Summary

â—� Since 2022, the Arctic has evolved from a region of cooperation and to one of competition and division.

� Previously deemed ‘exceptional’ due to its collaborative status quo’s resilience against geopolitical changes, increased militarization and economic competition indicates an abandonment of this norm, along with decreased prioritization in environmental security, climate change, and scientific exchanges.

â—� These shifts further compound environmental and climate consequences – as militarization and economic development pose great risks to Arctic environmental security and temperatures.

â—� Policies from Russia (since 2022) and the United States (since January 2025) have pivoted towards economic development, along with a decrease in efforts to foster sustainable development. Russia has also included an explicit pillar of militarization to its main strategic priorities.

â—� Canada and other NATO countries have stated environmental and climate commitments in policy and have also increased militarization in their Arctic regions.

Background

Prior to 2022, the Arctic was governed in a spirit of cooperation in large part due to its unforgiving environmental conditions and longstanding culture of multilateralism between states, Inuit, and other Arctic Indigenous communities through institutions like the Arctic Council. This institution was used to foster sustainable development, reduce risks of environmental accidents, as well as environmental degradation. It functioned as a forum for the negotiation of Arctic agreements.

Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, increased militarization and attention has been devoted to the Arctic by both Russian and NATO-Arctic nations. In March 2022, the A7 members of the Arctic Council announced a diplomatic pause in protest of Russia’s invasion. Currently, Russia does not participate and has for the council. The region has been increasingly divided into , ruining decades of progress as well as sidelining Indigenous voices and cooperative initiatives. As a result, the region has shifted from a culture of cooperation to competition, leaving scientists isolated, and with fewer opportunities for bilateral, multilateral, and scientific collaboration in the name of protecting the Arctic’s future.

Rising global temperatures have led to an increase of melting ice in the Arctic, contributing to longer shipping seasons, increasing traffic in the region, and more opportunities for resource extraction, including mining of critical minerals and other sources of energy. These potential economic prospects are largely with the region’s unforgiving operational conditions and lack of infrastructure. Regardless, the Arctic is growing increasingly vulnerable to exploitation due to climate change and the fracturing of the Arctic status-quo. The latter has resulted in policy shifts from collaboration and prioritization – albeit, not equal across all states – of environmental security, to securitization and economic development.

Russian Arctic Policy/Strategy since 2022

Russia’s Arctic Strategy is centred around securitization and economic development, with little regard for environmental security or sustainability. In response to Western sanctions, Russia has framed economic development and defense in the Arctic as a tenet of national security, . In addition, NATO’s northern expansion, with Sweden and Finland becoming full-members, has aggravated Russia’s fear of encirclement, rooted in its view of the Arctic as ‘’. Increased militarization, such as the Safe Arctic 2025 Exercise, underscore Russia’s strategic priority for defense posturing in the Arctic.

NSR is a large tenet of Russian economic development in the Arctic, which provides faster shipping routes between Europe and Asia, most notably for Russian energy. Increased naval traffic in the Arctic region, compounded by a lack of coast guard and joint-surveillance cooperation initiatives, increases the risk of oil spills and shipping accidents. In addition, pollution and ecological damage are symptomatic of unsustainable development. Russia is expected to release a new soon, unveiling its updated development priorities.

NATO Countries and New Arctic Strategies

NATO’s northern expansion has led to increased militarization of the Nordic Arctic. NATO’s Arctic approach focuses largely on “�. After joining NATO, Sweden and Finland committed to its defense spending guidelines, resulting in . In addition, increasing from Russia have prompted further development of defense capabilities. Although NATO remains dedicated to environmental security protection, observers urge the organization to for the Arctic that considers its unique vulnerabilities, operational challenges, and various regarding climate change, including environmental and human security. Further policy development is needed to its Climate Change and Security Action Plan to the Arctic’s idiosyncrasies.

The balances sustainable development and security concerns, whilst maintaining a level of non-political cooperation. Though recent incursions on NATO countries’ and spaces, notably in , pose serious challenges for any prospect of Arctic cooperation with Russia. Denmark’s highlights its effort to bolster its presence and defense capabilities in the Arctic. Denmark has increased its militarization in Greenland since 2022, and most prominently since the start of Donald Trump’s second term, given the latter’s continued ontological threats.

(March, 2025) stresses close ties between Canada and the United States to “secure North American homeland�, as well as with its Nordic Allies. It will initiate “Arctic security dialogue� with “like-minded states�, further alluding to Canada’s recent shift towards ‘friendshoring’ in foreign policy, as well as increasing polarization among Arctic actors. Although Canada remains dedicated to its – which prioritizes the wellbeing of northern communities, development of Arctic research, and environmental security – its increase in Arctic securitization and economic development necessitates further policy adaptation to the changing geopolitical environment.

The second term of Donald Trump marks a major shift in the from one of prioritizing security, climate change, sustainable development, and international governance, to a more “business-like� strategy that prioritizes large-scale resource extraction in Alaska. President Trump’s tariffs and annexation threats to American Arctic Allies further allude to this major shift. In addition, the Trump Administration has rescinded the previous Administration’s restrictions on resource development in order to unleash “�, including new , and projects in previously protected parks and forests. In addition, climate research is being dismantled and the once central to American Arctic policy is now cut out. At the between Putin and Trump in August 2025, Putin alluded to further cooperation in the United States by making mention of the Arctic, though emphasizing more diplomatic and economic cooperation, not environmental.

Conclusion- Risks to Environmental Security and Climate Change

Increased militarization in the Arctic risks environmental consequences. Military training exercises can lead to in training areas, in addition to levels of noise-pollution that harm humans and wildlife. Militarization can also severely disrupt Indigenous livelihoods across the Arctic region, with communities like the and relying on a longstanding tradition of land-based sustenance.

Decreased research collaboration severely reduces scientists’ abilities to track changes in the Arctic climate and ecology. in June indicate that prior to 2022, bilateral cooperation allowed for standardization of data collection, optimization of research processes through pooling of resources and skills, as well as increased habitat conservation and better outcomes for wildlife, eventually leading to the adoption of international market standards and best management practices. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, these scientists have had virtually no communication, resulting in a massive knowledge gap in understanding Arctic changes, as well as a decline in trust. In addition, pressing security risks such as , affecting infrastructure, food security, and public health, are lacking in crucial data, rendering it unpredictable and difficult to manage.

This new status quo of polarization and militarization is chipping away at every avenue for bilateral cooperation, which has tangible effects on Arctic environmental security. The longstanding between Norway and Russia, dating back to 1976, had persevered through these geopolitical changes. It is now at risk due to a recent Russian ultimatum to Norway to close its economic zone to its vessels. This occurred in light of Norway’s sanctions against companies Norebo and Murman Seafood in July 2025. A breakdown of this agreement would increase risks of poaching and unsustainable fishing, as well as pose serious risks to the region’s ecosystem. Overall, these strategic shifts indicate an abandonment of the previous norm of collaboration in the Arctic, and the emerging norm of competition, polarization and militarization, all of which pose grave dangers to the natural world in the Arctic.

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Russia and Iran increasingly view the United States (US)-led international order not as a guarantor of stability, but as a direct threat to their sovereignty and national interests. This perception has become a defining feature of their foreign policy orientation (). For Russia, confrontation with the West has evolved into a broader ideological and geopolitical contest, not just over the sovereignty of states like Ukraine, but over the very structure of the global order. This logic of confrontation now deeply informs Moscow’s regional strategy (). For Iran, this dynamic resonates with its own post-revolutionary worldview, which has long framed its foreign policy as part of a broader anti-colonial struggle. Since 1979, the Islamic Republic has positioned itself as a challenger to Western dominance, viewing the liberal order as an extension of American imperialism and seeking to assert its sovereignty through resistance to perceived external interference ().

Moscow and Tehran both advocate for a multipolar world order grounded in “sovereign internationalism,� a model that prioritizes national autonomy and cultural pluralism over liberal interventionism. This vision argues that no single state or coalition should dominate the global system or impose a universal ideological framework. Instead, the emphasis is on the coexistence of diverse political systems and civilizational models. In this context, Iran emerges not just as a regional partner for Russia, but as a strategic ally in a shared effort to reconfigure the global order away from US hegemony (; ).

Building upon the shared perception of the US-led international order as a threat and their mutual vision for a multipolar world, the subsequent analysis will delve into the manifestations of the strategic partnership between Iran and Russia. It will first examine their cooperation in the Syrian conflict, highlighting the military and political coordination that propped up the Assad regime. Following this, the discussion will pivot to the significant shifts in their defence partnership, particularly in the context of the war in Ukraine and its impact on arms sales and military technology transfers, as well as their ongoing collaboration in civilian nuclear energy. Finally, the analysis will explore the internal Iranian perspectives on this alliance, contrasting the historical distrust and pragmatic engagement of the elite with the distinct views of Principlist and Reformist factions on the benefits and limitations of their country’s relationship with Russia.

Cooperation in Syria

Iran and Russia have developed a robust partnership rooted in shared strategic interests, most notably in the Syrian conflict, where both powers were instrumental in propping up the Assad regime. Their cooperation encompassed military operations, intelligence sharing, and political coordination. United in their opposition of Western-backed efforts to overthrow Assad, Moscow and Tehran initially collaborated to suppress the Syrian opposition and combat the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL). Russia brought airpower and advanced military capabilities to the battlefield, while Iran supplied ground forces, intelligence, and logistical support through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and affiliated militias such as Hezbollah.

This collaboration intensified in 2015, when the Assad regime teetered on the brink of collapse following the fall of Palmyra to ISIL. The turning point came after Qassem Soleimani, the now deceased commander of the Quds Force, made a covert visit to Moscow in order to meet with President Vladimir Putin and Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu ( ). This meeting laid the groundwork for a major military intervention in Syria. Soon after, Russia and Iran – alongside Syria and Iraq – formed the so-called RSII coalition (also referred to as the 4+1, with Hezbollah as the fifth actor) and established joint operation centers in Damascus and Baghdad to synchronize their campaign against ISIL (). This unprecedented intelligence-sharing alliance marked a significant step in institutionalizing the Iran-Russia military partnership.

While Russia has long viewed Iran as a critical partner in stabilizing regions vulnerable to extremism – including Central Asia, the Northern Caucasus, and Chechnya – this relationship is not without its competitive undertones. Both powers seek influence over post‑war Syria, and their interests do not always align (). Tensions have emerged over military coordination, such as disagreements on air support for Iranian-backed ground forces in Khan Tuman and disputes over basing rights, which have occasionally resulted in operational friction on the ground. Additionally, each country has pursued economic and strategic footholds: Russia through its naval base at Tartus and air facility in Latakia, Iran through its role in shaping Syrian militias and economic reconstruction. These dueling interests have created ongoing bureaucratic and diplomatic rivalries despite continued large-scale cooperation (). Despite this friction, Russia and Iran remain aligned through their shared objective of undermining Western influence in Syria and the broader Middle East.

The Strategic Evolution of Russia-Iran Military Cooperation

The war in Ukraine has significantly reshaped Russia’s role in the global arms trade, directly influencing its defence partnership with Iran. Once one of the world’s leading arms exporters, Russia has seen a dramatic decline in its global military exports as a result of the war (). As Moscow diverts its military-industrial resources toward sustaining its own war effort, it has increasingly turned to Iran for key battlefield technologies, marking a striking reversal in traditional arms trade dynamics.

The clearest manifestation of this shift is Russia’s reliance on Iranian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), particularly the Shahed series of loitering munitions, widely referred to as “kamikaze� drones (; ). These weapons have played a key role in Russia’s battlefield tactics in Ukraine, offering a low-cost means of striking Ukrainian infrastructure and military positions. For Iran, the war provides an opportunity to test and refine its drone technology under live combat conditions. Iran has drawn valuable insights from Russia’s war with Ukraine to inform its own confrontations with Israel and involvement in regional proxy wars ().

Military cooperation between Tehran and Moscow now extends well beyond the simple exchange of weapons. Russia has started localizing the production of Iranian drones within its own borders, while Iran is reportedly acquiring Russian hardware and technological know-how with the intent to reverse-engineer and produce advanced systems domestically ().

On the other side, Iran has struggled for decades to modernize its air force, which is still heavily reliant on aging American aircraft acquired prior to the 1979 revolution. Russia has emerged as a potential supplier, particularly with the highly capable Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jet. Reports suggest that Iran finalized a purchase of Su-35s in early 2025, although deliveries have faced delays (; ). These jets are vital for enhancing Iran’s air superiority and regional defence posture. Alongside aircraft, Iran has also long sought advanced air defence systems from Russia. While the S-300 system was delivered following the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement, speculation continues around the possible acquisition of the more advanced S-400 ().

Nuclear Cooperation and Civilian Ambitions

Iran’s nuclear program remains a central component of its relationship with Russia. The two nations maintain long-standing cooperation in the civilian nuclear sector. The Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, completed by Russia in 2013, stands as a landmark in this collaboration. It helped revive Russia’s post-Soviet nuclear industry and provided Iran with a symbol of energy independence and technological progress ().

Russia supplies and retrieves spent fuel from Bushehr, thereby addressing concerns over the potential diversion of nuclear material for weapons use (). Despite growing international scrutiny and intensifying sanctions, Russia and Iran continue to pursue the expansion of nuclear infrastructure. Iran aims to triple its nuclear power generation capacity, with Russia assisting in the construction of additional facilities. This includes ongoing work on Bushehr Units 2 and 3 and plans for new reactors in Sirik or Karun. A major development came in January 2025, when Presidents Vladimir Putin and Masoud Pezeshkian signed a new agreement outlining the construction of eight nuclear power plants in Iran, four of which are to be located in Bushehr (; ).

Popular Sentiment: Historical Distrust Rooted in Imperial Legacy

A prevalent narrative within Iranian political discourse interprets Russia’s regional strategy through the lens of a historical “policy of access to open waters.� This concept – rooted in the 19th-century Iran-Russia wars and reinforced by the Soviet occupation of Iran during the Second World War – sees Russia as having long harboured ambitions to expand southward into Iran in order to gain access to the Persian Gulf (). Iranian historians and commentators frequently reference the Iran-Russia conflicts of the 1800s and the events of 1941 as key moments that shaped this suspicion ().
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These tensions are reflected in the Treaty of Golestan (1813), signed after Iran’s defeat in war and amid internal unrest. The Treaty forced Iran to cede vast territories – including present-day Georgia, Dagestan, and parts of Armenia – to Russia. It also gave Russia exclusive rights to deploy naval vessels in the Caspian Sea and allowed for Russian interference in Iran’s internal succession politics. In Iranian society, this agreement – along with the Treaty of Turkmenchay (1828) that followed – is commonly described as a “disgraceful� treaty,�[1] a label that continues to shape public perceptions of Russia’s intentions (). The 1979 Islamic Revolution institutionalized this deep-rooted skepticism through its foundational foreign policy principle of “Neither East nor West,� which rejected dominance by either Cold War superpower.

Iranian Elite View: Russia as a Useful but Unreliable Partner

Despite these historical grievances, Iran’s post-Revolutionary foreign policy has evolved toward pragmatic engagement with Russia. Shared opposition to US hegemony and a mutual interest in preserving regional sovereignty have driven this strategic alignment. For Iran, Russia differs from Western powers because of Moscow’s apparent non-interference in Iran’s internal political structure – a stark contrast to the West’s perceived advocacy for regime change or domestic transformation ().
Iran’s strategic relationship with Russia is rooted in the perception that Moscow does not seek to change Iran’s power structure, constitution, or cultural identity. Instead, Russia engages with the Islamic Republic on its own terms, respecting its political autonomy – a stance viewed as more conducive to long-term cooperation. Despite this favourable perception of Russia as a non-interfering partner, domestic disagreement persists over how deeply Iran should align itself with Moscow. This disagreement is generally divided between the Principlist[2] and Reformist camps.

Principlist View

Principlists consistently highlight Russia’s central role in resisting Western pressure, particularly emphasizing its ability to veto United Nations Security Council resolutions against Iran. Russia’s resistance is portrayed as a concrete advantage of the strategic partnership, as Iran – which maintains its status as an independent and influential actor – can partner with Russia to form a “regional transformation with global impact� in order to move towards a “new world order� (). Importantly, this narrative goes beyond rhetoric to serve as the ideological foundation for the Iran-Russia relationship. Cooperation with Russia is depicted as a practical embodiment of the “Resistance Economy,� a key Principlist doctrine focused on achieving self-sufficiency and resilience in the face of external threats ().

The Iran-Russia relationship is heavily anchored in military-security cooperation and aligned regional positions, especially in Syria and in opposition to perceived actions of the “Zionist regime� in Israel (). This points to a deep, mutually reinforcing bond rooted in shared adversaries and compounded by Western sanctions. Economic cooperation is equally central in Principlist discourse. The partnership is framed as strategic and mutually beneficial, expanding across energy, transportation, agriculture, and technology. Collaboration in the energy sector – particularly gas and oil trade – is viewed as critical for reducing dependence on Western markets and creating alternative supply routes ().

One major initiative is the integration of Iran’s railway network with Russia’s, touted as a top priority to boost trade and regional connectivity. The gas agreement signed in 2024, allowing up to 300 million cubic meters of gas to flow between the two countries per day, is heralded as the most significant gas contract in Iran’s history (). This positions Iran as a potential transit hub for Russian gas en route to India. Improvements in financial and banking ties through bilateral and multilateral currency agreements and the use of national and digital currencies are reported to have significantly enhanced trade. In the first ten months of 2024, Iranian exports to Russia rose by 20% in weight and 12% in value compared to the previous year, amounting to $889 million in non-oil exports ().

Reformist View

While recognizing the geopolitical realities that necessitate engagement with Russia, the Reformist camp in Iranian politics and society approaches the partnership with caution and pragmatism. They stress the importance of balance and transparency in Iran’s foreign policy, arguing that national interests are best served through diversified relations with all major global powers, rather than aligning exclusively with either China or Russia ().

This approach reflects an understanding of Iran’s geopolitical leverage, which – if managed wisely – could enable Tehran to extract concessions from both Eastern and Western blocs. Reformists contend that the strategic agreement with Russia will only yield meaningful results if pursued within a broader, balanced foreign policy framework. They often cite countries like Türkiye and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which engage strategically with both the East and West on their own terms – not out of necessity, but through conscious choice ().

Economic concerns also figure prominently in Reformist critiques. They highlight the relatively shallow economic and cultural ties between Iran and Russia, noting that trade volumes remain far lower than those with China or Türkiye (). Reformists also argue that Russia and Iran are more rivals than partners in the energy sector and that Iran’s current policies risk ceding too much ground to Russian interests. This camp also questions the reliability of Russia and China as partners, asserting that if either had a genuine interest in supporting Iran, they would have done so more meaningfully over the past two decades ().

Reformist voices regularly point out Russia’s limited capacity to deliver the capital and technology Iran needs to advance its industrial and scientific sectors. They also draw attention to domestic challenges such as administrative inefficiency and the undue influence of entrenched economic elites all of which, they argue, undermine the implementation of large-scale bilateral projects ().

Reformist opinions frequently advocate for a more pragmatic, interest-based foreign policy – one less shaped by ideological posturing and more attuned to the complexities of global engagement. A recurring theme in these narratives is the detrimental impact of internal political rivalries and factionalism on foreign policy, with Reformists warning that narrow political calculations often come at the expense of broader national interests. Ultimately, their discourse seeks to redefine “national interest� in a more comprehensive and less ideologically rigid way – one that avoids over-reliance on any single global power ().

Heading

[1] In everyday Iranian discourse, the Treaties of Turkmenchay and Golestan are commonly invoked as the ultimate symbols of national humiliation and defeat—often labeled as a qarardad-e nangin (a “disgraceful treaty”).

[2] Principlists in Iranian politics emphasize strict adherence to Islamic revolutionary ideals and resistance to liberal influence, differing from traditional conservatives who favour small governments, economic liberalization, and fiscal moderation over ideological purity.

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The post Russia and Iran – Strategic Allies or Tactical Partners? appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

Russian media coverage for the first half of April 2025 focused on projecting Russian diplomatic flexibility, economic resilience, and military strength, while continuing to highlight Western divisions, policy failures, and hypocrisy. These are the main narratives that have been recently dominating Russian headlines:  

Continuing Positive Russia-US Diplomatic Engagements 

Across multiple outlets, Russian media highlighted recent diplomatic developments in Russia-US relations, emphasizing the continuation of a potential thaw. Some examples of this reporting include: 

• April 10, 2025 – Kosmopolskaya Pravda on the negotiations between Russia and the US in Istanbul, noting that it lasted a difficult six hours. Alongside this coverage, Izvestia News that the “Ukraine situationâ€� was strategically left off the agenda to help push Russia-US relations back to normalcy.ÌýÌý

• April 14, 2025 – Izvestia News that while Russia and the US continue negotiations on the Ukraine war in a bilateral format, the parties are unlikely to reach a ceasefire agreement by Easter, which was previously floated by the White House. This source cites “Ukraine’s inability to negotiate, its violation of the moratorium on strikes on energy infrastructure, and US President Donald Trump’s desire to achieve a quick ceasefire without a political settlementâ€� as complicating factors in the negotiations.ÌýÌý

Context: On April 10, 2025, Russia and the US engaged in a high-profile prisoner exchange, which both Western and Russian media took as a sign of continued willingness from both sides to engage in meaningful diplomacy. Pushing this theme of cooperation with the US reinforces Russia’s image as a stable, rational actor and sets the stage for future bilateral deals that bypass Ukraine and NATO frameworks. 

Claims of Ukraine Carrying Out Attacks on Energy Infrastructure 

As Russia and the US engaged in bilateral discussions, Moscow started amplifying claims of Ukrainian ceasefire violations while portraying Russian military actions as defensive and strategic. Some sample Russian articles on this topic include: 

• April 10, 2025 – Kosmopolskaya Pravda to the Russia-US talks in Istanbul, Ukrainian armed forces launched 11 new strikes on Russian energy facilities in violation of the current cessation of strikes on energy facilities. The publication concluded that Ukrainian politicians continue to demonstratively violate Russia-US agreements.Ìý

• April 14, 2025 – TASS News that the extension of the moratorium on strikes on Russian and Ukrainian energy facilities beyond April 16 rests with the decision of Russian President Vladimir Putin. The publication highlighted that Russia’s Defence Ministry has repeatedly emphasized that Ukraine continues to unilaterally attack Russia’s energy infrastructure despite public statements of support for the moratorium.Ìý

Context: These reports are part of Russia’s effort to frame Ukraine as the aggressor and justify escalation ahead of talks, using alleged ceasefire violations to shift blame and portray Moscow as the more responsible actor. This rhetoric also aims to pressure Western negotiators by portraying Ukraine as undermining peace efforts, thereby shifting blame for any breakdown in talks onto Ukraine. 

Defending the Missile Attack on Sumy 

Russian media also gave significant attention to defending Russia’s April 13 missile strike on Sumy – its deadliest attack on Ukraine this year – which had sparked international outcry and conflicting narratives over the intended target. Key takes by Russian media on this topic include: 

• April 14, 2025 – Lenta.ru that Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said the strike on Sumy targeted a meeting between Ukrainian commanders and Western military officials, some allegedly from NATO, whom he claimed were helping coordinate long-range missile strikes against Russia.ÌýÌý

• April 15, 2025 – TASS News that the US informed its partners in the G7 that it will veto the statement condemning Russia’s attack in Sumy. Citing reporting by Bloomberg, TASS News indicated that the US told the G7 that it would not sign the statement because it is “working to preserve the space to negotiate peace” with Russia.ÌýÌý

Context: Russia’s current claim is that on April 13, 2025, the Russian armed forces delivered a strike by two Iskander-M tactical missiles on a gathering place of Ukraine’s Seversk operational-tactical group command staff in the city of Sumy, targeting military operations rather than civilians. This framing serves a dual purpose: to maintain domestic support by emphasizing Russian military gains, and to erode Western cohesion by amplifying skepticism and hesitation among NATO Allies. This framing also normalizes Russia’s continued aggression while painting any foreign resistance as fragmented and performative.Ìý

Division within the “Coalition of the Willingâ€� 

As debate over Western military support for Ukraine intensified, Russian media has also been seizing on internal divisions within the so-called “coalition of the willing” to portray the initiative as fragmented, ineffective, and ultimately destined for failure. Some media sources projecting this narrative include:Ìý

• April 10, 2025 – Kosmopolskaya Pravda that the “gathering of countries wanting to send troops to Ukraine ended in failureâ€� dubbing it the “coalition of the indecisiveâ€� and noting that only 6 of the 30 members are willing to commit forces, with progress stalled due to the lack of a US security guarantee in case of conflict with Russia.ÌýÌý

• April 14, 2025 – Kosmopolskaya Pravda on comments made by Italian Defence Minister Guido Crosetto in which he expressed doubt about the “coalition of the willing,” calling it a theoretical concept that lacked practical conditions, and instead emphasized that Europe should continue to rely on NATO for its security.Ìý

Context: These reports are part of Russia’s strategic messaging aimed at undermining Western unity and discrediting any multilateral effort to bolster Ukraine outside of NATO. By highlighting the coalition’s lack of cohesion, limited troop commitments, and the absence of a US security guarantee, Russian outlets seek to frame the West as hesitant and divided in its efforts to end the war in Ukraine.  

West Paying the Price for Distancing from Russia’s Oil and Gas 

Following the shocks to global oil prices caused by US tariffs, Russian media also emphasized the economic fallout of Europe’s break from Russian energy and the negative impacts that this decision has had on EU citizens. Some examples of this reporting include: 

• April 7, 2025 – Vedemosti News that the EU’s detachment from Russian energy resources came at a very high cost to its citizens, citing statements made by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen at the World Economic Forum in January 2025. Using its own calculations, this article determined that from 2022 to 2024, EU member states spent €544 billion extra on non-Russian energy imports.Ìý

• April 15, 2025 – RIA News: that the EU is looking to break long-term gas contracts with Russia without paying fines to Moscow, as part of its continued effort to stop using Russian energy resources. The publication emphasized Moscow’s messaging that European countries made a serious mistake when they rejected Russian fossil fuels, as they have since formed a new dependency on buying Russian oil and gas at higher prices through intermediaries.ÌýÌý

Context: This narrative aims to assert Russia’s indispensable role as an energy source to Europe and to portray the West as economically vulnerable and morally compromised in its pursuit of independence from Russian resources. By highlighting the higher cost paid for energy, this narrative also attempts to influence EU citizens to become more critical of the EU’s decision to end its reliance on Russian oil and gas. 

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