Following the Brexit vote in 2016 the defence relationship between the UK and the EU has since been relatively unfettered. This strength can largely be attributed to the increasing coordination through NATO institutions and the establishment of the Coalition of the Willing, creating functional cooperation without deepening policy integration between the UK and the EU. Yet this relationship has clear limits. As EU defence policy focuses inward on industry and procurement, the effects of Brexit now have immediate impacts on European capacity building.

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Introduction

On January 5th, 2026, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced the appointment of former Canadian Deputy Prime Minister and Member of Parliament, Chrystia Freeland, as Economic Advisor to the Office of the President of Ukraine. In a post on X, Zelenskyy stated, “Ukraine needs to strengthen its internal resilience – both for the sake of Ukraine’s recovery if diplomacy delivers results as swiftly as possible, and to reinforce our defence if, because of delays by our partners, it takes longer to bring this war to an end.” In the following days, Freeland confirmed she accepted President Zelenskyy’s appointment and that she would be resigning as a Member of Parliament, taking effect as of January 9th, 2026.

Freeland’s appointment as voluntary Economic Advisor to the Office of the President of Ukraine is being made against the larger and developing backdrop of ongoing diplomatic negotiations between the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the United States (US) to come to an agreed upon pathway to peace. This negotiation process continues to be arduous for Ukraine. It also comes alongside a deepening of foreign diplomatic relations between Canada and Ukraine under the Mark Carney government; this, coming on the back of Prime Minister Carney’s historical , where he stressed the end of the rules-based international order and hinted at the decline of American hegemony – a speech that have held to ultimately represent the beginning of a multipolar era in world politics.

In the coming months, the Eastern European and Transatlantic Network (EETN) will publish a series analyzing key developments shaping the war; these include prospective pathways to peace, ongoing diplomatic negotiations and tensions, and the shifting security and economic governance landscape in Ukraine. Freeland is an integral node among an emerging and vital network aimed at supporting Ukraine and its future as the anniversary of the full-scale invasion nears and passes. This series aims to make clear that Russia is not only engaged in a war of attrition so as to try to reclaim its great power status, but that Ukraine is increasingly prepared to respond to this war of attrition with strategies and methods of asymmetric and hybrid warfare. Ukraine is prepared to make the strategic, economic, and relational moves necessary to better guarantee its future, as well as its success on the battlefield and in diplomatic negotiations.

This first brief of the series reflects on Freeland’s appointment and builds upon an argument first offered by Ukrainian scholar Valeriia Gusieva, where she suggested that cultural resilience is a foundational pillar to security. I extend her argument here by suggesting that cultural resilience and situated experience are also crucial to sustaining a coherent and effective attritional war strategy – Freeland’s appointment, in this case, should be understood light through the lens of political habituation.

Chrystia Freeland: A Ukrainian-Canadian MP and Soviet War Crimes Researcher

Chrystia Freeland was born in Peace River, Alberta in 1968 to a Ukrainian mother and Canadian father. Though she formally entered Canadian federal politics in 2013, she is perhaps most known through her association with former Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and his government. Under Trudeau, Freeland was appointed to serve as Minister of International Trade in Trudeau’s cabinet. In this position, she was a key negotiator in the hard-fought Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) (which replaced the North American Free Trade Agreement, or NAFTA, in 2020), as well as the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with the European Union (EU) that was signed in 2016.

While it is fair to assume that many Western audiences are familiar with the whiplash antics of American President Donald Trump, who often combines “,” less well known are the tensions that characterized the negotiation process of CETA. As researchers , CETA encountered historical diplomatic tensions throughout its negotiation process: “This challenge becomes evident at various stages in the trade policy process, but it is most pronounced in the ratification of bilateral agreements, which require approval in all member states.”

On paper, arriving at CETA was through the bilateral process of negotiation between Canada and the EU; in reality, however, Freeland was situated in a much more difficult negotiating position. Because the subsequent ratification of CETA would require the approval of all EU member states, such a negotiating process proved to be a lesson for both Freeland and the European Commission, who was charged with ensuring the twenty-eight member states were in alignment. Indeed, as scholar Joris Larik , the alleged crisis of CETA negotiations soon became a “cautionary tale” about the “cumbersome and vulnerable EU treaty-making procedures, where internal politics and technical legal discussions detracted from the merits (or demerits) of the actual agreement.”

This became most visible through the tensions experienced with the Wallonia Parliament in Belgium, an autonomous regional government with veto power over EU trade deals. In late 2016, the Walloon government publicly rejected CETA, in part because of their worry that the trade deal would “.” Walloon regional minister-president, Paul Magnette, told reporters the following: “I don’t consider this as a funeral, I don’t consider this as a veto without any conditions. I consider this as a request to reopen negotiations so that European leaders could hear the legitimate demands which have been forcefully expressed by an organized, transparent civil society.” As Larik however, this crisis led to “profound internal reflections on EU trade policy, causing even a shift in the EU’s practice in concluding trade agreements.

It was largely in response to these tensions and apparent deadlock within Wallonia that Freeland made the public decision to walk out on CETA negotiations with our European allies. Following her decision, Freeland with Canadian journalists candidly: “It’s become evident for me, for Canada, that the European Union isn’t capable now to have an international treaty even with a country that has very European values like Canada. And even with a country so nice, with a lot of patience like Canada.” At the time, the move was taken by some in Canadian media as an “” response; Conservative critics in the House of Commons Freeland’s walk out as a “meltdown,” alleging she required “adult supervision” – language that carried clear sexist and gendered connotations. Still others this walk out is exactly what the negotiation process needed, as it eventually led to the signing of the trade agreement.

Reflecting on her CETA negotiation experience in 2026, Freeland the following about negotiating with European allies, which is worth quoting at-length here:

“You can sort of have two kinds of negotiations. Some negotiations start with a kind of win-win premise where the two parties come together wanting a deal, wanting to be friends, seeing each other as long-term partners, and they’ll disagree about stuff, but the negotiation is really about everyone working hard together to find the best possible landing zone. I would say °ä˛ą˛Ô˛ą»ĺ˛ąâ€™s negotiations with the EU about our trade deal with Europe, CETA, were conducted in that way, and they were hard, right? … Our final slightly melodramatic moments in Namur, in Wallonia, you know, proceeded by moments in Vienna, in Germany, in the European Parliament. I mean, it was a long slog and there were lots of obstacles and there was some drama, but it was clear there was goodwill on all sides.”

In this interview, Freeland goes on to characterize how Trump falls into an alternative negotiation camp compared to that which characterized CETA; she the idea that the American President abides by the logic of a zero-sum game: “…when you are dealing with a party that has that kind of a view [zero-sum game logic] and that kind of an attitude, then I think you have to be very clear in your own mind about red lines. And you have to be very prepared to say, thus far and no further, we’re not gonna capitulate our approach.”

Freeland later went on to become °ä˛ą˛Ô˛ą»ĺ˛ąâ€™s Minister of Finance in 2020, where she was responsible for introducing four federal budgets, including federal aid measures related to °ä˛ą˛Ô˛ą»ĺ˛ąâ€™s response to the COVID-19 pandemic. She was the first woman to serve in this role, a fact that would later be considered by the as crucial in the decay of her relationship with Trudeau prior to his own resignation in late-2025.

Beyond her political career, Freeland’s academic and journalistic works span two decades and have drawn the ire of the Kremlin. While pursuing graduate studies in Russian history and literature at Harvard, where she was responsible for documenting and translating archival and investigative materials related to the – an unmarked, mass burial site used by the NKVD (the secret police of the Soviet Union) to dispose of executed dissidents and prisoners. It remains one of the largest mass burial sites in Ukraine, even Russia’s current invasion. Her research played a decisive role in debunking the Stalin-era myth that the executions were exclusively carried out by the Nazis during World War Two. This research eventually attracted the attention of the KGB – the main security agency of the Soviet Union – who then assigned Freeland the codename “Frida,” closely surveilling and building a case against her throughout the course of her study.

As a Canadian with Ukrainian heritage, Freeland has been among the most outspoken advocates for sustained Canadian support to Ukraine. In response, she is one of thirteen Canadian officials barred from entering Russia under retaliatory sanctions imposed by Vladimir Putin himself in 2014 and has been the target of various . Freeland has also faced public attacks from American President Donald Trump, who on several occasions has described her in disparaging terms, including “,” a “,” a “,” and an overall “.” From a feminist perspective, Freeland’s experience navigating such attacks underscores her familiarity with the gendered power dynamics employed by – an experience that may indeed prove to be a strategic asset in a war whose social construction and conduct are themselves . While much of international politics Freeland nonetheless works against the masculine grain in a pursuit of fair and just agreements and futures.

Contextualizing the Habituation of Freeland and Concluding Remarks

As this series continues to examine changes within President Zelenskyy’s inner circle in response to both Ukrainian domestic pressures and Russia’s growing attritional war strategy, I suggest that Freeland’s appointment as a voluntary Economic Advisor to Ukraine signals an awareness within Ukrainian leadership and its closest allies that responding to Russia’s attritional warfare in 2026 cannot be confined to military operations alone. No longer are we in an era where hard power capabilities are the only measure of a nation’s strength; the personal and personnel also matter.

Freeland will be an important figure to watch, particularly as it relates to dialogue between Ukrainian feminists and the pro-democracy movement – not because Freeland herself has expressed a desire to pursue a feminist agenda in Ukraine’s economic reconstruction, but because her presence reflects the often-implicit reality that gendered political experience shapes how the dynamics of endurance, credibility, and trust are produced and sustained in wartime economies. In a war of attrition, where authority is continuously reaffirmed under conditions of prolonged uncertainty, reputational attack, and economic strain, such situated experience becomes strategically relevant, I suggest, as a form of habituation to sustained delegitimization.

The notion of habituation draws from a long philosophical tradition – mostly commonly, Aristotelian ethics, where habituation (hexis) was used to refer to repeated exposure and practice from durable dispositions rather than momentary or instantaneous reaction. In contemporary political thought, philosophers and scholars inspired by phenomenologists such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty have upon this idea to explain how subjects develop capacities for political action through ongoing relational strain. In feminist ethics, habituation helps to explain how – often oppressed – actors learn to endure, navigate, and act within conditions of prolonged vulnerability, scrutiny, and marginalization over time. It moves beyond experience; it is an engaged and embodied vision and practice.

In an attritional war where legitimacy is not necessarily secured through fast-paced or singular victories but continually reproduced across various political, economic, and social structures, as well as through relations of alliance management and public trust, this mode of habituation takes on strategic significance. Indeed, for President Zelenskyy, it works in his favour to cultivate and incorporate actors habituated to sustained delegitimization because it acts as a shock absorber to the , partner unreliability in a so-called newly-founded “” world, and economic fatigue increasingly characterizing this phase of the war and ongoing occupation. The hope is that these hybrid shocks are absorbed by such a habituation without suffering from significant strategic drifts that may carry over into the battlefield.

, nations and militaries perceived to possess greater status and capabilities – that is, the greater of two powers – engage in warfare by attrition. Those familiar with Russia and the former Soviet Union’s historical record of aggression, occupation, interference, and war across Eastern Europe will also recognize this mode of warfare, perhaps all too familiarly. The Baltics, the Balkans, Poland, Chechnya, Georgia – they all know this playbook. The Russian Federation continues to seek what it perceives as its rightful seat at the table of great-power politics; even those of us who reject John J. Mearsheimer’s structuralist projections onto Eastern Europe as lying within a fixed Russian “sphere of influence” cannot ignore such an imperial desire percolating within the Russian state since the unipolar moment.

In attritional war, time is a previous resource. As Sun Tzu , prolonged conflict could be of great risk to either warring side, on account of exhausting the state apparatus, undermining domestic order and morale, and eroding strategic advantage; for him, military strategy was a subtle and complex technique whose success depended on minimizing the temporal risks and costs of war. While Sun Tzu viewed attritional war as a strategic failure, the work of military theorist and general requires us to remember that wars of attrition often emerge as a political condition over time, shaped by friction, uncertainty, and an overall inability to achieve decisive political outcomes. What Ukraine demonstrates to the international community, this series aims to show, is that Russia’s apparent great power strategy grounded in attrition – like empire itself – can burn out.

It is by sources close to both Freeland and Prime Minister Carney that Freeland received Zelenskyy’s offer on December 22nd, 2025; by December 24th, she had shared with the Prime Minister her intentions to leave Canadian parliament to join the Ukrainian team. In responding to the Kremlin’s continued war of attrition, concerns beyond immediate hard power capabilities, military strategy, and command structures must be addressed. Freeland possesses a unique form of habituation to sustain delegitimation; her appointment may indeed be an important shock absorber to Russia’s ongoing disinformation campaigns, American partner unreliability, and the economic fatigue increasingly characterizing this war.

At the level of a broader wartime strategy, I suggest this capacity can also function as a form of resilience; it signals to communities, civil society, international partners, and adversaries alike that broader Ukraine’s leadership is prepared to govern through a liminal phase of uncertain futurity rather than govern toward a rapid endpoint. This is a strategy in stark contrast to Putin’s assumption that a “quick military operation” could sweep Ukraine in 2022, or that , once elected, could end the war in Ukraine in the first 24-hours of his second term. In this sense, it is important to emphasize that habituation is not merely an individual trait or disposition, but also a culturally sedimented capacity that is experienced transnationally and relationally. As Gusieva has argued, cultural resilience constitutes a foundational pillar of security; indeed, classical realist how such resilience at times is what pushes a nation beyond survival towards victory. I extend this logic here by suggesting that such cultural resilience is forged through repeated exposure to, and embeddedness within, enduring imperial projects and traditionalist military practices – in this case, namely, Russia’s ongoing attempts to reclaim imperial-great power status, legitimate its occupations, and sustain attritional warfare alongside its hybrid threats towards Europe.

In Ukraine, cultural habituation operates as resilience, but it is neither neutral nor abstract; rather, its experience is deeply racialized, ethnicized, and gendered. It is racialized and ethnicized through the persistent positioning of the nation as materially peripheral to Europe while cast as subordinate to Russia’s so-called historical sphere of influence; it is gendered through the paternalizing narratives directed at Ukraine and other Eastern European states aspiring to EU membership, as well as in the recurring trope of Ukraine as the “little brother” to a masculinized “Mother Russia.” More specifically, we see this reproduced through the hegemonically masculine practices embodied by state actors in political negotiations of economic and security matters; these behaviours continue to structure much of how political negotiation, listening, and diplomatic exchange take place. Freeland, in this respect, is a node within a broader relational structure of habituation and diplomatic practice in wartime Ukraine – one whose own political endurance aligns with, and stands to reinforce, Ukraine’s culturally embedded capacity to govern through attrition.

Please stay tuned for the next installment of this series, which will analyze Ukraine’s 2025 energy scandal and subsequent political moves undertaken President Zelenskyy following a state investigation that exposed high-level embezzlement within the nation’s energy sector.

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A new partnership was announced in January 2026 between Canadian and Estonian institutions that focus on clean energy solutions. The new partnership sets out three research projects that have been set for 2026, bringing together the University of Victoria’s Accelerating Community Energy Transformation (ACET) initiative and the Estonian Islands Energy Agency (EISEA). The aim of the partnership is to co-design and develop vital research and practical models for island populations as it relates to clean and sustainable energy priorities for local communities, which can then be expanded to larger populations. As featured in a by the University of Victoria, the hope is that by “combining ACET’s research expertise with EISEA’s on-the-ground knowledge of island communities, the partnership will foster innovative clean energy solutions, enhance local capacity and create replicable approaches to community-centered energy systems on Estonian islands.” This collaboration is part of a growing trend of Canadian cooperation with the Baltics, engaging with security, social, and professional sectors. In doing so, such a partnership gives an opportunity for Canada to support Baltic defence against Russian hybrid threats by developing broader social resilience strategies and relationships.

What will the partnership look like?

. The first, on Saarema, will investigate how local organic waste can be repurposed to power the island’s heating system. On Hiiuma, the second project will track a pilot initiative on sustainable energy production, distribution, and transportation. Both will generate important lessons on developing a circular and sustainable energy economy. The third project will look broadly at the social implications of energy development, analyzing how local communities respond to new projects. This can help build fair and transparent energy planning processes.

ACET and EISEA will be blending their research and innovation skills, each bringing an important skillset. Integral to the project will be the EISEA knowledge and engagement with Estonian island communities. The to ensure accurate interpretations of local contexts. For ACET, the partnership is an opportunity to showcase Canadian research leadership and apply lessons learned in previous projects. In the past, in British Columbia to co-design energy projects, giving important insight into how to lead collaborative and sustainable research development.

Security Implications

The development of clean energy in Estonia ties directly into their security resilience. Prior to 2022, Estonia was heavily reliant on Russian gas and oil, . While Estonia has been able to find alternative sources for LNG through Latvia and Lithuania, enhancing their own energy infrastructure will be integral to national capacity and resilience.

Previously, Estonia ; however, , part of the pipeline was damaged, leading Estonia to pivot to other Baltic states. The incident was alleged to be in response to heightened tensions over Russian sanctions. This highlights the need for strengthened local and regional infrastructure to mitigate possible threats. For example, . This is a vulnerability that can be exploited if there are disruptions to critical infrastructure by malign actors.

For islands in Estonia’s Baltic Sea, this is even more vital. Estonia has thousands of islands, some of which are exceptionally vulnerable due to distance from the mainland and close proximity to Russia. Last fall, . Other incursions have occurred in Poland and Lithuania, heightening security concerns among Europeans and their allies. While Estonia is , they will also need to ward off hybrid threats such as these. This means accounting for economic, environmental, social, and other vulnerabilities outside of hard security concerns. The partnership not only addresses critical infrastructure gaps, but it is doing so in a transparent and collaborative manner with local communities. This reinforces social cohesion and self-sustainability within these smaller populations – a model that could be replicated elsewhere. Therefore, the partnership is a strong example of the comprehensive approaches NATO and its members can continue to seek out to improve its readiness and defence posture.

°ä˛ą˛Ô˛ą»ĺ˛ąâ€™s approach to Baltics

This announcement is aligned with other moves Canada has recently made to deepen ties with Baltic states. Through and , Canada has bolstered its defence presence in the region. °ä˛ą˛Ô˛ą»ĺ˛ąâ€™s presence in the Baltics ties into a broader national goal to be a more active global partner, particularly in the effort to improve European security. This is a noteworthy shift from the previous Trudeau government, whose values-based foreign policy at times left Canada to the periphery of important security decision-making in Europe. This recalibration signals an effort to translate normative commitments into more robust material contributions and relationships, enhancing °ä˛ą˛Ô˛ą»ĺ˛ąâ€™s own strategic role within NATO while ensuring it remains reliable.

The Baltics’ proximity to Russia makes them a key target for hybrid Russian threats, emphasizing the need to improve counterresponse. Estonia in particular shares a . Estonia has already partnered with NATO to improve their defence, including on the islands of ; however, full resilience will require a comprehensive approach that also defends critical infrastructure and community interests. Here, Canada has a strong opportunity to partner with Estonian companies and research institutions to support the development of industries and technology in preparation for a more robust counterresponse to Russian hybrid pressures.

Estonia has been . This has opened the opportunity for Canadian companies to connect with Estonia on renewable energy, storage capacity, and smart technologies. In . to deploy a BWRX-300 small modular reactor, which will boost their nuclear energy capacity. The work generated by ACET-EISEA will further develop these opportunities and centre them in the community while prioritizing environmental sustainability. This is where Canada can really shine, as not only a supporter but also a promoter of key values and goals of the liberal international order.

Conclusion

Looking ahead, ACET-EISEA is set to announce more collaboration in the coming months. As the projects begin in 2026, it will be important to track progress and lessons learned. The partnership is a strong example of the kinds of multinational action that is needed to address collective security and political concerns. Drawing from this experience can give strong models for other initiatives, which can in turn strengthen the development of the Transatlantic community. In doing so, these initiatives play a significant role in reinforcing the strategic cohesion necessary among the Alliance at a time when cooperation is increasingly being tested by geopolitical tension and conflict.

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Traditionally, strategic stability was commonly understood to be when no major power perceived an incentive to initiate a first nuclear strike. Historically, during the Cold War, this condition rested on mutual vulnerability and was achieved through arms control and measure. However, this framework is being reshaped by the advent of digital capabilities.

Unlike the relatively static assumptions of mutual vulnerability in Cold War–era stability models, the digital era introduces fluid and adaptive threat environments, compresses decision-making time, and reduces predictability.

To read the full policy brief and the implications for Canadian strategic stability, our national strategic autonomy, and potential contributions to our alliance partners, click the Download button below.

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With Hungary set to have its , Prime Minister Viktor Orbán is facing arguably the first serious challenge to his almost 16-year rule. The Respect and Freedom party – commonly referred to as the Tisza party – is led by Péter Magyar and has emerged as a viable alternative to the Orbán regime. Campaigning on an anti-corruption platform, Tisza has been able to resonate with a domestic population that is increasingly frustrated with Orban’s Fidesz party.

Internationally, Orbán has soured relations with historical allies over opposing aid to Ukraine, bouts of rising illiberalism, as well as recurring appeals to right-wing populism. Importantly, he is a figure charged with largely leading throughout Europe – a loosely coordinated but growing, transnational populist movement that combines social and cultural conservatism with anti-liberal, anti-globalist politics. Domestically, frustration within Hungary has risen over the inability to revive the economy from inflation and instability. This is reflected in the polls, where Fidesz has fallen to Tisza, 37% to 49%, respectively. The outcome of this election will have serious long-term implications on Hungary’s future political trajectory and offers the nation an opportunity to pivot away from an illiberal-populist trajectory. In turn, the election may also influence the dynamics of the European Union (EU), which has long suffered from Hungary’s divisive role as a wedge to political consensus.

Who is Tisza?

, Tisza is a centre-right party that has been growing in popularity. Tisza has focused its campaign largely on anti-corruption, promising initiatives such as strengthening judicial independence. This is a powerful message for Hungarians who have continued to face economic struggle while the ruling party has benefited from state resources.

Tisza also openly positions itself as anti-Orbán, criticizing the leader for nepotism and allegedly funding an oligarchy. They have been able to convert some loyal Fidesz supporters but much of their support stems from luring voters from various opposition bases. Magyar himself was at one point , working as public administrator. He later resigned following a scandal where Hungary’s former President, , pardoned the former the deputy director of the Kossuth Zsuzsa’s Children’s Home in Bicske, who had been . After his resignation, Magyar as corrupt and authoritarian and has since continued to consolidate opposition.

Magyar has promised to on democratic issues related to the rule of law and human rights – two points the EU has increasingly been pressing in applying political pressure to the Orbán regime. The ongoing dispute has caused vital EU assets to be frozen and being able to access them could provide a necessary economic boost; however, the two parties would still have competing interests, as . Part of their appeal has been that they are neither pro-EU or anti-EU, but rather opt to prioritize the interests of Hungary and the V4 countries (Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia). This indicates that Tisza’s approach may still be rooted in right-wing and nationalist values shared amongst their neighbours. These risks inciting further tension with the EU, who have been critical of these values on the basis that they work against collective action and Western liberal democracy.

Differing ideologies and rhetorics can continue to fracture relations between Brussels and Eastern Europe. Regarding Russia and China, Magyar seeks to establish what he calls “.” This would prioritize mutual strategic interests and values rather than personal ties. Tisza has also highlighted the need to ; however, this is unlikely to revolutionize the Hungarian-Russian relationship, as the former remains reliant on Russia’s crude oil and gas. Magyar has stated openness to renegotiating projects like the and remains wary of Chinese foreign direct investment.

How likely is a Tisza win?

While polls are indicating a strong lead, the real battleground will be during the election period. Fidesz is notorious for influencing elections by using state resources to create an uneven political playground. Orbán himself has been known to use tactics such as . In addition, opponents are strongly disadvantaged in their ability to campaign. Fidesz’s makes it easy to push smear campaigns and pro-Fidesz content, while the opposition has less platforms to use. To secure Parliament, Tisza will have to navigate a severely rigged, competitive, political environment. The challenge for the Fidesz party will be to determine how far they may interfere with elections, risking potential backlash from the population. Currently, Orbán has already launched a campaign against Tisza, .

What impact would a Tisza win have?

A change in government will improve Hungary’s domestic situation in the long-term, but in the short-term, and internationally, the results will be mixed. on corruption can help undermine the increasingly powerful oligarchy and reduce clientelism. The party has also promised to , which could improve rule of law in the country. Additionally, the possibility of EU funds can be vital for improving the economy and social infrastructure, should it be utilized effectively; however, many of these benefits will take time to materialize. Many members within Orbán’s government will still have the rest of their terms to serve. This could prevent the necessary cultural change within constitutional institutions that needs to take place for democracy to recuperate after corruption, further slowing the (re)adoption of democratic values, including proper checks and balances. Dismantling the oligarchy will also take time and consistent effort from both the top and the bottom. Therefore, while Tisza is likely to pivot away from democratic backsliding, this will be a slow process.

While Tisza aims to restore democratic values such as rule of law, voting rights, and judicial independence, it has yet to be determined if they will do the same for so-called “liberal” values. Tisza has shied away from taking a stance on controversial issues, including Hungary’s LGBTQIA+ community and migration policies. This leaves uncertainty around whether they are willing to tackle social issues.

The popularity of both Tisza and Fidesz means Parliament may be run by right-wing parties come spring. Left-wing parties such as Democratic Coalition and Mi Hazanak . Under Orbán, , supporting the formation of a coalition of socially conservative, anti-EU, populist leaders. This includes prominent figures such as in Slovakia and in the Czech Republic. This coalition includes strong and persistent Euroskeptics that have stalled key EU decisions and leveraged recurring attacks against Brussels. While a Tisza government would not eliminate opposing standpoints, pursuing institutional compromises and negotiations instead of veto politics could ease internal hostilities. However, if Tisza elects to continue strengthening the right-wing flank, right-wing populism may become even more embedded into Europe’s institutional and political infrastructure. This could exacerbate polarization and division among communities, further destabilizing Europe’s political climate at a time when the world is already increasingly experiencing shifts in polarity and great power contestation.

Conclusion

The parliamentary elections in April 2026 have opened the opportunity for a change in governance for Hungary. This has the potential to strengthen democratic institutions, rule of law, and civil freedoms; however, Tisza will have to navigate a hostile electoral environment and consolidate a base strong enough to outweigh external interference. If they win, Hungary will be at a crossroads. Their decisions on social issues, the Russia-Ukraine war, and ties with the EU will help determine the nature of Hungary’s democracy moving forward.

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°ä˛ą˛Ô˛ą»ĺ˛ąâ€™s national strategy is undergoing a fundamental transformation. Great power competition, technological change, and hybrid tactics have reshaped the nature of modern conflict, blurring the boundaries between domestic stability and external security. States today face pressure not only to deter conventional military threats but also to address challenges that primarily affect civilian societies. represents an attempt to strengthen national resilience by integrating investments in defence capacity, critical infrastructure, and domestic military industrial capability. Yet these measures unfold against a backdrop of worsening socioeconomic pressures at home, leaving the country exposed to domestic destabilization even as defence spending rises. The convergence of external threats and internal vulnerabilities reveals that national security can no longer be understood solely through the lens of military preparedness. National security today requires a hybrid-resilience approach, combining military readiness and social cohesion to address threats.

Strategic Context and Security Challenges

°ä˛ą˛Ô˛ą»ĺ˛ąâ€™s outlines a strategic approach to increasing adept at dealing with amidst the . By integrating , , and , Canada is trying to become a more autonomous nation. Simultaneously, addressing Canadian domestic security necessities through investment and nation-building projects will help . With Canada joining the EU’s defence procurement initiative, , Canadian defence firms gain access to European joint procurement and finance mechanisms.

As the United States (US), °ä˛ą˛Ô˛ą»ĺ˛ąâ€™s traditional security guarantor, increasingly focuses on the Indo-Pacific and signals a reduced willingness to underwrite transatlantic stability, Canada is . Yet contemporary risk environments are defined not only by but also by , including , , and . Addressing these threats requires a multidimensional security posture that integrates physical, technological, and societal components. The budget’s allocation toward , , and developing underscores a commitment to and strategic autonomy. Investments in advanced technologies such as , , and further demonstrate recognition that modern security extends beyond traditional military capability, encompassing both technological resilience and the protection of critical industrial and information networks.

However, amidst a growing “” dilemma, in which defence imperatives compete with mounting domestic socioeconomic pressures, Canadian security challenges are complex. Socioeconomic vulnerabilities, , , , and , interact with traditional and hybrid security threats, creating interdependent risks. 

CAF Readiness and Personnel Support

Critical to a hybrid-resilient approach is developing the strength and readiness of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). Addressing hard-security concerns requires not only modern capabilities but also ensuring that CAF personnel are supported, retained, and operationally effective. Retention is a significant concern, with of new members leaving service, highlighting the need for , , and an enhanced . The recent are a step in the right direction, but additional investments in housing, , and are essential. Equally important are mental-health services, which have been consistently and who face the cumulative stresses of operations, repeated deployments, and long-term service.

At the same time, °ä˛ą˛Ô˛ą»ĺ˛ąâ€™s defence procurement system continues to face relating to personnel shortages and a multi-departmental model. While the Ministry of Public Services and Procurement invests in high-profile platforms such as and , – including , , and – receives insufficient attention from the federal government. The most recent audit by the (2025) found that as of March 31, 2024, many training areas had less gear than needed, while others did not have enough equipment to carry out training operations.

More transparent and accountable procurement processes are needed to ensure that frontline personnel have reliable, effective tools to perform their duties safely and efficiently. Strengthening both personnel support and procurement effectiveness not only enhances operational readiness but also integrates material and human resource stability into a broader national resilience framework, complementing community-level and social initiatives to counter hybrid threats.

Socioeconomic Pressures and Domestic Security Concerns

Although the federal budget , the and the limited attention to worsening social crises leave Canada vulnerable to further destabilisation, populism, and societal polarisation. For many young people facing , military service can appear to be one of the few . A recent analysis by highlights that °ä˛ą˛Ô˛ą»ĺ˛ąâ€™s youth face some of the toughest labour-market conditions in decades, making enlistment in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) a possible remedy for the youth unemployment crisis. This pattern echoes the , which has long been criticised for disproportionately drawing in economically disadvantaged youth, effectively creating pathways into the armed forces driven less by choice and more by necessity. 

Such dynamics also raise serious domestic security concerns: far-right networks have, in documented cases, encouraged members to or sought contact with as a means of acquiring and . Compounding this trend is the in Canada- particularly common among young men- which increasingly identify as a potential gateway into broader extremist ideologies. Without sufficient attention to these online spaces, the risk posed by vulnerable youth becoming radicalised and incentivised to join the military becomes a serious concern for domestic security and the protection of liberal-democratic values.

Growing separatist movements, particularly in and , highlight regional discontent and political polarisation, which can interact with socioeconomic vulnerabilities and be exploited by both domestic and foreign actors seeking to exacerbate societal fractures. These dynamics intersect with broader socioeconomic pressures and are further amplified by hybrid threats and foreign interference, which serve to exploit domestic polarisation through strategies titled “” 
Integrating with defence and technological investments is central to a . International examples, such as , demonstrate how initiatives that strengthen , media literacy, and can meaningfully complement traditional security capabilities. For Canada, public-awareness efforts like the campaign, which brings together over fifty feminist organisations to advocate for , , and , help address the socioeconomic stresses and political grievances that make communities vulnerable to polarisation and manipulation. 

Additionally, coordinated programs commissioned by the federal government, such as the (CRF) and the (DCI), linking defence, industrial strategy, and social resilience not only enhance the country’s ability to detect, withstand, and recover from hybrid threats but also reinforce national cohesion. In this sense, investing in social stability is not an adjunct to national security but a foundational component of it: strengthening communities, reducing socioeconomic vulnerabilities, and empowering citizens collectively contribute to a more unified, resilient society capable of withstanding increasingly complex threat environments.

Towards a Hybrid-Resilient Canada

°ä˛ą˛Ô˛ą»ĺ˛ąâ€™s security landscape in the twenty-first century is defined by the convergence of traditional military threats, hybrid challenges, and domestic vulnerabilities. As this analysis demonstrates, a comprehensive approach to national resilience cannot rely solely on modernising the Canadian Armed Forces or expanding technological and industrial capabilities. Socioeconomic pressures, including youth unemployment, housing insecurity, and political polarisation, interact with hybrid threats, creating opportunities for extremist mobilisation, disinformation, and foreign interference. Social spending is not a competing priority in an era of heightened geopolitical tension; it is a core element of national defence.

By investing in social programs, community resilience initiatives, and public-awareness campaigns like Demand Better, Canada addresses these underlying vulnerabilities while simultaneously strengthening civic trust, cohesion, and adaptability. When combined with targeted defence investments and technological modernisation, such measures create a multidimensional, hybrid-resilient framework capable of withstanding both internal and external pressures. Social spending and citizen support are not peripheral to national security; they are at the very heart of it. A Canada that invests in the well-being of its people is not only more equitable and inclusive but also more unified, adaptable, and resilient in the face of modern conflict.

The post From Defence to Community – Social Stability as a Pillar of National Security appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

â—Ź Russia has been testing and refining hybrid tactics in the Balkans since the 2010s

â—Ź Hybrid tactics prey on ethnic divisions, political instability, and encourage hostility towards the West

● Russia’s tactics have increased their soft power, making it easier for malign actors to destabilize Europe

Russia’s unconventional threats

Hybrid threats have become an increasingly pervasive aspect of the global security landscape. Since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Russian Federation has been a key instigator of hybrid attacks, launching disinformation and propaganda campaigns, offensive cyber operations, espionage, and attacks on critical infrastructure. In Ukraine, hybrid tactics act as a force multiplier for traditional combat. Such hybrid tactics seek to weaponize divisions between social groups; the government and citizens; as well as economic and structural weaknesses to undermine faith in the systems, norms, and values of Western countries. By eroding public trust and exploiting weaknesses in target countries, societies are becoming more susceptible to internal vulnerability and Russian influence.

One area that has been a target of hybrid tactics is the Western Balkans. A critical juncture between West and East, the Balkans have been an area of competing ideology and cultural influence; it is also a region with a multitude of divisions for Russia to exploit. The repeated use of threats and fanning of tensions may imply a desire to stoke regional conflict, which could divide and disorder Europe. Much of Russia’s connection to the area is rooted in , which in the worst case scenario, could invite further expansionist ambitions into the region. Russia has largely implemented hybrid warfare tactics in places where they can leverage the most historical and cultural connections: Serbia; Republika Srpska; Montenegro; and North Macedonia (Slavic population).

Proxy Political Actors

Since the 2010s, Russia has been developing and testing clear methods of direct interference in political systems. Their primary tactic is backing ultranationalist and populist political figures. This includes the VMRO-DPMNE party in North Macedonia, which is a pro-Russian right-wing party. They have amplified , including the Macedonian naming dispute regarding . In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Milorad Dodik has been a strong pro-Kremlin force in the region, advocating for the secession of Republika Srpska, the Serbian-dominated enclave in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Russia recently used the in an effort to condemn Western influence in the region. In Serbia, Kremlin-backed politicians have historically been influential. , appointed to Parliament in 2024, President Aleksander Vučić has also frequently been accused of succumbing to Russia influence, though in the Serbian-Russian bilateral relationship remain notable. Russia’s use of state proxy actors is an effective way to ensure that the developing democratic systems in these countries remain divided and fragile. These actors are effective at preventing cooperation and often incite violent and polarizing rhetoric.

Non-political proxy actors

Russia has also refined its hybrid tactics through the exploitation of religious and cultural ties. The Russian Federation has deep and historical ties with the Orthodox Church, an integral part of daily life and culture in many Balkan countries. Pro-Kremlin oligarchs provide financial support to the Church and its charitable works. In return, moves towards democracy are framed as immoral Western decadence, which destroys traditional culture. The Orthodox Church has frequently opposed sovereignty and democracy for Montenegro and Kosovo, framing it as a threat to pan-Slavic identity. This rhetoric maintains tensions around territory, making peace more fragile. Cultural associations, mainly in Serbia, serve to disseminate propaganda among everyday citizens and cement Russian opinions. . Since the group was dismantled, the fate of criminal recruiting networks remains unclear. Another famous example is the . Cultural and educational programs throughout the region promote Russian language and ideology. This primes citizens to be more susceptible to Russian narratives and propaganda, increasing the effectiveness of hybrid tactics. Russia’s actions in the Balkans demonstrates its ability to leverage indirect, soft forms of influence.

Digital Landscape

Russia has been able to effectively weaponize social media and news outlets throughout the Balkans. Primarily, these efforts are targeted towards Serbian audiences. News outlets are flooded with Russian disinformation and propaganda. . The site itself is accessible to a wide audience, filling information voids with inflammatory stories. Many popular local news outlets – not tied to Russia – often repost such information as well. Disinformation portrays the West as weak, reinvigorating controversial memories such as the 1999 NATO bombings, and overstating regional conflicts. Outlets like , , and consistently regurgitate this messaging. Russia also leverages social media platforms like Telegram to further its disinformation campaign. Rybar, a pro-Russian channel, recently posted information regarding the joint special exercise between Albania, Croatia, and Kosovo. It claimed that this was evidence of an axis being formed by the West. Dozens of local Serbian channels reposted this information, inciting panic and paranoia about ethnic tensions.

Conclusion

Russia’s moves in the Western Balkans demonstrates its intentions to destabilize Europe from multiple fronts in the east, while simultaneously waging war in Ukraine This can divide the attention and resources of European nations, which improve the success of Russia’s strategic ambitions. For years, malign influence has penetrated the region, as noted in NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept. NATO should build on their outlined commitment and empower the region to become more resilient to hybrid threats.

Policy Recommendations

â—Ź Existing institutions and developmental frameworks should be buttressed by NATO to support democracy-building in the region

â—Ź Canada should support resilience and democratic stability by developing bilateral ties via NGO, diplomatic, and economic partnerships.

â—Ź Individuals, companies, centres, and associations who undermine democracy and encourage pro-Russian beliefs should be appropriately identified and restricted.

The post Russia’s Hybrid War in the Balkans appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

Prior to 2022, Europe’s defence posture relied heavily on NATO deterrence and the United States’ (US) security guarantee, underscoring the absence of a fully realized shared strategic vision within the European Union (EU). Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, coupled with growing , exposed the risks of this reliance and accelerated the EU’s push for greater strategic autonomy. For the first time, the EU financed the through the European Peace Facility and under the 2023–25 European Defence Industrial Programme. Defence spending soared across the continent, and what had long been an aspirational concept of strategic autonomy became an urgent necessity, even if its full realization remains a long-term project.

Yet, as Russia’s war in Ukraine exceeds its third year, the EU faces a lingering challenge: the rise of far-right governments in many of its member states. While strategic autonomy is still top of mind for EU leaders, materialized through the introduction of , several members states are increasingly pursuing nationalist defence agendas. As a result, the EU finds itself caught between advancing the architecture of collective defence while simultaneously contending with leaders who instrumentalize this same mechanism for domestic political gain. This tension has direct implications for Europe’s credibility as a security actor. It complicates efforts to align defence procurement, weakens the consistency of sanctions and aid policies, and risks eroding the transatlantic trust which Europe still depends on for deterrence.

The Far-Right Populist and Defence

The far right’s influence on European defence policy does not manifest through outright obstruction but through . Rather than rejecting Brussels’ new defence architecture, nationalist leaders have learned to operate within it, appropriating both its funding mechanism and its language to advance sovereignty-based agendas. These actors recognize that participating in EU-funded defence initiatives confers both material and symbolic rewards: access to industrial contracts, regional investment, and the legitimacy that comes from being seen as a responsible European partner. What distinguishes them is not withdrawal, but the ability to convert cooperation into a narrative of national strength. In doing so, they hollow out the collective rationale of defence integration, turning what should be a shared European project into a vehicle for domestic legitimacy.

Hungary illustrates this pattern most overtly. Under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, the Hungarian government while remaining ambivalent toward the collective logic underpinning the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In 2017, Budapest initiated the , a €13 billion modernization effort aimed at creating domestic supply chains for arms and munitions. German firms such as , establishing joint ventures that anchor Hungary’s defence industry within the European market while strengthening Orban’s narrative of rebuilding the Hungarian military. The , co-financed through EU cohesion funds and national investment subsidies, is emblematic of this dual logic: it deepens Hungary’s integration in the EU defence economy even as Orban portrays it as proof of national self-reliance.

Yet while leveraging these partnerships, Hungary remains one of the least aligned member states when it comes to the that underpin the EU’s CSDP overall goal. Budapest consistently resists the forms of coordination that give CSDP substance, shared threat assessments, deeper PESCO commitments, and capability-pooling arrangements that would bind national planning to collective European priorities. At the same time, Budapest has sought access to funding under the EU’s new support for Ammunition and Firearms Expansion loan instrument, , while opposing proposals to link disbursements to rule-of-law compliance. Orban repeatedly frames defence modernization as integral to protecting Hungary’s national identity, emphasizing that . Hungary supports EU investment when it serves its industrial base, such as the Security Action for Europe and European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement schemes, that would make these mechanisms genuinely European. Orban’s model thus envisions a Europe of self-reliant states loosely connected through markets and contracts, not through . The result is a form of instrumental integration, wherein Hungary contributes materially to Europe’s rearmament while eroding the institutional cohesion that collective security demands.

The EU’s Response

The dual challenge of Russian aggression and internal fragmentation has forced EU leaders to harden both its defence and governance instruments. The EU’s post-2022 defence agenda has expanded at a pace unseen since the bloc’s creation. The Readiness 2030 initiative, announced in 2025, seeks to mobilize over and establish new fiscal flexibility for member states to allocate up to 1.5 percent of GDP to defence without breaching budget-deficit rules. A is intended to finance joint procurement of military products, while the European Defence Industrial Strategy lays the groundwork for a with harmonized rules to enable faster and larger-scale production.

At the same time, recognizing Russia’s active hybrid warfare strategy and the role illiberal and populist actors play in it, the EU has coupled defence integration with measures to safeguard its democratic infrastructure. The now empowers Brussels to audit social-media platforms and penalize those that facilitate foreign influence operations. The EU has also invested in counter-hybrid capabilities, from cyber-resilience frameworks to a proposed along its eastern frontier, reflecting the growing convergence of internal and external security.

Conclusion – A Contested Path Forward

Europe’s defence awakening has built the structure of strategic autonomy but not its political foundation. The EU now commands funding instruments, industrial incentives, and procurement schemes approaching a true defence union, yet its legitimacy in this area still remains fragile. Without a mandate rooted in democratic accountability and public debate, these mechanisms risk becoming a technocratic enterprise that populists can exploit for their domestic gain. Leaders such as Viktor Orbán have learned to navigate this gap, appropriating the language and benefits of European rearmament to validate nationalist narratives while obstructing collective decision-making.

Yet public sentiment offers an opening. .The task for Brussels is to transform this diffuse approval into a clear mandate, linking defence to agency, accountability, and shared purpose. Strategic autonomy will only endure if it becomes political as well as industrial, anchored in legitimacy, communication, and leadership that make Europe not just rearmed, but united.

Policy Recommendations: From Technocracy to Political Cohesion

To combine Europe’s strategic autonomy and close the legitimacy gap that populist actors exploit, the EU must move beyond institutional design to political consolidation. The following measures outline how Brussels can align its defence ambitions with democratic cohesion.

Mobilize public consent through strategic communication and civic engagement – The EU should institutionalize structured citizen dialogue on security and defence, modelled on the Conference on the Future of Europe, to engage Europeans in shaping the Union’s strategic priorities.

Form a European Strategic Communication Taskforce for Defence – The EU should establish a Strategic Communication Taskforce for Defence to counter the populist narratives that reframe collective defence as a threat to sovereignty or a national achievement. Housed within the European External Action Service and building on existing StratCom capabilities, the taskforce would coordinate messaging across member states, highlight the local benefits of EU-funded defence projects, and proactively counter disinformation about European rearmament.

Strengthen role of European Defence Commissioner and unify procurement authority – The establishment of a Defence and Space Commissioner marks progress, but the portfolio currently lacks the political weight and institutional tools needed to meaningfully coordinate EU defence initatives. With responbilities dispersed between the European External Action Service, the Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space, and the European Defence Agency, strengthening the Commissioner’s mandate, particularly in unified procurement and capability planning, would reduce fragmentation and advance Europe’s strategic sovereignty.

The post Europe’s Fragmented Shield: Populism and the Politics of EU Defence Integration appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

On November 1st, 2025, , the site of a railway canopy collapse that killed sixteen people just a year prior. Novi Sad railway station, intended to be a symbol of modernization after renovations led by , instead became a demonstration of how quickly corruption can turn deadly. Student-led protests quickly began, calling for accountability and a transparent investigation on the incident; however, as resistance and negligence continued, the movement quickly grew to a revolt against an entire system deemed corrupt. Aleksander Vučić, the president of Serbia and founder of the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), has long defined his rule in Serbia through increasing autocratization. His anti-democratic methods have incited more outrage, but also made it more difficult to realize change. What are some of the successes and challenges that have defined the movement so far? What are possible next steps?

Success through community

One of the most notable features of the protests was the ability to mobilize vast sectors of the population. Leaders like Vučić are very skilled at making citizens feel shut out from politics; the protests have reawakened a sense of agency and power among society. The students leading the protest have been able to gain the support of the , , , and . Students have made an effort to include marginalized voices, which has bridged the divide between urban-rural populations, cultural groups, and sectors. Key to the organization has been its leaderless and decentralized form. Rather than establishing any new kind of hierarchy, the protests have opted for horizontal forms of authority, which ensure all participants are equal. for debates and decisions. This has also allowed all participants to feel that they are actively involved in their own governance and society, rather than remaining disenfranchised. The tactics used by the protestors have also aided its success. Actions that are symbolic, yet peaceful and legal, have made resistance approachable. These include traffic blockades, inter-city marches, social media campaigns, and marathons to Brussels.

The protests have pushed the resignation of select key officials, including the . An investigation was opened, but the lack of progress and reality of state power of the judiciary remain an issue. Similarly, partial documents around the construction project have been released, but much information . The protesters, after much campaigning, have received official support on October 22, 2025. This could have impacts on the ability for external actors to pressure Vučić. The sustained cooperation and power of the protests remain its biggest success, demonstrating the power of the people and the ability for citizens to regain their voice.

Challenges: state pushback

Crackdowns on civil society, control over free press, patronage networks, and election interference have become characteristic of Vučić’s office, undermining Serbia’s development as well as its pathway to democracy and EU accession. This has led to many calling for a leadership change. Vučić has responded by attacking the protestors, labelling them as . Physical attacks, smear campaigns, doxxing, unlawful questioning/detainment, and the controversial continue to be ongoing threats levied against protestors. Attacks on the educational sector have also been strong, with teachers facing pay cuts and threats since the beginning of the protests. Over the summer, government response became increasingly violent, with . This has drawn international criticism and has exponentially increased the threat level for protest participants. The government has also organized , though they remain smaller than their opposition.

State pushback and unwillingness to discuss have impeded the ability of meaningful dialogue and reform to occur; however, the system was designed this way. For protestors, it is difficult to translate actions into meaningful reform through the barring of political participation in civil society. , and social-political structures are captured by the state. Additionally, the has stood out for being very reticent in their support, likely due to fears over economic uncertainty following a new government, or to their own connections to .

An additional area where more support would be instrumental relates to international and external actors. The EU’s formal resolution came after months of relative disengagement from events in Serbia. Many may view student protests as a potentially unstable bet, however there should be strong support for civil society and the principles the protestors are advocating for. For a long time, international actors who support Vučić (such as Russia and China) have been louder than those in support. Considerable political transformation must take place in order to pressure Vučić, both internally and externally.

Where to next?

Currently, the protest sits at a defining moment. The past year has seen success through mass mobilization, the resignation of key officials, and the EU’s resolution of support for the protest. However, the government remains strong, and while . This has raised the issue of how to navigate these challenges. A major debate surrounds how the students should engage in the electoral arena. A student’s list of outsider candidates is being developed, however . It is difficult to justify joining the very system seen as corrupt, and there are concerns the election will not actually reform the system, just change the face. Additionally, attempts from are a growing internal issue that risks causing further division and factionalism. It may require the protestors to set ideological lines, countering its primarily apolitical image.

The protests in Serbia demonstrate the power of collective action and citizen mobilization. Its year-long anniversary marks a crossroads where the collective needs to decide its next steps. How they choose to orient themselves could have deep implications on the success of the protests and the growing political voice of the people.

The post Reflecting on 1 year post Novi Sad: Where to next? appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

The South Caucasus region has historically been regarded as one of the most complex regions in the world, where geopolitical rivalries, ethnic disputes, and energy security risks collide. One of the longest-lasting conflicts in the region is the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh.

This paper aims to study the Washington Peace Declaration between Armenia and Azerbaijan and its potential impact on security and economic integration in the South Caucasus region. TRIPP and related transport initiatives could enable Armenia and Azerbaijan to serve as critical components of a strategic transit corridor linking Europe and Asia. US and EU engagement is highlighted as essential for maintaining stability and attracting investment in the region.

The post The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Geopolitical Significance of the Washington Peace Declaration for the South Caucasus appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.