Executive SummaryÌı

• Russia’s ability to sustainÌıitsÌıwar against Ukraine depends not only on military capacity but on how the state manages the social and economic pressures placed on families.Ìı

• So-called “traditionalâ€� spiritual-moral values provide the ideological framework through which the state justifies sacrifice, promotes compliance, and assigns meaning to the disruption of family life caused by the war in Ukraine.Ìı

• Extensive financial and social benefits for military families help stabilize the home front and support recruitment, but these measures are costly and may be difficult to sustain over time.Ìı

• The war’s impact on families is uneven across regions, creating long-term demographic and social vulnerabilities that could undermine Russia’s post-war stability.Ìı

• Russian family policy prioritizes material support and narrative control while existing structures are inadequately prepared to address key problems of veteran reintegration, including mental health challenges and increased risks of domestic violence.Ìı

The post Understanding Russia’s Family Policy for Wartime Resilience appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

Executive Summary:

Russia’s war against Ukraine is also a struggle about public interpretation. NATO members have responded to Russia’s full-scale invasion through sanctions, military aid, deterrence, and diplomatic efforts. These actions depend on the public understanding that Russia is the aggressor, Ukraine is the victim of an illegal invasion, and support for Ukraine is important for European and transatlantic security. Russia’s counter-narrative seeks to weaken this consensus view by claiming that Ukraine, NATO, the US, or the West provoked the war.

Drawing on , with a Canada-focused analysis, as initially outlined at ĞÓ°ÉÔ­´´ University’s 2026 Eastern European and Transatlantic Network conference, this brief argues that trust in NATO is central to how citizens interpret responsibility for the war. Canadian public opinion remains strongly aligned with the core NATO narrative: most Canadians blame Russia, while only a small minority blame the West. Yet this minority is not randomly distributed. Canadians who do not trust NATO are significantly more likely to accept the narrative that the West provoked the war, while Canadians who trust NATO are much more likely to blame Russia.

The implication is straightforward: countering disinformation is not only about correcting false claims after they spread. It is also about sustaining public trust in the institutions whose messages compete with adversaries’ propaganda and misinformation. For Canada and its NATO Allies, trust in NATO should therefore be treated as a security resource — one that requires proactive prebunking, clearer explanations of NATO’s relevance to Canadian security, and a wider network of trusted messengers.

Introduction: The Narrative Dimension of the War in Ukraine

NATO countries responded to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 through military, economic, and diplomatic means and pressure. However, this support also sparked an ongoing discussion about how and why this war erupted. The core NATO narrative is straightforward: Russia is the aggressor, Ukraine is the victim of an unlawful and unprovoked invasion, and allied support for Ukraine is necessary for European and transatlantic security. The main Kremlin counter-narrative tells a different story: Ukraine, NATO, the United States, or “the West� provoked the war, leaving Russia no choice but to invade in order to protect its so-called historical sphere of influence.

This ongoing contest matters because it can affect whether citizens support sanctions, weapons deliveries, refugee assistance, defense spending, and long-term deterrence measures taken by their countries and NATO. If the public believes that Russia caused the war, continued support for Ukraine and NATO cohesion becomes easier to sustain. If the public believes that NATO or the West provoked the war, allied policy aimed at countering Russia can appear reckless, hypocritical, or needlessly escalatory.

Much of the discussion about Russian information operations focuses on the supply side. It aims to address threats posed by, for example, Russian propaganda, falsehoods, and electoral and other interference, across different channels and platforms. These are important. , a foreign disinformation detection institution, defines foreign information manipulation and interference as “intentional and coordinated efforts by state or non-state actors to alter information in pursuit of political, security, or other strategic objectives.� But supply alone does not explain why people in Canada and other countries believe one competing strategic narrative over another.

This brief, therefore, focuses on the demand side of strategic narrative reception. Why are some citizens more receptive to the Kremlin’s West-blame narrative while others accept the NATO narrative that Russia caused the war? Findings from suggest that people tend to rely on trust in the messenger as a shortcut to plausibility. When they trust NATO, they also tend to trust its messaging. When they distrust NATO, those same explanations are easier to dismiss as propaganda, spin, or elite messaging.

Strategic Narratives and the Credibility of the Narrator

Strategic narratives are stories that countries tell to “win the story� as they frame issues, advance their goals, and convince others of the righteousness of their actions in global affairs. Strategic narratives identify heroes and villains, assign blame, explain crises, and justify policy choices. In the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine, narratives about the origins of the war are especially important because they can and do shape policy debates. If Russia is understood as the aggressor, then sanctions, deterrence, and military assistance to Ukraine follow logically. If NATO is understood as the provocateur, then those same policies can be framed as a dangerous escalation.

Narratives succeed not only because of repetition or exposure. They also depend on the narrator’s perceived credibility. Citizens do not evaluate every claim from scratch; they use their trust in the messenger as a cognitive shortcut that, especially when multiple competing narratives are present, is more likely to lead them to accept or reject the story in question.

This is why fact-checking and rebuttals of malign information, while necessary, are not sufficient. The consensus recommendations in emphasize that corrections are most effective when they are clear, credible, and accompanied by an alternative explanation. However, both this handbook and our research suggest that to increase the likelihood that the audience accepts the debunking, the audience should hold a positive view of the messenger. When trust is low, the same corrections can be rejected as self-interested messaging. In practice, “truth� often competes with “trusted.�

The policy implication is that institutional credibility is neither a soft nor a secondary issue. It is part of democratic resilience. explicitly identifies resilience as central to its ability to deter and defend. While NATO’s deterrent posture depends on military capabilities, we should also keep in mind that the Alliance also depends on public support for the political choices that make deterrence credible. If hostile information operations can weaken trust in the institutions that explain and justify allied policy, they can complicate democratic decision-making even without changing facts on the ground.

Evidence from the Survey: Canada as a High-Trust but Still Vulnerable Case

The empirical evidence for this brief comes from the . The survey asked respondents who they believe caused the war in Ukraine and measured trust in NATO, the EU, and domestic institutions.

Figure 1: Public Trust in NATO across Alliance Countries

Canada is a useful case because public alignment with the core NATO narrative is strong overall. In the Canadian sample, approximately 84% of respondents blame Russia for the war, while only about 8% blame the West. Around 60% of reports trust NATO. This suggests that Kremin’s West-blame narrative has not received much traction in Canada.

Yet the Canadian data also show why overconfidence would be a mistake. West-blame beliefs are not evenly distributed. They are concentrated among respondents who do not trust NATO. For Canadians who trust NATO, only about 4% blame the West. Among those who do not trust NATO, the figure rises to about 15%. Similarly, about 90% of Canadians who trust NATO blame Russia, compared to about 74% among those who do not trust NATO.

Figure 2: Canadian Trust in NATO and Blame Attribution for the War in Ukraine

The full Canadian results reinforce this pattern. Controlling for socio-demographic factors, trust in NATO is strongly associated with blaming Russia for the war and strongly negatively associated with blaming the West. Other socio-demographic and attitudinal factors also matter, but the clearest and most policy-relevant pattern is the relationship between trust in NATO and blame attribution.

This does not mean that distrust in NATO automatically translates into pro-Kremlin beliefs. The relationship may run in both directions. Some citizens may distrust NATO and therefore reject NATO’s account of the war. Others may become less trusting of NATO after consuming information critical of it. Both processes could occur simultaneously. For policy purposes, however, the direction is less important than the vulnerability itself. Where trust in NATO is lower, NATO’s messages are less likely to be heard, and adversarial narratives are more likely to find receptive audiences.

Why This Matters for Canada

For Canada, the findings are directly relevant as it is an active player in Europe and, increasingly, the Arctic. Through , Canada has played a leading role in NATO’s presence in Latvia and on the Alliance’s eastern flank. Canada’s security interests extend to the Arctic, cyber defence, democratic resilience, and the protection of a rules-based order that is directly challenged by Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. In the Arctic, however, security communication must also include Inuit and other Indigenous communities as central stakeholders, since their knowledge, rights, livelihoods, and local security concerns are directly affected by how Canada defines and communicates its northern defence priorities.

Moreover, NATO can still feel abstract to many Canadians. It may appear distant, bureaucratic, European, or not sufficiently in Canada’s interests. When NATO is understood mainly as a Brussels-based security organization, it is easier for adversaries to portray it as “out-of-touchâ€� with the average Canadian. When NATO is understood as Canadian soldiers in Latvia for the purposes of preventing a wider war, as Arctic deterrence, as cyber cooperation, and as a framework that helps prevent wider war, its relevance to Canada and Canadians is strengthened.

The challenge is not simply to tell Canadians that NATO matters; it is to show how NATO strengthens Canadian security and Canada’s international role. This is particularly important as allied governments ask the public to support higher defense spending, long-term military assistance to Ukraine, and sustained deterrence. These policies require political endurance, and political endurance depends on public trust. For example, Canada’s broader efforts against foreign information manipulation and interference could connect more directly to strategic communication about NATO. Monitoring hostile narratives, exposing coordinated manipulation, and working with platforms remain necessary. However, Canada’s counter-disinformation strategy should also focus on credibility-building to increase the likelihood that its messages will resonate better with the public. This means transparency, consistency, local relevance, and messengers who can reach audiences that may not respond to official statements.

For example, Canada’s broader efforts against could connect more directly to strategic communication about NATO. Monitoring hostile narratives, exposing coordinated manipulation, and working with platforms remain necessary. However, Canada’s counter-disinformation strategy should also focus on credibility-building to increase the likelihood that its messages will resonate better with the public. This means transparency, consistency, local relevance, and messengers who can reach audiences that may not respond to official statements.

Why Rebuttals and Takedowns Are Not Enough

Democratic governments often respond to disinformation with three main tools: exposure, removal, and correction. They identify false claims, work to take them down if possible, and post factual rebuttals. These tools are important, but they tend to be reactive. By the time a false narrative has spread widely, corrections may reach only a fraction of the original audience. Also, in instances where people do not trust the institutions or organizations taking up the correcting, attempts to take down false narratives could reinforce distrust and suspicion. Studies on and show that it helps to anticipate and address manipulation techniques before people encounter them.

It may be helpful to supplement existing debunking efforts with more prebunking, building societal resistance to misinformation, and strengthening trust in NATO and similar institutions. Experimental research by show that short interventions aimed at informing people about common manipulation tactics used by hostile actors can increase resilience to misinformation. For example, before a major NATO summit, Ukrainian aid package, or deployment decision, Canadian and allied communicators can anticipate predictable claims that NATO provoked the war, Ukraine is merely a proxy, or Canada is paying for Europe’s war. Rather than waiting for these claims to circulate, Canadian and NATO communicators could explain in advance why they are misleading and how they fit into a broader Russian narrative strategy aimed at dividing and weakening Canada and NATO. This approach should be simple and delivered by trusted voices. It should avoid overly technical language.

At the same time, NATO and Canadian institutions need to avoid communicating only during crises. Trust building takes time and patience. If the public learns about the role and benefits of NATO membership only when leaders are seeking support for a given initiative, they may view such communication with suspicion.

Policy Recommendations

1. Treat trust as an early-warning indicator

Canada already monitors foreign information manipulation and interference and conducts public opinion research on security issues. Canada and its Allies should monitor public trust in NATO and other key security institutions as part of democratic resilience planning. Public opinion polls should ask respondents whether they trust NATO, the Canadian government, and similar institutions. Declining trust should be treated as an early warning indicator that more outreach is needed to reduce susceptibility to adversarial information warfare.

2. Institutionalize prebunking before predictable narrative attacks

More attention should be paid to prebunking at moments when adversarial information warfare is likely to escalate (e.g., predictable narrative attacks). Among others, such events likely include NATO summits, defense spending announcements, Ukraine aid package announcements, troop deployments abroad, and elections in allied countries. Communicators should prepare short, accessible materials that explain both the facts and the manipulation techniques adversaries are likely to use. Such efforts should be coordinated by the Canadian government, NATO allies, and other communicators to increase narrative resilience before hostile narratives reach NATO audiences.

3. Make NATO concrete in Canadian public communication

Conduct public information campaigns aimed at explaining the benefits of NATO membership and consistently connecting them to Canadian security interests. Such a campaign could use specific examples to emphasize NATO’s relevance by highlighting its leadership in Latvia, its role in Arctic security, its cyber defense capabilities, and its efforts to prevent a wider war in Europe, among others. Such communication should also be transparent about trade-offs, given legitimate questions about rising defense spending and the implications of Canada’s growing involvement in European deterrence initiatives. Credible communication should not avoid taking on difficult questions directly — in fact, addressing them should help with building trust.

4. Expand the trusted messenger network

Canada already supports public outreach initiatives aimed at countering disinformation and promoting democratic resilience. Such work should be extended to matters surrounding NATO and its work. Since government and NATO officials may not always be the most trusted communicators, Canada should aim to work with a wide network of credible messengers, including veterans, reservists, military families, educators, local officials, Ukrainian and Eastern European diaspora communities, Indigenous and northern voices on Arctic security, and independent scholars. Using such goodwill ambassadors should help key messages reach individuals across different local and social contexts. This could be a way to reach audiences distrustful of political elites.

Conclusion: Trust as Democratic Deterrence

The full-scale invasion in Ukraine highlighted that deterrence requires military capability, political will, and social resilience. Part of Russia’s challenges to NATO is represented by its hostile information operations. Moscow does not want NATO to admire Russia – it only needs enough citizens to doubt NATO’s reliability, blame the West for the invasion of Ukraine, oppose support, or lose confidence that allied institutions are telling the truth.

The Canadian evidence presented here offers both reassurance and warning — and policy recommendations outlined here aim to strengthen Canada’s broader democratic resilience. Most Canadians blame Russia for the war, and the Kremlin’s West-blame narrative remains a minority view. But that minority is meaningfully larger among those who do not trust NATO. Increasing trust in NATO, in turn, would require ongoing attention to informational campaigns aimed at raising public understanding of why and how the Alliance matters.

The post Canada and Allies Cannot Win the Information War if Their Populations Do Not Trust NATO appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

Introduction

ÌıFor the first time since 1972,ÌıwhenÌıSALT I negotiations yielded the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the Interim Agreement on offensive arms, the strategic relationship between Washington and Moscow is entirely unconstrained by a legal framework.Ìı.ÌıAs the current normative vacuum is unprecedented in the modern era, theÌıNorth Atlantic TreatyÌıOrganizationÌı(NATO)ÌıAlliance facesÌıa new ‘strategic trilemma’:Ìıthe simultaneous and often contradictory imperativesÌıof maintaining credible extended deterrence;Ìıenhancing conventional defence against hybrid and missile threats;Ìıand reconstructing a confidence-building, risk-reduction framework to prevent accidental escalation. The central policy problem is that the traditional tools of strategic stabilityÌı– quantitative and qualitative ceilings, inspections, and transparencyÌı–Ìıhave been discarded in favour of verticalÌınuclearÌıproliferation. NATO must navigate an environment whereÌıthe absence of constraints increases the risk of miscalculations, potentially leading to an unmanaged arms race that reduces the securityÌıfor allÌıNATO Allies.ÌıÌı

Context: The Long Transition and the Paradox of the New STARTÌı

TheÌıinternationalÌıarms control regime, which persisted through various systemic shifts from 1972 until 2026, has finally fractured. However, a rigorous assessmentÌıof its lifespanÌısuggests that the final pillar of this regime,Ìıthe New START,Ìıwas already flawed.ÌıÌıThis omission allowed Moscow to channel its modernization efforts toward lethal, MIRV-capable systems,Ìıwhile remaining formallyÌıcompliant toÌıthe treaty limit of 1,550 warheads.Ìı,ÌıMoscow’s StrategicÌıRocketÌıForces (RVSN) and the missile industry exploited this normativeÌı‘shield’Ìıto initiate a massiveÌı‘re-MIRVing’Ìıprocess. This modernization was driven by aÌıÌıwithin the Russian military-industrial complex. By focusing on systems that exploited New START’s qualitative loopholes, institutional actors, such as theÌı, secured long-term funding and development pathways for a new generation of delivery vehicles. This momentumÌıfacilitatedÌıthe emergence of a direct nexus between treaty-compliant modernization and the later deployment of advanced long-range capabilities on the Ukrainian battlefield.Ìı

The Strategic Trilemma between Extended Deterrence and the ‘Upload’ DisparityÌı

The end of New START has transformed the re-MIRVing process into a catalyst for a new arms race. In this new unconstrained environment, the US possesses a significant technical advantage. . If the US opts to utilize its technological edge, it would effectively out-deploy Moscow, potentially doubling its arsenal to levels above the failed treaty’s limits.  In response, Moscow may prioritize asymmetrical offset centred on long-range theatre strike capabilities. This likely reaction is deeply rooted in the bureaucratic momentum of Russian military-industrial complex, favouring dual capable systems that operate in regulatory grey zones.   

Defence, Resilience, and the Hypersonic Decision Gap

ÌıUnlike traditionalÌıICBMs, which allow for a 25-plus minutes warning window, a hypersonic system launched from central Europe can reach critical command nodes in Moscow in less than 10 minutes. ThisÌıÌıin decision time undermines de-escalatory signalling and placesÌıÌıon the adversary’s early warning systems, potentially triggering automated ‘launch on warning’ responses. Even a conventional strike on communications, command-and-control (C3) centres would be strategically relevant. Therefore,Ìıthe deployment of such systems in substantial numbers would create a ‘launch-on-warning’ incentive for Moscow, further destabilizing the offensive-defensiveÌıbalance and increasing the risk of automated nuclear response.ÌıÌı

Managing UncertaintyÌıin a Multipolar SystemÌı

Emerging from a Cold War environment coalesced around a bipolar international power-distribution, traditional arms control has proven ill-suited for the asymmetrical, multipolar international disorder of the last two decades.  In a world without inspections, stability depends on predictability. To achieve this goal, the international community must work to prevent accidental escalation through transparency and launch notifications. The reconstruction of a stabilizing framework is currently stymied by two primary structural hurdles: Russia’s current lack of trustworthiness and China’s strategic intentions.  

The main obstacle to reopening dialogue with Russia is the paradox of negotiating limits on the same systems being employed in the current war in Ukraine. It would be politically fraught for the US to engage in fresh negotiations, while Russia utilizes these assets as tool of active coercion and battlefield destruction. . This move puts Washington in an uneasy negotiating position, forcing it to negotiate over assets that France and the United Kingdom (UK) consider non-negotiable. This is hardly a novel tactic:  Putin’s proposal risks to exacerbate infra-systemic fault lines, foster suspects of decoupling, and ‘fears of abandonment’ between the US and its European Allies. Simultaneously, China’s strategic stalling (and its own ambitions to increase its arsenal) prevents the necessary transition toward a trilateral framework. By hiding behind the rhetoric of minimal deterrence, Beijing refuses to accept any oversight while rapidly expanding its nuclear and conventional inventory.  

While the American and Russian nuclear stockpiles greatly exceed those of all other nuclear-weapon states, the strategic equation has irrevocably shifted from a bipolar to a multipolar calculus through China’s ambitions to drastically increase its own arsenal.  These missiles provide Beijing with a high-precision, non-nuclear capability to hold regional strategic assets in the mire, including forward air bases, carrier strike groups, and command-and-control (C2) nodes.  This scenario of ‘conventional entanglement’ complicates the global force posture of NATO’s primary security provider, the US.   

Technological Acceleration: The AI-Hypersonic NexusÌı

The ‘Strategic Trilemma’ is further complicated by the integration ofÌıÌıand launch-control systems. As theÌıÌıthrough the deployment of Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs), the decision-making window for political leaders has shrunk from thirty minutes to mere seconds.Ìı.ÌıHowever, the ‘black-box’ nature of neural network-based AI introduces unprecedentedÌı. Because these models recognize patterns in ways that are non-replicable and often incomprehensible to human operators, they are prone to hallucinations or false positives – interpreting unusual atmospheric phenomena or cyber-spoofing as an incoming strike. In a strategic environment dominated by fast-flying systems like theÌıDark EagleÌıorÌıOreshnik, the reliance on AI-driven recommendations could lead to a ‘compressed escalation’ where a machineÌıinitiatesÌıa retaliatory strike before human deliberation even occurs. This technological entanglementÌınecessitatesÌıthat any futureÌıarmsÌıcontrol negotiations must deal not only with warheads and delivery systems, but also with the algorithms governing their employment.ÌıÌı

The Shift towards Integrated DeterrenceÌı

In response to this acceleration, NATO has transitioned toward a posture of integrated deterrence. With the expiration of New START in sight, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) moved to solidify the Alliance’s defensive architecture.  This strategic shift was codified on February 12, 2026, when several NATO Allies launched  to develop next-generation sensors designated to counter ballistic and hypersonic threats (like the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS)). These initiatives, alongside a new  for drone-based deep precision strike capability, signal a move away from static, treaty-based stability, toward a dynamic denial posture. Furthermore, the  reinforces this approach by emphasizing trans-regional deterrence, acknowledging that while NATO remains a regional alliance, its security is inextricably tied to the ‘two-peer’ challenge.  

Policy Recommendations:ÌıÌı

1. Rediscover a dual approach: Combine military modernization with a standingÌınegotiatingÌıofferÌıto both Russia andÌıChinaÌıon Strategic Stability Dialogue,Ìıwhich wouldÌılikely benefitÌıNATOÌıAlliance cohesion by reassuring the most risk-adverse NATOÌımemberÌıstates.ÌıÌı

2. Prioritize Qualitative Limits: Advocate for a Multilateral MIRV-freeze to mitigate first-strike incentives and neutralize the advantage of rapid uploading.ÌıÌıIn the post-START environment, the primary risk is no longer aggregate warheads counts, but the rapid surgeÌıinÌıcapacity,Ìıafforded by US upload potential and Russia’s modernization of MIRV-capable systems.ÌıA ‘freeze’ approach would be aimed at neutralizing the perceived advantages of rapid arsenal expansion, signalling a commitment to strategic sufficiency rather than theÌırecklessÌıpursuit of superiority.ÌıÌı

3. EstablishÌı‘Cold WarÌıPlus’ÌıCommunication Channels: Strengthen secure, real-time links between military headquarters to manage crisis in an era of hypersonic weapons.ÌıNATO should strengthen secure, real-time links between military headquarters – specificallyÌıthe Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)Ìıand the Russian Ministry of Defence – to manage crisis in an era defined by HGVs. These channels must be hardened against cyber-interferences and electronic warfare to ensure theyÌıremainÌıviableÌıduring high-intensity grey zone friction or hybrid confrontations.ÌıÌı

4. Manage AI Integration in Command and Control:ÌıEstablishÌı‘human-in-the-loop’ standards between launch commands and early warning systems toÌıpreventÌıAIÌısystemsÌıfrom triggering accidental escalation during high-speed hypersonic encounters.ÌıWhile AI may become indispensable for processing massive data streams from next-generationÌısensors like the HBTSS, it must neverÌıpossessÌıthe autonomous authority toÌıinitiateÌıa response. Hence, theÌıNATOÌıAlliance should champion an international protocol that mandatesÌıa ‘’ for human commanders, even in high-speed hypersonic confrontations.Ìı

5. Define a Clear Doctrine for Conventional Hypersonic: Clarify that systems likeÌıDark EagleÌıare forÌı,Ìıwhile acknowledging thatÌıÌıremainsÌıinherently destabilizing.ÌıNATO should explicitly disavow ‘decapitation’ or strategic nuclear roles for these assets to reduce the risk of Russia misperceiving conventional precision strikes as existential threats to itsÌıC2Ìıarchitecture.Ìı

6. Strengthen Hybrid Resilience: Protect undersea and digital infrastructure as a coreÌıcomponentÌıof strategic stability to preventÌıhybrid,Ìınon-kinetic bypassing of deterrence.ÌıBy neutralizing low-cost, high-impact hybrid threats, theÌıNATOÌıAlliance prevents adversaries from bypassing deterrence thresholdsÌıand undermining stability at the lowest level of the escalation ladder. This approach ensures that the emerging new capabilities in air, missile, and drone-defence would not beÌıcompromisedÌıby asymmetric disruption aimed at eroding domestic resilience and political will during a crisis.ÌıÌı

The post Strategic Stability in Flux: Can NATO Balance Deterrence, Defence, and Arms Control in a New Missile Age? appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

Introduction

Recent think tank and policy discussionsÌıaboutÌıtheÌıRussianÌıFederationÌıhave primarily focused on three issues: the prospects of a peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine;Ìıdevelopments on the battlefield;Ìıand the limits of Russia’s resilience to Western economic sanctions (). While these questions are undoubtedly centralÌıto the ongoing war, they risk obscuring a critical dimension of European securityÌı–Ìıthat is, the future of enemy politics, orÌı“enemization,â€�ÌıinÌıpost-war Russia.Ìı

In this policy brief, enemization refers to the systematic construction and reproduction of internal and external enemy images by political elites and state-controlled media, framing so-called “enemiesâ€� as existential threats to national survival, identity, and sovereignty. Enemization serves crucial political functions such as legitimizing authoritarian governance, mobilizing public support for repressive and confrontational domestic and foreign policies (; ). While enemization has radicalized during the war against Ukraine, it reflects a broader and longer-standing pattern in Russian politics. Even if the war ends, enemization is likely to remain one of the central organizing frameworks shaping how Russian political discourse interprets international relations, if an authoritarian regime continues. In this case, the European Union (EU) is likely to continue being framed as an adversary, limiting prospects for stable post-war engagement across Eurasia and sustaining long-term security risks.  

Therefore, understanding how enemization functions, why it persists, and how it shapes Russia’s postwar behaviour is essential for developing realistic and effective EU policy responses. Even though enemization also occurs in other countries of various political systems, the case of Russia â€“ as a neighbouring country that has demonstrated willingness to use force â€“ plays substantial relevance for European security. This policy brief examines the persistence of enemization in Russia and evaluates its implications for European security and long-term post-war engagement, arguing that under conditions of continued authoritarian rule, enemy narratives are likely to remain a durable feature of Russian politics regardless of war outcomes or leadership configurations.

Continuity andÌıEscalation ofÌıEnemizationÌıin RussiaÌı

Enemization in Russia has been a recurring feature of Russian public discourse since at least the 1990s, when political, social, and economic instability revived threat and enemy perceptions, conspiracy theories, and nostalgia for “glorious pastâ€� and a strong state (Gudkov 2005¹; ). The Chechen wars and terrorist attacks further reinforced enemy framing, while trust in military and security institutions, including the presidency, grew stronger (Gudkov 2005). Under Putin, negative mobilization of the population around the ideas of enemies, threats, and other symbolic constituents of the besieged fortress narrative has become a core component of regime communication and governance (; ).  

Enemization dynamics are visible in concrete rhetorical and legislative practices. Russian propaganda, following a long-established Soviet mechanism of using references to Nazis or Fascists to delegitimize political opponents (), routinely frames Ukraine as a “Nazi regimeâ€� (), or Western values as aimed to destroy Russian culture, while domestic opposition and various social minorities are labelled as foreign agents, traitors, or extremists. Legislative measures continue to limit human rights and freedoms of these alleged enemies (), while intensifying public glorification of wartime sacrifices and spreading binary logic of enmity into education and other spheres of social life.  

The full-scale invasion of Ukraine represents the culmination of the enemization in Russian public discourse. To justify aggressive foreign policies and domestic repressions against its own citizens, the Russian regime has strengthened and radicalized its propaganda of enmity. Russian social surveys results, although requiring cautious interpretation, consistently demonstrate a widespread public endorsement, usually between 70 and 80% of respondents, of enemy images portraying Russia as a besieged fortress surrounded by hostile actors (). These enemy images are reflected in official state communications and state media framing of Ukraine as a “Nazi regimeâ€�; the West as seeking Russia’s collapse; and active narration of foreign agents and traitors among domestic political opposition and other social groups such as religious and sexual minorities. Such narratives reinforce the perception of existential threats to the Russian worldview – also commonly referred to as Ruskiy Mir â€“ and legitimize aggressive foreign policies and repressions at home.  

Although questions remain as to what extent Russian elites genuinely believe in these enemy narratives or opportunistically instrumentalize them, public opinion data shows widespread support of enemy perceptions with official messaging (). Even if the Russian regime adopts less confrontational rhetoric, the institutionalization and long-term reproduction of enemy narratives across political discourse, media, and education may suggest that such perceptions will persist at least for a certain period. This persistence reflects not an inherent social disposition, but rather the cumulative effect of sustained propaganda of enmity which resonates, among other things, with certain popular – though not uniform – perceptions, biases, opinions, and worldviews present within a society (). For Europe, this means that rhetorical moderation alone should not be read as evidence of rapid de-escalation, since the drivers reproducing enemy narratives may remain in place after the formal conclusion of the war. 

TheÌıDrivers ofÌıPost-WarÌıEnemizationÌıin RussiaÌı

Enemization in Russia should not be understood as a temporary wartime social and political mobilization tool, but as a longstanding political instrument and condition. First, a substantial and meaningful reversal of enemy narratives would require a major disruption of the Russian political and informational environment that sustains it. Second, enemization in wartime Russia predates the war and has become institutionalized in Russian politics throughout history. The routinized enemy narratives tend to be self-reinforcing, shaping public expectations and interpretations even after the immediate conditions that intensified them have changed. Finally, enemization is closely linked to a broader narrative of confrontation with the West, within which the war against Ukraine is framed as a separate episode in a bigger geopolitical struggle (); a particular possible scenario if Putin remains in power. Thus, even if hostilities end, the drivers that reinforce enemization are likely to persist, allowing enemy narratives remain in place and manifest.  

Although military outcomes of the war against Ukraine remain obscure, they will likely shape the tone and targets of Russian enemization in distinct ways while keeping the underlying logic intact. Russian authorities will likely declare any war outcomes as victorious, and such declarations will reinforce enemization by legitimizing the use of military force as an effective foreign policy instrument, and the use of repression as an effective domestic policy instrument (); both are based on the perception of enemies and threats. If the war ends in a prolonged stalemate without clear successes and lines drawn, the Kremlin could credibly sell narratives to the population; enemization may shift from triumphalist to resentful tones, picturing Russia as constrained or undermined by hostile external and internal forces which prevented the country from achieving a complete victory. Finally, possible military defeat could intensify revanchist narratives and scapegoating directed at already constructed enemies. Thus, across these outcomes, enemization is likely to be adapted and reformulated but not abandoned. 

One may hope that substantial regime change may positively affect enemization by beginning its partial or even full demobilization. This unlikely possibility requires us to look deeper into the phenomenon. While political leadership in autocratic Russia shapes policy choices, enemization also draws on pre-existing historical perceptions and biases in parts of society; rather than inventing enemies from scratch, Russian propaganda amplifies and rearticulates such narratives by promoting the most useful ones in a given political context (Gudkov 2005). These enemy narratives are embedded in state institutions, public expectations about politics, security, and national identity. As a result, Russian political elites operate within pre-determined moral boundaries that constrain the range of discursive options, including how enemies are defined, justified, and, if needed, de-enemized (). Even in the event of elite change, successor elites would likely be motivated to maintain at least elements of familiar narratives of enemization to avoid accusations of weakness, betrayal, and capitulation, especially from those we define as ultra-patriotic and nationalist radicals. In turn, to secure some stability amidst the leadership’s change, the new elites may find it easier to reproduce familiar enemy constructs, instead of dismantling them altogether, as historical experience in post-Soviet Russia in the 1990s suggests.   

To conclude, post-war Russia is likely to remain dependent on enemization as a policy instrument across a range of plausible war outcomes. While the specific targets and intensity of enemization may shift, the institutional framework that supports them will likely persist. Even a regime change would not automatically disband enemy narratives as the new elites may face strong incentive to continue employing in some way such enemy rhetoric to secure their own power. That is why Europe should prepare for a strong possibility to deal with Russia, in which enemization remains politically usable even if its form evolves over time.

PolicyÌıImplications andÌıRecommendations for EuropeÌı

As demonstrated above, enemization depends on propaganda’s resonance with pre-existing social and historical biases and perceptions. State messages about a hostile West or treacherous domestic political opposition draw much of its legitimacy from this resonance. Accordingly, it is unlikely that certain changes in European policies or rhetoric would suffice to transform elite threat messaging. Despite contemporary censorship conditions in Russia, however, European actions remain visible and preferable to at least some segments of Russian society. Therefore, Europe should prioritize reaching Russian society directly through its policies to mitigate enemization narratives. Even though Europe cannot directly dismantle enemization narratives within Russia, EU policies could influence the credibility and resonance of such narratives while showing that it does not consider Russian society as a whole to be a threat nor an actor to be punished.  

1. European post-war strategic communication planning should aim for long-term deterrence over rapid or even gradual normalization.  

Europe needs to base their post-war planning on the assumption that enemization in Russia will persist after the end of active hostilities in Ukraine and that it will affect Russian foreign and domestic political agendas. Although the EU has already invested substantial resources in becoming more independent from Russian energy and raw materials, as well as in its military industrial complex, such planning also requires a well-planned discursive strategy of communicating with not only the Russian regime or state elites, but Russian society as a whole. Expectations that Russia will become more pacifist and less prone to use militant instruments due to its losses in Ukraine appear to be wishful thinking, so it is essential to embrace the opposite possibility to manage the security effects of this enemization. 

2. Utilize discursive restraint in official communication.  

European officials should avoid using rhetorical frames in public speeches and documents that portray Russia as a civilizational enemy or a permanently hostile society. This, however, by no means implies that the official rhetoric needs to be softened towards the Russian government â€“ the condemnation of Russian aggression is necessary and justified. Discursive restraint, suggested here as the policy instrument, should be understood not as conciliation but rather as a tool to limit the discursive reproduction of enemization.  

3. Clearly differentiate between the Russian regime and the population.  

Although the issue of moral responsibility of the society in an authoritarian regime for the crimes committed throughout the war is a subject of academic and political debates, avoiding the narrative of collective responsibility may be beneficial, specifically in this case of mitigating the risks of enemization for European security. Messaging that brings together the regime and the population contributes to the regime’s claim that it represents the nation as a whole and validates narratives of collective punishment and guilt. This in turn leads to consolidation of the Russian public around their leaders or, at the very least, around the narratives framing Europe as a threat and enemy to Russians.  

The post Enemy Politics in Russia: A Long-Term Security Risk for Europe appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

Key Takeaways 

• In Estonia and Latvia, border residents, ethnic Russians, and Russian-speakers differ from the general population in their perception of security threats. They are more likely to view domestic political instability as their country’s primary security threat, rather than Russia. 

• This segment of Estonians and Latvians also tend to feel disenfranchised and helpless regarding national defence, with the majority more likely to respond that their countries are “on their ownâ€� if faced by a military threat. 

• NATO should take a regionally focused outreach, using the Russian language as a medium and utilize transparent intelligence disclosure to assure and rebuild trust among these vulnerable populations. Furthermore, using visible and well-tested approaches such as tangible first-responder training and on-the-ground capacity-building measures could help address local skepticism. 

Background 

While the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) focuses on defending the Baltics from external Russian aggression, a critical segment of the population – namely border residents, ethnic Russians, and Russian-speakers – are more concerned with internal political instability than external threats for its national security. In addition, many of these respondents express a feeling of helplessness and alienation, believing neither the West nor Russia would come to their aid should their country face a military or security threat. Thus far, NATO operations aimed at reassuring Baltic residents are not succeeding with instilling confidence in current national security frameworks. Recognizing the diversity of security beliefs with a particular regional and linguistic focus could better inform NATO strategies that address security threat responses in the Baltics, helping to reassure these skeptical and disenfranchised populations.   

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has fundamentally transformed the international security landscape, prompting NATO’s response to reassure its Baltic members that, should it face a threat, NATO will come to their defence.  NATO’s operations in Latvia and Estonia are a part of its broader efforts at deterrence and defence on its eastern flank by increasing its presence in the region, with Canada leading the Multinational Brigade in Latvia through , and the United Kingdom leading in Estonia with . Latvia and Estonia are both active participants in various NATO-accredited Centres of Excellence (COEs) that conduct collaborative research with NATO Allies to better address security threats, many by malign Russian influence through hybrid tactics. For example, the , located in Riga, Latvia, monitors and counters information-manipulation threats in real time. Russia’s information operations in these countries exploit pre-existing societal divisions among ethnic, regional, and linguistic lines, promoting extremist sentiments and skepticism against their governments and Western partners.  accuse Estonian and Latvian governments of being anti-Russian and incapable of defending their countries against any threat.   

Existing studies suggest that Russophone, ethnic Russian, and borderland populations in both Latvia and Estonia are more skeptical towards NATO and existing national security frameworks. They are found to be , and .  is found to be a salient factor, associated with decreased support for present (often liberal democratic) regimes.  In the context of the ongoing war against Ukraine, , and . Furthermore, they are.   

However, public opinion amongst these groups in Estonia and Latvia is proving to be more nuanced; many in these populations express a complex belief system surrounding national security that is . , , meaning that public opinion among Russophones in Latvia and Estonia is heterogenous. Given these insights, policy aimed at developing trust with these populations and fostering participation in national security frameworks should reflect this variety of beliefs, and address skepticism through regionally and linguistically mindful outreach initiatives.

Belief in ‘Domestic Political Instability’ as the Greatest National Security Threat

A survey conducted by the ĞÓ°ÉÔ­´´ University Eastern European and Transatlantic Network (EETN) in Latvia and Estonia between March and May 2025 indicates that while Russia and the war in Ukraine are still prevalent security threats, 26% of Latvians and 22% of Estonians perceive “domestic political instabilityâ€� as the most important threat. These opinions are particularly widespread among the border-region populations, among Russian speakers, and ethnic Russians. For example, in Latgale (Latvia’s border region) 52% chose “domestic political instabilityâ€� as the greatest threat; only 7% picked Russia, and 12% the war in Ukraine. Similarly, in Northeastern Estonia, an area that borders Russia, 47% consider domestic political instability as a main security threat while only 17% consider Russia as the greatest threat. In Latvia, Russian speakers were far more likely to hold this belief compared to respondents who speak the titular language; language was not a measured factor in the Estonia survey. 

These groups are all more likely than their counterparts to feel personally “unsafe,â€� with 51% of Latgale residents and 30% of Russian speakers in Latvia choosing “unsafeâ€� when asked about their personal safety. In Northeastern Estonia, 31% also personally feel “unsafe.â€� Skeptics tend to attribute threats to personal safety on internal concerns rather than external actors. In both countries, those who share this belief have a higher likelihood to view Russia as most helpful for their national security. â€‹â€‹For example, in Latvia 26% of respondents chose â€œdomestic political instabilityâ€� as the greatest threat to personal safety, and among these respondents 61% chose Russia as the most helpful external actor to Latvia in the case of a military threat- pointing to an intersection between positive perceptions of Russia and concerns over internal concerns. Similarly, for the same question in Estonia, 22% chose â€œdomestic political instability,â€� and of this group 77% also picked Russia to come to their aid. 

In addition, those concerned with domestic security are more likely to be skeptical of the EU, NATO, and the West. In both countries, such respondents are least likely to choose “the Westâ€� as most helpful should they face a military threat, with only 12% in Latvia, and 18% in Estonia. Furthermore, among those who share this belief is a higher likelihood to vote “no/leaveâ€� in hypothetical referendums for the EU and NATO respectively.  

Feelings of Alienation, NATO Skepticism and Internal Instability Belief 

Among respondents who share a belief regarding domestic political instability and specifically in the Russophone, ethnic Russian, and borderland populations is a common feeling of alienation from current security mechanisms and parliamentary processes. Respondents who share this belief also often expressed disenfranchisement, believing that if their country faces a military threat that they will be helped by no one. When asked the same question, Russophones in Latvia proved that they are least likely to choose NATO and most likely to choose “Nobody will help us/we are here for ourselvesâ€�.  

Residents of Northeastern Estonia and Latgale are the least likely among Estonia’s macro-regions to choose “closer to NATOâ€� (only 34% in Northeast Estonia and 41% in Latgale) and are most likely among all regions to pick either “closer to Russiaâ€� (22% in Northeast Estonia, 21% in Latgale) or “closer to both/neitherâ€� (31% in Northeast Estonia, 25% in Latgale). 

It seems that such skepticism towards common security architecture reflects a greater disbelief in the national political system. Although a majority of respondents who also share the belief of alienation would vote “yes/stayâ€� in the hypothetical referendums to remain in NATO or the EU, their support is weaker than the general population. To conclude, Russophones, border-region residents, and respondents who share their “domestic political instability belief more often express feelings of alienation and disenfranchisement from political processes rather than a desire to deepen ties with Russia.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 

Feelings of skepticism, alienation, and disenfranchisement in the border regions cannot be attributed to ethnic and linguistic identification alone. Being Russian or Russophone in a border region does not inherently make someone vulnerable to Russian influence. Socioeconomic disparities in these regions paired with titular language mandates in both countries can contribute to feelings of alienation, though further research is needed in order to uncover a clearer picture of these citizens’ experiences. A more in-depth understanding will further restore agency to this population, as their beliefs are likely acquired through more complex routes than simply absorbing Kremlin media.  that Russian media did not have an independent effect on one’s willingness to defend their country and instead infers that many respondents who consume Russian media have a distrust of media in general, further highlighting a need for a more nuanced understanding of skepticism among Russophones. 

1. Further research on best practices through NATO COEs is needed to address alienation and helplessness 

NATO Allies utilize different COE’s to share best practices for countermeasures and confidence-building initiatives and to build societal resilience against malign information influence. A transnational study on best practices for building confidence among ethnic minorities would fill a sizable gap in current research and would provide a basis for which to design public outreach campaigns for populations experiencing alienation and skepticism.  In addition, further research can investigate the security perceptions and feelings of alienation in public opinion. This would provide a more accurate foundation for which to form policy on public outreach, rather than simply attributing the security concerns of Russophones to inherent Russian-tendencies that favor Kremlin-intervention. 

2. Targeted and regionally mindful outreach for key groups could have important impacts 

Further regionally-focused outreach for these specific Russophone, ethnic Russian, and borderland populations using a , with tactics such as intelligence disclosures (gathered through the , or NISRF), can effectively rebuild credibility and better reassure these populations of NATO’s defence commitments and decision-making. Furthermore, intelligence disclosures through accessible media can inform users on external security threats and potentially increase risk awareness and trust in public institutions through transparency measures.  

 Given that a significant amount of  is conducted by Russian-language media, it is tantamount to consider this population’s linguistic preference as a tool of engagement rather than a characteristic to exclude from policy measures to counteract Russian influence.  

3. Share key expertise within NATO frameworks, and make it visible to key groups 

 found that any citizen regardless of ethnicity is more open to helping in their country’s defences if they are reassured by a powerful patron, one that they have confidence in. In 2023, , sharing best practices for preparedness among first responders. Similar efforts in Latvia and Estonia could reach NATO-skeptical populations among citizens working in the public sector for emergency response. Sharing key expertise in similar sectors can potentially build trust among skeptical groups and increase NATO’s visibility among local populations, offering a firsthand account of NATO’s efforts instead of through malign narratives online.  

The post Skepticism, Alienation and Perceptions of Internal Instability in Public Opinion: Are NATO’s Baltic Operations Succeeding at Reassuring All Segments of their Populations? appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

The current geopolitical climate has increased fears surrounding war and instability across the transatlantic. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has brought along with it a rapidly changing conventional mode of warfare to the European continent for the first time in decades, destabilizing a previous sense of peace. In addition to traditional warfighting, several malign actors – including revisionist actors such as Russia Federation and the People’s Republic of China – are increasingly using hybrid tactics in hopes of destabilizing the relationship between NATO members. Importantly, hybrid warfare includes tactics that fall short of traditional armed aggression but nonetheless have adverse effects against their target and broader citizenry, including disinformation and propaganda campaigns, offensive cyber operations, espionage, and attacks on critical infrastructure. Since 2022, numerous European states – such as Germany, Poland, France, and the Baltics – have identified an increase in hybrid attacks as a prominent part of this rapidly changing and uncertain threat landscape. Most recently, these attempts to breach NATO sovereignty and place a strain on partnerships have taken the form of cyber attacks, drone incursions, and disinformation campaigns. The rise in hybrid warfare has thus generated questions on how NATO may improve its collective responses to evolving tactics in such an uncertain international landscape. Article 5 remains a core part of the Alliance’s defensive operations but is facing questions regarding its overall effectiveness. This is largely due to the challenges created by grey-scale conflicts in establishing concrete and cohesive countermeasures. New types of war are challenging traditional conventions of collective defence, and require NATO to adapt. By analyzing the mechanisms of Article 5, it becomes evident that additional safeguards should be implemented to reinforce the power of collective defence.

Article 5 and NATO countermeasures

NATO was first formed in in the context of the Cold War. Its primary goal was to engage all Western partners in an attempt to shield them from influence of the Warsaw Pact. By declaring that an attack on one is an attack on all, Article 5 has constituted the foundation of the NATO alliance through its enshrining of the principle of collective defence. Article 5, however, does not define specifics of what constitutes an “armed attack,� nor what measures should be implemented when such an act occurs. The Article is intentionally vague in this respect, giving member states the room to maneuver and to respond on a case-by-case basis pursuant to a threat’s overall status. To trigger Article 5, a formal unanimous consensus must be reached among NATO members. Through its history, Article 5 has only been invoked once following the in New York City.

Article 4 is also an important element of collective defence, which gives members the right to call a . Article 4 was initially triggered at the outset of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 by Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. Since then, it has been triggered by and in response to Russian airspace violations[KN1]. Most recently, Romanian officials discussed using Article 4 after a Article 4 is an essential tool for countries to collaborate on defence responses, which is even more important now as threats are increasingly unconventional and unprecedented.

This escalation of hybrid warfare has challenged traditional assumptions and led to questions of what collective defence may look like in the twenty-first century. Since 2016, , including cyber attacks. At the Madrid Summit in 2022, the , formalizing their strategy against hybrid threats. The Alliance generally outlined their commitment to building resilience through preparedness, deterrence, and defence. Several coordinated initiatives, such as and counter-hybrid support teams, have strengthened collective resilience. NATO continues to also work at being a ; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents; critical infrastructure; cyber defence; energy security; and international terrorism. At a glance, this signals that NATO is adopting a multitude of policies, frameworks, and teams to address threats of hybrid attacks; however, . Article 4 consultations have helped to address airspace incursions, but a wide range of other threats have yet to be formally addressed. Article 5 has thus far not been invoked. A major problem remains, however, one which does not stem from the Treaty itself but rather countermeasures that are not cohesive or consistent enough. To improve NATO’s positioning against hybrid threats, a better framework and strategy must be adopted, which can in turn clarify the use of Article 5 in grey-scale conflict.

Next steps?

A major question surrounding Article 5 is determining how severe of an attack may call for its invocation. Would it be the cutting of a major undersea cable? A large-scale hacking incident? indicate that these threats would likely not be sufficient enough to call on collective defence. Hybrid attacks fundamentally operate below conventional thresholds on purpose. Therefore, NATO should move to assessing threats not only based on force (i.e. what hybrid tactics are equivalent to an armed attack), but rather, focus on aggregate impact on a target country. While one singular attack is unlikely to cause intensive harm, long-term campaigns are aimed at intensely eroding societal infrastructure and citizen resolve. An aggregate threat framework can provide more accurate judgements on member’s security and sovereignty.

            Another area of improvement can be further standardization of member responses based on the type of hybrid attack. Broad counter-hybrid support teams could be developed into specialized units, such as AI or cybercrime teams. Existing organizations, such as the and the , can be leveraged to develop specialized response mechanisms. Establishing cohesive procedures in response to hybrid incidents will make it easier for the Alliance to act in coordination, which is essential in deterring ongoing Russian attempts to weaken the whole of European society. This may also lead to reduced friction among between members and narrow the gap for Russia to exploit these internal vulnerabilities and tensions. Establishing improved, specialized mechanisms regarding collective defence will also help to clarify for members how to assemble if Article 5 is triggered, and to do so in a timely fashion.  Finally, an additional recommendation is to further develop a counter-hybrid warfare strategy which goes beyond defence mechanisms to engage sectors like education, transportation, and technology.

Such a counter-hybrid strategy could follow the approach, a move increasingly being embraced by many nations. The strategy could also look to establish a minimum guideline or set of requirements for member states to follow to have adequate safety net. The strategy should also target ways to improve preventative measures for member states. Integral to this will be improving intelligence-sharing and collective tracking to improve attribution. Improving attribution will help clarify who is behind such hybrid attacks. Furthermore, ensuring that countries are investing in defense or dual-use infrastructure which supports a coordinated net of European security will improve prevention.

Conclusion

NATO’s commitment to collective defense is more important than ever when addressing newly-emerging ways to fight wars in the twenty-first century. Article 5 remains a key part of this approach to security, and it should be noted its ambiguity does serve a strategic purpose. Article 4 also remains as a powerful tool for countries to leverage. However, for collective defence to be actionable in the case of grey-scale conflict, it must be supported within a strong framework that deeply engages with new offensive tactics. Without this, Article 5 can continue to be seen as vague or ineffective, which provides malign actors with more capacity to exploit vulnerabilities. These adaptations will help to improve transatlantic security from a myriad of malign actors.

The post Evaluating Article 5 and NATO in hybrid warfare appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

Prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukraine was one of the world’s largest exporters of grain, with its Black Sea ports in Odesa, Chornomorsk, and Pivdennyi serving as key stops in global shipment routes. The ongoing war has severely impeded Ukraine’s exporting capabilities, which has had critical impacts domestically and abroad. Ukraine has been able to adapt by establishing alternative shipping routes, but this has also created new potential vulnerabilities. The Port of Constanta, Romania’s Black Sea port, has emerged as a central node in stabilizing global grain supply as a result of the war. This development provides an opportunity for intraregional cooperation, as well as further EU and NATO presence through key littoral states. Understanding the geopolitical implications of shifting supply routes gives insight into a primary target for economic pressure by Russia, and how this has influenced regional development.

Securitization of Shipping Routes in the Black Sea

A key element of Russia’s war strategy in Ukraine has been to target industry and infrastructure to deplete Ukraine’s economy and overall capacity to defend itself. The Black Sea and Danube shipping routes are instrumental to this strategy. Odesa is Ukraine’s largest port on the Black Sea. Rail and road transport connect Odesa to the Danube, so goods can be shipped upstream to the rest of Europe or out to international destinations. Prior to the war, Odesa was the main hub for exports of grain, sunflower products, and oilseeds, . When shipping out of Odesa and other Black Sea ports became inviable due to Russian attacks, transport shifted to rail, truck, and barge; however, this rapid increase in land traffic quickly led to chokepoints and delays. The inability for Ukraine to export grain created shortages around the world – particularly in Africa, Asia, and – and also had a severe impact on Ukraine’s economy, . Therefore, disruptions had a huge impact on Ukraine’s economy, as well as global markets. As a result, in 2022 the was brokered to enable Ukrainian exports. A UN-brokered deal between Russia, Ukraine, and Türkiye, this Initiative established safe passages, inspections, and additional security for commercial vessels during the war. However, it only lasted a year before Russia withdrew. Since then, Russian attacks on Ukraine’s ports on both the Black Sea and the Danube have been consistent and destructive. While Ukraine has been able to partially restore grain exports since 2023, these exports still remained in 2025. Alternative shipping routes have been critical in providing an outlet for this grain, notably , transport across the Danube, and the . To support these new routes, regional partners have helped Ukraine by taking in more imports to domestic markets and by exporting more Ukrainian grain through domestic facilities. The Port of Constanta in Romania has played a central part in this shift and serves as a primary example of how the war is strengthening cooperation between Ukraine and the European Union (EU).

Port of Constanta

The Port of Constanta, located on the coast of Romania, is the EU’s largest port on the Black Sea. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion, this port has become a major grain hub with a . In 2023, as Ukrainian cereal and grain was redirected there after the war started. Bridging Europe, Asia, and Africa, this port holds significant strategic importance while also serving as . Additionally, the port’s proximity to the Danube River emphasizes its connectivity to Ukraine. Since the war, the Danube River corridor has become a vital alternative route for Ukrainian grain exports, making the Port of Constanta an essential aspect of Ukraine’s export flows. Additionally, the geopolitical importance of the Port has motivated large-scale modernization of facilities and broader infrastructural upgrades. The EU has been pivotal in funding key projects involving the Port of Constanta such as a , , and . Private companies have also contributed to ramping up operational capacity at the Port. This includes a new with specialized equipment, , and a . At this point, Russia has not launched direct attacks on Romanian port infrastructure on the Black Sea or the Danube. This is because Romania is a part of NATO, and therefore an attack risks triggering Article 5. However, fallout from attacks on their Ukrainian ports such as Izmail along the Danube affects Romanian facilities and villages by the water. Infrastructural damage affects the ability for shipments along the waterway to run smoothly. Additionally, , and a .

Geopolitical Implications

The securitization of Black Sea shipping routes have provided new geopolitical challenges while also accelerating already existing intraregional issues. The integral role exports play for the Ukrainian economy make it essential for routes to be protected to avoid further economic destabilization. Additionally, the inability for Ukraine to ship regular capacities of grain out of the Black Sea has placed additional stress on the Solidarity Lanes into neighbouring countries of Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia. This decreased capacity, in turn, has created political tensions between Ukraine and its Eastern European neighbours as , negatively affecting the livelihoods of local farmers who cannot compete with the influx of supply. As a result of this influx, the which limit trade liberalization for key products like wheat and sugar. However, Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary still maintain their , which has further increased tensions within the EU. This blockade has contributed to worsening relations between these countries and Ukraine, as well as preventing unified EU action on this issue. The destabilizing effects of Russia’s attacks on shipment routes needs to be addressed in order to ensure Ukraine does not face additional material pressures in the war. Stabilizing the region will also be integral to protecting networks such as the , which rely on the Black Sea to connect goods between Asia and Europe.

These security needs present EU littoral states a unique opportunity to establish their own presence in the region, both politically and economically. Romania has expressed strong interest in becoming a key EU representative in the region, which could be pivotal in breaking through the current disagreements. Engaging in deeper ties with other countries like Bulgaria and Georgia could also increase prosperity and development within the region. For example, Georgia and Romania recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding on a new , which can reinforce energy security that has been consistently undermined by Russian attacks. An outcome of this increased cooperation could be strengthened collaboration with the EU and NATO through these littoral states. The EU has already played a strong role as an investor and economic partner for countries like Romania and Bulgaria. NATO, through and the Mines Countermeasure exercise, improves deterrence and defence in the region. Using the EU/NATO umbrella also helps to bring in key external partners in the region. For example, engaging with Georgia on this initiative is an important opportunity to push back against Russian expansionism and influence on the other side of the Black Sea.

Conclusion

The Black Sea region acts as a crossroads between several different trade routes, making it pivotal as both an economic and military target. Russia’s actions in the region have been effective in destabilizing the Ukrainian economy and reducing the capacity of preexisting trade routes in the region. However, these challenges have been mitigated by the ability of Ukraine and its neighbours to adapt under difficult circumstances. Moving forward, further coordinated action in the region can further enhance its stability and even contribute to future prosperity. Existing pan-European and even transatlantic cooperation in the region has already provided a strong foundation to protect and support littoral partners. Leveraging these ties further provides an opportunity to counter Russian strategies and contain its expansionist ambitions.

The post Navigating the Waters: Trade Routes in the Black Sea After 2022 appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

Introduction

On January 5th, 2026, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced the appointment of former Canadian Deputy Prime Minister and Member of Parliament, Chrystia Freeland, as Economic Advisor to the Office of the President of Ukraine. In a post on X, Zelenskyy stated, “Ukraine needs to strengthen its internal resilience – both for the sake of Ukraine’s recovery if diplomacy delivers results as swiftly as possible, and to reinforce our defence if, because of delays by our partners, it takes longer to bring this war to an end.� In the following days, Freeland confirmed she accepted President Zelenskyy’s appointment and that she would be resigning as a Member of Parliament, taking effect as of January 9th, 2026.

Freeland’s appointment as voluntary Economic Advisor to the Office of the President of Ukraine is being made against the larger and developing backdrop of ongoing diplomatic negotiations between the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the United States (US) to come to an agreed upon pathway to peace. This negotiation process continues to be arduous for Ukraine. It also comes alongside a deepening of foreign diplomatic relations between Canada and Ukraine under the Mark Carney government; this, coming on the back of Prime Minister Carney’s historical , where he stressed the end of the rules-based international order and hinted at the decline of American hegemony – a speech that have held to ultimately represent the beginning of a multipolar era in world politics.

In the coming months, the Eastern European and Transatlantic Network (EETN) will publish a series analyzing key developments shaping the war; these include prospective pathways to peace, ongoing diplomatic negotiations and tensions, and the shifting security and economic governance landscape in Ukraine. Freeland is an integral node among an emerging and vital network aimed at supporting Ukraine and its future as the anniversary of the full-scale invasion nears and passes. This series aims to make clear that Russia is not only engaged in a war of attrition so as to try to reclaim its great power status, but that Ukraine is increasingly prepared to respond to this war of attrition with strategies and methods of asymmetric and hybrid warfare. Ukraine is prepared to make the strategic, economic, and relational moves necessary to better guarantee its future, as well as its success on the battlefield and in diplomatic negotiations.

This first brief of the series reflects on Freeland’s appointment and builds upon an argument first offered by Ukrainian scholar Valeriia Gusieva, where she suggested that cultural resilience is a foundational pillar to security. I extend her argument here by suggesting that cultural resilience and situated experience are also crucial to sustaining a coherent and effective attritional war strategy – Freeland’s appointment, in this case, should be understood light through the lens of political habituation.

Chrystia Freeland: A Ukrainian-Canadian MP and Soviet War Crimes Researcher

Chrystia Freeland was born in Peace River, Alberta in 1968 to a Ukrainian mother and Canadian father. Though she formally entered Canadian federal politics in 2013, she is perhaps most known through her association with former Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and his government. Under Trudeau, Freeland was appointed to serve as Minister of International Trade in Trudeau’s cabinet. In this position, she was a key negotiator in the hard-fought Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) (which replaced the North American Free Trade Agreement, or NAFTA, in 2020), as well as the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with the European Union (EU) that was signed in 2016.

While it is fair to assume that many Western audiences are familiar with the whiplash antics of American President Donald Trump, who often combines “,� less well known are the tensions that characterized the negotiation process of CETA. As researchers , CETA encountered historical diplomatic tensions throughout its negotiation process: “This challenge becomes evident at various stages in the trade policy process, but it is most pronounced in the ratification of bilateral agreements, which require approval in all member states.�

On paper, arriving at CETA was through the bilateral process of negotiation between Canada and the EU; in reality, however, Freeland was situated in a much more difficult negotiating position. Because the subsequent ratification of CETA would require the approval of all EU member states, such a negotiating process proved to be a lesson for both Freeland and the European Commission, who was charged with ensuring the twenty-eight member states were in alignment. Indeed, as scholar Joris Larik , the alleged crisis of CETA negotiations soon became a “cautionary tale� about the “cumbersome and vulnerable EU treaty-making procedures, where internal politics and technical legal discussions detracted from the merits (or demerits) of the actual agreement.�

This became most visible through the tensions experienced with the Wallonia Parliament in Belgium, an autonomous regional government with veto power over EU trade deals. In late 2016, the Walloon government publicly rejected CETA, in part because of their worry that the trade deal would “.� Walloon regional minister-president, Paul Magnette, told reporters the following: “I don’t consider this as a funeral, I don’t consider this as a veto without any conditions. I consider this as a request to reopen negotiations so that European leaders could hear the legitimate demands which have been forcefully expressed by an organized, transparent civil society.� As Larik however, this crisis led to “profound internal reflections on EU trade policy, causing even a shift in the EU’s practice in concluding trade agreements.

It was largely in response to these tensions and apparent deadlock within Wallonia that Freeland made the public decision to walk out on CETA negotiations with our European allies. Following her decision, Freeland with Canadian journalists candidly: “It’s become evident for me, for Canada, that the European Union isn’t capable now to have an international treaty even with a country that has very European values like Canada. And even with a country so nice, with a lot of patience like Canada.� At the time, the move was taken by some in Canadian media as an “� response; Conservative critics in the House of Commons Freeland’s walk out as a “meltdown,� alleging she required “adult supervision� – language that carried clear sexist and gendered connotations. Still others this walk out is exactly what the negotiation process needed, as it eventually led to the signing of the trade agreement.

Reflecting on her CETA negotiation experience in 2026, Freeland the following about negotiating with European allies, which is worth quoting at-length here:

“You can sort of have two kinds of negotiations. Some negotiations start with a kind of win-win premise where the two parties come together wanting a deal, wanting to be friends, seeing each other as long-term partners, and they’ll disagree about stuff, but the negotiation is really about everyone working hard together to find the best possible landing zone. I would say Canada’s negotiations with the EU about our trade deal with Europe, CETA, were conducted in that way, and they were hard, right? … Our final slightly melodramatic moments in Namur, in Wallonia, you know, proceeded by moments in Vienna, in Germany, in the European Parliament. I mean, it was a long slog and there were lots of obstacles and there was some drama, but it was clear there was goodwill on all sides.”

In this interview, Freeland goes on to characterize how Trump falls into an alternative negotiation camp compared to that which characterized CETA; she the idea that the American President abides by the logic of a zero-sum game: “…when you are dealing with a party that has that kind of a view [zero-sum game logic] and that kind of an attitude, then I think you have to be very clear in your own mind about red lines. And you have to be very prepared to say, thus far and no further, we’re not gonna capitulate our approach.�

Freeland later went on to become Canada’s Minister of Finance in 2020, where she was responsible for introducing four federal budgets, including federal aid measures related to Canada’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic. She was the first woman to serve in this role, a fact that would later be considered by the as crucial in the decay of her relationship with Trudeau prior to his own resignation in late-2025.

Beyond her political career, Freeland’s academic and journalistic works span two decades and have drawn the ire of the Kremlin. While pursuing graduate studies in Russian history and literature at Harvard, where she was responsible for documenting and translating archival and investigative materials related to the – an unmarked, mass burial site used by the NKVD (the secret police of the Soviet Union) to dispose of executed dissidents and prisoners. It remains one of the largest mass burial sites in Ukraine, even Russia’s current invasion. Her research played a decisive role in debunking the Stalin-era myth that the executions were exclusively carried out by the Nazis during World War Two. This research eventually attracted the attention of the KGB – the main security agency of the Soviet Union – who then assigned Freeland the codename “Frida,� closely surveilling and building a case against her throughout the course of her study.

As a Canadian with Ukrainian heritage, Freeland has been among the most outspoken advocates for sustained Canadian support to Ukraine. In response, she is one of thirteen Canadian officials barred from entering Russia under retaliatory sanctions imposed by Vladimir Putin himself in 2014 and has been the target of various . Freeland has also faced public attacks from American President Donald Trump, who on several occasions has described her in disparaging terms, including “,� a “,� a “,� and an overall “.� From a feminist perspective, Freeland’s experience navigating such attacks underscores her familiarity with the gendered power dynamics employed by – an experience that may indeed prove to be a strategic asset in a war whose social construction and conduct are themselves . While much of international politics Freeland nonetheless works against the masculine grain in a pursuit of fair and just agreements and futures.

Contextualizing the Habituation of Freeland and Concluding Remarks

As this series continues to examine changes within President Zelenskyy’s inner circle in response to both Ukrainian domestic pressures and Russia’s growing attritional war strategy, I suggest that Freeland’s appointment as a voluntary Economic Advisor to Ukraine signals an awareness within Ukrainian leadership and its closest allies that responding to Russia’s attritional warfare in 2026 cannot be confined to military operations alone. No longer are we in an era where hard power capabilities are the only measure of a nation’s strength; the personal and personnel also matter.

Freeland will be an important figure to watch, particularly as it relates to dialogue between Ukrainian feminists and the pro-democracy movement – not because Freeland herself has expressed a desire to pursue a feminist agenda in Ukraine’s economic reconstruction, but because her presence reflects the often-implicit reality that gendered political experience shapes how the dynamics of endurance, credibility, and trust are produced and sustained in wartime economies. In a war of attrition, where authority is continuously reaffirmed under conditions of prolonged uncertainty, reputational attack, and economic strain, such situated experience becomes strategically relevant, I suggest, as a form of habituation to sustained delegitimization.

The notion of habituation draws from a long philosophical tradition – mostly commonly, Aristotelian ethics, where habituation (hexis) was used to refer to repeated exposure and practice from durable dispositions rather than momentary or instantaneous reaction. In contemporary political thought, philosophers and scholars inspired by phenomenologists such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty have upon this idea to explain how subjects develop capacities for political action through ongoing relational strain. In feminist ethics, habituation helps to explain how – often oppressed – actors learn to endure, navigate, and act within conditions of prolonged vulnerability, scrutiny, and marginalization over time. It moves beyond experience; it is an engaged and embodied vision and practice.

In an attritional war where legitimacy is not necessarily secured through fast-paced or singular victories but continually reproduced across various political, economic, and social structures, as well as through relations of alliance management and public trust, this mode of habituation takes on strategic significance. Indeed, for President Zelenskyy, it works in his favour to cultivate and incorporate actors habituated to sustained delegitimization because it acts as a shock absorber to the , partner unreliability in a so-called newly-founded “� world, and economic fatigue increasingly characterizing this phase of the war and ongoing occupation. The hope is that these hybrid shocks are absorbed by such a habituation without suffering from significant strategic drifts that may carry over into the battlefield.

, nations and militaries perceived to possess greater status and capabilities – that is, the greater of two powers – engage in warfare by attrition. Those familiar with Russia and the former Soviet Union’s historical record of aggression, occupation, interference, and war across Eastern Europe will also recognize this mode of warfare, perhaps all too familiarly. The Baltics, the Balkans, Poland, Chechnya, Georgia – they all know this playbook. The Russian Federation continues to seek what it perceives as its rightful seat at the table of great-power politics; even those of us who reject John J. Mearsheimer’s structuralist projections onto Eastern Europe as lying within a fixed Russian “sphere of influence� cannot ignore such an imperial desire percolating within the Russian state since the unipolar moment.

In attritional war, time is a previous resource. As Sun Tzu , prolonged conflict could be of great risk to either warring side, on account of exhausting the state apparatus, undermining domestic order and morale, and eroding strategic advantage; for him, military strategy was a subtle and complex technique whose success depended on minimizing the temporal risks and costs of war. While Sun Tzu viewed attritional war as a strategic failure, the work of military theorist and general requires us to remember that wars of attrition often emerge as a political condition over time, shaped by friction, uncertainty, and an overall inability to achieve decisive political outcomes. What Ukraine demonstrates to the international community, this series aims to show, is that Russia’s apparent great power strategy grounded in attrition – like empire itself – can burn out.

It is by sources close to both Freeland and Prime Minister Carney that Freeland received Zelenskyy’s offer on December 22nd, 2025; by December 24th, she had shared with the Prime Minister her intentions to leave Canadian parliament to join the Ukrainian team. In responding to the Kremlin’s continued war of attrition, concerns beyond immediate hard power capabilities, military strategy, and command structures must be addressed. Freeland possesses a unique form of habituation to sustain delegitimation; her appointment may indeed be an important shock absorber to Russia’s ongoing disinformation campaigns, American partner unreliability, and the economic fatigue increasingly characterizing this war.

At the level of a broader wartime strategy, I suggest this capacity can also function as a form of resilience; it signals to communities, civil society, international partners, and adversaries alike that broader Ukraine’s leadership is prepared to govern through a liminal phase of uncertain futurity rather than govern toward a rapid endpoint. This is a strategy in stark contrast to Putin’s assumption that a “quick military operation� could sweep Ukraine in 2022, or that , once elected, could end the war in Ukraine in the first 24-hours of his second term. In this sense, it is important to emphasize that habituation is not merely an individual trait or disposition, but also a culturally sedimented capacity that is experienced transnationally and relationally. As Gusieva has argued, cultural resilience constitutes a foundational pillar of security; indeed, classical realist how such resilience at times is what pushes a nation beyond survival towards victory. I extend this logic here by suggesting that such cultural resilience is forged through repeated exposure to, and embeddedness within, enduring imperial projects and traditionalist military practices – in this case, namely, Russia’s ongoing attempts to reclaim imperial-great power status, legitimate its occupations, and sustain attritional warfare alongside its hybrid threats towards Europe.

In Ukraine, cultural habituation operates as resilience, but it is neither neutral nor abstract; rather, its experience is deeply racialized, ethnicized, and gendered. It is racialized and ethnicized through the persistent positioning of the nation as materially peripheral to Europe while cast as subordinate to Russia’s so-called historical sphere of influence; it is gendered through the paternalizing narratives directed at Ukraine and other Eastern European states aspiring to EU membership, as well as in the recurring trope of Ukraine as the “little brother� to a masculinized “Mother Russia.� More specifically, we see this reproduced through the hegemonically masculine practices embodied by state actors in political negotiations of economic and security matters; these behaviours continue to structure much of how political negotiation, listening, and diplomatic exchange take place. Freeland, in this respect, is a node within a broader relational structure of habituation and diplomatic practice in wartime Ukraine – one whose own political endurance aligns with, and stands to reinforce, Ukraine’s culturally embedded capacity to govern through attrition.

Please stay tuned for the next installment of this series, which will analyze Ukraine’s 2025 energy scandal and subsequent political moves undertaken President Zelenskyy following a state investigation that exposed high-level embezzlement within the nation’s energy sector.

The post Habituation in War: The Appointment of Chrystia Freeland as a Node in Ukraine’s Attritional War Strategy appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

“The Black Sea in 2026: Strategic Maneuvers and Economic Opportunity” examines how the Black Sea has become one of the world’s most consequential geopolitical and economic corridors following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The brief analyzes the competing strategies of Russia, Türkiye, the European Union, and China, alongside the security concerns of littoral states, highlighting how control of the region shapes Ukraine’s future and broader transatlantic stability. It also outlines Canada’s growing role as a NATO partner in supporting regional security, trade resilience, and postwar reconstruction. The paper concludes with targeted policy recommendations for strengthening Canada–Ukraine cooperation and enhancing Black Sea security in a rapidly evolving strategic landscape.

To read the full policy brief prepared by Dr. Jeff Sahadeo, click the download button below.

The post The Black Sea in 2026: Strategic Manoeuvres and Economic Opportunity appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

After a contentious summit – one that saw European Union (EU) members divided on the future of funding to Ukraine as the war nears its fourth year – the EU has created a plan to secure an . This plan depends on using cash from secured capital markets, deviating from the to use frozen Russian assets. The summit comes at a time where and . While the EU’s major goal of securing a funding package was achieved, internal fractures are increasingly felt and spreading, with the discussion inflaming verbal attacks and disagreements between Hungary, Slovakia, and other EU members.

Risky or revolutionary?

The EU’s final iteration of its funding package comes as a much safer development from the Commission’s initial Reparations Loan. That initial package would have secured funding from since the start of the full-scale invasion. Days before the summit, the EU agreed to , which primarily belong to the Russian Central Bank, held through Euroclear. The Commission maintained there was no breach of ethics on account of the agreement not affecting the Russian Central Bank’s intellectual property and Euroclear would be bound to repay it. Despite this, the plan elicited heated controversy among EU members.

Strong opposition largely stems from Euroclear and Belgium – where the financial company is based. Euroclear’s concerns pertain to the international trust in the euro and the company itself; it also expressed concern that it may be undermined by what they deemed a “.� Belgium fears Russian retaliation through international courts. The and promised if the plan were to go ahead. Retaliation from Russia could also include various hybrid strategies such as cyberattacks, sabotage of critical infrastructure, or even drone incursions. Hungary and Slovakia have also opposed the plan. The two countries have become increasingly critical of EU sanctions against Russia due to their own political and energy connections and dependencies on the country. Both nations to indefinitely freeze Russian assets, eliminating their veto power. Prime Ministers and slammed the plan on social media, implying it betrays important normative and legal architecture of the European Union.

Ultimately, the Reparations Loan in its original form was not passed, with members saying it was “too complex� and politically risky to go through with now. The primary concern was that Belgium needed . This brought mixed reactions and the guarantees could not be met. The EU’s main strategic goal to avoid escalation with Russia also made this move too risky, with the threat of financial and legal repercussions too costly.

What’s next for Ukraine?

The loan will be based on , requiring Ukraine to pay it back once they begin receiving reparations after the war has ended. The current plan eases the burden for some struggling with financing Ukraine directly, while also not affecting the obligations of countries like . This guarantee also paved the way for these countries to support the loan, making the decision smoother. The loan will be used to support Ukraine’s financial needs, particularly for investing in Ukrainian defence technology and industry. The country has identified a need for additional funding beyond its current IMF program, calling for up to .

What does this say about the EU?

One thing that has become abundantly clear during the summit is the increasing fractures between members of the European Union regarding the war in Ukraine. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and its continued influence throughout Eastern Europe is beginning to sow real discord within the EU, proving to be an increasingly complex issue as the war rolls on. Currently, the EU has made several moves that mitigate the ability for countries that sympathize with Russia to disrupt aid to Ukraine; however, the new plan also gives a noteworthy “out� to these countries by allowing them not to contribute. Disagreements over the war are also combined with strong anti-bureaucratic and anti-EU rhetoric from leaders, who operate from a populist and, at times, illiberal base of governance. The EU will need to be vigilant and cautious about the influence and relationship to Russia that current member states have. The destabilization and weakening of the EU will be strategically advantageous to Russia, divisions that have already begun to exploit.

What will be interesting to see is how funding will evolve as time goes on. The EU . Will later developments prompt this risky move? Additionally, what will the reaction of Moscow be in these current conditions? It will be important to follow developments as they relate to renewed funding, as this could (re)invigorate either party and change future strategies and funding scenarios. Whether this will result in strategic pressures with positive outcomes or a further destabilization of the European continent, has yet to be seen.

The post EU Frozen Asset Plan appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.