Introduction

Since the 1970s, the European Economic Community (EEC)/European Union (EU) has sought to play a complementary role to the United States (US) in the pursuit of security and stability in the Middle East. This has occurred mostly through soft security measures: diplomacy; economic and financial aid to Palestinians; civilian missions focused on stability; and dialogue with Arab states. In this regard, it is worth mentioning the Euro-Arab Dialogue: a political and economic cooperation framework launched in 1974 between the EEC and the Arab League to strengthen the relationship between the parties after the Yom Kippur War and oil crisis. However, despite these efforts, the limits of the EU’s unique institutional set-up have prevented it from playing a major role in regional affairs. The ongoing war in the Gaza Strip between Israel and Hamas has highlighted the limits of the EU’s diplomatic action. In the meantime, President Donald Trump’s Peace Plan for Gaza has re-energized, once again, the role of the , prompting some to draw historical parallels to earlier US-brokered efforts – from Camp David to the failed Oslo Accords. What role could the EU play in the American plan? How can its involvement be decisive to achieve a just and lasting peace in the region?

Context

The 2006 electoral victory of Hamas in the Gaza Strip led to a severe escalation with Israel. With Hamas taking over the territory from the Fatah-controlled Palestinian Authority (PA), Israel considered the Palestinian military group a security threat, as it refused to recognize the Jewish state, renounce violence, or accept previous peace agreements brokered by the PA and Israel. Hamas’ accession to power in 2006 constituted a critical historical juncture that transformed governance in Gaza and its overall relationship with Israel. This shift was accompanied by the return of a range of familiar political practices – including diplomatic negotiations, economic sanctions, and ongoing military engagement – that continue to define this governance period.

In the meantime, two other factors made the relationship between the parties more strained. On the one hand, on November 29, 2012, the , which upgraded Palestine from a “non-member observer entity” to a “non-member observer State.” This historic vote granted Palestine implicit recognition of statehood and was seen as a move to revive the two-state solution, a move strongly opposed by the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. On the other hand, the US-brokered Abraham Accords were signed in 2020, aiming to normalize diplomatic, economic, and security relations between Israel and several Arab nations (including the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan). Palestinians overwhelmingly opposed the Abraham Accords, perceiving the agreements as an abandonment of the long-standing consensus among Arab states that negotiations with Israel were contingent on ending occupation.

On October 7, 2023, Hamas initiated an attack on Israel. . The Israeli response was a full-scale military invasion of the Gaza Strip which, by December 2025, has killed 71,266 Palestinians, left most schools and hospitals in ruins, and caused long-term damage to the local society and economy.

The EU’s response to Gaza was characterized by contradictions and divisions between its member states. Some countries such as Czech Republic, Austria, Hungary, Italy, and Germany, stood with Israel, backing its military campaign and avoiding criticism of Netanyahu’s regime. Other governments, such as Belgium, Spain, France and Ireland – while strongly condemning Hamas – called for a ceasefire and criticized Israel for violating international humanitarian law. These differing positions prevented the EU from having a coordinated stance at the UN when voting on a on December 12, 2023, which called for a humanitarian ceasefire.

Divergencies appeared not only between member states but also across EU institutions. While European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen showed a stronger emphasis on Israel’s right to defence, the European Council issued a more cautious joint statement aimed at highlighting the EU as a unified voice. The statement took a more neutral tone than President von der Leyen, emphasizing both Israel’s right to defence as well as the crucial need for humanitarian aid, civilian protection, and adherence to international law. A third voice, EU’s foreign policy chief Josep Borrell, was more critical of Israel, . The inertia resulting from lack of consensus among member states and across institutions severely undermines the EU’s position as mediator, letting the Americans play a leading role once again.

On September 29, 2025, President Trump announced his plan to “end the Gaza war” and address the broader Middle Eastern crisis. The so-called was negotiated with the consultation of Arab states, namely Egypt, Qatar and Türkiye. The EU played no formal role in the negotiations; it made no proposals of its own, despite being both a major donor to Palestine and an important partner of Israel.

Endorsed by UN Security Council , Trump’s plan includes the deployment of an International Stabilization Force (ISF) in Gaza, a multinational military body that will ensure the demilitarization and security of the Gaza Strip; and the creation of a Board of Peace (BoP), a committee led by Trump that will oversee the political transition in Gaza until a reformed Palestinian Authority can take over governance in 2027. Formally launched at the 56th World Economic Forum in January 2026, the BoP claims its main purpose is the promotion of peacekeeping all around the world, not only in Gaza. Countries wishing to participate in the BoP are required to contribute US$1 billion to the organization to renew their membership, and Trump, as its chairman, is not subject to term limits, holding the sole authority to nominate his successor.

to ending the war in Gaza; however, many EU member states have expressed concern over the possibility of the BoP overshadowing the role of the UN. Currently, Bulgaria and Hungary are the only two EU countries to have joined the initiative. France, Spain, Poland, and Germany declined to participate, while Italy, Romania, Greece and Cyprus joined as observers. The EU Commission also decided to join as an observer, sending the Commissioner for the Mediterranean, Dubravka Šuica, to Washington, DC, to attend the inaugural meeting of the BoP on February 19, 2026. In a sign of continued disunity, , calling it a “mistake”, as the EU supports a two-state solution and “cannot participate” in any body that excludes the Palestinian National Authority.

Problems

Even if Trump’s plan represents an important step towards a peace deal, it contains critical aspects which might hinder its implementation. The current plan effectively grants Israel a veto power over peace, as its military redeployments are conditioned on Hamas’ demilitarization and reform of the PA. At the same time, Israel is not required to make any formal commitments towards halting settlement expansion in the West Bank or respecting the autonomy of a Palestinian state. On this issue Israel’s stance is clear: Netanyahu declared that , as it is an “existential threat to Israel.” Therefore, there is a real risk that, without guarantees for the Palestinian people and a plan to address occupation, Trump’s plan may fail or lead to an unjust and unstable peace agreement that steamrolls Palestinian rights and territories recognized by international law.

On the other hand, Trump’s peace plan has confirmed that the US continues to play a . However, some , such as Francesca Albanese, Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian Occupied Territory, criticized the plan. UN Special Adviser on Sustainability, Jeffrey Sachs, labelled the US proposal as “.” According to them, Trump is behaving in Gaza like a 19th-century colonial broker, placing himself at the helm of the BoP to oversee a foreign territory’s governance, with the overall aim of advancing US interests in the region. The Middle East has figured prominently in the first and second Trump administrations’ foreign policy. President Trump’s main goal is to broker agreements between Israel and other Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, to . This attitude could prove counterproductive and place EU interests at risk.

Strategic Outlook and Policy Recommendations

A more active role of the EU in the region is necessary to guarantee success and counter risks of instability, which may have severe implications for European security, including energy supply limitations, new security threats, and an increase of migration and refugee flows. It is in the EU’s interest to enhance its influence in the region. What practical steps should the EU take to avoid marginalization and make a meaningful contribution to peace?

1. The EU should consider holding an enhanced observer status at the BoP as a necessary counterweight to US and Israeli pressures and hegemony in decision-making. Of course, the EU has to maintain a steadfast commitment to strengthening and reforming the UN, confirming it as the core of a rules-based international order and multilateralism. However, enhanced observer status at the BoP could allow the EU to monitor negotiations and participate in debates specifically devoted to making interventions, peace proposals, and amendments. The presence of the EU, with its traditional concern for Palestinian issues, could ensure meaningful Palestinian involvement. This is fundamental to legitimate the transitory governance of the Gaza Strip and preserve Palestinian decision-making power. A more active EU at BoP could also contribute to reforming the PA.

The divergences between member states and across EU institutions negatively impact the EU’s international role. Therefore, the EU should take a cohesive stance on its participation at the BoP, bearing in mind some key arguments. Firstly, “” provides direct insight into how decisions are implemented, serving as a channel for influence. The EU is the largest donor to Palestinian recovery and its involvement in the BoP could help the EU shape outcomes rather than merely fund them, aligning its significant financial contributions with the necessary humanitarian, governance, and security strands of the peace plan. Moreover, “” is vital for influencing the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2803.

2. The EU should be part of the International Security Force. Together with The European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) Rafah Mission and EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS), involvement in the ISF could contribute to the maintenance of the ceasefire. Participation in the ISF could enhance European influence on Israel, for example, by convincing the Israeli government to review its settlement policy and improve living conditions for the Palestinians.

3. The EU should use economic and financial tools to enhance its political influence. On the Palestinian side, the European Commission recently . On the Israeli side, the EU should overcome its reluctances and suspend the EU-Israel Association Agreement if the Israeli government continues to violate human rights in Gaza, as required by Article 2 of the Agreement. The suspension of this Agreement could influence Israel to respect the , following preliminary rulings about a “plausible” genocide occurring in Gaza. The EU could link Israeli participation in EU funding programs, such as Horizon Europe, to the full withdrawal from Gaza, the end of settlements in the West Bank, and apartheid policy against Palestinians.

4. The EU should invest in the implementation of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), an economic initiative designed to enhance connectivity and integration between Asia, the Middle East, and Europe, based on three pillars: energy, transportation, and digital connectivity. IMEC should be a core interest for Europeans, as it , increasing political and economic ties between participating counties. Moreover, it could enhance the EU’s political influence in the area, counterbalancing China and the US. The implementation of some projects as part of the IMEC – such as the EastMed Gas Pipeline – could make the EU a relevant player in terms of future economic cooperation projects, allowing it to increase its weight in the Middle East peace process.

The EU could influence, for example, the implementation of the so-called “Green Blue Deal” between Jordan and Israel, which provides for the supply of water from Israel in exchange for Jordanian supplies of solar power. The Gaza war stopped the project, but the ceasefire created hope that it may be relaunched in such a way that the Gaza Strip and the West Bank can also benefit from it.

Conclusion

While the US commitment has been the sine qua non for a ceasefire in Gaza, the EU holds key cards to ensure the successful implementation of Trump’s peace plan. With its traditional regional approach, a more active observer role of the EU in the BoP and its participation in the ISF could balance American – and Israeli – influence and ensure a more equitable peace solution. In doing so, it may also help ensure that Palestinian rights recognized by international law are considered against the backdrop of ongoing ceasefire and conflict negotiations. In addition, the use of economic leverage as well as the implementation of the IMEC corridor could enhance the EU political weight in the area, preventing the dawn of a new era of regional instability and insecurity with direct impact on Europe itself.

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Executive Summary:

Russia’s war against Ukraine is also a struggle about public interpretation. NATO members have responded to Russia’s full-scale invasion through sanctions, military aid, deterrence, and diplomatic efforts. These actions depend on the public understanding that Russia is the aggressor, Ukraine is the victim of an illegal invasion, and support for Ukraine is important for European and transatlantic security. Russia’s counter-narrative seeks to weaken this consensus view by claiming that Ukraine, NATO, the US, or the West provoked the war.

Drawing on , with a Canada-focused analysis, as initially outlined at �Ӱ�ԭ�� University’s 2026 Eastern European and Transatlantic Network conference, this brief argues that trust in NATO is central to how citizens interpret responsibility for the war. Canadian public opinion remains strongly aligned with the core NATO narrative: most Canadians blame Russia, while only a small minority blame the West. Yet this minority is not randomly distributed. Canadians who do not trust NATO are significantly more likely to accept the narrative that the West provoked the war, while Canadians who trust NATO are much more likely to blame Russia.

The implication is straightforward: countering disinformation is not only about correcting false claims after they spread. It is also about sustaining public trust in the institutions whose messages compete with adversaries’ propaganda and misinformation. For Canada and its NATO Allies, trust in NATO should therefore be treated as a security resource — one that requires proactive prebunking, clearer explanations of NATO’s relevance to Canadian security, and a wider network of trusted messengers.

Introduction: The Narrative Dimension of the War in Ukraine

NATO countries responded to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 through military, economic, and diplomatic means and pressure. However, this support also sparked an ongoing discussion about how and why this war erupted. The core NATO narrative is straightforward: Russia is the aggressor, Ukraine is the victim of an unlawful and unprovoked invasion, and allied support for Ukraine is necessary for European and transatlantic security. The main Kremlin counter-narrative tells a different story: Ukraine, NATO, the United States, or “the West” provoked the war, leaving Russia no choice but to invade in order to protect its so-called historical sphere of influence.

This ongoing contest matters because it can affect whether citizens support sanctions, weapons deliveries, refugee assistance, defense spending, and long-term deterrence measures taken by their countries and NATO. If the public believes that Russia caused the war, continued support for Ukraine and NATO cohesion becomes easier to sustain. If the public believes that NATO or the West provoked the war, allied policy aimed at countering Russia can appear reckless, hypocritical, or needlessly escalatory.

Much of the discussion about Russian information operations focuses on the supply side. It aims to address threats posed by, for example, Russian propaganda, falsehoods, and electoral and other interference, across different channels and platforms. These are important. , a foreign disinformation detection institution, defines foreign information manipulation and interference as “intentional and coordinated efforts by state or non-state actors to alter information in pursuit of political, security, or other strategic objectives.” But supply alone does not explain why people in Canada and other countries believe one competing strategic narrative over another.

This brief, therefore, focuses on the demand side of strategic narrative reception. Why are some citizens more receptive to the Kremlin’s West-blame narrative while others accept the NATO narrative that Russia caused the war? Findings from suggest that people tend to rely on trust in the messenger as a shortcut to plausibility. When they trust NATO, they also tend to trust its messaging. When they distrust NATO, those same explanations are easier to dismiss as propaganda, spin, or elite messaging.

Strategic Narratives and the Credibility of the Narrator

Strategic narratives are stories that countries tell to “win the story” as they frame issues, advance their goals, and convince others of the righteousness of their actions in global affairs. Strategic narratives identify heroes and villains, assign blame, explain crises, and justify policy choices. In the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine, narratives about the origins of the war are especially important because they can and do shape policy debates. If Russia is understood as the aggressor, then sanctions, deterrence, and military assistance to Ukraine follow logically. If NATO is understood as the provocateur, then those same policies can be framed as a dangerous escalation.

Narratives succeed not only because of repetition or exposure. They also depend on the narrator’s perceived credibility. Citizens do not evaluate every claim from scratch; they use their trust in the messenger as a cognitive shortcut that, especially when multiple competing narratives are present, is more likely to lead them to accept or reject the story in question.

This is why fact-checking and rebuttals of malign information, while necessary, are not sufficient. The consensus recommendations in emphasize that corrections are most effective when they are clear, credible, and accompanied by an alternative explanation. However, both this handbook and our research suggest that to increase the likelihood that the audience accepts the debunking, the audience should hold a positive view of the messenger. When trust is low, the same corrections can be rejected as self-interested messaging. In practice, “truth” often competes with “trusted.”

The policy implication is that institutional credibility is neither a soft nor a secondary issue. It is part of democratic resilience. explicitly identifies resilience as central to its ability to deter and defend. While NATO’s deterrent posture depends on military capabilities, we should also keep in mind that the Alliance also depends on public support for the political choices that make deterrence credible. If hostile information operations can weaken trust in the institutions that explain and justify allied policy, they can complicate democratic decision-making even without changing facts on the ground.

Evidence from the Survey: Canada as a High-Trust but Still Vulnerable Case

The empirical evidence for this brief comes from the . The survey asked respondents who they believe caused the war in Ukraine and measured trust in NATO, the EU, and domestic institutions.

Figure 1: Public Trust in NATO across Alliance Countries

Canada is a useful case because public alignment with the core NATO narrative is strong overall. In the Canadian sample, approximately 84% of respondents blame Russia for the war, while only about 8% blame the West. Around 60% of reports trust NATO. This suggests that Kremin’s West-blame narrative has not received much traction in Canada.

Yet the Canadian data also show why overconfidence would be a mistake. West-blame beliefs are not evenly distributed. They are concentrated among respondents who do not trust NATO. For Canadians who trust NATO, only about 4% blame the West. Among those who do not trust NATO, the figure rises to about 15%. Similarly, about 90% of Canadians who trust NATO blame Russia, compared to about 74% among those who do not trust NATO.

Figure 2: Canadian Trust in NATO and Blame Attribution for the War in Ukraine

The full Canadian results reinforce this pattern. Controlling for socio-demographic factors, trust in NATO is strongly associated with blaming Russia for the war and strongly negatively associated with blaming the West. Other socio-demographic and attitudinal factors also matter, but the clearest and most policy-relevant pattern is the relationship between trust in NATO and blame attribution.

This does not mean that distrust in NATO automatically translates into pro-Kremlin beliefs. The relationship may run in both directions. Some citizens may distrust NATO and therefore reject NATO’s account of the war. Others may become less trusting of NATO after consuming information critical of it. Both processes could occur simultaneously. For policy purposes, however, the direction is less important than the vulnerability itself. Where trust in NATO is lower, NATO’s messages are less likely to be heard, and adversarial narratives are more likely to find receptive audiences.

Why This Matters for Canada

For Canada, the findings are directly relevant as it is an active player in Europe and, increasingly, the Arctic. Through , Canada has played a leading role in NATO’s presence in Latvia and on the Alliance’s eastern flank. Canada’s security interests extend to the Arctic, cyber defence, democratic resilience, and the protection of a rules-based order that is directly challenged by Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. In the Arctic, however, security communication must also include Inuit and other Indigenous communities as central stakeholders, since their knowledge, rights, livelihoods, and local security concerns are directly affected by how Canada defines and communicates its northern defence priorities.

Moreover, NATO can still feel abstract to many Canadians. It may appear distant, bureaucratic, European, or not sufficiently in Canada’s interests. When NATO is understood mainly as a Brussels-based security organization, it is easier for adversaries to portray it as “out-of-touch” with the average Canadian. When NATO is understood as Canadian soldiers in Latvia for the purposes of preventing a wider war, as Arctic deterrence, as cyber cooperation, and as a framework that helps prevent wider war, its relevance to Canada and Canadians is strengthened.

The challenge is not simply to tell Canadians that NATO matters; it is to show how NATO strengthens Canadian security and Canada’s international role. This is particularly important as allied governments ask the public to support higher defense spending, long-term military assistance to Ukraine, and sustained deterrence. These policies require political endurance, and political endurance depends on public trust. For example, Canada’s broader efforts against foreign information manipulation and interference could connect more directly to strategic communication about NATO. Monitoring hostile narratives, exposing coordinated manipulation, and working with platforms remain necessary. However, Canada’s counter-disinformation strategy should also focus on credibility-building to increase the likelihood that its messages will resonate better with the public. This means transparency, consistency, local relevance, and messengers who can reach audiences that may not respond to official statements.

For example, Canada’s broader efforts against could connect more directly to strategic communication about NATO. Monitoring hostile narratives, exposing coordinated manipulation, and working with platforms remain necessary. However, Canada’s counter-disinformation strategy should also focus on credibility-building to increase the likelihood that its messages will resonate better with the public. This means transparency, consistency, local relevance, and messengers who can reach audiences that may not respond to official statements.

Why Rebuttals and Takedowns Are Not Enough

Democratic governments often respond to disinformation with three main tools: exposure, removal, and correction. They identify false claims, work to take them down if possible, and post factual rebuttals. These tools are important, but they tend to be reactive. By the time a false narrative has spread widely, corrections may reach only a fraction of the original audience. Also, in instances where people do not trust the institutions or organizations taking up the correcting, attempts to take down false narratives could reinforce distrust and suspicion. Studies on and show that it helps to anticipate and address manipulation techniques before people encounter them.

It may be helpful to supplement existing debunking efforts with more prebunking, building societal resistance to misinformation, and strengthening trust in NATO and similar institutions. Experimental research by show that short interventions aimed at informing people about common manipulation tactics used by hostile actors can increase resilience to misinformation. For example, before a major NATO summit, Ukrainian aid package, or deployment decision, Canadian and allied communicators can anticipate predictable claims that NATO provoked the war, Ukraine is merely a proxy, or Canada is paying for Europe’s war. Rather than waiting for these claims to circulate, Canadian and NATO communicators could explain in advance why they are misleading and how they fit into a broader Russian narrative strategy aimed at dividing and weakening Canada and NATO. This approach should be simple and delivered by trusted voices. It should avoid overly technical language.

At the same time, NATO and Canadian institutions need to avoid communicating only during crises. Trust building takes time and patience. If the public learns about the role and benefits of NATO membership only when leaders are seeking support for a given initiative, they may view such communication with suspicion.

Policy Recommendations

1. Treat trust as an early-warning indicator

Canada already monitors foreign information manipulation and interference and conducts public opinion research on security issues. Canada and its Allies should monitor public trust in NATO and other key security institutions as part of democratic resilience planning. Public opinion polls should ask respondents whether they trust NATO, the Canadian government, and similar institutions. Declining trust should be treated as an early warning indicator that more outreach is needed to reduce susceptibility to adversarial information warfare.

2. Institutionalize prebunking before predictable narrative attacks

More attention should be paid to prebunking at moments when adversarial information warfare is likely to escalate (e.g., predictable narrative attacks). Among others, such events likely include NATO summits, defense spending announcements, Ukraine aid package announcements, troop deployments abroad, and elections in allied countries. Communicators should prepare short, accessible materials that explain both the facts and the manipulation techniques adversaries are likely to use. Such efforts should be coordinated by the Canadian government, NATO allies, and other communicators to increase narrative resilience before hostile narratives reach NATO audiences.

3. Make NATO concrete in Canadian public communication

Conduct public information campaigns aimed at explaining the benefits of NATO membership and consistently connecting them to Canadian security interests. Such a campaign could use specific examples to emphasize NATO’s relevance by highlighting its leadership in Latvia, its role in Arctic security, its cyber defense capabilities, and its efforts to prevent a wider war in Europe, among others. Such communication should also be transparent about trade-offs, given legitimate questions about rising defense spending and the implications of Canada’s growing involvement in European deterrence initiatives. Credible communication should not avoid taking on difficult questions directly — in fact, addressing them should help with building trust.

4. Expand the trusted messenger network

Canada already supports public outreach initiatives aimed at countering disinformation and promoting democratic resilience. Such work should be extended to matters surrounding NATO and its work. Since government and NATO officials may not always be the most trusted communicators, Canada should aim to work with a wide network of credible messengers, including veterans, reservists, military families, educators, local officials, Ukrainian and Eastern European diaspora communities, Indigenous and northern voices on Arctic security, and independent scholars. Using such goodwill ambassadors should help key messages reach individuals across different local and social contexts. This could be a way to reach audiences distrustful of political elites.

Conclusion: Trust as Democratic Deterrence

The full-scale invasion in Ukraine highlighted that deterrence requires military capability, political will, and social resilience. Part of Russia’s challenges to NATO is represented by its hostile information operations. Moscow does not want NATO to admire Russia – it only needs enough citizens to doubt NATO’s reliability, blame the West for the invasion of Ukraine, oppose support, or lose confidence that allied institutions are telling the truth.

The Canadian evidence presented here offers both reassurance and warning — and policy recommendations outlined here aim to strengthen Canada’s broader democratic resilience. Most Canadians blame Russia for the war, and the Kremlin’s West-blame narrative remains a minority view. But that minority is meaningfully larger among those who do not trust NATO. Increasing trust in NATO, in turn, would require ongoing attention to informational campaigns aimed at raising public understanding of why and how the Alliance matters.

The post Canada and Allies Cannot Win the Information War if Their Populations Do Not Trust NATO appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

Introduction

��For the first time since 1972,��when��SALT I negotiations yielded the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the Interim Agreement on offensive arms, the strategic relationship between Washington and Moscow is entirely unconstrained by a legal framework.��.��As the current normative vacuum is unprecedented in the modern era, the��North Atlantic Treaty��Organization��(NATO)��Alliance faces��a new ‘strategic trilemma’:��the simultaneous and often contradictory imperatives��of maintaining credible extended deterrence;��enhancing conventional defence against hybrid and missile threats;��and reconstructing a confidence-building, risk-reduction framework to prevent accidental escalation. The central policy problem is that the traditional tools of strategic stability��– quantitative and qualitative ceilings, inspections, and transparency��–��have been discarded in favour of vertical��nuclear��proliferation. NATO must navigate an environment where��the absence of constraints increases the risk of miscalculations, potentially leading to an unmanaged arms race that reduces the security��for all��NATO Allies.����

Context: The Long Transition and the Paradox of the New START��

The��international��arms control regime, which persisted through various systemic shifts from 1972 until 2026, has finally fractured. However, a rigorous assessment��of its lifespan��suggests that the final pillar of this regime,��the New START,��was already flawed.����This omission allowed Moscow to channel its modernization efforts toward lethal, MIRV-capable systems,��while remaining formally��compliant to��the treaty limit of 1,550 warheads.��,��Moscow’s Strategic��Rocket��Forces (RVSN) and the missile industry exploited this normative��‘shield’��to initiate a massive��‘re-MIRVing’��process. This modernization was driven by a����within the Russian military-industrial complex. By focusing on systems that exploited New START’s qualitative loopholes, institutional actors, such as the��, secured long-term funding and development pathways for a new generation of delivery vehicles. This momentum��facilitated��the emergence of a direct nexus between treaty-compliant modernization and the later deployment of advanced long-range capabilities on the Ukrainian battlefield.��

The Strategic Trilemma between Extended Deterrence and the ‘Upload’ Disparity��

The end of New START has transformed the re-MIRVing process into a catalyst for a new arms race. In this new unconstrained environment, the US possesses a significant technical advantage. . If the US opts to utilize its technological edge, it would effectively out-deploy Moscow, potentially doubling its arsenal to levels above the failed treaty’s limits.  In response, Moscow may prioritize asymmetrical offset centred on long-range theatre strike capabilities. This likely reaction is deeply rooted in the bureaucratic momentum of Russian military-industrial complex, favouring dual capable systems that operate in regulatory grey zones.   

Defence, Resilience, and the Hypersonic Decision Gap

��Unlike traditional��ICBMs, which allow for a 25-plus minutes warning window, a hypersonic system launched from central Europe can reach critical command nodes in Moscow in less than 10 minutes. This����in decision time undermines de-escalatory signalling and places����on the adversary’s early warning systems, potentially triggering automated ‘launch on warning’ responses. Even a conventional strike on communications, command-and-control (C3) centres would be strategically relevant. Therefore,��the deployment of such systems in substantial numbers would create a ‘launch-on-warning’ incentive for Moscow, further destabilizing the offensive-defensive��balance and increasing the risk of automated nuclear response.����

Managing Uncertainty��in a Multipolar System��

Emerging from a Cold War environment coalesced around a bipolar international power-distribution, traditional arms control has proven ill-suited for the asymmetrical, multipolar international disorder of the last two decades.  In a world without inspections, stability depends on predictability. To achieve this goal, the international community must work to prevent accidental escalation through transparency and launch notifications. The reconstruction of a stabilizing framework is currently stymied by two primary structural hurdles: Russia’s current lack of trustworthiness and China’s strategic intentions.  

The main obstacle to reopening dialogue with Russia is the paradox of negotiating limits on the same systems being employed in the current war in Ukraine. It would be politically fraught for the US to engage in fresh negotiations, while Russia utilizes these assets as tool of active coercion and battlefield destruction. . This move puts Washington in an uneasy negotiating position, forcing it to negotiate over assets that France and the United Kingdom (UK) consider non-negotiable. This is hardly a novel tactic:  Putin’s proposal risks to exacerbate infra-systemic fault lines, foster suspects of decoupling, and ‘fears of abandonment’ between the US and its European Allies. Simultaneously, China’s strategic stalling (and its own ambitions to increase its arsenal) prevents the necessary transition toward a trilateral framework. By hiding behind the rhetoric of minimal deterrence, Beijing refuses to accept any oversight while rapidly expanding its nuclear and conventional inventory.  

While the American and Russian nuclear stockpiles greatly exceed those of all other nuclear-weapon states, the strategic equation has irrevocably shifted from a bipolar to a multipolar calculus through China’s ambitions to drastically increase its own arsenal.  These missiles provide Beijing with a high-precision, non-nuclear capability to hold regional strategic assets in the mire, including forward air bases, carrier strike groups, and command-and-control (C2) nodes.  This scenario of ‘conventional entanglement’ complicates the global force posture of NATO’s primary security provider, the US.   

Technological Acceleration: The AI-Hypersonic Nexus��

The ‘Strategic Trilemma’ is further complicated by the integration of����and launch-control systems. As the����through the deployment of Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs), the decision-making window for political leaders has shrunk from thirty minutes to mere seconds.��.��However, the ‘black-box’ nature of neural network-based AI introduces unprecedented��. Because these models recognize patterns in ways that are non-replicable and often incomprehensible to human operators, they are prone to hallucinations or false positives – interpreting unusual atmospheric phenomena or cyber-spoofing as an incoming strike. In a strategic environment dominated by fast-flying systems like the��Dark Eagle��or��Oreshnik, the reliance on AI-driven recommendations could lead to a ‘compressed escalation’ where a machine��initiates��a retaliatory strike before human deliberation even occurs. This technological entanglement��necessitates��that any future��arms��control negotiations must deal not only with warheads and delivery systems, but also with the algorithms governing their employment.����

The Shift towards Integrated Deterrence��

In response to this acceleration, NATO has transitioned toward a posture of integrated deterrence. With the expiration of New START in sight, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) moved to solidify the Alliance’s defensive architecture.  This strategic shift was codified on February 12, 2026, when several NATO Allies launched  to develop next-generation sensors designated to counter ballistic and hypersonic threats (like the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS)). These initiatives, alongside a new  for drone-based deep precision strike capability, signal a move away from static, treaty-based stability, toward a dynamic denial posture. Furthermore, the  reinforces this approach by emphasizing trans-regional deterrence, acknowledging that while NATO remains a regional alliance, its security is inextricably tied to the ‘two-peer’ challenge.  

Policy Recommendations:����

1. Rediscover a dual approach: Combine military modernization with a standing��negotiating��offer��to both Russia and��China��on Strategic Stability Dialogue,��which would��likely benefit��NATO��Alliance cohesion by reassuring the most risk-adverse NATO��member��states.����

2. Prioritize Qualitative Limits: Advocate for a Multilateral MIRV-freeze to mitigate first-strike incentives and neutralize the advantage of rapid uploading.����In the post-START environment, the primary risk is no longer aggregate warheads counts, but the rapid surge��in��capacity,��afforded by US upload potential and Russia’s modernization of MIRV-capable systems.��A ‘freeze’ approach would be aimed at neutralizing the perceived advantages of rapid arsenal expansion, signalling a commitment to strategic sufficiency rather than the��reckless��pursuit of superiority.����

3. Establish��‘Cold War��Plus’��Communication Channels: Strengthen secure, real-time links between military headquarters to manage crisis in an era of hypersonic weapons.��NATO should strengthen secure, real-time links between military headquarters – specifically��the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)��and the Russian Ministry of Defence – to manage crisis in an era defined by HGVs. These channels must be hardened against cyber-interferences and electronic warfare to ensure they��remain��viable��during high-intensity grey zone friction or hybrid confrontations.����

4. Manage AI Integration in Command and Control:��Establish��‘human-in-the-loop’ standards between launch commands and early warning systems to��prevent��AI��systems��from triggering accidental escalation during high-speed hypersonic encounters.��While AI may become indispensable for processing massive data streams from next-generation��sensors like the HBTSS, it must never��possess��the autonomous authority to��initiate��a response. Hence, the��NATO��Alliance should champion an international protocol that mandates��a ‘’ for human commanders, even in high-speed hypersonic confrontations.��

5. Define a Clear Doctrine for Conventional Hypersonic: Clarify that systems like��Dark Eagle��are for��,��while acknowledging that����remains��inherently destabilizing.��NATO should explicitly disavow ‘decapitation’ or strategic nuclear roles for these assets to reduce the risk of Russia misperceiving conventional precision strikes as existential threats to its��C2��architecture.��

6. Strengthen Hybrid Resilience: Protect undersea and digital infrastructure as a core��component��of strategic stability to prevent��hybrid,��non-kinetic bypassing of deterrence.��By neutralizing low-cost, high-impact hybrid threats, the��NATO��Alliance prevents adversaries from bypassing deterrence thresholds��and undermining stability at the lowest level of the escalation ladder. This approach ensures that the emerging new capabilities in air, missile, and drone-defence would not be��compromised��by asymmetric disruption aimed at eroding domestic resilience and political will during a crisis.����

The post Strategic Stability in Flux: Can NATO Balance Deterrence, Defence, and Arms Control in a New Missile Age? appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

Introduction

In 2025, the United States (US)-Türkiye relationship moved beyond the traditional logic of NATO Alliance cohesion and entered a phase of strategic bargaining. Once anchored almost exclusively in NATO solidarity and Cold War–era security imperatives, bilateral ties between the nations are now being increasingly shaped by two defining and interconnected issues: Türkiye’s calibrated position on the war in Ukraine and its growing relevance in the geopolitics of rare earth elements and critical minerals.¹ These dynamics reflect a broader transformation of the international system and intra-alliance dynamics in which great power competition, fragmented supply chains, and regional autonomy are increasingly overriding ideological alignment.  

For Washington, Türkiye remains indispensable but unreliable; for Ankara, the US is a necessary but constraining partner. The challenge for both sides is how to construct a functional partnership that accommodates a divergence of alignment while still delivering strategic value. Rare earth elements and Türkiye’s role in Ukraine offer precisely such a framework: material, interest-based, and adaptable to a world defined by competition with Russia and China. 

Türkiye, Ukraine, and the Logic of Strategic Autonomy��

Türkiye’s response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has crystallized its broader foreign policy doctrine. Ankara condemned the invasion, supported Ukraine’s territorial integrity, supplied Kyiv with military equipment, and closed the Turkish Straits to military traffic under the Montreux Convention. At the same time, it refused to impose sanctions on Russia and preserved energy, trade, and diplomatic ties with Moscow. 

This approach is often described in Washington as “” but from Ankara’s perspective, it is a rational expression of strategic autonomy.&�Բ�����;��ü���쾱���&�Բ�����;views the war not only as a European security crisis but also a  with direct implications for its own stability, energy security, and economic resilience. Full alignment with Western sanctions would expose Türkiye to severe economic costs, exacerbate inflation, and jeopardize energy supplies, while full alignment with Russia would undermine its role in NATO. 

Türkiye’s early mediation efforts following the invasion of Ukraine have reinforced its self-image as an indispensable intermediary between Russia and the West. Unlike most NATO Allies, Ankara retains the ability to communicate credibly with both sides. For the US, this role is double-edged: it dilutes Alliance discipline but preserves a diplomatic channel with Russia that would otherwise not exist. 

US Expectations and Limits of Alliance Discipline��

Throughout the second Trump presidency, the US has viewed the war in Ukraine less as a fundamental test of the rules-based international order and more as a measure of Allied burden-sharing and loyalty to US interests. Washington’s discard of normative alignment and expectations of tangible demonstrations of support carries deep implications for Türkiye that benefits substantially from NATO security guarantees. In this context, Ankara’s refusal to impose sanctions on Russia and its continued economic engagement with Moscow are not seen as violations of shared principles, but rather as opportunistic behaviour that undermines NATO cohesion and reinforces perceptions of Allies ‘freeloading’ off US protection. 

Yet, these expectations reflect an older model of Alliance behaviour that is increasingly difficult to sustain. In a multipolar system, medium powers like Türkiye are less willing to subordinate their interests to bloc politics. Ankara’s behaviour in Ukraine is not an anomaly but a signal of how smaller and middle powers navigate systemic competition: hedging, mediating, and extracting leverage from multiple relationships simultaneously. 

This suggests that pressuring the Turkish government into full alignment may be counterproductive. Excessive coercion risks accelerating Ankara’s drift toward alternative partnerships, while reducing US influence over Turkish strategic choices. The challenge for Washington, therefore, is not to put an end to Turkish autonomy, but to channel it toward outcomes compatible with US interests. 

Rare Earth��Elements��and the New Geopolitics of Supply Chains��

In October 2025, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced that Türkiye had identified the world’s second largest reserve of rare earth elements, containing an estimated 694 million tons of mineral resources in Beylikova, located in northwestern Türkiye. The discovery includes .&�Բ�����;��ü���쾱���&�Բ�����; developing rare-earth reserves in western Anatolia with the US after similar talks with China and Russia were halted amid disagreements over control; it is also engaging with  on potential cooperation. Türkiye plans on building a refinery in Beylikova, which contains ore with more than 1% rare-earth oxide by weight.  In addition, Ankara plans to apply to the Australian Institute of Geoscientists for certification under the JORC Code, which sets minimum standards for how companies publicly report exploration results and would reveal the size of deposits for potential investors. 

Ankara’s talks with Western partners come as the US and the European Union (EU) step up efforts to reduce China’s dominance in the production and processing of rare earth elements. The Turkish government has sought to balance its ties with both the West and China amid growing global trade tensions. In September 2025, Türkiye joined a  led by the US and EU aimed at diversifying critical mineral supply chains; however, it has also been offered partner-country status to the BRICS group of emerging-market powers and attracted Chinese investment in electric vehicle production. In 2026, the EU  a new agreement with US and Japan to cooperate on critical raw materials supply chains.  

It is within this context that rare earth elements and critical minerals acquire strategic significance. The global competition over rare earth elements has become a central front in US-China geopolitical rivalry. China’s dominant position across extraction, processing, and downstream manufacturing of these elements represents a structural vulnerability for the US and its partners. For Ankara, cooperation supports its goal of moving up the global value chain, reducing reliance on external suppliers, and strengthening its role in strategic industries, such as defense systems, medical technologies, and consumer electronics. For Washington, Türkiye represents a politically and geographically viable partner in efforts to diversify supply chains for key technological and defence products while reducing dependence on China without concentrating production in a limited number of partner countries. 

Diversifying supply chains is therefore a national security imperative and Türkiye is increasingly relevant for three reasons: firstly, it possesses geological potential for rare earth elements and other strategic minerals; second, it has a substantial industrial base capable of supporting processing and manufacturing; and third, its geographic position makes it a hub connecting Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. 

Linking Rare Earth��Elements��and Ukraine: Strategic Complementarity��

The intersection between cooperation on rare earth elements and Türkiye’s position on Ukraine is not coincidental. Both issues raise the same underlying question: how much strategic autonomy can Türkiye exercise while remaining embedded in the Western alliance structure?  

Economic interdependence in critical sectors creates incentives for alignment that political pressure alone cannot achieve. A structured US-Türkiye partnership on rare earth exploration, processing, and technology transfer would deepen mutual dependence, making a sharp geopolitical rupture less likely. Such cooperation would strengthen Türkiye’s stake in a Western-oriented economic order, indirectly shaping its calculations on Ukraine. While it would not compel Ankara to adopt sanctions or abandon mediation, it would raise costs of drifting too far from US strategic priorities. This logic is visible in US efforts to structure critical mineral partnerships with Ukraine, suggesting that resource cooperation is emerging as a broader instrument of strategic alignment rather than a case-specific initiative. 

Russia, China, and��Türkiye’s Hedging Strategy��

Türkiye’s approach to rare earths must also be understood in the context of its broader hedging strategy vis-à-vis Russia and China. Moscow remains a key energy supplier and a critical actor in the Black Sea, while Beijing is an increasingly important trade and investment partner for Türkiye. 

China’s dominance in the rare earth industry presents Ankara with both an opportunity and a constraint. On the one hand, Chinese investment and technology are an attractive prospect for developing Türkiye’s mineral sector. On the other, excessive reliance on China would undermine Türkiye’s aspiration for strategic autonomy and expose it to geopolitical pressure from its Western partners A US-Türkiye partnership on rare earth elements offers Ankara an alternative path – one that diversifies external dependencies. For Washington, engaging with Türkiye reduces the likelihood that Ankara will default to China. 

Türkiye’s value extends well beyond economics. Its control of access to the Black Sea, close proximity to Ukraine, Russia, and the Middle East, and strong military capabilities make it a cornerstone of NATO’s southern and eastern flanks. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has reinforced the strategic importance of the Black Sea as a contested space where naval power, energy routes, and regional stability intersect. Türkiye’s enforcement of the Montreux Convention has limited Russian naval reinforcement and demonstrated Ankara’s capacity to shape the operational environment without direct military confrontation. This contribution, though often overlooked, has tangible value for Ukraine, the US and other NATO Allies. Maintaining Türkiye’s integration within NATO is therefore essential, even as undercurrents persist. Cooperation on rare earth elements complements this objective by reinforcing Türkiye’s embeddedness in the Western order. 

Scenarios for the Evolution of US-Türkiye Relations��

Several trajectories could shape US-Türkiye relations in the coming years. 

Scenario 1: Strategic Convergence Through Economic Anchoring 

In this scenario, the US and Türkiye deepen cooperation on rare earth elements and other critical minerals, integrating cooperation with broader collaboration in defense technologies, energy transition, and industrial policy. Deepening economic interdependence would help stabilize the bilateral relationship and provide a practical framework for managing political differences. Türkiye would continue to act as a semi-autonomous NATO Ally – aligned with the US on core security interests, while retaining flexibility in its diplomatic engagement with other powers and partners. 

Scenario 2: Strategic Drift and Competitive Hedging 

If cooperation on rare earth elements fails to materialize and political tensions over Ukraine intensify, Türkiye may deepen its ties with Russia and China. In this scenario, Ankara’s mediation role loses value for Washington, and the relationship becomes increasingly transactional and distrustful. NATO cohesion weakens, and supply chain cooperation shifts elsewhere. 

Scenario 3: Managed Autonomy and Functional Partnership 

In the most realistic scenario, the US accepts Türkiye’s strategic autonomy while selectively deepening cooperation in areas of high mutual value, particularly rare earth elements and Black Sea security.&�Բ�����;��ü���쾱���&�Բ�����;continues to mediate Ukraine, and Washington leverages this role pragmatically, even as political differences persist. 

Policy Options for the United States 

US policy toward Türkiye should place cooperation on rare earth elements and critical minerals at the centre of the bilateral agenda, elevating it to a strategic pillar within broader efforts to reduce supply chain dependence on China. This would require the adoption of concrete measures, including investment, technology sharing, and regulatory coordination. At the same time, Washington should continue to reassess Türkiye’s approach to Ukraine by focusing more on practical outcomes, recognizing that Ankara’s efforts and selective support for Kyiv can contribute to regional stability in ways that rigid conformity may not. Strengthening high-level institutional dialogue that links security, economic, and industrial policy would help reduce misunderstandings and prevent tensions from overshadowing the broader relationship. Finally, the US should reaffirm Türkiye’s central role within NATO while accepting that member country cohesion in a multipolar environment will inevitably involve tension and diversity in policies and approaches,  

Conclusion: From Alignment to Strategic Interdependence��

The US-Türkiye relationship in 2025 highlights how NATO may increasingly be shaped by pragmatism and negotiated interests, alongside – but not replaced by – shared values and ideological affinity. In this context, values remain relevant but may no longer be sufficient on their own to sustain strategic partnerships. Instead, cooperation is structured through selective interdependence across security, economic, and technological domains. Türkiye’s calibrated approach to Ukraine and its growing role in rare earth elements and critical mineral supply chains should therefore be seen as interdependent strategies, offering broader theoretical insights regarding contemporary alliance patterns. 

For the US, this shift may require a recalibration of expectations. The ultimate choice is not between accepting Turkish autonomy or attempting to impose alliance discipline, but between shaping that autonomy through sustained engagement or allowing it to evolve in ways increasingly misaligned with US interests. Treating Türkiye’s behaviour as a problem of non-compliance risks overlooking the structural forces driving Ankara’s decisions. A strategy centred on pressure alone is unlikely to succeed and may intensify Türkiye’s temptations to turn toward alternative partnerships. Instead, over time, deepening interdependence could play a stabilizing role, mitigate political disputes and increase the costs of strategic divergence on both sides. 

Ultimately, in an era defined by multipolar competition and systemic rivalry, resilience will depend more on flexible, interest-based cooperation. The combination of cooperation on rare earth elements and pragmatic engagement on Ukraine offers a framework through which the US and NATO can adapt their approach to Türkiye without relinquishing core strategic objectives. By prioritizing realism, mutual benefit, and long-term interdependence, Washington can help ensure that Türkiye remains a pivotal — if unconventional — partner, capable of contributing to Western security and economic resilience in an increasingly fragmented world. 

The post Rare Earth Elements, Ukraine, and Strategic Autonomy: Reframing US-Türkiye Relations appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

Executive Summary

Authoritarian states are increasingly using police organizations to target diaspora communities in democratic countries. This is especially evident in the misuse of Interpol’s Red Notice system to bypass extradition barriers and pursue dissidents abroad. When politically motivated notices are dispersed through Canadian policing systems, they risk compromising the integrity of international law enforcement cooperation, increasing the likelihood of refoulement which violates Canada’s legal obligations, and exacerbates a chilling effect among diaspora communities. In doing so, these notices expose the vulnerabilities in Canada’s domestic protections by allowing foreign states the ability to project coercive influence through Canadian political institutions.  

While this brief focuses on the misuse of INTERPOL mechanisms as a specific form of Transnational Repression (TR), it sits within a broader context of state-led repression ranging from the People’s Republic of China to India. It uses Tajikistan as a case study to highlight vulnerabilities in INTERPOL’s vetting process, including insufficient pre-screening and the burden placed on victims to prove their innocence. These weaknesses enable states to exploit Canadian institutions to harass and deport political refugees, a practice known as Transnational Repression (TR).  

TR has occurred in Canada, demonstrating the urgent need for a governmental response.  The focus of this policy brief is on the use of INTERPOL to target dissidents. To address these challenges, this brief proposes specific procedural enhancements to protect the asylum process and strengthen pre-existing domestic protections to protect Canada’s diaspora communities. 

To read the full policy brief, use the button below to download the full policy memo.

The post Closing Canada’s INTERPOL Gap: Preventing Politicized Red Notice Abuse appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

Introduction

Recent think tank and policy discussions��about��the��Russian��Federation��have primarily focused on three issues: the prospects of a peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine;��developments on the battlefield;��and the limits of Russia’s resilience to Western economic sanctions (). While these questions are undoubtedly central��to the ongoing war, they risk obscuring a critical dimension of European security��–��that is, the future of enemy politics, or��“enemization,”��in��post-war Russia.��

In this policy brief, enemization refers to the systematic construction and reproduction of internal and external enemy images by political elites and state-controlled media, framing so-called “enemies” as existential threats to national survival, identity, and sovereignty. Enemization serves crucial political functions such as legitimizing authoritarian governance, mobilizing public support for repressive and confrontational domestic and foreign policies (; ). While enemization has radicalized during the war against Ukraine, it reflects a broader and longer-standing pattern in Russian politics. Even if the war ends, enemization is likely to remain one of the central organizing frameworks shaping how Russian political discourse interprets international relations, if an authoritarian regime continues. In this case, the European Union (EU) is likely to continue being framed as an adversary, limiting prospects for stable post-war engagement across Eurasia and sustaining long-term security risks.  

Therefore, understanding how enemization functions, why it persists, and how it shapes Russia’s postwar behaviour is essential for developing realistic and effective EU policy responses. Even though enemization also occurs in other countries of various political systems, the case of Russia – as a neighbouring country that has demonstrated willingness to use force – plays substantial relevance for European security. This policy brief examines the persistence of enemization in Russia and evaluates its implications for European security and long-term post-war engagement, arguing that under conditions of continued authoritarian rule, enemy narratives are likely to remain a durable feature of Russian politics regardless of war outcomes or leadership configurations.

Continuity and��Escalation of��Enemization��in Russia��

Enemization in Russia has been a recurring feature of Russian public discourse since at least the 1990s, when political, social, and economic instability revived threat and enemy perceptions, conspiracy theories, and nostalgia for “glorious past” and a strong state (Gudkov 2005¹; ). The Chechen wars and terrorist attacks further reinforced enemy framing, while trust in military and security institutions, including the presidency, grew stronger (Gudkov 2005). Under Putin, negative mobilization of the population around the ideas of enemies, threats, and other symbolic constituents of the besieged fortress narrative has become a core component of regime communication and governance (; ).  

Enemization dynamics are visible in concrete rhetorical and legislative practices. Russian propaganda, following a long-established Soviet mechanism of using references to Nazis or Fascists to delegitimize political opponents (), routinely frames Ukraine as a “Nazi regime” (), or Western values as aimed to destroy Russian culture, while domestic opposition and various social minorities are labelled as foreign agents, traitors, or extremists. Legislative measures continue to limit human rights and freedoms of these alleged enemies (), while intensifying public glorification of wartime sacrifices and spreading binary logic of enmity into education and other spheres of social life.  

The full-scale invasion of Ukraine represents the culmination of the enemization in Russian public discourse. To justify aggressive foreign policies and domestic repressions against its own citizens, the Russian regime has strengthened and radicalized its propaganda of enmity. Russian social surveys results, although requiring cautious interpretation, consistently demonstrate a widespread public endorsement, usually between 70 and 80% of respondents, of enemy images portraying Russia as a besieged fortress surrounded by hostile actors (). These enemy images are reflected in official state communications and state media framing of Ukraine as a “Nazi regime”; the West as seeking Russia’s collapse; and active narration of foreign agents and traitors among domestic political opposition and other social groups such as religious and sexual minorities. Such narratives reinforce the perception of existential threats to the Russian worldview – also commonly referred to as Ruskiy Mir – and legitimize aggressive foreign policies and repressions at home.  

Although questions remain as to what extent Russian elites genuinely believe in these enemy narratives or opportunistically instrumentalize them, public opinion data shows widespread support of enemy perceptions with official messaging (). Even if the Russian regime adopts less confrontational rhetoric, the institutionalization and long-term reproduction of enemy narratives across political discourse, media, and education may suggest that such perceptions will persist at least for a certain period. This persistence reflects not an inherent social disposition, but rather the cumulative effect of sustained propaganda of enmity which resonates, among other things, with certain popular – though not uniform – perceptions, biases, opinions, and worldviews present within a society (). For Europe, this means that rhetorical moderation alone should not be read as evidence of rapid de-escalation, since the drivers reproducing enemy narratives may remain in place after the formal conclusion of the war. 

The��Drivers of��Post-War��Enemization��in Russia��

Enemization in Russia should not be understood as a temporary wartime social and political mobilization tool, but as a longstanding political instrument and condition. First, a substantial and meaningful reversal of enemy narratives would require a major disruption of the Russian political and informational environment that sustains it. Second, enemization in wartime Russia predates the war and has become institutionalized in Russian politics throughout history. The routinized enemy narratives tend to be self-reinforcing, shaping public expectations and interpretations even after the immediate conditions that intensified them have changed. Finally, enemization is closely linked to a broader narrative of confrontation with the West, within which the war against Ukraine is framed as a separate episode in a bigger geopolitical struggle (); a particular possible scenario if Putin remains in power. Thus, even if hostilities end, the drivers that reinforce enemization are likely to persist, allowing enemy narratives remain in place and manifest.  

Although military outcomes of the war against Ukraine remain obscure, they will likely shape the tone and targets of Russian enemization in distinct ways while keeping the underlying logic intact. Russian authorities will likely declare any war outcomes as victorious, and such declarations will reinforce enemization by legitimizing the use of military force as an effective foreign policy instrument, and the use of repression as an effective domestic policy instrument (); both are based on the perception of enemies and threats. If the war ends in a prolonged stalemate without clear successes and lines drawn, the Kremlin could credibly sell narratives to the population; enemization may shift from triumphalist to resentful tones, picturing Russia as constrained or undermined by hostile external and internal forces which prevented the country from achieving a complete victory. Finally, possible military defeat could intensify revanchist narratives and scapegoating directed at already constructed enemies. Thus, across these outcomes, enemization is likely to be adapted and reformulated but not abandoned. 

One may hope that substantial regime change may positively affect enemization by beginning its partial or even full demobilization. This unlikely possibility requires us to look deeper into the phenomenon. While political leadership in autocratic Russia shapes policy choices, enemization also draws on pre-existing historical perceptions and biases in parts of society; rather than inventing enemies from scratch, Russian propaganda amplifies and rearticulates such narratives by promoting the most useful ones in a given political context (Gudkov 2005). These enemy narratives are embedded in state institutions, public expectations about politics, security, and national identity. As a result, Russian political elites operate within pre-determined moral boundaries that constrain the range of discursive options, including how enemies are defined, justified, and, if needed, de-enemized (). Even in the event of elite change, successor elites would likely be motivated to maintain at least elements of familiar narratives of enemization to avoid accusations of weakness, betrayal, and capitulation, especially from those we define as ultra-patriotic and nationalist radicals. In turn, to secure some stability amidst the leadership’s change, the new elites may find it easier to reproduce familiar enemy constructs, instead of dismantling them altogether, as historical experience in post-Soviet Russia in the 1990s suggests.   

To conclude, post-war Russia is likely to remain dependent on enemization as a policy instrument across a range of plausible war outcomes. While the specific targets and intensity of enemization may shift, the institutional framework that supports them will likely persist. Even a regime change would not automatically disband enemy narratives as the new elites may face strong incentive to continue employing in some way such enemy rhetoric to secure their own power. That is why Europe should prepare for a strong possibility to deal with Russia, in which enemization remains politically usable even if its form evolves over time.

Policy��Implications and��Recommendations for Europe��

As demonstrated above, enemization depends on propaganda’s resonance with pre-existing social and historical biases and perceptions. State messages about a hostile West or treacherous domestic political opposition draw much of its legitimacy from this resonance. Accordingly, it is unlikely that certain changes in European policies or rhetoric would suffice to transform elite threat messaging. Despite contemporary censorship conditions in Russia, however, European actions remain visible and preferable to at least some segments of Russian society. Therefore, Europe should prioritize reaching Russian society directly through its policies to mitigate enemization narratives. Even though Europe cannot directly dismantle enemization narratives within Russia, EU policies could influence the credibility and resonance of such narratives while showing that it does not consider Russian society as a whole to be a threat nor an actor to be punished.  

1. European post-war strategic communication planning should aim for long-term deterrence over rapid or even gradual normalization.  

Europe needs to base their post-war planning on the assumption that enemization in Russia will persist after the end of active hostilities in Ukraine and that it will affect Russian foreign and domestic political agendas. Although the EU has already invested substantial resources in becoming more independent from Russian energy and raw materials, as well as in its military industrial complex, such planning also requires a well-planned discursive strategy of communicating with not only the Russian regime or state elites, but Russian society as a whole. Expectations that Russia will become more pacifist and less prone to use militant instruments due to its losses in Ukraine appear to be wishful thinking, so it is essential to embrace the opposite possibility to manage the security effects of this enemization. 

2. Utilize discursive restraint in official communication.  

European officials should avoid using rhetorical frames in public speeches and documents that portray Russia as a civilizational enemy or a permanently hostile society. This, however, by no means implies that the official rhetoric needs to be softened towards the Russian government – the condemnation of Russian aggression is necessary and justified. Discursive restraint, suggested here as the policy instrument, should be understood not as conciliation but rather as a tool to limit the discursive reproduction of enemization.  

3. Clearly differentiate between the Russian regime and the population.  

Although the issue of moral responsibility of the society in an authoritarian regime for the crimes committed throughout the war is a subject of academic and political debates, avoiding the narrative of collective responsibility may be beneficial, specifically in this case of mitigating the risks of enemization for European security. Messaging that brings together the regime and the population contributes to the regime’s claim that it represents the nation as a whole and validates narratives of collective punishment and guilt. This in turn leads to consolidation of the Russian public around their leaders or, at the very least, around the narratives framing Europe as a threat and enemy to Russians.  

The post Enemy Politics in Russia: A Long-Term Security Risk for Europe appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

Executive Summary

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has been a leading factor in the rise of conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) in Ukraine. CRSV has a wide scope and is gendered in nature; it includes rape as a weapon of war, as well as sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, sexual torture, forced abortion, forced sterilization, forced marriage, and other similar acts of sexual violence and abuse, directly and indirectly linked to conflict and war. CRSV has primarily been perpetrated by the Russian military forces in occupied Ukrainian territories, including against women, girls, men, boys, civilians, detainees, and prisoners of war. This violence must be understood not only as a set of individual war crimes but also as part of a gendered strategy of domination that links occupation, militarized masculinity, and attacks on Ukraine’s social and political order (Kratochvíl & O’Sullivan, 2023; OHCHR, 2023). This is one form of war crime that is clearly prohibited under international law. The war has also had the effect of exacerbating pre-existing domestic violence trends in Ukraine. Thus, the full-scale invasion of Ukraine has had a dual effect: it has brought with it a sharp increase in CRSV being strategically carried out by Russian forces across the country, while also testing the domestic gender governance structures across the country as it relates to domestic violence. 

Major legislative reforms in the Ukrainian domestic legal system were introduced in June 2022, following the ratification of the Istanbul Convention. The reforms have aimed to ensure that Ukraine’s legal system is in line with the European Union’s standards regarding prevention and protection from violence against women. There are, however, gaps that remain and need to be addressed: further resources for investigating cases of violence; gender-sensitive training for police officers, prosecutors, and judges; improved coordination between institutions; sustainable funding for shelters and crisis centres; and stronger monitoring within the security and defence sectors. These reforms should also be read through Ukraine’s Women, Peace and Security (WPS) commitments, particularly the protection and prevention pillars of the WPS agenda. 

To read the full policy paper, please download the PDF at the button below.

The post Women, Peace and Security in Ukraine: Addressing Conflict-Related Sexual Violence and Advancing EU Integration appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

Key��Takeaways

• Most Armenians feel that their country is��“on their own”��if faced��with��a military threat,��displaying a��perception��of personal safety associated with geopolitical alignment.��

• With uncertainty widespread and��perceptions��on security partnerships polarized, many��in Armenia��are open to diversifying security ties.��

• Considering public opinion, while NATO��has��a��relatively limited��set of cooperation tools, they should��nonetheless��prioritize visible��engagement��with Armenia, communicate limitations��of such partnership��clearly,��and manage��expectations.��Sustained��and predictable cooperation��should be kept��in��practical��rather than geopolitical��terms and��perceptions.��

Context��

This policy brief examines the implications of public attitudes towards security issues in Armenia for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It assesses the prevalence of insecurity narratives among Armenians and shows how such attitudes are associated with opinions towards external security actors. Survey evidence shows that Armenia’s core security challenge is a sense of abandonment among its public. Confidence in international security institutions is weak, as nearly half of Armenians (48%) believe their country would not receive support in the event of a military conflict.  

As confidence in Armenia’s traditional security partners – Russia and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) – stands low,  other international actors are seen as positive contributors to Armenia’s overall security, including both NATO and China. The Armenian public’s openness toward alternative security partners and a broader reassessement of Armenia’s security architecture creates an opportunity for NATO to push for more active involvement. As available options are limited, NATO should strive for realistic, civilian-oriented cooperation based in institutional resilience, without raising expectations of formal guarantees. This increased involvement, along with sustained and visible engagement, should offer better reassurance to Armenia without otherwise escalating geopolitical tensions in the region. 

Between its independence in 1991 and the start of the second Nagorno- Karabakh War in 2020, Armenia’s security architecture was heavily . Armenian political elites leaned towards Russia due to a lack of alternative options on account of its landlocked status and persistent conflict with Azerbaijan and Türkiye, along with a limited domestic military capacity. Russia served as Armenia’s primary security guarantor through  and  membership; Western military and security engagement remained largely symbolic. Although Armenia and NATO collaborated through  and  frameworks, these initiatives focused on technical cooperation and institutional dialogue rather than substantive security guarantees. 

The  to prevent military defeat in 2020 marked a critical rupture in Armenia’s security system. The second Nagorno-Karabakh War significantly undermined public and government confidence in  and the CSTO as reliable protectors and intensified feelings that Armenia had been  by its traditional security partners. In response, the Pashinyan government increasingly sought to . This shift is visible in several developments, including the “,” the deployment of the European Union’s (EU)  along the Armenia–Azerbaijan border, and the launch of enhanced  in January 2025.

Public Insecurity, Security Preferences, and Reported Future Vote in Armenia����

A nationwide survey in Armenia, conducted by �Ӱ�ԭ�� University’s Eastern European and Transatlantic Network (EETN) in February and March 2025, shows that Armenians are almost equally split between who report to feel safe (52%) and unsafe (47%) in their daily lives. Residents of Yerevan tend to feel more unsafe (52%) compared to these in other urban (44%) and rural areas (45%). The risk of war with Azerbaijan (59%) is the major concern consistent across society. 

Perceived personal security is closely associated with positive attitudes toward Western alignment; those who feel safer are substantially more likely to support NATO and EU membership than those who do not. Among individuals who report feeling safe, 60% would vote “Yes” in a hypothetical referendum for Armenia joining NATO and 64% would do the same in a potential referendum on joining the EU. In contrast, among those who feel unsafe, only 40% would support NATO, and 36% would back EU membership, with clear majorities in this group opposing both initiatives, 56% against NATO and 64% against the EU. 

Armenians are divided across party lines in their assessment of personal safety. With a clear majority (71%) either recusing themselves from voting in parliamentary elections, intending to spoil the ballot, or not share voting preferences. Among those who would engage in elections and/or share their preferences, the majority who support the Civil Contract party (86%) feel safe, compared to 36 percent of opposition supporters that include the largely pro-Russian Armenia Alliance party. 

Many in Armenia feel that their country would be left on their own if it faces a military attack, with nearly half (48%) thinking so and only 6% being unsure about who might help. As the sense of abandonment is widespread, still, those with different perceptions of safety have distinct expectations on who might help. Those who feel unsafe are more likely to choose Russia or the CSTO (20%) as a likely ally in case Armenia faces military conflict, compared to NATO or the West (14%). Conversely, more amongst those feeling secure would expect NATO or the West to come to their aid (25%) than Russia or the CSTO (12%). In sum, perceptions of insecurity are associated with greater reliance on Russia, whereas feelings of security are more strongly linked to expectations of Western support. 

At the same time, support for diversifying security partnerships beyond existing allies is relatively broad, with 53% agreeing that searching for new defense and military ties with other countries would make Armenia safer against foreign threats. This idea is popular across the political divide, including 70% of Civil Contract supporters and 59% of opposition voters. While uncertainty is higher among those with no declared voting intentions, still, more among this group believe that diversification of defense and military ties would make Armenia more secure compared to those who disagree. 

This preference for diversification also resonates with elite threat narratives. While Armenian political parties differ in their preferred alignments — some favouring Russia, others emphasizing Western engagement, or expressing self-reliance — they somehow share a recognition that reliance on a single security partner is no longer sufficient. 

Despite widespread pessimism about Armenia’s security environment, preferences over geopolitical alignment remain divided rather than consolidated into a single dominant orientation. Equal proportions of respondents believe Armenia would be safer moving closer to NATO (36%) or Russia (36%). Furthermore, more than half of Armenians consider that having NATO troops on the ground would make Armenia safer, indicating a veiled sympathy towards the NATO Alliance. 

Overall, these patterns do not indicate a clear preference toward any single geopolitical bloc, although the Western side carries somewhat greater weight. Armenians are somewhat engaged in a survival-driven reassessment of security providers and remaining open to diversified allies clarifies this viewpoint. This creates potetial opportunities for NATO to expand its partnership with Armenia. 

Conclusions and Policy Recommendations��

Given Armenia’s non-member status in NATO and the structural constraints created by Russia’s influence in the region, formal security guarantees from Western institutions are unlikely to materialize in the near future. NATO’s internal dynamics — particularly Türkiye’s membership and its close military partnership with Azerbaijan — further limit the �����հ�’s&�Բ�����;capacity to provide direct defence commitments to Armenia. 

At the same time, Armenia’s security landscape is shifting as the government seeks to diversify its external security partnerships. In practice, this has created space for forms of cooperation that do not rely on military guarantees but instead focus on civilian-oriented, visible, and predictable initiatives such as resilience building, civil emergency planning, institutional reform, and confidence-building measures. These efforts aim to address vulnerabilities rather than establish broader geopolitical alignment. 

Evidence from NATO’s engagement in partner countries illustrates the value of this approach. The substantial  has supported defence reforms, institutional coordination, and national resilience through training, interoperability programs, and civil–military cooperation. Similarly, cooperation with  has strengthened energy resilience, medical capacity, disaster response, and defence education, showing that civilian-focused partnerships can deliver sustained, practical outcomes.  

For Armenia, diversification therefore functions as a pragmatic way to expand sources of security support in the absence of formal guarantees. Within this framework, NATO could become a more constructive and realistic partner for Armenia. While direct defence commitments remain improbable, civilian-oriented initiatives offer tools to strengthen institutions and reduce security risks. This perspective underpins the policy recommendations that follow.  

1. Given the substantial support of Western-led political structures, NATO should prioritize visible engagement with Armenia. 

�����հ�’s&�Բ�����;is the central framework coordinating cooperation with Armenia, bringing together planning, training, exercises, and institutional reform in a multi-year, capacity-building process. As outlined in , the  is designed to deepen cooperation in line with  and level of readiness. NATO should use this initiatives not only as a coordination tool, but as a delivery mechanism for visible, locally-implemented cooperation, particularly beyond Yerevan. By translating the framework into routine, practical engagement, NATO and Armenia can bilaterally strengthen security capacities and address perceptions of abandonment from the Armenian public. 

2. NATO should clearly communicate limitations and manage expectations about its partnership with Armenia.  

NATO already frames cooperation with Armenia as partnership-based rather than guarantee-based, but could benefit from communicating more clearly and publicly about what cooperation involves (e.g., preparedness, institutional reform, resilience) and what it does not (e.g., full membership). Additionally, engagement should be consistently framed as capacity-building rather than a security provision to avoid creating public expectations of any security guarantees. Simple cooperation roadmaps with regular milestones would strengthen predictability, credibility, and reassurance. Furthermore, this should happen in a sustained manner, emphasizing repeated training cycles, ongoing institutional support, and routine regional exercises rather than isolated events. Predictable, long-term cooperation builds trust without raising unrealistic expectations. 

3. NATO should keep cooperation with Armenia practical and not geopolitical. 

Finally, as the Armenian public remains divided in their geopolitical preferences, it is important for NATO to prevent its partnership with Armenia from expanding into questions of geopolitical alignment. Engagement should remain centred on functional areas such as crisis preparedness, emergency coordination, institutional reform, and civilian resilience rather than Western-versus-Russian narratives. Expanding direct and clear communication with the Armenian general public can further limit perceptions of forced geopolitical choice and better align external policies with insecurity-driven public concerns in Armenia. This action would strengthen Armenia’s security capacity while minimizing escalation risks and domestic polarization. 

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Key Takeaways��

• �Ӱ�ԭ�� one in three residents of Estonia and Latvia say they would do nothing��in the event of��a military threat, with even lower likelihood to act among ethnic Russians.����

• Interest in��participating��through non-combat roles (e.g.,��financial contributions) is higher than in combat roles��but still does not reflect��a significant��portion��of the population��in either Latvia or Estonia.��

• NATO (and Canada) should��address��the��societal resilience��gap among local��communities.��Targeted grants for trusted local organizations, coupled with strong monitoring and evaluation, can help build social cohesion and civic preparedness across Estonia and Latvia, particularly in regions with a significant ethnic Russian population.��

Background��

Recent polling data from Estonia and Latvia suggest there is a significant gap in societal resilience among the residents of both countries. While Russia is overwhelmingly perceived as a security threat within these nations, an overall willingness to act in the event of a military threat is low. This gap is particularly pronounced along demographic lines, with lower willingness to act among ethnic Russians in Estonia and Latvia. As the Baltic states are likely targets for potential future Russian aggression, this deficit in resilience has direct implications for Canadian and NATO security commitments in the region.  

Since their post-Soviet independence, Estonia and Latvia have invested heavily in defence preparedness through joining NATO, bolstering their cyber networks, and educating their youth on mis- and disinformation. After Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, Canada joined its NATO Allies in strengthening defence structures in Eastern and Central Europe under , currently the Canadian Armed Forces’ (CAF) largest overseas mission. Recognizing the particular vulnerability of the Baltic states to Russian aggression, Canada took the initiative to lead the Multinational Battlegroup in Latvia in 2017. After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Canada committed to scaling this presence into a full . Following his election in Spring 2025, Prime Minister Mark Carney emphasized that these operations work to reinforce NATO at a time of great global instability and change. 

To meet NATO’s Article 3 , Estonia and Latvia have adopted “Total Defence” models, recognizing that societal resilience and civilian participation are just as crucial as military structures for overall defence of the country. Learning from the success of the Ukrainian Territorial Defence Forces in fighting the Russian military,  is working to promote its own reservist force through public awareness campaigns, increased daily allowances for reservists, and crisis preparedness education.  similarly promotes civil protection while identifying “political trust” and “inter-ethnic cohesion” as vital to national security. Both Baltic countries are also working to increase civil support for their law enforcement agencies, fire departments, and medical systems.  

As highlighted in the Latvian defence plan, social cohesion and confidence in state institutions and partnerships are essential for building and maintaining civil engagement in total defence. The  in Riga engages in public diplomacy, information operations, and psychological operations to align national efforts with NATO’s strategic objectives. The Latvian government has also partnered with the  – an NGO with the goal of informing the public about NATO and Latvia’s participation in it.  

Social cohesion between ethnic communities has been a focus of national and local NGOs, as Russian-speaking minorities remain less likely to trust NATO or volunteer for national defence than their neighbours. In the northeastern region of Estonia,  works mostly with Russian speakers of all ages on projects developing critical thinking and media literacy. These projects promote active citizenship and social entrepreneurship through youth work and international exchanges. VitaTiim already has international partnerships, including with the European Solidarity Corps and the US Embassy in Estonia. In Latvia, the organization  focuses on education, culture, media, and civic engagement in the Baltics and beyond, specifically striving to foster open dialogue and social inclusion for underrepresented ethnic minorities.  

Despite these institutional frameworks and nonprofit initiatives, recent polling reveals a high likelihood amongst the public to do nothing to defend Estonia and Latvia from a military threat, as well as a persistent gap in how different ethnic communities perceive national security and threats to their country. To better understand these dynamics, the following data examines security perceptions across the region. 

Survey Evidence: Societal Resilience Gaps in Estonia and Latvia��

Polling from �Ӱ�ԭ�� University’s Eastern European and Transatlantic Network (EETN) shows that,��as of Spring 2025, many people in Estonia and Latvia do not see themselves as active participants in defence during a crisis. Most significantly, about 30% of Estonians and Latvians say they are likely to do nothing��in the event of��a military threat.����

Demographic and geographic��characteristics of��this vulnerability��show a stark division:��almost half��of ethnic Russians��(46%)��residing��in Latvia and Estonia��would��do nothing��if��their��respective countries face a military threat.��Four in 10��(43%)��polled��residents��of��Latgale, a region of Latvia directly on the border with Russia��comprised��of a��large Russian-speaking minority,��say they would not act.��Half of those polled��in Northeastern Estonia��(51%), another region sharing a border with Russia��and having a similar demographic composition as Latgale, are also likely to do nothing.��

Reported willingness to participate in national defence is low. When asked whether they would join the active-duty military in the event of a military threat, only about 20% of Estonians and Latvians say they are likely to do so, and only about 30% are likely to join the military reserves or territorial forces in response to the same threat.  

While more people are willing to take up non-combat forms of national defence, still, even such likelihood is low. Estonians appear to be more likely to assist in this way than Latvians, approximately six in 10 (59%) of Estonians are likely to volunteer to contribute with physical labour, versus 44% in Latvia. �Ӱ�ԭ�� half (48%) of Estonians are likely to volunteer to contribute financially, compared to only 29% of Latvians.  

Ethnic Russians in both countries are even less likely to be active defenders in the event of a military threat. A staggering 80% of ethnic Russians in Latvia and Estonia are unlikely to join the active-duty military, military reserves, or territorial forces. In Estonia, 41% of ethnic Russians are likely to volunteer to contribute with physical labour, but this number drops significantly in Latvia, with only 29% of ethnic Russians likely to do so. Finally, only about 20% of ethnic Russians, in both Estonia and Latvia, are likely to volunteer to contribute financially.  

From a policy perspective, this polling data highlights��both��a��gap and an��opportunity. If a significant segment of the population is unlikely to��contribute to the active defence of their country, resilience-building efforts must expand beyond military��deployments. To foster the social cohesion necessary for resilience, trust��and cooperation between minority and majority communities must be bolstered. NATO and Canada can do this through collaboration with local community networks��–��such as��VitaTiim��and New East��–��that are already on the ground��in��the region.��

Conclusion��

Recent polling data from Estonia and Latvia suggests a region with a significant gap in societal resilience. While Russia is overwhelmingly perceived as a security threat, willingness to act��in the event of��a military threat is low. This gap is particularly pronounced along��demographic��lines, with lower willingness to act among��ethnic Russians. As��Estonia and Latvia��are��likely targets��for potential future Russian aggression, this deficit in resilience has direct implications for Canadian and NATO security commitments in the region. By supporting well-monitored projects with local organizations that build social cohesion and civic preparedness, Canada and NATO can help ensure Estonia and Latvia are more resilient and better prepared to withstand a military threat.����

Policy Recommendations��

1. NATO and Canada should create a dedicated societal resilience grant to support local NGOs such as VitaTiim and New East that advance social cohesion and civic preparedness. Supported projects should have bilingual messaging (in Russian and Estonian or Latvian) and may include media literacy and cyber safety training, community initiatives fostering dialogue across demographic lines, and projects that engage citizens as partners in international governance. 

The grant should emphasize collaboration between local and international organizations, promoting a shared responsibility in local, national, and international governance. Priority should go to local initiatives in regions with large Russian-speaking populations. 

2. Each NATO/Canadian-supported project should be required to include a monitoring, evaluation, and feedback plan in alignment with �����հ�’s&�Բ�����;. Thorough monitoring is necessary in order to accurately evaluate how effective projects are at bolstering societal resilience and civic preparedness.  

3. Canada and NATO should use existing NATO StratCom COE platforms to highlight successful partnerships in relatable ways to the Estonians and Latvians, including through multilingual media and public events. Positive views of NATO and the West expressed by individuals and organizations that already have credibility in their communities should be amplified to . 

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Executive Summary  

Transatlantic relations are currently facing growing uncertainty due to significant strategic divergences in the fields of trade, security, technology, and global governance. From the trade tariff disputes to President of the United States (US) Donald Trump’s territorial claims on Greenland, ties between the European Union (EU) and the US are under growing stress. This tension has heavy repercussions on the EU and its member states. Fears about an effective transatlantic decoupling have reenergized calls for the EU to acquire a capacity to act on its own. In this context, Canada can play a decisive role. Stronger EU-Canada cooperation could provide an answer to this new strategic anxiety. It would also allow to reduce dependency on the US and help develop both Canadian and European strategic autonomy.  

Changing Transatlantic Relations: An Opening for Deeper Canada-EU Ties 

While the first Trump administration tested traditional transatlantic relations, Trump’s second term has marked a significant recalibration of US foreign policy that has fundamentally challenged the core values that have underpinned this relationship for the last 80 years. From recurring trade tariff disputes to territorial claims over Greenland, Trump’s actions have often questioned – and even opposed – the US’s role as the principal guarantor of transatlantic stability and security. His administration has delegitimized multilateralism in favour of a “selective engagement” strategy with individual US partners. The recent US , released in November 2025, formalized this major shift in American foreign policy. This new strategy reorders global priorities, reframes NATO Allies’ roles, and seeks stability in Europe to allow Washington to redirect its focus and resources to the Indo-Pacific and the Western Hemisphere. At the same time, it adopts  toward the EU, portraying it as a source of instability and accusing it of undermining political liberty, sovereignty, and social cohesion. 

These dynamics raise fundamental questions about the stability, predictability, and future shape of the transatlantic relationship. For the EU, the implications are immediate: increased strategic risk, reduced certainties, and stronger pressure to develop autonomous capabilities and diversified partnerships. 

Why Canada Matters to the EU (and why the EU Matters to Canada) 

In this rapidly-changing international environment marked by geopolitical fragmentation, erratic US behaviour, and Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine, the EU must meet three conditions in order to become a more credible and decisive actor at the global level: one, it must sway sufficient economic power; two, it must demonstrate political will to act cohesively both amongst its member states and with its international partners; and three, it must be perceived as a legitimate and credible entity by other . 

To achieve these conditions, the EU needs to strengthen its ties with like-minded democracies, such as . Among them, Canada appears as an especially natural and highly compatible partner for the EU. Throughout the last 50 years, Canada and the EU have built an exemplary partnership based on shared democratic values and worldview. But in today’s challenging global landscape, the EU and Canada stand together more firmly than ever as stable and trusted partners. And while the  and  serve as the foundation of the contemporary EU-Canada relationship, increased cooperation to both reinforce current areas of coopetition – such as security and defence – as well as joint ventures in new sectors – including the digital domain – will play key roles in the near future.

Security and Defence Cooperation Between Canada and the EU: A Win-Win Opportunity 

Canada’s contribution to European security and defence policy is hardly new: Ottawa has been a valued contributor to EU-led security and defence efforts for over a decade. It was the first country to establish a Security and Defence Dialogue with the EU in 2015; it participates in  and has contributed to . 

However, at the 20^th EU–Canada Summit in Brussels last June, António Costa, President of the European Council, Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, and Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada, together pledged to further strengthen their bilateral cooperation. Both sides committed to an ambitious and comprehensive partnership, the new , aimed at deepening cooperation across key areas such as trade, security, energy and other critical sectors. 

As part of their re-energized relationship, the EU High Representative of Foreign Affairs, Kaja Kallas, the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Anita Anand, and the Canadian Minister of Defense, David J. McGuinty, also signed the , which provides a framework for cooperation on cyber defence, hybrid threats, space security, maritime issues, crisis response and assistance to partners, such as Ukraine. This agreement also includes provisions for joint research in emerging technologies, which can help position both Canada and the EU as global leaders in these fields.  

This new agreement importantly lays the groundwork for increased defence procurement collaboration, primarily related to the EU’s . It also opened the door for   – a new European loan instrument for joint procurement – and for an administrative arrangement between Canada and the European Defence Agency, the body that supports cooperative European  and provides a forum for European ministries of defence to coordinate their policies. As a result of this increased cooperation, both Brussels and Ottawa have made tangible steps to diversify their defence partnership and become less reliant and vulnerable to Washington’s shifting moods on collective security. Similarly, this new agreement enhances the resiliency of the European pillar within NATO, without either undermining the NATO Alliance or trying to substitute it. 

New Areas of Cooperation in the Digital Domain 

As part of their cooperative efforts, the Canadian Minister of Artificial Intelligence and Digital Innovation, Evan Solomon, and the Executive Vice-President of the European Commission for Technological Sovereignty, Security and Democracy, Henna Virkkunen, have also agreed to strengthen cooperation in the . On 8 December 2025, the first meeting of the EU-Canada Digital Partnership Council took place in Montreal, Quebec. The  made at the conclusion of that meeting showed that both sides recognized the importance that digital partnership plays in advancing bilateral efforts to boost competitiveness, innovation, and economic resilience. This meeting also resulted in Canada and the EU  This meeting also resulted in Canada and the , one on cooperation on artificial intelligence, and another on digital credentials, digital identity wallets, and trust services. This new partnership will guide collaboration on AI governance, quantum technologies, cybersecurity, and digital standards. The  of this partnership is to build digital systems that are secure, transparent, and centred on public trust.

Conclusion

The ongoing reconfiguration of US foreign policy and the end of predictable transatlantic relations have led the EU and its member states to reconsider their strategic goals and explore alternative strategies to promote their own interests and societal well-being. In this context, cooperation with Canada would be a win-win opportunity, allowing both sides to reduce dependencies on the US and bolster collective defence capabilities without undermining NATO. Strengthening the EU-Canada relationship could also help show other countries that – in an era of re-emerging great power rivalry – there is still an opportunity for states to create and benefit from collective partnerships. 

Policy Recommendations  

In order to make the EU-Canada cooperation effective and concrete, both sides should consider the following policy recommendations: 

• Take an active approach to , including encouragement of domestic defence industries to actively utilize this instrument to gain increased access to external markets. 

• Encourage all EU member states to ratify CETA, as only 17 member states have ratified the agreement thus far. Finalizing the ratification of CETA would ensure stability and continuity for the agreement and would signal increased confidence in the overall Canada-EU trade relationship going forward.  

• Strengthen efforts aimed at enhancing their bilateral , to advance and diversify trade, promote economic security and resilience, and create investment opportunities. 

• Increase cooperation in the extraction and trading of . Deepening ties in this area could help reduce dependencies on unreliable partners while strengthening internal supply chains.  

• Improve cooperation on  while at the same time continue working together in order to balance innovation with ethical considerations and standards. This includes joint investments on AI-driven sustainability solutions, the adoption of accountability measures for violators of AI regulations, and the enforcement of policies that support both technological advancement and societal well-being. 

• Utilize the strong EU-Canada relationship as a stepping stone to reinforce multilateral partnerships with like-minded democratic partners, such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, and Taiwan. 

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