Executive Summary��

• Russia’s ability to sustain��its��war against Ukraine depends not only on military capacity but on how the state manages the social and economic pressures placed on families.��

• So-called “traditional” spiritual-moral values provide the ideological framework through which the state justifies sacrifice, promotes compliance, and assigns meaning to the disruption of family life caused by the war in Ukraine.��

• Extensive financial and social benefits for military families help stabilize the home front and support recruitment, but these measures are costly and may be difficult to sustain over time.��

• The war’s impact on families is uneven across regions, creating long-term demographic and social vulnerabilities that could undermine Russia’s post-war stability.��

• Russian family policy prioritizes material support and narrative control while existing structures are inadequately prepared to address key problems of veteran reintegration, including mental health challenges and increased risks of domestic violence.��

The post Understanding Russia’s Family Policy for Wartime Resilience appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

Executive Summary

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has been a leading factor in the rise of conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) in Ukraine. CRSV has a wide scope and is gendered in nature; it includes rape as a weapon of war, as well as sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, sexual torture, forced abortion, forced sterilization, forced marriage, and other similar acts of sexual violence and abuse, directly and indirectly linked to conflict and war. CRSV has primarily been perpetrated by the Russian military forces in occupied Ukrainian territories, including against women, girls, men, boys, civilians, detainees, and prisoners of war. This violence must be understood not only as a set of individual war crimes but also as part of a gendered strategy of domination that links occupation, militarized masculinity, and attacks on Ukraine’s social and political order (Kratochvíl & O’Sullivan, 2023; OHCHR, 2023). This is one form of war crime that is clearly prohibited under international law. The war has also had the effect of exacerbating pre-existing domestic violence trends in Ukraine. Thus, the full-scale invasion of Ukraine has had a dual effect: it has brought with it a sharp increase in CRSV being strategically carried out by Russian forces across the country, while also testing the domestic gender governance structures across the country as it relates to domestic violence. 

Major legislative reforms in the Ukrainian domestic legal system were introduced in June 2022, following the ratification of the Istanbul Convention. The reforms have aimed to ensure that Ukraine’s legal system is in line with the European Union’s standards regarding prevention and protection from violence against women. There are, however, gaps that remain and need to be addressed: further resources for investigating cases of violence; gender-sensitive training for police officers, prosecutors, and judges; improved coordination between institutions; sustainable funding for shelters and crisis centres; and stronger monitoring within the security and defence sectors. These reforms should also be read through Ukraine’s Women, Peace and Security (WPS) commitments, particularly the protection and prevention pillars of the WPS agenda. 

To read the full policy paper, please download the PDF at the button below.

The post Women, Peace and Security in Ukraine: Addressing Conflict-Related Sexual Violence and Advancing EU Integration appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

Prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukraine was one of the world’s largest exporters of grain, with its Black Sea ports in Odesa, Chornomorsk, and Pivdennyi serving as key stops in global shipment routes. The ongoing war has severely impeded Ukraine’s exporting capabilities, which has had critical impacts domestically and abroad. Ukraine has been able to adapt by establishing alternative shipping routes, but this has also created new potential vulnerabilities. The Port of Constanta, Romania’s Black Sea port, has emerged as a central node in stabilizing global grain supply as a result of the war. This development provides an opportunity for intraregional cooperation, as well as further EU and NATO presence through key littoral states. Understanding the geopolitical implications of shifting supply routes gives insight into a primary target for economic pressure by Russia, and how this has influenced regional development.

Securitization of Shipping Routes in the Black Sea

A key element of Russia’s war strategy in Ukraine has been to target industry and infrastructure to deplete Ukraine’s economy and overall capacity to defend itself. The Black Sea and Danube shipping routes are instrumental to this strategy. Odesa is Ukraine’s largest port on the Black Sea. Rail and road transport connect Odesa to the Danube, so goods can be shipped upstream to the rest of Europe or out to international destinations. Prior to the war, Odesa was the main hub for exports of grain, sunflower products, and oilseeds, . When shipping out of Odesa and other Black Sea ports became inviable due to Russian attacks, transport shifted to rail, truck, and barge; however, this rapid increase in land traffic quickly led to chokepoints and delays. The inability for Ukraine to export grain created shortages around the world – particularly in Africa, Asia, and – and also had a severe impact on Ukraine’s economy, . Therefore, disruptions had a huge impact on Ukraine’s economy, as well as global markets. As a result, in 2022 the was brokered to enable Ukrainian exports. A UN-brokered deal between Russia, Ukraine, and Türkiye, this Initiative established safe passages, inspections, and additional security for commercial vessels during the war. However, it only lasted a year before Russia withdrew. Since then, Russian attacks on Ukraine’s ports on both the Black Sea and the Danube have been consistent and destructive. While Ukraine has been able to partially restore grain exports since 2023, these exports still remained in 2025. Alternative shipping routes have been critical in providing an outlet for this grain, notably , transport across the Danube, and the . To support these new routes, regional partners have helped Ukraine by taking in more imports to domestic markets and by exporting more Ukrainian grain through domestic facilities. The Port of Constanta in Romania has played a central part in this shift and serves as a primary example of how the war is strengthening cooperation between Ukraine and the European Union (EU).

Port of Constanta

The Port of Constanta, located on the coast of Romania, is the EU’s largest port on the Black Sea. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion, this port has become a major grain hub with a . In 2023, as Ukrainian cereal and grain was redirected there after the war started. Bridging Europe, Asia, and Africa, this port holds significant strategic importance while also serving as . Additionally, the port’s proximity to the Danube River emphasizes its connectivity to Ukraine. Since the war, the Danube River corridor has become a vital alternative route for Ukrainian grain exports, making the Port of Constanta an essential aspect of Ukraine’s export flows. Additionally, the geopolitical importance of the Port has motivated large-scale modernization of facilities and broader infrastructural upgrades. The EU has been pivotal in funding key projects involving the Port of Constanta such as a , , and . Private companies have also contributed to ramping up operational capacity at the Port. This includes a new with specialized equipment, , and a . At this point, Russia has not launched direct attacks on Romanian port infrastructure on the Black Sea or the Danube. This is because Romania is a part of NATO, and therefore an attack risks triggering Article 5. However, fallout from attacks on their Ukrainian ports such as Izmail along the Danube affects Romanian facilities and villages by the water. Infrastructural damage affects the ability for shipments along the waterway to run smoothly. Additionally, , and a .

Geopolitical Implications

The securitization of Black Sea shipping routes have provided new geopolitical challenges while also accelerating already existing intraregional issues. The integral role exports play for the Ukrainian economy make it essential for routes to be protected to avoid further economic destabilization. Additionally, the inability for Ukraine to ship regular capacities of grain out of the Black Sea has placed additional stress on the Solidarity Lanes into neighbouring countries of Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia. This decreased capacity, in turn, has created political tensions between Ukraine and its Eastern European neighbours as , negatively affecting the livelihoods of local farmers who cannot compete with the influx of supply. As a result of this influx, the which limit trade liberalization for key products like wheat and sugar. However, Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary still maintain their , which has further increased tensions within the EU. This blockade has contributed to worsening relations between these countries and Ukraine, as well as preventing unified EU action on this issue. The destabilizing effects of Russia’s attacks on shipment routes needs to be addressed in order to ensure Ukraine does not face additional material pressures in the war. Stabilizing the region will also be integral to protecting networks such as the , which rely on the Black Sea to connect goods between Asia and Europe.

These security needs present EU littoral states a unique opportunity to establish their own presence in the region, both politically and economically. Romania has expressed strong interest in becoming a key EU representative in the region, which could be pivotal in breaking through the current disagreements. Engaging in deeper ties with other countries like Bulgaria and Georgia could also increase prosperity and development within the region. For example, Georgia and Romania recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding on a new , which can reinforce energy security that has been consistently undermined by Russian attacks. An outcome of this increased cooperation could be strengthened collaboration with the EU and NATO through these littoral states. The EU has already played a strong role as an investor and economic partner for countries like Romania and Bulgaria. NATO, through and the Mines Countermeasure exercise, improves deterrence and defence in the region. Using the EU/NATO umbrella also helps to bring in key external partners in the region. For example, engaging with Georgia on this initiative is an important opportunity to push back against Russian expansionism and influence on the other side of the Black Sea.

Conclusion

The Black Sea region acts as a crossroads between several different trade routes, making it pivotal as both an economic and military target. Russia’s actions in the region have been effective in destabilizing the Ukrainian economy and reducing the capacity of preexisting trade routes in the region. However, these challenges have been mitigated by the ability of Ukraine and its neighbours to adapt under difficult circumstances. Moving forward, further coordinated action in the region can further enhance its stability and even contribute to future prosperity. Existing pan-European and even transatlantic cooperation in the region has already provided a strong foundation to protect and support littoral partners. Leveraging these ties further provides an opportunity to counter Russian strategies and contain its expansionist ambitions.

The post Navigating the Waters: Trade Routes in the Black Sea After 2022 appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

Introduction

On January 5th, 2026, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced the appointment of former Canadian Deputy Prime Minister and Member of Parliament, Chrystia Freeland, as Economic Advisor to the Office of the President of Ukraine. In a post on X, Zelenskyy stated, “Ukraine needs to strengthen its internal resilience – both for the sake of Ukraine’s recovery if diplomacy delivers results as swiftly as possible, and to reinforce our defence if, because of delays by our partners, it takes longer to bring this war to an end.” In the following days, Freeland confirmed she accepted President Zelenskyy’s appointment and that she would be resigning as a Member of Parliament, taking effect as of January 9th, 2026.

Freeland’s appointment as voluntary Economic Advisor to the Office of the President of Ukraine is being made against the larger and developing backdrop of ongoing diplomatic negotiations between the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the United States (US) to come to an agreed upon pathway to peace. This negotiation process continues to be arduous for Ukraine. It also comes alongside a deepening of foreign diplomatic relations between Canada and Ukraine under the Mark Carney government; this, coming on the back of Prime Minister Carney’s historical , where he stressed the end of the rules-based international order and hinted at the decline of American hegemony – a speech that have held to ultimately represent the beginning of a multipolar era in world politics.

In the coming months, the Eastern European and Transatlantic Network (EETN) will publish a series analyzing key developments shaping the war; these include prospective pathways to peace, ongoing diplomatic negotiations and tensions, and the shifting security and economic governance landscape in Ukraine. Freeland is an integral node among an emerging and vital network aimed at supporting Ukraine and its future as the anniversary of the full-scale invasion nears and passes. This series aims to make clear that Russia is not only engaged in a war of attrition so as to try to reclaim its great power status, but that Ukraine is increasingly prepared to respond to this war of attrition with strategies and methods of asymmetric and hybrid warfare. Ukraine is prepared to make the strategic, economic, and relational moves necessary to better guarantee its future, as well as its success on the battlefield and in diplomatic negotiations.

This first brief of the series reflects on Freeland’s appointment and builds upon an argument first offered by Ukrainian scholar Valeriia Gusieva, where she suggested that cultural resilience is a foundational pillar to security. I extend her argument here by suggesting that cultural resilience and situated experience are also crucial to sustaining a coherent and effective attritional war strategy – Freeland’s appointment, in this case, should be understood light through the lens of political habituation.

Chrystia Freeland: A Ukrainian-Canadian MP and Soviet War Crimes Researcher

Chrystia Freeland was born in Peace River, Alberta in 1968 to a Ukrainian mother and Canadian father. Though she formally entered Canadian federal politics in 2013, she is perhaps most known through her association with former Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and his government. Under Trudeau, Freeland was appointed to serve as Minister of International Trade in Trudeau’s cabinet. In this position, she was a key negotiator in the hard-fought Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) (which replaced the North American Free Trade Agreement, or NAFTA, in 2020), as well as the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with the European Union (EU) that was signed in 2016.

While it is fair to assume that many Western audiences are familiar with the whiplash antics of American President Donald Trump, who often combines “,” less well known are the tensions that characterized the negotiation process of CETA. As researchers , CETA encountered historical diplomatic tensions throughout its negotiation process: “This challenge becomes evident at various stages in the trade policy process, but it is most pronounced in the ratification of bilateral agreements, which require approval in all member states.”

On paper, arriving at CETA was through the bilateral process of negotiation between Canada and the EU; in reality, however, Freeland was situated in a much more difficult negotiating position. Because the subsequent ratification of CETA would require the approval of all EU member states, such a negotiating process proved to be a lesson for both Freeland and the European Commission, who was charged with ensuring the twenty-eight member states were in alignment. Indeed, as scholar Joris Larik , the alleged crisis of CETA negotiations soon became a “cautionary tale” about the “cumbersome and vulnerable EU treaty-making procedures, where internal politics and technical legal discussions detracted from the merits (or demerits) of the actual agreement.”

This became most visible through the tensions experienced with the Wallonia Parliament in Belgium, an autonomous regional government with veto power over EU trade deals. In late 2016, the Walloon government publicly rejected CETA, in part because of their worry that the trade deal would “.” Walloon regional minister-president, Paul Magnette, told reporters the following: “I don’t consider this as a funeral, I don’t consider this as a veto without any conditions. I consider this as a request to reopen negotiations so that European leaders could hear the legitimate demands which have been forcefully expressed by an organized, transparent civil society.” As Larik however, this crisis led to “profound internal reflections on EU trade policy, causing even a shift in the EU’s practice in concluding trade agreements.

It was largely in response to these tensions and apparent deadlock within Wallonia that Freeland made the public decision to walk out on CETA negotiations with our European allies. Following her decision, Freeland with Canadian journalists candidly: “It’s become evident for me, for Canada, that the European Union isn’t capable now to have an international treaty even with a country that has very European values like Canada. And even with a country so nice, with a lot of patience like Canada.” At the time, the move was taken by some in Canadian media as an “” response; Conservative critics in the House of Commons Freeland’s walk out as a “meltdown,” alleging she required “adult supervision” – language that carried clear sexist and gendered connotations. Still others this walk out is exactly what the negotiation process needed, as it eventually led to the signing of the trade agreement.

Reflecting on her CETA negotiation experience in 2026, Freeland the following about negotiating with European allies, which is worth quoting at-length here:

“You can sort of have two kinds of negotiations. Some negotiations start with a kind of win-win premise where the two parties come together wanting a deal, wanting to be friends, seeing each other as long-term partners, and they’ll disagree about stuff, but the negotiation is really about everyone working hard together to find the best possible landing zone. I would say Canada’s negotiations with the EU about our trade deal with Europe, CETA, were conducted in that way, and they were hard, right? … Our final slightly melodramatic moments in Namur, in Wallonia, you know, proceeded by moments in Vienna, in Germany, in the European Parliament. I mean, it was a long slog and there were lots of obstacles and there was some drama, but it was clear there was goodwill on all sides.”

In this interview, Freeland goes on to characterize how Trump falls into an alternative negotiation camp compared to that which characterized CETA; she the idea that the American President abides by the logic of a zero-sum game: “…when you are dealing with a party that has that kind of a view [zero-sum game logic] and that kind of an attitude, then I think you have to be very clear in your own mind about red lines. And you have to be very prepared to say, thus far and no further, we’re not gonna capitulate our approach.”

Freeland later went on to become Canada’s Minister of Finance in 2020, where she was responsible for introducing four federal budgets, including federal aid measures related to Canada’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic. She was the first woman to serve in this role, a fact that would later be considered by the as crucial in the decay of her relationship with Trudeau prior to his own resignation in late-2025.

Beyond her political career, Freeland’s academic and journalistic works span two decades and have drawn the ire of the Kremlin. While pursuing graduate studies in Russian history and literature at Harvard, where she was responsible for documenting and translating archival and investigative materials related to the – an unmarked, mass burial site used by the NKVD (the secret police of the Soviet Union) to dispose of executed dissidents and prisoners. It remains one of the largest mass burial sites in Ukraine, even Russia’s current invasion. Her research played a decisive role in debunking the Stalin-era myth that the executions were exclusively carried out by the Nazis during World War Two. This research eventually attracted the attention of the KGB – the main security agency of the Soviet Union – who then assigned Freeland the codename “Frida,” closely surveilling and building a case against her throughout the course of her study.

As a Canadian with Ukrainian heritage, Freeland has been among the most outspoken advocates for sustained Canadian support to Ukraine. In response, she is one of thirteen Canadian officials barred from entering Russia under retaliatory sanctions imposed by Vladimir Putin himself in 2014 and has been the target of various . Freeland has also faced public attacks from American President Donald Trump, who on several occasions has described her in disparaging terms, including “,” a “,” a “,” and an overall “.” From a feminist perspective, Freeland’s experience navigating such attacks underscores her familiarity with the gendered power dynamics employed by – an experience that may indeed prove to be a strategic asset in a war whose social construction and conduct are themselves . While much of international politics Freeland nonetheless works against the masculine grain in a pursuit of fair and just agreements and futures.

Contextualizing the Habituation of Freeland and Concluding Remarks

As this series continues to examine changes within President Zelenskyy’s inner circle in response to both Ukrainian domestic pressures and Russia’s growing attritional war strategy, I suggest that Freeland’s appointment as a voluntary Economic Advisor to Ukraine signals an awareness within Ukrainian leadership and its closest allies that responding to Russia’s attritional warfare in 2026 cannot be confined to military operations alone. No longer are we in an era where hard power capabilities are the only measure of a nation’s strength; the personal and personnel also matter.

Freeland will be an important figure to watch, particularly as it relates to dialogue between Ukrainian feminists and the pro-democracy movement – not because Freeland herself has expressed a desire to pursue a feminist agenda in Ukraine’s economic reconstruction, but because her presence reflects the often-implicit reality that gendered political experience shapes how the dynamics of endurance, credibility, and trust are produced and sustained in wartime economies. In a war of attrition, where authority is continuously reaffirmed under conditions of prolonged uncertainty, reputational attack, and economic strain, such situated experience becomes strategically relevant, I suggest, as a form of habituation to sustained delegitimization.

The notion of habituation draws from a long philosophical tradition – mostly commonly, Aristotelian ethics, where habituation (hexis) was used to refer to repeated exposure and practice from durable dispositions rather than momentary or instantaneous reaction. In contemporary political thought, philosophers and scholars inspired by phenomenologists such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty have upon this idea to explain how subjects develop capacities for political action through ongoing relational strain. In feminist ethics, habituation helps to explain how – often oppressed – actors learn to endure, navigate, and act within conditions of prolonged vulnerability, scrutiny, and marginalization over time. It moves beyond experience; it is an engaged and embodied vision and practice.

In an attritional war where legitimacy is not necessarily secured through fast-paced or singular victories but continually reproduced across various political, economic, and social structures, as well as through relations of alliance management and public trust, this mode of habituation takes on strategic significance. Indeed, for President Zelenskyy, it works in his favour to cultivate and incorporate actors habituated to sustained delegitimization because it acts as a shock absorber to the , partner unreliability in a so-called newly-founded “” world, and economic fatigue increasingly characterizing this phase of the war and ongoing occupation. The hope is that these hybrid shocks are absorbed by such a habituation without suffering from significant strategic drifts that may carry over into the battlefield.

, nations and militaries perceived to possess greater status and capabilities – that is, the greater of two powers – engage in warfare by attrition. Those familiar with Russia and the former Soviet Union’s historical record of aggression, occupation, interference, and war across Eastern Europe will also recognize this mode of warfare, perhaps all too familiarly. The Baltics, the Balkans, Poland, Chechnya, Georgia – they all know this playbook. The Russian Federation continues to seek what it perceives as its rightful seat at the table of great-power politics; even those of us who reject John J. Mearsheimer’s structuralist projections onto Eastern Europe as lying within a fixed Russian “sphere of influence” cannot ignore such an imperial desire percolating within the Russian state since the unipolar moment.

In attritional war, time is a previous resource. As Sun Tzu , prolonged conflict could be of great risk to either warring side, on account of exhausting the state apparatus, undermining domestic order and morale, and eroding strategic advantage; for him, military strategy was a subtle and complex technique whose success depended on minimizing the temporal risks and costs of war. While Sun Tzu viewed attritional war as a strategic failure, the work of military theorist and general requires us to remember that wars of attrition often emerge as a political condition over time, shaped by friction, uncertainty, and an overall inability to achieve decisive political outcomes. What Ukraine demonstrates to the international community, this series aims to show, is that Russia’s apparent great power strategy grounded in attrition – like empire itself – can burn out.

It is by sources close to both Freeland and Prime Minister Carney that Freeland received Zelenskyy’s offer on December 22nd, 2025; by December 24th, she had shared with the Prime Minister her intentions to leave Canadian parliament to join the Ukrainian team. In responding to the Kremlin’s continued war of attrition, concerns beyond immediate hard power capabilities, military strategy, and command structures must be addressed. Freeland possesses a unique form of habituation to sustain delegitimation; her appointment may indeed be an important shock absorber to Russia’s ongoing disinformation campaigns, American partner unreliability, and the economic fatigue increasingly characterizing this war.

At the level of a broader wartime strategy, I suggest this capacity can also function as a form of resilience; it signals to communities, civil society, international partners, and adversaries alike that broader Ukraine’s leadership is prepared to govern through a liminal phase of uncertain futurity rather than govern toward a rapid endpoint. This is a strategy in stark contrast to Putin’s assumption that a “quick military operation” could sweep Ukraine in 2022, or that , once elected, could end the war in Ukraine in the first 24-hours of his second term. In this sense, it is important to emphasize that habituation is not merely an individual trait or disposition, but also a culturally sedimented capacity that is experienced transnationally and relationally. As Gusieva has argued, cultural resilience constitutes a foundational pillar of security; indeed, classical realist how such resilience at times is what pushes a nation beyond survival towards victory. I extend this logic here by suggesting that such cultural resilience is forged through repeated exposure to, and embeddedness within, enduring imperial projects and traditionalist military practices – in this case, namely, Russia’s ongoing attempts to reclaim imperial-great power status, legitimate its occupations, and sustain attritional warfare alongside its hybrid threats towards Europe.

In Ukraine, cultural habituation operates as resilience, but it is neither neutral nor abstract; rather, its experience is deeply racialized, ethnicized, and gendered. It is racialized and ethnicized through the persistent positioning of the nation as materially peripheral to Europe while cast as subordinate to Russia’s so-called historical sphere of influence; it is gendered through the paternalizing narratives directed at Ukraine and other Eastern European states aspiring to EU membership, as well as in the recurring trope of Ukraine as the “little brother” to a masculinized “Mother Russia.” More specifically, we see this reproduced through the hegemonically masculine practices embodied by state actors in political negotiations of economic and security matters; these behaviours continue to structure much of how political negotiation, listening, and diplomatic exchange take place. Freeland, in this respect, is a node within a broader relational structure of habituation and diplomatic practice in wartime Ukraine – one whose own political endurance aligns with, and stands to reinforce, Ukraine’s culturally embedded capacity to govern through attrition.

Please stay tuned for the next installment of this series, which will analyze Ukraine’s 2025 energy scandal and subsequent political moves undertaken President Zelenskyy following a state investigation that exposed high-level embezzlement within the nation’s energy sector.

The post Habituation in War: The Appointment of Chrystia Freeland as a Node in Ukraine’s Attritional War Strategy appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

Disclaimer: This profile is based on an extended interview conducted with a serving member of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The soldier’s name and call sign are used with consent.

Dmytro, known by his nom de guerre “Student,” has spent the past three years in uniform. He joined the Armed Forces of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the first day of Russia’s full-scale invasion, answering a call to what he describes not as a sudden impulse, but as a moral certainty. Now a combat medic in the Reconnaissance Company of the 106th Separate Territorial Defence Brigade, Dmytro was just twenty-two years old when the full-scale invasion began.

When the air raid woke him up on the morning of the 24th, he already knew where he was going. His father had been helping Ukrainian soldiers since 2014, after Russia first occupied Crimea. Dima grew up inside that world: distributing bulletproof vests, learning military equipment, and often participating in training at the local polygon. Ironically, February 24 was meant to be a shooting practice day and his gear was already packed.

“I woke up to the siren and my first thought was that I already knew where to go”, he recalls.

When he arrived at the recruitment centre, there were already too many people. There was nowhere to sleep. He was issued a uniform and sent home, told to return later. That first night, nine people shared four beds, rotating sleep while others stood watch.

“I never second-guessed my choice” Dmytro says. “I knew it was my responsibility to protect my homeland, my family and my people.”

For him, civilian life was no longer an option. He explained that the existence of a frontline, where people were dying every day, made the idea of continuing life as before feel morally impossible.

“There are moments when it is objectively terrifying,” he admits. “When an enemy drone is flying nearby, I even start to believe in God.” What keeps him going after all this time is not adrenaline but as a combat medic, he sees the impact his work makes. His brigade has suffered a minimal number of casualties, something he connects directly to planning, training and logistics. He designs evacuation plans down to the smallest detail, ensures vehicles are stocked with proper medical equipment and provides extensive medical training to fellow soldiers.

“I like to achieve things,” he says. “When I see that someone comes back alive from a mission because I planned their evacuation, stocked the vehicles properly, trained the unit, that keeps me going.”

When asked about the role civic identity played in his decision, he said that civic identity is inseparable from action. He speaks less about rights and more about responsibility.

“I believe in basic values, fairness, and truth,” he explains. “If you are a man, you have to prove it through your actions. Patriotism and honour are not words.”

Loving one’s country, in his view, does not mean accepting its failures. If something is broken, whether in government, institutions, or the military, it must be changed.

“I don’t want to come back from war and see that everything stayed the same,” he says. “We need change.”

Even amid constant Russian attacks, Ukrainians continue to demonstrate a deep commitment to a pro-democracy civil society. Ukraine consciously chose a democratic path, and despite the strains of war, the country persists in building resilient institutions and reinforcing democratic governance. The summer 2025 protest emerged in response to a high-profile corruption scandal involving a close advisor to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and the resignation that followed. This protest and subsequent cabinet reshufflings highlight how public pressure and demands for accountability continue to shape political decision-making in Ukraine, even in the midst of war. These events demonstrate that Ukrainian civil society remains active and engaged, insisting on transparency and reform while the state simultaneously fights for national survival.

Dmytro’s experience on the frontlines reflects the same sense of civic responsibility. His commitment to serve, improve systems within his unit, and protect his comrades resonates with the broader determination of Ukrainians to defend not only their territory, but also the democratic values and institutions they have worked so hard to build.

Life at the Front: Environment and Morale

Life at the front is defined by simplicity and scarcity. Routine is dictated by opportunity, not preference. “If you have a chance to do your laundry, you do your laundry,” Dima says. “Because the next chance might be in a month.” Units often stay in abandoned houses. They take care of the property and of the animals left behind. Dogs and cats are fed before soldiers worry about themselves. “It’s funny sometimes,” he smiles. “We might be able to eat very little for a few days, but the pets must be taken care of.”

The army has reshaped his understanding of human nature. Age, once synonymous with authority, no longer guarantees respect. “I used to think age gives wisdom,” he reflects. “Now I know that only actions do.”

Despite constant danger, Dima does not feel that his life is on hold. He does not plan far ahead for a future after demobilization, not because he lacks hope, but because his focus is anchored firmly in the present. “My life is here,” he says. “I want to be useful to my team.”

He continues to make plans for improving systems within his unit, refining processes and improving the quality of life for his comrades. The war has made him stronger and more resilient, but it has also sharpened his understanding of what matters. He sees his family approximately thirty days a year and the distance has reordered his priorities. “Before, I avoided family time,” he admits. “Now I know my family is my home.”

Fear is constant, but it is contextualized. “You can be afraid now under a Ukrainian flag,” he says, “or later under an occupation flag, forced to fight on their side.”

When asked about the challenges soldiers face and the support available to them, Dmytro reflects on the growing emotional and psychological toll of the war. After years of continuous fighting, fatigue is setting in, and the weight of that responsibility is becoming harder to carry. While soldiers remain deeply committed to their mission, they also recognize that they deserve stronger systems of care in return, especially when it comes to mental health support. He further reflects:

“The work is difficult, and there are psychological supports offered, but we are lacking a systemic approach to mental health for both soldiers and veterans. There are simply too many people and individual support is hard to provide. It’s also not normalized to ask for help. What has helped me personally is physical activity and maintaining a good nutrition routine. We sometimes have presentations or webinars about breathing techniques or wellness tips, but there isn’t consistent one-on-one support.”

The War Beyond the Ukrainian Trench: International Support and Its Limitations

From the frontline, international support is not an abstract policy debate.

“Definitely, you can feel the support from Western countries at a systemic level, through additional education, training and supplies,” Dima says. “As a combat medic, I would not be able to do my job without Western support.” At the same time, he is acutely aware of its limits. Assistance often arrives slowly, entangled in bureaucracy, disconnected from the immediacy of frontline needs. “War is expensive,” he says. “You need a lot, in large quantities, and ideally you needed it yesterday and not in two months.” Because of these delays, individual soldiers and units frequently organize personal fundraisers to improve their chances of survival. Our past piece on Civilian Frontlines: Drones, Fundraising, and Evolving Military Policy unpack the role informal fundraising plays out on the Ukrainian battlefield.

Dima spends much of his salary ensuring his unit is properly equipped. He does not have savings for civilian life. “I spend my salary so that me and my comrades come back alive,” he says. His battalion has a CASEVAC vehicle. Many others do not. From his perspective, there is often no systemic understanding of what is urgently required on the ground.

General geopolitical narratives also shape morale. He recalls how speculation abroad about quick diplomatic solutions led some soldiers to relax, a dangerous illusion. “If you relax on the frontline, you are dead,” he says. “Or your comrade is dead. That’s the reality.”

Dima believes many countries underestimate Russia because they have never experienced its occupation or repression firsthand. “A lot of the world doesn’t understand what kind of evil Russia is,” he says. “They’ve never had direct contact with occupation.” At the same time, reliance on Western support should not replace internal responsibility. Ukraine, he argues, must continue working toward self-sufficiency. “We can’t wait for someone to come and save us,” he says. “We need education and training early, so people are ready to show their love for the country through action.”

Recruitment, Mobilization and the Weight of Reality

According to Dmytro, recruitment and mobilization remain deeply flawed. War, he argues, is often romanticized, while the reality is left unspoken. “We need a healthy approach to recruitment,” he says. “And from early on, we need to teach young people about responsibility as citizens of Ukraine.” He is blunt about demographic reality: young, healthy people are needed at the front. A fully professional contract army is a goal, but not a current reality during a full-scale invasion. “We are not close to winning this war,” he says. “The government needs to explain that protection of the homeland comes through military service.” He also points to systemic issues inside the army: recognition that does not always reflect contribution, bureaucracy that resists innovation and tensions between volunteers and career military personnel.

“The full-scale invasion showed how two different worlds met,” he explains. “Volunteers came with creativity and initiative, while career military often do everything strictly by the book. But the frontline changes fast. We need new solutions.” Many talented people from civilian fields are now in uniform, trying to improve systems while navigating internal resistance. “For volunteers, rules are sometimes more flexible,” he says. “But internal battles with bureaucracy still exist.” For him personally, financial incentives or benefits were never a consideration. “I wasn’t thinking about money when I joined,” he says. “My role is to implement changes that can save lives or health.”

Dmytro also reflected on how gender continues to shape realities on the frontline. “Throughout my service, I have seen women occupy a wide range of roles, from frontline positions to more supportive ones, and many of them demonstrate remarkable courage, strength, and resilience, often exceeding that of their male counterparts. One challenge I have observed is the assumption that the combat medic role is inherently more suitable for women because it is associated with healthcare. In reality, the position is extremely demanding. A significant part of the role involves physically evacuating wounded soldiers from frontline positions, who are often much larger in size, requiring specific physical capacities.

There are, of course, many stereotypes about women in the military, most of which are still perpetuated by older career personnel. At the same time, I have served alongside many women who are exceptionally strong and capable, while continuing to carry their femininity within an environment that remains deeply masculine and physically demanding.”

Rethinking Victory

When asked what victory means, Dima rejects the term entirely.

“We should ban the word ‘victory,’” he says. “It has a positive connotation, but what happened to us, especially to people in occupied territories, is a tragedy.” For him, the end goal is not celebration, but accountability. “The collapse of the Russian Federation would not bring back lost lives,” he says. “But at least we could say that, at a heavy price, we defeated evil.”

Narratives about victory are often amplified through social media in Ukraine and sometimes presented as morale-boosting policies by the government. However, when asked whether he feels a disconnect from civilians during short breaks in areas far from the frontlines, Dmytro is quick to acknowledge that civilians will never fully understand a soldier’s experience simply because they have never been there. It is a particular type of as Donna Haraway defines it. He says you cannot put yourself in the shoes of a soldier and that it is okay. You do not need frontline combat experience to show empathy. What Ukrainians are lacking, he believes, is basic respect for people in uniform and for soldiers.

Dmytro is clear that soldiers deserve understanding and recognition from civilians, but he is even more demanding of the government. In his view, the state owes them guarantees of a decent life after demobilization and meaningful support in return for everything they have done to preserve Ukraine’s sovereignty. He is honest about the challenges ahead, including reintegration, PTSD, and other psychological struggles, and he stresses that society should already be preparing to welcome soldiers back and help them rehabilitate. He firmly believes that as strong as Ukrainian society is, there is still a lot of work to do, starting with improving access to medical services, resources, and knowledge about what support exists.

When asked about the scariest experience he has had, Dmytro described the first time he truly felt that death was close. During a massive attack by Russian forces, he ran toward a trench and heard a mine explode right behind him. He still does not understand how he survived. That moment, he says, made him realize just how fragile life on the frontline can be. While the Ukrainian government has not officially disclosed the number of soldiers who were not as lucky as Dmytro and were killed in action, . Many Ukrainian soldiers remain in Russian captivity, a situation that requires urgent attention from the international community and sustained efforts to secure their release.

At the time of this writing, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has surpassed the length of the Soviet Union’s war against Nazi Germany. Dmytro’s story is not unique. The resilience of Ukraine rests in the hands of people like him who answered the call to serve their country, carrying not only the weight of the battlefield but the hopes of an entire nation. Their courage should serve as a reminder to us all that the values of freedom, human rights, and democracy are often inseparable from the willingness to defend them on the battlefield.

The post “I Never Gave Myself a Choice”: A Ukrainian Combat Medic on War, Responsibility and Freedom appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

“The Black Sea in 2026: Strategic Maneuvers and Economic Opportunity” examines how the Black Sea has become one of the world’s most consequential geopolitical and economic corridors following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The brief analyzes the competing strategies of Russia, Türkiye, the European Union, and China, alongside the security concerns of littoral states, highlighting how control of the region shapes Ukraine’s future and broader transatlantic stability. It also outlines Canada’s growing role as a NATO partner in supporting regional security, trade resilience, and postwar reconstruction. The paper concludes with targeted policy recommendations for strengthening Canada–Ukraine cooperation and enhancing Black Sea security in a rapidly evolving strategic landscape.

To read the full policy brief prepared by Dr. Jeff Sahadeo, click the download button below.

The post The Black Sea in 2026: Strategic Manoeuvres and Economic Opportunity appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

After a contentious summit – one that saw European Union (EU) members divided on the future of funding to Ukraine as the war nears its fourth year – the EU has created a plan to secure an . This plan depends on using cash from secured capital markets, deviating from the to use frozen Russian assets. The summit comes at a time where and . While the EU’s major goal of securing a funding package was achieved, internal fractures are increasingly felt and spreading, with the discussion inflaming verbal attacks and disagreements between Hungary, Slovakia, and other EU members.

Risky or revolutionary?

The EU’s final iteration of its funding package comes as a much safer development from the Commission’s initial Reparations Loan. That initial package would have secured funding from since the start of the full-scale invasion. Days before the summit, the EU agreed to , which primarily belong to the Russian Central Bank, held through Euroclear. The Commission maintained there was no breach of ethics on account of the agreement not affecting the Russian Central Bank’s intellectual property and Euroclear would be bound to repay it. Despite this, the plan elicited heated controversy among EU members.

Strong opposition largely stems from Euroclear and Belgium – where the financial company is based. Euroclear’s concerns pertain to the international trust in the euro and the company itself; it also expressed concern that it may be undermined by what they deemed a “.” Belgium fears Russian retaliation through international courts. The and promised if the plan were to go ahead. Retaliation from Russia could also include various hybrid strategies such as cyberattacks, sabotage of critical infrastructure, or even drone incursions. Hungary and Slovakia have also opposed the plan. The two countries have become increasingly critical of EU sanctions against Russia due to their own political and energy connections and dependencies on the country. Both nations to indefinitely freeze Russian assets, eliminating their veto power. Prime Ministers and slammed the plan on social media, implying it betrays important normative and legal architecture of the European Union.

Ultimately, the Reparations Loan in its original form was not passed, with members saying it was “too complex” and politically risky to go through with now. The primary concern was that Belgium needed . This brought mixed reactions and the guarantees could not be met. The EU’s main strategic goal to avoid escalation with Russia also made this move too risky, with the threat of financial and legal repercussions too costly.

What’s next for Ukraine?

The loan will be based on , requiring Ukraine to pay it back once they begin receiving reparations after the war has ended. The current plan eases the burden for some struggling with financing Ukraine directly, while also not affecting the obligations of countries like . This guarantee also paved the way for these countries to support the loan, making the decision smoother. The loan will be used to support Ukraine’s financial needs, particularly for investing in Ukrainian defence technology and industry. The country has identified a need for additional funding beyond its current IMF program, calling for up to .

What does this say about the EU?

One thing that has become abundantly clear during the summit is the increasing fractures between members of the European Union regarding the war in Ukraine. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and its continued influence throughout Eastern Europe is beginning to sow real discord within the EU, proving to be an increasingly complex issue as the war rolls on. Currently, the EU has made several moves that mitigate the ability for countries that sympathize with Russia to disrupt aid to Ukraine; however, the new plan also gives a noteworthy “out” to these countries by allowing them not to contribute. Disagreements over the war are also combined with strong anti-bureaucratic and anti-EU rhetoric from leaders, who operate from a populist and, at times, illiberal base of governance. The EU will need to be vigilant and cautious about the influence and relationship to Russia that current member states have. The destabilization and weakening of the EU will be strategically advantageous to Russia, divisions that have already begun to exploit.

What will be interesting to see is how funding will evolve as time goes on. The EU . Will later developments prompt this risky move? Additionally, what will the reaction of Moscow be in these current conditions? It will be important to follow developments as they relate to renewed funding, as this could (re)invigorate either party and change future strategies and funding scenarios. Whether this will result in strategic pressures with positive outcomes or a further destabilization of the European continent, has yet to be seen.

The post EU Frozen Asset Plan appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

• Turkish goals in the Black Sea region (BSR) are to maintain stability and its own strategic positioning within the region.

• Canadian cooperation with Türkiye continues to encounter challenges due to misaligned priorities and estrangement between actors.

• Canada has an opportunity to increase presence in the BSR by cooperating on initiatives outside of hard security concerns.

Policy Recommendations

• Canada should support the initiation of additional humanitarian projects in the BSR and seek out ways to partner with Türkiye on defence technology and modernization to strengthen overall diplomatic and defence relations.

• Increasing Canada’s regional presence around the BSR through NATO initiatives could help to bolster its image as a supportive ally to Türkiye while also helping project overall Canadian security interests.

Türkiye’s Foreign Policy post 2022

Türkiye has historically played an influential role in the Black Sea Region (BSR) as NATO’s southeastern bulwark. The gives Türkiye control over the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits, the key entry point of the Black Sea. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the BSR has been under wartime conditions. Türkiye has since invoked the Convention to effectively close the straits to both NATO and Russian ships; a decision which has nonetheless sparked controversy, particularly after Türkiye . Ankara remains apprehensive towards NATO involvement in the region, and while its relationship with the West is strained, it continues to maintain relations with Russia based on shared in the .

Türkiye, unlike most NATO countries, has , and still . At the same time, Türkiye has also . Türkiye’s seemingly contradictory policies reflect its primary goal: to maintain the existing balance of power in the BSR.

Türkiye’s stance is driven by independent interests rather an alignment with the West or Russia. For Türkiye, reinforcing the status quo reaffirms their military, economic, and diplomatic power in the BSR. Türkiye prioritizes business and trade to aid its struggling economy. It has also been increasingly positioning itself ; this has informed the country’s decisions to participate in the (a humanitarian-focused mission) and engage in peacemaking talks with Russia and Ukraine. Türkiye’s commitments are strategic, wishing to avoid provocation of either side while still leveraging their influence in military, resources, and politics.

Challenges for Canada

The major challenge for Canada will be to understand how to approach collaborations with Türkiye in the BSR. Estrangement and misalignment from both parties pose potential problems. Relations only recently improved after Canada following Türkiye’s use of Canadian arms in Nagorno-Karabakh, Libya, and Syria. Türkiye, through its refusal to sanction Russia or permit NATO military presence BSR, has demonstrated that it is not willing to explicitly target Russia. This clashes with Canada’s aim to contain Russian expansionism and protect Ukraine.

Canadian-Turkish military cooperation largely operates through NATO. Both countries participate in , , , and . While NATO provides a strong foundation, direct partnerships between Canadian and Turkish armed forces are still minimal, thus heightening the chances of estrangement between both sides.

Opportunities for Canada

Despite limitations, there are still opportunities to develop Canadian-Turkish diplomatic collaboration. Focusing on economic, humanitarian, or regional development initiatives creates common ground. For example, the defence industry is an area of growing partnership. Since Canada lifted the arms embargo on Türkiye, it has become one of Canada’s . Türkiye also participates in CANSEC (Canada’s international defence technology conference), and Turkish defence firms travelled to Canada as part of a . The exercise generated technology that enhances automated systems and increases resilience to hybrid offensives. For example, the firm HAVELSAN was able to . between the two countries also provide strong opportunities for investment and technological development which can have positive effects both for defence and for the overall economies of each country.

Building regional capacity is a promising avenue for cooperation. As mentioned above, Türkiye participates in FLF battlegroups, part of NATO’s . Pursuing similar initiatives in the scope of military modernization could be successful in increasing regional capacity. Furthermore, Canada can draw upon its skills in mediation and development to encourage stable, formal BSR organizations. Both actions can increase the ability for the BSR to safeguard against further destabilization in the region, which is beneficial to Turkish interests. The MCM was able to launch successfully in large part because it was framed as a humanitarian mission. This emphasizes the importance of optics for Türkiye, and should serve as an example of how to navigate different positionalities.

For Canada, the BSR can be a new avenue of partnership, increasing overall soft power and presence. A strong BSR is essential for NATO’s objective to defend Alliance territories. It is also essential for Canada’s efforts to enhance its defence posture and bolster international stability. However, without critically engaging with Türkiye this goal will be difficult to achieve. Therefore, finding relevant but non-conventional ways to collaborate in the BSR is key. Enhancing relations also align with other moves Türkiye has been making to collaborate more closely with other NATO and EU countries which seek similar goals as Canada. With an increasing need for fortification of the BSR, Canada should take the opportunity to distinguish itself as a valuable partner.

The post Turkish Foreign Policy in the BSR: Opportunities and Challenges for Canada appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

In a post on X (formerly known as Twitter), current German Chancellor Friedrich Merz stated the following: “.” Just a few short weeks later, in a posted on YouTube with Hungary’s news outlet, former German Chancellor Angela Merkel spoke about her experience in June 2021 when she and French President Emmanuel Macron had floated the idea of the EU holding direct talks with Vladimir Putin in an effort to calm re-ignited tensions with Ukraine. However, at that time, COVID-19 was given as the reason for preventing more frequent dialogue with Russia, which Merkel felt was crucial to ensuring that the be upheld.

In this new interview, Merkel revealed that it was in fact the Baltic states and Poland who were against such initiatives, and then claimed that “” Clearly, such a statement aims to manipulate memory for strategic purposes by placing significant blame on the Baltic states and Poland in the lead-up to the war, while also suggesting that Merkel herself had been serving as a peace-making actor, playing no role in empowering Russia to take such aggressive actions.

The reaction to Merkel’s comments was near instant. For example, Estonian foreign minister Margus Tsahkna responded that Merkel was “” and that instead of strongly responding to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, or its war in Georgia, . Another example of the outrage initiated by Merkel’s comments was captured by Poland’s Minister for Regional Policy, Katarzyna Pełczyńska-Nałęcz (former Polish Ambassador to Russia), who stated that being blamed for starting a war because they “.”

Why say it, and why say it there?

In short, Merkel argues about process in order to justify and defend her legacy and relations with Russia during her time as Chancellor, which focused on fostering “” – including sanctions, Minsk diplomacy, and energy interdependence as a ‘bridge’ with strategic intentions. This political approach is . Merkel’s casting of 2021 as a sort of missed off-ramp shifts focus from Berlin’s (and Merkel’s) long-term bet on engagement with Russia to an Eastern European veto that indirectly led to the war in Ukraine in the first place. Similarly, this mimics the theme that ‘,’ which politicians such as US President Donald Trump tend to employ as a discursive strategy. Legally and morally, the aggressor is Russia. What Merkel’s storytelling does is recast the focus on the intra-EU process of who blocked talks, rather than on the actor who chose invasion over dialogue. This narrative also directly undermines EU unity against Russia’s aggression, .

The venue of this interview further amplifies the political impact on EU unity. The that operates within a highly polarized media ecosystem, which placed . Additionally, alongside being the second lowest among EU member states in this index, recent reports indicate that Prime Minister Victor Orbán and his allies have consolidated control over around 80% of the press media in Hungary.The �ʲ����پ���á�� is hardly a mouthpiece for Budapest, but it is undoubtedly interesting that such an interview would come from the EU member state most often associated with strategic ambiguity in its relations with Moscow. It is worth noting, however, that during the same interview, when asked whether Orbán was a Trojan horse for Putin into the EU, Merkel simply stated that this propagated idea was “.” As placed in Hungary’s polarized media space, the Merkel clip conveys intra-EU blame, further testing cohesion by muddying the EU’s message to Moscow.

For the Baltics and Poland, the was both a threat and signal test. As the Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda warned, engaging in dialogue with Putin without tangible changes in Russian behaviour would send “” that the EU was placating Russia’s actions. Hosting summits without leverage and making agreements without cost or constraints creates an opportunity for Russia to further normalize coercion and potentially foster coalition-splitting rather than deterring it. Viewed in this light, the disapproval in 2021 from Poland and the Baltics was not obstructionism but rather a and a fear for potentially being the next target of Russia’s aggression.

An inconvenient backdrop

There is a reason Eastern Europe balks at Merkel’s ‘if only we had talked more’ sentiments. For three decades, Germany’s policy towards Russia combined binding and deterrence through sanctions and Minsk diplomacy, alongside a dense web of commercial, energy, and even security-based ties. , or the , where a German prime military contractor supplying high-end training systems to a Russian arms centre was . Only after the annexation of Crimea did Berlin entirely revoke the license. The cancellation showed that routine cooperation between Germany and Russia had been institutionalized even after Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008.

The EU’s own briefings on Nord Stream 2 noted that it , which led to debates and arguments from Poland, for example, , as well as broader concerns that Russia was using such initiatives to . Angela Merkel had reiterated to partners, and more specifically to Kyiv, that , despite being seemingly immune to the suggestion that Russia would, in fact, use energy as a tool to achieve its political interests in Europe.

Schröder, the useful contrast

Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, Merkel’s predecessor, moved straight into Russian energy after his time leading Germany, first chairing (the European-Russian pipeline company), then later joining the board of Rosneft (a state-owned Russian oil company), from which he under mounting political pressure. Additionally, Schröder had flirted with a ; however, , which was later stripped of a taxpayer-funded office by the Bundestag, prompting him to navigate the German court system to regain his office. However, the courts upheld his loss of privileges.

Merkel, by contrast, has not taken any corporate posts from Russian-based firms. However, her entanglement with Moscow is apparent through her narrative in the interview which re-allocates the burden of the war within the EU. This reframing serves two distinct purposes: The first is directly shifting any accountability for the complex situation Europe currently finds itself in with Russia, and the second, more indirectly, serves Russian hybrid tactics that seek to and as the .

What now?

Merkel’s interview works less as revisionism and more as a redistribution of memory, agency, and what she believes that EU unity should have resulted in during that time. It invites a tempting but counterfactual narrative that is ultimately counterproductive: that one more conversation might have ‘saved the day’ if only the Easterners had not blocked it. The empirical record – from Mulino to Nord Stream – suggests the opposite. That being said, diplomacy only works when backed by credible costs; absent that, it enables coercion. The lesson Europe should take is that the Baltics and Poland were cautious, given their historical understanding of Russia as a political actor, but were not outright fearful of dialogue with Moscow. If Europe shifts its focus to who blocked what talks and actions, it risks falling into the very divisions and tensions that Moscow seeks to foster.

The post Does the Mask Still Fit? Merkel’s Legacy-Protective Reframing of the Russo-Ukrainian War appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

Amidst continued uncertainty regarding Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine, Latvia and other Baltic states are considering ending their support for the Ottawa Landmine Treaty in the name of national defence. While the decision underscores Latvia’s current fears of vulnerability to Russian aggression, it also poses complex implications for NATO operational cooperation and Canada’s humanitarian commitments. This policy memo examines the implications of the Baltic states’ possible withdrawal from the Treaty on Canada’s leadership and joint NATO operations in Latvia. It offers recommendations on how Canada can retain its international legal obligations while continuing to work successfully with Latvia and the rest of NATO through joint military operations.

Russia’s Threat

Russia’s persistent aggression towards Ukraine has led many of its neighbours to reassess their national security strategies. Poland and the Baltic states have expressed rising concerns, claiming that the regional security environment has ““. Although Russia remains primarily focused on Ukraine, Western intelligence agencies have warned of its long-term plans to challenge NATO’s Eastern flank. In the next three to four years, it is theorized that Russia plans to rebuild and strengthen its military forces, leading to the large potential of an escalated attack . Due to Latvia’s proximity to Russia and location on NATO’s Eastern flank, anticipation of a future attack and motivation to test NATO’s defence readiness are . The Latvian defence intelligence community recently presented heightened warnings of Russia’s military developments and threats, such as infiltrating Latvia’s rural areas.

Treaty Details

was adopted in 1972 to ban the current and future possession, production, and transfer of anti-personnel landmines. The international agreement is currently , excluding Russia and the United States.

Latvia, Poland, Lithuania, and Estonia from the Ottawa Treaty Agreement in late March 2025, amidst rising national security concerns regarding Russian aggression. On April 16th, Latvia’s parliament (the Saeima) voted to officially withdraw from the agreement. With this vote, Latvia became to formally apply to leave the Ottawa Treaty. members of parliament voted in favour of the withdrawal, leaving fourteen against and two abstentions. Latvia set the stage for Lithuania’s parliament (the Seimas) to follow, to leave the treaty just a few weeks later on . Riigikogu, Estonia’s parliament, on June 4th, with 81 members in favour, out of 101 members. The Baltic states must inform all other treaty parties, as well as the United Nations Security Council and Secretary General, of their intentions to withdraw. The state must then wait a before the treaty ceases to apply. This period now gives the Baltic states an opportunity to address concerns with other NATO states on their plans for navigating the future of their defence against Russia.

Despite all three countries being politically aligned to support the decision, they have nonetheless faced backlash from global humanitarian organizations and humanitarian diplomatic figures. Examples include the large banner placed on Geneva’s iconic broken chair statue by the as a direct message to the Baltic states, Finland, and Poland, advocating against withdrawal discussions. Opposition has been expressed from various humanitarian organizations, including a statement by a top human rights official, Volker Türk, from the and , denouncing the decision. A key Canadian leader in diplomatic efforts to establish the Ottawa Treaty, that this move will risk long-term humanitarian consequences in the region.

Apart from a global humanitarian response, gauging local civilian perspectives on the withdrawal remains difficult. Literature or data regarding citizen opinion on the issue across all three Baltic states is scarce, making it a challenge to assess domestic support or opposition

Implications for Canada and NATO

Despite Canada’s continued commitment to the Ottawa Treaty, the potential exit of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia raises questions about the future of Canada’s operational relationship with each of these Baltic states. This question arises because the Ottawa Treaty extends beyond the possession, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines to also of any state using landmines. The Canada-Latvia relationship is especially sensitive to this change, as Lativa currently hosts approximately 1,600 members of the Canadian Armed Forces deployed under . This operation has been extended by Mark Carney for three more years.

Canada also leads a NATO brigade in Latvia made up of troops from 13 Allies. Last year, this brigade successfully conducted , which was the first major field exercise . As activity in this region grows, it is necessary to continue assessing the alignment of the Baltic states with Canada’s treaty obligations and commitments to NATO cooperation as a whole. Canadian leadership plans to expand its brigade by adding 2,200 Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) members apart of the operation .

NATO as an organization prioritizes a collective defence strategy; however, states still hold a level of sovereignty to make military-related decisions. The decision by Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia to leave the Ottawa Treaty suggests that humanitarian concerns are being sidelined in favour of state survival. Whether this shift has an effect on the level of cooperation between Canada and the Baltic states remains to be seen. In order to mitigate this potential change, this policy memo provides two recommendations for Canadian government officials to consider as they assess their relationship with their Baltic Allies.

Recommendation: Canada-Latvia Bilateral Dialogue on Operational Framework

An initial bilateral meeting between Canada and Latvia should take place focusing on creating a plan for navigating new legal circumstances as they emerge in the international security arena. Although Prime Minister Mark Carney did in late August to discuss the extension of military operations in the region, there was no public indication that the topic of landmines was discussed. It is necessary for Canada to engage with Latvian counterparts at the level of defence ministers and senior military leadership. By involving both political authority and operational expertise, both states can ensure that diplomatic commitments are aligned with on-the-ground coordination of operative measures. Assessments should be made to weigh the need for additional legal documents such as non-involvement clauses to ensure that Canada would not engage in activity that would undermine the Treaty.

During initial meetings, Canadian and Latvian officials should seek to establish an understanding of the effects that Latvia’s withdrawal may have on joint operations. A discussion around Canada’s legal obligations should be at the forefront of the discussion. Future NATO exercises and training should be reviewed, and new scenarios should be drawn, should Latvia indicate an intention to incorporate anti-personnel landmines into joint training activities.

To institutionalize this collaboration, both states should consider establishing a Canada-Latvia Operational Working Group. This group would create a permanent, ongoing cooperation between both parties, which would address legal and logistical updates as needed.

While the priority lies in communication with Latvia due to operational duties, Canada should consider exploring avenues for broader engagement with Lithuania and Estonia to strengthen diplomatic relationships in light of changing political and legal conditions.

The post Canada, Latvia and the Ottawa Treaty: Responding to an Evolving Security Landscape appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.