As Canada looks to build a renewed vision of sovereignty and economic independence – divorced from the influence, reliance, and hegemony of the United States (US) – the nation is increasingly seeking foreign capital to develop an economically viable Canada for tomorrow. The urgent need to develop a sovereign wealth fund – the – is the structural result of the . In a bid to attract capital and develop the Canada Strong Fund while facing a , Prime Minister Mark Carney is hosting the in Toronto, Ontario, from September 14-15, 2026. 

Attending the summit will be the world’s leading investors who have been invited to identify opportunities for investment in Canada. The government’s ambition is to catalyse $1 trillion in total investment across Canada over the next five years, supported by approximately $280 billion in federal capital investments and incentives. The summit is being in partnership with the federal government, the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board (CPP Investments), and the Public Sector Pension Investment Board (PSP Investments). It will build upon Canada’s economic developments of the , as the government seeks to diversify Canada’s economic relationships, attract foreign capital, and reduce the country’s historical dependence on the US. Yet this drive for investment raises two important questions: how prepared is Canada to protect the infrastructure and strategic assets that this investment will create, expand, and place under private ownership? And does Canada have the institutional guardrails to responsibly place constraints upon private entities?

The Question of Investment and Strategic Infrastructure

The question of foreign investment in strategic infrastructure and resources is particularly relevant given the Carney government’s growing interest in private investment in Canadian transportation infrastructure. The explicitly announced that the government would , alongside measures intended to attract . The same budget also identifies continued engagement with investors to increase private investment in .

The rationale for investment in this infrastructure is straightforward. Airports and ports are essential to Canada’s economic growth and trade diversification. . At the same time, airports facilitate the movement of high-value cargo and connect Canadian communities both domestically and to . These are attractive opportunities for private investment that will generate revenue for Canada, enabling the modernisation and development of this infrastructure, boosting trade efficiency, without increasing public debt.

In Canada, there are and . These airports and ports, managed by private not-for-profit local authorities, and . These are not merely economic assets; they sustain the livelihoods of approximately half a million Canadians while serving as critical infrastructure and strategic nodes of sovereignty. They facilitate the movement of people, goods, energy, information, and, when necessary, military and emergency resources. Their worth extends beyond their commercial value and contributes to the public good of Canadian society.

Canada’s move towards the privatisation of transportation infrastructure does not make it the first state to do so – that position would belong to the . In 1987, the United Kingdom’s Conservative government’s privatisation of airports successfully generated revenue for a while simultaneously offloading the cost of airport upgrades from the state onto private firms. However, private ownership quickly poorer working conditions and lower pay for the thousands of employees.

In Canada in 2026, a similar pattern risks manifesting itself again: the auctioning off of infrastructure that provides a public service may occur at a discount price – much to the chagrin of private investors – while costs for services charged by these private entities may be able to escalate with no public accountability. Without state oversight, it may be more than solely price gouging that harms Canadians, but service interruption. If, through a callous calculation, a foreign-owned private entity decides to reduce service or even close an airport to maximise profits, this would be a corporate decision without government input or public accountability.

While the federal government may not be focused on the impact that privatisation could have upon the everyday lives of ordinary Canadians, the broader geopolitical realities of 2026 – characterised by a return to and , alongside a decline of American hegemony – make for a compelling case for the federal government to reconsider. The more Canada relies upon private and foreign capital to operate and develop these assets, the more important it becomes that the government establishes who is responsible for their security when a threat emerges. The core question to ask of the federal government is whether Canada’s security architecture and institutional capacity can keep pace with growing technological complexity and the change of ownership created by private investment.

This inquiry strikes at a weakness in Canadian governance: institutions are organised around jurisdictional responsibilities while the infrastructure and threats they must protect operate across those jurisdictions. Threats to critical infrastructure do not fit neatly within the pre-existing institutional mandates of the confederation. Radio-frequency interference, jamming, cyberattacks, hostile drones, physical intrusion, and other forms of disruption involve responsibilities spanning across institutional bodies such as (ISED), the (RCMP), the (DND), , and .

When a Threat Emerges, Who Responds?

Consider a hypothetical incident at a Canadian airport or marine port. A drone is detected approaching the facility, but its purpose is initially unknown. It may be a negligent operator, indicate criminal activity, surveillance of the facility, or something more nefarious. The distinction matters, but in the first few minutes, authorities may not have enough information to know what they are facing. The immediate problem is determining who has the authority and capability to respond while the nature of the threat is still being established.

This is particularly apparent as counter-drone systems rely upon radio-frequency interference or jamming. , and it states that the use of jammers is prohibited unless a ministerial exemption applies. Such exemptions have been granted to the , , and the . The result is a critical distinction between possessing counter-drone capability and possessing the authority to use it in a particular circumstance.

This critical distinction becomes more consequential when the infrastructure itself is privately operated. An airport or port operator may be the first to detect an intrusion and may have sophisticated security personnel and detection systems, but it does not possess the jurisdictional authority exercised by Canada’s institutional and legal bodies. Provincial or municipal police may be positioned to respond to an immediate criminal threat, but federal authorities possess jurisdiction over aviation, spectrum management, national security, and defence. The institution with the most appropriate capability may therefore not be the institution that can immediately employ it. But the first few minutes of a security incident have no respect for time nor institutional boundaries. A threat does not wait for federal, provincial, municipal, and private actors to determine whose mandate applies.

As Canada attracts private and foreign investment for critical infrastructure projects and investment, if a threat consequently emerges in the privately-owned scenario, this begs the question of who possesses both the authority and the capability to act immediately. If the answer depends upon transferring responsibility between multiple institutions before an effective response can begin, then the vulnerability is institutional. The challenge is to proactively determine who is responsible for detecting the threat, assessing it, who has authority to intervene, who possesses the necessary capability, and who assumes command. As strategic infrastructure becomes increasingly privately operated, these questions cannot be left unresolved.

Inconvenient Timing: Canada’s Policing Transition

Institutional fragmentation is becoming more consequential as Canada approaches a broader transition in the organisation of policing itself. identifies the modernisation of federal policing as an ongoing priority. At the same time, the federal government is preparing for the , which expire in . This approaching deadline is particularly important as policing responsibilities are already . and maintain their own provincial police services, while Canada’s eight other provinces and three territories contract out police services to the RCMP; but in recent years, the mandate of the RCMP is changing. In the city of Surrey, British Columbia, a has recently concluded.

Alberta provides perhaps the clearest example of where this trend could lead: the province has continued to consider the establishment of an , and the . These developments raise a question extending beyond ordinary policing, located at the core of Canadian federalism and problematising the privatisation of critical infrastructure: as provinces increasingly seek greater sovereignty and enhanced control over policing, who is ultimately responsible for protecting infrastructure that is provincially located, nationally significant, but privately owned?

Crucially, Alberta is home to infrastructure whose significance extends beyond provincial boundaries, particularly in the energy sector. If policing authority becomes increasingly provincial while infrastructure is increasingly privatized, responsibility for its protection becomes convoluted. This is further complicated by in greater provincial autonomy and potential separation, which could create additional uncertainty around the long-term governance of nationally significant infrastructure. At the same time, Alberta’s energy resources – identified as for the upcoming Canada Investment Summit –  and make the province particularly attractive to foreign private investment. While such investment can generate significant economic value, foreign ownership of strategically important energy and infrastructure assets can also create new dependencies and avenues for .

Alberta therefore provides a useful stress test for Canada’s emerging investment model: what happens when nationally significant infrastructure is provincially located, privately owned, attractive to foreign capital, and situated within a province increasingly questioning its relationship with Ottawa?

Invest if You Must, But Know Who Protects It

This highlights a tension at the heart of Canada’s investment strategy. The government is asking foreign and private investors to place capital into infrastructure that Canada considers essential to its economic sovereignty, while the frameworks governing the protection of that infrastructure remain unevenly distributed. Canada should therefore treat security governance as an essential component of its investment strategy rather than as a separate policy concern. Before encouraging significant private or foreign investment in airports, ports, telecommunications networks, energy infrastructure, critical-mineral supply chains, and other strategically important assets, Ottawa should ensure that there are clear lines of responsibility for their protection, establish mechanisms for interagency coordination, and clearly define the responsibilities of respective authorities for responding to emerging threats.

The renegotiation of the Police Service Agreements ahead of their 2032 expiry provides an opportunity to address this problem at the federal level. Ottawa and the provinces should clarify how provincial, municipal, and federal policing authorities will coordinate when locally situated infrastructure has national-security implications. Canada cannot build economic sovereignty merely by diversifying who provides capital. It must ensure that the infrastructure built with that capital remains secure, resilient, and subject to a clear Canadian security architecture. Canada should therefore enter this new era of investment with a simple principle: before deciding who will own or finance strategic infrastructure, Canada must know who will be responsible for protecting it.

But the question of who protects infrastructure is only one part of the larger challenge. Canada must also ask who operates it, who maintains it, who regulates it, who works within it, and who ensures that essential services continue when normal systems are disrupted. A resilient nation cannot rely upon conventional security capabilities while allowing the social and institutional foundations of resilience to erode.

Economic sovereignty requires investment. Conventional security requires protection. But national resilience requires both to be built alongside the public goods and institutions that allow Canadian society to withstand disruption.

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Executive Summary

Canada’s Arctic sovereignty depends on digital infrastructure governed outside its jurisdiction. Critical communications rely on foreign-owned satellite networks, exposing Canadian data and essential services to external legal regimes and geopolitical risk. The European Union faces similar vulnerabilities, creating a shared strategic challenge. Rather than pursuing separate solutions, Canada and the EU can leverage existing frameworks—including the Digital Partnership Council, the Security and Defence Partnership, SAFE, and CETA—to jointly invest in secure communications infrastructure, satellite capabilities, research and development, and regulatory coordination. By treating digital infrastructure as a collective security capability, both partners can strengthen Arctic resilience, reduce dependence on external actors, and enhance their ability to respond to emerging geopolitical threats.

Introduction

What exactly does Canadian sovereignty mean when a medical alert sent from an Indigenous community in Nunavut through a US ground station before reaching its destined Canadian community? In the digital age, all communications rely on transnational digital infrastructure , exposing both Canada and the EU to foreign surveillance, political coercion, service disruptions, and the weaponisation of critical digital infrastructure. Dependence on American digital infrastructure creates a strategic vulnerability: no state can claim if one cannot control its data. 

These strategic have become increasingly apparent as the Arctic emerges as a strategic theatre of geopolitical competition. While dependence on American digital infrastructure has historically been tolerated by both Canada and the EU, this dependency is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain. Russia’s of the High North and China’s growing in Arctic infrastructure demonstrate that the Arctic can no longer be treated as a stable environment. Simultaneously, security dynamics are shifting within NATO, originating from the erratic posturing of American President Donald Trump and his repeated calls for greater control over . Demanding as well that Canada strengthen its Arctic . This behaviour highlights the growing uncertainty surrounding Arctic governance and security. 

In this increasingly contested environment, reliance on foreign-controlled digital infrastructure represents a strategic vulnerability. The widespread ongoing through the , alongside the disruption of Venezuelan during the 2026 US operation targeting President Nicolás Maduro’s government, illustrates that communications networks can become instruments of geopolitical coercion and strategic leverage. Rather than pursuing parallel solutions, Canada and the EU are better positioned to address these challenges together. Existing frameworks such as the already provide mechanisms for joint investment, industrial cooperation, research and development, and regulatory coordination of critical digital infrastructure. Collectively, these initiatives can transform digital infrastructure from a source of strategic vulnerability into an instrument of deterrence by increasing the resilience, redundancy, and interoperability of allied communications networks.

Nunavut: A Case Study in Digital Dependence

Nunavut concentrates these vulnerabilities into a poignant case study. Its remote yet increasingly strategic geography makes satellite connectivity essential as remain limited for many of these predominantly Indigenous communities. has captured this market and has across the territory, becoming the connectivity provider for northern Indigenous communities and Canadians. This is reflected by Canada ranking among the world’s highest users of Starlink in . While this expansion has improved connectivity in underserved regions, it also creates strategic vulnerabilities. Starlink’s owner, Elon Musk, has demonstrated how privately controlled communications infrastructure can become entangled with geopolitical decision-making, most notably through the . Furthermore, reliance on places Nunavut’s communications within scope of American intelligence authorities through FISA Section 702, . The growing influence of private technology companies over critical infrastructure presents a broader sovereignty challenge, particularly amid increasing uncertainty surrounding US Arctic policy and the role of non-state actors in geopolitical affairs.

Beyond the security implications of foreign-controlled infrastructure, Nunavut’s connectivity challenges reveal both a market failure and a broader governance gap. Private interests have not accounted for the national security, sovereignty, and governance risks created by dependence on externally controlled infrastructure. This in turn represents a failure of governance. Canada has not established sufficient requirements or incentives for to extend reliable, secure connectivity to northern communities or to ensure that critical infrastructure serving the Arctic aligns with national security objectives. This failure largely stems from Canadian federalism and the constitutional , as responsibility for digital connectivity is interprovincial and therefore mandated to the federal government; however, provinces and territories retain significant responsibilities for service delivery, consumer protection, and privacy-related issues. This division creates a regulatory gap in which no single level of government is fully responsible for ensuring that northern communities receive connectivity that meets both public service needs and national security objectives. The result is a communications environment in which foreign providers have filled gaps left by domestic infrastructure investment, creating dependence on externally controlled networks. Consequently, . For residents of Nunavut, this is not an occasional anomaly, but the everyday reality of staying connected in the federation. 

This governance gap has consequences beyond service delivery and economic development; in the Arctic, digital connectivity is increasingly a component of national security. Arctic communications underpin search and rescue operations, NORAD surveillance, environmental monitoring, and critical infrastructure management across the region. An outage, interference event, or politically motivated disruption could isolate communities, degrade Canadian operational capacity, and compromise situational awareness in a strategically sensitive domain.

Building Collective Arctic Digital Capability

The vulnerabilities exposed in the Nunavut case demonstrate that Arctic security increasingly depends on resilient digital infrastructure and shared technological capabilities. Ensuring Arctic sovereignty therefore requires more than territorial presence; it requires the ability to observe, communicate, and coordinate across an increasingly contested region. No single state possesses all the infrastructure, financial resources, or technological capacity required to secure the Arctic digital environment alone.

Canada and the EU possess complementary capabilities that can strengthen collective Arctic resilience. Canada’s Constellation Mission (RCM) already provides across the Arctic. If integrated with European satellite systems such as and , these capabilities become significantly more powerful, enabling of the region. This cooperation would reduce reliance on unreliable external providers while strengthening allied capacity to respond to emerging threats. This, in turn, could also positively contribute to future NATO preparedness 

Existing Canada–EU frameworks provide the foundation to transform this shared capability into sustained cooperation. (SAFE) initiative provides access to up to €150 billion in competitively priced loans for defence capability investment. This aligns Canadian and EU defence priorities and creates new export opportunities for Canadian defence firms. The (SDP) formalised cooperation on defence planning, intelligence exchange, and emerging technologies. In of the Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), regulatory pathways are established for joint standards development, shared cybersecurity practices, and the integration of cross‑border digital services.

Beyond improving connectivity and interoperability, collective digital capability strengthens deterrence. A diversified Canada–EU digital ecosystem reduces the ability of any single state, corporation, or legal regime to exert political leverage over Arctic communications. By distributing critical infrastructure across trusted partners, Canada and the European Union increase the resilience of essential services while raising the costs of coercion, disruption, or interference. In the digital age, deterrence depends not only on military capability, but also on the resilience and redundancy of the networks that underpin national security.

Recommendations

1. Establish a Canada–EU Arctic Satellite Connectivity Partnership

Canada and the EU should develop an integrated satellite communications framework linking Canadian capabilities, including RADARSAT and Telesat’s low-Earth-orbit (LEO) systems, with European initiatives such as Copernicus and ±õ¸é±õ³§Â². Pooling resources would distribute development costs, expand northern coverage, and create a more resilient and interoperable communications architecture for Arctic communities, defence operations, and environmental monitoring.

2. Expand Trusted Telecommunications Competition in Canada

Canada should create a regulatory environment that allows trusted European telecommunications companies to operate more easily within the Canadian market. Greater competition would reduce reliance on a small number of dominant providers, incentivise investment in underserved northern regions, and encourage the development of resilient connectivity solutions for Indigenous communities. Expanding trusted foreign participation would complement domestic investment while reducing dependence on any single external provider.

3. Complete Ratification of CETA

Canada and the European Union should prioritise full ratification of CETA. Although provisionally applied, CETA has only been ratified by 17 EU member states, limiting the agreement’s full potential. Complete ratification would provide greater legal certainty, expand opportunities for cross-border procurement and investment, and establish a stronger foundation for long-term industrial, technological, and digital infrastructure cooperation.

4. Create a Joint Canada–EU Research and Development Fund for Arctic Technologies

Emerging technologies—including inter-satellite laser communications, secure LEO networks, and space-based edge computing—require sustained investment beyond the capacity of individual states. Canada and the EU should pool funding through mechanisms such as the EU’s Security Action for Europe (SAFE) initiative, CETA procurement mechanisms, and European Investment Bank programs to support collaborative research and development. Joint investment would create economies of scale, strengthen allied technological competitiveness, and accelerate innovation in northern connectivity.

5. Develop Shared Regulatory and Security Standards for Digital Infrastructure

Canada and the EU should establish coordinated standards for satellite communications, cybersecurity, and emerging technologies to strengthen the resilience of critical infrastructure. Drawing on Canada’s Digital Sovereignty Framework and European data protection principles, including lessons from , both partners should create joint assessment mechanisms for communications infrastructure procurement to mitigate risks from foreign interference. As LEO satellite systems become increasingly essential to civilian and defence operations, coordinated standards will be necessary to address cybersecurity threats, orbital congestion, and geopolitical competition.

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Since its establishment in 1949, the foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany was grounded in the concept of Zivilmacht (civilian power), a model based on the renunciation of military force, multilateral cooperation, and economic diplomacy. However, the Russian Federation’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 acted as a significant catalyst for change in Germany’s foreign policy and broader geopolitical positioning. Following these shifts in the European strategic environment, then-Chancellor Olaf Scholz proclaimed Zeitenwende (a turning point in history) had arrived, which would redefine Germany’s security policy through increased defence spending and a more prominent place in international affairs. The electoral victory of Friedrich Merz as current Chancellor has ultimately shifted Germany’s international role to a more assertive and openly strategic posture, distancing itself from the civilian power model of the past.

This essay examines Germany’s evolution from a culture of military restraint toward one of new strategic posturing, analyzing whether this transformation represents a definitive abandonment of its identity as a civilian power in favour of a return to a modern form Machtpolitik (power politics). Through an examination of the historical trajectory from the Cold War to the chancellorship of Friedrich Merz starting in 2025, this essay suggests that Germany is not reverting to aggressive militarism but is instead adopting a form of defensive and integrated Machtpolitik, necessary to ensure security within the Euro-Atlantic order.

The Erosion of the Civilian Power Paradigm

For over seven decades, the Federal Republic of Germany defined its national identity through the lens of a (civilian power). Emerging from the ruins of 1945, it anchored itself in the West under Konrad Adenauer’s policy of (western integration), replacing traditional power politics with a culture of military restraint, multilateralism, and rejection of nuclear arms. This identity consolidated during the Cold War through and the diplomatic success of Willy Brandt’s (eastern policy), which favoured economic interdependence and dialogue over the use of military force. Even after reunification in 1990, Germany struggled to move beyond this posture, exposing a lasting tension between its expanding economic influence and its unwillingness to deploy its military – an approach that NATO Allies frequently criticized as “.�

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 shattered these certainties. Then-Chancellor Olaf Scholz proclaimed a Zeitenwende had taken place, and promising a massive investment in defence through a . However, the Scholz era (2021–2025) was marked by a profound gap between rhetoric and reality. Hampered by bureaucratic bottlenecks, internal coalition disputes, and a lingering culture of pacifism, the implementation of the Zeitenwende proved difficult. Scholz’s reluctance to supply ‘offensive’ weapons – – combined with concerns about Germany’s actual capacity to increase defence spending levels, caused political inconsistency and eroded trust in his leadership at home and abroad. Consequently, the collapse of the Scholz’s governing coalition in late 2024, , paved the way for a more radical transformation under Friedrich Merz.

The Merz Chancellorship: Enforcing Zeitenwende 2.0

The election of Friedrich Merz as Chancellor in February 2025 marked the definitive end of Germany’s post-war strategic ambiguity. Merz’s rise to power envisioned a “,â€� a strategy that aimed to translate the previous government’s hesitant rhetoric into concrete, assertive action. Under Merz’s leadership, Germany has accelerated its transition from a reluctant partner to a burgeoning military leader in Europe, driven by the dual pressures of Russian aggression and uncertainty in the transatlantic security relationship following the second election of Donald Trump to the Presidency of the United States (US).

Unconditional Support for Ukraine and Strategic Assertiveness

The most immediate shift under Chancellor Merz has been the abandonment of self-imposed “red linesâ€� regarding the war in Ukraine. In stark contrast to Scholz’s , Merz’s government adopted a stance of support with “,â€� strengthening Germany’s role as the leading military supporter of Kyiv in Europe. Crucially, the Merz administration on German-supplied weaponry, allowing Ukraine to strike military targets within Russian territory – a decision that signalled a clear break from the fear of escalation that characterized Scholz’s government. This policy is supported by Germany’s continued commitment to , separate from domestic defence spending, although the level of assistance remains . By framing Ukraine’s defence as essential to preserving the European security order, Friedrich Merz has effectively normalized the use of military force as a legitimate and necessary instrument of Germany’s foreign policy.

In line with this strategic imperative, the Merz government has extended its commitment beyond military assistance, actively seeking to reshape Europe’s broader geopolitical frameworks. To shield Eastern Europe from shifting transatlantic dynamics, Merz has recently proposed supporting Ukraine to become an “� within the EU. This proposal would see Ukraine attend high-level EU meetings as an observer without voting rights, effectively allowing it to gain access to EU decision-making forums while it progresses through the legal and administrative work of becoming a full EU member state.

Rearmament and the “Kriegstüchtigkeit” of the Bundeswehr

Domestically, the Merz chancellorship has been defined by an unprecedented drive for rearmament, aiming to transform the Bundeswehr into “.� Following the , Germany committed to significant new spending targets: 3.5% of GDP by 2029, rising to 5% by 2035. To finance the increase defence spending, the German government pushed through a controversial reform of the constitutional debt brake, .

This financial commitment has been matched by structural reforms aimed at achieving Kriegstüchtigkeit (war readiness). The adoption of the designates Germany as the central logistical hub for NATO in Europe, preparing the nation to serve as the transit corridor and operational base for Allied troops in the event of a large-scale conflict with Russia. This shift acknowledges that Germany is no longer just a security contributor, but a frontline state exposed to hybrid threats, requiring full coordination between military forces and civilian infrastructure.

The Return of Conscription and Societal Friction

Perhaps the most socially divisive aspect of Merz’s security overhaul has been the move to address the personnel crisis within the armed forces. In late 2025, the government passed the with the ambition of reaching 260,000 active personnel by the 2030s. This legislation relies on a hybrid model: while initially prioritizing voluntary service with financial incentives, it also established the legal framework for a “� (Bedarfsabhängige Dienstpflicht) that can be activated if volunteer targets are not met.

The potential reintroduction of conscription, which had been abolished in 2011, has sparked significant . Younger generations view the move as a regression to militarism, highlighting a disconnect between the government’s strategic objectives and the pacifist undercurrents of German civil society. The friction reveals that while the German political elite have embraced a harsher security and foreign policy, under a modern form of defensive and integrated Machtpolitik, the societal transition away from the civilian power identity remains incomplete and contested.

European Autonomy and the “Atomic Zeitenwende�

The geopolitical context of Merz’s chancellorship is heavily influenced by second Trump administration in the US. In the wake of President Trump’s “� foreign policy strategy, Merz has pushed for more and an urgent strengthening of German defence. This has led to a breaking of the ultimate German taboo: the nuclear question.

While explicitly ruling out the acquisition of a nuclear arsenal, the Merz government is pursuing an “� through an integration strategy. Germany has deepened cooperation with Europe’s two nuclear powers, France and the United Kingdom (UK), within the framework of the – an informal trilateral forum originally established in 2003 to coordinate diplomatic efforts over Iran’s nuclear program. Despite Brexit complicating its institutional dimension, the E3 has evolved into a broader platform for strategic coordination, . Through initiatives such as the – and in the context of strengthened Franco-British nuclear cooperation through the – Germany is seeking to link European security more closely to Franco-British nuclear deterrents. These developments mark a deep cultural shift: nuclear deterrence is no longer discarded but instead embraced as a necessary component of European defence, with Germany acting as a key political facilitator of this shared capability.

Theoretical Analysis: A Return to Machtpolitik? Neoclassical realist approach

The radical transformation of German security policy under Friedrich Merz raises a fundamental question: has Germany abandoned its identity as a Zivilmacht in favour of a return to Machtpolitik? The evidence suggests that while the civilian power model in its idealistic and pacifist form has largely faded, Germany is not returning to the aggressive, unilateral power politics of the pre-1945 era. Instead, it is adopting a defensive and integrated Machtpolitik.

The theory of helps explain why Germany could no longer remain a civilian power after 2022 while also highlighting the variables that have complicated this transformation. External pressures, such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine, altered the distribution of power and threat perception in Europe, compelling the German government to embark on a Zeitenwende to adapt its material capabilities. Yet the theory recognizes that systemic imperatives are filtered through domestic variables. Perceptions of policy-makers, institutional constraints such as the debt brake, and a society shaped by pacifist norms have all slowed decision-making and implementation of reforms, reflecting what Hanns W. Maull defined as , or, a “lack of realism� or “oblivion of power.�

Under these conditions, Germany’s rearmament is not simply about accumulating hard power, but instead about responding to a shifting geopolitical environment in an integrated and defensive manner. Integration () occurs through NATO and EU institutions, allowing Berlin to exercise influence and maximize security without alarming Allies. The defensive dimension () focuses on denying Russian victory and protecting the status quo rather than redrawing Europe’s borders. This approach illustrates a neoclassical realist compromise: Germany adapts to systemic requirements while being constrained and shaped by internal political and societal factors, explaining why its strategic transformation has been slow and deliberate.

Overcoming Machtvergessenheit

As argued by , Germany is in the process of overcoming its “forgetting of power.� For decades, the Federal Republic of Germany operated under the illusion that European economic interdependence and normative power projection were sufficient to secure its interests – characteristically liberal ideals. The Merz era reflects a growing recognition that civilian power may require the support of military strength to remain credible.

The Merz government has realized that to preserve the liberal international order – a core objective of the Zivilmacht concept – it must employ the tools of Machtpolitik. Thus, the dichotomy traditionally rendered between the two ontologies is false. Germany is not choosing power over law; rather, it frames the strengthening of its military as part of a broader effort to provide security for Europe and the liberal international order. Its refusal to pursue an independent nuclear arsenal while simultaneously seeking deeper integration into Allied nuclear frameworks demonstrates this nuanced position. Initiatives such as the establishment of a high-level , or the debate at this year’s Munich Security Conference on to safeguard Europe’s future, demonstrate that Germany remains firmly anchored in the institutions that have shaped its identity since its founding. At the same time, Germany is discussing options with European partners to develop a deterrence posture that is autonomous, independent, and credible.

Recent diplomatic developments strongly illustrate this assertive and autonomous stance. On the diplomatic front, Friedrich Merz has cast aside any lingering hesitation, explicitly accusing the Trump administration of allowing itself to be during the course of the ongoing US-Iran conflict. This position reflects a pragmatic call for European self-reliance in response to unpredictable US diplomacy, rather than an open challenge to the NATO Alliance.

Conclusion

The chancellorship of Friedrich Merz has placed the Federal Republic of Germany on a decisive path towards a difficult, yet necessary, transformation. The hesitation and ambiguity that defined the Scholz era and the Zeitenwende 1.0 have been replaced by a strategic clarity that acknowledges the harsh realities of the current security environment.

By challenging fiscal constraints with the €500 billion fund, addressing societal taboos with the reintroduction of conscription, and engaging with previously avoided strategic debates, Germany has fundamentally redefined its role. It has transitioned from a reluctant partner, long constrained by neglect of military power and capability development, to an emerging pillar of European stability, actively shaping defence initiatives and security cooperation.

However, this transition carries significant perils. Societal backlash against conscription and concerns over Germany’s military buildup underscore the fragility of both internal and external support. The success of a defensive, integrated Machtpolitik depends not only on the . Furthermore, fears of a potential authoritarian turn – partly driven by rising domestic support for the – continues to create anxieties among the Allies.

Ultimately, Germany has not yet returned to the aggressive nationalism of its past. Instead, it is slowly becoming a “normal� geopolitical power by acknowledging that, in a multipolar world, abstaining from projections of power may undermine chances for survival.

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Over the past two decades, nuclear weapons have returned to the centre of European security as a result of consistent and compounding changes to global geopolitics. For most of the post-Cold War era, weapons of mass destruction appeared to have lost salience as the disappearance of bipolar confrontation, the expansion of cooperative security frameworks, and the consolidation of arms control regimes fostered the belief that large-scale interstate conflict in Europe was a phenomenon of the past. However, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the collapse of arms control frameworks and agreements, and growing uncertainty surrounding the durability of security guarantees from the United States (US) have altered these assumptions, forcing a reassessment of the role of nuclear deterrence in Europe. Nuclear weapons have now regained centrality in European security as instruments of coercion, signalling, and strategic reassurance.

These dynamics have rekindled a nuclear debate in a number of European states, including the United Kingdom (UK) and France – Western Europe’s only two nuclear powers – who came together in July 2025 to sign the Northwood Declaration. This Declaration represents a significant political step for European nuclear security as, for the first time, both French and British governments publicly recognize that their independent nuclear forces must be thought of as a nuclear tandem in upholding the security of Europe. The political significance of this Declaration is much greater than its technical content and raises the following questions: does Northwood Declaration represent a strategic turning point in Franco-British nuclear cooperation in the context of perceived US disengagement from Europe and renewed Russian assertiveness? Can this renewed commitment to cooperation bridge the UK and France’s historically distinct strategic traditions regarding nuclear weapons?

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Nuclear relations between the UK and France have always been shaped by a triangulated great power partnership that necessarily involved the US. The UK’s nuclear program was deeply embedded in Anglo-American cooperation from the Second World War onward. The 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement institutionalized this relationship, giving the UK access to American technology, materials, and missile systems. The credibility of the British deterrent therefore rested not only on national capability but also on continued US support.

France followed the opposite path. Excluded from early nuclear cooperation and sceptical of extended deterrence, Paris developed its force de frappe as an explicit sovereign instrument. The French nuclear doctrine emphasized national decision-making, freedom of action, and the political symbolism of independence. Deterrence was not merely military protection; it was a guarantee of strategic autonomy.

These divergent trajectories repeatedly complicated bilateral cooperation between France and the UK. During the Cold War, the UK could not easily share nuclear information without American approval while France refused to subordinate its deterrent to any external framework, including NATO. Even moments of diplomatic convergence produced mostly rhetorical statements rather than operational coordination.

After 1991, the issue temporarily lost urgency. Arms control agreements, reduced geopolitical tensions, and the shift toward crisis management operations moved nuclear questions into the background. Franco-British defence cooperation deepened through initiatives such as the Saint-Malo Declaration (1998) and later the Lancaster House Treaties (2010), though these agreements focused largely on conventional capabilities and technical collaboration. Nuclear policy remained politically sensitive and largely separate from coordinated strategic planning.

TheÌıReturn ofÌıNuclearÌıPolitics in EuropeÌı

The strategic environment, already undergoing gradual change, shifted dramatically after 2014. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of armed conflict in Donbas marked the return of conventional warfare in Europe. More importantly,  While these signals remained largely indirect at the time, they reintroduced the nuclear dimension into European security. Since 2022, Russian rhetoric has become far more overt, . 

At the same time, the institutional foundations of nuclear stability weakened. The  (8 May 2018), the  (2 August 2019), the  (5 February 2026), and the broader erosion of arms control norms removed many stabilizing constraints inherited from the Cold War. These developments coincided with a gradual reorientation of US strategy toward the Indo-Pacific. . Although Washington did not disengage from NATO, successive administrations placed growing emphasis on burden-sharing and regional prioritization, encouraging European Allies to assume greater responsibility for their own security.  

For European states, the combination of Russian coercion and America’s shifting security priorities created a dilemma. NATO’s deterrence remained credible, yet its perceived unconditionality weakened. European security increasingly depended on whether Europeans could carry a larger share of the burden of deterrence in a crisis directly affecting the continent, rather than relying exclusively on automatic US escalation. In this context, nuclear discourse has regained political salience for European NATO Allies. The issue is no longer deterrence itself, but who will be responsible for making deterrence credible in a crisis directly affecting Europe. 

The Northwood DeclarationÌı

The 2025 Northwood Declaration must be understood in the context of this shifting dynamic. This Declaration does not create a joint Franco-British nuclear force; however, its significance lies in its political message that British and French nuclear deterrents can be coordinated and jointly considered in the management of European security. 

The creation of the UK-France Nuclear Steering Group through this Declaration introduces a permanent mechanism for political consultation across nuclear policy, capabilities, and operations. However, national decision-making authority remains unaffected and both France and the UK retain explicit sovereignty over their nuclear arsenals. This step represents an important qualitative change.  Nuclear policy itself remained politically insulated. Northwood, by contrast, brings nuclear cooperation into the political sphere. For the first time, . 

The Declaration also restates the long-standing formulation that the vital interests of one country cannot be threatened without affecting those of the other, a wording that originates from the . In the contemporary context, this relational language carries broader implications than in the 1990s, as it signals a shared willingness to extend nuclear deterrence across Europe. 

ReconcilingÌıAtlanticismÌıandÌıAutonomyÌı

Does this development have broader implications for transatlantic security? Does it reconcile the United Kingdom’s US-integrated deterrent posture with France’s doctrine of independent nuclear decision-making? The answer is both yes and no. The UK has not abandoned its reliance on the US. . Participation in NATO nuclear planning and the acquisition of dual-capable aircraft further reinforce transatlantic integration. France, on the other hand, has not diluted its doctrine of independence. It remains outside NATO’s nuclear planning structures and continues to emphasize sovereign decision-making, as   

The Northwood Declaration therefore does not produce doctrinal convergence. Instead, it provides functional political alignment. Both states retain their respective strategic identities while deepening political cooperation in response to a shared perception of risk. The significance of this shift lies precisely in its pragmatism. Rather than forcing institutional integration – which would be politically unacceptable to both sides – the declaration creates a cooperative interface. The UK derives credibility from its integration with NATO and its nuclear relationship with the US, whereas France derives that same credibility from autonomous national decision-making. The political coordination provided by the Northwood Declaration therefore does not merge the two deterrents but instead creates parallel centres of nuclear decision-making aligned in a common strategic posture, complicating an adversary’s assessment of escalation. 

In effect, coordination substitutes for doctrinal reconciliation. The Declaration does not remove the structural tension between NATO dependence and strategic autonomy; it manages this tension by transforming it into coordinated political signalling. 

Implications for EuropeanÌıDeterrenceÌı

The Northwood Declaration importantly does not create a European nuclear deterrent. No extended guarantee is offered, no shared command established. Hence, US extended deterrence and NATO remain central for many European states. However, the Declaration does still alter the strategic landscape in Europe.  

By coordinating their deterrents politically, the UK and France introduce a European layer of nuclear signalling within the transatlantic system. This European layer operates through identifiable mechanisms. For European NATO Allies, the public coordination of the two nuclear powers signals that deterrence credibility does not depend exclusively on immediate US escalation. For a potential adversary, the existence of two politically aligned but nationally independent nuclear decision-makers introduces uncertainty about escalation thresholds and responses. At the same time, the political burden of deterrence is no longer borne solely by Washington, as London and Paris visibly assume a larger role in strategic signalling and crisis management. 

The result is best understood as a hedge. It is designed to supplement American guarantees rather than replace them. In a crisis, adversaries must consider not only NATO and the US, but also the combined political stance of Europe’s two nuclear powers. Over time, this may influence how deterrence is discussed within Europe. While not establishing a European nuclear force, the Northwood Declaration makes European nuclear responsibility a legitimate topic of policy rather than a theoretical debate.  

The Northwood Declaration fits within a broader pattern in which nuclear deterrence is no longer confined to NATO’s internal mechanisms. In this sense, the Declaration may represent a catalyst for deeper dialogue and coordination between European nuclear and non-nuclear actors. An early indication of this dynamic emerged with the  through which the UK and the Federal Republic of Germany agreed to pursue deep exchanges on deterrence, nuclear issues and arms control, as well as a permanent dialogue on defence matters, while also envisaging intensified trilateral cooperation with France. Furthermore, . 

More recently, this broader trend has been further reinforced by the French President’s proposal of a  which envisages deeper forms of political and strategic coordination between France and a group of willing European partners, including both nuclear and non-nuclear states. While stopping short of creating a European nuclear deterrent, . 

Limits andÌıConstraintsÌı

Despite its significance, the Declaration faces important limitations. Structural asymmetries remain profound. The US still possesses nuclear capabilities vastly exceeding those of either France or the UK, but the relevant comparison is broader:  and . 

A further limitation concerns the autonomy of the British deterrent. Although the UK retains sovereign political control over its nuclear forces, it also remains deeply intertwined with the US through the Mutual Defence Agreement, , and broader technological cooperation. This creates structural limits on how far the UK can engage in deeper nuclear cooperation with its European nuclear and non-nuclear partners and how far the British nuclear deterrent can be Europeanized. However, the novelty concerning the French doctrine of “advanced deterrenceâ€� could be seen as another step towards a more extended deterrence. 

Divergent defence-industrial partnerships also complicate long-term convergence. France’s cooperation with Germany contrasts with Britain’s global partnerships such as the . Regional priorities differ as well. The UK has increasingly oriented its security policy toward Northern Europe, most notably through its leadership of the , a regional military framework bringing together Nordic and Baltic states for rapid crisis response and defence cooperation. 

For these reasons, the Northwood Declaration should not be interpreted as the beginning of a fully integrated European nuclear structure. Its strength lies in political signalling rather than institutional transformation. 

ConclusionÌı

The Northwood DeclarationÌırepresentsÌıa strategic turning point in Franco-British nuclear cooperation, but in a specific and carefully bounded sense. It does not dismantle the structural differences between British Atlanticism and French strategic autonomy. Rather, it lays the foundations forÌıthese two systemsÌıtoÌıoperateÌıtogether. By publicly acknowledging coordination and institutionalizing consultation, the Declaration moves cooperation from symbolic reassurance to structured political practice. The UK continues to rely on the US; France continues to emphasize autonomy. Yet bothÌıthe UK and FranceÌırecognize that, in this current era of intense geopolitical tension, the credibility of European deterrence increasingly depends onÌıtheirÌıpolitical leadership. The Northwood Declaration is a strong signal that they are willing to assume that role together.Ìı

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Executive Summary:

Russia’s war against Ukraine is also a struggle about public interpretation. NATO members have responded to Russia’s full-scale invasion through sanctions, military aid, deterrence, and diplomatic efforts. These actions depend on the public understanding that Russia is the aggressor, Ukraine is the victim of an illegal invasion, and support for Ukraine is important for European and transatlantic security. Russia’s counter-narrative seeks to weaken this consensus view by claiming that Ukraine, NATO, the US, or the West provoked the war.

Drawing on , with a Canada-focused analysis, as initially outlined at ĞÓ°ÉÔ­´´ University’s 2026 Eastern European and Transatlantic Network conference, this brief argues that trust in NATO is central to how citizens interpret responsibility for the war. Canadian public opinion remains strongly aligned with the core NATO narrative: most Canadians blame Russia, while only a small minority blame the West. Yet this minority is not randomly distributed. Canadians who do not trust NATO are significantly more likely to accept the narrative that the West provoked the war, while Canadians who trust NATO are much more likely to blame Russia.

The implication is straightforward: countering disinformation is not only about correcting false claims after they spread. It is also about sustaining public trust in the institutions whose messages compete with adversaries’ propaganda and misinformation. For Canada and its NATO Allies, trust in NATO should therefore be treated as a security resource — one that requires proactive prebunking, clearer explanations of NATO’s relevance to Canadian security, and a wider network of trusted messengers.

Introduction: The Narrative Dimension of the War in Ukraine

NATO countries responded to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 through military, economic, and diplomatic means and pressure. However, this support also sparked an ongoing discussion about how and why this war erupted. The core NATO narrative is straightforward: Russia is the aggressor, Ukraine is the victim of an unlawful and unprovoked invasion, and allied support for Ukraine is necessary for European and transatlantic security. The main Kremlin counter-narrative tells a different story: Ukraine, NATO, the United States, or “the West� provoked the war, leaving Russia no choice but to invade in order to protect its so-called historical sphere of influence.

This ongoing contest matters because it can affect whether citizens support sanctions, weapons deliveries, refugee assistance, defense spending, and long-term deterrence measures taken by their countries and NATO. If the public believes that Russia caused the war, continued support for Ukraine and NATO cohesion becomes easier to sustain. If the public believes that NATO or the West provoked the war, allied policy aimed at countering Russia can appear reckless, hypocritical, or needlessly escalatory.

Much of the discussion about Russian information operations focuses on the supply side. It aims to address threats posed by, for example, Russian propaganda, falsehoods, and electoral and other interference, across different channels and platforms. These are important. , a foreign disinformation detection institution, defines foreign information manipulation and interference as “intentional and coordinated efforts by state or non-state actors to alter information in pursuit of political, security, or other strategic objectives.� But supply alone does not explain why people in Canada and other countries believe one competing strategic narrative over another.

This brief, therefore, focuses on the demand side of strategic narrative reception. Why are some citizens more receptive to the Kremlin’s West-blame narrative while others accept the NATO narrative that Russia caused the war? Findings from suggest that people tend to rely on trust in the messenger as a shortcut to plausibility. When they trust NATO, they also tend to trust its messaging. When they distrust NATO, those same explanations are easier to dismiss as propaganda, spin, or elite messaging.

Strategic Narratives and the Credibility of the Narrator

Strategic narratives are stories that countries tell to “win the story� as they frame issues, advance their goals, and convince others of the righteousness of their actions in global affairs. Strategic narratives identify heroes and villains, assign blame, explain crises, and justify policy choices. In the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine, narratives about the origins of the war are especially important because they can and do shape policy debates. If Russia is understood as the aggressor, then sanctions, deterrence, and military assistance to Ukraine follow logically. If NATO is understood as the provocateur, then those same policies can be framed as a dangerous escalation.

Narratives succeed not only because of repetition or exposure. They also depend on the narrator’s perceived credibility. Citizens do not evaluate every claim from scratch; they use their trust in the messenger as a cognitive shortcut that, especially when multiple competing narratives are present, is more likely to lead them to accept or reject the story in question.

This is why fact-checking and rebuttals of malign information, while necessary, are not sufficient. The consensus recommendations in emphasize that corrections are most effective when they are clear, credible, and accompanied by an alternative explanation. However, both this handbook and our research suggest that to increase the likelihood that the audience accepts the debunking, the audience should hold a positive view of the messenger. When trust is low, the same corrections can be rejected as self-interested messaging. In practice, “truth� often competes with “trusted.�

The policy implication is that institutional credibility is neither a soft nor a secondary issue. It is part of democratic resilience. explicitly identifies resilience as central to its ability to deter and defend. While NATO’s deterrent posture depends on military capabilities, we should also keep in mind that the Alliance also depends on public support for the political choices that make deterrence credible. If hostile information operations can weaken trust in the institutions that explain and justify allied policy, they can complicate democratic decision-making even without changing facts on the ground.

Evidence from the Survey: Canada as a High-Trust but Still Vulnerable Case

The empirical evidence for this brief comes from the . The survey asked respondents who they believe caused the war in Ukraine and measured trust in NATO, the EU, and domestic institutions.

Figure 1: Public Trust in NATO across Alliance Countries

Canada is a useful case because public alignment with the core NATO narrative is strong overall. In the Canadian sample, approximately 84% of respondents blame Russia for the war, while only about 8% blame the West. Around 60% of reports trust NATO. This suggests that Kremin’s West-blame narrative has not received much traction in Canada.

Yet the Canadian data also show why overconfidence would be a mistake. West-blame beliefs are not evenly distributed. They are concentrated among respondents who do not trust NATO. For Canadians who trust NATO, only about 4% blame the West. Among those who do not trust NATO, the figure rises to about 15%. Similarly, about 90% of Canadians who trust NATO blame Russia, compared to about 74% among those who do not trust NATO.

Figure 2: Canadian Trust in NATO and Blame Attribution for the War in Ukraine

The full Canadian results reinforce this pattern. Controlling for socio-demographic factors, trust in NATO is strongly associated with blaming Russia for the war and strongly negatively associated with blaming the West. Other socio-demographic and attitudinal factors also matter, but the clearest and most policy-relevant pattern is the relationship between trust in NATO and blame attribution.

This does not mean that distrust in NATO automatically translates into pro-Kremlin beliefs. The relationship may run in both directions. Some citizens may distrust NATO and therefore reject NATO’s account of the war. Others may become less trusting of NATO after consuming information critical of it. Both processes could occur simultaneously. For policy purposes, however, the direction is less important than the vulnerability itself. Where trust in NATO is lower, NATO’s messages are less likely to be heard, and adversarial narratives are more likely to find receptive audiences.

Why This Matters for Canada

For Canada, the findings are directly relevant as it is an active player in Europe and, increasingly, the Arctic. Through , Canada has played a leading role in NATO’s presence in Latvia and on the Alliance’s eastern flank. Canada’s security interests extend to the Arctic, cyber defence, democratic resilience, and the protection of a rules-based order that is directly challenged by Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. In the Arctic, however, security communication must also include Inuit and other Indigenous communities as central stakeholders, since their knowledge, rights, livelihoods, and local security concerns are directly affected by how Canada defines and communicates its northern defence priorities.

Moreover, NATO can still feel abstract to many Canadians. It may appear distant, bureaucratic, European, or not sufficiently in Canada’s interests. When NATO is understood mainly as a Brussels-based security organization, it is easier for adversaries to portray it as “out-of-touchâ€� with the average Canadian. When NATO is understood as Canadian soldiers in Latvia for the purposes of preventing a wider war, as Arctic deterrence, as cyber cooperation, and as a framework that helps prevent wider war, its relevance to Canada and Canadians is strengthened.

The challenge is not simply to tell Canadians that NATO matters; it is to show how NATO strengthens Canadian security and Canada’s international role. This is particularly important as allied governments ask the public to support higher defense spending, long-term military assistance to Ukraine, and sustained deterrence. These policies require political endurance, and political endurance depends on public trust. For example, Canada’s broader efforts against foreign information manipulation and interference could connect more directly to strategic communication about NATO. Monitoring hostile narratives, exposing coordinated manipulation, and working with platforms remain necessary. However, Canada’s counter-disinformation strategy should also focus on credibility-building to increase the likelihood that its messages will resonate better with the public. This means transparency, consistency, local relevance, and messengers who can reach audiences that may not respond to official statements.

For example, Canada’s broader efforts against could connect more directly to strategic communication about NATO. Monitoring hostile narratives, exposing coordinated manipulation, and working with platforms remain necessary. However, Canada’s counter-disinformation strategy should also focus on credibility-building to increase the likelihood that its messages will resonate better with the public. This means transparency, consistency, local relevance, and messengers who can reach audiences that may not respond to official statements.

Why Rebuttals and Takedowns Are Not Enough

Democratic governments often respond to disinformation with three main tools: exposure, removal, and correction. They identify false claims, work to take them down if possible, and post factual rebuttals. These tools are important, but they tend to be reactive. By the time a false narrative has spread widely, corrections may reach only a fraction of the original audience. Also, in instances where people do not trust the institutions or organizations taking up the correcting, attempts to take down false narratives could reinforce distrust and suspicion. Studies on and show that it helps to anticipate and address manipulation techniques before people encounter them.

It may be helpful to supplement existing debunking efforts with more prebunking, building societal resistance to misinformation, and strengthening trust in NATO and similar institutions. Experimental research by show that short interventions aimed at informing people about common manipulation tactics used by hostile actors can increase resilience to misinformation. For example, before a major NATO summit, Ukrainian aid package, or deployment decision, Canadian and allied communicators can anticipate predictable claims that NATO provoked the war, Ukraine is merely a proxy, or Canada is paying for Europe’s war. Rather than waiting for these claims to circulate, Canadian and NATO communicators could explain in advance why they are misleading and how they fit into a broader Russian narrative strategy aimed at dividing and weakening Canada and NATO. This approach should be simple and delivered by trusted voices. It should avoid overly technical language.

At the same time, NATO and Canadian institutions need to avoid communicating only during crises. Trust building takes time and patience. If the public learns about the role and benefits of NATO membership only when leaders are seeking support for a given initiative, they may view such communication with suspicion.

Policy Recommendations

1. Treat trust as an early-warning indicator

Canada already monitors foreign information manipulation and interference and conducts public opinion research on security issues. Canada and its Allies should monitor public trust in NATO and other key security institutions as part of democratic resilience planning. Public opinion polls should ask respondents whether they trust NATO, the Canadian government, and similar institutions. Declining trust should be treated as an early warning indicator that more outreach is needed to reduce susceptibility to adversarial information warfare.

2. Institutionalize prebunking before predictable narrative attacks

More attention should be paid to prebunking at moments when adversarial information warfare is likely to escalate (e.g., predictable narrative attacks). Among others, such events likely include NATO summits, defense spending announcements, Ukraine aid package announcements, troop deployments abroad, and elections in allied countries. Communicators should prepare short, accessible materials that explain both the facts and the manipulation techniques adversaries are likely to use. Such efforts should be coordinated by the Canadian government, NATO allies, and other communicators to increase narrative resilience before hostile narratives reach NATO audiences.

3. Make NATO concrete in Canadian public communication

Conduct public information campaigns aimed at explaining the benefits of NATO membership and consistently connecting them to Canadian security interests. Such a campaign could use specific examples to emphasize NATO’s relevance by highlighting its leadership in Latvia, its role in Arctic security, its cyber defense capabilities, and its efforts to prevent a wider war in Europe, among others. Such communication should also be transparent about trade-offs, given legitimate questions about rising defense spending and the implications of Canada’s growing involvement in European deterrence initiatives. Credible communication should not avoid taking on difficult questions directly — in fact, addressing them should help with building trust.

4. Expand the trusted messenger network

Canada already supports public outreach initiatives aimed at countering disinformation and promoting democratic resilience. Such work should be extended to matters surrounding NATO and its work. Since government and NATO officials may not always be the most trusted communicators, Canada should aim to work with a wide network of credible messengers, including veterans, reservists, military families, educators, local officials, Ukrainian and Eastern European diaspora communities, Indigenous and northern voices on Arctic security, and independent scholars. Using such goodwill ambassadors should help key messages reach individuals across different local and social contexts. This could be a way to reach audiences distrustful of political elites.

Conclusion: Trust as Democratic Deterrence

The full-scale invasion in Ukraine highlighted that deterrence requires military capability, political will, and social resilience. Part of Russia’s challenges to NATO is represented by its hostile information operations. Moscow does not want NATO to admire Russia – it only needs enough citizens to doubt NATO’s reliability, blame the West for the invasion of Ukraine, oppose support, or lose confidence that allied institutions are telling the truth.

The Canadian evidence presented here offers both reassurance and warning — and policy recommendations outlined here aim to strengthen Canada’s broader democratic resilience. Most Canadians blame Russia for the war, and the Kremlin’s West-blame narrative remains a minority view. But that minority is meaningfully larger among those who do not trust NATO. Increasing trust in NATO, in turn, would require ongoing attention to informational campaigns aimed at raising public understanding of why and how the Alliance matters.

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Introduction

ÌıFor the first time since 1972,ÌıwhenÌıSALT I negotiations yielded the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the Interim Agreement on offensive arms, the strategic relationship between Washington and Moscow is entirely unconstrained by a legal framework.Ìı.ÌıAs the current normative vacuum is unprecedented in the modern era, theÌıNorth Atlantic TreatyÌıOrganizationÌı(NATO)ÌıAlliance facesÌıa new ‘strategic trilemma’:Ìıthe simultaneous and often contradictory imperativesÌıof maintaining credible extended deterrence;Ìıenhancing conventional defence against hybrid and missile threats;Ìıand reconstructing a confidence-building, risk-reduction framework to prevent accidental escalation. The central policy problem is that the traditional tools of strategic stabilityÌı– quantitative and qualitative ceilings, inspections, and transparencyÌı–Ìıhave been discarded in favour of verticalÌınuclearÌıproliferation. NATO must navigate an environment whereÌıthe absence of constraints increases the risk of miscalculations, potentially leading to an unmanaged arms race that reduces the securityÌıfor allÌıNATO Allies.ÌıÌı

Context: The Long Transition and the Paradox of the New STARTÌı

TheÌıinternationalÌıarms control regime, which persisted through various systemic shifts from 1972 until 2026, has finally fractured. However, a rigorous assessmentÌıof its lifespanÌısuggests that the final pillar of this regime,Ìıthe New START,Ìıwas already flawed.ÌıÌıThis omission allowed Moscow to channel its modernization efforts toward lethal, MIRV-capable systems,Ìıwhile remaining formallyÌıcompliant toÌıthe treaty limit of 1,550 warheads.Ìı,ÌıMoscow’s StrategicÌıRocketÌıForces (RVSN) and the missile industry exploited this normativeÌı‘shield’Ìıto initiate a massiveÌı‘re-MIRVing’Ìıprocess. This modernization was driven by aÌıÌıwithin the Russian military-industrial complex. By focusing on systems that exploited New START’s qualitative loopholes, institutional actors, such as theÌı, secured long-term funding and development pathways for a new generation of delivery vehicles. This momentumÌıfacilitatedÌıthe emergence of a direct nexus between treaty-compliant modernization and the later deployment of advanced long-range capabilities on the Ukrainian battlefield.Ìı

The Strategic Trilemma between Extended Deterrence and the ‘Upload’ DisparityÌı

The end of New START has transformed the re-MIRVing process into a catalyst for a new arms race. In this new unconstrained environment, the US possesses a significant technical advantage. . If the US opts to utilize its technological edge, it would effectively out-deploy Moscow, potentially doubling its arsenal to levels above the failed treaty’s limits.  In response, Moscow may prioritize asymmetrical offset centred on long-range theatre strike capabilities. This likely reaction is deeply rooted in the bureaucratic momentum of Russian military-industrial complex, favouring dual capable systems that operate in regulatory grey zones.   

Defence, Resilience, and the Hypersonic Decision Gap

ÌıUnlike traditionalÌıICBMs, which allow for a 25-plus minutes warning window, a hypersonic system launched from central Europe can reach critical command nodes in Moscow in less than 10 minutes. ThisÌıÌıin decision time undermines de-escalatory signalling and placesÌıÌıon the adversary’s early warning systems, potentially triggering automated ‘launch on warning’ responses. Even a conventional strike on communications, command-and-control (C3) centres would be strategically relevant. Therefore,Ìıthe deployment of such systems in substantial numbers would create a ‘launch-on-warning’ incentive for Moscow, further destabilizing the offensive-defensiveÌıbalance and increasing the risk of automated nuclear response.ÌıÌı

Managing UncertaintyÌıin a Multipolar SystemÌı

Emerging from a Cold War environment coalesced around a bipolar international power-distribution, traditional arms control has proven ill-suited for the asymmetrical, multipolar international disorder of the last two decades.  In a world without inspections, stability depends on predictability. To achieve this goal, the international community must work to prevent accidental escalation through transparency and launch notifications. The reconstruction of a stabilizing framework is currently stymied by two primary structural hurdles: Russia’s current lack of trustworthiness and China’s strategic intentions.  

The main obstacle to reopening dialogue with Russia is the paradox of negotiating limits on the same systems being employed in the current war in Ukraine. It would be politically fraught for the US to engage in fresh negotiations, while Russia utilizes these assets as tool of active coercion and battlefield destruction. . This move puts Washington in an uneasy negotiating position, forcing it to negotiate over assets that France and the United Kingdom (UK) consider non-negotiable. This is hardly a novel tactic:  Putin’s proposal risks to exacerbate infra-systemic fault lines, foster suspects of decoupling, and ‘fears of abandonment’ between the US and its European Allies. Simultaneously, China’s strategic stalling (and its own ambitions to increase its arsenal) prevents the necessary transition toward a trilateral framework. By hiding behind the rhetoric of minimal deterrence, Beijing refuses to accept any oversight while rapidly expanding its nuclear and conventional inventory.  

While the American and Russian nuclear stockpiles greatly exceed those of all other nuclear-weapon states, the strategic equation has irrevocably shifted from a bipolar to a multipolar calculus through China’s ambitions to drastically increase its own arsenal.  These missiles provide Beijing with a high-precision, non-nuclear capability to hold regional strategic assets in the mire, including forward air bases, carrier strike groups, and command-and-control (C2) nodes.  This scenario of ‘conventional entanglement’ complicates the global force posture of NATO’s primary security provider, the US.   

Technological Acceleration: The AI-Hypersonic NexusÌı

The ‘Strategic Trilemma’ is further complicated by the integration ofÌıÌıand launch-control systems. As theÌıÌıthrough the deployment of Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs), the decision-making window for political leaders has shrunk from thirty minutes to mere seconds.Ìı.ÌıHowever, the ‘black-box’ nature of neural network-based AI introduces unprecedentedÌı. Because these models recognize patterns in ways that are non-replicable and often incomprehensible to human operators, they are prone to hallucinations or false positives – interpreting unusual atmospheric phenomena or cyber-spoofing as an incoming strike. In a strategic environment dominated by fast-flying systems like theÌıDark EagleÌıorÌıOreshnik, the reliance on AI-driven recommendations could lead to a ‘compressed escalation’ where a machineÌıinitiatesÌıa retaliatory strike before human deliberation even occurs. This technological entanglementÌınecessitatesÌıthat any futureÌıarmsÌıcontrol negotiations must deal not only with warheads and delivery systems, but also with the algorithms governing their employment.ÌıÌı

The Shift towards Integrated DeterrenceÌı

In response to this acceleration, NATO has transitioned toward a posture of integrated deterrence. With the expiration of New START in sight, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) moved to solidify the Alliance’s defensive architecture.  This strategic shift was codified on February 12, 2026, when several NATO Allies launched  to develop next-generation sensors designated to counter ballistic and hypersonic threats (like the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS)). These initiatives, alongside a new  for drone-based deep precision strike capability, signal a move away from static, treaty-based stability, toward a dynamic denial posture. Furthermore, the  reinforces this approach by emphasizing trans-regional deterrence, acknowledging that while NATO remains a regional alliance, its security is inextricably tied to the ‘two-peer’ challenge.  

Policy Recommendations:ÌıÌı

1. Rediscover a dual approach: Combine military modernization with a standingÌınegotiatingÌıofferÌıto both Russia andÌıChinaÌıon Strategic Stability Dialogue,Ìıwhich wouldÌılikely benefitÌıNATOÌıAlliance cohesion by reassuring the most risk-adverse NATOÌımemberÌıstates.ÌıÌı

2. Prioritize Qualitative Limits: Advocate for a Multilateral MIRV-freeze to mitigate first-strike incentives and neutralize the advantage of rapid uploading.ÌıÌıIn the post-START environment, the primary risk is no longer aggregate warheads counts, but the rapid surgeÌıinÌıcapacity,Ìıafforded by US upload potential and Russia’s modernization of MIRV-capable systems.ÌıA ‘freeze’ approach would be aimed at neutralizing the perceived advantages of rapid arsenal expansion, signalling a commitment to strategic sufficiency rather than theÌırecklessÌıpursuit of superiority.ÌıÌı

3. EstablishÌı‘Cold WarÌıPlus’ÌıCommunication Channels: Strengthen secure, real-time links between military headquarters to manage crisis in an era of hypersonic weapons.ÌıNATO should strengthen secure, real-time links between military headquarters – specificallyÌıthe Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)Ìıand the Russian Ministry of Defence – to manage crisis in an era defined by HGVs. These channels must be hardened against cyber-interferences and electronic warfare to ensure theyÌıremainÌıviableÌıduring high-intensity grey zone friction or hybrid confrontations.ÌıÌı

4. Manage AI Integration in Command and Control:ÌıEstablishÌı‘human-in-the-loop’ standards between launch commands and early warning systems toÌıpreventÌıAIÌısystemsÌıfrom triggering accidental escalation during high-speed hypersonic encounters.ÌıWhile AI may become indispensable for processing massive data streams from next-generationÌısensors like the HBTSS, it must neverÌıpossessÌıthe autonomous authority toÌıinitiateÌıa response. Hence, theÌıNATOÌıAlliance should champion an international protocol that mandatesÌıa ‘’ for human commanders, even in high-speed hypersonic confrontations.Ìı

5. Define a Clear Doctrine for Conventional Hypersonic: Clarify that systems likeÌıDark EagleÌıare forÌı,Ìıwhile acknowledging thatÌıÌıremainsÌıinherently destabilizing.ÌıNATO should explicitly disavow ‘decapitation’ or strategic nuclear roles for these assets to reduce the risk of Russia misperceiving conventional precision strikes as existential threats to itsÌıC2Ìıarchitecture.Ìı

6. Strengthen Hybrid Resilience: Protect undersea and digital infrastructure as a coreÌıcomponentÌıof strategic stability to preventÌıhybrid,Ìınon-kinetic bypassing of deterrence.ÌıBy neutralizing low-cost, high-impact hybrid threats, theÌıNATOÌıAlliance prevents adversaries from bypassing deterrence thresholdsÌıand undermining stability at the lowest level of the escalation ladder. This approach ensures that the emerging new capabilities in air, missile, and drone-defence would not beÌıcompromisedÌıby asymmetric disruption aimed at eroding domestic resilience and political will during a crisis.ÌıÌı

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Introduction

In 2025, the United States (US)-Türkiye relationship moved beyond the traditional logic of NATO Alliance cohesion and entered a phase of strategic bargaining. Once anchored almost exclusively in NATO solidarity and Cold War–era security imperatives, bilateral ties between the nations are now being increasingly shaped by two defining and interconnected issues: Türkiye’s calibrated position on the war in Ukraine and its growing relevance in the geopolitics of rare earth elements and critical minerals.¹ These dynamics reflect a broader transformation of the international system and intra-alliance dynamics in which great power competition, fragmented supply chains, and regional autonomy are increasingly overriding ideological alignment.  

For Washington, Türkiye remains indispensable but unreliable; for Ankara, the US is a necessary but constraining partner. The challenge for both sides is how to construct a functional partnership that accommodates a divergence of alignment while still delivering strategic value. Rare earth elements and Türkiye’s role in Ukraine offer precisely such a framework: material, interest-based, and adaptable to a world defined by competition with Russia and China. 

Türkiye, Ukraine, and the Logic of Strategic AutonomyÌı

Türkiye’s response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has crystallized its broader foreign policy doctrine. Ankara condemned the invasion, supported Ukraine’s territorial integrity, supplied Kyiv with military equipment, and closed the Turkish Straits to military traffic under the Montreux Convention. At the same time, it refused to impose sanctions on Russia and preserved energy, trade, and diplomatic ties with Moscow. 

This approach is often described in Washington as “â€� but from Ankara’s perspective, it is a rational expression of strategic autonomy.&²Ô²ú²õ±è;°Õü°ù°ì¾±²â±ğ&²Ô²ú²õ±è;views the war not only as a European security crisis but also a  with direct implications for its own stability, energy security, and economic resilience. Full alignment with Western sanctions would expose Türkiye to severe economic costs, exacerbate inflation, and jeopardize energy supplies, while full alignment with Russia would undermine its role in NATO. 

Türkiye’s early mediation efforts following the invasion of Ukraine have reinforced its self-image as an indispensable intermediary between Russia and the West. Unlike most NATO Allies, Ankara retains the ability to communicate credibly with both sides. For the US, this role is double-edged: it dilutes Alliance discipline but preserves a diplomatic channel with Russia that would otherwise not exist. 

US Expectations and Limits of Alliance DisciplineÌı

Throughout the second Trump presidency, the US has viewed the war in Ukraine less as a fundamental test of the rules-based international order and more as a measure of Allied burden-sharing and loyalty to US interests. Washington’s discard of normative alignment and expectations of tangible demonstrations of support carries deep implications for Türkiye that benefits substantially from NATO security guarantees. In this context, Ankara’s refusal to impose sanctions on Russia and its continued economic engagement with Moscow are not seen as violations of shared principles, but rather as opportunistic behaviour that undermines NATO cohesion and reinforces perceptions of Allies â€˜freeloading’ off US protection. 

Yet, these expectations reflect an older model of Alliance behaviour that is increasingly difficult to sustain. In a multipolar system, medium powers like Türkiye are less willing to subordinate their interests to bloc politics. Ankara’s behaviour in Ukraine is not an anomaly but a signal of how smaller and middle powers navigate systemic competition: hedging, mediating, and extracting leverage from multiple relationships simultaneously. 

This suggests that pressuring the Turkish government into full alignment may be counterproductive. Excessive coercion risks accelerating Ankara’s drift toward alternative partnerships, while reducing US influence over Turkish strategic choices. The challenge for Washington, therefore, is not to put an end to Turkish autonomy, but to channel it toward outcomes compatible with US interests. 

Rare EarthÌıElementsÌıand the New Geopolitics of Supply ChainsÌı

In October 2025, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced that Türkiye had identified the world’s second largest reserve of rare earth elements, containing an estimated 694 million tons of mineral resources in Beylikova, located in northwestern Türkiye. The discovery includes .&²Ô²ú²õ±è;°Õü°ù°ì¾±²â±ğ&²Ô²ú²õ±è; developing rare-earth reserves in western Anatolia with the US after similar talks with China and Russia were halted amid disagreements over control; it is also engaging with  on potential cooperation. Türkiye plans on building a refinery in Beylikova, which contains ore with more than 1% rare-earth oxide by weight.  In addition, Ankara plans to apply to the Australian Institute of Geoscientists for certification under the JORC Code, which sets minimum standards for how companies publicly report exploration results and would reveal the size of deposits for potential investors. 

Ankara’s talks with Western partners come as the US and the European Union (EU) step up efforts to reduce China’s dominance in the production and processing of rare earth elements. The Turkish government has sought to balance its ties with both the West and China amid growing global trade tensions. In September 2025, Türkiye joined a  led by the US and EU aimed at diversifying critical mineral supply chains; however, it has also been offered partner-country status to the BRICS group of emerging-market powers and attracted Chinese investment in electric vehicle production. In 2026, the EU  a new agreement with US and Japan to cooperate on critical raw materials supply chains.  

It is within this context that rare earth elements and critical minerals acquire strategic significance. The global competition over rare earth elements has become a central front in US-China geopolitical rivalry. China’s dominant position across extraction, processing, and downstream manufacturing of these elements represents a structural vulnerability for the US and its partners. For Ankara, cooperation supports its goal of moving up the global value chain, reducing reliance on external suppliers, and strengthening its role in strategic industries, such as defense systems, medical technologies, and consumer electronics. For Washington, Türkiye represents a politically and geographically viable partner in efforts to diversify supply chains for key technological and defence products while reducing dependence on China without concentrating production in a limited number of partner countries. 

Diversifying supply chains is therefore a national security imperative and Türkiye is increasingly relevant for three reasons: firstly, it possesses geological potential for rare earth elements and other strategic minerals; second, it has a substantial industrial base capable of supporting processing and manufacturing; and third, its geographic position makes it a hub connecting Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. 

Linking Rare EarthÌıElementsÌıand Ukraine: Strategic ComplementarityÌı

The intersection between cooperation on rare earth elements and Türkiye’s position on Ukraine is not coincidental. Both issues raise the same underlying question: how much strategic autonomy can Türkiye exercise while remaining embedded in the Western alliance structure?  

Economic interdependence in critical sectors creates incentives for alignment that political pressure alone cannot achieve. A structured US-Türkiye partnership on rare earth exploration, processing, and technology transfer would deepen mutual dependence, making a sharp geopolitical rupture less likely. Such cooperation would strengthen Türkiye’s stake in a Western-oriented economic order, indirectly shaping its calculations on Ukraine. While it would not compel Ankara to adopt sanctions or abandon mediation, it would raise costs of drifting too far from US strategic priorities. This logic is visible in US efforts to structure critical mineral partnerships with Ukraine, suggesting that resource cooperation is emerging as a broader instrument of strategic alignment rather than a case-specific initiative. 

Russia, China, andÌıTürkiye’s Hedging StrategyÌı

Türkiye’s approach to rare earths must also be understood in the context of its broader hedging strategy vis-à-vis Russia and China. Moscow remains a key energy supplier and a critical actor in the Black Sea, while Beijing is an increasingly important trade and investment partner for Türkiye. 

China’s dominance in the rare earth industry presents Ankara with both an opportunity and a constraint. On the one hand, Chinese investment and technology are an attractive prospect for developing Türkiye’s mineral sector. On the other, excessive reliance on China would undermine Türkiye’s aspiration for strategic autonomy and expose it to geopolitical pressure from its Western partners A US-Türkiye partnership on rare earth elements offers Ankara an alternative path â€“ one that diversifies external dependencies. For Washington, engaging with Türkiye reduces the likelihood that Ankara will default to China. 

Türkiye’s value extends well beyond economics. Its control of access to the Black Sea, close proximity to Ukraine, Russia, and the Middle East, and strong military capabilities make it a cornerstone of NATO’s southern and eastern flanks. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has reinforced the strategic importance of the Black Sea as a contested space where naval power, energy routes, and regional stability intersect. Türkiye’s enforcement of the Montreux Convention has limited Russian naval reinforcement and demonstrated Ankara’s capacity to shape the operational environment without direct military confrontation. This contribution, though often overlooked, has tangible value for Ukraine, the US and other NATO Allies. Maintaining Türkiye’s integration within NATO is therefore essential, even as undercurrents persist. Cooperation on rare earth elements complements this objective by reinforcing Türkiye’s embeddedness in the Western order. 

Scenarios for the Evolution of US-Türkiye RelationsÌı

Several trajectories could shape US-Türkiye relations in the coming years. 

Scenario 1: Strategic Convergence Through Economic Anchoring 

In this scenario, the US and Türkiye deepen cooperation on rare earth elements and other critical minerals, integrating cooperation with broader collaboration in defense technologies, energy transition, and industrial policy. Deepening economic interdependence would help stabilize the bilateral relationship and provide a practical framework for managing political differences. Türkiye would continue to act as a semi-autonomous NATO Ally â€“ aligned with the US on core security interests, while retaining flexibility in its diplomatic engagement with other powers and partners. 

Scenario 2: Strategic Drift and Competitive Hedging 

If cooperation on rare earth elements fails to materialize and political tensions over Ukraine intensify, Türkiye may deepen its ties with Russia and China. In this scenario, Ankara’s mediation role loses value for Washington, and the relationship becomes increasingly transactional and distrustful. NATO cohesion weakens, and supply chain cooperation shifts elsewhere. 

Scenario 3: Managed Autonomy and Functional Partnership 

In the most realistic scenario, the US accepts Türkiye’s strategic autonomy while selectively deepening cooperation in areas of high mutual value, particularly rare earth elements and Black Sea security.&²Ô²ú²õ±è;°Õü°ù°ì¾±²â±ğ&²Ô²ú²õ±è;continues to mediate Ukraine, and Washington leverages this role pragmatically, even as political differences persist. 

Policy Options for the United States 

US policy toward Türkiye should place cooperation on rare earth elements and critical minerals at the centre of the bilateral agenda, elevating it to a strategic pillar within broader efforts to reduce supply chain dependence on China. This would require the adoption of concrete measures, including investment, technology sharing, and regulatory coordination. At the same time, Washington should continue to reassess Türkiye’s approach to Ukraine by focusing more on practical outcomes, recognizing that Ankara’s efforts and selective support for Kyiv can contribute to regional stability in ways that rigid conformity may not. Strengthening high-level institutional dialogue that links security, economic, and industrial policy would help reduce misunderstandings and prevent tensions from overshadowing the broader relationship. Finally, the US should reaffirm Türkiye’s central role within NATO while accepting that member country cohesion in a multipolar environment will inevitably involve tension and diversity in policies and approaches,  

Conclusion: From Alignment to Strategic InterdependenceÌı

The US-Türkiye relationship in 2025 highlights how NATO may increasingly be shaped by pragmatism and negotiated interests, alongside â€“ but not replaced by â€“ shared values and ideological affinity. In this context, values remain relevant but may no longer be sufficient on their own to sustain strategic partnerships. Instead, cooperation is structured through selective interdependence across security, economic, and technological domains. Türkiye’s calibrated approach to Ukraine and its growing role in rare earth elements and critical mineral supply chains should therefore be seen as interdependent strategies, offering broader theoretical insights regarding contemporary alliance patterns. 

For the US, this shift may require a recalibration of expectations. The ultimate choice is not between accepting Turkish autonomy or attempting to impose alliance discipline, but between shaping that autonomy through sustained engagement or allowing it to evolve in ways increasingly misaligned with US interests. Treating Türkiye’s behaviour as a problem of non-compliance risks overlooking the structural forces driving Ankara’s decisions. A strategy centred on pressure alone is unlikely to succeed and may intensify Türkiye’s temptations to turn toward alternative partnerships. Instead, over time, deepening interdependence could play a stabilizing role, mitigate political disputes and increase the costs of strategic divergence on both sides. 

Ultimately, in an era defined by multipolar competition and systemic rivalry, resilience will depend more on flexible, interest-based cooperation. The combination of cooperation on rare earth elements and pragmatic engagement on Ukraine offers a framework through which the US and NATO can adapt their approach to Türkiye without relinquishing core strategic objectives. By prioritizing realism, mutual benefit, and long-term interdependence, Washington can help ensure that Türkiye remains a pivotal â€” if unconventional â€” partner, capable of contributing to Western security and economic resilience in an increasingly fragmented world. 

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Introduction

In recent years, Europe’s geopolitical centre of gravity has shifted toward the Northeast, with the Baltic region emerging as a . As , the Organization’s member countries are increasingly focused on deterrence and defence. Traditional conceptions of deterrence are constructed around three pillars: . This memo focuses on the second “Câ€� â€“ credibility â€“ by examining prospects for strengthening the resilience of ±·´¡°Õ°¿â€™s&²Ô²ú²õ±è;military supply chains in the Baltic region through defence industrial cooperation between the three enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) framework nations (Canada, Germany, and the United Kingdom (UK)) and the three host nations (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia). 

As a response to Russia’s military aggression and hybrid warfare against Ukraine since 2014, the 2016 NATO Warsaw summit marked a significant step towards reinforcing the security of the Baltic region. Canada, Germany, and the UK assumed leadership as framework nations for eFP battlegroups in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, respectively. While the eFP signals a strong multinational Allied presence in the Baltic states, lessons from Ukraine since 2022 inevitably raise critical questions: is NATO ready to fight for a prolonged period? And can NATO secure supply chains so that they remain close to the war fighters? 

This policy brief first analyses how resilient supply chains lay the foundation for credible long-term deterrence. Second, it examines the role and prospects of defence industrial cooperation between eFP framework nations and host nations, before finally concluding with three concrete policy recommendations.  

WhyÌıDoesÌıSecurity of Supply Matter?Ìı

There is an old saying attributed to Dwight. E. Eisenhower that . It is also true that , as each nation brings its own peculiarities while the combined force must act as a single organization. To put this into perspective, the Canadian-led NATO Multinational Brigade in Latvia (formerly, the eFP battlegroup) is composed of 14 nations, making it ±·´¡°Õ°¿â€™s&²Ô²ú²õ±è; military unit. 

Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, NATO began scaling the three eFP battlegroups in the Baltics into brigade-sized units. Germany’s 45^th Panzer brigade has been relocated to Lithuania and is expected to achieve . Canada is also considering  in Latvia.  

Regardless of how its war against Ukraine ends, Russia will remain an existential security threat to the Baltic states. To deter and, if necessary, defend against Russia in the Baltic region, NATO Allies â€“ especially the eFP framework nations â€“ must demonstrate both the capacity and the resolve to fight alongside the host nations for as long as it takes to defend NATO territory. This, in turn, requires a continuous and resilient flow of supplies through to the battlefield.  

While experts have called for the  to sustain operational capability in the longer term, this approach has clear limitations – most importantly because stockpiles are finite in the event of a prolonged conflict. To secure an uninterrupted supply, it is essential to develop local defence industrial capacities. 

Security of supply extends beyond the availability of raw materials and manufacturing components. Latvia’s  defines security of supply as a guarantee of access to the materiel and services required by the National Armed Forces to fulfil its tasks. This understanding emphasizes that the defence industrial base is an integral part of comprehensive defence strategy across the peace-crisis-war spectrum. It also implies that the defence industries of eFP host nations must be able to supply not only their national militaries but also Allied armed forces. However, defence industries in the Baltic states, while growing rapidly, are still relatively nascent, and there may not be sufficient latent industrial capacity to scale up production quickly in time of crisis.  

Failure to secure military supply chains would pose strategic risks that are particularly acute given the geographic characteristics of the Baltic states. A close proximity to Russia and reliance on the roughly 65km-wide  to link the region to the rest of Europe exacerbate supply vulnerabilities. To ensure that NATO forces deployed in the region can fight a prolonged war, it is necessary to establish short, resilient, and regionally-anchored military supply chains and, at the same time, to deepen defence industrial cooperation between the eFP framework nations and host nations. 

Enhancing the Enhanced Forward PresenceÌı

The  posits that the Baltic states constitute a single area of operations. This means that regional cooperation should be understood as a key enabler of credible deterrence and effective defence. This logic applies not only to trilateral Baltic cooperation but also among all Allies deployed in the region.  

To improve coordination between the three framework nations and the three host nations, the  was launched in 2023. Although it was originally envisaged as a platform for political and strategic dialogue in areas of common interest, such as training and exercises, it also holds untapped potential to serve as a venue for industrial cooperation and joint supply chain management. 

There are already examples of bilateral cooperation in this area. Recently, the Latvian Ministry of Defence signed a  (MoU) with the Canadian Commercial Corporation â€“ Canada’s government-to-government contracting agency –  concerning bilateral cooperation in military equipment, services, infrastructure, and industry. 

However, since the Baltics consider themselves to be a single area of operations, a broader relationship of regional cooperation between the framework and host nations is needed. Dialogue must take place at all levels – political, strategic, operational, tactical, as well as between defence industries. Regular information sharing and practical measures to harmonize defence investment and industrial policies will strengthen the security of supply and help forge new defence industrial partnerships.

WhatÌıDo Host Nations Have to Offer?Ìı

The three host nations are  in NATO. With defence budgets reaching 5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2026, the Baltic states are actively developing local defence industrial capabilities. In recent years, . There are notable success stories, such as the production of  and subsequent expansion into assembly and maintenance of more advanced systems such as . Nevertheless, the Baltic defence industries remain primarily focused on niche technological areas and generally lack the scale to support full production cycles of heavy armaments or other advanced military systems. At the same time, their relatively small size makes Baltic defence industries flexible, innovation-oriented, and able to rapidly adapt. 

This environment creates opportunities for foreign defence companies to enter the market and address the existing gaps in cooperation with local partners. As of 2025, all three framework nations allocate at least 2% of GDP to defence and have committed to increase defence expenditure up to 5% of GDP by 2035. Consequently, there is a strong push to build homegrown . 

Recently, German defence companies have been particularly active in the Baltic states. For example,  to establish 155mm artillery ammunition production facilities. More recently, Lithuania Defense Services, a joint venture established in 2022 by Rheinmetall and KNDS Germany, announced plans to .  

 and  are also pursuing ambitious efforts to expand their defence industrial capacities. For example, a Canadian company  to establish assembly lines for its BlackWolf tactical armoured vehicles in Latvia. Of the three eFP framework nations, such partnerships are especially relevant for Canada given the geographical distance between Canada and the Baltic region. Partnering Canadian defence industry with local companies in Latvia not only facilitates access to new markets but also helps build viable defence industrial capacity in the Baltic states for warfighting purposes, especially in a prolonged conflict.  

This logic extends beyond the manufacture of original equipment to also encompass access to critical components and materials. For example, last year the Canadian company â€“ a component that is essential for sensors and electronic systems widely used in defence technology, such as aircraft, missiles, and drones. 

The new geopolitical reality, growing defence budgets, and commitment to develop defence industrial capabilities underscore the need to coordinate defence investment and industrial policies within the 3+3 format. Such coordination would help secure military supply chains precisely where they are needed the most. This approach would align with broader NATO efforts to ramp up defence industrial capacities, such as  and .  

Conclusions andÌıRecommendationsÌı

Secured supply chains through defence industrial cooperation are not just desirable; they are a strategic necessity for credible deterrence. Since its creation, , from which the defence industries of framework and host nations stand to benefit. 

To harness the potential of defence industrial cooperation within the 3+3 format, the policymakers in the three framework nations and the three host nations should consider the following actions: 

1. Expand the Scope of 3+3 Format to Include Defence Industrial Cooperation.  

TheÌı3+3ÌıagendaÌıshouldÌıbeÌıbroadened byÌıhavingÌıregular meetings of keyÌırepresentativesÌı– such asÌıNational Armaments DirectorsÌı–Ìıfrom the Baltic states, Canada, Germany, and theÌıUKÌıto promote dialogue, coordinate policies,Ìıand identify opportunitiesÌıforÌıdefence industrial cooperation andÌıstrengtheningÌısecurity of supplyÌıacross the region.ÌıÌı

2. Establish an Annual 3+3 Defence Industry Forum.  

To facilitate the establishment of cross-border partnerships between defence companies, regular and open dialogue is essential. As several bilateral defence industry events already exist, a dedicated 3+3 Defence Industry Forum could be built on these foundations, providing a multilateral platform for collaboration. 

3. D±ğ±¹±ğ±ô´Ç±è&²Ô²ú²õ±è;¸é±ğ²µ¾±´Ç²Ô²¹±ô±ô²â&²Ô²ú²õ±è;´¡²Ô³¦³ó´Ç°ù±ğ»å&²Ô²ú²õ±è;±Ê°ù´Ç»å³Ü³¦³Ù¾±´Ç²Ô&²Ô²ú²õ±è;°ä²¹±è²¹³¦¾±³Ù¾±±ğ²õ.   

Host nations and framework nations should invest in new production facilities and reinforce supply chains for the militaries deployed in the Baltic region. Framework nations’ defence industry national champions should take a leading role and integrate host nations’ defence industries into regional supply chains. This approach would promote transfer of knowledge and technology, as well as strengthen the overall capacity to sustain operations over a prolonged period. 

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Key Findings

Key Takeaways 

• NATO and Western partners are widely viewed as desirable securityÌıpartnersÌıin Armenia, Estonia, Georgia, and Latvia, with the strongest support in the Baltic states and Georgia.ÌıPerceptionsÌıof NATO’s security impact are highly positive in Estonia and Latvia, andÌımost citizens support continued NATO membership. However, about one-third in each country expect toÌıreceive no externalÌıassistanceÌıor aid in theÌıfaceÌıof a securityÌıcrisis.Ìı

• In the South Caucasus, favourable views of NATO do not translate into expectations of crisis support. FewÌıidentifyÌıNATO as the main crisis responder, while self-reliance is the dominant view. In Armenia, public opinion is evenly split on alignment, with equal support for closer ties to NATO and Russia.Ìı

• Considering this,ÌıNATO should increase regular and visible reassurance in regions where it is the main defense guarantor, especially in the Baltic states, and address the concerns of those who expect toÌıbe self-reliantÌıduring crises. In the South Caucasus, NATO should manage public expectations and focus on building resilience and preparedness, given limited direct security options.Ìı

To read the full policy memo, download a PDF copy with the button below.

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KeyÌıTakeaways

• Most Armenians feel that their country isÌı“on their ownâ€�Ìıif facedÌıwithÌıa military threat,Ìıdisplaying aÌıperceptionÌıof personal safety associated with geopolitical alignment.Ìı

• With uncertainty widespread andÌıperceptionsÌıon security partnerships polarized, manyÌıin ArmeniaÌıare open to diversifying security ties.Ìı

• Considering public opinion, while NATOÌıhasÌıaÌırelatively limitedÌıset of cooperation tools, they shouldÌınonethelessÌıprioritize visibleÌıengagementÌıwith Armenia, communicate limitationsÌıof such partnershipÌıclearly,Ìıand manageÌıexpectations.ÌıSustainedÌıand predictable cooperationÌıshould be keptÌıinÌıpracticalÌırather than geopoliticalÌıterms andÌıperceptions.Ìı

ContextÌı

This policy brief examines the implications of public attitudes towards security issues in Armenia for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It assesses the prevalence of insecurity narratives among Armenians and shows how such attitudes are associated with opinions towards external security actors. Survey evidence shows that Armenia’s core security challenge is a sense of abandonment among its public. Confidence in international security institutions is weak, as nearly half of Armenians (48%) believe their country would not receive support in the event of a military conflict.  

As confidence in Armenia’s traditional security partners â€“ Russia and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) â€“ stands low,  other international actors are seen as positive contributors to Armenia’s overall security, including both NATO and China. The Armenian public’s openness toward alternative security partners and a broader reassessement of Armenia’s security architecture creates an opportunity for NATO to push for more active involvement. As available options are limited, NATO should strive for realistic, civilian-oriented cooperation based in institutional resilience, without raising expectations of formal guarantees. This increased involvement, along with sustained and visible engagement, should offer better reassurance to Armenia without otherwise escalating geopolitical tensions in the region. 

Between its independence in 1991 and the start of the second Nagorno- Karabakh War in 2020, Armenia’s security architecture was heavily . Armenian political elites leaned towards Russia due to a lack of alternative options on account of its landlocked status and persistent conflict with Azerbaijan and Türkiye, along with a limited domestic military capacity. Russia served as Armenia’s primary security guarantor through  and  membership; Western military and security engagement remained largely symbolic. Although Armenia and NATO collaborated through  and  frameworks, these initiatives focused on technical cooperation and institutional dialogue rather than substantive security guarantees. 

The  to prevent military defeat in 2020 marked a critical rupture in Armenia’s security system. The second Nagorno-Karabakh War significantly undermined public and government confidence in  and the CSTO as reliable protectors and intensified feelings that Armenia had been  by its traditional security partners. In response, the Pashinyan government increasingly sought to . This shift is visible in several developments, including the â€œ,â€� the deployment of the European Union’s (EU)  along the Armenia–Azerbaijan border, and the launch of enhanced  in January 2025.

Public Insecurity, Security Preferences, and Reported Future Vote in ArmeniaÌıÌı

A nationwide survey in Armenia, conducted by ĞÓ°ÉÔ­´´ University’s Eastern European and Transatlantic Network (EETN) in February and March 2025, shows that Armenians are almost equally split between who report to feel safe (52%) and unsafe (47%) in their daily lives. Residents of Yerevan tend to feel more unsafe (52%) compared to these in other urban (44%) and rural areas (45%). The risk of war with Azerbaijan (59%) is the major concern consistent across society. 

Perceived personal security is closely associated with positive attitudes toward Western alignment; those who feel safer are substantially more likely to support NATO and EU membership than those who do not. Among individuals who report feeling safe, 60% would vote â€œYesâ€� in a hypothetical referendum for Armenia joining NATO and 64% would do the same in a potential referendum on joining the EU. In contrast, among those who feel unsafe, only 40% would support NATO, and 36% would back EU membership, with clear majorities in this group opposing both initiatives, 56% against NATO and 64% against the EU. 

Armenians are divided across party lines in their assessment of personal safety. With a clear majority (71%) either recusing themselves from voting in parliamentary elections, intending to spoil the ballot, or not share voting preferences. Among those who would engage in elections and/or share their preferences, the majority who support the Civil Contract party (86%) feel safe, compared to 36 percent of opposition supporters that include the largely pro-Russian Armenia Alliance party. 

Many in Armenia feel that their country would be left on their own if it faces a military attack, with nearly half (48%) thinking so and only 6% being unsure about who might help. As the sense of abandonment is widespread, still, those with different perceptions of safety have distinct expectations on who might help. Those who feel unsafe are more likely to choose Russia or the CSTO (20%) as a likely ally in case Armenia faces military conflict, compared to NATO or the West (14%). Conversely, more amongst those feeling secure would expect NATO or the West to come to their aid (25%) than Russia or the CSTO (12%). In sum, perceptions of insecurity are associated with greater reliance on Russia, whereas feelings of security are more strongly linked to expectations of Western support. 

At the same time, support for diversifying security partnerships beyond existing allies is relatively broad, with 53% agreeing that searching for new defense and military ties with other countries would make Armenia safer against foreign threats. This idea is popular across the political divide, including 70% of Civil Contract supporters and 59% of opposition voters. While uncertainty is higher among those with no declared voting intentions, still, more among this group believe that diversification of defense and military ties would make Armenia more secure compared to those who disagree. 

This preference for diversification also resonates with elite threat narratives. While Armenian political parties differ in their preferred alignments â€” some favouring Russia, others emphasizing Western engagement, or expressing self-reliance â€” they somehow share a recognition that reliance on a single security partner is no longer sufficient. 

Despite widespread pessimism about Armenia’s security environment, preferences over geopolitical alignment remain divided rather than consolidated into a single dominant orientation. Equal proportions of respondents believe Armenia would be safer moving closer to NATO (36%) or Russia (36%). Furthermore, more than half of Armenians consider that having NATO troops on the ground would make Armenia safer, indicating a veiled sympathy towards the NATO Alliance. 

Overall, these patterns do not indicate a clear preference toward any single geopolitical bloc, although the Western side carries somewhat greater weight. Armenians are somewhat engaged in a survival-driven reassessment of security providers and remaining open to diversified allies clarifies this viewpoint. This creates potetial opportunities for NATO to expand its partnership with Armenia. 

Conclusions and Policy RecommendationsÌı

Given Armenia’s non-member status in NATO and the structural constraints created by Russia’s influence in the region, formal security guarantees from Western institutions are unlikely to materialize in the near future. NATO’s internal dynamics — particularly Türkiye’s membership and its close military partnership with Azerbaijan — further limit the ±·´¡°Õ°¿â€™s&²Ô²ú²õ±è;capacity to provide direct defence commitments to Armenia. 

At the same time, Armenia’s security landscape is shifting as the government seeks to diversify its external security partnerships. In practice, this has created space for forms of cooperation that do not rely on military guarantees but instead focus on civilian-oriented, visible, and predictable initiatives such as resilience building, civil emergency planning, institutional reform, and confidence-building measures. These efforts aim to address vulnerabilities rather than establish broader geopolitical alignment. 

Evidence from NATO’s engagement in partner countries illustrates the value of this approach. The substantial  has supported defence reforms, institutional coordination, and national resilience through training, interoperability programs, and civil–military cooperation. Similarly, cooperation with  has strengthened energy resilience, medical capacity, disaster response, and defence education, showing that civilian-focused partnerships can deliver sustained, practical outcomes.  

For Armenia, diversification therefore functions as a pragmatic way to expand sources of security support in the absence of formal guarantees. Within this framework, NATO could become a more constructive and realistic partner for Armenia. While direct defence commitments remain improbable, civilian-oriented initiatives offer tools to strengthen institutions and reduce security risks. This perspective underpins the policy recommendations that follow.  

1. Given the substantial support of Western-led political structures, NATO should prioritize visible engagement with Armenia. 

±·´¡°Õ°¿â€™s&²Ô²ú²õ±è;is the central framework coordinating cooperation with Armenia, bringing together planning, training, exercises, and institutional reform in a multi-year, capacity-building process. As outlined in , the  is designed to deepen cooperation in line with  and level of readiness. NATO should use this initiatives not only as a coordination tool, but as a delivery mechanism for visible, locally-implemented cooperation, particularly beyond Yerevan. By translating the framework into routine, practical engagement, NATO and Armenia can bilaterally strengthen security capacities and address perceptions of abandonment from the Armenian public. 

2. NATO should clearly communicate limitations and manage expectations about its partnership with Armenia.  

NATO already frames cooperation with Armenia as partnership-based rather than guarantee-based, but could benefit from communicating more clearly and publicly about what cooperation involves (e.g., preparedness, institutional reform, resilience) and what it does not (e.g., full membership). Additionally, engagement should be consistently framed as capacity-building rather than a security provision to avoid creating public expectations of any security guarantees. Simple cooperation roadmaps with regular milestones would strengthen predictability, credibility, and reassurance. Furthermore, this should happen in a sustained manner, emphasizing repeated training cycles, ongoing institutional support, and routine regional exercises rather than isolated events. Predictable, long-term cooperation builds trust without raising unrealistic expectations. 

3. NATO should keep cooperation with Armenia practical and not geopolitical. 

Finally, as the Armenian public remains divided in their geopolitical preferences, it is important for NATO to prevent its partnership with Armenia from expanding into questions of geopolitical alignment. Engagement should remain centred on functional areas such as crisis preparedness, emergency coordination, institutional reform, and civilian resilience rather than Western-versus-Russian narratives. Expanding direct and clear communication with the Armenian general public can further limit perceptions of forced geopolitical choice and better align external policies with insecurity-driven public concerns in Armenia. This action would strengthen Armenia’s security capacity while minimizing escalation risks and domestic polarization. 

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