Introduction

Since the 1970s, the European Economic Community (EEC)/European Union (EU) has sought to play a complementary role to the United States (US) in the pursuit of security and stability in the Middle East. This has occurred mostly through soft security measures: diplomacy; economic and financial aid to Palestinians; civilian missions focused on stability; and dialogue with Arab states. In this regard, it is worth mentioning the Euro-Arab Dialogue: a political and economic cooperation framework launched in 1974 between the EEC and the Arab League to strengthen the relationship between the parties after the Yom Kippur War and oil crisis. However, despite these efforts, the limits of the EU’s unique institutional set-up have prevented it from playing a major role in regional affairs. The ongoing war in the Gaza Strip between Israel and Hamas has highlighted the limits of the EU’s diplomatic action. In the meantime, President Donald Trump’s Peace Plan for Gaza has re-energized, once again, the role of the , prompting some to draw historical parallels to earlier US-brokered efforts – from Camp David to the failed Oslo Accords. What role could the EU play in the American plan? How can its involvement be decisive to achieve a just and lasting peace in the region?

Context

The 2006 electoral victory of Hamas in the Gaza Strip led to a severe escalation with Israel. With Hamas taking over the territory from the Fatah-controlled Palestinian Authority (PA), Israel considered the Palestinian military group a security threat, as it refused to recognize the Jewish state, renounce violence, or accept previous peace agreements brokered by the PA and Israel. Hamas’ accession to power in 2006 constituted a critical historical juncture that transformed governance in Gaza and its overall relationship with Israel. This shift was accompanied by the return of a range of familiar political practices – including diplomatic negotiations, economic sanctions, and ongoing military engagement – that continue to define this governance period.

In the meantime, two other factors made the relationship between the parties more strained. On the one hand, on November 29, 2012, the , which upgraded Palestine from a “non-member observer entity” to a “non-member observer State.” This historic vote granted Palestine implicit recognition of statehood and was seen as a move to revive the two-state solution, a move strongly opposed by the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. On the other hand, the US-brokered Abraham Accords were signed in 2020, aiming to normalize diplomatic, economic, and security relations between Israel and several Arab nations (including the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan). Palestinians overwhelmingly opposed the Abraham Accords, perceiving the agreements as an abandonment of the long-standing consensus among Arab states that negotiations with Israel were contingent on ending occupation.

On October 7, 2023, Hamas initiated an attack on Israel. . The Israeli response was a full-scale military invasion of the Gaza Strip which, by December 2025, has killed 71,266 Palestinians, left most schools and hospitals in ruins, and caused long-term damage to the local society and economy.

The EU’s response to Gaza was characterized by contradictions and divisions between its member states. Some countries such as Czech Republic, Austria, Hungary, Italy, and Germany, stood with Israel, backing its military campaign and avoiding criticism of Netanyahu’s regime. Other governments, such as Belgium, Spain, France and Ireland – while strongly condemning Hamas – called for a ceasefire and criticized Israel for violating international humanitarian law. These differing positions prevented the EU from having a coordinated stance at the UN when voting on a on December 12, 2023, which called for a humanitarian ceasefire.

Divergencies appeared not only between member states but also across EU institutions. While European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen showed a stronger emphasis on Israel’s right to defence, the European Council issued a more cautious joint statement aimed at highlighting the EU as a unified voice. The statement took a more neutral tone than President von der Leyen, emphasizing both Israel’s right to defence as well as the crucial need for humanitarian aid, civilian protection, and adherence to international law. A third voice, EU’s foreign policy chief Josep Borrell, was more critical of Israel, . The inertia resulting from lack of consensus among member states and across institutions severely undermines the EU’s position as mediator, letting the Americans play a leading role once again.

On September 29, 2025, President Trump announced his plan to “end the Gaza war” and address the broader Middle Eastern crisis. The so-called was negotiated with the consultation of Arab states, namely Egypt, Qatar and Türkiye. The EU played no formal role in the negotiations; it made no proposals of its own, despite being both a major donor to Palestine and an important partner of Israel.

Endorsed by UN Security Council , Trump’s plan includes the deployment of an International Stabilization Force (ISF) in Gaza, a multinational military body that will ensure the demilitarization and security of the Gaza Strip; and the creation of a Board of Peace (BoP), a committee led by Trump that will oversee the political transition in Gaza until a reformed Palestinian Authority can take over governance in 2027. Formally launched at the 56th World Economic Forum in January 2026, the BoP claims its main purpose is the promotion of peacekeeping all around the world, not only in Gaza. Countries wishing to participate in the BoP are required to contribute US$1 billion to the organization to renew their membership, and Trump, as its chairman, is not subject to term limits, holding the sole authority to nominate his successor.

to ending the war in Gaza; however, many EU member states have expressed concern over the possibility of the BoP overshadowing the role of the UN. Currently, Bulgaria and Hungary are the only two EU countries to have joined the initiative. France, Spain, Poland, and Germany declined to participate, while Italy, Romania, Greece and Cyprus joined as observers. The EU Commission also decided to join as an observer, sending the Commissioner for the Mediterranean, Dubravka Šuica, to Washington, DC, to attend the inaugural meeting of the BoP on February 19, 2026. In a sign of continued disunity, , calling it a “mistake”, as the EU supports a two-state solution and “cannot participate” in any body that excludes the Palestinian National Authority.

Problems

Even if Trump’s plan represents an important step towards a peace deal, it contains critical aspects which might hinder its implementation. The current plan effectively grants Israel a veto power over peace, as its military redeployments are conditioned on Hamas’ demilitarization and reform of the PA. At the same time, Israel is not required to make any formal commitments towards halting settlement expansion in the West Bank or respecting the autonomy of a Palestinian state. On this issue Israel’s stance is clear: Netanyahu declared that , as it is an “existential threat to Israel.” Therefore, there is a real risk that, without guarantees for the Palestinian people and a plan to address occupation, Trump’s plan may fail or lead to an unjust and unstable peace agreement that steamrolls Palestinian rights and territories recognized by international law.

On the other hand, Trump’s peace plan has confirmed that the US continues to play a . However, some , such as Francesca Albanese, Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian Occupied Territory, criticized the plan. UN Special Adviser on Sustainability, Jeffrey Sachs, labelled the US proposal as “.” According to them, Trump is behaving in Gaza like a 19th-century colonial broker, placing himself at the helm of the BoP to oversee a foreign territory’s governance, with the overall aim of advancing US interests in the region. The Middle East has figured prominently in the first and second Trump administrations’ foreign policy. President Trump’s main goal is to broker agreements between Israel and other Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, to . This attitude could prove counterproductive and place EU interests at risk.

Strategic Outlook and Policy Recommendations

A more active role of the EU in the region is necessary to guarantee success and counter risks of instability, which may have severe implications for European security, including energy supply limitations, new security threats, and an increase of migration and refugee flows. It is in the EU’s interest to enhance its influence in the region. What practical steps should the EU take to avoid marginalization and make a meaningful contribution to peace?

1. The EU should consider holding an enhanced observer status at the BoP as a necessary counterweight to US and Israeli pressures and hegemony in decision-making. Of course, the EU has to maintain a steadfast commitment to strengthening and reforming the UN, confirming it as the core of a rules-based international order and multilateralism. However, enhanced observer status at the BoP could allow the EU to monitor negotiations and participate in debates specifically devoted to making interventions, peace proposals, and amendments. The presence of the EU, with its traditional concern for Palestinian issues, could ensure meaningful Palestinian involvement. This is fundamental to legitimate the transitory governance of the Gaza Strip and preserve Palestinian decision-making power. A more active EU at BoP could also contribute to reforming the PA.

The divergences between member states and across EU institutions negatively impact the EU’s international role. Therefore, the EU should take a cohesive stance on its participation at the BoP, bearing in mind some key arguments. Firstly, “” provides direct insight into how decisions are implemented, serving as a channel for influence. The EU is the largest donor to Palestinian recovery and its involvement in the BoP could help the EU shape outcomes rather than merely fund them, aligning its significant financial contributions with the necessary humanitarian, governance, and security strands of the peace plan. Moreover, “” is vital for influencing the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2803.

2. The EU should be part of the International Security Force. Together with The European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) Rafah Mission and EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS), involvement in the ISF could contribute to the maintenance of the ceasefire. Participation in the ISF could enhance European influence on Israel, for example, by convincing the Israeli government to review its settlement policy and improve living conditions for the Palestinians.

3. The EU should use economic and financial tools to enhance its political influence. On the Palestinian side, the European Commission recently . On the Israeli side, the EU should overcome its reluctances and suspend the EU-Israel Association Agreement if the Israeli government continues to violate human rights in Gaza, as required by Article 2 of the Agreement. The suspension of this Agreement could influence Israel to respect the , following preliminary rulings about a “plausible” genocide occurring in Gaza. The EU could link Israeli participation in EU funding programs, such as Horizon Europe, to the full withdrawal from Gaza, the end of settlements in the West Bank, and apartheid policy against Palestinians.

4. The EU should invest in the implementation of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), an economic initiative designed to enhance connectivity and integration between Asia, the Middle East, and Europe, based on three pillars: energy, transportation, and digital connectivity. IMEC should be a core interest for Europeans, as it , increasing political and economic ties between participating counties. Moreover, it could enhance the EU’s political influence in the area, counterbalancing China and the US. The implementation of some projects as part of the IMEC – such as the EastMed Gas Pipeline – could make the EU a relevant player in terms of future economic cooperation projects, allowing it to increase its weight in the Middle East peace process.

The EU could influence, for example, the implementation of the so-called “Green Blue Deal” between Jordan and Israel, which provides for the supply of water from Israel in exchange for Jordanian supplies of solar power. The Gaza war stopped the project, but the ceasefire created hope that it may be relaunched in such a way that the Gaza Strip and the West Bank can also benefit from it.

Conclusion

While the US commitment has been the sine qua non for a ceasefire in Gaza, the EU holds key cards to ensure the successful implementation of Trump’s peace plan. With its traditional regional approach, a more active observer role of the EU in the BoP and its participation in the ISF could balance American – and Israeli – influence and ensure a more equitable peace solution. In doing so, it may also help ensure that Palestinian rights recognized by international law are considered against the backdrop of ongoing ceasefire and conflict negotiations. In addition, the use of economic leverage as well as the implementation of the IMEC corridor could enhance the EU political weight in the area, preventing the dawn of a new era of regional instability and insecurity with direct impact on Europe itself.

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Introduction

��For the first time since 1972,��when��SALT I negotiations yielded the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the Interim Agreement on offensive arms, the strategic relationship between Washington and Moscow is entirely unconstrained by a legal framework.��.��As the current normative vacuum is unprecedented in the modern era, the��North Atlantic Treaty��Organization��(NATO)��Alliance faces��a new ‘strategic trilemma’:��the simultaneous and often contradictory imperatives��of maintaining credible extended deterrence;��enhancing conventional defence against hybrid and missile threats;��and reconstructing a confidence-building, risk-reduction framework to prevent accidental escalation. The central policy problem is that the traditional tools of strategic stability��– quantitative and qualitative ceilings, inspections, and transparency��–��have been discarded in favour of vertical��nuclear��proliferation. NATO must navigate an environment where��the absence of constraints increases the risk of miscalculations, potentially leading to an unmanaged arms race that reduces the security��for all��NATO Allies.����

Context: The Long Transition and the Paradox of the New START��

The��international��arms control regime, which persisted through various systemic shifts from 1972 until 2026, has finally fractured. However, a rigorous assessment��of its lifespan��suggests that the final pillar of this regime,��the New START,��was already flawed.����This omission allowed Moscow to channel its modernization efforts toward lethal, MIRV-capable systems,��while remaining formally��compliant to��the treaty limit of 1,550 warheads.��,��Moscow’s Strategic��Rocket��Forces (RVSN) and the missile industry exploited this normative��‘shield’��to initiate a massive��‘re-MIRVing’��process. This modernization was driven by a����within the Russian military-industrial complex. By focusing on systems that exploited New START’s qualitative loopholes, institutional actors, such as the��, secured long-term funding and development pathways for a new generation of delivery vehicles. This momentum��facilitated��the emergence of a direct nexus between treaty-compliant modernization and the later deployment of advanced long-range capabilities on the Ukrainian battlefield.��

The Strategic Trilemma between Extended Deterrence and the ‘Upload’ Disparity��

The end of New START has transformed the re-MIRVing process into a catalyst for a new arms race. In this new unconstrained environment, the US possesses a significant technical advantage. . If the US opts to utilize its technological edge, it would effectively out-deploy Moscow, potentially doubling its arsenal to levels above the failed treaty’s limits.  In response, Moscow may prioritize asymmetrical offset centred on long-range theatre strike capabilities. This likely reaction is deeply rooted in the bureaucratic momentum of Russian military-industrial complex, favouring dual capable systems that operate in regulatory grey zones.   

Defence, Resilience, and the Hypersonic Decision Gap

��Unlike traditional��ICBMs, which allow for a 25-plus minutes warning window, a hypersonic system launched from central Europe can reach critical command nodes in Moscow in less than 10 minutes. This����in decision time undermines de-escalatory signalling and places����on the adversary’s early warning systems, potentially triggering automated ‘launch on warning’ responses. Even a conventional strike on communications, command-and-control (C3) centres would be strategically relevant. Therefore,��the deployment of such systems in substantial numbers would create a ‘launch-on-warning’ incentive for Moscow, further destabilizing the offensive-defensive��balance and increasing the risk of automated nuclear response.����

Managing Uncertainty��in a Multipolar System��

Emerging from a Cold War environment coalesced around a bipolar international power-distribution, traditional arms control has proven ill-suited for the asymmetrical, multipolar international disorder of the last two decades.  In a world without inspections, stability depends on predictability. To achieve this goal, the international community must work to prevent accidental escalation through transparency and launch notifications. The reconstruction of a stabilizing framework is currently stymied by two primary structural hurdles: Russia’s current lack of trustworthiness and China’s strategic intentions.  

The main obstacle to reopening dialogue with Russia is the paradox of negotiating limits on the same systems being employed in the current war in Ukraine. It would be politically fraught for the US to engage in fresh negotiations, while Russia utilizes these assets as tool of active coercion and battlefield destruction. . This move puts Washington in an uneasy negotiating position, forcing it to negotiate over assets that France and the United Kingdom (UK) consider non-negotiable. This is hardly a novel tactic:  Putin’s proposal risks to exacerbate infra-systemic fault lines, foster suspects of decoupling, and ‘fears of abandonment’ between the US and its European Allies. Simultaneously, China’s strategic stalling (and its own ambitions to increase its arsenal) prevents the necessary transition toward a trilateral framework. By hiding behind the rhetoric of minimal deterrence, Beijing refuses to accept any oversight while rapidly expanding its nuclear and conventional inventory.  

While the American and Russian nuclear stockpiles greatly exceed those of all other nuclear-weapon states, the strategic equation has irrevocably shifted from a bipolar to a multipolar calculus through China’s ambitions to drastically increase its own arsenal.  These missiles provide Beijing with a high-precision, non-nuclear capability to hold regional strategic assets in the mire, including forward air bases, carrier strike groups, and command-and-control (C2) nodes.  This scenario of ‘conventional entanglement’ complicates the global force posture of NATO’s primary security provider, the US.   

Technological Acceleration: The AI-Hypersonic Nexus��

The ‘Strategic Trilemma’ is further complicated by the integration of����and launch-control systems. As the����through the deployment of Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs), the decision-making window for political leaders has shrunk from thirty minutes to mere seconds.��.��However, the ‘black-box’ nature of neural network-based AI introduces unprecedented��. Because these models recognize patterns in ways that are non-replicable and often incomprehensible to human operators, they are prone to hallucinations or false positives – interpreting unusual atmospheric phenomena or cyber-spoofing as an incoming strike. In a strategic environment dominated by fast-flying systems like the��Dark Eagle��or��Oreshnik, the reliance on AI-driven recommendations could lead to a ‘compressed escalation’ where a machine��initiates��a retaliatory strike before human deliberation even occurs. This technological entanglement��necessitates��that any future��arms��control negotiations must deal not only with warheads and delivery systems, but also with the algorithms governing their employment.����

The Shift towards Integrated Deterrence��

In response to this acceleration, NATO has transitioned toward a posture of integrated deterrence. With the expiration of New START in sight, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) moved to solidify the Alliance’s defensive architecture.  This strategic shift was codified on February 12, 2026, when several NATO Allies launched  to develop next-generation sensors designated to counter ballistic and hypersonic threats (like the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS)). These initiatives, alongside a new  for drone-based deep precision strike capability, signal a move away from static, treaty-based stability, toward a dynamic denial posture. Furthermore, the  reinforces this approach by emphasizing trans-regional deterrence, acknowledging that while NATO remains a regional alliance, its security is inextricably tied to the ‘two-peer’ challenge.  

Policy Recommendations:����

1. Rediscover a dual approach: Combine military modernization with a standing��negotiating��offer��to both Russia and��China��on Strategic Stability Dialogue,��which would��likely benefit��NATO��Alliance cohesion by reassuring the most risk-adverse NATO��member��states.����

2. Prioritize Qualitative Limits: Advocate for a Multilateral MIRV-freeze to mitigate first-strike incentives and neutralize the advantage of rapid uploading.����In the post-START environment, the primary risk is no longer aggregate warheads counts, but the rapid surge��in��capacity,��afforded by US upload potential and Russia’s modernization of MIRV-capable systems.��A ‘freeze’ approach would be aimed at neutralizing the perceived advantages of rapid arsenal expansion, signalling a commitment to strategic sufficiency rather than the��reckless��pursuit of superiority.����

3. Establish��‘Cold War��Plus’��Communication Channels: Strengthen secure, real-time links between military headquarters to manage crisis in an era of hypersonic weapons.��NATO should strengthen secure, real-time links between military headquarters – specifically��the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)��and the Russian Ministry of Defence – to manage crisis in an era defined by HGVs. These channels must be hardened against cyber-interferences and electronic warfare to ensure they��remain��viable��during high-intensity grey zone friction or hybrid confrontations.����

4. Manage AI Integration in Command and Control:��Establish��‘human-in-the-loop’ standards between launch commands and early warning systems to��prevent��AI��systems��from triggering accidental escalation during high-speed hypersonic encounters.��While AI may become indispensable for processing massive data streams from next-generation��sensors like the HBTSS, it must never��possess��the autonomous authority to��initiate��a response. Hence, the��NATO��Alliance should champion an international protocol that mandates��a ‘’ for human commanders, even in high-speed hypersonic confrontations.��

5. Define a Clear Doctrine for Conventional Hypersonic: Clarify that systems like��Dark Eagle��are for��,��while acknowledging that����remains��inherently destabilizing.��NATO should explicitly disavow ‘decapitation’ or strategic nuclear roles for these assets to reduce the risk of Russia misperceiving conventional precision strikes as existential threats to its��C2��architecture.��

6. Strengthen Hybrid Resilience: Protect undersea and digital infrastructure as a core��component��of strategic stability to prevent��hybrid,��non-kinetic bypassing of deterrence.��By neutralizing low-cost, high-impact hybrid threats, the��NATO��Alliance prevents adversaries from bypassing deterrence thresholds��and undermining stability at the lowest level of the escalation ladder. This approach ensures that the emerging new capabilities in air, missile, and drone-defence would not be��compromised��by asymmetric disruption aimed at eroding domestic resilience and political will during a crisis.����

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Introduction

In 2025, the United States (US)-Türkiye relationship moved beyond the traditional logic of NATO Alliance cohesion and entered a phase of strategic bargaining. Once anchored almost exclusively in NATO solidarity and Cold War–era security imperatives, bilateral ties between the nations are now being increasingly shaped by two defining and interconnected issues: Türkiye’s calibrated position on the war in Ukraine and its growing relevance in the geopolitics of rare earth elements and critical minerals.¹ These dynamics reflect a broader transformation of the international system and intra-alliance dynamics in which great power competition, fragmented supply chains, and regional autonomy are increasingly overriding ideological alignment.  

For Washington, Türkiye remains indispensable but unreliable; for Ankara, the US is a necessary but constraining partner. The challenge for both sides is how to construct a functional partnership that accommodates a divergence of alignment while still delivering strategic value. Rare earth elements and Türkiye’s role in Ukraine offer precisely such a framework: material, interest-based, and adaptable to a world defined by competition with Russia and China. 

Türkiye, Ukraine, and the Logic of Strategic Autonomy��

Türkiye’s response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has crystallized its broader foreign policy doctrine. Ankara condemned the invasion, supported Ukraine’s territorial integrity, supplied Kyiv with military equipment, and closed the Turkish Straits to military traffic under the Montreux Convention. At the same time, it refused to impose sanctions on Russia and preserved energy, trade, and diplomatic ties with Moscow. 

This approach is often described in Washington as “” but from Ankara’s perspective, it is a rational expression of strategic autonomy.&�Բ�����;��ü���쾱���&�Բ�����;views the war not only as a European security crisis but also a  with direct implications for its own stability, energy security, and economic resilience. Full alignment with Western sanctions would expose Türkiye to severe economic costs, exacerbate inflation, and jeopardize energy supplies, while full alignment with Russia would undermine its role in NATO. 

Türkiye’s early mediation efforts following the invasion of Ukraine have reinforced its self-image as an indispensable intermediary between Russia and the West. Unlike most NATO Allies, Ankara retains the ability to communicate credibly with both sides. For the US, this role is double-edged: it dilutes Alliance discipline but preserves a diplomatic channel with Russia that would otherwise not exist. 

US Expectations and Limits of Alliance Discipline��

Throughout the second Trump presidency, the US has viewed the war in Ukraine less as a fundamental test of the rules-based international order and more as a measure of Allied burden-sharing and loyalty to US interests. Washington’s discard of normative alignment and expectations of tangible demonstrations of support carries deep implications for Türkiye that benefits substantially from NATO security guarantees. In this context, Ankara’s refusal to impose sanctions on Russia and its continued economic engagement with Moscow are not seen as violations of shared principles, but rather as opportunistic behaviour that undermines NATO cohesion and reinforces perceptions of Allies ‘freeloading’ off US protection. 

Yet, these expectations reflect an older model of Alliance behaviour that is increasingly difficult to sustain. In a multipolar system, medium powers like Türkiye are less willing to subordinate their interests to bloc politics. Ankara’s behaviour in Ukraine is not an anomaly but a signal of how smaller and middle powers navigate systemic competition: hedging, mediating, and extracting leverage from multiple relationships simultaneously. 

This suggests that pressuring the Turkish government into full alignment may be counterproductive. Excessive coercion risks accelerating Ankara’s drift toward alternative partnerships, while reducing US influence over Turkish strategic choices. The challenge for Washington, therefore, is not to put an end to Turkish autonomy, but to channel it toward outcomes compatible with US interests. 

Rare Earth��Elements��and the New Geopolitics of Supply Chains��

In October 2025, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced that Türkiye had identified the world’s second largest reserve of rare earth elements, containing an estimated 694 million tons of mineral resources in Beylikova, located in northwestern Türkiye. The discovery includes .&�Բ�����;��ü���쾱���&�Բ�����; developing rare-earth reserves in western Anatolia with the US after similar talks with China and Russia were halted amid disagreements over control; it is also engaging with  on potential cooperation. Türkiye plans on building a refinery in Beylikova, which contains ore with more than 1% rare-earth oxide by weight.  In addition, Ankara plans to apply to the Australian Institute of Geoscientists for certification under the JORC Code, which sets minimum standards for how companies publicly report exploration results and would reveal the size of deposits for potential investors. 

Ankara’s talks with Western partners come as the US and the European Union (EU) step up efforts to reduce China’s dominance in the production and processing of rare earth elements. The Turkish government has sought to balance its ties with both the West and China amid growing global trade tensions. In September 2025, Türkiye joined a  led by the US and EU aimed at diversifying critical mineral supply chains; however, it has also been offered partner-country status to the BRICS group of emerging-market powers and attracted Chinese investment in electric vehicle production. In 2026, the EU  a new agreement with US and Japan to cooperate on critical raw materials supply chains.  

It is within this context that rare earth elements and critical minerals acquire strategic significance. The global competition over rare earth elements has become a central front in US-China geopolitical rivalry. China’s dominant position across extraction, processing, and downstream manufacturing of these elements represents a structural vulnerability for the US and its partners. For Ankara, cooperation supports its goal of moving up the global value chain, reducing reliance on external suppliers, and strengthening its role in strategic industries, such as defense systems, medical technologies, and consumer electronics. For Washington, Türkiye represents a politically and geographically viable partner in efforts to diversify supply chains for key technological and defence products while reducing dependence on China without concentrating production in a limited number of partner countries. 

Diversifying supply chains is therefore a national security imperative and Türkiye is increasingly relevant for three reasons: firstly, it possesses geological potential for rare earth elements and other strategic minerals; second, it has a substantial industrial base capable of supporting processing and manufacturing; and third, its geographic position makes it a hub connecting Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. 

Linking Rare Earth��Elements��and Ukraine: Strategic Complementarity��

The intersection between cooperation on rare earth elements and Türkiye’s position on Ukraine is not coincidental. Both issues raise the same underlying question: how much strategic autonomy can Türkiye exercise while remaining embedded in the Western alliance structure?  

Economic interdependence in critical sectors creates incentives for alignment that political pressure alone cannot achieve. A structured US-Türkiye partnership on rare earth exploration, processing, and technology transfer would deepen mutual dependence, making a sharp geopolitical rupture less likely. Such cooperation would strengthen Türkiye’s stake in a Western-oriented economic order, indirectly shaping its calculations on Ukraine. While it would not compel Ankara to adopt sanctions or abandon mediation, it would raise costs of drifting too far from US strategic priorities. This logic is visible in US efforts to structure critical mineral partnerships with Ukraine, suggesting that resource cooperation is emerging as a broader instrument of strategic alignment rather than a case-specific initiative. 

Russia, China, and��Türkiye’s Hedging Strategy��

Türkiye’s approach to rare earths must also be understood in the context of its broader hedging strategy vis-à-vis Russia and China. Moscow remains a key energy supplier and a critical actor in the Black Sea, while Beijing is an increasingly important trade and investment partner for Türkiye. 

China’s dominance in the rare earth industry presents Ankara with both an opportunity and a constraint. On the one hand, Chinese investment and technology are an attractive prospect for developing Türkiye’s mineral sector. On the other, excessive reliance on China would undermine Türkiye’s aspiration for strategic autonomy and expose it to geopolitical pressure from its Western partners A US-Türkiye partnership on rare earth elements offers Ankara an alternative path – one that diversifies external dependencies. For Washington, engaging with Türkiye reduces the likelihood that Ankara will default to China. 

Türkiye’s value extends well beyond economics. Its control of access to the Black Sea, close proximity to Ukraine, Russia, and the Middle East, and strong military capabilities make it a cornerstone of NATO’s southern and eastern flanks. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has reinforced the strategic importance of the Black Sea as a contested space where naval power, energy routes, and regional stability intersect. Türkiye’s enforcement of the Montreux Convention has limited Russian naval reinforcement and demonstrated Ankara’s capacity to shape the operational environment without direct military confrontation. This contribution, though often overlooked, has tangible value for Ukraine, the US and other NATO Allies. Maintaining Türkiye’s integration within NATO is therefore essential, even as undercurrents persist. Cooperation on rare earth elements complements this objective by reinforcing Türkiye’s embeddedness in the Western order. 

Scenarios for the Evolution of US-Türkiye Relations��

Several trajectories could shape US-Türkiye relations in the coming years. 

Scenario 1: Strategic Convergence Through Economic Anchoring 

In this scenario, the US and Türkiye deepen cooperation on rare earth elements and other critical minerals, integrating cooperation with broader collaboration in defense technologies, energy transition, and industrial policy. Deepening economic interdependence would help stabilize the bilateral relationship and provide a practical framework for managing political differences. Türkiye would continue to act as a semi-autonomous NATO Ally – aligned with the US on core security interests, while retaining flexibility in its diplomatic engagement with other powers and partners. 

Scenario 2: Strategic Drift and Competitive Hedging 

If cooperation on rare earth elements fails to materialize and political tensions over Ukraine intensify, Türkiye may deepen its ties with Russia and China. In this scenario, Ankara’s mediation role loses value for Washington, and the relationship becomes increasingly transactional and distrustful. NATO cohesion weakens, and supply chain cooperation shifts elsewhere. 

Scenario 3: Managed Autonomy and Functional Partnership 

In the most realistic scenario, the US accepts Türkiye’s strategic autonomy while selectively deepening cooperation in areas of high mutual value, particularly rare earth elements and Black Sea security.&�Բ�����;��ü���쾱���&�Բ�����;continues to mediate Ukraine, and Washington leverages this role pragmatically, even as political differences persist. 

Policy Options for the United States 

US policy toward Türkiye should place cooperation on rare earth elements and critical minerals at the centre of the bilateral agenda, elevating it to a strategic pillar within broader efforts to reduce supply chain dependence on China. This would require the adoption of concrete measures, including investment, technology sharing, and regulatory coordination. At the same time, Washington should continue to reassess Türkiye’s approach to Ukraine by focusing more on practical outcomes, recognizing that Ankara’s efforts and selective support for Kyiv can contribute to regional stability in ways that rigid conformity may not. Strengthening high-level institutional dialogue that links security, economic, and industrial policy would help reduce misunderstandings and prevent tensions from overshadowing the broader relationship. Finally, the US should reaffirm Türkiye’s central role within NATO while accepting that member country cohesion in a multipolar environment will inevitably involve tension and diversity in policies and approaches,  

Conclusion: From Alignment to Strategic Interdependence��

The US-Türkiye relationship in 2025 highlights how NATO may increasingly be shaped by pragmatism and negotiated interests, alongside – but not replaced by – shared values and ideological affinity. In this context, values remain relevant but may no longer be sufficient on their own to sustain strategic partnerships. Instead, cooperation is structured through selective interdependence across security, economic, and technological domains. Türkiye’s calibrated approach to Ukraine and its growing role in rare earth elements and critical mineral supply chains should therefore be seen as interdependent strategies, offering broader theoretical insights regarding contemporary alliance patterns. 

For the US, this shift may require a recalibration of expectations. The ultimate choice is not between accepting Turkish autonomy or attempting to impose alliance discipline, but between shaping that autonomy through sustained engagement or allowing it to evolve in ways increasingly misaligned with US interests. Treating Türkiye’s behaviour as a problem of non-compliance risks overlooking the structural forces driving Ankara’s decisions. A strategy centred on pressure alone is unlikely to succeed and may intensify Türkiye’s temptations to turn toward alternative partnerships. Instead, over time, deepening interdependence could play a stabilizing role, mitigate political disputes and increase the costs of strategic divergence on both sides. 

Ultimately, in an era defined by multipolar competition and systemic rivalry, resilience will depend more on flexible, interest-based cooperation. The combination of cooperation on rare earth elements and pragmatic engagement on Ukraine offers a framework through which the US and NATO can adapt their approach to Türkiye without relinquishing core strategic objectives. By prioritizing realism, mutual benefit, and long-term interdependence, Washington can help ensure that Türkiye remains a pivotal — if unconventional — partner, capable of contributing to Western security and economic resilience in an increasingly fragmented world. 

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Executive Summary  

Transatlantic relations are currently facing growing uncertainty due to significant strategic divergences in the fields of trade, security, technology, and global governance. From the trade tariff disputes to President of the United States (US) Donald Trump’s territorial claims on Greenland, ties between the European Union (EU) and the US are under growing stress. This tension has heavy repercussions on the EU and its member states. Fears about an effective transatlantic decoupling have reenergized calls for the EU to acquire a capacity to act on its own. In this context, Canada can play a decisive role. Stronger EU-Canada cooperation could provide an answer to this new strategic anxiety. It would also allow to reduce dependency on the US and help develop both Canadian and European strategic autonomy.  

Changing Transatlantic Relations: An Opening for Deeper Canada-EU Ties 

While the first Trump administration tested traditional transatlantic relations, Trump’s second term has marked a significant recalibration of US foreign policy that has fundamentally challenged the core values that have underpinned this relationship for the last 80 years. From recurring trade tariff disputes to territorial claims over Greenland, Trump’s actions have often questioned – and even opposed – the US’s role as the principal guarantor of transatlantic stability and security. His administration has delegitimized multilateralism in favour of a “selective engagement” strategy with individual US partners. The recent US , released in November 2025, formalized this major shift in American foreign policy. This new strategy reorders global priorities, reframes NATO Allies’ roles, and seeks stability in Europe to allow Washington to redirect its focus and resources to the Indo-Pacific and the Western Hemisphere. At the same time, it adopts  toward the EU, portraying it as a source of instability and accusing it of undermining political liberty, sovereignty, and social cohesion. 

These dynamics raise fundamental questions about the stability, predictability, and future shape of the transatlantic relationship. For the EU, the implications are immediate: increased strategic risk, reduced certainties, and stronger pressure to develop autonomous capabilities and diversified partnerships. 

Why Canada Matters to the EU (and why the EU Matters to Canada) 

In this rapidly-changing international environment marked by geopolitical fragmentation, erratic US behaviour, and Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine, the EU must meet three conditions in order to become a more credible and decisive actor at the global level: one, it must sway sufficient economic power; two, it must demonstrate political will to act cohesively both amongst its member states and with its international partners; and three, it must be perceived as a legitimate and credible entity by other . 

To achieve these conditions, the EU needs to strengthen its ties with like-minded democracies, such as . Among them, Canada appears as an especially natural and highly compatible partner for the EU. Throughout the last 50 years, Canada and the EU have built an exemplary partnership based on shared democratic values and worldview. But in today’s challenging global landscape, the EU and Canada stand together more firmly than ever as stable and trusted partners. And while the  and  serve as the foundation of the contemporary EU-Canada relationship, increased cooperation to both reinforce current areas of coopetition – such as security and defence – as well as joint ventures in new sectors – including the digital domain – will play key roles in the near future.

Security and Defence Cooperation Between Canada and the EU: A Win-Win Opportunity 

Canada’s contribution to European security and defence policy is hardly new: Ottawa has been a valued contributor to EU-led security and defence efforts for over a decade. It was the first country to establish a Security and Defence Dialogue with the EU in 2015; it participates in  and has contributed to . 

However, at the 20^th EU–Canada Summit in Brussels last June, António Costa, President of the European Council, Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, and Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada, together pledged to further strengthen their bilateral cooperation. Both sides committed to an ambitious and comprehensive partnership, the new , aimed at deepening cooperation across key areas such as trade, security, energy and other critical sectors. 

As part of their re-energized relationship, the EU High Representative of Foreign Affairs, Kaja Kallas, the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Anita Anand, and the Canadian Minister of Defense, David J. McGuinty, also signed the , which provides a framework for cooperation on cyber defence, hybrid threats, space security, maritime issues, crisis response and assistance to partners, such as Ukraine. This agreement also includes provisions for joint research in emerging technologies, which can help position both Canada and the EU as global leaders in these fields.  

This new agreement importantly lays the groundwork for increased defence procurement collaboration, primarily related to the EU’s . It also opened the door for   – a new European loan instrument for joint procurement – and for an administrative arrangement between Canada and the European Defence Agency, the body that supports cooperative European  and provides a forum for European ministries of defence to coordinate their policies. As a result of this increased cooperation, both Brussels and Ottawa have made tangible steps to diversify their defence partnership and become less reliant and vulnerable to Washington’s shifting moods on collective security. Similarly, this new agreement enhances the resiliency of the European pillar within NATO, without either undermining the NATO Alliance or trying to substitute it. 

New Areas of Cooperation in the Digital Domain 

As part of their cooperative efforts, the Canadian Minister of Artificial Intelligence and Digital Innovation, Evan Solomon, and the Executive Vice-President of the European Commission for Technological Sovereignty, Security and Democracy, Henna Virkkunen, have also agreed to strengthen cooperation in the . On 8 December 2025, the first meeting of the EU-Canada Digital Partnership Council took place in Montreal, Quebec. The  made at the conclusion of that meeting showed that both sides recognized the importance that digital partnership plays in advancing bilateral efforts to boost competitiveness, innovation, and economic resilience. This meeting also resulted in Canada and the EU  This meeting also resulted in Canada and the , one on cooperation on artificial intelligence, and another on digital credentials, digital identity wallets, and trust services. This new partnership will guide collaboration on AI governance, quantum technologies, cybersecurity, and digital standards. The  of this partnership is to build digital systems that are secure, transparent, and centred on public trust.

Conclusion

The ongoing reconfiguration of US foreign policy and the end of predictable transatlantic relations have led the EU and its member states to reconsider their strategic goals and explore alternative strategies to promote their own interests and societal well-being. In this context, cooperation with Canada would be a win-win opportunity, allowing both sides to reduce dependencies on the US and bolster collective defence capabilities without undermining NATO. Strengthening the EU-Canada relationship could also help show other countries that – in an era of re-emerging great power rivalry – there is still an opportunity for states to create and benefit from collective partnerships. 

Policy Recommendations  

In order to make the EU-Canada cooperation effective and concrete, both sides should consider the following policy recommendations: 

• Take an active approach to , including encouragement of domestic defence industries to actively utilize this instrument to gain increased access to external markets. 

• Encourage all EU member states to ratify CETA, as only 17 member states have ratified the agreement thus far. Finalizing the ratification of CETA would ensure stability and continuity for the agreement and would signal increased confidence in the overall Canada-EU trade relationship going forward.  

• Strengthen efforts aimed at enhancing their bilateral , to advance and diversify trade, promote economic security and resilience, and create investment opportunities. 

• Increase cooperation in the extraction and trading of . Deepening ties in this area could help reduce dependencies on unreliable partners while strengthening internal supply chains.  

• Improve cooperation on  while at the same time continue working together in order to balance innovation with ethical considerations and standards. This includes joint investments on AI-driven sustainability solutions, the adoption of accountability measures for violators of AI regulations, and the enforcement of policies that support both technological advancement and societal well-being. 

• Utilize the strong EU-Canada relationship as a stepping stone to reinforce multilateral partnerships with like-minded democratic partners, such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, and Taiwan. 

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Summary

● Since 2022, the Arctic has evolved from a region of cooperation and to one of competition and division.

● Previously deemed ‘exceptional’ due to its collaborative status quo’s resilience against geopolitical changes, increased militarization and economic competition indicates an abandonment of this norm, along with decreased prioritization in environmental security, climate change, and scientific exchanges.

● These shifts further compound environmental and climate consequences – as militarization and economic development pose great risks to Arctic environmental security and temperatures.

● Policies from Russia (since 2022) and the United States (since January 2025) have pivoted towards economic development, along with a decrease in efforts to foster sustainable development. Russia has also included an explicit pillar of militarization to its main strategic priorities.

● Canada and other NATO countries have stated environmental and climate commitments in policy and have also increased militarization in their Arctic regions.

Background

Prior to 2022, the Arctic was governed in a spirit of cooperation in large part due to its unforgiving environmental conditions and longstanding culture of multilateralism between states, Inuit, and other Arctic Indigenous communities through institutions like the Arctic Council. This institution was used to foster sustainable development, reduce risks of environmental accidents, as well as environmental degradation. It functioned as a forum for the negotiation of Arctic agreements.

Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, increased militarization and attention has been devoted to the Arctic by both Russian and NATO-Arctic nations. In March 2022, the A7 members of the Arctic Council announced a diplomatic pause in protest of Russia’s invasion. Currently, Russia does not participate and has for the council. The region has been increasingly divided into , ruining decades of progress as well as sidelining Indigenous voices and cooperative initiatives. As a result, the region has shifted from a culture of cooperation to competition, leaving scientists isolated, and with fewer opportunities for bilateral, multilateral, and scientific collaboration in the name of protecting the Arctic’s future.

Rising global temperatures have led to an increase of melting ice in the Arctic, contributing to longer shipping seasons, increasing traffic in the region, and more opportunities for resource extraction, including mining of critical minerals and other sources of energy. These potential economic prospects are largely with the region’s unforgiving operational conditions and lack of infrastructure. Regardless, the Arctic is growing increasingly vulnerable to exploitation due to climate change and the fracturing of the Arctic status-quo. The latter has resulted in policy shifts from collaboration and prioritization – albeit, not equal across all states – of environmental security, to securitization and economic development.

Russian Arctic Policy/Strategy since 2022

Russia’s Arctic Strategy is centred around securitization and economic development, with little regard for environmental security or sustainability. In response to Western sanctions, Russia has framed economic development and defense in the Arctic as a tenet of national security, . In addition, NATO’s northern expansion, with Sweden and Finland becoming full-members, has aggravated Russia’s fear of encirclement, rooted in its view of the Arctic as ‘’. Increased militarization, such as the Safe Arctic 2025 Exercise, underscore Russia’s strategic priority for defense posturing in the Arctic.

NSR is a large tenet of Russian economic development in the Arctic, which provides faster shipping routes between Europe and Asia, most notably for Russian energy. Increased naval traffic in the Arctic region, compounded by a lack of coast guard and joint-surveillance cooperation initiatives, increases the risk of oil spills and shipping accidents. In addition, pollution and ecological damage are symptomatic of unsustainable development. Russia is expected to release a new soon, unveiling its updated development priorities.

NATO Countries and New Arctic Strategies

NATO’s northern expansion has led to increased militarization of the Nordic Arctic. NATO’s Arctic approach focuses largely on “”. After joining NATO, Sweden and Finland committed to its defense spending guidelines, resulting in . In addition, increasing from Russia have prompted further development of defense capabilities. Although NATO remains dedicated to environmental security protection, observers urge the organization to for the Arctic that considers its unique vulnerabilities, operational challenges, and various regarding climate change, including environmental and human security. Further policy development is needed to its Climate Change and Security Action Plan to the Arctic’s idiosyncrasies.

The balances sustainable development and security concerns, whilst maintaining a level of non-political cooperation. Though recent incursions on NATO countries’ and spaces, notably in , pose serious challenges for any prospect of Arctic cooperation with Russia. Denmark’s highlights its effort to bolster its presence and defense capabilities in the Arctic. Denmark has increased its militarization in Greenland since 2022, and most prominently since the start of Donald Trump’s second term, given the latter’s continued ontological threats.

(March, 2025) stresses close ties between Canada and the United States to “secure North American homeland”, as well as with its Nordic Allies. It will initiate “Arctic security dialogue” with “like-minded states”, further alluding to Canada’s recent shift towards ‘friendshoring’ in foreign policy, as well as increasing polarization among Arctic actors. Although Canada remains dedicated to its – which prioritizes the wellbeing of northern communities, development of Arctic research, and environmental security – its increase in Arctic securitization and economic development necessitates further policy adaptation to the changing geopolitical environment.

The second term of Donald Trump marks a major shift in the from one of prioritizing security, climate change, sustainable development, and international governance, to a more “business-like” strategy that prioritizes large-scale resource extraction in Alaska. President Trump’s tariffs and annexation threats to American Arctic Allies further allude to this major shift. In addition, the Trump Administration has rescinded the previous Administration’s restrictions on resource development in order to unleash “”, including new , and projects in previously protected parks and forests. In addition, climate research is being dismantled and the once central to American Arctic policy is now cut out. At the between Putin and Trump in August 2025, Putin alluded to further cooperation in the United States by making mention of the Arctic, though emphasizing more diplomatic and economic cooperation, not environmental.

Conclusion- Risks to Environmental Security and Climate Change

Increased militarization in the Arctic risks environmental consequences. Military training exercises can lead to in training areas, in addition to levels of noise-pollution that harm humans and wildlife. Militarization can also severely disrupt Indigenous livelihoods across the Arctic region, with communities like the and relying on a longstanding tradition of land-based sustenance.

Decreased research collaboration severely reduces scientists’ abilities to track changes in the Arctic climate and ecology. in June indicate that prior to 2022, bilateral cooperation allowed for standardization of data collection, optimization of research processes through pooling of resources and skills, as well as increased habitat conservation and better outcomes for wildlife, eventually leading to the adoption of international market standards and best management practices. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, these scientists have had virtually no communication, resulting in a massive knowledge gap in understanding Arctic changes, as well as a decline in trust. In addition, pressing security risks such as , affecting infrastructure, food security, and public health, are lacking in crucial data, rendering it unpredictable and difficult to manage.

This new status quo of polarization and militarization is chipping away at every avenue for bilateral cooperation, which has tangible effects on Arctic environmental security. The longstanding between Norway and Russia, dating back to 1976, had persevered through these geopolitical changes. It is now at risk due to a recent Russian ultimatum to Norway to close its economic zone to its vessels. This occurred in light of Norway’s sanctions against companies Norebo and Murman Seafood in July 2025. A breakdown of this agreement would increase risks of poaching and unsustainable fishing, as well as pose serious risks to the region’s ecosystem. Overall, these strategic shifts indicate an abandonment of the previous norm of collaboration in the Arctic, and the emerging norm of competition, polarization and militarization, all of which pose grave dangers to the natural world in the Arctic.

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Russia and Iran increasingly view the United States (US)-led international order not as a guarantor of stability, but as a direct threat to their sovereignty and national interests. This perception has become a defining feature of their foreign policy orientation (). For Russia, confrontation with the West has evolved into a broader ideological and geopolitical contest, not just over the sovereignty of states like Ukraine, but over the very structure of the global order. This logic of confrontation now deeply informs Moscow’s regional strategy (). For Iran, this dynamic resonates with its own post-revolutionary worldview, which has long framed its foreign policy as part of a broader anti-colonial struggle. Since 1979, the Islamic Republic has positioned itself as a challenger to Western dominance, viewing the liberal order as an extension of American imperialism and seeking to assert its sovereignty through resistance to perceived external interference ().

Moscow and Tehran both advocate for a multipolar world order grounded in “sovereign internationalism,” a model that prioritizes national autonomy and cultural pluralism over liberal interventionism. This vision argues that no single state or coalition should dominate the global system or impose a universal ideological framework. Instead, the emphasis is on the coexistence of diverse political systems and civilizational models. In this context, Iran emerges not just as a regional partner for Russia, but as a strategic ally in a shared effort to reconfigure the global order away from US hegemony (; ).

Building upon the shared perception of the US-led international order as a threat and their mutual vision for a multipolar world, the subsequent analysis will delve into the manifestations of the strategic partnership between Iran and Russia. It will first examine their cooperation in the Syrian conflict, highlighting the military and political coordination that propped up the Assad regime. Following this, the discussion will pivot to the significant shifts in their defence partnership, particularly in the context of the war in Ukraine and its impact on arms sales and military technology transfers, as well as their ongoing collaboration in civilian nuclear energy. Finally, the analysis will explore the internal Iranian perspectives on this alliance, contrasting the historical distrust and pragmatic engagement of the elite with the distinct views of Principlist and Reformist factions on the benefits and limitations of their country’s relationship with Russia.

Cooperation in Syria

Iran and Russia have developed a robust partnership rooted in shared strategic interests, most notably in the Syrian conflict, where both powers were instrumental in propping up the Assad regime. Their cooperation encompassed military operations, intelligence sharing, and political coordination. United in their opposition of Western-backed efforts to overthrow Assad, Moscow and Tehran initially collaborated to suppress the Syrian opposition and combat the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL). Russia brought airpower and advanced military capabilities to the battlefield, while Iran supplied ground forces, intelligence, and logistical support through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and affiliated militias such as Hezbollah.

This collaboration intensified in 2015, when the Assad regime teetered on the brink of collapse following the fall of Palmyra to ISIL. The turning point came after Qassem Soleimani, the now deceased commander of the Quds Force, made a covert visit to Moscow in order to meet with President Vladimir Putin and Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu ( ). This meeting laid the groundwork for a major military intervention in Syria. Soon after, Russia and Iran – alongside Syria and Iraq – formed the so-called RSII coalition (also referred to as the 4+1, with Hezbollah as the fifth actor) and established joint operation centers in Damascus and Baghdad to synchronize their campaign against ISIL (). This unprecedented intelligence-sharing alliance marked a significant step in institutionalizing the Iran-Russia military partnership.

While Russia has long viewed Iran as a critical partner in stabilizing regions vulnerable to extremism – including Central Asia, the Northern Caucasus, and Chechnya – this relationship is not without its competitive undertones. Both powers seek influence over post‑war Syria, and their interests do not always align (). Tensions have emerged over military coordination, such as disagreements on air support for Iranian-backed ground forces in Khan Tuman and disputes over basing rights, which have occasionally resulted in operational friction on the ground. Additionally, each country has pursued economic and strategic footholds: Russia through its naval base at Tartus and air facility in Latakia, Iran through its role in shaping Syrian militias and economic reconstruction. These dueling interests have created ongoing bureaucratic and diplomatic rivalries despite continued large-scale cooperation (). Despite this friction, Russia and Iran remain aligned through their shared objective of undermining Western influence in Syria and the broader Middle East.

The Strategic Evolution of Russia-Iran Military Cooperation

The war in Ukraine has significantly reshaped Russia’s role in the global arms trade, directly influencing its defence partnership with Iran. Once one of the world’s leading arms exporters, Russia has seen a dramatic decline in its global military exports as a result of the war (). As Moscow diverts its military-industrial resources toward sustaining its own war effort, it has increasingly turned to Iran for key battlefield technologies, marking a striking reversal in traditional arms trade dynamics.

The clearest manifestation of this shift is Russia’s reliance on Iranian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), particularly the Shahed series of loitering munitions, widely referred to as “kamikaze” drones (; ). These weapons have played a key role in Russia’s battlefield tactics in Ukraine, offering a low-cost means of striking Ukrainian infrastructure and military positions. For Iran, the war provides an opportunity to test and refine its drone technology under live combat conditions. Iran has drawn valuable insights from Russia’s war with Ukraine to inform its own confrontations with Israel and involvement in regional proxy wars ().

Military cooperation between Tehran and Moscow now extends well beyond the simple exchange of weapons. Russia has started localizing the production of Iranian drones within its own borders, while Iran is reportedly acquiring Russian hardware and technological know-how with the intent to reverse-engineer and produce advanced systems domestically ().

On the other side, Iran has struggled for decades to modernize its air force, which is still heavily reliant on aging American aircraft acquired prior to the 1979 revolution. Russia has emerged as a potential supplier, particularly with the highly capable Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jet. Reports suggest that Iran finalized a purchase of Su-35s in early 2025, although deliveries have faced delays (; ). These jets are vital for enhancing Iran’s air superiority and regional defence posture. Alongside aircraft, Iran has also long sought advanced air defence systems from Russia. While the S-300 system was delivered following the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement, speculation continues around the possible acquisition of the more advanced S-400 ().

Nuclear Cooperation and Civilian Ambitions

Iran’s nuclear program remains a central component of its relationship with Russia. The two nations maintain long-standing cooperation in the civilian nuclear sector. The Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, completed by Russia in 2013, stands as a landmark in this collaboration. It helped revive Russia’s post-Soviet nuclear industry and provided Iran with a symbol of energy independence and technological progress ().

Russia supplies and retrieves spent fuel from Bushehr, thereby addressing concerns over the potential diversion of nuclear material for weapons use (). Despite growing international scrutiny and intensifying sanctions, Russia and Iran continue to pursue the expansion of nuclear infrastructure. Iran aims to triple its nuclear power generation capacity, with Russia assisting in the construction of additional facilities. This includes ongoing work on Bushehr Units 2 and 3 and plans for new reactors in Sirik or Karun. A major development came in January 2025, when Presidents Vladimir Putin and Masoud Pezeshkian signed a new agreement outlining the construction of eight nuclear power plants in Iran, four of which are to be located in Bushehr (; ).

Popular Sentiment: Historical Distrust Rooted in Imperial Legacy

A prevalent narrative within Iranian political discourse interprets Russia’s regional strategy through the lens of a historical “policy of access to open waters.” This concept – rooted in the 19th-century Iran-Russia wars and reinforced by the Soviet occupation of Iran during the Second World War – sees Russia as having long harboured ambitions to expand southward into Iran in order to gain access to the Persian Gulf (). Iranian historians and commentators frequently reference the Iran-Russia conflicts of the 1800s and the events of 1941 as key moments that shaped this suspicion ().
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These tensions are reflected in the Treaty of Golestan (1813), signed after Iran’s defeat in war and amid internal unrest. The Treaty forced Iran to cede vast territories – including present-day Georgia, Dagestan, and parts of Armenia – to Russia. It also gave Russia exclusive rights to deploy naval vessels in the Caspian Sea and allowed for Russian interference in Iran’s internal succession politics. In Iranian society, this agreement – along with the Treaty of Turkmenchay (1828) that followed – is commonly described as a “disgraceful” treaty,”[1] a label that continues to shape public perceptions of Russia’s intentions (). The 1979 Islamic Revolution institutionalized this deep-rooted skepticism through its foundational foreign policy principle of “Neither East nor West,” which rejected dominance by either Cold War superpower.

Iranian Elite View: Russia as a Useful but Unreliable Partner

Despite these historical grievances, Iran’s post-Revolutionary foreign policy has evolved toward pragmatic engagement with Russia. Shared opposition to US hegemony and a mutual interest in preserving regional sovereignty have driven this strategic alignment. For Iran, Russia differs from Western powers because of Moscow’s apparent non-interference in Iran’s internal political structure – a stark contrast to the West’s perceived advocacy for regime change or domestic transformation ().
Iran’s strategic relationship with Russia is rooted in the perception that Moscow does not seek to change Iran’s power structure, constitution, or cultural identity. Instead, Russia engages with the Islamic Republic on its own terms, respecting its political autonomy – a stance viewed as more conducive to long-term cooperation. Despite this favourable perception of Russia as a non-interfering partner, domestic disagreement persists over how deeply Iran should align itself with Moscow. This disagreement is generally divided between the Principlist[2] and Reformist camps.

Principlist View

Principlists consistently highlight Russia’s central role in resisting Western pressure, particularly emphasizing its ability to veto United Nations Security Council resolutions against Iran. Russia’s resistance is portrayed as a concrete advantage of the strategic partnership, as Iran – which maintains its status as an independent and influential actor – can partner with Russia to form a “regional transformation with global impact” in order to move towards a “new world order” (). Importantly, this narrative goes beyond rhetoric to serve as the ideological foundation for the Iran-Russia relationship. Cooperation with Russia is depicted as a practical embodiment of the “Resistance Economy,” a key Principlist doctrine focused on achieving self-sufficiency and resilience in the face of external threats ().

The Iran-Russia relationship is heavily anchored in military-security cooperation and aligned regional positions, especially in Syria and in opposition to perceived actions of the “Zionist regime” in Israel (). This points to a deep, mutually reinforcing bond rooted in shared adversaries and compounded by Western sanctions. Economic cooperation is equally central in Principlist discourse. The partnership is framed as strategic and mutually beneficial, expanding across energy, transportation, agriculture, and technology. Collaboration in the energy sector – particularly gas and oil trade – is viewed as critical for reducing dependence on Western markets and creating alternative supply routes ().

One major initiative is the integration of Iran’s railway network with Russia’s, touted as a top priority to boost trade and regional connectivity. The gas agreement signed in 2024, allowing up to 300 million cubic meters of gas to flow between the two countries per day, is heralded as the most significant gas contract in Iran’s history (). This positions Iran as a potential transit hub for Russian gas en route to India. Improvements in financial and banking ties through bilateral and multilateral currency agreements and the use of national and digital currencies are reported to have significantly enhanced trade. In the first ten months of 2024, Iranian exports to Russia rose by 20% in weight and 12% in value compared to the previous year, amounting to $889 million in non-oil exports ().

Reformist View

While recognizing the geopolitical realities that necessitate engagement with Russia, the Reformist camp in Iranian politics and society approaches the partnership with caution and pragmatism. They stress the importance of balance and transparency in Iran’s foreign policy, arguing that national interests are best served through diversified relations with all major global powers, rather than aligning exclusively with either China or Russia ().

This approach reflects an understanding of Iran’s geopolitical leverage, which – if managed wisely – could enable Tehran to extract concessions from both Eastern and Western blocs. Reformists contend that the strategic agreement with Russia will only yield meaningful results if pursued within a broader, balanced foreign policy framework. They often cite countries like Türkiye and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which engage strategically with both the East and West on their own terms – not out of necessity, but through conscious choice ().

Economic concerns also figure prominently in Reformist critiques. They highlight the relatively shallow economic and cultural ties between Iran and Russia, noting that trade volumes remain far lower than those with China or Türkiye (). Reformists also argue that Russia and Iran are more rivals than partners in the energy sector and that Iran’s current policies risk ceding too much ground to Russian interests. This camp also questions the reliability of Russia and China as partners, asserting that if either had a genuine interest in supporting Iran, they would have done so more meaningfully over the past two decades ().

Reformist voices regularly point out Russia’s limited capacity to deliver the capital and technology Iran needs to advance its industrial and scientific sectors. They also draw attention to domestic challenges such as administrative inefficiency and the undue influence of entrenched economic elites all of which, they argue, undermine the implementation of large-scale bilateral projects ().

Reformist opinions frequently advocate for a more pragmatic, interest-based foreign policy – one less shaped by ideological posturing and more attuned to the complexities of global engagement. A recurring theme in these narratives is the detrimental impact of internal political rivalries and factionalism on foreign policy, with Reformists warning that narrow political calculations often come at the expense of broader national interests. Ultimately, their discourse seeks to redefine “national interest” in a more comprehensive and less ideologically rigid way – one that avoids over-reliance on any single global power ().

Heading

[1] In everyday Iranian discourse, the Treaties of Turkmenchay and Golestan are commonly invoked as the ultimate symbols of national humiliation and defeat—often labeled as a qarardad-e nangin (a “disgraceful treaty”).

[2] Principlists in Iranian politics emphasize strict adherence to Islamic revolutionary ideals and resistance to liberal influence, differing from traditional conservatives who favour small governments, economic liberalization, and fiscal moderation over ideological purity.

References

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The post Russia and Iran – Strategic Allies or Tactical Partners? appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

Russian media coverage for the first half of April 2025 focused on projecting Russian diplomatic flexibility, economic resilience, and military strength, while continuing to highlight Western divisions, policy failures, and hypocrisy. These are the main narratives that have been recently dominating Russian headlines:  

Continuing Positive Russia-US Diplomatic Engagements 

Across multiple outlets, Russian media highlighted recent diplomatic developments in Russia-US relations, emphasizing the continuation of a potential thaw. Some examples of this reporting include: 

• April 10, 2025 – Kosmopolskaya Pravda on the negotiations between Russia and the US in Istanbul, noting that it lasted a difficult six hours. Alongside this coverage, Izvestia News that the “Ukraine situation” was strategically left off the agenda to help push Russia-US relations back to normalcy.����

• April 14, 2025 – Izvestia News that while Russia and the US continue negotiations on the Ukraine war in a bilateral format, the parties are unlikely to reach a ceasefire agreement by Easter, which was previously floated by the White House. This source cites “Ukraine’s inability to negotiate, its violation of the moratorium on strikes on energy infrastructure, and US President Donald Trump’s desire to achieve a quick ceasefire without a political settlement” as complicating factors in the negotiations.����

Context: On April 10, 2025, Russia and the US engaged in a high-profile prisoner exchange, which both Western and Russian media took as a sign of continued willingness from both sides to engage in meaningful diplomacy. Pushing this theme of cooperation with the US reinforces Russia’s image as a stable, rational actor and sets the stage for future bilateral deals that bypass Ukraine and NATO frameworks. 

Claims of Ukraine Carrying Out Attacks on Energy Infrastructure 

As Russia and the US engaged in bilateral discussions, Moscow started amplifying claims of Ukrainian ceasefire violations while portraying Russian military actions as defensive and strategic. Some sample Russian articles on this topic include: 

• April 10, 2025 – Kosmopolskaya Pravda to the Russia-US talks in Istanbul, Ukrainian armed forces launched 11 new strikes on Russian energy facilities in violation of the current cessation of strikes on energy facilities. The publication concluded that Ukrainian politicians continue to demonstratively violate Russia-US agreements.��

• April 14, 2025 – TASS News that the extension of the moratorium on strikes on Russian and Ukrainian energy facilities beyond April 16 rests with the decision of Russian President Vladimir Putin. The publication highlighted that Russia’s Defence Ministry has repeatedly emphasized that Ukraine continues to unilaterally attack Russia’s energy infrastructure despite public statements of support for the moratorium.��

Context: These reports are part of Russia’s effort to frame Ukraine as the aggressor and justify escalation ahead of talks, using alleged ceasefire violations to shift blame and portray Moscow as the more responsible actor. This rhetoric also aims to pressure Western negotiators by portraying Ukraine as undermining peace efforts, thereby shifting blame for any breakdown in talks onto Ukraine. 

Defending the Missile Attack on Sumy 

Russian media also gave significant attention to defending Russia’s April 13 missile strike on Sumy – its deadliest attack on Ukraine this year – which had sparked international outcry and conflicting narratives over the intended target. Key takes by Russian media on this topic include: 

• April 14, 2025 – Lenta.ru that Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said the strike on Sumy targeted a meeting between Ukrainian commanders and Western military officials, some allegedly from NATO, whom he claimed were helping coordinate long-range missile strikes against Russia.����

• April 15, 2025 – TASS News that the US informed its partners in the G7 that it will veto the statement condemning Russia’s attack in Sumy. Citing reporting by Bloomberg, TASS News indicated that the US told the G7 that it would not sign the statement because it is “working to preserve the space to negotiate peace” with Russia.����

Context: Russia’s current claim is that on April 13, 2025, the Russian armed forces delivered a strike by two Iskander-M tactical missiles on a gathering place of Ukraine’s Seversk operational-tactical group command staff in the city of Sumy, targeting military operations rather than civilians. This framing serves a dual purpose: to maintain domestic support by emphasizing Russian military gains, and to erode Western cohesion by amplifying skepticism and hesitation among NATO Allies. This framing also normalizes Russia’s continued aggression while painting any foreign resistance as fragmented and performative.��

Division within the “Coalition of the Willing” 

As debate over Western military support for Ukraine intensified, Russian media has also been seizing on internal divisions within the so-called “coalition of the willing” to portray the initiative as fragmented, ineffective, and ultimately destined for failure. Some media sources projecting this narrative include:��

• April 10, 2025 – Kosmopolskaya Pravda that the “gathering of countries wanting to send troops to Ukraine ended in failure” dubbing it the “coalition of the indecisive” and noting that only 6 of the 30 members are willing to commit forces, with progress stalled due to the lack of a US security guarantee in case of conflict with Russia.����

• April 14, 2025 – Kosmopolskaya Pravda on comments made by Italian Defence Minister Guido Crosetto in which he expressed doubt about the “coalition of the willing,” calling it a theoretical concept that lacked practical conditions, and instead emphasized that Europe should continue to rely on NATO for its security.��

Context: These reports are part of Russia’s strategic messaging aimed at undermining Western unity and discrediting any multilateral effort to bolster Ukraine outside of NATO. By highlighting the coalition’s lack of cohesion, limited troop commitments, and the absence of a US security guarantee, Russian outlets seek to frame the West as hesitant and divided in its efforts to end the war in Ukraine.  

West Paying the Price for Distancing from Russia’s Oil and Gas 

Following the shocks to global oil prices caused by US tariffs, Russian media also emphasized the economic fallout of Europe’s break from Russian energy and the negative impacts that this decision has had on EU citizens. Some examples of this reporting include: 

• April 7, 2025 – Vedemosti News that the EU’s detachment from Russian energy resources came at a very high cost to its citizens, citing statements made by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen at the World Economic Forum in January 2025. Using its own calculations, this article determined that from 2022 to 2024, EU member states spent €544 billion extra on non-Russian energy imports.��

• April 15, 2025 – RIA News: that the EU is looking to break long-term gas contracts with Russia without paying fines to Moscow, as part of its continued effort to stop using Russian energy resources. The publication emphasized Moscow’s messaging that European countries made a serious mistake when they rejected Russian fossil fuels, as they have since formed a new dependency on buying Russian oil and gas at higher prices through intermediaries.����

Context: This narrative aims to assert Russia’s indispensable role as an energy source to Europe and to portray the West as economically vulnerable and morally compromised in its pursuit of independence from Russian resources. By highlighting the higher cost paid for energy, this narrative also attempts to influence EU citizens to become more critical of the EU’s decision to end its reliance on Russian oil and gas. 

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