{"id":2143,"date":"2025-10-30T15:02:21","date_gmt":"2025-10-30T19:02:21","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/?p=2143"},"modified":"2025-10-30T15:18:31","modified_gmt":"2025-10-30T19:18:31","slug":"turkish-foreign-policy-in-the-bsr-opportunities-and-challenges-for-canada","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/2025\/turkish-foreign-policy-in-the-bsr-opportunities-and-challenges-for-canada\/","title":{"rendered":"Turkish Foreign Policy in the BSR: Opportunities and Challenges for Canada"},"content":{"rendered":"    \n<section class=\"w-screen px-6 cu-section cu-section--white ml-offset-center md:px-8 lg:px-14\">\n    <div class=\"space-y-6 cu-max-w-child-max  md:space-y-10 cu-prose-first-last\">\n\n        \n                    \n                    \n            \n    <div class=\"cu-wideimage relative flex items-center justify-center mx-auto px-8 overflow-hidden md:px-16 rounded-xl not-prose  my-6 md:my-12 first:mt-0 bg-opacity-50 bg-cover bg-cu-black-50 py-24 md:py-28 lg:py-36 xl:py-48\" style=\"background-image: url(https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/44\/2025\/10\/BSR-port-768x349.jpg); background-position: 50% 50%;\">\n\n                    <div class=\"absolute top-0 w-full h-screen\" style=\"background-color:rgba(0,0,0,0.600);\"><\/div>\n        \n        <div class=\"relative z-[2] max-w-4xl w-full flex flex-col items-center gap-2 cu-wideimage-image cu-zero-first-last\">\n            <header class=\"mx-auto mb-6 text-center text-white cu-pageheader cu-component-updated cu-pageheader--center md:mb-12\">\n\n                                    <h1 class=\"cu-prose-first-last font-semibold mb-2 text-3xl md:text-4xl lg:text-5xl lg:leading-[3.5rem] cu-pageheader--center text-center mx-auto after:left-px\">\n                        Turkish Foreign Policy in the BSR: Opportunities and Challenges for Canada\n                    <\/h1>\n                \n                                    \n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">By Anna Robinson<\/p>\n\n\n                            <\/header>\n        <\/div>\n\n            <\/div>\n\n    \n\n    <\/div>\n<\/section>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Turkish goals in the Black Sea region (BSR) are to maintain stability and its own strategic positioning within the region.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Canadian cooperation with T\u00fcrkiye continues to encounter challenges due to misaligned priorities and estrangement between actors.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Canada has an opportunity to increase presence in the BSR by cooperating on initiatives outside of hard security concerns.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h2 id=\"policy-recommendations\" class=\"wp-block-heading\">Policy Recommendations<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Canada should support the initiation of additional humanitarian projects in the BSR and seek out ways to partner with T\u00fcrkiye on defence technology and modernization to strengthen overall diplomatic and defence relations.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Increasing Canada\u2019s regional presence around the BSR through NATO initiatives could help to bolster its image as a supportive ally to T\u00fcrkiye while also helping project overall Canadian security interests. <\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h2 id=\"turkiyes-foreign-policy-post-2022\" class=\"wp-block-heading\">T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s Foreign Policy post 2022<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">T\u00fcrkiye has historically played an influential role in the Black Sea Region (BSR) as NATO\u2019s southeastern bulwark. The <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mfa.gov.tr\/implementation-of-the-montreux-convention.en.mfa\">Montreux Convention<\/a> gives T\u00fcrkiye control over the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits, the key entry point of the Black Sea. Since Russia\u2019s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the BSR has been under wartime conditions. T\u00fcrkiye has since invoked the Convention to effectively close the straits to both NATO and Russian ships; a decision which has nonetheless sparked controversy, particularly after T\u00fcrkiye <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/turkey-cannot-stop-russian-warships-accessing-black-sea-says-foreign-minister-2022-02-25\/\">allowed Russian warships to travel through the straits if returning to a home port<\/a>. Ankara remains apprehensive towards NATO involvement in the region, and while its relationship with the West is strained, it continues to maintain relations with Russia based on shared <a href=\"https:\/\/carnegieendowment.org\/research\/2024\/10\/understanding-turkiyes-entanglement-with-russia?lang=en\">security, economic, and political interests<\/a> in the <a href=\"https:\/\/ecfr.eu\/publication\/bridging-the-bosphorus-how-europe-and-turkey-can-turn-tiffs-into-tactics-in-the-black-sea\/\">BSR<\/a>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">T\u00fcrkiye, unlike most NATO countries, has <a href=\"https:\/\/www.europarl.europa.eu\/doceo\/document\/E-9-2022-003495_EN.html\">not yet sanctioned Russia<\/a>, and still <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/markets\/commodities\/top-turkish-refiner-tupras-resumes-buying-russian-urals-crude-sources-say-2025-04-16\/\">remains one of Russia\u2019s most important partners for refining Russian crude oil<\/a>. At the same time, T\u00fcrkiye has also <a href=\"https:\/\/www.atlanticcouncil.org\/blogs\/turkeysource\/turkey-wants-to-end-the-war-in-ukraine-and-might-have-a-formula-to-do-it\/\">provided diplomatic and military aid to Ukraine<\/a>. T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s seemingly contradictory policies reflect its primary goal: to maintain the existing balance of power in the BSR. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s stance is driven by independent interests rather an alignment with the West or Russia. For T\u00fcrkiye, reinforcing the status quo reaffirms their military, economic, and diplomatic power in the BSR. T\u00fcrkiye prioritizes business and trade to aid its struggling economy. It has also been increasingly positioning itself <a href=\"https:\/\/www.csis.org\/analysis\/what-role-can-turkey-play-ukraine-negotiations\">as a mediator and central diplomatic force<\/a>; this has informed the country\u2019s decisions to participate in the <a href=\"https:\/\/mc.nato.int\/media-centre\/news\/2025\/turkiye-transfers-command-of-standing-nato-mine-countermeasure-group-2-to-italy\">Mine Countermeasures (MCM) task force<\/a> (a humanitarian-focused mission) and engage in peacemaking talks with Russia and Ukraine. T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s commitments are strategic, wishing to avoid provocation of either side while still leveraging their influence in military, resources, and politics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 id=\"challenges-for-canada\" class=\"wp-block-heading\">Challenges for Canada<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The major challenge for Canada will be to understand how to approach collaborations with T\u00fcrkiye in the BSR. Estrangement and misalignment from both parties pose potential problems. Relations only recently improved after Canada <a href=\"https:\/\/www.international.gc.ca\/trade-commerce\/controls-controles\/reports-rapports\/exp-permits-turkiye-licences-turkiye.aspx?lang=eng\">placed an embargo<\/a> following T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s use of Canadian arms in Nagorno-Karabakh, Libya, and Syria. T\u00fcrkiye, through its refusal to sanction Russia or permit NATO military presence BSR, has demonstrated that it is not willing to explicitly target Russia. This clashes with Canada\u2019s aim to contain Russian expansionism and protect Ukraine. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Canadian-Turkish military cooperation largely operates through NATO. Both countries participate in <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/topics_136388.htm\">Forward Land Forces (FLF) battlegroups<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/jfcnaples.nato.int\/kfor\/about-us\/welcome-to-kfor\/contributing-nations\">KFOR<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.tak.org.tr\/en\/turkiye-and-nato\/\">NATO Mission Iraq<\/a>, and <a href=\"https:\/\/www.canada.ca\/en\/department-national-defence\/news\/2024\/12\/canada-transfers-command-of-standing-nato-maritime-group-two.html\">Standing NATO Maritime Group Two<\/a>. While NATO provides a strong foundation, direct partnerships between Canadian and Turkish armed forces are still minimal, thus heightening the chances of estrangement between both sides. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 id=\"opportunities-for-canada\" class=\"wp-block-heading\">Opportunities for Canada <\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Despite limitations, there are still opportunities to develop Canadian-Turkish diplomatic collaboration. Focusing on economic, humanitarian, or regional development initiatives creates common ground. For example, the defence industry is an area of growing partnership. Since Canada lifted the arms embargo on T\u00fcrkiye, it has become one of Canada\u2019s <a href=\"https:\/\/ploughshares.ca\/canadas-soaring-arms-exports-what-the-2024-numbers-reveal\/\">top export destinations for arms<\/a>. T\u00fcrkiye also participates in CANSEC (Canada\u2019s international defence technology conference), and Turkish defence firms travelled to Canada as part of a <a href=\"https:\/\/www.turkiyetoday.com\/nation\/turkish-defense-firms-showcase-autonomous-systems-at-nato-innovation-exercise-3208622\">NATO innovation exercise<\/a>. The exercise generated technology that enhances automated systems and increases resilience to hybrid offensives. For example, the firm HAVELSAN was able to <a href=\"https:\/\/www.asianmilitaryreview.com\/2025\/07\/defence-reimagined-havelsans-multi-domain-ai-strategy\/\">create a way for automatic systems to operate even if GPS signals are jammed<\/a>. <a href=\"https:\/\/ottawa-emb.mfa.gov.tr\/Mission\/ShowInfoNote\/414398\">Existing economic ties<\/a> between the two countries also provide strong opportunities for investment and technological development which can have positive effects both for defence and for the overall economies of each country. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Building regional capacity is a promising avenue for cooperation. As mentioned above, T\u00fcrkiye participates in FLF battlegroups, part of NATO\u2019s <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/topics_136388.htm\">broader goal to reinforce the eastern flank against Russia<\/a>. Pursuing similar initiatives in the scope of military modernization could be successful in increasing regional capacity. Furthermore, Canada can draw upon its skills in mediation and development to encourage stable, formal BSR organizations. Both actions can increase the ability for the BSR to safeguard against further destabilization in the region, which is beneficial to Turkish interests. The MCM was able to launch successfully in large part because it was framed as a humanitarian mission. This emphasizes the importance of optics for T\u00fcrkiye, and should serve as an example of how to navigate different positionalities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">For Canada, the BSR can be a new avenue of partnership, increasing overall soft power and presence. A strong BSR is essential for NATO\u2019s objective to defend Alliance territories. It is also essential for Canada\u2019s efforts to enhance its defence posture and bolster international stability. However, without critically engaging with T\u00fcrkiye this goal will be difficult to achieve. Therefore, finding relevant but non-conventional ways to collaborate in the BSR is key. Enhancing relations also align with other moves T\u00fcrkiye has been making to collaborate more closely with other NATO and EU countries which seek similar goals as Canada. With an increasing need for fortification of the BSR, Canada should take the opportunity to distinguish itself as a valuable partner.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>T\u00fcrkiye, as the bulwark of NATO&#8217;s eastern flank, looks to maximize its own independent desires in the Black Sea Region, increased Canadian cooperation on initiatives outside of hard security concerns can fortify NATO interests in the region.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":375,"featured_media":2144,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":"","_links_to":"","_links_to_target":""},"categories":[180,85,84,145,92,100,83],"tags":[178,198,132,109,173,222,78],"class_list":["post-2143","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-black-sea","category-eurasia","category-european-security","category-nato","category-brief","category-russia","category-ukraine","tag-black-sea","tag-canada","tag-eurasia","tag-nato","tag-security","tag-turkiye-2","tag-war-in-ukraine"],"acf":{"cu_post_thumbnail":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2143","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/375"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2143"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2143\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2145,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2143\/revisions\/2145"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/2144"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2143"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2143"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2143"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}