Key Takeaways

• Georgia’s ruling party, Georgian Dream (GD), has recently turned to history in order to position itself as a defender of a peaceful, enduring state amid dangerous neighbours.

• GD continues to conduct a multivector foreign policy but must carefully balance relationships with Eurasian powers alongside a “European” identity favoured by its citizens.

• As long as it spurns Euro-Atlantic integration, Georgia’s security relies on its utility as a hub to evade sanctions and conduct international trade.

A Turn to Georgia’s Pre-Imperial Past

Georgia’s Prime Minister, Irakli Kobakhidze, detoured centuries into the country’s history during a briefing on international relations on August 18. Before the press, he praised the 1783 Treaty of Georgievsk, when Erekle II of the Georgian kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti accepted Russian “protection” in exchange for guarantees of sovereignty.

Kobakhidze’s unprompted defence of a treaty that foreshadowed Imperial Russia’s annexation of Georgia sparked a firestorm at home and abroad. Did this move herald a new stage – or at least a new public stage – in Russia-Georgia relations? Russian media nodded approvingly. What might this mean for Georgia’s multivector foreign policy, which has been leaning heavily towards China, Iran and Eurasia in the past years? What did it augur for tentative efforts at transatlantic détente with North America and the European Union (EU), which have been critical of Georgia’s democratic backsliding?

Any effort to attribute long-term strategy to the actions of the governing Georgian Dream (GD) party is risky, but Kobakhidze appealed to domestic and international audiences alike as he spoke about Georgia’s place in the world through its history. The diversion reveals above all the delicacy of Georgia’s security surrounded by countries currently at war (Russia, Ukraine, Iran) as well as those considering a path to peace (Armenia, Azerbaijan, °ŐĂĽ°ů°ěľ±˛â±đ). It also accounts for the Georgian population’s ambivalent views towards Europe, Russia and Eurasian powers.

Kobakhidze presented Erekle II’s decision as a “” for Georgia. He cited Christianity and “traditional European culture” in a treaty that ostensibly allowed Georgia to avoid assimilation into Turkic or Persian worlds. He also argued Georgians that Russia – which later violated the agreement, absorbing the region in 1801 – would act in its own interests, in a briefing that presented a of international relations.

Russia’s state-run news agency, RIA Novosti, highlighted Kobakhidze’s speech with the headline: “.” Georgian opposition figures alongside Mikheil Saakashvili, the now-jailed former Prime Minister, that this “history lesson” foreshadowed a future agreement between Georgia and Russia. One that the Georgian public, still negatively inclined towards its northern neighbour (), would need to swallow for its own future survival and “civilization.”

Europe (Which Europe) or Eurasia?

Motivations behind Kobakhidze’s statements, however, appear more complicated. GD has little to gain through formalizing a relationship with Russia. Opening a discussion on the Russian-backed territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia – which together compose about 20% of Georgia’s territory – would open a large wound with unpredictable consequences. Given Russia’s unpopularity in Georgia, GD has always operated in a zone of plausible (and public) deniability of links between Moscow and Tbilisi. Sanctions-busting, however, . Georgia has followed domestic security playbooks used in Russia and Belarus, among others, from to the .

Keeping these relationships quiet also allows Georgia to continue feigning allegiance with the West even as it builds an increasingly authoritarian state, condemning “,” and . The loss, however, of their closest ally in Europe – Hungary’s Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party – complicated GD’s narrative that they would join, in essence, an Orbánified-Europe. Georgia has extended olive branches to and a high-level parliamentary delegation visited in June. As Kobakhidze’s defence of Erekle II highlights, Georgia continues to view itself as “civilizationally” European. GD leaders hold , alongside citizenship for their families. Formal agreements with Russia would threaten GD members with further sanctions () and disturb their quiet – though commonly-known within Georgia – relationship with the European powers whose liberal values they condemn in terms .

Kobakhidze’s highlighting of Erekle II’s Christian choice also serves to counterbalance its increasing Eurasian links, even as the population overwhelmingly considers itself European. Thus far in 2026, Kobakhidze has visited the Central Asian countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan; Uzbek President Shavkat Mirzoyiyev met Kobakhidze in Tbilisi in July. Georgian President Mikheil Kavelashvili also attended the funeral of Iranian leader Ayatollah Khamenei in July 2026, while on June 9 Georgia and China “upgraded” their relationship to a “.”

The Middle Corridor: Georgia’s Future?

Georgia is staking its security and prosperity on acting as a critical transport hub through the Middle Corridor (also known as the ), linking China to Europe through Central Asia and the Caucasus. Traffic through the Middle Corridor has experienced since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Central Asia’s promise to increase the corridor’s importance in the coming years. Georgia’s free trade agreements with °ŐĂĽ°ů°ěľ±˛â±đ, the EU, and US also serve to make the country extremely attractive for Chinese enterprises. Chinese companies have already played a major role in upgrading Georgian road and rail infrastructure, while Xinjiang’s facilitates commercial exchange between Georgia and other Xinjiang-based Chinese companies.

Georgia’s ties with Iran have also deepened, though the effect of the ongoing regional war is unclear. As with Russia, Georgia has become a for Iranian companies. Russian strategic airlifters have been to Iran, even though the country has pledged to . And while relations with the US remain rocky, . Washington has noted the importance of Middle Corridor trade and in the long-stalled plan to develop the deep-sea Anaklia port on the Black Sea after a Chinese company withdrew from the project.

GD also realizes it needs to move quickly to consolidate trade as the prospective Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) could soon become a rival transitway across the Middle Corridor. With plans to take Chinese and Central Asian goods to Europe through Armenia and Azerbaijan, the TRIPP represents a threat to Georgia’s role in facilitating regional trade. However, to Georgia’s benefit, and faces staunch Iranian opposition.

How does Erekle II fit this picture? Kobakhidze wants Georgians to consider the historic King as making hard but necessary geopolitical decisions in a world of great powers. Kobakhidze, like Erekle in a way, wants to be seen as the trusted actor to deal with dangerous entities in the interests of maintaining a , which has been GD’s basic platform since 2022. GD wants to show a “civilized” European face even as it deepens dealings with Eurasian powers. This discourse also serves as a signal to Russia that Georgia is a friendly country even as it privileges maintenance of its sovereignty. GD will, in the meantime, happily use a historical debate to that has condemned this comparison through its control of an increasingly authoritarian regime. Georgians who oppose GD point to growing internal party divisions,, as evidence of a party lacking the funds to grease enough palms to tighten its rule. Such calls, however, remain based on hope more than evidence.

Policy Recommendations

• GD’s decision to support US civil aviation sanctions on Iran shows it is sensitive to Western pressure. Intensified efforts, by Europe and the US simultaneously, to identify and punish sanctions-busting by the Georgian government could loosen GD’s anti-democratic grip.

• Possible carrots for Georgia can involve support for trans-shipment through Anaklia or an expanded Poti port, with strings that would allow Georgian civil society groups to function. It is unclear, however, whether GD would make such a concession. One stick would involve efforts to shift trade to TRIPP, effectively icing Georgia out of the economic benefits of regional integration.

The post Back to the Future? Georgian Dream and Regional Security in the Caucasus appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

After 18 months of public inquiry, the Foreign Interference Commission, commonly known as the Hogue Commission, published a report highlighting extensive patterns of foreign interference and transnational repression in Canada. The report underscored how certain ethnic communities have been actively targeted by foreign governments, including Iran, India, China, and, to a lesser extent, Russia. The Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force has highlighted the impact of transnational repression on electoral processes in Canada, notably in the case of Joe Tay, the Conservative Party candidate for Don Valley North in 2025.

Both the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) have become increasingly involved in investigating cases of transnational repression affecting ethnic communities, including the high-profile murder of Hardeep Singh Nijjar in Surrey, British Columbia, in 2023. The report further contributed to the creation of the , responsible for administering and enforcing the provisions of the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act (FITAA).

The Government of Canada identifies Iran among the state actors conducting in the country, citing assassination plots, harassment of dissidents, and digital threats. In 2026, against the backdrop of widespread domestic political protests and direct military hostilities involving the United States (US) and Israel, anticipate that pressure on diaspora communities will intensify, citing a documented pattern in which periods of domestic instability are followed by increased activity abroad. Analysts read this pattern as an attempt to mitigate internal vulnerabilities while extending diaspora coercion as a component of broader hybrid conflict with Western states.

At the margins of, and often overlooked within, discussions of transnational repression, violence and intimidation occurring within ethnic communities continue to take place in Canada and other Western countries. This form of violence remains understudied and frequently falls between the mandates of national security agencies and local law enforcement. Because this type of violence comprises transnational repression, hate crimes and incidents, and local crime, an overall understanding of the trends and comparative analysis between countries is difficult to establish.

This white paper uses open-source intelligence to document escalating patterns of physical violence, intimidation, activism, and online harassment within the Iranian diaspora following the January 2026 domestic protests and US-Israeli war against Iran which has been ongoing since February. By doing so, we further investigate Iranian diaspora fragmentation beyond the highly visible transnational repression, providing security and law enforcement agencies a better overall understanding of security dynamics in Canada. Furthermore, if experts forecast a growing threat to Iranian Canadians from the Iranian government through 2026, a more comprehensive understanding of intra-community tensions and patterns of polarization will be essential for accurately assessing risks and developing appropriate policy responses.

The Iranian Diaspora in Canada: Polarization and Fragmentation in 2026

Since January 2026, Canada’s Iranian diaspora has mobilized on a significant scale. Roughly in Ottawa on 11 January, and an estimated on 14 February. While largely peaceful, these demonstrations highlighted growing ideological friction among different groups within the diaspora. Following the beginning of American and Israeli strikes on Iran in February 2026, also known as Operation “Epic Fury,” the Iranian diaspora in Canada became increasingly polarized. On 1 March, about in Calgary to oppose the American and Israeli strikes; an hour later, . The possibility of political transition, prompted by either domestic collapse or foreign intervention, has catalyzed intra-diaspora rivalry as competing groups seek to advance distinct political outcomes.

Political disagreement within Canada’s Iranian diaspora has hardened into a question of loyalty, dividing the community over foreign military intervention, the shape of a post-Republic Iran, and who counts as a legitimate opponent of the government. Since January 2026, street-level protests have largely split along two main axes: first, between monarchist (Pahlavist) demonstrators and those displaying pro-government or non-aligned symbols; and second, within the opposition itself, spanning monarchist right-wing groups, pro-democracy advocates, ethnic minority movements, and Mojahedin-aligned groups. 

The Pahlavists are the largest group in the 2026 mobilization. They support the return of Reza Pahlavi, the exiled son of the last shah. Within the broader pro-monarchy Pahlavi movement, a hardline nationalist element has increasingly asserted itself. This wing openly endorses more aggressive foreign policy measures against Tehran, including aligned Israeli-American military action, while displaying hostility toward political rivals in and other Western countries. Pro-Pahlavi forces increasingly embrace hardline rhetoric, reflected in the chant The slogan groups leftist and Mojahed opposition movements together with the clerical establishment, portraying all three as equal targets of opposition. This extremist wing has expanded rapidly since January 2026, coordinating across social media and establishing a physical presence at demonstrations throughout Western Europe and North America. Some branches march in , which has drawn controversy. This group often aligns with right-wing movements in Europe and North America and supports the American and Israeli strikes on Iran. It also polices its own side, rejecting supporters who would accept Pahlavi’s return as a civilian political figure rather than as monarch.

The second protest group consists of a loosely affiliated pro-democracy current, including republicans, anti-war activists, and those organizing under the 2022 slogan “Woman, Life, Freedom.” The slogan became the rallying cry of the that followed the death of Mahsa Amini, a 22-year-old woman, in September 2022, three days after her arrest by Iran’s Guidance Patrol over failing to wear her hijab according to state standards. For those in this camp, the slogan expresses a demand for women’s rights and personal freedoms. While these groups differ on the governance model for a future Iran, they share a rejection of both the Islamic Republic and a restored monarchy. However, monarchist activists often collapse these internal distinctions, framing diverse critics across this spectrum as leftists or Islamic Republic sympathizers. reported in February that aides to Reza Pahlavi in the US had pushed supporters to remove references to the Woman, Life, Freedom slogan from their social media accounts on the grounds that it is associated with a leftist and feminist agenda. In a video circulated on social media of a demonstration in Vancouver in February 2026, organizers barred the slogan, while a man leading the demonstration stated through a megaphone that those chanting the slogan were connected to the reformist parties in Iran and were attempting to steal the revolution. Meanwhile, the pre-1979 Lion and Sun flag serves as a common visual thread across these protests, carried by both Pahlavists and pro-democracy activists. The emblem has in Iranian iconography and its meaning has shifted over time. Some trace it to ancient Persia and read it as a symbol of Iranian history before the arrival of Islam, while in other narratives it evolved after Islam, and particularly after the Safavids made Shi’ism the state religion in 1501, into a symbol of Iran’s , with the lion representing Ali ibn Abi Talib (the first Shia Imam). Because these layers of meaning long predate the Pahlavi dynasty, many who carry the flag see it as a symbol of historic Iran rather than as an endorsement of any particular political system, which allows groups with different visions for the country’s future to claim it.

The Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK) is the third main group opposed to the Islamic Republic. Often described as a , this group is organized as an opposition movement in long-standing mutual hostility with both the monarchists and the government in Tehran. The group carries its own version of the Lion and Sun flag, adopted by its political wing, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (), in 1993, which is distinguishable from the Pahlavist version by the absence of the crown. Although still the most organized group within the opposition diaspora, the MEK remains unpopular among Iranians because of its cult-like internal practices, its origins as an Islamist-Marxist militia, and its during the Iran-Iraq war. The group’s presence at demonstrations is treated as a provocation by monarchists and government sympathizers alike, though since January 2026 it has kept a comparatively low profile in Canadian street mobilization.

Alongside general anti-Islamic Republic forces, various nationalist and ethno-regional groups have gained prominence within the Iranian diaspora, advocating for decentralization or state fragmentation in the event of government collapse. Ethnic minority groups, including Azeri, Arab, Kurdish, and Baluch movements, are pursuing distinct national rights, with demands spanning from regional federalism to outright independence. These platform positions put them in direct conflict with the centralizing nationalism of Pahlavist monarchists, other anti-Islamic Republic nationalists, and Islamic Republic supporters. Furthermore, several of these movements maintain cross-border ties with foreign governments, including Israel and °ŐĂĽ°ů°ěľ±˛â±đ, as well as regional armed groups, such as Iraqi Kurdish forces. Carrying their own flags and chanting their own slogans, they are often targeted by other groups in protests.

Contrasting with anti-Islamic Republic forces, pro-government elements within the diaspora consist of individuals sympathetic to Iran’s current political system. At political demonstrations, display of the Islamic Republic flag generally signals alignment with Tehran, and this group routinely clashes with opposition groups at such events. The same emblem carries a different meaning in other settings, however, since it remains the current national flag and is carried at cultural and sporting events by Iranians who hold no brief for the government, a distinction that bears directly on several of the incidents described below.

Intra-Diaspora Conflict: Escalating Violence and Tension in 2026

Heightened polarization and rising internal divisions are increasingly linked to criminal incidents within the Iranian diaspora and its political mobilization in Canada. These activities remain difficult to address through traditional judicial channels, as the high degree of polarization complicates perpetrator identification and successful prosecution.

Such polarization has escalated into intra-diaspora violence. In February 2026, Masood Masjoody, a critic of both the Islamic Republic and the exiled Pahlavi family, disappeared in British Columbia. His remains were found the following month. were charged with first-degree murder. that both accused had opposed the Iranian government and backed the monarchist movement in online posts, and that one was a defendant in a harassment suit Masjoody had filed before his death. Reuters later that Masjoody had himself belonged to the monarchist organization “Farashgard” before becoming a critic of it. In an interview in April 2025, Masjoody described being harassed for his views, saying that monarchist activists had threatened him without limits. Masjoody said that one threat specified the , and that he had submitted this material to the Supreme Court of British Columbia. Following a court appearance by the two accused, two groups of spectators and were separated by sheriffs.

Days after Masjoody disappeared, ten diaspora figures, most of them critics of the monarchist campaign or of the war, were which read, in Farsi and beneath a knife emoji, that they would soon have to find the corpses of many. The account was named for SAVAK, the pre-1979 Iranian security service, and has since been deactivated. At least two of those tagged reported the post to police and altered their routines. In July, a Greater Toronto Area resident publicly called on to add a lethal agricultural chemical to food served at a public funeral, drawing condemnation from voices in the diaspora. Although directed at events in Iran, the statement was made publicly from Canada by a resident and no public action by Canadian authorities has followed. In March, Toronto Police arrested two counter-demonstrators at the rally following a clash between pro-Islamic Republic and anti-Islamic Republic protesters. One of the accused allegedly tore an Islamic Republic flag from a participant’s back and later set one alight; his charges include public incitement of hatred. Toronto Police stated that both investigations were being At a monarchist demonstration in downtown Toronto in January, a man who had argued with participants was struck in the face and injured in the eye. Video that circulated afterwards shows a participant defending the assault on the grounds that he had insulted them. At demonstrations in Vancouver, have gathered in close proximity and entered into sustained confrontation. In June 2026, the City of Toronto had to of the World Cup match between Iran and Belgium because of public safety concerns related to the demonstrations and increased risks of confrontations between pro-Islamic Republic and anti-Islamic Republic protesters. FIFA from World Cup stadiums in May. Tensions have occasionally manifested in threats or acts of physical violence targeting pro-democracy activists, government sympathizers, and ethno-national groups such as Azerbaijani, Arab, Kurd, and Baluch representatives. Those who or repeat the expected slogan are increasingly treated not as opponents but as collaborators. Polarization within the diaspora has increased drastically in everyday life as well. A boycott campaign has circulated online naming Iranian businesses in Toronto as being affiliated with or supporting the Islamic Republic, including . Harassment between monarchist activists and their critics has also increased, and Iranian-Canadian academics and journalists in Toronto describe receiving repeated death threats, rape threats, and doxxing over the same period. On 12 April, was exchanged between the two sides at a rally in Toronto.

Parallel Dynamics in the United States and United Kingdom

These dynamics extend well beyond Canada. Over the same timeframe, comparable clashes involving the same groups have emerged across the broader West, notably in the US and the United Kingdom (UK). This widespread incidence points to a systemic, transnational pattern of diaspora fragmentation and intra-community conflict, and underlines the challenges facing law-enforcement agencies in Canada.

In the US, on 11 January, in the Westwood district of Los Angeles, California, carrying a banner that read “No Shah. No Regime. USA: Don’t Repeat 1953. No Mullah,” a message rejecting both the monarchy and the Islamic Republic. According to the , demonstrators tore the banner from the truck, smashed its windows, and assaulted the driver, who then drove through the crowd. The driver was arrested for reckless driving and later released without charge.

In March, that ^[1] In June, during Iran’s opening World Cup match in , stadium officials had to break up a fight in the stands between . Outside the stadium, videos circulated showing , as well as other people trying to enter or leave the stadium, being harassed by Pahlavi supporters for not carrying the Lion and Sun flag.

In the UK, Pahlavi supporters have targeted ethnic minority Iranians and anti-war demonstrators, treating those who oppose the American and Israeli military campaign against Iran as complicit with the Islamic Republic. In March, following an attack on a Kurdish-owned restaurant in London, , the UK correspondent for Kurdistan24, was seriously injured by a group of roughly fifteen monarchist supporters while reporting on the incident. The Metropolitan Police opened an investigation into what witnesses described as part of a wider pattern of attacks on Kurdish businesses and individuals. In April, , an Iranian demonstrating against the war outside Downing Street, was stabbed several times by a counter-protester of Iranian origin and survived. He had previously been abused in public, and other anti-war Iranians in the UK reported threats of stabbing from the monarchist side at demonstrations.

Beyond Transnational Repression: Jurisdictional Challenges

Existing scholarship on transnational repression has focused primarily on state-directed activities targeting dissidents, while paying comparatively little attention to coercive and violent dynamics occurring within diaspora communities. Transnational repression is now seen as a matter of national security in relation to foreign interference. Violence between diaspora members falls outside this scope when it is not sponsored and supported directly by foreign governments.

Intra-community violence is a more complex process involving genuine political activism as well as organized criminality and foreign interference. Political activism such as protests can turn into political intimidation and violence aimed at silencing part of ethnic communities which, in turn, leads to social polarization. Canada has seen intra-community political violence before. Examples include the confrontations at Eritrean community events in and , and the inward-directed incidents that have accompanied . In each instance, the conduct was handled as public disorder or as a matter of foreign interference rather than as diaspora politics in its own right. This threat is not specific to Canada and occurs in most Western countries.

, the RCMP is the primary agency responsible for investigating threats to national security, including foreign interference as defined under the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act. Transnational repression, including threats directed at diaspora communities, falls within this mandate. The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) and CSIS also play important roles in investigating transnational repression activities and identifying foreign operatives acting on Canadian soil.

By contrast, intimidation, violence at protests, and threats exchanged between members of diaspora communities generally fall within the jurisdiction of local law enforcement agencies. A useful parallel can be drawn with the distinction between terrorist activities, which fall under the mandate of RCMP Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams (INSETs), and hate crimes that are not linked to broader extremist ideologies or organized groups, which are typically investigated by local police services.

These manifestations of diaspora polarization are further complicated by the fact that violence occurs within a broader context of political activism directed against the government in Tehran, which Canada has long criticized on human rights grounds. Canadian policy seeks simultaneously to protect freedoms of expression and assembly at home and to sustain that criticism abroad. The Iranian case presents a distinct set of challenges compared to other cases of foreign interference in Canada, such as those involving India, because intra-community tensions are intertwined with a broader political movement that receives considerable public sympathy and support within Canadian society.

As a result, investigative attention is often directed toward transnational repression, while patterns of intra-ethnic polarization receive comparatively limited scrutiny as a distinct phenomenon. Rather than being analyzed collectively, such incidents are generally treated as discrete criminal acts perpetrated by individuals, agent provocateurs, or criminal organizations. In a July 2026 with Reuters, Reza Pahlavi attributed some of the conduct carried out in his name to plants and agitators masquerading as supporters in order to create such conflicts. Such rhetoric further blurs the line between state-sponsored foreign interference and localized diaspora violence, interweaving local, national, transnational, and geopolitical dynamics.

While intra-diaspora political polarization is well-documented, institutional blind spots regarding its intersection with state-backed foreign interference leave diaspora members acutely vulnerable. Victims often find it difficult to report these politically motivated acts, as the political and ideological nuances surrounding such incidents can complicate their interpretation by both community members and law enforcement agencies. Consequently, these incidents may be underreported or investigated as isolated criminal acts rather than as part of broader patterns of intra-ethnic polarization. In the UK, activist Ghazal Diani and was told the matter would be investigated only if something more serious occurred.

Politically motivated intimidation within these communities occupies an ambiguous legal space, straddling national security mandates, hate crime enforcement, and conventional criminal law. This jurisdictional overlap complicates local law enforcement responses and creates significant reporting barriers, hindering the systematic tracking and prosecution of intra-community violence. Furthermore, investigations related to transnational repression often require extensive international cooperation, as segments of the Iranian diaspora are active across multiple Western countries. Effective investigations also depend on access to Persian-language expertise, trusted relationships within diaspora communities, and a nuanced understanding of community dynamics. At the law enforcement level, this requires keeping pace with rapidly evolving political tensions and polarization within the diaspora, as well as broader geopolitical developments. At the national security level, a key challenge is sharing highly classified information with local law enforcement partners in ways that support investigations while protecting sensitive sources and methods. This is particularly important when distinguishing between criminal activities stemming from community polarization and actions directed or supported by a foreign state. Authorities must also recognize that investigations and interventions within diaspora communities can have unintended consequences. If not approached carefully, they may deepen existing divisions, reinforce perceptions of stigmatization, and inadvertently strengthen narratives that portray Western governments as targeting Iranian communities.

Recommendations and Implications for Canada

Violence within diaspora communities presents a significant challenge that Canada’s existing security and law-enforcement categories were not designed to capture as effectively as threats to national security. It does not neatly fit the framework of transnational repression and foreign interference, as much of the violence is neither directed nor coordinated by a foreign state. Nor is it adequately understood as conventional hate crime or violent extremism, particularly when perpetrators and victims may share the same nationality, ethnic identity, or religious affiliation. Yet the consequences of this violence are distinctly transnational and political, often intersecting with mobilization and protests against the Islamic Republic of Iran. When agencies assess these incidents only through the lens of their individual mandates, the broader pattern can remain invisible. The result is a fragmented response that risks overlooking victims, underestimating the scale of the threat, and failing to address the political and transnational dimensions of the violence.

Although it can sometimes fit within the framework of politically motivated violent extremism, intra-community violence presents distinct analytical challenges. It may be interpreted differently from forms of violent extremism occurring between distinct communities, such as the tensions and violence observed between Canada’s Palestinian and Jewish communities following October 2023. Because perpetrators and victims may share the same ethnic, religious, or national identity, the political and ideological motivations underlying the violence can be more difficult to identify and may be overlooked within existing threat-assessment frameworks. For example, has funded multiple programs to address polarization between Arab and Jewish diasporas, but very few are designed for violence inside a single community.

Prevention and enforcement efforts in diaspora communities often lack dedicated language expertise and the capacity to monitor increased activity across multiple platforms, including Telegram, Instagram, X, diaspora media, and encrypted channels. These gaps are particularly consequential during periods of heightened political mobilization, when emerging vulnerabilities and risks can develop rapidly and require early intervention. Hate-based incidents are rarely the product of a single organization or network; rather, they can emerge in protests and other political activities and involve loosely connected actors. Yet these incidents can reflect broader transnational trends, with narratives, tactics, and grievances circulating across borders and becoming mutually reinforcing. Effective prevention therefore requires heightened monitoring during periods of political mobilization, combined with stronger language and analytical capabilities to identify emerging risks upstream and distinguish isolated incidents from broader patterns of mobilization and violence. Risks often first emerge through seemingly isolated episodes of hate and intimidation online or during protests, including doxxing, sexualized threats, the circulation of target lists, and other forms of targeted harassment. A concrete public safety response should be sufficiently flexible to address a threat that does not fit neatly within existing frameworks for transnational repression, foreign interference, or countering violent extremism. It should enable authorities to monitor large-scale protests and political mobilization as well as social media where violence occurs within communities and movements, rather than primarily between them. This requires the capacity to identify early indicators of hate and escalation across multiple platforms, supported by language-specific expertise. It should also allow authorities to connect local episodes of violence to broader transnational trends without assuming that such trends reflect hierarchical command structures or formal organizational links.

Interagency Collaboration: A Coordinated Approach to Hate Incident Reporting and Threat Assessment

In an ideal scenario, dedicated task forces could be established to foster sustained collaboration among relevant agencies. A more realistic and immediately actionable approach, however, would be to strengthen information-sharing mechanisms and reinforce referral pathways between agencies. Law enforcement agencies often lack the broader visibility needed to identify trends and linkages across incidents occurring elsewhere in Canada and in other Western countries. Enhanced information sharing could help bridge this gap by connecting local, incident-level intelligence with broader assessments of emerging threats and extremist activity.

One promising model is the increasingly effective coordination between local law enforcement agencies investigating hate crimes motivated by Islamophobia, antisemitism, and racism on the one hand, and national security agencies addressing hate-based groups and far-right extremism on the other. Current efforts to address nihilistic violent extremism at the local, national, and international levels provide another useful model to adapt. Existing collaboration between agencies has long been developed to identify concrete threats to national security, requiring the involvement of INSET units in Canada, as distinct from localized crimes to be investigated and prosecuted by local law enforcement and prosecutors. These partnerships have also included intervention and prevention teams established to address vulnerabilities and risk factors associated with radicalization leading to violence.

The case of intra-diaspora violence appears more complex to address, as the national security threat environment combines far-right extremism, hate-based ideologies, foreign interference, and transnational repression. At the local level, violence and criminality can unfold across a range of settings, including large public protests, mass gatherings associated with sporting events, and Middle East-related events such as Al-Quds events or those linked to the war in Palestine. At the same time, the Criminal Code provisions on uttering threats, criminal harassment, intimidation, and public incitement of hatred cover most of the incidents documented in this paper, and the laid by Toronto Police following the Al-Quds Day rally demonstrate their applicability.

Local law enforcement should remain responsible for receiving and investigating individual hate incidents and criminal offences, while national-level agencies could provide broader threat assessments, identify cross-jurisdictional patterns, and facilitate the sharing of relevant intelligence. The RCMP plays a central role in cross-jurisdictional investigations, as well as in establishing sustained operational partnerships with other intelligence and investigative bodies, such as CSIS and CBSA, alongside broader strategic coordination by Public Safety Canada tracking these incidents. The transnational nature of the threat also requires greater coordination among Five Eyes partners, alongside carefully calibrated information-sharing arrangements with foreign governments. This is particularly important when engaging the United States, given its direct and ongoing military confrontation with Iran.

Strengthening Outreach and Trust with the Iranian Diaspora

Given that the threat environment remains fluid and is heavily influenced by geopolitical developments, interagency communication should not be treated as an ad hoc or event-driven process. Instead, it should be structured as a recurring mechanism, with regular exchanges of information and threat assessments that allow agencies to identify emerging patterns, reassess risks, and adjust their responses as circumstances evolve.

Outreach mechanisms targeting the Iranian diaspora have already been developed to address concerns related to transnational repression, but these efforts could be expanded to better capture dynamics of intra-diaspora violence. A reliable referral mechanism could enable members of the diaspora to report hate incidents at both the local and national levels, while providing law enforcement agencies with the contextual information needed to assess individual incidents within broader patterns. Such reporting mechanisms are effectively implemented for , but are ill-equipped for intra-diaspora polarization.

At the same time, the highly polarized and politically contested nature of these issues creates a risk that referral mechanisms could be exploited for partisan or strategic purposes, including through the submission of unsubstantiated or politically motivated allegations. Any such mechanism should therefore incorporate robust, evidence-based safeguards. Reports should be assessed against consistent criteria, corroborated where possible, and clearly distinguished between verified incidents, credible allegations, and unsubstantiated claims.

Implementing an incident-reporting mechanism is easier than sustaining one effectively. Its long-term success depends on local authorities earning the trust of the community, while also demonstrating the capacity to investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute reported cases. Without both community confidence and credible follow-through, reporting mechanisms risk generating limited engagement and may fail to provide the sustained information needed to identify broader patterns and trends.

Conclusion

Overall, intra-diaspora violence is not a new phenomenon. Existing interagency coordination mechanisms can address many of its manifestations effectively. The central challenge, however, is that such violence is often identified only after incidents have occurred, resulting in a predominantly reactive rather than proactive response. This report has documented recent incidents, their increasing intensity, and their transnational dimensions to raise awareness of the need for a more coordinated approach building on existing transnational repression outreach and prevention activities as well as existing mechanisms developed to address violent extremism.

In a multicultural society, the test of a security policy is whether it protects citizens from violence within their own communities as carefully as it protects them from foreign states, and whether it can do so without treating an entire community as suspect. This approach is not specific to Iranian communities. The same combination of early detection, behaviour-based intervention, and restraint is applicable wherever political conflicts abroad divide communities at home, as has occurred among Eritrean, Sikh, and other diaspora communities in Canada. A framework developed to address these challenges in the Iranian diaspora could therefore provide a broader model for identifying and mitigating community-based political violence without stigmatizing legitimate political activity.

^[1] Meaning long live the King, a slogan popular among the Pahlavists and royalists.

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As Canada looks to build a renewed vision of sovereignty and economic independence – divorced from the influence, reliance, and hegemony of the United States (US) – the nation is increasingly seeking foreign capital to develop an economically viable Canada for tomorrow. The urgent need to develop a sovereign wealth fund – the – is the structural result of the . In a bid to attract capital and develop the Canada Strong Fund while facing a , Prime Minister Mark Carney is hosting the in Toronto, Ontario, from September 14-15, 2026. 

Attending the summit will be the world’s leading investors who have been invited to identify opportunities for investment in Canada. The government’s ambition is to catalyse $1 trillion in total investment across Canada over the next five years, supported by approximately $280 billion in federal capital investments and incentives. The summit is being in partnership with the federal government, the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board (CPP Investments), and the Public Sector Pension Investment Board (PSP Investments). It will build upon Canada’s economic developments of the , as the government seeks to diversify Canada’s economic relationships, attract foreign capital, and reduce the country’s historical dependence on the US. Yet this drive for investment raises two important questions: how prepared is Canada to protect the infrastructure and strategic assets that this investment will create, expand, and place under private ownership? And does Canada have the institutional guardrails to responsibly place constraints upon private entities?

The Question of Investment and Strategic Infrastructure

The question of foreign investment in strategic infrastructure and resources is particularly relevant given the Carney government’s growing interest in private investment in Canadian transportation infrastructure. The explicitly announced that the government would , alongside measures intended to attract . The same budget also identifies continued engagement with investors to increase private investment in .

The rationale for investment in this infrastructure is straightforward. Airports and ports are essential to Canada’s economic growth and trade diversification. . At the same time, airports facilitate the movement of high-value cargo and connect Canadian communities both domestically and to . These are attractive opportunities for private investment that will generate revenue for Canada, enabling the modernisation and development of this infrastructure, boosting trade efficiency, without increasing public debt.

In Canada, there are and . These airports and ports, managed by private not-for-profit local authorities, and . These are not merely economic assets; they sustain the livelihoods of approximately half a million Canadians while serving as critical infrastructure and strategic nodes of sovereignty. They facilitate the movement of people, goods, energy, information, and, when necessary, military and emergency resources. Their worth extends beyond their commercial value and contributes to the public good of Canadian society.

Canada’s move towards the privatisation of transportation infrastructure does not make it the first state to do so – that position would belong to the . In 1987, the United Kingdom’s Conservative government’s privatisation of airports successfully generated revenue for a while simultaneously offloading the cost of airport upgrades from the state onto private firms. However, private ownership quickly poorer working conditions and lower pay for the thousands of employees.

In Canada in 2026, a similar pattern risks manifesting itself again: the auctioning off of infrastructure that provides a public service may occur at a discount price – much to the chagrin of private investors – while costs for services charged by these private entities may be able to escalate with no public accountability. Without state oversight, it may be more than solely price gouging that harms Canadians, but service interruption. If, through a callous calculation, a foreign-owned private entity decides to reduce service or even close an airport to maximise profits, this would be a corporate decision without government input or public accountability.

While the federal government may not be focused on the impact that privatisation could have upon the everyday lives of ordinary Canadians, the broader geopolitical realities of 2026 – characterised by a return to and , alongside a decline of American hegemony – make for a compelling case for the federal government to reconsider. The more Canada relies upon private and foreign capital to operate and develop these assets, the more important it becomes that the government establishes who is responsible for their security when a threat emerges. The core question to ask of the federal government is whether Canada’s security architecture and institutional capacity can keep pace with growing technological complexity and the change of ownership created by private investment.

This inquiry strikes at a weakness in Canadian governance: institutions are organised around jurisdictional responsibilities while the infrastructure and threats they must protect operate across those jurisdictions. Threats to critical infrastructure do not fit neatly within the pre-existing institutional mandates of the confederation. Radio-frequency interference, jamming, cyberattacks, hostile drones, physical intrusion, and other forms of disruption involve responsibilities spanning across institutional bodies such as (ISED), the (RCMP), the (DND), , and .

When a Threat Emerges, Who Responds?

Consider a hypothetical incident at a Canadian airport or marine port. A drone is detected approaching the facility, but its purpose is initially unknown. It may be a negligent operator, indicate criminal activity, surveillance of the facility, or something more nefarious. The distinction matters, but in the first few minutes, authorities may not have enough information to know what they are facing. The immediate problem is determining who has the authority and capability to respond while the nature of the threat is still being established.

This is particularly apparent as counter-drone systems rely upon radio-frequency interference or jamming. , and it states that the use of jammers is prohibited unless a ministerial exemption applies. Such exemptions have been granted to the , , and the . The result is a critical distinction between possessing counter-drone capability and possessing the authority to use it in a particular circumstance.

This critical distinction becomes more consequential when the infrastructure itself is privately operated. An airport or port operator may be the first to detect an intrusion and may have sophisticated security personnel and detection systems, but it does not possess the jurisdictional authority exercised by Canada’s institutional and legal bodies. Provincial or municipal police may be positioned to respond to an immediate criminal threat, but federal authorities possess jurisdiction over aviation, spectrum management, national security, and defence. The institution with the most appropriate capability may therefore not be the institution that can immediately employ it. But the first few minutes of a security incident have no respect for time nor institutional boundaries. A threat does not wait for federal, provincial, municipal, and private actors to determine whose mandate applies.

As Canada attracts private and foreign investment for critical infrastructure projects and investment, if a threat consequently emerges in the privately-owned scenario, this begs the question of who possesses both the authority and the capability to act immediately. If the answer depends upon transferring responsibility between multiple institutions before an effective response can begin, then the vulnerability is institutional. The challenge is to proactively determine who is responsible for detecting the threat, assessing it, who has authority to intervene, who possesses the necessary capability, and who assumes command. As strategic infrastructure becomes increasingly privately operated, these questions cannot be left unresolved.

Inconvenient Timing: Canada’s Policing Transition

Institutional fragmentation is becoming more consequential as Canada approaches a broader transition in the organisation of policing itself. identifies the modernisation of federal policing as an ongoing priority. At the same time, the federal government is preparing for the , which expire in . This approaching deadline is particularly important as policing responsibilities are already . and maintain their own provincial police services, while Canada’s eight other provinces and three territories contract out police services to the RCMP; but in recent years, the mandate of the RCMP is changing. In the city of Surrey, British Columbia, a has recently concluded.

Alberta provides perhaps the clearest example of where this trend could lead: the province has continued to consider the establishment of an , and the . These developments raise a question extending beyond ordinary policing, located at the core of Canadian federalism and problematising the privatisation of critical infrastructure: as provinces increasingly seek greater sovereignty and enhanced control over policing, who is ultimately responsible for protecting infrastructure that is provincially located, nationally significant, but privately owned?

Crucially, Alberta is home to infrastructure whose significance extends beyond provincial boundaries, particularly in the energy sector. If policing authority becomes increasingly provincial while infrastructure is increasingly privatized, responsibility for its protection becomes convoluted. This is further complicated by in greater provincial autonomy and potential separation, which could create additional uncertainty around the long-term governance of nationally significant infrastructure. At the same time, Alberta’s energy resources – identified as for the upcoming Canada Investment Summit –  and make the province particularly attractive to foreign private investment. While such investment can generate significant economic value, foreign ownership of strategically important energy and infrastructure assets can also create new dependencies and avenues for .

Alberta therefore provides a useful stress test for Canada’s emerging investment model: what happens when nationally significant infrastructure is provincially located, privately owned, attractive to foreign capital, and situated within a province increasingly questioning its relationship with Ottawa?

Invest if You Must, But Know Who Protects It

This highlights a tension at the heart of Canada’s investment strategy. The government is asking foreign and private investors to place capital into infrastructure that Canada considers essential to its economic sovereignty, while the frameworks governing the protection of that infrastructure remain unevenly distributed. Canada should therefore treat security governance as an essential component of its investment strategy rather than as a separate policy concern. Before encouraging significant private or foreign investment in airports, ports, telecommunications networks, energy infrastructure, critical-mineral supply chains, and other strategically important assets, Ottawa should ensure that there are clear lines of responsibility for their protection, establish mechanisms for interagency coordination, and clearly define the responsibilities of respective authorities for responding to emerging threats.

The renegotiation of the Police Service Agreements ahead of their 2032 expiry provides an opportunity to address this problem at the federal level. Ottawa and the provinces should clarify how provincial, municipal, and federal policing authorities will coordinate when locally situated infrastructure has national-security implications. Canada cannot build economic sovereignty merely by diversifying who provides capital. It must ensure that the infrastructure built with that capital remains secure, resilient, and subject to a clear Canadian security architecture. Canada should therefore enter this new era of investment with a simple principle: before deciding who will own or finance strategic infrastructure, Canada must know who will be responsible for protecting it.

But the question of who protects infrastructure is only one part of the larger challenge. Canada must also ask who operates it, who maintains it, who regulates it, who works within it, and who ensures that essential services continue when normal systems are disrupted. A resilient nation cannot rely upon conventional security capabilities while allowing the social and institutional foundations of resilience to erode.

Economic sovereignty requires investment. Conventional security requires protection. But national resilience requires both to be built alongside the public goods and institutions that allow Canadian society to withstand disruption.

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Executive Summary

Canada’s Arctic sovereignty depends on digital infrastructure governed outside its jurisdiction. Critical communications rely on foreign-owned satellite networks, exposing Canadian data and essential services to external legal regimes and geopolitical risk. The European Union faces similar vulnerabilities, creating a shared strategic challenge. Rather than pursuing separate solutions, Canada and the EU can leverage existing frameworks—including the Digital Partnership Council, the Security and Defence Partnership, SAFE, and CETA—to jointly invest in secure communications infrastructure, satellite capabilities, research and development, and regulatory coordination. By treating digital infrastructure as a collective security capability, both partners can strengthen Arctic resilience, reduce dependence on external actors, and enhance their ability to respond to emerging geopolitical threats.

Introduction

What exactly does Canadian sovereignty mean when a medical alert sent from an Indigenous community in Nunavut through a US ground station before reaching its destined Canadian community? In the digital age, all communications rely on transnational digital infrastructure , exposing both Canada and the EU to foreign surveillance, political coercion, service disruptions, and the weaponisation of critical digital infrastructure. Dependence on American digital infrastructure creates a strategic vulnerability: no state can claim if one cannot control its data. 

These strategic have become increasingly apparent as the Arctic emerges as a strategic theatre of geopolitical competition. While dependence on American digital infrastructure has historically been tolerated by both Canada and the EU, this dependency is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain. Russia’s of the High North and China’s growing in Arctic infrastructure demonstrate that the Arctic can no longer be treated as a stable environment. Simultaneously, security dynamics are shifting within NATO, originating from the erratic posturing of American President Donald Trump and his repeated calls for greater control over . Demanding as well that Canada strengthen its Arctic . This behaviour highlights the growing uncertainty surrounding Arctic governance and security. 

In this increasingly contested environment, reliance on foreign-controlled digital infrastructure represents a strategic vulnerability. The widespread ongoing through the , alongside the disruption of Venezuelan during the 2026 US operation targeting President Nicolás Maduro’s government, illustrates that communications networks can become instruments of geopolitical coercion and strategic leverage. Rather than pursuing parallel solutions, Canada and the EU are better positioned to address these challenges together. Existing frameworks such as the already provide mechanisms for joint investment, industrial cooperation, research and development, and regulatory coordination of critical digital infrastructure. Collectively, these initiatives can transform digital infrastructure from a source of strategic vulnerability into an instrument of deterrence by increasing the resilience, redundancy, and interoperability of allied communications networks.

Nunavut: A Case Study in Digital Dependence

Nunavut concentrates these vulnerabilities into a poignant case study. Its remote yet increasingly strategic geography makes satellite connectivity essential as remain limited for many of these predominantly Indigenous communities. has captured this market and has across the territory, becoming the connectivity provider for northern Indigenous communities and Canadians. This is reflected by Canada ranking among the world’s highest users of Starlink in . While this expansion has improved connectivity in underserved regions, it also creates strategic vulnerabilities. Starlink’s owner, Elon Musk, has demonstrated how privately controlled communications infrastructure can become entangled with geopolitical decision-making, most notably through the . Furthermore, reliance on places Nunavut’s communications within scope of American intelligence authorities through FISA Section 702, . The growing influence of private technology companies over critical infrastructure presents a broader sovereignty challenge, particularly amid increasing uncertainty surrounding US Arctic policy and the role of non-state actors in geopolitical affairs.

Beyond the security implications of foreign-controlled infrastructure, Nunavut’s connectivity challenges reveal both a market failure and a broader governance gap. Private interests have not accounted for the national security, sovereignty, and governance risks created by dependence on externally controlled infrastructure. This in turn represents a failure of governance. Canada has not established sufficient requirements or incentives for to extend reliable, secure connectivity to northern communities or to ensure that critical infrastructure serving the Arctic aligns with national security objectives. This failure largely stems from Canadian federalism and the constitutional , as responsibility for digital connectivity is interprovincial and therefore mandated to the federal government; however, provinces and territories retain significant responsibilities for service delivery, consumer protection, and privacy-related issues. This division creates a regulatory gap in which no single level of government is fully responsible for ensuring that northern communities receive connectivity that meets both public service needs and national security objectives. The result is a communications environment in which foreign providers have filled gaps left by domestic infrastructure investment, creating dependence on externally controlled networks. Consequently, . For residents of Nunavut, this is not an occasional anomaly, but the everyday reality of staying connected in the federation. 

This governance gap has consequences beyond service delivery and economic development; in the Arctic, digital connectivity is increasingly a component of national security. Arctic communications underpin search and rescue operations, NORAD surveillance, environmental monitoring, and critical infrastructure management across the region. An outage, interference event, or politically motivated disruption could isolate communities, degrade Canadian operational capacity, and compromise situational awareness in a strategically sensitive domain.

Building Collective Arctic Digital Capability

The vulnerabilities exposed in the Nunavut case demonstrate that Arctic security increasingly depends on resilient digital infrastructure and shared technological capabilities. Ensuring Arctic sovereignty therefore requires more than territorial presence; it requires the ability to observe, communicate, and coordinate across an increasingly contested region. No single state possesses all the infrastructure, financial resources, or technological capacity required to secure the Arctic digital environment alone.

Canada and the EU possess complementary capabilities that can strengthen collective Arctic resilience. Canada’s Constellation Mission (RCM) already provides across the Arctic. If integrated with European satellite systems such as and , these capabilities become significantly more powerful, enabling of the region. This cooperation would reduce reliance on unreliable external providers while strengthening allied capacity to respond to emerging threats. This, in turn, could also positively contribute to future NATO preparedness 

Existing Canada–EU frameworks provide the foundation to transform this shared capability into sustained cooperation. (SAFE) initiative provides access to up to €150 billion in competitively priced loans for defence capability investment. This aligns Canadian and EU defence priorities and creates new export opportunities for Canadian defence firms. The (SDP) formalised cooperation on defence planning, intelligence exchange, and emerging technologies. In of the Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), regulatory pathways are established for joint standards development, shared cybersecurity practices, and the integration of cross‑border digital services.

Beyond improving connectivity and interoperability, collective digital capability strengthens deterrence. A diversified Canada–EU digital ecosystem reduces the ability of any single state, corporation, or legal regime to exert political leverage over Arctic communications. By distributing critical infrastructure across trusted partners, Canada and the European Union increase the resilience of essential services while raising the costs of coercion, disruption, or interference. In the digital age, deterrence depends not only on military capability, but also on the resilience and redundancy of the networks that underpin national security.

Recommendations

1. Establish a Canada–EU Arctic Satellite Connectivity Partnership

Canada and the EU should develop an integrated satellite communications framework linking Canadian capabilities, including RADARSAT and Telesat’s low-Earth-orbit (LEO) systems, with European initiatives such as Copernicus and ±ő¸é±őł§Â˛. Pooling resources would distribute development costs, expand northern coverage, and create a more resilient and interoperable communications architecture for Arctic communities, defence operations, and environmental monitoring.

2. Expand Trusted Telecommunications Competition in Canada

Canada should create a regulatory environment that allows trusted European telecommunications companies to operate more easily within the Canadian market. Greater competition would reduce reliance on a small number of dominant providers, incentivise investment in underserved northern regions, and encourage the development of resilient connectivity solutions for Indigenous communities. Expanding trusted foreign participation would complement domestic investment while reducing dependence on any single external provider.

3. Complete Ratification of CETA

Canada and the European Union should prioritise full ratification of CETA. Although provisionally applied, CETA has only been ratified by 17 EU member states, limiting the agreement’s full potential. Complete ratification would provide greater legal certainty, expand opportunities for cross-border procurement and investment, and establish a stronger foundation for long-term industrial, technological, and digital infrastructure cooperation.

4. Create a Joint Canada–EU Research and Development Fund for Arctic Technologies

Emerging technologies—including inter-satellite laser communications, secure LEO networks, and space-based edge computing—require sustained investment beyond the capacity of individual states. Canada and the EU should pool funding through mechanisms such as the EU’s Security Action for Europe (SAFE) initiative, CETA procurement mechanisms, and European Investment Bank programs to support collaborative research and development. Joint investment would create economies of scale, strengthen allied technological competitiveness, and accelerate innovation in northern connectivity.

5. Develop Shared Regulatory and Security Standards for Digital Infrastructure

Canada and the EU should establish coordinated standards for satellite communications, cybersecurity, and emerging technologies to strengthen the resilience of critical infrastructure. Drawing on Canada’s Digital Sovereignty Framework and European data protection principles, including lessons from , both partners should create joint assessment mechanisms for communications infrastructure procurement to mitigate risks from foreign interference. As LEO satellite systems become increasingly essential to civilian and defence operations, coordinated standards will be necessary to address cybersecurity threats, orbital congestion, and geopolitical competition.

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The issue

In November 2023, Latvia ratified the , a core international treaty which aims to prevent violence towards women, including domestic and sexual violence. The Istanbul Convention has since then been at the centre of a contentious political debate in Latvia, becoming a in Latvia’s cultural wars, and bringing about a clash of ideologies on gender, nationality, and constitutional issues.

The debate on the Istanbul Convention reflects a broader shift in societal values and political loyalties in Latvia. On 30 October 2025, a majority vote in the Saeima (Latvia’s parliament) to denounce the Istanbul Convention unexpectedly succeeded, as one of the partners in the ruling coalition – Union of Greens and Farmers – . The vote led to public protests: on October 29, at least 5,000 people protested outside the Saeima against Latvia’s withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention; on November 6, at least 10,000 protested at Dome Square in Riga, organizing a petition with more than 67,000 signatures. A veto by has put the issue on the back burner until after the parliamentary elections scheduled for early October 2026. Depending on the results of that election, to withdraw from the Istanbul Convention.

This policy brief aims to examine how disinformation narratives and radicalization risks emerged and evolved throughout the public debate on the Istanbul Convention in Latvia from 2023 to 2025. For each phase (the ratification phase in 2023; the withdrawal mobilization phase in 2025; and the post-decision phase in late-2025), the study reviews the 15 most popular Facebook posts and the 80 most liked comments (a total of 45 posts and 240 comments) by manually coding them for narrative type, emotional intensity, disinformation indicators, and evidence of radicalization. This methodological approach was chosen to select a representative but manageable sample of a highly visible discourse. The policy brief is structured as a three-phase analysis of the debate, followed by a synthesis of findings and concluding remarks.

Phase 1: Ratification and Immediate Online Backlash (2023)

Division and debate over the Istanbul Convention appeared immediately after the Latvian parliament voted – by incredibly slim margins – to ratify the Convention on November 30, 2023. Women’s rights organizations and liberal bloggers in Latvia saw this as proof of . On the other hand, an ardent anti-Convention movement sprang up in social networks, claiming that ratifying the Conventions was a betrayal of national interests and gender values. Furthermore, right-wing politicians publicly criticized lawmakers for violating Latvian values in support of the Convention.

The anti-Convention group was represented in public declarations by the former social welfare minister Ramona Petraviča, who argued that “.” In monitoring disinformation about the Convention, included many misconceptions about the Convention circulating in the last quarter of 2023. On Facebook and on Latvian blogging sites, rumors spread about new policies to be gay at school; about gender reassignment surgeries taking place at the age of 14 without parents’ consent for children interested in such procedures; and about . Such misinformation, usually centered around the were disseminated by right-leaning bloggers such as musician Kaspars Pudniks and author Vija Beinerte, who both claimed that ratifying the Convention would involve teaching in schools about gender transition .

Thus, the showed considerable polarization, moving away from its actual goal of combating domestic violence. Instead of focusing on the objectives of the Istanbul Convention, the online discussion turned into a moral battle between those who claimed to defend traditional gender values and those who were perceived to represent a radical liberal agenda. In this regard, the ratification of the Istanbul Convention fueled cultural conflicts online, thereby undermining positive communication and discussions on how to end domestic violence.

Phase 2: Disinformation Surge and Withdrawal Campaign (2025)

Latvia’s ratification of the Istanbul Convention remained a key issue for Latvian far-right movements thorough the post-ratification period. This opposition reached a new level in September 2025, when started a campaign advocating for the withdrawal of Latvia from the Istanbul Convention. The political movement initiated a flood of conspiratorial posts on social media platforms and messaging applications. Facebook continued to be the central platform wherein these posts were made, but heated debates also took place on Telegram and TikTok, where messaging was aimed at specific target groups. in the online disinformation campaign. His Facebook posts in 2025 clearly demonstrated the use of shifting the debate from the Convention’s legal purpose of preventing violence against women and domestic violence to alleged threats to children, the “natural family”, national sovereignty, and traditional values. A group of started a campaign advocating for the withdrawal of Latvia from the Istanbul Convention. The political movement initiated a flood of conspiratorial posts on social media platforms and messaging applications.

Ĺ lesers has himself claimed, without any evidence in the treaty text, that the Istanbul Convention forces the on Latvia, which aims to “threaten the natural family.” This video represents another case of complex problems being reduced to â€�us vs. them’ dichotomies, fostering polarization and discord in society. According to research done by , platforms like TikTok and YouTube are flooded with memes about culture wars as well as general fear-mongering content. This finding fits with the posting trend of Ĺ lesers and others in this group, who lashed out at progressive actors being “[]/global gangsters” – often pairing these posts with accompanying memes and manipulated photos – in addition to their specific opposition to the Convention.

For instance, Linda Liepiņa, a parliament member of the Latvia First Party who originally advocated for the ratification of the Convention in 2023, also began to criticize the Convention on Facebook and Telegram. , which was delivered in the Saeima and reached large audiences online, claiming that a “foreign ideology tries to creep into our everyday lives” and that “what’s abnormal will be declared normal.” She also argued that “.” Another MP, MÄ�rcis JencÄ«tis, also a member of the Latvia First Party, called the Convention a “,” a term that was subsequently .

By mid-2025, anti-Convention-related online activism increased; yet, the shift in parliamentary voting was mainly caused by political trends that developed at the time. In the period from 2023 to 2025, splits in the ruling coalition in the Saeima became more pronounced, and some MPs readjusted their stances because of pressure from conservative groups and their voters. Furthermore, the problem became more politically relevant and was recast by the opposition in terms of the issues of sovereignty and values, which resonated with the pre-election discourse.

At the same time, continuous online activism contributed to perceptions of growing popular dissent, which affected the decisions of many MPs and forced them to change their stances, especially among those whose constituencies were electorally competitive. By 2025, supporting withdrawal from the European Convention became a useful political tool to reach out to conservatives and demonstrate a distinct position,

Phase 3: President’s Intervention and Digital Aftermath (Late 2025)

The Saeima’s vote in late October to withdraw from the Convention was a shock to many Latvians and reflected and a high level of polarization in Latvian politics. The result also surprised President Edgars Rinkēvičs, who declined to sign the bill into law and instead called for a period of reflection. On the 5th and 6th of November, the Saeima agreed to postpone the decision until the next parliamentary term, that is, after the 2026 election scheduled for early October. The online reactions to these moves were mixed, with at the decision. Supporters of the Convention , with Prime Minister Evika Silina posting on her Facebook page that the decision to postpone the decision

This intervention effectively stalled Latvia’s exit from the Istanbul Convention, throwing a lifeline to supporters and provoking a new wave of hostile . Online, Rinkēvičs’ move was met with an outpouring of both relief and vitriol – reflecting entrenched polarization. On one side, women’s rights organizations and liberal civil society celebrated the veto as a courageous step against populism. Activists like Beata Jonite of the MARTA Centre – an organization that provides specialized support to victims of domestic violence and human trafficking – shared the President’s message via social media. Jonite, who had been posting on TikTok and Instagram throughout the fall to debunk myths and rally youth support, posted an emotional TikTok video thanking Rinkēvičs for “.” That video garnered tens of thousands of views and comments expressing sentiments like “Finally, sanity prevails!” and “Thank you, President!” Meanwhile, a Manabalss.lv petition urging the President to gathered over 67,000 signatures .

Based on public opinion polls on the issue, Latvian society has not been divided into two clear camps, despite the polarization that appears online. In reality, there appears to be a relatively large segment of the population that is opposed to withdrawal, a relatively small segment of the population that is in favour of withdrawal, and a large segment of the population that is undecided. carried out in May 2023 by Berg Research indicate a high level of public support for the ratification of the Convention, with 71% of the total number of respondents showing their approval in May; the results of the survey conducted in June 2023 among Latvian citizens show a similar level of support, with 73% of the total number of respondents showing their approval.

These results show that support for the Convention among the general public was relatively strong in terms of the . In contrast, the Berg Research survey conducted in October 2025 shows that there was greater division among respondents in terms of their positions but not necessarily polarization. Specifically, 49% of respondents were against withdrawing from the Convention, 31% were in favor of it, and 20% were still undecided. These results support the position of this policy brief that the rhetoric surrounding the issue has been able to produce the illusion of greater polarization compared to what public opinion figures actually show. While anti-Convention narratives had gained a lot of traction and emotional appeal online, public opinion was actually more complex and could be influenced by both political parties involved.

Emotional Sentiment and Ideological Framing in Latvia’s Istanbul Convention Debate

The force of public engagement may thus be seen as emanating from the change in the nature of the Convention, from being primarily a legal document dealing with violence against women to becoming a symbol representing a number of emotionally charged topics, including children, family, nationhood, sovereignty, and skepticism toward political elites. The shift served to increase the potency of the disinformation narrative, which was no longer tied to any deep familiarity with the text of the Convention but, instead, tapped into preexisting emotions

and value differences. Hence, the case represents one more feature of modern Latvian online political communication: the tendency for a complicated policy issue to quickly transform into a medium for simplified culture wars, where emotion and suspicion often outweigh law and facts.

According to Google Trends data, public interest in the Istanbul Convention remained relatively low from early 2023 to the point where a strong surge occurred towards the end of 2025. These findings of increased searches towards the end of 2025 do correspond with renewed political struggles and mobilization efforts in the form of mass protests and intensive debates within parliament on withdrawing from the Convention. One of the most interesting findings is how public interest is geographically distributed regarding the searches conducted, where smaller towns (Inčukalns, Lielv�rde, Ozolnieki, Garkalne, and Sigulda) show the greatest levels of activity.

Figure 1. Google Trends search interest in the Istanbul Convention in Latvia, 2023- 2025.

Figure 2. Geographic distribution of Google searches related to the Istanbul Convention in Latvia.

The data indicates that online engagement has not been isolated to Riga and major cities, as rural communities are just as likely to search for this topic online.

The analysis of the discourse on the Istanbul Convention on Facebook in Latvia reveals a clear pattern of coordinated disinformation, emotionally polarized audiences, and radicalization of political discourse. The dominant discourse against the Istanbul Convention is based on three distinct narratives: (1) the notion that the Convention promotes a dangerous “gender ideology” that undermines traditional morality and family values (45% of the analyzed content); (2) the idea that the Convention is an external threat to national sovereignty and legal independence of Latvia (30%); and (3) the notion that the Convention has no practical benefits in combating violence and instead distracted from legitimate issues, such as the rights of the LGBT community (20%). The dominant disinformation in the discourse on the Istanbul Convention in Latvia was not peripheral; instead, it was central to the dominant discourse.

The persistence of disinformation, such as the trope of the �117 genders,’ the claim that the Convention would replace the words �mother’ and �father’ with �Parent 1 and 2,’ and the claim that the Convention would sexualize children, were all widespread. Not only was this this disinformation apparent in all three phases of the Convention debate, but it was also visible in the rhetoric of Latvian parliamentarians, suggesting that it had become normalized in the political discourse on the Convention.

The audience’s reactions varied depending on the narrative. The â€�gender ideology’ threat narrative elicited the highest number of â€�angry’ emoji reactions (50%). This was closely followed by the â€�sovereignty’ narrative (45%). The audience reactions to the narrative on the protection of women were different. In this case, â€�Like’ and â€�Love’ combined for 40% of the audience reactions; â€�Angry’ was seen in 15% of reactions. The â€�Laughing’ emoji reactions were higher in the case of the â€�exaggerated’ narrative (20%). These findings show that while the audience reacted with anger to the ideological threat narrative, another part of the audience reacted with mockery to the exaggerated narrative.

The analysis also shows that there are signs of discursive political radicalization. Of the approximately 30 high-engagement posts, 6-8 showed strong signs of radicalization. These included alarmist rhetoric, conspiracy theories, and delegitimization of democratic actors. Radicalization was also more evident in the comments sections of each post. In some posts, 15% to 25% of the comments contained dehumanizing metaphors, accusations of treason, or appeals for silencing or expelling political opponents. The politicians who took the side of the Convention were called “traitors,” “foreign agents”, or “corrupt pigs,” while the veto of the withdrawal decision by the President was described as “betrayal.” Some of the comments also contained appeals for “rising up”, “expelling” the supporters of the Convention, and “saving the nation.”

The radicalization of the discourse was also asymmetrical. The posts of the supporters of the Convention sometimes showed signs of frustration or irony but rarely used hostile language or rejected the idea of democratic pluralism. Arguments mostly focused on the legal content of the Convention, women’s rights, and the refutation of disinformation. However, the level of engagement of the posts was significantly lower than that of the opponents.

Conclusion

Across all three phases, the Latvia-based discussion on the Istanbul Convention illustrates the manner in which a policy debate can be transformed into a debate on cultural values via disinformation and powerful emotive appeals. Disinformation was consistently used to galvanize opposition and link the Convention to unrelated concerns, such as those surrounding children, gender ideology, and identity. As such, highly emotive and divisive messages achieved greater traction than evidence-based messages, undermining the space for constructive debate and normalizing hostile, delegitimizing rhetoric.

The case highlights the extent to which online discourse may distort the perception of public opinion. According to polls, Latvian society was not divided into two equally strong groups; instead, an active online minority shaping part of the discussion gave the impression of wider opposition. More generally, Latvia is symptomatic of a gender backlash that is taking place across Europe, including in post-Soviet and Central-Eastern countries. In this backlash, gender equality policies are presented as endangering the traditional family, children, national identity, and even state sovereignty.

In Latvia, the convention came to symbolize an ideological struggle over gender norms and social values. The debate is still ongoing, with the final resolution scheduled for sometime after the October 2026 Saeima elections. Thus, the Convention will continue to be a relevant topic on the political agenda. Without a consensus, the survival of the Istanbul Convention in Latvia will depend on the next parliamentary composition and the willingness of actors to keep spreading anti-gender narratives or return to fact-based discussions about violence prevention and victim protection.

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Since its establishment in 1949, the foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany was grounded in the concept of Zivilmacht (civilian power), a model based on the renunciation of military force, multilateral cooperation, and economic diplomacy. However, the Russian Federation’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 acted as a significant catalyst for change in Germany’s foreign policy and broader geopolitical positioning. Following these shifts in the European strategic environment, then-Chancellor Olaf Scholz proclaimed Zeitenwende (a turning point in history) had arrived, which would redefine Germany’s security policy through increased defence spending and a more prominent place in international affairs. The electoral victory of Friedrich Merz as current Chancellor has ultimately shifted Germany’s international role to a more assertive and openly strategic posture, distancing itself from the civilian power model of the past.

This essay examines Germany’s evolution from a culture of military restraint toward one of new strategic posturing, analyzing whether this transformation represents a definitive abandonment of its identity as a civilian power in favour of a return to a modern form Machtpolitik (power politics). Through an examination of the historical trajectory from the Cold War to the chancellorship of Friedrich Merz starting in 2025, this essay suggests that Germany is not reverting to aggressive militarism but is instead adopting a form of defensive and integrated Machtpolitik, necessary to ensure security within the Euro-Atlantic order.

The Erosion of the Civilian Power Paradigm

For over seven decades, the Federal Republic of Germany defined its national identity through the lens of a (civilian power). Emerging from the ruins of 1945, it anchored itself in the West under Konrad Adenauer’s policy of (western integration), replacing traditional power politics with a culture of military restraint, multilateralism, and rejection of nuclear arms. This identity consolidated during the Cold War through and the diplomatic success of Willy Brandt’s (eastern policy), which favoured economic interdependence and dialogue over the use of military force. Even after reunification in 1990, Germany struggled to move beyond this posture, exposing a lasting tension between its expanding economic influence and its unwillingness to deploy its military – an approach that NATO Allies frequently criticized as “.”

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 shattered these certainties. Then-Chancellor Olaf Scholz proclaimed a Zeitenwende had taken place, and promising a massive investment in defence through a . However, the Scholz era (2021–2025) was marked by a profound gap between rhetoric and reality. Hampered by bureaucratic bottlenecks, internal coalition disputes, and a lingering culture of pacifism, the implementation of the Zeitenwende proved difficult. Scholz’s reluctance to supply �offensive’ weapons – – combined with concerns about Germany’s actual capacity to increase defence spending levels, caused political inconsistency and eroded trust in his leadership at home and abroad. Consequently, the collapse of the Scholz’s governing coalition in late 2024, , paved the way for a more radical transformation under Friedrich Merz.

The Merz Chancellorship: Enforcing Zeitenwende 2.0

The election of Friedrich Merz as Chancellor in February 2025 marked the definitive end of Germany’s post-war strategic ambiguity. Merz’s rise to power envisioned a “,” a strategy that aimed to translate the previous government’s hesitant rhetoric into concrete, assertive action. Under Merz’s leadership, Germany has accelerated its transition from a reluctant partner to a burgeoning military leader in Europe, driven by the dual pressures of Russian aggression and uncertainty in the transatlantic security relationship following the second election of Donald Trump to the Presidency of the United States (US).

Unconditional Support for Ukraine and Strategic Assertiveness

The most immediate shift under Chancellor Merz has been the abandonment of self-imposed “red lines” regarding the war in Ukraine. In stark contrast to Scholz’s , Merz’s government adopted a stance of support with “,” strengthening Germany’s role as the leading military supporter of Kyiv in Europe. Crucially, the Merz administration on German-supplied weaponry, allowing Ukraine to strike military targets within Russian territory – a decision that signalled a clear break from the fear of escalation that characterized Scholz’s government. This policy is supported by Germany’s continued commitment to , separate from domestic defence spending, although the level of assistance remains . By framing Ukraine’s defence as essential to preserving the European security order, Friedrich Merz has effectively normalized the use of military force as a legitimate and necessary instrument of Germany’s foreign policy.

In line with this strategic imperative, the Merz government has extended its commitment beyond military assistance, actively seeking to reshape Europe’s broader geopolitical frameworks. To shield Eastern Europe from shifting transatlantic dynamics, Merz has recently proposed supporting Ukraine to become an “” within the EU. This proposal would see Ukraine attend high-level EU meetings as an observer without voting rights, effectively allowing it to gain access to EU decision-making forums while it progresses through the legal and administrative work of becoming a full EU member state.

Rearmament and the “KriegstĂĽchtigkeit” of the Bundeswehr

Domestically, the Merz chancellorship has been defined by an unprecedented drive for rearmament, aiming to transform the Bundeswehr into “.” Following the , Germany committed to significant new spending targets: 3.5% of GDP by 2029, rising to 5% by 2035. To finance the increase defence spending, the German government pushed through a controversial reform of the constitutional debt brake, .

This financial commitment has been matched by structural reforms aimed at achieving KriegstĂĽchtigkeit (war readiness). The adoption of the designates Germany as the central logistical hub for NATO in Europe, preparing the nation to serve as the transit corridor and operational base for Allied troops in the event of a large-scale conflict with Russia. This shift acknowledges that Germany is no longer just a security contributor, but a frontline state exposed to hybrid threats, requiring full coordination between military forces and civilian infrastructure.

The Return of Conscription and Societal Friction

Perhaps the most socially divisive aspect of Merz’s security overhaul has been the move to address the personnel crisis within the armed forces. In late 2025, the government passed the with the ambition of reaching 260,000 active personnel by the 2030s. This legislation relies on a hybrid model: while initially prioritizing voluntary service with financial incentives, it also established the legal framework for a “” (Bedarfsabhängige Dienstpflicht) that can be activated if volunteer targets are not met.

The potential reintroduction of conscription, which had been abolished in 2011, has sparked significant . Younger generations view the move as a regression to militarism, highlighting a disconnect between the government’s strategic objectives and the pacifist undercurrents of German civil society. The friction reveals that while the German political elite have embraced a harsher security and foreign policy, under a modern form of defensive and integrated Machtpolitik, the societal transition away from the civilian power identity remains incomplete and contested.

European Autonomy and the “Atomic Zeitenwende”

The geopolitical context of Merz’s chancellorship is heavily influenced by second Trump administration in the US. In the wake of President Trump’s “” foreign policy strategy, Merz has pushed for more and an urgent strengthening of German defence. This has led to a breaking of the ultimate German taboo: the nuclear question.

While explicitly ruling out the acquisition of a nuclear arsenal, the Merz government is pursuing an “” through an integration strategy. Germany has deepened cooperation with Europe’s two nuclear powers, France and the United Kingdom (UK), within the framework of the – an informal trilateral forum originally established in 2003 to coordinate diplomatic efforts over Iran’s nuclear program. Despite Brexit complicating its institutional dimension, the E3 has evolved into a broader platform for strategic coordination, . Through initiatives such as the – and in the context of strengthened Franco-British nuclear cooperation through the – Germany is seeking to link European security more closely to Franco-British nuclear deterrents. These developments mark a deep cultural shift: nuclear deterrence is no longer discarded but instead embraced as a necessary component of European defence, with Germany acting as a key political facilitator of this shared capability.

Theoretical Analysis: A Return to Machtpolitik? Neoclassical realist approach

The radical transformation of German security policy under Friedrich Merz raises a fundamental question: has Germany abandoned its identity as a Zivilmacht in favour of a return to Machtpolitik? The evidence suggests that while the civilian power model in its idealistic and pacifist form has largely faded, Germany is not returning to the aggressive, unilateral power politics of the pre-1945 era. Instead, it is adopting a defensive and integrated Machtpolitik.

The theory of helps explain why Germany could no longer remain a civilian power after 2022 while also highlighting the variables that have complicated this transformation. External pressures, such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine, altered the distribution of power and threat perception in Europe, compelling the German government to embark on a Zeitenwende to adapt its material capabilities. Yet the theory recognizes that systemic imperatives are filtered through domestic variables. Perceptions of policy-makers, institutional constraints such as the debt brake, and a society shaped by pacifist norms have all slowed decision-making and implementation of reforms, reflecting what Hanns W. Maull defined as , or, a “lack of realism” or “oblivion of power.”

Under these conditions, Germany’s rearmament is not simply about accumulating hard power, but instead about responding to a shifting geopolitical environment in an integrated and defensive manner. Integration () occurs through NATO and EU institutions, allowing Berlin to exercise influence and maximize security without alarming Allies. The defensive dimension () focuses on denying Russian victory and protecting the status quo rather than redrawing Europe’s borders. This approach illustrates a neoclassical realist compromise: Germany adapts to systemic requirements while being constrained and shaped by internal political and societal factors, explaining why its strategic transformation has been slow and deliberate.

Overcoming Machtvergessenheit

As argued by , Germany is in the process of overcoming its “forgetting of power.” For decades, the Federal Republic of Germany operated under the illusion that European economic interdependence and normative power projection were sufficient to secure its interests – characteristically liberal ideals. The Merz era reflects a growing recognition that civilian power may require the support of military strength to remain credible.

The Merz government has realized that to preserve the liberal international order – a core objective of the Zivilmacht concept – it must employ the tools of Machtpolitik. Thus, the dichotomy traditionally rendered between the two ontologies is false. Germany is not choosing power over law; rather, it frames the strengthening of its military as part of a broader effort to provide security for Europe and the liberal international order. Its refusal to pursue an independent nuclear arsenal while simultaneously seeking deeper integration into Allied nuclear frameworks demonstrates this nuanced position. Initiatives such as the establishment of a high-level , or the debate at this year’s Munich Security Conference on to safeguard Europe’s future, demonstrate that Germany remains firmly anchored in the institutions that have shaped its identity since its founding. At the same time, Germany is discussing options with European partners to develop a deterrence posture that is autonomous, independent, and credible.

Recent diplomatic developments strongly illustrate this assertive and autonomous stance. On the diplomatic front, Friedrich Merz has cast aside any lingering hesitation, explicitly accusing the Trump administration of allowing itself to be during the course of the ongoing US-Iran conflict. This position reflects a pragmatic call for European self-reliance in response to unpredictable US diplomacy, rather than an open challenge to the NATO Alliance.

Conclusion

The chancellorship of Friedrich Merz has placed the Federal Republic of Germany on a decisive path towards a difficult, yet necessary, transformation. The hesitation and ambiguity that defined the Scholz era and the Zeitenwende 1.0 have been replaced by a strategic clarity that acknowledges the harsh realities of the current security environment.

By challenging fiscal constraints with the €500 billion fund, addressing societal taboos with the reintroduction of conscription, and engaging with previously avoided strategic debates, Germany has fundamentally redefined its role. It has transitioned from a reluctant partner, long constrained by neglect of military power and capability development, to an emerging pillar of European stability, actively shaping defence initiatives and security cooperation.

However, this transition carries significant perils. Societal backlash against conscription and concerns over Germany’s military buildup underscore the fragility of both internal and external support. The success of a defensive, integrated Machtpolitik depends not only on the . Furthermore, fears of a potential authoritarian turn – partly driven by rising domestic support for the – continues to create anxieties among the Allies.

Ultimately, Germany has not yet returned to the aggressive nationalism of its past. Instead, it is slowly becoming a “normal” geopolitical power by acknowledging that, in a multipolar world, abstaining from projections of power may undermine chances for survival.

The post From Zivilmacht to Machtpolitik? The Strategic Evolution of Germany’s International Role appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

· The Civil Contract Party, led by Nikol Pashinyan, won a decisive majority in Armenia’s June 2026 parliamentary elections, overcoming a significant Russian disinformation campaign.

· Pashinyan’s effort to promote trade and stability through improving relations with °ŐĂĽ°ů°ěľ±˛â±đ and Azerbaijan remains challenged as Russia increases sanctions on Armenian goods.

· The European Union (EU), United States (US) and Canada play vital roles in supporting the only liberal democracy in the geopolitically critical South Caucasus.

Armenia’s Post-Election Environment

Parliamentary elections on June 7, 2026, gave Nikol Pashinyan’s Civil Contract Party 49.8% of the vote, . Civil Contract secured 64 seats in the 105-seat parliament, six short of the two-thirds majority needed to change Armenia’s Constitution.

Pashinyan faces a challenging environment despite his party’s convincing electoral win. Memories of the remain fresh, and trauma from the conflict continues to permeate society. Russia also retains a strong interest in Armenia, as seen through the recent and failed effort to install Russian-Armenian billionaire Samvel Karpetyan as prime minister during the election.

Armenia is nonetheless currently experiencing unprecedented levels of . Long-standing border violence with Azerbaijan has also ceased. Still, Pashinyan and his government must navigate geopolitical issues that could—at any moment—return Armenia to volatility or conflict.

Azerbaijan

Rumours flew in Spring 2026 that Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev would sign a peace agreement to formalise Azerbaijani control of Nagorno-Karabakh and address outstanding bilateral issues. Relations between the two countries have improved surrounding the Washington Declaration of August 8, 2025. Formalising the so-called Trump Road for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), the Washington Declaration committed both Armenia and Azerbaijan to improving transport routes and progressing towards normalising relations. Since the Declaration, third-country railway routes between Armenia and Azerbaijan have opened, and dialogue has begun, including the linking civil society actors. Azerbaijani experts interviewed by the author in Baku stated that they believed Pashinyan’s election would offer a chance for an enduring peace.

Despite such optimism, an agreement between Pashinyan and Aliyev never materialised. The Baku interlocutors noted that President Aliyev considers Armenia’s constitutional preamble to imply and is insisting it be changed before moving to any formal agreement. Pashinyan has begun the process of constitutional change, but the election results leave him short of the two-thirds majority needed to amend the constitution in parliament. Even after parliamentary changes, a new constitution would need to be sent to a referendum, requiring both 50%+ support and 50%+ turnout for ratification. Armenian observers remain sceptical that the parliament or public has the will to change the constitution to placate Aliyev. An electoral campaign would also be fertile ground for a Russian disinformation campaign.

Pashinyan’s most plausible strategy appears to be engaging in smaller measures with the Azerbaijanis, such as border delimitation, economic relations and supporting the Peace Bridge. Time and concrete results might sway parliamentarians and public opinion. This will require Aliyev’s cooperation. The Azerbaijani president, confident in military superiority, can always reactivate talk of renewing conflict. Washington’s interest in TRIPP renders a future invasion of Armenian territory less likely, but .

°ŐĂĽ°ů°ěľ±˛â±đ

Turkish-Armenian relations have improved since the , when Turks provided military assistance to Azerbaijan. Recent efforts have focused on a , including allowing crossings of third-party nationals and railway traffic. Both countries understand an open border would provide economic benefits, facilitating participation in burgeoning linking Europe to Central Asia and China. TRIPP, which has progressed to framework agreements and may see shovels in the ground in 2027, should deepen rapprochement.

Sources interviewed by the author note tension between Turkish and Azerbaijani diplomats, which became open when both attended the May 2026 . The Turkish delegation believes Azerbaijan is attempting to exercise an effective veto on border opening. Relations between Aliyev and Turkish President Recep Tayyip ErdoÄźan remain strong, however, and Aliyev would .

Russia

Even after their failed election intervention, Russia retains multiple levers of influence over Armenia. On the economic front, Russia has banned imports of Armenian fruits, vegetables and – as of July 2026 – milk. This has produced suffering for Armenian farmers, dependent on exporting goods to Russia. Russia also imposes itself militarily through its base in Gyumri, near the Turkish border in northwestern Armenia. Russia is refraining, however, from broader measures, including raising energy prices, which would have a significant impact given that Armenia relies on Russia for . The outlook of the Russia-Armenia relationship is also difficult to predict. Armenia’s informal economy appears to provide , while Pashinyan travelled to Russia in July 2026 in an effort to .

The European Union, United States and Canada

Russia’s sanctions and interference reflect Armenia’s westward tilt. Pashinyan has actively courted European investment throughout his time in power. This strategy has continued; the EU-Armenia Summit in Yerevan in May 2026 produced a . Armenia has also initiated studies toward EU membership.

The US overseer of TRIPP, Konstantin Sokolov, has . Iran is a wild card in the US role; the planned TRIPP railway linking Azerbaijan, Armenia and °ŐĂĽ°ů°ěľ±˛â±đ comes .

Canada’s embassy in Armenia has increased its importance. Canada is encouraging investment and assisting in legal and administrative reforms. Canada can further assist Armenia in countering Russian destabilisation efforts, including , while also mobilising its Armenian diaspora, . For Armenia to survive, much less prosper, investment from North American and European diasporas is vital.

, Armenia is the one hope for liberal democracy in the South Caucasus. Europe and North America should work diligently to counter potential moves by Russia, or Azerbaijan, that might reverse the country’s progress and increase the risk of conflict.

Policy Recommendations

· Facilitate incremental progress between Armenia, Azerbaijan and °ŐĂĽ°ů°ěľ±˛â±đ, noting the benefits of access to European markets and greater Western investment.

· Develop alternatives for Russian markets and energy. Focus on rural areas where economic suffering is acute and youth depopulation significant. Outline clear pathways towards deepening partnership with the EU.

· Foster engagement between the Armenian diaspora and the Pashinyan government.

· Build trust between the Armenians and Western institutions to counter Russian disinformation.

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Over the past two decades, nuclear weapons have returned to the centre of European security as a result of consistent and compounding changes to global geopolitics. For most of the post-Cold War era, weapons of mass destruction appeared to have lost salience as the disappearance of bipolar confrontation, the expansion of cooperative security frameworks, and the consolidation of arms control regimes fostered the belief that large-scale interstate conflict in Europe was a phenomenon of the past. However, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the collapse of arms control frameworks and agreements, and growing uncertainty surrounding the durability of security guarantees from the United States (US) have altered these assumptions, forcing a reassessment of the role of nuclear deterrence in Europe. Nuclear weapons have now regained centrality in European security as instruments of coercion, signalling, and strategic reassurance.

These dynamics have rekindled a nuclear debate in a number of European states, including the United Kingdom (UK) and France – Western Europe’s only two nuclear powers – who came together in July 2025 to sign the Northwood Declaration. This Declaration represents a significant political step for European nuclear security as, for the first time, both French and British governments publicly recognize that their independent nuclear forces must be thought of as a nuclear tandem in upholding the security of Europe. The political significance of this Declaration is much greater than its technical content and raises the following questions: does Northwood Declaration represent a strategic turning point in Franco-British nuclear cooperation in the context of perceived US disengagement from Europe and renewed Russian assertiveness? Can this renewed commitment to cooperation bridge the UK and France’s historically distinct strategic traditions regarding nuclear weapons?

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Nuclear relations between the UK and France have always been shaped by a triangulated great power partnership that necessarily involved the US. The UK’s nuclear program was deeply embedded in Anglo-American cooperation from the Second World War onward. The 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement institutionalized this relationship, giving the UK access to American technology, materials, and missile systems. The credibility of the British deterrent therefore rested not only on national capability but also on continued US support.

France followed the opposite path. Excluded from early nuclear cooperation and sceptical of extended deterrence, Paris developed its force de frappe as an explicit sovereign instrument. The French nuclear doctrine emphasized national decision-making, freedom of action, and the political symbolism of independence. Deterrence was not merely military protection; it was a guarantee of strategic autonomy.

These divergent trajectories repeatedly complicated bilateral cooperation between France and the UK. During the Cold War, the UK could not easily share nuclear information without American approval while France refused to subordinate its deterrent to any external framework, including NATO. Even moments of diplomatic convergence produced mostly rhetorical statements rather than operational coordination.

After 1991, the issue temporarily lost urgency. Arms control agreements, reduced geopolitical tensions, and the shift toward crisis management operations moved nuclear questions into the background. Franco-British defence cooperation deepened through initiatives such as the Saint-Malo Declaration (1998) and later the Lancaster House Treaties (2010), though these agreements focused largely on conventional capabilities and technical collaboration. Nuclear policy remained politically sensitive and largely separate from coordinated strategic planning.

TheĚýReturn ofĚýNuclearĚýPolitics in EuropeĚý

The strategic environment, already undergoing gradual change, shifted dramatically after 2014. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of armed conflict in Donbas marked the return of conventional warfare in Europe. More importantly,  While these signals remained largely indirect at the time, they reintroduced the nuclear dimension into European security. Since 2022, Russian rhetoric has become far more overt, . 

At the same time, the institutional foundations of nuclear stability weakened. The  (8 May 2018), the  (2 August 2019), the  (5 February 2026), and the broader erosion of arms control norms removed many stabilizing constraints inherited from the Cold War. These developments coincided with a gradual reorientation of US strategy toward the Indo-Pacific. . Although Washington did not disengage from NATO, successive administrations placed growing emphasis on burden-sharing and regional prioritization, encouraging European Allies to assume greater responsibility for their own security.  

For European states, the combination of Russian coercion and America’s shifting security priorities created a dilemma. NATO’s deterrence remained credible, yet its perceived unconditionality weakened. European security increasingly depended on whether Europeans could carry a larger share of the burden of deterrence in a crisis directly affecting the continent, rather than relying exclusively on automatic US escalation. In this context, nuclear discourse has regained political salience for European NATO Allies. The issue is no longer deterrence itself, but who will be responsible for making deterrence credible in a crisis directly affecting Europe. 

The Northwood DeclarationĚý

The 2025 Northwood Declaration must be understood in the context of this shifting dynamic. This Declaration does not create a joint Franco-British nuclear force; however, its significance lies in its political message that British and French nuclear deterrents can be coordinated and jointly considered in the management of European security. 

The creation of the UK-France Nuclear Steering Group through this Declaration introduces a permanent mechanism for political consultation across nuclear policy, capabilities, and operations. However, national decision-making authority remains unaffected and both France and the UK retain explicit sovereignty over their nuclear arsenals. This step represents an important qualitative change.  Nuclear policy itself remained politically insulated. Northwood, by contrast, brings nuclear cooperation into the political sphere. For the first time, . 

The Declaration also restates the long-standing formulation that the vital interests of one country cannot be threatened without affecting those of the other, a wording that originates from the . In the contemporary context, this relational language carries broader implications than in the 1990s, as it signals a shared willingness to extend nuclear deterrence across Europe. 

ReconcilingĚýAtlanticismĚýandĚýAutonomyĚý

Does this development have broader implications for transatlantic security? Does it reconcile the United Kingdom’s US-integrated deterrent posture with France’s doctrine of independent nuclear decision-making? The answer is both yes and no. The UK has not abandoned its reliance on the US. . Participation in NATO nuclear planning and the acquisition of dual-capable aircraft further reinforce transatlantic integration. France, on the other hand, has not diluted its doctrine of independence. It remains outside NATO’s nuclear planning structures and continues to emphasize sovereign decision-making, as   

The Northwood Declaration therefore does not produce doctrinal convergence. Instead, it provides functional political alignment. Both states retain their respective strategic identities while deepening political cooperation in response to a shared perception of risk. The significance of this shift lies precisely in its pragmatism. Rather than forcing institutional integration – which would be politically unacceptable to both sides – the declaration creates a cooperative interface. The UK derives credibility from its integration with NATO and its nuclear relationship with the US, whereas France derives that same credibility from autonomous national decision-making. The political coordination provided by the Northwood Declaration therefore does not merge the two deterrents but instead creates parallel centres of nuclear decision-making aligned in a common strategic posture, complicating an adversary’s assessment of escalation. 

In effect, coordination substitutes for doctrinal reconciliation. The Declaration does not remove the structural tension between NATO dependence and strategic autonomy; it manages this tension by transforming it into coordinated political signalling. 

Implications for EuropeanĚýDeterrenceĚý

The Northwood Declaration importantly does not create a European nuclear deterrent. No extended guarantee is offered, no shared command established. Hence, US extended deterrence and NATO remain central for many European states. However, the Declaration does still alter the strategic landscape in Europe.  

By coordinating their deterrents politically, the UK and France introduce a European layer of nuclear signalling within the transatlantic system. This European layer operates through identifiable mechanisms. For European NATO Allies, the public coordination of the two nuclear powers signals that deterrence credibility does not depend exclusively on immediate US escalation. For a potential adversary, the existence of two politically aligned but nationally independent nuclear decision-makers introduces uncertainty about escalation thresholds and responses. At the same time, the political burden of deterrence is no longer borne solely by Washington, as London and Paris visibly assume a larger role in strategic signalling and crisis management. 

The result is best understood as a hedge. It is designed to supplement American guarantees rather than replace them. In a crisis, adversaries must consider not only NATO and the US, but also the combined political stance of Europe’s two nuclear powers. Over time, this may influence how deterrence is discussed within Europe. While not establishing a European nuclear force, the Northwood Declaration makes European nuclear responsibility a legitimate topic of policy rather than a theoretical debate.  

The Northwood Declaration fits within a broader pattern in which nuclear deterrence is no longer confined to NATO’s internal mechanisms. In this sense, the Declaration may represent a catalyst for deeper dialogue and coordination between European nuclear and non-nuclear actors. An early indication of this dynamic emerged with the  through which the UK and the Federal Republic of Germany agreed to pursue deep exchanges on deterrence, nuclear issues and arms control, as well as a permanent dialogue on defence matters, while also envisaging intensified trilateral cooperation with France. Furthermore, . 

More recently, this broader trend has been further reinforced by the French President’s proposal of a  which envisages deeper forms of political and strategic coordination between France and a group of willing European partners, including both nuclear and non-nuclear states. While stopping short of creating a European nuclear deterrent, . 

Limits andĚýConstraintsĚý

Despite its significance, the Declaration faces important limitations. Structural asymmetries remain profound. The US still possesses nuclear capabilities vastly exceeding those of either France or the UK, but the relevant comparison is broader:  and . 

A further limitation concerns the autonomy of the British deterrent. Although the UK retains sovereign political control over its nuclear forces, it also remains deeply intertwined with the US through the Mutual Defence Agreement, , and broader technological cooperation. This creates structural limits on how far the UK can engage in deeper nuclear cooperation with its European nuclear and non-nuclear partners and how far the British nuclear deterrent can be Europeanized. However, the novelty concerning the French doctrine of “advanced deterrence” could be seen as another step towards a more extended deterrence. 

Divergent defence-industrial partnerships also complicate long-term convergence. France’s cooperation with Germany contrasts with Britain’s global partnerships such as the . Regional priorities differ as well. The UK has increasingly oriented its security policy toward Northern Europe, most notably through its leadership of the , a regional military framework bringing together Nordic and Baltic states for rapid crisis response and defence cooperation. 

For these reasons, the Northwood Declaration should not be interpreted as the beginning of a fully integrated European nuclear structure. Its strength lies in political signalling rather than institutional transformation. 

ConclusionĚý

The Northwood DeclarationĚýrepresentsĚýa strategic turning point in Franco-British nuclear cooperation, but in a specific and carefully bounded sense. It does not dismantle the structural differences between British Atlanticism and French strategic autonomy. Rather, it lays the foundations forĚýthese two systemsĚýtoĚýoperateĚýtogether. By publicly acknowledging coordination and institutionalizing consultation, the Declaration moves cooperation from symbolic reassurance to structured political practice. The UK continues to rely on the US; France continues to emphasize autonomy. Yet bothĚýthe UK and FranceĚýrecognize that, in this current era of intense geopolitical tension, the credibility of European deterrence increasingly depends onĚýtheirĚýpolitical leadership. The Northwood Declaration is a strong signal that they are willing to assume that role together.Ěý

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Introduction

Since the 1970s, the European Economic Community (EEC)/European Union (EU) has sought to play a complementary role to the United States (US) in the pursuit of security and stability in the Middle East. This has occurred mostly through soft security measures: diplomacy; economic and financial aid to Palestinians; civilian missions focused on stability; and dialogue with Arab states. In this regard, it is worth mentioning the Euro-Arab Dialogue: a political and economic cooperation framework launched in 1974 between the EEC and the Arab League to strengthen the relationship between the parties after the Yom Kippur War and oil crisis. However, despite these efforts, the limits of the EU’s unique institutional set-up have prevented it from playing a major role in regional affairs. The ongoing war in the Gaza Strip between Israel and Hamas has highlighted the limits of the EU’s diplomatic action. In the meantime, President Donald Trump’s Peace Plan for Gaza has re-energized, once again, the role of the , prompting some to draw historical parallels to earlier US-brokered efforts – from Camp David to the failed Oslo Accords. What role could the EU play in the American plan? How can its involvement be decisive to achieve a just and lasting peace in the region?

Context

The 2006 electoral victory of Hamas in the Gaza Strip led to a severe escalation with Israel. With Hamas taking over the territory from the Fatah-controlled Palestinian Authority (PA), Israel considered the Palestinian military group a security threat, as it refused to recognize the Jewish state, renounce violence, or accept previous peace agreements brokered by the PA and Israel. Hamas’ accession to power in 2006 constituted a critical historical juncture that transformed governance in Gaza and its overall relationship with Israel. This shift was accompanied by the return of a range of familiar political practices – including diplomatic negotiations, economic sanctions, and ongoing military engagement – that continue to define this governance period.

In the meantime, two other factors made the relationship between the parties more strained. On the one hand, on November 29, 2012, the , which upgraded Palestine from a “non-member observer entity” to a “non-member observer State.” This historic vote granted Palestine implicit recognition of statehood and was seen as a move to revive the two-state solution, a move strongly opposed by the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. On the other hand, the US-brokered Abraham Accords were signed in 2020, aiming to normalize diplomatic, economic, and security relations between Israel and several Arab nations (including the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan). Palestinians overwhelmingly opposed the Abraham Accords, perceiving the agreements as an abandonment of the long-standing consensus among Arab states that negotiations with Israel were contingent on ending occupation.

On October 7, 2023, Hamas initiated an attack on Israel. . The Israeli response was a full-scale military invasion of the Gaza Strip which, by December 2025, has killed 71,266 Palestinians, left most schools and hospitals in ruins, and caused long-term damage to the local society and economy.

The EU’s response to Gaza was characterized by contradictions and divisions between its member states. Some countries such as Czech Republic, Austria, Hungary, Italy, and Germany, stood with Israel, backing its military campaign and avoiding criticism of Netanyahu’s regime. Other governments, such as Belgium, Spain, France and Ireland – while strongly condemning Hamas – called for a ceasefire and criticized Israel for violating international humanitarian law. These differing positions prevented the EU from having a coordinated stance at the UN when voting on a on December 12, 2023, which called for a humanitarian ceasefire.

Divergencies appeared not only between member states but also across EU institutions. While European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen showed a stronger emphasis on Israel’s right to defence, the European Council issued a more cautious joint statement aimed at highlighting the EU as a unified voice. The statement took a more neutral tone than President von der Leyen, emphasizing both Israel’s right to defence as well as the crucial need for humanitarian aid, civilian protection, and adherence to international law. A third voice, EU’s foreign policy chief Josep Borrell, was more critical of Israel, . The inertia resulting from lack of consensus among member states and across institutions severely undermines the EU’s position as mediator, letting the Americans play a leading role once again.

On September 29, 2025, President Trump announced his plan to “end the Gaza war” and address the broader Middle Eastern crisis. The so-called was negotiated with the consultation of Arab states, namely Egypt, Qatar and °ŐĂĽ°ů°ěľ±˛â±đ. The EU played no formal role in the negotiations; it made no proposals of its own, despite being both a major donor to Palestine and an important partner of Israel.

Endorsed by UN Security Council , Trump’s plan includes the deployment of an International Stabilization Force (ISF) in Gaza, a multinational military body that will ensure the demilitarization and security of the Gaza Strip; and the creation of a Board of Peace (BoP), a committee led by Trump that will oversee the political transition in Gaza until a reformed Palestinian Authority can take over governance in 2027. Formally launched at the 56th World Economic Forum in January 2026, the BoP claims its main purpose is the promotion of peacekeeping all around the world, not only in Gaza. Countries wishing to participate in the BoP are required to contribute US$1 billion to the organization to renew their membership, and Trump, as its chairman, is not subject to term limits, holding the sole authority to nominate his successor.

to ending the war in Gaza; however, many EU member states have expressed concern over the possibility of the BoP overshadowing the role of the UN. Currently, Bulgaria and Hungary are the only two EU countries to have joined the initiative. France, Spain, Poland, and Germany declined to participate, while Italy, Romania, Greece and Cyprus joined as observers. The EU Commission also decided to join as an observer, sending the Commissioner for the Mediterranean, Dubravka Šuica, to Washington, DC, to attend the inaugural meeting of the BoP on February 19, 2026. In a sign of continued disunity, , calling it a “mistake”, as the EU supports a two-state solution and “cannot participate” in any body that excludes the Palestinian National Authority.

Problems

Even if Trump’s plan represents an important step towards a peace deal, it contains critical aspects which might hinder its implementation. The current plan effectively grants Israel a veto power over peace, as its military redeployments are conditioned on Hamas’ demilitarization and reform of the PA. At the same time, Israel is not required to make any formal commitments towards halting settlement expansion in the West Bank or respecting the autonomy of a Palestinian state. On this issue Israel’s stance is clear: Netanyahu declared that , as it is an “existential threat to Israel.” Therefore, there is a real risk that, without guarantees for the Palestinian people and a plan to address occupation, Trump’s plan may fail or lead to an unjust and unstable peace agreement that steamrolls Palestinian rights and territories recognized by international law.

On the other hand, Trump’s peace plan has confirmed that the US continues to play a . However, some , such as Francesca Albanese, Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian Occupied Territory, criticized the plan. UN Special Adviser on Sustainability, Jeffrey Sachs, labelled the US proposal as “.” According to them, Trump is behaving in Gaza like a 19th-century colonial broker, placing himself at the helm of the BoP to oversee a foreign territory’s governance, with the overall aim of advancing US interests in the region. The Middle East has figured prominently in the first and second Trump administrations’ foreign policy. President Trump’s main goal is to broker agreements between Israel and other Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, to . This attitude could prove counterproductive and place EU interests at risk.

Strategic Outlook and Policy Recommendations

A more active role of the EU in the region is necessary to guarantee success and counter risks of instability, which may have severe implications for European security, including energy supply limitations, new security threats, and an increase of migration and refugee flows. It is in the EU’s interest to enhance its influence in the region. What practical steps should the EU take to avoid marginalization and make a meaningful contribution to peace?

1. The EU should consider holding an enhanced observer status at the BoP as a necessary counterweight to US and Israeli pressures and hegemony in decision-making. Of course, the EU has to maintain a steadfast commitment to strengthening and reforming the UN, confirming it as the core of a rules-based international order and multilateralism. However, enhanced observer status at the BoP could allow the EU to monitor negotiations and participate in debates specifically devoted to making interventions, peace proposals, and amendments. The presence of the EU, with its traditional concern for Palestinian issues, could ensure meaningful Palestinian involvement. This is fundamental to legitimate the transitory governance of the Gaza Strip and preserve Palestinian decision-making power. A more active EU at BoP could also contribute to reforming the PA.

The divergences between member states and across EU institutions negatively impact the EU’s international role. Therefore, the EU should take a cohesive stance on its participation at the BoP, bearing in mind some key arguments. Firstly, “” provides direct insight into how decisions are implemented, serving as a channel for influence. The EU is the largest donor to Palestinian recovery and its involvement in the BoP could help the EU shape outcomes rather than merely fund them, aligning its significant financial contributions with the necessary humanitarian, governance, and security strands of the peace plan. Moreover, “” is vital for influencing the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2803.

2. The EU should be part of the International Security Force. Together with The European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) Rafah Mission and EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS), involvement in the ISF could contribute to the maintenance of the ceasefire. Participation in the ISF could enhance European influence on Israel, for example, by convincing the Israeli government to review its settlement policy and improve living conditions for the Palestinians.

3. The EU should use economic and financial tools to enhance its political influence. On the Palestinian side, the European Commission recently . On the Israeli side, the EU should overcome its reluctances and suspend the EU-Israel Association Agreement if the Israeli government continues to violate human rights in Gaza, as required by Article 2 of the Agreement. The suspension of this Agreement could influence Israel to respect the , following preliminary rulings about a “plausible” genocide occurring in Gaza. The EU could link Israeli participation in EU funding programs, such as Horizon Europe, to the full withdrawal from Gaza, the end of settlements in the West Bank, and apartheid policy against Palestinians.

4. The EU should invest in the implementation of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), an economic initiative designed to enhance connectivity and integration between Asia, the Middle East, and Europe, based on three pillars: energy, transportation, and digital connectivity. IMEC should be a core interest for Europeans, as it , increasing political and economic ties between participating counties. Moreover, it could enhance the EU’s political influence in the area, counterbalancing China and the US. The implementation of some projects as part of the IMEC – such as the EastMed Gas Pipeline – could make the EU a relevant player in terms of future economic cooperation projects, allowing it to increase its weight in the Middle East peace process.

The EU could influence, for example, the implementation of the so-called “Green Blue Deal” between Jordan and Israel, which provides for the supply of water from Israel in exchange for Jordanian supplies of solar power. The Gaza war stopped the project, but the ceasefire created hope that it may be relaunched in such a way that the Gaza Strip and the West Bank can also benefit from it.

Conclusion

While the US commitment has been the sine qua non for a ceasefire in Gaza, the EU holds key cards to ensure the successful implementation of Trump’s peace plan. With its traditional regional approach, a more active observer role of the EU in the BoP and its participation in the ISF could balance American – and Israeli – influence and ensure a more equitable peace solution. In doing so, it may also help ensure that Palestinian rights recognized by international law are considered against the backdrop of ongoing ceasefire and conflict negotiations. In addition, the use of economic leverage as well as the implementation of the IMEC corridor could enhance the EU political weight in the area, preventing the dawn of a new era of regional instability and insecurity with direct impact on Europe itself.

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Executive Summary 

• Russia’s ability to sustain its war against Ukraine depends not only on military capacity but on how the state manages the social and economic pressures placed on families. 

• So-called “traditional” spiritual-moral values provide the ideological framework through which the state justifies sacrifice, promotes compliance, and assigns meaning to the disruption of family life caused by the war in Ukraine. 

• Extensive financial and social benefits for military families help stabilize the home front and support recruitment, but these measures are costly and may be difficult to sustain over time. 

• The war’s impact on families is uneven across regions, creating long-term demographic and social vulnerabilities that could undermine Russia’s post-war stability. 

• Russian family policy prioritizes material support and narrative control while existing structures are inadequately prepared to address key problems of veteran reintegration, including mental health challenges and increased risks of domestic violence. 

The post Understanding Russia’s Family Policy for Wartime Resilience appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.