Luhansk territories? His announcement that he would put a peace deal to a referendum signals his nervousness to make such concessions on his own. Will regime change need to happen before this war ends? This is the question I frequently ponder when I look towards an endgame.

~ Jeff Sahadeo

Professor, Institute of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, �Ӱ�ԭ�� University (jeff.sahadeo@carleton.ca)

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How Russian Television Primed the Public for War – by J. Paul Goode

Following Russia’s invasion, a vigorous debate erupted over whether ordinary Russians support or oppose the war, with a great deal of attention focused on the kinds of information presented to them via broadcast media. It is well known that most Russians get most of their news from television—a fact that likely will increase with the ongoing crackdown on foreign news and social media. That Russian broadcast media is now state-owned or state-controlled is a constant refrain in studies of Russia’s domestic politics, and particularly in past explanations for the failure to mobilize and coordinate opposition protests. To what extent can we determine that state control of television played a role in preparing Russians for war?

A couple of caveats are in order before continuing to the data and analysis. First, this research should not be interpreted as suggesting that Russians are “zombified” by television, nor does this research measure or justify the Russian public’s ambivalent reception of the war. However, we can observe whether (or how) the Kremlin used television to advance its objectives, as well as the means by which it pursued those objectives. In turn, these kinds of findings provide some insight to the public ambivalence that stems from the regime’s domination of discursive space in Russia.

Second, the goal of this approach is not necessarily to re-create Russians’ viewing habits, though one might reasonably assume that more frequently mentioned topics are more likely to have been viewed or noticed. Rather, the frequency and distribution of topics over time reveals the extent to which state-controlled television presented a coordinated campaign. In the absence of reliable public opinion data in war-time Russia, such an approach further suggests insights about the ways that Russians were prepared for, and reacted to, the onset of war.

The data for this study are drawn from the Integrum Profi television broadcast transcripts, which were analyzed on a week-to-week basis from December 13, 2021 through March 13, 2022. The week of December 13 was chosen as a starting point just before Putin initiated a crisis in relations with Russia with the issuance of his ultimatums to the US and NATO, hence a coordinated media campaign in Russia might also be observed from this time. Five channels were chosen for analysis: the state-run channels Pervyi Kanal (1tv) and Rossiia 1, the pro-government NTV (owned by Gazprom Media), Moscow’s public television station TV Tsentr, and the independent Dozhd TV (which ceased operation on March 3, 2022).

Beginning with Russia’s claim that its invasion was intended to stop an alleged genocide in eastern Ukraine, one would expect to find at least somewhat constant signaling of a genuinely humanitarian concern from the start of the crisis in December 2021 through the invasion of Ukraine and the early stages of war. In reality, genocide barely rated mentioning save for a small spike by the state-owned Pervyi Kanal in late January (see Figure 1). By the time the decision to go to war had been taken, mentions of genocide soared on state-owned and pro-government television channels. The effect is even more pronounced when looking at online press agencies, which provide the raw materials for posting and circulating on social media. We see a similar pattern more generally on Russian websites, it is worth drawing attention to the number of sites that are driving these mentions: for the week of March 7-13, for example, just 3 websites drove 40% of mentions of genocide.

Figure 1: Mentions of “Genocide” on Russian TV, Dec 13-Mar 13

Further evidence of the instrumental mobilization of humanitarian concerns is found in the shifting narratives in the weeks immediately following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (Figure 2). In the two weeks following the start of the war, “genocide” almost completely disappeared from mentions on Russian TV. A new narrative emerged concerning fears that Ukrainian nationalists might get ahold of nuclear materials to make dirty bombs, but this quickly dissipated after the messy and alarming seizure of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant by Russian forces. Instead, that narrative was quickly replaced by new claims about the purported threat that increasingly desperate Ukrainian forces might resort to using (or had already planned to use) chemical and biological weapons.

Figure 2: Shifting Narratives on Russian TV, Feb 21 – Mar 13

In short, it is difficult to view Russia’s humanitarian justifications for invading Ukraine as little more than cynical manipulations that served to put such terms and discourse into circulation, providing viewers with a regime-friendly lexicon to frame and discuss the war.

While the patterns of mentions on Russian television are striking, how likely is it that they were noticed by Russian viewers? As the weather is perhaps the only thing that is reported objectively and consistently across all channels, it is a helpful measure of what constitutes normal background noise on Russian television. I used a simple measure of the number of mentions of war-related topics relative to the reporting of the weather. The assumption guiding this approach is that topics mentioned less often than the weather probably are less likely to be noticed, while those mentioned more frequently than the weather are more likely to be noticed. With regard to genocide, the separatist republics in eastern Ukraine (the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics), and Nazis, none of those topics warranted more mentions than the weather on Russian television until just before the invasion (Figure 3).

Figure 3: Mentions of Genocide, DNR/LNR, and Nazi vs the weather on Russian TV, Feb 13 – Mar 13

However, somewhat interesting is Russian TV suddenly elevated mentions of war in all sorts of ways from late-January, none of which were initially related to Ukraine (Figure 4). Looking closely at the various ways that war was mentioned from January 24 through March 13 (Figure 5), one observes lots of mentions in reference to the Great Patriotic War in mid- to late-January. This may be considered on-brand for the Kremlin, which has turned the memory of the war into a cornerstone of the regime’s legitimation. One also finds references to the Cold War and Western aggression (past and present) in roughly equal proportions. By February, this “war talk” expanded to include information warfare, particularly in mocking the West’s “mythical Russian invasion” of Ukraine—only to disappear after Russia actually invaded Ukraine. The prevalence of “war talk” in the run up to the invasion is ironic given that the Kremlin refers to its invasion of Ukraine as a “special military operation” and has effectively banned any reference to the war or invasion online or in the press. Nevertheless, it may have normalized the notion of Russia’s being at war in advance of the invasion.

Figure 4: Mentions of War vs the weather on Russian TV

Figure 5: Mentions of “War” on Russian TV, Jan 24-Mar 6, 2022

In conclusion, Russian television primed viewers for war with steady doses of “war talk” prior to the invasion. It reminded Russians of past victories as well as betrayals. State-controlled television deftly merged this “war talk” with narratives about Western and Ukrainian aggression before fully joining the war effort by advancing claims about the prevention of genocide and fighting fascism. Russians may not have sought war with Ukraine, but the justifications resonated with television-promoted world views that made Western and Ukrainian treachery appear both plausible and lamentable. Once these narratives were put into circulation, the Kremlin no longer had to convince the public but instead activated new narratives in each week of the war to justify its invasion of Ukraine.

~ J. Paul Goode

McMillan Chair in Russian Studies and Associate Professor, Institute of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, �Ӱ�ԭ�� University (paul.goode@carleton.ca)

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Zelenskyy and Havel – by Andrea Chandler

On March 15, 2022, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy spoke to Canada’s Parliament by video link. Canadians had the unique opportunity to be addressed directly by the leader of a country at war, who faced an unwarranted attack on his own soil. While those immersed in European and Russian studies have long been aware of the challenges facing the postcommunist countries, the invasion of Ukraine has brought Eastern Europe to the centre of world attention. Zelenskyy’s gravely concerned, yet composed demeanour raised directly the threats to human security that have been imposed by an authoritarian Russian leadership. The Ukrainian catastrophe calls upon the world community once again to ponder the contentious relationship between state sovereignty and democracy, as Zelenskyy appeals to member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for assistance. NATO was explicitly formed in 1949 to protect the democracies of its members through a strong military alliance, but a perfect balance between democracy and military strength has never been achieved.

In 1999, another respected world leader raised these questions in an address to Canada’s legislature. Czech President, the late Vaclav Havel, addressed Parliament in April of that year, not long after his country joined NATO. At the time, NATO was taking action against Yugoslav President Slobodan Milošević following alleged human rights abuses, including the attempt to deport ethnic Albanians from Serbia, as the long-simmering conflict in Kosovo peaked. (1) Havel’s speech provides a good reminder that the expansion of NATO to include East European members took place within the context of a bloody war in the centre of Europe, in the former Yugoslavia. There is much to question and debate about the expansion of NATO. Nevertheless, at the moment that Havel spoke, the alliance was widely seen as the principal actor capable of defending the security of smaller European states during a decade in which the collapse of communism had had unanticipated ripple effects.

Havel’s speech to Parliament presents to the reader of 2022 as highly optimistic in some ways. He showed a faith in the ability of globalization processes to empower citizens to effect positive change, by deepening their relationships with people in other states. The twenty-first century created an opportunity for people to empower themselves, their local governments, and their civil society organizations. At the same time, said Havel, the state should assume its proper place in the background, relinquishing unnecessary coercion and letting go of its fixation with territory. Instead, the state should be devoted to advancing the well-being of citizens and maintaining fair laws passed in a democratic manner. (2)

Havel’s speech reflected his ambivalence over the position of Europe at the end of the 20th century. On the one hand, there was a clear relief at the ability of his country to join with other continental European nations, and his hope at the prospect of building a deeper multilateral community. A respected writer and activist who had been imprisoned under the Czechoslovak communist regime, Havel had written eloquently about the human being’s basic need for freedom and dignity (3). On the other hand, Havel directly addressed the conflict underway in Kosovo: as he wrote, “[NATO] is fighting because decent people cannot sit back and watch systematic, state-directed massacres of other people. Decent people simply cannot tolerate this, and cannot fail to come to the rescue if a rescue action is within their power.” (4)

Whether Zelenskyy was aware of Havel’s speech or not, the Ukrainian President’s words to Canada’s Parliament seemed to appeal directly to these ‘decent people’ who are horrified by the needless suffering of civilians as a result of aggression from another state. Zelenskyy spoke in simple, direct language, calling upon Members of Parliament to imagine experiencing in their own country the sights and sounds of bombing, destruction, deaths of innocent people. Think of what it feels like, and consider what you would do, was his message. While expressing gratitude for what Canada and other countries had already done, he called for more direct assistance to Ukraine’s military effort. In his speech he blamed neither the people of Russia nor Vladimir Putin: he located the aggression in the “Russian Federation” – the state, and by extension, its leadership. And in a phrase worthy of Vaclav Havel, he called for support from “all friends of the truth.” (5)

Havel, in his speech almost twenty-three years earlier, had raised his concerns about the Russian state. He observed that Russia saw NATO expansion as a threat, but this assertion was unreasonable: Russia simply needed to accept NATO as a counterpart with which to engage in dialogue. The problem with Russia, Havel noted, was a problem of boundaries: not so much lines of territory, but of identity – the Russian government had “an uncertainty about where the beginning is, and where the end is, of that which might be called the world of Russia….Russia has had some difficulty with that its entire history.” (6) This interpretation helps to explain the present-day situation in Ukraine. If the landscape of Luhansk oblast, Ukraine, doesn’t look that different from neighbouring Rostov oblast, Russia, then what does it mean to be Russian? In my opinion, for Vladimir Putin, Russia’s western boundary is a fuzzy, blurry space in a flat plain. It is a liminal space, a borderland, an area on a map. And therefore, an area that needs to be controlled, lest the border mysteriously creep eastward towards Moscow itself. It is as if Putin sees Ukraine without seeing Ukrainians, as if they are utterly invisible to him. From the gaze of one obsessed with Soviet notions of security, Ukraine is a territory in which barbed wire and concrete barriers grow organically; trees, wheat and sunflowers do not.

Endnotes

1. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), “Kosovo Air Campaign.” 7 April 2016.
2. Address of His Excellency Václav Havel President of the Czech Republic to both Houses of Parliament in the House of Commons Chamber, Ottawa. 29 April 1999. Debates of the Senate (Hansard) 1st Session, 36th Parliament, Volume 137, Issue 134.
3. See for example Vaclav Havel and Paul Wilson. “The Power of the Powerless.” East European Politics and Societies and Cultures, 32, no. 2, May 2018, pp. 353–408.
4. Address of His Excellency Václav Havel President of the Czech Republic to both Houses of Parliament in the House of Commons Chamber, Ottawa. 29 April 1999. Debates of the Senate (Hansard) 1st Session, 36th Parliament, Volume 137, Issue 134.
5. Address to Parliament by his Excellency, Volodymyr Zelenskyy President of Ukraine. March 15, 2022
6. Address of His Excellency Václav Havel President of the Czech Republic to both Houses of Parliament in the House of Commons Chamber, Ottawa. 29 April 1999. Debates of the Senate (Hansard) 1st Session, 36th Parliament, Volume 137, Issue 134.
   
   

~ Andrea Chandler

Professor, Department of Political Science, �Ӱ�ԭ�� University (andrea.chandler@carleton.ca)

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