“The Black Sea in 2026: Strategic Maneuvers and Economic Opportunity” examines how the Black Sea has become one of the world’s most consequential geopolitical and economic corridors following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The brief analyzes the competing strategies of Russia, TĂĽrkiye, the European Union, and China, alongside the security concerns of littoral states, highlighting how control of the region shapes Ukraine’s future and broader transatlantic stability. It also outlines Canada’s growing role as a NATO partner in supporting regional security, trade resilience, and postwar reconstruction. The paper concludes with targeted policy recommendations for strengthening Canada–Ukraine cooperation and enhancing Black Sea security in a rapidly evolving strategic landscape.

To read the full policy brief prepared by Dr. Jeff Sahadeo, click the download button below.

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The South Caucasus region has historically been regarded as one of the most complex regions in the world, where geopolitical rivalries, ethnic disputes, and energy security risks collide. One of the longest-lasting conflicts in the region is the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh.

This paper aims to study the Washington Peace Declaration between Armenia and Azerbaijan and its potential impact on security and economic integration in the South Caucasus region. TRIPP and related transport initiatives could enable Armenia and Azerbaijan to serve as critical components of a strategic transit corridor linking Europe and Asia. US and EU engagement is highlighted as essential for maintaining stability and attracting investment in the region.

The post The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Geopolitical Significance of the Washington Peace Declaration for the South Caucasus appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

A Changing Landscape for Armenia–Russia Relations: A Colonial Legacy argues that Armenia’s long-standing reliance on Russia—rooted in imperial rule, Soviet governance, and post-1991 security dependency—has produced a deeply asymmetrical, quasi-colonial relationship that continues to shape contemporary politics. The piece highlights how Russia’s role in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, its use of “frozen conflicts” as leverage, and the economic and migratory ties binding Armenians to Russian structures have reinforced this dependency even as Armenia seeks greater sovereignty after the 2018 Velvet Revolution. Russia’s inconsistent support during crises, particularly the 2020 and 2023 conflicts, has accelerated an erosion of trust, prompting Armenia to reconsider its strategic orientation. Yet the legacy of Russian dominance—embedded in institutions, security arrangements, and political culture—complicates any attempt to reorient the country’s foreign policy, leaving Armenia caught between historical dependency and a desire for genuine autonomy.

The post A Changing Landscape for Armenia-Russia Relations: A Colonial Legacy? appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

Canada’s role in the Black Sea Mine Countermeasures Task Force supports regional security by helping clear naval mines and ordnance threatening vital shipping routes. Working alongside Romania, Türkiye, and Bulgaria, Canada enhances NATO interoperability and gains critical experience in multi-domain naval operations. The mission highlights Canada’s strategic interest in the Black Sea and its potential role in postwar recovery. Continued engagement could strengthen Canada’s regional presence, support allied capabilities, and advance readiness for future maritime challenges.

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Executive Summary

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has had far-reaching consequences for global security, particularly for regions and areas outside the European Union (EU), such as the South Caucasus, post-Soviet Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Mongolia. Although these areas are geographically far from the conflict zone, security ripple effects have been significant, as the Russian Federation has remained historically dominant and influential in these regions. However, the war in Ukraine has raised concerns about the security challenges and terrorism threats in Central Asia and South Caucasus.

This white paper explores the strategic consequences of Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine for broader security architecture with a focus on four critical areas: the South Caucasus, Central Asia, Mongolia, and Afghanistan. It offers a regional assessment of shifting military alignments, hybrid threats, counterterrorism dynamics, and Canada’s emerging security interests in this evolving landscape.

Key Findings

· Russia’s military overstretch has significantly weakened its role as a regional security guarantor, particularly in Central Asia and the South Caucasus.

· Traditional alliances are being re-evaluated; new security actors such as Turkiye, China, and smaller Western states are filling the resulting vacuum.

· Hybrid threats are rising in formerly Russian-dominated regions, increasing instability and risk.

· The resurgence of terrorism and border insecurity in Central Asia and Afghanistan poses renewed threats to regional and global stability.

· Canada has vital strategic interests in contributing to the mitigation of these risks, leveraging its role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and longstanding regional partnerships.

· Poland and Romania, as key actors in NATO and EU strategic initiatives, offer replicable models for Canadian-supported deterrence and resilience across Eurasia.

Introduction

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has not only redefined the contemporary nature of war but exposed deep strategic vulnerabilities within Europe’s security architecture. NATO’s eastern flank was shown to be underprepared for full-scale military aggression, and debates over enlargement and deterrence capabilities have been reinvigorated. Compounding this is the growing uncertainty surrounding US foreign policy under a second Trump administration, casting doubt on the consistency and reliability of transatlantic security commitments.

These shifting dynamics raise critical questions for states on the periphery of NATO and Russia’s former sphere of influence. As they navigate the emerging multipolar order, the need for new strategic calculations, and potentially, alternative or diversified security guarantees, has become paramount.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 marked a turning point in global security relations. While much focus has remained on NATO’s eastern flank and Western Europe, the war’s ripple effects are being acutely felt across post-Soviet Eurasia. Countries that once relied on Russia for military protection are now exploring new alignments, hedging their defense dependencies, or recalibrating their neutrality.

In addition, this war has been influencing NATO’s counterterrorism strategy. The war has created new opportunities for terrorist groups to exploit and ultimately increase their influence to fill the security vacuum. Among these groups we can mention IS-K/IS-KP – Islamic State in Khorasan Province, the branch of IS – Islamic State – which has been spreading its propaganda in Western societies as well. During the war, Russia has continued to be a trusted partner for Iran, hosting members of another radical group Hamas previously in Moscow. Anti-Western propaganda is familiar for Russia as it has often blamed Western countries in facilitating the rise of terrorist organizations. For example, Maria Zabolotskaya, deputy permanent representative of Russia in United Nations (UN), has argued that emergence of IS in the Middle East and Africa can be blamed on the failed US withdrawal and intervention in Iraq and Libya. She added that the situation in Afghanistan is a vivid example of the West leveraging counterterrorism issues to serve their “selfish geopolitical interests”.

This white paper examines the impacts of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on the South Caucasus, Central Asia, Mongolia, and Afghanistan, which have been historically influenced by Russian (and Soviet) military presence, as well as political and economic interests, but are navigating an increasingly fragmented and uncertain security environment. While it is true that the war may not be immediately felt within these regions, it will still nevertheless have significant indirect implications for regional security dynamics by potentially escalating terrorism and extremism. Groups like IS, Al-Qaeda, and other Islamist militant organizations remain active not only in conflict zones, but also in launching global terror operations.

For Canadian policymakers, these developments raise key questions about strategic engagement, NATO cooperation, counterterrorism strategy, and regional stability.

Methodology

This white paper employs a qualitative research design, utilizing a combination of primary and secondary sources to investigate the multifaceted challenges faced by selected states in the context of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Primary sources include government strategy papers, defense white papers, and formal statements issued by international organizations, such as NATO and the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE). Secondary sources include academic literature, policy briefs or analyses from research institutions or think tanks as well as insights derived from expert interviews.

A case study methodology underpins the country-level analysis, enabling in-depth examination of the geopolitical and security implications for Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, and Afghanistan. This approach facilitates comparative insights regarding the regional ramifications of the war in Ukraine, particularly concerning national resilience, foreign policy realignments, and security sector responses.

Historical and Geopolitical Context

For decades following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia maintained its influence over the South Caucasus and Central Asia through a combination of hard military presence, economic dependencies, and soft power. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), bilateral military treaties, and strategic basing agreements, such as those in Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, reflected Moscow’s central role in regional security. As have argued, Russia’s approach was rooted in the belief that the Eastern European neighbourhood should remain within its exclusive sphere of influence, serving both as a security buffer and a geopolitical assertion of status. However, the war in Ukraine has fundamentally destabilized this architecture.

Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine accelerated a visible erosion of Russia’s hegemonic posture in the broader Eurasian region. Yet this war did not begin in 2022; it is the culmination of a broader imperial strategy that began with Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia and the 2014 annexation of Crimea. These earlier incursions served as testing grounds for military aggression, hybrid warfare, and the West’s tolerance for territorial revisionism.

The 2008 war in Georgia, which resulted in the occupation of 20% of Georgian territory, was met with limited international pushback and no enduring deterrent mechanisms. This failure arguably emboldened the Kremlin’s further actions in Ukraine and elsewhere, reinforcing a perception of impunity. The erosion of credible deterrence, both conventional and hybrid, has challenged the assumptions underpinning NATO’s posture in Eastern Europe.

The war in Ukraine has also tested the transatlantic relationship, revealing an over-reliance on US leadership and exposing uncertainties about the durability of Western unity, particularly in light of shifts in American administrations. The conflict has reignited debates in Europe about strategic autonomy, defense investment, and burden-sharing within NATO.

While much attention remains focused on Ukraine, the shockwaves of the war have rippled well beyond its borders. Eurasia, particularly the South Caucasus, Central Asia, Mongolia, and Afghanistan have felt the tremors. These regions, historically shaped by Russia’s military and political dominance, now face a strategic vacuum. Russia’s overextension, domestic fragility, and inability to honor security commitments have altered the geopolitical balance. The result is a complex reordering of alliances, threat perceptions, and defense strategies across a vast and vulnerable geography.

Countries like Kazakhstan, traditionally aligned with Moscow, have resisted pressure to support the Kremlin’s war aims and have actively diversified their foreign policy strategies. Some scholars identify a growing trend of “strategic hedging” among Central Asian states, an effort to reduce overdependence on Russian security while cautiously engaging other powers. Meanwhile, Armenia’s disillusionment with the CSTO following Russia’s passivity during the 2020 and 2023 Nagorno-Karabakh crises reflects a broader questioning of Moscow’s reliability.

This erosion has created space for other actors. China, once cautious in its military profile, is now establishing a more visible security footprint in Central Asia. As Raffaello Pantucci (2023) notes, Beijing has invested in border surveillance, counterterrorism cooperation, and limited joint exercises in Tajikistan

and Kyrgyzstan. These changes indicate a transition from Russian-centric security alignment to multipolar, flexible, and interest-based configurations.

NATO’s role in Eurasian security is also undergoing a significant transformation. While formal enlargement remains politically sensitive, NATO has pursued partnership formats, especially with Georgia and, increasingly, Mongolia, to build interoperability and signal political support. Michael RĂĽhle discusses the strategic importance of “NATO’s global partnerships,” which allow for flexible collaboration without formal membership. Georgia’s engagement through the NATO–Georgia Substantial Package has been one of the examples of this evolving cooperation. The Alliance’s “open door” policy is also being undermined by strategic ambiguity, raising doubts among aspirant states about the credibility of Western security guarantees.

In the Georgian case, what was once a society firmly committed to Euro-Atlantic integration has, in recent years, seen a partial retrenchment. Public support for NATO remains high, but political dynamics and growing disillusionment with Western inaction in the face of Russian occupation have fueled uncertainty. This creates both risk and opportunity: risk in the form of democratic backsliding and regional instability, and opportunity for Canada and NATO allies to re-engage with clear, consistent support for democratic reform and territorial integrity.

Yet, NATO’s ability to provide credible security guarantees short of membership remains contested. highlight how ambiguity in NATO’s posture toward aspirant states undermines deterrence and opens space for adversarial manipulation. These concerns are further compounded by shifting US policies and uncertain commitment levels, especially under new administrations. For states in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, this ambiguity feeds the appeal of diversification.

focuses on the new security landscape created by Russia’s war in Ukraine to adapt the new strategy of counter-terrorism and hybrid warfare. According to a particular NATO document, three main tasks has been identified: collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security. As analyzes, this document “identifies terrorism as one of the primary asymmetric threats to the alliance, alongside hybrid warfare…”. Also, the Washington Summit Declaration of 2024 highlighted to prevent the spread of radical ideologies and adapt the counter-terrorism policy.

mentions three main challenges for security architecture: “low-level terrorism,” digital “value chain,” and proliferation of arms. He suggests that NATO’s counter-terrorism strategy should take up a practice of selective reevaluation to answer new terrorism threats. As NATO’s adaptive strategy from the 1990s to the 2000s was focused on strengthening its counter-terrorism efforts, the new security landscape is reshaping NATO’s strategy to be more focused on answering these new threats connecting to arms trafficking from conflict zones. Stockhammer includes the example of when

The literature also emphasizes the growing prevalence of hybrid threats, disinformation campaigns, and covert paramilitary activity. theorize that hegemonic decline is often accompanied by a rise in grey zone tactics, as waning powers seek to maintain influence without triggering direct confrontation. Russia’s increased use of cyber and disinformation tools in Georgia and Kazakhstan supports this thesis. Similarly, China’s security strategy in Central Asia increasingly includes digital authoritarianism, with exported surveillance technologies and cyber-cooperation compacts.

These hybrid methods are particularly concerning in contexts of weak governance and democratic fragility, where external manipulation can exploit societal divisions. Scholars like have long warned about the vulnerability of aspiring democracies on Russia’s border, and recent events in Georgia and Armenia suggest that these vulnerabilities are being actively exploited in the post-Ukraine war environment.

The South Caucasus region – including Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan – remains vulnerable to terrorism largely due to its proximity to unstable areas such as the North Caucasus, Turkiye, and Iran, as well as the movement of foreign terrorist fighters (FTF) linked to conflicts in Syria and Iraq that have involved IS and other radical Islamist groups. These conflicts have created fertile ground for radicalization that some scholars suggest may further intensify the risk of radicalization; they express concern regarding the possibility of individuals returning home and further engaging with radical ideologies among local communities. While Armenia has been less affected by Islamist movements, the instability following the Karabakh conflict may nonetheless have left fertile ground for hybrid threats to form. In addition, there are concerns about Syrian militants (mainly from groups with ties to jihadist organizations) being transported to the South Caucasus to fight alongside Azerbaijani forces, particularly since the second Nagorno-Karabakh war. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine could exacerbate the , with some potentially being diverted to the South Caucasus, either

The Pankisi Gorge region in Georgia gained notoriety in the 2000s as a site of jihadist recruitment, a refuge site for Islamic militants, and a key transit route. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Western intelligence raised alarms on presence of Al-Qaeda in the Gorge. According to various sources, Arab foreign fighters who participated in the Chechen wars also received training in the region – a practice that Russia frequently cited in its accusations of Georgia harboring terrorists and failing to control its borders. From 2014 to 2015, Georgia re-emerged in international media coverage when IS rose to power in Iraq, drawing foreign fighters from around the world – including Georgia – to the battlefields of Iraq and subsequently, Syria. According to different sources, approximately 50 to 200 fighters left Georgia to fight in the ranks of IS or other terrorist organizations. As the war in Ukraine continues, it may present Russia with yet another opportunity to accuse others of providing safe haven to foreign terrorist fighters.

Recent reflections, including by , highlight that international engagement in Afghanistan, particularly by Western powers including Canada, was compromised by flawed diplomatic design and operational fragmentation. In his assessment of the , Rahim identifies key failures such as the exclusion of the Afghan government, unrealistic timelines imposed by the United States, and a lack of impartial mediation as primary factors in the collapse of political settlement efforts. These deficiencies, compounded by internal divisions among Afghan elites, resulted in a fragile negotiating structure vulnerable to collapse under Taliban pressure. Canada’s mission, like that of its NATO allies, was constrained by unclear objectives and shifting operational mandates, a point echoed by Canadian commentators in major outlets like The Globe and Mail (2023).

The collapse of the Afghan Republic and the Taliban’s return to power has had immediate and long-term security spillovers in the region. Central Asian states are particularly concerned about cross-border terrorism, refugee surges, narcotics trafficking, and the spread of extremist ideologies. With Russia distracted and weakened by its invasion of Ukraine, and China reluctant to assume deep security commitments, the region

faces a growing vacuum of counterterrorism leadership. In this context, Rahim’s critique serves as a cautionary framework for future interventions: local legitimacy, inclusive diplomacy, and long-term strategic alignment must form the foundation of external engagement. Canada’s policy going forward should include lessons learned from Afghanistan’s collapse, as well as new mechanisms to support border-state resilience through coordinated regional intelligence, multilateral diplomacy, and support for community-level stabilization initiatives.

Afghanistan, however, presents another dimension of strategic instability. The US forces withdrawal and the Taliban’s return to power have turned the country into a potential source of terrorist activity and transnational criminal networks. Reports by the International Crisis Group and the United States Institute of Peace warn of the risks posed by IS-KP and other extremist groups to regional security, particularly in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. The new atmosphere gave more flexibility to various extremist groups to regroup or collaborate with each other. There are three main terrorist groups operating in Afghanistan now: the .

Afghanistan falling to Taliban rule has created a multitude of challenges for international relations. Despite the fact that no country or international organization formally recognizes the leadership of Taliban, some maintain diplomatic relations. Central Asian countries such as Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan continue to engage in diplomatic talks with Taliban, focusing mostly on regional economic issues. All five Central Asian states have kept embassies in Kabul despite the fallout.

As Russia focuses more on Ukraine, IS-KP has more possibility to increase its influence outside Afghanistan too. IS-KP is estimated to have about , including foreign recruits from Central Asia and Europe. IS-KP carried out its first terrorist attack at Kabul airport immediately after the US military withdrawal in 2021, signaling its intent to challenge the Taliban for control over Afghanistan. As result of the , 170 Afghans and 13 US militants were killed. And although IS has lost its territorial strongholds in Iraq and Syria, the group has nonetheless quickly shifted its strategy to forming smaller factions across various countries: “”.

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has expressed concern over the situation in Afghanistan and IS-KP since the US withdrawal in 2021. As Vladimir Voronkov, UN Under-Secretary-General mentioned, “”. In this context, some scholars consider IS-KP as the most formidable extremist group, with . It has plotted more terrorist attacks since 2021 when Taliban came to power. The reasons of the increased terrorist attacks are the tactical shift that began in 2019 and chaos and vacuum in Afghanistan. while the Taliban referred to IS-KP members as Salafis or Khawarij, or heretical extremists.

It is important to mention that IS-KP members, which became one of the main threats for the security of Afghanistan and Central Asia, who organize terrorist attacks in Afghanistan, are from Central Asian countries and mainly, Tajikistan. For example, the first terrorist attack following the onset of the Ukraine war occurred in Kabul in 2022 and was carried out by of IS. In March 2023, a Tajik militant assassinated the , , who had been a promient figure in the fight against the IS-KP network in Nangarhar. Later, in December 2023, a member from Central Asia residing in Germany . These attacks were flollowed by several terrorist attacks in Iran – killing 90 people – and Turkiye – killing one person.

This continued into 2024, where IS-KP orchestrated a series of terrorist attacks across Afghanistan. Among the most notable was an assault on , the Afghan Taliban governor of Nimroz, who narrowly escaped execution by a faction of IS-KP Tajik member. On March 21, 2024, an Uzbek national affiliated with . Following this, IS expanded its operations beyond the Khorasan region and launched several high-profile attacks. Among them was a widely publicized suicide bombing in Kerman province, Iran, during the anniversary procession of the General Qassem Soleimani’s death. According to the Iranian investigators, one of the terrorists was of who had received training instructions in Afghanistan (Table 1).

Furthermore, among those noteworthy included terrorist attacks attributed to IS-KP on March 24, 2024, which saw Tajik nationals storm and kill 145 people. Such terrorist attacks showed the tendency, that since IS-KP became active in Afghanistan, more individuals from Central Asian countries – mainly ethnic Tajiks – have been engaged in terrorist activities. This trend created the fertile ground for radicalization in Central Asia’s region that already experienced Islamic radical movements in the 1990s.

2025 was no exception to terrorist violence, as several high-profile terrorist attacks in Turkiye and Russia took place. In an effort to thwart future terrorist attacks, the Turkish government carried out a series of operations targeting IS cells across the country. More than three hundred individuals were arrested, most of them originating from Central Asia. Subsequent investigations revealed that several of the detainees were high-ranking members of the IS-KP network operating across Central Asia, Turkiye, and the Caucasus.

Due to IS-KP’s terrorist activities beyond Afghanistan’s borders, neighbouring countries – particularly in – have found it necessary to engage with the Taliban, not only to pursue counterterrorism objectives but to also advance their own economic and political interests in the region. Unlike the IS-KP, which poses a greater regional security threat, the Taliban has been viewed as a more viable partner in reshaping the regional security landscape. Central Asian countries have maintained their embassies in Kabul, signaling a pragmatic approach to diplomacy with Taliban governance. As Turgunbaeva & Ghiasi suggest, for Central Asian countries, the Taliban proves to be the better partner than IS-KP, as the latter has already attacked two Central Asian countries: Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Additionally, while China seeks stability in Afghanistan for fulfilling the interests served by the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and to prevent the spread the radical ideology, Central Asian countries also try to stabilize the region.

The persistence of Central Asian militants remains an overwhelming challenge to international security. Since 2023, the region has been a wellspring of terrorist operations organized by its nationals, whose reach has extended from Europe to the Middle East. These attacks, carried out across countries such as Iran, Russia, Afghanistan, and Turkiye, bear the unmistakable imprint of Central Asian involvement. Although, despite the troubling export of violence, the post-Soviet Central Asian states themselves have, thus far, remained largely untouched by such acts of terrorism on their own soil.

Uzbekistan was the first country to host a Taliban delegation, led by the Deputy Prime Minister Mawlawi Abdul Salam Hanafi in September 2022. In 2024 the Uzbek Prime Minister visited Kabul to discuss the trade projects. Kyrgyzstan’s relations with Afghanistan continue to be shaped in part by the presence of a strong Afghan-Kyrgyz minority in the nation. In 2021, Deputy Chairman of the Security Council Taalatbek Masadykov met with Taliban ministers to address issues important to this Afghan-Kyrgyz electorate. In September 2024, cooperation had expanded to include trade and energy infrastructure, which was soon followed by agreements in agriculture and transit.

Kazakhstan has focused its engagement with Afghanistan on economic opportunities, particularly in the chemical, mining, and metallurgical sectors. The Kazak Prime Minister led a delegation to Kabul to participate in a Kazakhstan-Afghanistan business forum, highlighting growing bilateral commercial ties.

Tajikistan, despite being the main regional opponent of the Taliban, has established trade relations with Afghanistan and signed an agreement worth $120 million USD. In addition, in 2023, Tajikistan opened five joint border markets with Afghanistan.

Turkmenistan maintains a neutral stance and primarily engages with Afghanistan through the lens of energy cooperation. Its principal interest lies in the progress of the TAPI – Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India gas pipeline. As a result, Turkmen officials’ meetings with the Taliban have mostly focused on advancing this strategic energy TAPI project.

While not a formal diplomatic move, the US has also begun to engage with the Taliban on a limited basis. On March 23, 2025, they removed three high-profile members of the Haqqani network – including Sirajuddin Haqqani, the group’s leader and the Taliban’s acting Interior Minister – from its most-wanted list. According to the Taliban, are Sirajuddin Haqqani’s brother and nephew.

The United States added the Haqqani Network as one of the deadliest groups connected to Taliban – operating in Pakistan and bordering Afghanistan – to the foreign terrorist organizations list in 2012. In doing so, they offered $5 to 10 USD reward for information leading to the capture of its leaders. However, , causing larger questions to arise regarding the future role and presence of US hegemony in the region. As scholars mention, this removal followed the Taliban’s release of US citizen George Glezmann, who had been detained in Afghanistan since 2022.

With Russia weakened and NATO’s reach limited, alternative security and development frameworks have gained prominence. The Central Asia–Caucasus–Europe (CACE) corridor, for example, envisions a strategic and economic bridge from Central Asia through the South Caucasus to Europe, bypassing Russian-controlled routes and creating new geoeconomic fault lines. Meanwhile, the , spearheaded by Poland and supported by NATO allies, connects the Adriatic, Baltic, and Black Seas in a project of economic resilience, energy diversification, and digital infrastructure.

In considering NATO members’ strategic roles, Romania has been emphasized in discussions about NATO’s deterrence on the eastern flank and the EU’s updated Black Sea Strategy (). Romania stands at the intersection of NATO’s military initiatives and the EU’s efforts to enhance connectivity, economic resilience, and maritime security in the Black Sea. Also, Poland’s assertive role in the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) highlights a regional approach to infrastructure, energy security, and defense cooperation. The 3SI provides a framework for enhanced Central European resilience in the face of growing Russian assertiveness and fluctuating US involvement in Europe.

Graham highlights Mongolia’s position as a neutral buffer balancing Russian and Chinese pressures. The Ukraine war has further encouraged Mongolia to diversify security and economic partnerships, including through engagement with Canada and other liberal democracies. Mongolia is geographically distant from Ukraine, although the war’s influence on global security dynamics may affect the region’s stability and terrorism risks. Mongolia is close to China and Russia, rendering them an indirect target for the potential exporting of radical ideologies from the extremist groups. As a neutral power between China and Russia, Mongolia may be targeted by the extremist groups allied with the Russian and Chinese state – countries which are on the same side in Ukraine war.

Mongolia recognizes the global threat that terrorism and violent extremist present to an increasingly uncertain and multipolar world. Since 2023, Mongolia has been a member of the UN Office Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) program and established the Passenger Information Unit of Mongolia. It became the fourth country to join this program and the first Asian country to establish an UNOCT unit (). According to the UN representative of Mongolia, the country is continuing to take steps to increase awareness of, and fight against, disinformation and propaganda. In 2024, Mongolia hosted the conference titled “Addressing the prevailing Digital Information Disorder: Countering the Use of the Internet by Terrorists and Extremists,” organized by OSCE Transnational Threats Department together with the National Counter-Terrorism Council of Mongolia (). In addition, the “Case for Central Asia–Caucasus Engagement” () proposes a new strategic platform to integrate diplomatic, development, and deterrence policy toward post-Soviet Eurasia. This vision aligns closely with Canada’s potential for flexible engagement and soft security.

Against this backdrop, countries are hedging their bets. While some still look to NATO as the ultimate guarantor, others have diversified their options, seeking bilateral arrangements, new regional alignments, or transactional partnerships with authoritarian powers. Strategic pluralism, rather than bloc politics, defines the new Eurasian security order.

Canadian Strategic Engagement

Poland, through its leadership in the Three Seas Initiative (3SI), represents a strategic anchor for Central and Eastern Europe in countering Russian influence and fostering Euro-Atlantic cooperation. As highlighted by , Poland has played a central role in building regional infrastructure, energy interconnectivity, and digital resilience across the 3SI member states. These efforts reduce dependency on Russian-controlled supply lines and enhance regional autonomy in the face of hybrid and conventional threats.

The 3SI complements broader NATO and EU frameworks by focusing on practical development and connectivity between the Adriatic, Baltic, and Black Seas. For countries in the South Caucasus and Central

Asia, it offers a vision of post-Soviet regionalism that emphasizes integration, resilience, and Western alignment. Integrating the Three Seas Initiative into Canadian policy considerations provides a valuable model for aligning economic development with security stabilization across the broader post-Soviet periphery.

As regional actors seek to build more autonomous strategic and economic futures, new frameworks such as the proposed Central Asia–Caucasus–Europe (CACE) corridor have gained traction. The CACE initiative, as highlighted by The National Interest (2025), envisions a geoeconomic and geopolitical link connecting Central Asia and the South Caucasus directly to Europe, bypassing traditional Russian-controlled routes. The corridor promotes diversified energy exports, secure supply chains, and multilateral infrastructure cooperation. It also reinforces the strategic importance of Georgia and Azerbaijan as transit hubs between East and West.

In this context, offers an alternative regional architecture that counters Russian and Chinese monopolies on overland infrastructure. For Canada, supporting such corridors may serve dual objectives: reducing regional dependency on adversarial actors, and facilitating sustainable development and security cooperation among emerging democracies. Integrating the CACE vision into Canadian foreign policy also complements NATO’s military posture with a civilian, development-focused track aimed at long-term stabilization.

Recent policy commentary underscores two interlinked narratives in Eurasia’s evolving security order: the significance of credible NATO-aligned deterrence models (as seen in Romania), and the consequences of softening international stances toward Russia’s occupation of Crimea. Recognizing Russia’s annexation of Crimea as legitimate would embolden other revisionist powers and fundamentally erode international legal norms regarding sovereignty. Meanwhile, Romania has demonstrated how mid-sized NATO allies can reinforce the alliance’s eastern posture through infrastructure development, multinational coordination, and hybrid threat management.

These examples illustrate the critical importance of defending international legal standards and investing in alliance readiness. Canada’s strategic outlook would benefit from incorporating these dual lessons: defending non-recognition policies in contested regions like Crimea while simultaneously learning from NATO forward-deployed frameworks in countries like Romania. Taken together, these academic and policy perspectives provide the analytical foundation for understanding Eurasia’s post-Ukraine security recalibration – and for formulating Canada’s strategic options in response.

Regional Security Implications

Across the South Caucasus, Central Asia, Mongolia, and Afghanistan, Russia’s declining influence has triggered regional realignments, new threat landscapes, and emerging opportunities for external engagement. For Canada, understanding these dynamics is critical to shaping effective policy responses.

In the South Caucasus, Armenia has grown increasingly disillusioned with Russia, particularly following Moscow’s failure to act during Azerbaijan’s 2023 offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh. Yerevan is now actively pursuing closer ties with the EU and the United States. Azerbaijan, meanwhile, has capitalized on Russia’s invasion in Ukraine to boost its military cooperation with Turkiye and Israel, positioning itself as a dominant regional power. Georgia, while maintaining its strategic commitment to NATO integratio

struggle with domestic political instability and the enduring occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Russian forces.

In Central Asia, countries like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have distanced themselves from Moscow’s geopolitical agenda. Kazakhstan notably refused to recognize Russia’s annexation of Ukrainian territories, reaffirming its commitment to territorial integrity as a core foreign policy principle. Kazakhstan has deepened defense partnerships with Turkiye, NATO, and select Western actors, while Uzbekistan – traditionally outside the CSTO – has pursued independent counterterrorism and security dialogues with the United States and China. China’s growing footprint, especially in Tajikistan, highlights Beijing’s transactional interest in border security and regime stability rather than full-spectrum defense cooperation.

At the same time, the region is facing increased pressure from transnational threats. The reassertion of Taliban control in Afghanistan and the resurgence of IS-KP have heightened fears of terrorism, arms trafficking, and extremist ideology spilling into Central Asia. Weak border management capacities and the erosion of Russia’s traditional role as a security bulwark have created a dangerous vacuum. Parallel to these trends, cyber and information warfare have intensified. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and others have been targeted by Russian disinformation campaigns aiming to undermine public trust in democratic institutions and discourage Western engagement. These hybrid threats have led to growing interest in cyber cooperation with NATO-aligned actors.

Mongolia, long maintaining a neutral foreign policy posture, is also recalibrating. Concerns about Russian unpredictability and Chinese dominance have pushed Ulaanbaatar to pursue closer security and economic ties with democratic partners, including the US, Japan, and Canada. Mongolia’s strategic location and democratic credentials position it as a valuable partner for middle-power engagement.

Afghanistan remains a critical axis of instability. The Taliban’s unchecked consolidation of power, Russia’s diminished role, and China’s limited security ambition have allowed terrorist groups such as IS-KP to flourish. Cross-border smuggling of arms and narcotics continues to destabilize the region. For bordering states like Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, this poses a direct security threat, prompting interest in greater intelligence-sharing and joint counterterrorism mechanisms.

Together, these developments suggest that Canada has an opportunity to deepen its role as a stabilizing actor. This includes advancing NATO partnerships, co-sponsoring cybersecurity and counterterrorism initiatives, and investing in diplomatic and development programs that enhance regional resilience.

Future Security Scenarios and Policy Recommendations

remains one of the most significant violations of international law in recent history. Recognizing this act, or failing to robustly oppose it, would send dangerous signals to other revisionist powers seeking to alter borders by force. As noted in the analysis by The National Interest (2024), legitimizing Russia’s control over Crimea would reward aggression and erode international norms surrounding sovereignty and territorial integrity.

For aspiring NATO-aligned nations such as Georgia and Moldova, the failure to maintain a firm stance on Crimea undermines the credibility of international deterrence. It also emboldens separatist movements supported by external powers, particularly in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria. In Central Asia,

states with Russian-speaking minorities observe the situation closely, wary of Moscow’s justifications for intervention under the pretense of “protecting compatriots.”

Canada’s unwavering support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity remains essential. Backsliding on Crimea would not only harm Kyiv’s war effort but also undermine Canadian diplomatic credibility across Eurasia. As part of NATO’s eastern flank engagement, Canadian policymakers must continue advocating for non-recognition, bolster security assistance to at-risk states, and ensure hybrid threats exploiting ambiguous status territories do not escalate into new conflicts.

Romania has emerged as a pivotal actor in NATO’s Black Sea strategy, showcasing how smaller but committed allies can meaningfully reinforce alliance posture in contested regions. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Romania rapidly expanded its defense spending, modernized its armed forces, and upgraded key infrastructure, including the Mihail Kog�lniceanu Air Base — set to become one of NATO’s largest air hubs in Europe. Romania’s role is further reinforced through its leadership in regional maritime security efforts, including trilateral cooperation with Bulgaria and Turkiye to counter drifting mines in the Black Sea.

Moreover, Romania has played a critical role in supporting Ukraine’s economic resilience by facilitating the transit of over 29 million tons of Ukrainian grain through its ports, despite Russian attempts to blockade Black Sea maritime routes. It also hosts the Headquarters Multinational Corps Southeast in Sibiu, enhancing NATO’s regional command and control capacity in crisis scenarios.

Canada can view Romania as a strategic partner and operational hub within NATO’s Black Sea architecture. Joint participation in military exercises would help build interoperability with Romanian and other allied forces. Canada could contribute cyber defense expertise, helping Romania counter hybrid threats and disinformation campaigns that have intensified in the region. Infrastructure support and humanitarian collaboration could also be explored to reinforce Canada’s commitment to Eastern European security and resilience. This model of NATO-aligned deterrence in Romania can serve as a valuable reference for engaging other aspirant or front-line states, particularly Georgia and Armenia, as they navigate uncertain security environments amid a weakening Russian presence and ambiguous Western guarantees.

As Eurasian states reassess their security futures in the post-Ukraine context, two contrasting strategic directions are emerging:

Option A: NATO as a security anchor despite its limited footprint beyond Eastern Europe, some aspirant states (like Georgia) still view the alliance as the ultimate guarantor of their sovereignty and territorial integrity. For these countries, deepening interoperability with NATO standards, participating in joint exercises, and securing bilateral defense commitments from individual NATO members are seen as vital steps toward eventual membership or at least enhanced deterrence.

Option B: Strategic diversification and bilateral guarantees given uncertainties surrounding NATO’s future enlargement and potential policy shifts under a new US administration, other regional actors may opt for diversified security partnerships. This could include closer defense ties with China, or even non-aligned groupings. These actors may pursue flexible arrangements that prioritize regime security, border control, or cyber defense, rather than full-spectrum alliance integration.

Strategic Recommendations for Canada

• Expand NATO regional initiatives through technical support and military training missions.

• Deepen defense cooperation with Mongolia, Georgia, and Kazakhstan.

• Invest in regional CT capacity-building, particularly in border zones adjacent to Afghanistan.

• Contribute to hybrid threat awareness and resilience by supporting anti-disinformation programs.

• Engage multilaterally in regional defense forums, including OSCE dialogues and confidence-building platforms.

• Enhance counterterrorism cooperation with Central Asian Republics, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Mongolia

• Participate on framing the Security Policy and border control mechanisms together with Central Asian and South Caucasus countries

• Deradicalization programs – several countries in the region of Central Asia and South Caucasus have implemented de-radicalization programs to counter extremist ideologies – collaborating in adopting such programs will facilitate the process that thus far, been struggling to gain political traction.

• Advance Strategic Engagement with CACE states through:
  • Backing multilateral efforts that increase the corridor’s resilience to hybrid threats.
  • Encouraging diplomatic alignment with CACE-participating states as part of Canada’s broader Eurasia engagement strategy
  • Supporting infrastructure financing and regional governance frameworks through international institutions.
• Consider engagement with the 3SI through:
  • Investment in critical infrastructure and digital connectivity projects led by trusted allies like Poland.
  • Policy dialogue and technical assistance in the 3SI’s energy and cyber defense pillars.
  • Support for South Caucasus participation in transregional linkages with 3SI corridors, particularly through Georgia.

Conclusion

The ripple effects of Russia’s war in Ukraine extend far beyond Europe. In Eurasia, the reshuffling of defense alignments and emergence of new security actors are already reshaping the regional landscape. Canada, as a capable actor within NATO and the global security community, must engage strategically to protect its interests, support its allies, and contribute to long-term regional stability.

This white paper underscores the urgency of proactive engagement across counterterrorism and multilateral defense diplomacy. The evolving security vacuum must be addressed with foresight, allied coordination, and a renewed commitment to regional security partnerships.

Canada has both a responsibility and an opening. By advancing its contributions to NATO’s deterrence efforts, supporting resilience-focused development corridors like the Three Seas Initiative and the Central

Asia–Caucasus–Europe platform, and deepening counterterrorism cooperation with frontline states, Canada can reinforce stability and uphold democratic values in an increasingly contested region.

Table 1

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This policy memo examines the complex and evolving security threats posed by Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) in the Black Sea region, particularly in the context of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war. This memo assesses the scale of the FTF threat across key Black Sea states, including TĂĽrkiye, Georgia, Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania, and Moldova, and outlines the multifaceted risks posed by returning or transiting fighters, including future terrorist activity, regional destabilization, and violations of international humanitarian law. In response, the memo calls for a comprehensive and cooperative regional security strategy that includes Canadian support. Recommended actions include strengthening border surveillance, enhancing intelligence-sharing mechanisms, expanding legal frameworks aligned with international human rights standards, and implementing community-based deradicalization and reintegration programs. Canadian experience in counterterrorism and human rights advocacy is positioned to facilitate regional dialogue, contribute technical expertise, and promote long-term security in this geopolitically volatile region.

To view the whole report, download the report below.

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The Black Sea has long held historical importance due to various political, economic, and trade factors. For centuries, the area was disputed by the Russian and Ottoman Empires. Since the 20^th century, the region’s geopolitical landscape has grown more complex, especially because three important countries in the region – TĂĽrkiye, Bulgaria, and Romania – are North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies.  

Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine, which culminated in the full-scale invasion of 2022, has further increased the fragility and complexity of the Black Sea region. In addition to military threats, the region also faces a multitude of other security hazards such as economic, environmental and migratory concerns. Interestingly, most of these issues have direct links to Russian aggression in the region. 

It is no accident that Russia is at the centre of the majority of conflicts that have been fought in this region. In 2004, Russia did not have sufficient power to challenge Bulgaria and Romania’s NATO accession. However, when Georgia and Ukraine moved towards joining NATO following the Bucharest Summit of 2008, Russia responded with military force. In 2008, Russia invaded Georgia and occupied parts of its territory; in 2014, Russia annexed Crimea, and eight years later, launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. 

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Türkiye’s deepening relationship with Russia is reshaping the regional security landscape and challenging NATO’s strategic cohesion. From trilateral cooperation in Syria’s Astana Process to the controversial S-400 missile system and major energy projects like TurkStream and Akkuyu, Ankara’s pursuit of strategic autonomy continues to raise questions about alliance unity and energy dependency.

Strategic Cooperation in Syria: The Astana Process 

The Astana Process, initiated in 2017 by Iran, Russia, and TĂĽrkiye has played a pivotal role in managing the Syrian civil war, despite the trio’s divergent interests. While Russia and Iran have supported the Assad regime, TĂĽrkiye has backed various opposition groups. This collaboration, though fraught with complexities, has been instrumental in shaping the trajectory of the conflict.  

The Astana Process emerged as an alternative to the United Nations (UN)-led Geneva talks, aiming to reduce hostilities and establish de-escalation zones in Syria. Russia’s primary goal was to legitimize the Assad regime and consolidate its military gains. Iran sought to maintain its influence in Syria, ensuring continued accessibility to Hezbollah in Lebanon (). Conversely, TĂĽrkiye aimed to prevent the establishment of a Kurdish autonomous region along its border with Syria, viewing the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) as a terrorist threat due to their links with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) (; ) 

TĂĽrkiye’s trajectory within the Astana Process evolved from cautious mediation to a more assertive and strategic engagement aligned with its broader geopolitical aims. Initially entering the trilateral format with Russia and Iran to manage and prevent Kurdish political mobilization and violence near its southern border, TĂĽrkiye used the de-escalation zones not only to limit the YPG’s presence but  also to entrench its own long-term political influence in northern Syria (). As the process unfolded, particularly from 2019 onward, Ankara shifted from mere observation and containment toward active operational involvement, increasingly backing the Syrian National Army (SNA), a conglomerate of rebel factions integrated under Turkish direction and logistical control (). 

TĂĽrkiye’s maneuvering was shaped not only by tactical opportunity but by its evolving relationship with Russia. Turkish President Recep Tayyip ErdoÄźan had successfully positioned his country as a regional power able to speak with all sides – hosting negotiations for grain export agreements with Ukraine and simultaneously maintaining a military presence in Syria. Russia tolerated Turkish advances in part because Ankara tacitly accepted the continuation of Russian air dominance in central and eastern Syria, even as Turkish-backed groups overran regime positions in the west (). This quid-pro-quo understanding, never formalized but visible in military posturing and diplomatic language, underscored the highly transactional and realist basis of the Turkish-Russian relationship during this critical period . 

Despite the Astana Process playing a significant role in managing conflict dynamics on the ground in Syria, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) remained highly skeptical of its long-term legitimacy and strategic outcomes, particularly in contrast to the UN-led Geneva process. NATO consistently reiterated that there was no military solution to the Syrian conflict and firmly supported a political resolution rooted in UN Security Council Resolution 2254 (). From NATO’s perspective, the Astana Process, while ostensibly designed to reduce hostilities through mechanisms like de-escalation zones, risked undermining international diplomatic consensus by becoming a parallel framework to the UN-backed solution. Indeed, many NATO members, particularly the US, expressed concern that the de-escalation zones facilitated regime consolidation rather than genuine conflict reduction, as they were often used as staging grounds for Syrian and Russian offensives (). These zones were criticized by international humanitarian organizations as being one-sided, failing to protect opposition-held areas from systematic recapture . Throughout the war, NATO maintained its own strategic focus on counter-terrorism, particularly through its role in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS (). While TĂĽrkiye’s participation in the Astana Process aligned with its national security objectives, NATO as a whole viewed the framework as an inadequate and potentially harmful substitute for a legitimate, UN-endorsed political solution. 

The S-400 Missile System Acquisition 

TĂĽrkiye’s interest in advanced air defense systems dates back over a decade, with multiple attempts to procure such systems from NATO Allies, including the US. However, these efforts were often stymied by disagreements over technology transfer and co-production rights. The S-400 deal with Russia – concluded in 2019 –  offered more favourable terms in these areas, aligning with TĂĽrkiye’s desire to bolster its indigenous defense capabilities and reduce reliance on Western suppliers (). The system’s extended and flexible engagement, allowing for various missile types and sizes, and its rapid deployment capability further enhanced its appeal to the Turkish government (). Moreover, the acquisition was seen as a means to assert national sovereignty and diversify TĂĽrkiye’s defense partnerships, especially in the wake of strained relations with the US following the 2016 coup attempt, which Ankara partially attributed to American complicity (). 

A central issue raised by the US and other NATO Allies was the potential for the S-400’s advanced radar to collect intelligence on NATO military assets, including stealth platforms like the F-35 fighter jet, thereby risking the exposure of sensitive operational data to Russia. This was not just a strategic concern: integration of a Russian-made system into NATO’s defense network also posed unprecedented compatibility issues (). As a result, TĂĽrkiye’s participation in key joint military exercises and training activities was scaled back, weakening interoperability, a cornerstone of NATO’s collective defense model (). While the Alliance formally respects each member state’s sovereign right to determine its own defense procurement choices, the S-400 deal was widely seen as crossing a threshold that jeopardized collective security and trust. For NATO, sovereignty must be balanced with interdependence, particularly when it comes to shared systems and defense planning. 

Domestically, the S-400 acquisition bolstered President ErdoÄźan’s narrative of an assertive and independent TĂĽrkiye. The deal was portrayed as a triumph of national sovereignty, resonating with a populace increasingly skeptical of Western intentions. Additionally, the advanced capabilities of the S-400 system were perceived as a safeguard against potential internal threats, particularly in the aftermath of the 2016 coup attempt, during which Turkish F-16s were used by insurgent forces (). 

Turkish-Russian Energy Partnerships 

The TurkStream pipeline, operational since January 2020, is a dual-line natural gas conduit that transports Russian gas across the Black Sea directly to TĂĽrkiye. With a total capacity of 31.5 billion cubic meters annually, the first line supplies TĂĽrkiye’s domestic market, while the second extends through Bulgaria to Southeast and Central Europe. This infrastructure not only solidifies TĂĽrkiye’s role as a regional energy hub but also deepens its energy interdependence with Russia. 

Analysts highlight that while TurkStream enhances TĂĽrkiye’s strategic importance in regional energy transit, it simultaneously increases Ankara’s reliance on Russian energy imports. Given that nearly half of TĂĽrkiye’s natural gas is sourced from Russia, this project highlights a complex interdependence that can both empower and constrain TĂĽrkiye’s foreign policy options (). 

The Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant, located in Mersin Province, represents TĂĽrkiye’s inaugural venture into nuclear energy. Constructed and operated by Russia’s state-owned Rosatom under a Build-Own-Operate (BOO) model, the plant comprises four VVER-1200 reactors, each with a capacity of 1,200 MW  (). This arrangement, wherein Rosatom retains ownership and operational control, is unprecedented and has sparked debates regarding TĂĽrkiye’s energy sovereignty (). 

Critics argue that the BOO model may lead to long-term dependency on Russian technology and expertise, potentially compromising TĂĽrkiye’s autonomy in critical energy infrastructure. Furthermore, the plant’s proximity to strategic NATO installations has raised security concerns amongst TĂĽrkiye’s Allies, emphasizing the geopolitical ramifications of such deep energy collaborations with Russia (). 

NATO views TĂĽrkiye’s expanding energy relationship with Russia – particularly through projects such as the TurkStream pipeline and the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant – with growing concern. This position is consistent with the Alliance’s long-standing emphasis on energy security, diversification, and resilience against strategic vulnerabilities that stem from over-reliance on a single, adversarial supplier. The 2022 NATO Strategic Concept explicitly identifies Russia as “the most significant and direct threat” to Allied security, underscoring its use of energy as a tool of political coercion ().  

Importantly, TĂĽrkiye is not alone in this predicament. Europe as a whole continues to grapple with significant exposure to Russian energy, often falling short of meeting NATO’s collective energy security goals. In 2024, Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports reached record levels, with major purchases by France, Spain, the Netherlands, and Belgium—despite the broader geopolitical context (). Pipeline gas from Russia still flows into Europe, though European Union officials have recently set out a plan to end this dependency by 2027 (). Furthermore, Russian petroleum products continue to enter the EU through exemption-based mechanisms for landlocked states like Hungary and Slovakia and through indirect channels via countries like India, China, and TĂĽrkiye, which refine Russian crude (). On the nuclear front, Russia remains a dominant supplier of nuclear fuel and technology, controlling substantial global uranium enrichment capacity, with nearly 20% of Europe’s raw uranium imports still sourced from Russia (). The web of dependencies created by such projects across all NATO members raises fundamental concerns about the Alliance’s cohesion and the integrity of its collective defense posture in the face of sustained Russian influence. 

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saw Armenia and Azerbaijan announce a major step towards normalization, raising the prospect of a near-term peace agreement. However, these post-2023 negotiations present Armenia with stark choices: potentially sacrificing national identity, sovereignty, or international justice access. With the pre-2020 status quo no longer viable, Armenia must confront compromises largely dictated by Azerbaijan, raising the crucial question of what will be lost and whether national unity can be maintained.

This white paper analyzes how Armenia’s weak negotiating position, regional isolation, and limited leverage hinder its pursuit of a just and lasting peace. It explores the impact of power imbalances in conflict resolution, the influence of external actors or the lack thereof in post-conflict stabilization, the crucial role of social reconciliation given the absence of international justice, and unresolved human rights issues within the peace process. The paper argues that international justice will likely be sacrificed in this process, potentially deepening generational trauma in Armenia, and risk perpetuating regional violence. Ultimately, the paper concludes that preserving Armenia’s absolute sovereignty is a critical redline for ensuring the nation’s survival.

The Peace Process: How to Ensure a Fair Settlement Facing Asymmetry

Since 1994, multilateral diplomacy—primarily through the —has failed to resolve the core issues of the region’s peace process. Weakened by escalating geopolitical rivalries and the influence of Russian imperialist policies in the former Soviet Union, the Minsk Group and the OSCE’s monitoring mission were unable to prevent outbreaks of violence between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This failure created an opportunity for TĂĽrkiye to expand its role in the conflict, providing political and military support to Azerbaijan and significantly shifting the balance of power.

Following the 2020 Second Karabakh War, multilateral efforts were largely supplanted by direct external mediation led by Russia, which yielded limited results. Although Moscow brokered a ceasefire and deployed a peacekeeping mission, it proved either unable or unwilling to prevent violations of Armenia’s sovereignty in 2022. The war fundamentally shifted the balance of power in Azerbaijan’s favour, a dynamic further reinforced after the one-day war in 2023.

In September 2023, Azerbaijan launched a new military offensive to retake the breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh, mainly populated by ethnic Armenians. Although in violation of the 2020 ceasefire, the operation was designed to take over the region while Russia remained bogged down in Ukraine and mainly uninterested in fulfilling its mandate as peace guarantors of the 2020 accords. After a swift Azerbaijani military victory over Armenian separatist forces in Nagorno-Karabakh, ethnic Armenians fled, fearing for their lives. The scale and swiftness of this ethnic cleansing was reminiscent of what happened in former Yugoslavia in the 1990s.

Following Armenia’s military defeat and the failed ceasefire brokered by Russia, TĂĽrkiye’s growing influence, coupled with Azerbaijan’s military victory, marked the decline of multilateral diplomacy in the South Caucasus. As a result, , sidelining previous mediation efforts and moving away from Russia’s self-interested approach to conflict resolution. 

The negotiation process has been skewed by Azerbaijan’s dominant position in the conflict, a lack of external constraints, and the absence of a mutually hurting stalemate. This concept, defined by Zartmann (1985), describes a situation where neither side believes it can win the war, and further conflict would be unbearably harmful to all involved. Baku’s control of most negotiation leverage has led to relative intransigence in accepting compromise and negotiating in good faith. While Armenia has shown willingness to compromise on some maximalist demands regarding the status of Karabakh and transitional justice, Azerbaijan’s willingness to make concessions remains less apparent.

The burden of peace largely falls on Armenia. The country faces a difficult balancing act: its limits its leverage at the negotiating table, while internal political dynamics constrain its ability to accept a settlement perceived as a national defeat. Moreover, the progress of direct negotiations between Armenia and TĂĽrkiye is contingent on the results of bilateral discussions between Armenia and Azerbaijan. TĂĽrkiye’s prioritization of its support for Azerbaijan outweighs its need for a bilateral agreement with Armenia.

Rather than repeating the mistakes made after the 2018 revolution—when the government adopted a rigid stance and withdrew from the negotiation process (Grigoryan 2024)—Armenia appears to have adopted a proactive approach. This means defining its core priorities and determining what it is willing to compromise in this short but critical window of opportunity to establish peace with Azerbaijan. However, an important level of uncertainty continues to surround Azerbaijan’s willingness to commit to the peace accord.

In this context, a peace agreement that imposes minimal concessions on Azerbaijan—without external enforcement mechanisms or meaningful diplomatic costs—could severely undermine Armenia’s security, leaving it vulnerable to further coercion. Azerbaijan’s demands for directly challenge Armenia’s sovereignty and could serve as a Trojan horse, increasing Armenia’s vulnerability to Azerbaijan’s maximalist claims. Precedents for granting extraterritorial rights in post-conflict negotiations are extremely rare. The 1995 Dayton Accords included a territorial exchange to create the Goražde corridor, avoiding the need to grant extraterritorial rights. However, this exchange was part of a broader settlement based on territorial control established during the civil war. While Armenia has expressed willingness to honour its commitments under the 2020 ceasefire and has proposed a bilateral agreement on transportation through the Zangezur corridor, Azerbaijan has refused to grant reciprocal access to Nakhchivan. As a result, both sides have agreed to put negotiations over the corridor and its access on hold.

For some , the delay to sign a peace treaty even after Armenia’s formal recognition of Azerbaijan territorial integrity underlines a careful approach seeking to avoid negative consequences of a premature peace treaty as observed with the Dayton and Minsk Accord. However, time does not play in Armenia’s favour; it only worsens Armenia’s bargaining position. While negotiating, Azerbaijan continues to implement a policy seeking to transform the Karabakh region and deconstruct previous as well as targeting its . It seeks to eliminate the option of a return to the status quo ante bellum and de facto prevent the return of refugees in the absence of a de jure option.

Peace Accord and Enforcement: The Imperative of a Reliable Guarantor

Negotiations where one side holds all the leverage often lead to a victor’s peace.  Without an external mediator or balancing force, the dominant party can push for maximalist and recurring demands—a pattern Azerbaijan has followed since September 2023. Azerbaijan’s insistence that Armenia amend its constitution exemplifies this growing pressure.

Even in the context of a prospective peace accord, with no significant international or domestic pressure, Azerbaijan can escalate its demands on Armenia with minimal political repercussions. In asymmetric negotiations, the more dominant party is often incentivized to renege on agreements and push for further concessions (Fearon 1996). In a victor’s peace, where there is no external pressure to curb maximalist demands, one of the few restraining factors is the recognition that excessive demands could backfire in the long run or that a mutually beneficial economic arrangement offers a more sustainable alternative.

More than mediation, this peace process requires external guarantors. Guarantors typically engage in conflict resolution when they have strategic incentives or significant stakes in the outcome. At present, no strong external guarantor is pressuring Azerbaijan to uphold any potential settlement with Armenia. The issue at hand in the South Caucasus is not necessarily security guarantees, as in Ukraine, but rather assurances that any bilateral agreement will be upheld by both parties, preventing negotiated compromises from becoming leverage for further demands.

Relying solely on good faith and trust often leads to disappointment, as seen in many post-Soviet peace processes. As seen in the cases of the Minsk Process and the Accords, the absence of an external guarantor often benefits the stronger belligerent, allowing it to reshape the agreement, refuse to implement it, and escalate its demands while the weaker party bears the consequences.

Escalating demands from Ankara and Baku highlight that without a reliable enforcement mechanism, Armenia risks being in a weaker position if it proceeds with signing an agreement. exemplifies this risk. After the 2020 ceasefire, Azerbaijan imposed restrictions on the only road connecting Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh, citing security concerns over alleged arms transfers. This move directly violated the Russian-brokered peace agreement and further infringed on the rights of the Armenian minority. The blockade effectively starved the Armenian population, depriving them of essential resources and threatening their survival in Karabakh for several months. It underscores the dangers of asymmetrical power dynamics between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the absence of a credible international guarantor. Russia has failed to enforce the ceasefire or uphold the 2020 agreement, leaving power politics as the primary driver of bilateral negotiations.

Even in a victorious scenario, such as in the First Chechen War, the absence of international support can hinder the consolidation of peace. Despite achieving a decisive military victory against the Russian Federation in 1996 and holding free and fair presidential elections in 1997, Chechnya struggled to implement political reforms and state-building measures due to its international isolation. While Russia reneged on its commitments under the , the international community failed to impose sanctions on Moscow. This lack of external support contributed to the rise of warlordism and laid the groundwork for the Second Chechen War. The (EUMA) is a cautious first step, distancing external actors from purely geopolitical motives, unlike Russia’s role in the 2000s and especially after 2020. However, the recent between the parties suggests a willingness to . Long-lasting peace in protracted ethnic conflicts, such as in Northern Ireland, hinge on legal commitments to renounce violence. Given the geopolitical tensions in the South Caucasus, strong legal commitments may be the only viable path to achieving sustainable peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Armenia’s relative regional and international isolation heightens its vulnerability to Azerbaijan’s growing and maximalist demands, and the risk of Baku reneging on a peace treaty despite Armenia’s significant concessions.

Armenia at the Crossroads: Navigating Regional and Global Isolation

Russia’s inaction to protect Armenia in 2020 and its subsequent inability to fulfill its mandate as a peace guarantor has led to Armenia’s decision to sever its security ties with Russia and withdraw from the CSTO, ultimately creating an opportunity for Armenia to rethink its security strategy as a whole. Armenia’s recent pivot to the West places it in a precarious position as it seeks to challenge the victor’s peace imposed by Azerbaijan and its Turkish ally. Although its current isolation is not a permanent state but rather a transitional phase, it has complicated Armenia’s efforts to secure an international guarantor for a peace settlement.

In peace processes, isolation can be used to pressure states into renouncing revanchist demands, engaging in transitional justice, or joining negotiations as observers—such as Serbia in the early 2000s. However, Armenia’s situation is different. Its isolation benefits Azerbaijan, reinforcing its intransigent stance on peace, human rights, and Armenian sovereignty. Moreover, Armenia’s isolation encourages Azerbaijan’s territorial ambitions and reluctance to engage in a transitional justice process.

To mitigate its isolation, Armenia has leveraged its democratization process and pivot toward the EU as a signal of its intention to pursue strategic changes and its urgent need for international support in implementing the peace process. As Prime Minister framed it, peace and normalized relations with Türkiye and Azerbaijan are sine qua non conditions for a successful democratization process in Armenia. However, in the broader context of democratic backsliding in the United States, Pashinyan’s strategy of positioning Armenia as the new beacon of democracy in the South Caucasus could backfire in the coming years. He may ultimately face a difficult choice between aligning more closely with the EU or the U.S. in his bid for political backing. While democratic values present themselves as the moral choice, the more pressing survival imperative remains a firm and expedited commitment to a lasting peace settlement.

Armenia has also moved to strengthen its strategic partnerships, signing agreements with France in 2024 and with the United States and the Netherlands in 2025. France, in particular, has expanded its role in the South Caucasus, positioning itself as a key actor in providing Armenia with increased support and . At the same time, Armenia should avoid overestimating the impact of its recent weapons procurement from France and India as a means of altering the current status quo. Weapon systems remain mostly defensive and do not represent a game-changer in terms of military parity with Azerbaijan. Previous miscalculations before the 2020 war have demonstrated the risks of adopting a hardline approach to peace settlements.

Overall, Armenia remains in a precarious position, where a military solution to its predicament is not foreseeable, and limited foreign support hinders its ability to re-establish a balance of power in the negotiation process.

Pathways to Peace: Leveraging Economic and Political Incentives for Win-Win Solutions

With limited external constraints, Baku’s uncompromising approach makes a balanced agreement increasingly difficult. The absence of a win-win peace scenario could become a source of future grievances, fueling deep-seated conflicts, as seen in the cases of Russia’s in Chechnya and in Georgia. Sustainable peace, however, requires both sides to be willing to compromise rather than escalating their demands.

Conflict resolution experiences highlight the critical role of economic and political incentives in fostering peace (Mansfield and Snyder 1995). Achieving historical justice and addressing deep-seated tensions are essential for peace, but sustainable peace also requires that all parties see it as a preferable alternative to continued violence—particularly in cases where local populations have been polarized and mobilized over long periods of time.

Win-win scenarios provide long-term solutions by fostering cooperation between warring factions. For such solutions to be viable, both sides must perceive the peace settlement as politically and economically beneficial for them rather than as a loss of something fundamental to their identity and interests. Shifting negotiations away from emotionally charged issues of identity, justice, and blame could create a more constructive path forward.

Economic cooperation, when framed as a fair and reciprocal partnership rather than a victory imposing dominance over the other, can serve as a foundation for trust-building and de-escalation. Additionally, emphasizing economic imperatives and tangible successes over nationalist narratives can help demobilize hardliners and foster a more pragmatic .

The post-1945 German-French reconciliation, the 1998 Belfast Agreement, and peace settlements in the former Yugoslavia underscore the powerful role of economic incentives in fostering reconciliation. In the latter case, a combination of Serbia’s regional isolation and the European Union’s (EU) integration incentives facilitated the implementation of transitional justice. These factors encouraged warring parties to seek compromises, leading Serbia to rebuild its relationships with Kosovo and Croatia. For instance, the EU’s requirement for full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) as a condition for accession played a crucial role in advancing the peace process. Each side recognized the necessity of setting aside historical grievances in pursuit of economic opportunities.

A mutually beneficial solution in the South Caucasus remains elusive. Few countries or international institutions currently possess the will to compel Azerbaijan to negotiate in good faith with Armenia. The European energy sector continues to rely on Azeri gas, often turning a blind eye to Baku’s role in circumventing energy sanctions on Russia. Unlike other regional actors, Azerbaijan is not seeking EU integration and instead prioritizes its relationships with Türkiye and, more recently, Central Asia. The proposed by Armenia entitled the “Crossroad of Peace,” along with broader discussions on economic and logistical cooperation between Azerbaijan, Türkiye, Armenia, and Iran, present the most significant opportunity for an economic-driven peace process in the region. In the current bargaining context, Armenia perceives itself as facing significant sacrifices. However, framing the Zangezur corridor within a broader vision of regional economic integration—rather than as a unilateral loss—could help mitigate the perception of total defeat among the Armenian population.

Reframing the negotiation process around regional economic cooperation rather than the loss of Karabakh could help stabilize relations, despite decades of armed conflict. While the current outcome of recent wars is not what Armenia had hoped for, the country must navigate this suboptimal reality and focus on achievable, mutually beneficial goals. Concessions should not always be seen as historical defeats but rather as strategic steps toward a more stable and prosperous future.

The Peace Process and the Erosion of International Law

In March 2025, the two countries agreed to withdraw, dismiss, or settle their legal disputes in international courts, particularly at the International Court of Justice (ICJ). However, the agreement remains silent on alternative mechanisms for addressing international crimes committed over the past forty years of conflict. Nor does it provide a framework for societal reconciliation—a sine qua non for long-term peace.

Addressing international crimes committed by both sides over an extended period presents a significant challenge for peacebuilding and transitional justice. International justice and accountability for war crimes are often among the first concessions states make to secure a peace deal, as seen in Nicaragua, Cambodia, and Colombia. Conflict resolution literature suggests that while such compromises may facilitate agreements, they carry long-term consequences. For instance, blanket amnesties for crimes against humanity have shown limited effectiveness in sustaining lasting peace (Dancy 2018). The absence of transitional justice fosters generational trauma, erodes confidence in international law, and increases the likelihood of future conflicts. Addressing international crimes is therefore crucial to preventing cyclical violence, as demonstrated in Rwanda, Cambodia, and, to a lesser extent, the former Yugoslavia.

The ICJ is also currently reviewing potential war crimes committed during the 2020 War, including the destruction of Armenian cultural heritage as a possible crime against humanity, alongside a countersuit from Azerbaijan. However, Armenia’s international legal has resigned amid the impending agreement with Azerbaijan. In the present case, the ICJ has explicitly stated that it will restrict its inquiry to incidents occurring after , affecting Azerbaijan’s willingness to engage with international justice

Armenia also joined the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2024, but the tribunal has yet to open an investigation into crimes committed in the recent conflicts. Largely due to a tacit agreement with Azerbaijan, has refrained from referring the 2023 one-day war, the blockade of the Lachin corridor, and the ongoing destruction of its cultural heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh to the ICC.

Since May 2022, Armenia has retroactively accepted the ICC’s jurisdiction, meaning crimes committed in Nagorno-Karabakh after that date could fall under its purview, provided certain legal conditions are met. Drawing a parallel to the procedure initiated regarding crimes against Rohingyas in in 2016 and 2017, the ICC could explore the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh despite the alleged crimes taking place within Azerbaijan’s internationally recognized borders. Even though Azerbaijan is not a party to the Rome Statute, ICC prosecutors could build a case by arguing that certain crimes, such as the deportations resulting in ethnic cleansing, had consequences that occurred within Armenia’s territory.

A growing opposition in Armenia and its diaspora has criticized the Armenian government for considering the withdrawal of its legal proceedings at the ICC and ICJ. Furthermore, in April 2024, an petitioned the ICC prosecutor to investigate potential crimes against humanity and acts of genocide committed in Karabakh. The claim of genocide has also been raised in policy circles, notably by a .

Unless the peace settlement ensures long-term stability and fosters a mutually beneficial partnership, sidelining justice may prove to be a short-term fix that exacerbates generational trauma and reignites tensions between the belligerents. Moreover, while the Armenian government and its negotiators may see the strategic value in compromising on international justice, such a decision risks further alienating the Armenian population—potentially undermining the very peace process it seeks to uphold.

Crimes Against Humanity in Nagorno-Karabakh: The Imperative for Action

The political and social costs of abandoning these cases appear significantly higher than Armenia’s formal recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh as sovereign Azerbaijani territory—a move that aligns with international law and does not impact the right of refugees to return. As the ICJ and other tribunals prepare to deliver historic rulings on the crime of aggression and genocide in three major cases—South Africa v. Israel, Ukraine v. Russian Federation, and The Gambia v. Myanmar (with seven states intervening)—Armenia’s decision to abandon legal proceedings may prove to be a costly choice in the long run. 

Even if Armenia chooses not to pursue the case itself, ICC state parties such as Canada or France have the authority to refer the situation to the ICC prosecutor for investigation, as was done in Ukraine regarding war crimes committed by Russian Armed Forces. Furthermore, the ICC prosecutor can launch a proprio motu investigation if sufficient evidence exists that a crime under the court’s jurisdiction has been committed. Moreover, the Statute of the International Court of Justice permits state parties, under specific conditions, to institute legal proceedings concerning crimes perpetrated in armed conflicts, as demonstrated by in relation to Israel’s conduct in Gaza.

For the moment, the international community has been cautious not to jeopardize the peace process by advocating for judicial accountability regarding crimes committed during the recent conflicts between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This restraint contrasts sharply with the approach taken in the case of Russia’s war against Ukraine. The Armenian government and the international community must be mindful not to sacrifice justice and human rights in pursuit of a temporary peace with Azerbaijan.

The Unclear Path to Social Reconciliation: Navigating the Challenges

The current peace negotiations and the March 2025 preliminary announcement on normalization remain vague on reconciliation and accountability mechanisms. This silence raises concerns about an Azeri-imposed peace process that lacks a formal approach to addressing international crimes or, at the very least, establishing a path forward to confront their impact on both civil societies. Social reconciliation does not necessarily require the establishment of an international tribunal. While the two countries have agreed to abandon legal proceedings, this should not mean abandoning the principle of accountability—especially in the context of a victor’s peace. Creating the conditions for sustainable peace and successful conflict resolution requires addressing generational trauma, myths, and historical distortions that perpetuate cycles of hatred. A genuine peace process should prioritize tackling the root causes of violence rather than merely addressing its symptoms, which result from ongoing negative interactions between the belligerents.

In the context of the South Caucasus peace process, it is essential for each party to adopt an introspective and analytical approach to the international crimes committed since 1988. An unfortunate tendency in peace settlements is often to focus on the most recent crimes and limit the historical period covered by transitional justice or social reconciliation mechanisms (Schabas 2006). However, in the case of Armenia and Azerbaijan, such a narrow approach risks perpetuating a cycle of hatred and grievances. For that reason, alternative approaches to international courts can provide the necessary flexibility, as international courts often face temporal limitations regarding the scope of their investigations, which ultimately feed into the cycle of grievances between parties.

While accountability mechanisms such as international tribunals and truth commissions are not always universally accepted by all parties in a conflict, they play a crucial role in bringing closure to victims and laying the groundwork for a shared historical narrative. The ICTY has been instrumental in addressing crimes committed in Bosnia-Herzegovina, particularly the Srebrenica genocide, by providing both a legal and historical framework for prosecuting atrocities under international law. The recognition of Srebrenica as genocide is now firmly established in international legal jurisprudence. Although political actors in Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina continue to contest this legal interpretation, the ICTY’s rulings have significantly shaped the historical narrative that international institutions continue to build upon.

Due to Azerbaijan’s prioritization of a victor’s peace and Armenia’s weak negotiating position, the peace process is ill-equipped to address social reconciliation, especially given the dismissal of cases in international courts. This relative absence of a transitional justice process led by international institutions, accountability mechanisms or mutual consent to address human rights violations remains one of the most significant obstacles to lasting peace. Combined with Azerbaijan’s unreliability as a partner, this lack of foresight regarding reconciliation in the peace accord increases the risk of future armed conflict.

How Unresolved Human Rights Issues Imperil the Peace Process

As the peace process appears to have entered its final stage, many human rights violations remain unaddressed, undermining once again the prospects for a lasting peace accord. For example, the status of and the grim conditions they face in captivity underscore how much remains to be done to achieve reconciliation and foster a cooperative environment based on the standards of international law.

In addition to the status of prisoners of war, many legal questions on the right to return of Armenian refugees, and Armenia’s cultural heritage remain unaddressed. Following its military victory, Azerbaijan’s lack of commitment to respecting fundamental principles of international human rights law in Nagorno-Karabakh casts a doubt on the sustainability of any peace accords.

Whereas the period between 1994 and 2023 was marked by a between self-determination and territorial integrity, enabling each party to invoke international lawt, he right of return represents an inalienable right, and the protection of cultural heritage constitutes a legal obligation for Azerbaijan. The affirming the right of safe return for Armenian refugees from the region “in a safe, unimpeded, and expeditious manner.”

Despite the ICJ’s ruling and the need for both sides to demonstrate a willingness to engage in good faith negotiations, Azerbaijan has effectively erased Armenian existence in Karabakh. The lack of a proactive approach to address the issue of lost properties and compensation further highlights Baku’s unwillingness to seriously consider its obligations under international law. On the contrary, Azerbaijan has introduced strategies to hinder or discourage the return of individuals including the destruction of Armenian cultural heritage.

Although it is not surprising that the right to a safe and sustainable return is not strictly enforced, what is striking is Azerbaijan’s ability to openly violate this right without facing any consequences. Warring parties are typically willing to recognize the right of return in peace settlements, while simultaneously creating conditions that prevent refugees from returning. For instance, the Dayton Accords, which aimed to address the aftermath of ethnic cleansing in and Croatia, established the framework for the right of return. However, the return of Serbs from Krajina and Bosnian Muslims from Eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina never materialized. Similarly, the issue of return for Palestinians following the Nakba highlights the difficulties in addressing the right to return during peace negotiations.

Reconciliation without a genuine process of return is likely to fail, leading to profound resentment as observed in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo in the 1990s and 2000s. As many Armenians point out, is seen as a sacred part of their homeland and cultural identity. In such an emotionally-charged context, a failure to facilitate return almost guarantees profound generational trauma. Future generations may adopt this trauma as a defining part of their collective identity. Historical narratives and conflict understandings become centered around this trauma, making healing and peacebuilding particularly difficult, as seen in the aftermath of the 1944 Chechen deportation.

Cultural Heritage in Artsakh: An Ongoing Crime

Since its full occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023, has destroyed entire villages, historical monuments, cemeteries, khachkars, churches, and other religious sites, as well as governmental and administrative buildings. So far, has provided one of the most comprehensive lists of such violations of international law through its interactive map and research report. These violations have continued throughout the negotiation process between the two countries, highlighting the difficulty of trusting Azerbaijan to uphold its commitments in any forthcoming peace settlement. They also underscore Azerbaijan’s disregard for its international obligations toward Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Although extensive cultural destruction is recognized as a crime against humanity under the Rome Statute, the Court would unfortunately not have jurisdiction on crimes committed in Azerbaijan. However, such crimes could be prosecuted under international jurisdiction as it was done for some crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in Syria.

More broadly, alongside the displacement of the Armenian population in September 2023, their inability to return to Nagorno-Karabakh, and the 10-month blockade of the Lachin Corridor, the destruction of Armenian cultural heritage in the region further reinforces claims of ethnic cleansing—a crime against humanity—committed by Azerbaijani forces. The destruction of Armenian cultural heritage in Azerbaijan could be used to support a legal argument of criminal intent behind the deportation.

While Armenia has the sovereign right to withdraw or refrain from pursuing international legal action against Azerbaijan, other countries are not bound by its decisions. On the contrary, international law may obligate them to explore alternative avenues for prosecuting such crimes. In this context, an international tribunal—or even a hybrid one—could be instrumental in documenting and establishing the historical record of this latest phase of the conflict. Overall, this situation as a whole undermines the implementation of a peace settlement, perpetuating the violation of international human rights law by one of the parties. Azerbaijan’s actions in Nagorno-Karabakh after 2023 cast serious doubt on its reliability as a negotiating partner and its willingness to uphold its obligations after the signing of a peace treaty. This issue underscores the critical importance of legal guarantees, or a third-party state acting as a guarantor, as well as the role of international law in the settlement of the conflict.

Conclusion

This white paper highlights the significant challenges Armenia faces in asymmetrical peace negotiations with Azerbaijan, where Azerbaijan’s dominant position allows it to dictate terms. The paper contends that Armenia is forced to make a painful choice between its sovereignty, identity, security, and the pursuit of international justice. Even if Armenia decides to make considerable sacrifices to achieve a peace agreement, Azerbaijan’s adherence to treaty obligations remains questionable given Armenia’s current regional and international isolation and overall geopolitical vulnerability.

The potential sacrifices of Nagorno-Karabakh and the abandonment of legal proceedings regarding crimes committed after 2020 are major concessions Armenia should only make if Azerbaijan demonstrates a firm commitment to the peace accord. Without international guarantors or significant international pressure, it seems improbable that Azerbaijan will moderate its recurring and expanding demands.

In any case, the current peace process is unlikely to succeed unless it establishes mutually beneficial conditions, including a genuine societal reconciliation process and a win-win economic framework for peace. As long as Azerbaijan interprets the negotiation for the Zangezur corridor through a geopolitical lens, the current process is more likely to be a temporary truce before future conflict rather than a sustainable plan for peace.

Without concrete mechanisms for social reconciliation integrated into the peace process to effectively address deep-seated mistrust and generational trauma, and compounded by the largely political nature of international , the peace process risks further alienating the civilian population on both sides, reinforcing generational traumas, and ultimately fueling a new cycle of violence.

Given the continued obstruction of the Armenian right to return to Karabakh and the ongoing destruction of their historical heritage, it is understandable that the Armenian population will harbor resentment toward their government for what they perceive as sacrifices on deeply emotional issues, and further animosity toward Azerbaijan

Bibliography

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James Fearon, “Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict,” in David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, eds., The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996.

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