“The Black Sea in 2026: Strategic Maneuvers and Economic Opportunity” examines how the Black Sea has become one of the world’s most consequential geopolitical and economic corridors following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The brief analyzes the competing strategies of Russia, Türkiye, the European Union, and China, alongside the security concerns of littoral states, highlighting how control of the region shapes Ukraine’s future and broader transatlantic stability. It also outlines Canada’s growing role as a NATO partner in supporting regional security, trade resilience, and postwar reconstruction. The paper concludes with targeted policy recommendations for strengthening Canada–Ukraine cooperation and enhancing Black Sea security in a rapidly evolving strategic landscape.

To read the full policy brief prepared by Dr. Jeff Sahadeo, click the download button below.

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Drone warfare is one of the defining features of Russia’s war against Ukraine. The war has seen the constant introduction of new technology and tactics, and in turn, new countermeasures to respond to these developments.

The post Russian Drone Warfare: Destruction, Development, Defence, and Deterrence appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

Since 2022, Russia has intensified its hybrid warfare against Western states, exposing persistent vulnerabilities in NATO and EU responses. Despite new sanctions, evolving doctrines, and enhanced operational tools, key challenges remain — including legal uncertainty, attribution difficulties, fragmented coordination, and a continued imbalance between military spending and resilience investment. Rapidly evolving disinformation and systemic pressure on critical infrastructure further strain Europe’s adaptive capacity. This policy brief calls for a unified NATO-EU doctrine addressing all domains of hybrid warfare, a strategic shift toward strengthening societal and infrastructure resilience, and the implementation of clear emergency protocols to ensure a more coordinated and effective response to this growing threat.

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Event Details

The event NATO at a Crossroads: Present Challenges and Future Trajectories was held on Friday November 7 to examine various challenges and demands NATO is currently facing due to an increasingly multipolar and conflictual world. The emergence of new hostile actors, hybrid threats, and attacks on the neoliberal order places an additional need for NATO to be adaptive and resilient.

As an influential member in NATO, Canada’s defence strategy is taking a noteworthy shift in light of a rapidly changing international environment. Prime Minister Mark Carney’s budget – referred to as Canada Strong – plans to invest an estimated , aimed at strengthening the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) while reaffirming its role in multinational organizations and NATO exercises. With this rapidly evolving domestic and international contexts in mind, EETN’s conference brought together an array of academics and political practitioners to discuss ongoing developments with the Alliance, its current status, as well as critical next steps to ensure a stable future.

Panel One: Academic Institutions

Our first panel convened scholars and researchers from diverse disciplinary backgrounds to reflect on NATO’s future, as well as the evolving landscape of Canadian defence and security. Speakers addressed persistent gaps in Canada’s defence posturing; they went on to highlight the need for more transparency and open communication with the public on national security priorities. They also examined how external actors– including the United States (US) and key European Allies – shape NATO’s strategic direction and, in turn, Canada’s position within the Alliance.

Speaker One: Dr. Christian Leuprecht (Professor, Royal Military College and Queen’s University)

Dr. Leuprecht’s presentation looked at the grand strategy of the US to reflect on how this has influenced NATO to previously change its approaches to global security, as well as how Canada should organize its own strategy. Dr. Leuprecht remarked on how despite the current unreliability of the US Administration, we should not be excessively concerned for the future of the Alliance. He highlighted that the grand strategy of the US has shifted historically and unpredictably since 2000. In 2007, its pivot towards Asia and the Indo-Pacific reflected a similar systemic shift; this being said, its land mission in Europe remains a priority requiring continued collaboration.

While the US may not be able to support Europe in the same way it has historically as a result of ongoing domestic economic struggles, it will remain essential for additional actors to supplant resources to boost European defence. Dr. Leuprecht identified that a major issue for Canada continues to be its lack of engagement and depth to its international partnerships. For example, Canada continues to struggle to establish deep and effective ties with the European Parliament. Dr. Leuprecht advised that it is a necessity for Canada to partner with fellow middle powers to reaffirm its international role and relevance. This includes countries in the Black Sea region, as well as the Weimar triangle – regions that remain critical threat vectors in the war with Russia and integral to maintaining peace in Europe. Therefore, Canada should look to give more to these partners and deepen bonds. When it comes to increasing defence spending, he states we need to clearly identify what we need to buy, how it is bought, and how it is paid for.

Additionally, considering when to focus on defence investment versus procurement remains a critical question. Overall, if Canada hopes to improve its ability to support its partners as well as cement its role in the international order, such domestic considerations, external pressures, and ongoing shifts need to be made transparent and clear.

Speaker Two: Dr. Benjamin Zyla (Professor, University of Ottawa)

Dr. Zyla’s presentation focused on four key themes: ongoing debates surrounding how much defence spending is “enough”; the diminishing coherence and contested meaning of “the West”; the importance of avoiding excessive pessimism when assessing global security trends; and the effects of no living memory of great war in Canada. On the question of minimum spending, Dr. Zyla noted this was a question of reduced importance; instead, policymakers need to identify where the maximum lies, what the money is spent on, and how this balances against sectors being cut. Money allocated to defence often does not get completely spent in a fiscal year, raising questions about internal logistics. Additionally, the grand story of why Canada needs additional defence spending is missing, making it difficult to convince the public that such spending is necessary. This disconnect can cause further friction between citizens and the government.

In response to the decline and diminished coherence of the West – a trend targeted and exploited by Russian actors – Dr. Zyla noted how much of this decline comes from within. The erosion of democratic norms within the transatlantic community, he highlights, has contributed to such a decline in status, enabling interference and external attacks by foreign actors. The solution to this normative decline must come from within the transatlantic community itself, and more importantly, it is vital Canadians remain optimistic. The current international system provides many opportunities for middle powers to work together, including in instances of mediation, niche diplomacy, and multilateral cooperation.

Finally, Dr. Zyla suggested that Canadian decision-makers must contend with the fact that the current generation has no living memory of great war. This has a significant impact on the ways threats are framed in society, the way civil society perceives such frames, as well as the government’s ability to respond through defence spending. A major takeaway from his presentation is that improving Canada’s defence is not about obvious concrete actions, but the subtler ones which work to legitimate and support Canada’s national and international ambitions.

Speaker Three: Dr. Anne Fitz-Gerald (Professor and Director of Balsillie School of International Affairs)

Dr. Fitz-Gerald focused her presentation on the importance of considering data and technology in future defence planning. She suggests these dimensions of war have changed in recent years, requiring new approaches to address cognitive and data-driven tactics. Power has become increasingly vested in who owns the most intellectual property (IP) and who controls data, having ramifications for a nation’s sovereignty.

Dr. Fitz-Gerald suggests this new technological environment continues to be a major weak point for Canada, who has not built up the skills, products, and resources to excel in this industry. Civil and government workers do not have the tools to navigate this intangible world, both in policy and in threat responses. Decisions on deployment and sunsetting of legacy systems, along with innovation towards future ones, will have to be made. She presents Canada as an excellent candidate to become a specialist within this new context if the appropriate steps are taken.

A key component to this strategy is the Arctic, as reflected in Carney’s budget, which has the ideal environmental conditions to store, process, and receive data. Developing data centers in northern climates would also provide Canada with a stake in setting the rules of the technological game. Canada can use this to advocate for safe and responsible use of technology, reinforcing liberal values. Canada requires value-added products and services to prosper, which would create a technical specialist role, create passive income through IP, and create opportunities for collaboration with international partners. Otherwise, Canada may continue to face a drain on talent and patents, remaining ill-equipped to handle the new emerging frontiers of security.

Speaker Four: Dr. Luca Ratti (Professor, University of Rome III)

Dr. Ratti outlined the various historical crossroads that NATO has faced and advocated for its ability to resurrect itself. NATO’s history of adaptation makes it well-equipped to be able to handle various challenges and structural changes, suggesting that there should be a more positive outlook on the future of the Alliance. He noted how the crossroads today look different than before; there will certainly be setbacks, but the need to pivot is not a new experience.

Dr. Ratti went on to outline four major dynamics for the current resurrection of NATO: the revival of American leadership; the need for Europe to back up its defence promises with concrete action; the consolidation of the Nordic and Eastern flanks; and the consolidation of NATO’s values. The first two points both create an opportunity for transformation within European members, where countries can begin to strengthen their commitments and capabilities. This will create a stronger NATO, and in doing so, a stronger Europe. The final two points emphasize the need for geographic and ideological consolidation; the two newest members, Sweden and Finland, demonstrate good progress in consolidating flanks closest to Russia, leaving hope for the future. Finally, the neoliberal values of NATO need to be reaffirmed and fully committed too. The fractures between neoliberalism versus more traditional conservative ideologies have caused internal conflict, polarization, and an overall lack of cohesion, leaving NATO vulnerable.

Speaker Five: Dr. David Sichinava (Adjunct Research Professor, �Ӱ�ԭ�� University)

Dr. Sichinava presented the results of his survey research conducted in Estonia, Latvia, Armenia, and Georgia. The goal of the study was to track the perception of public and security issues in the Baltics and South Caucasus. Conducted via interviews, the result provided interesting information regarding perceived threats, sentiments regarding allies, as well as challenges perceived by citizens. His study measured many different questions, however a few key ones stood out.

Regarding the perception of the biggest threat to their country, publics in Estonia, Latvia, and Georgia all ranked Russia as the first; Armenia ranked Azerbaijan as its leading concern. Political instability was the second biggest threat to all. The impact of actors like Russia, China, and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) were mixed, but generally skewed negatively (especially in Baltic states). Alternatively, Western organizations were seen more positively, though with mixed answers in the South Caucasus. Publics in the Baltics voiced strong support for the West, stating they believed the West would come to their aid in the case of an attack. Other countries however, still charged themselves with their own protection and survival. The impact of Canada was seen positively in the Baltics and inconclusive elsewhere.

Important conclusions drawn from the study include notes reflecting on the positive perceptions towards NATO and the European Union (EU) continuing to be common, even in the South Caucasus, where much uncertainty and distrust remains. This means there is still space for organizations that promote neoliberal values to connect with the population and mitigate autocratic influence. Additionally, in the South Caucasus, an area especially vulnerable to malign influence, there is a strong awareness and readiness to mobilize against threatening actors.

Speaker Six: Dr. Mihai Sebe (Lecturer, University of Bucharest and Head of the European Affairs Department; European Institute of Romania)

The final speaker of the panel discussed the importance of the Black Sea in the shifting geopolitical context, advocating for NATO to pay more attention to this region. The Black Sea region (BSR) is both a critical target for Russian threats, and a vital part of international trade with Europe. Dr. Sebe suggested that Romania as an important emerging actor in this region, highlighting its strategic geography and ongoing security initiatives. Critical to Romania’s strategy to defend the Black Sea is the Danube River, an important trade route that connects to the Balkans and beyond, which Dr. Sebe argued must be better utilized.

Looking to the future, the rebuilding of Ukraine will involve these trade routes, further underscoring its importance. Productive involvement from the BSR necessitates better and deeper cooperation with Türkiye, an area of opportunity.

A key part of Russia’s actions in the BSR is the development of hybrid tactics, which NATO needs to improve its responses to. Dr. Sebe pointed to the increasing automation of warfare, which has several important security implications, including the need for improved general regulation of technology, especially in domains of artificial intelligence (AI). In conclusion, the Eastern flank and BSR continue to experience rapid developments; NATO must be prepared to support and respond to these challenges.

Panel Two: Policymakers and Practitioners

Our second panel brought together four practitioners from the fields of defence, foreign policy, and diplomacy. Their discussions largely concentrated on the concrete steps already being taken to bolster NATO’s defence capabilities, as well as the strategic initiatives shaping the Alliance’s future trajectory.

Speaker One: H.E. Witold Dzielski (Ambassador, Embassy of Poland)

Witold Dzielski, Abassador to the Embassy of Poland, took the time to discuss the commitments that Poland has made towards NATO spending, bolstering the Eastern flank, as well as improvements that can be made to the strategic defence of Europe. As one of the top spenders in NATO, Poland has invested a greal deal in procurement, providing a robust defence framework. Dzielski also highlighted the extensive defence partnership that exist between Poland and Canada. The two have a long history of joint military cooperation and training bilaterally, as well as through NATO exercises. He noted how Canada recognizes the significant contributions of Poland in supporting Ukrainian refugees at the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion, as well as Ukrainian resilience and defence capabilities overall. For Canada, deepening its ties with Poland is an important strategic move. This is reflected through the recent announcement from Prime Minister Mark Carney and Prime Minister Donald Tusk that they will continue to enhance interoperability and collaboration. This will be an important move in reaffirming Canadian partnerships to cement its role in defending European security.

Speaker Two: Eric Laporte (Executive Director, Defence and Security Relations Division, Global Affairs)

Eric Laporte focused on discussing how the framework of decision-making and strategy-setting have changed. He suggests that we are witnessing a reversion back to “classical” geopolitical norms and dynamics, in which power politics, balancing behaviour, and strategic interdependence are growing increasing important, accompanied by renewed concerns over absolute gains. There is also a renewed focus on deterrence as countries seek to contain various malign actors.

For Canada, key questions on sovereignty have emerged: what is sovereign capability? And what does it look like in a Canadian context? Important to agenda-setting will be determining what Canada needs in order to reinforce its independent capabilities, and how this will be acquired. Laporte also emphasized that the way hard power is implemented has changed, influencing the direction of spending.

Laporte ended with a reflection on how NATO is being enhanced through transformation, as the Alliance adapts itself to respond to a new reality. He outlines some key developments from Canada that should boost innovation in defence technology. First, a new climate change centre in Quebec that addresses the unique security risks that are emerging as a result of climate change; and second, the NATO Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) has opened its North American Regional Office in Halifax, Nova Scotia. These recent events indicate important ways that Canada is contributing to NATO’s ongoing transformation.

Speaker Three: Kerry-Lynn Nankivell (Director, NATO and Europe, ADM(Pol) Department of National Defence)

Nankivell discussed the importance of policy alignment between Canada, NATO, the Department of National Defence (DND), and Global Affairs Canada (GAC). She identified a high level of alignment with NATO through the replication of key bureaucratic structures in Canada’s defence policymaking. She also emphasized that DND and GAC work closely together to ensure objectives and procedures are closely aligned, creating a robust policy framework for Canada. Canada is responding to not only Russia, but also the threat of Russia with others. This creates a need for a comprehensive defence plan between Canada and others in the international community.

Nankivell identified several challenges that need to be resolved, including responsible spending, which is an area of increasing concern and responsibility. She also identifies challenges around innovation and increasing the amount of available personnel for the CAF. She generally had a positive assessment towards the steps that Canada is making, and will be making, to ensure it establishes a productive role on the global stage.

Speaker Four: BGen Scott McKenzie (Director General, Canadian Joint Operations Command)

Scott McKenzie provided a presentation as a security practitioner on Canada’s ability to support NATO readiness. Canadian presence in Latvia has been a key part of this support, which has brought lessons and growth. The importance of pre-positioning was emphasized, where Canada participates in collective actions so that it can mobilize as fast as possible if a real threat occurs. Canada is increasingly participating in decision-making, rehearsals, plans, and drills which contributes to its role in NATO.

Since 2022, with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, NATO has been rapidly evolving and mobilizing, which Canada must ensure it keeps up with. McKenzie establishes that the fundamental problem facing NATO in regards to European security is its ability to demonstrate a sustained capacity to combat Russian threats over a long duration. The key to warding off Russia will be to demonstrate strength, which requires intense amounts of consolidation and cooperation. Consolidation remains an integral problem, as NATO countries still struggle to integrate forces on tactical and strategic levels. Countries also need to work on standardizing systems and equipment between each other to improve interoperability. Infrastructure also needs to be improved (ports, hospitals, borders, etc.) to enable rapid mobilization. This requires cooperation between militaries, governments, and private industries. Therefore, McKenzie advocates that overcoming logistical problems such as these are key to improving the effectiveness and success of NATO forces.

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NATO at a Crossroads: Present Challenges and Future Trajectories appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

• Turkish goals in the Black Sea region (BSR) are to maintain stability and its own strategic positioning within the region.

• Canadian cooperation with Türkiye continues to encounter challenges due to misaligned priorities and estrangement between actors.

• Canada has an opportunity to increase presence in the BSR by cooperating on initiatives outside of hard security concerns.

Policy Recommendations

• Canada should support the initiation of additional humanitarian projects in the BSR and seek out ways to partner with Türkiye on defence technology and modernization to strengthen overall diplomatic and defence relations.

• Increasing Canada’s regional presence around the BSR through NATO initiatives could help to bolster its image as a supportive ally to Türkiye while also helping project overall Canadian security interests.

Türkiye’s Foreign Policy post 2022

Türkiye has historically played an influential role in the Black Sea Region (BSR) as NATO’s southeastern bulwark. The gives Türkiye control over the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits, the key entry point of the Black Sea. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the BSR has been under wartime conditions. Türkiye has since invoked the Convention to effectively close the straits to both NATO and Russian ships; a decision which has nonetheless sparked controversy, particularly after Türkiye . Ankara remains apprehensive towards NATO involvement in the region, and while its relationship with the West is strained, it continues to maintain relations with Russia based on shared in the .

Türkiye, unlike most NATO countries, has , and still . At the same time, Türkiye has also . Türkiye’s seemingly contradictory policies reflect its primary goal: to maintain the existing balance of power in the BSR.

Türkiye’s stance is driven by independent interests rather an alignment with the West or Russia. For Türkiye, reinforcing the status quo reaffirms their military, economic, and diplomatic power in the BSR. Türkiye prioritizes business and trade to aid its struggling economy. It has also been increasingly positioning itself ; this has informed the country’s decisions to participate in the (a humanitarian-focused mission) and engage in peacemaking talks with Russia and Ukraine. Türkiye’s commitments are strategic, wishing to avoid provocation of either side while still leveraging their influence in military, resources, and politics.

Challenges for Canada

The major challenge for Canada will be to understand how to approach collaborations with Türkiye in the BSR. Estrangement and misalignment from both parties pose potential problems. Relations only recently improved after Canada following Türkiye’s use of Canadian arms in Nagorno-Karabakh, Libya, and Syria. Türkiye, through its refusal to sanction Russia or permit NATO military presence BSR, has demonstrated that it is not willing to explicitly target Russia. This clashes with Canada’s aim to contain Russian expansionism and protect Ukraine.

Canadian-Turkish military cooperation largely operates through NATO. Both countries participate in , , , and . While NATO provides a strong foundation, direct partnerships between Canadian and Turkish armed forces are still minimal, thus heightening the chances of estrangement between both sides.

Opportunities for Canada

Despite limitations, there are still opportunities to develop Canadian-Turkish diplomatic collaboration. Focusing on economic, humanitarian, or regional development initiatives creates common ground. For example, the defence industry is an area of growing partnership. Since Canada lifted the arms embargo on Türkiye, it has become one of Canada’s . Türkiye also participates in CANSEC (Canada’s international defence technology conference), and Turkish defence firms travelled to Canada as part of a . The exercise generated technology that enhances automated systems and increases resilience to hybrid offensives. For example, the firm HAVELSAN was able to . between the two countries also provide strong opportunities for investment and technological development which can have positive effects both for defence and for the overall economies of each country.

Building regional capacity is a promising avenue for cooperation. As mentioned above, Türkiye participates in FLF battlegroups, part of NATO’s . Pursuing similar initiatives in the scope of military modernization could be successful in increasing regional capacity. Furthermore, Canada can draw upon its skills in mediation and development to encourage stable, formal BSR organizations. Both actions can increase the ability for the BSR to safeguard against further destabilization in the region, which is beneficial to Turkish interests. The MCM was able to launch successfully in large part because it was framed as a humanitarian mission. This emphasizes the importance of optics for Türkiye, and should serve as an example of how to navigate different positionalities.

For Canada, the BSR can be a new avenue of partnership, increasing overall soft power and presence. A strong BSR is essential for NATO’s objective to defend Alliance territories. It is also essential for Canada’s efforts to enhance its defence posture and bolster international stability. However, without critically engaging with Türkiye this goal will be difficult to achieve. Therefore, finding relevant but non-conventional ways to collaborate in the BSR is key. Enhancing relations also align with other moves Türkiye has been making to collaborate more closely with other NATO and EU countries which seek similar goals as Canada. With an increasing need for fortification of the BSR, Canada should take the opportunity to distinguish itself as a valuable partner.

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The return of war to Europe with Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has caused many North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members to re-evaluate and reflect upon their own practices of state sovereignty, defence, and foreign policy. Canada is no different in this regard; Russia’s invasion has indeed highlighted many vulnerabilities in Canada’s defence and security architecture, both pertaining to its NATO commitments in Europe and its ongoing presence in Arctic diplomacy. Projecting an image of Canada as a strong Ally associated with Europe has become a top priority for Prime Minister Mark Carney, particularly following the alienating comments and actions of United States (US) President Donald Trump. Canadian self-sufficiency, and security integration with Europe apart from the US, is vital in this changing geopolitical landscape. At the same time, asserting Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic is becoming incredibly important with the increased presence of Russian, Chinese, and American vessels.

As the severity of the security challenges that Canada faces become more apparent, so have the many institutional problems plaguing the Canadian military. Canada’s military is , is on a progressively unreliable US, and is subject to ongoing cultural reform attempts addressing . In finding solutions for Canada’s military problems, Canada should lean on and work with its European Allies – particularly those who share Arctic territory. Sustained Russian aggression and pressure from the US have made security self-sufficiency a high priority issue in Europe. Across Europe there has been a related for policies of mandatory national service, reflecting a change in security culture that, as an Ally, Canada will need to adapt to. For Canada to take itself seriously – and be taken seriously on the world stage – as an Arctic nation and a strong NATO Ally, it needs to make significant societal changes regarding the nature of national security.

This policy brief highlights how a system of national service inspired by the Scandinavian models could have the potential to both invigorate Canada’s military culture and redefine Canadians’ relationship with national defence. By shifting the understanding of national service away from traditional conflict-oriented military roles and towards a more varied and selective system, Canada could better address its vulnerabilities and strengthen its reputation both domestically and abroad. A shifting of focus of national service away from enforced combat-oriented roles, informed by the Scandinavian example, will also address a cultural scepticism of conscription that remains prevalent throughout Canada. The ongoing and contentious debates among other Canadian allies over alternative national service options highlight the challenging reality of political and cultural responses to such policies among civil society. In considering different models from which to take inspiration for such a system, the selective compulsory national service seen in Norway and Sweden stands out as the most applicable model for the Canadian context.

Models of National Service

While there are currently nine NATO members that enforce a system of mandatory national service, the examples of Nordic countries, encompassing Finland, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark (excluding the demilitarized Iceland), are particularly attractive to Canadian and due to similar liberal democratic political values, Arctic security concerns, and NATO membership. In fact, the Nordics represent : mandatory service, lottery-driven service, and selective compulsory service.

Mandatory service is seen in Finland as well as other NATO members such as Estonia, Greece, and Türkiye. This system of conscription – in which every male citizen is required to serve in some capacity – would be untenable in a Canadian context. For instance, Finland has a small population of approximately 5.5 million, and a much longer and more conflict-ridden relationship with its dominant neighbour, the Russian Federation. Canada’s geographic insulation, and its larger and more dispersed population of approximately 40 million, makes such a comprehensive conscription system considerably less attractive and less digestible practically or politically.

In Denmark, Latvia, and Lithuania, after mandatory written and health examinations citizens are subject to a lottery-driven conscription. Most position are filled by volunteers, so conscription is heavily limited. In the past decade, nearly of those undertaking military service in Denmark were volunteers. Conscripts are otherwise placed in the service of the Emergency Management Agency. However, there are two major reasons why this lottery-based system would be ill-advised for Canada. First, its random selection bears resemblance to the historic system used in the United States during the Vietnam War, which, as discussed below, carries a great degree of cultural influence. This would run the risk of stoking widespread negative reaction merely by association with the hegemonic military and cultural legacy and memory of the US (discussed further below). Secondly, the system of random selection designed primarily to boost the number of military recruits perpetuates an assumption of traditional conflict. It therefore distracts from the need to redefine defence responsibilities of the citizenry to include more than narrow militarised considerations. It may also inhibit the ability to reframe service as a means of providing training opportunities.

Norway and Sweden share a similar system of selective compulsory service, with Sweden taking influence from the pioneering Norwegian model. Norway, while nominally extending mandatory service to all citizens, has a highly competitive system that utilizes mental and physical assessments to select candidates. Sweden’s system of “” extends to all Swedish citizens (even abroad) and foreign residents of Sweden. It includes three types of duties: military service, civilian service, and general service obligations in the event of war. In both Norway and Sweden, conscription is determined by a set of questionnaires given to all 18-year-olds. In 2024, civilian service was enacted for the first time since the Cold War ended, incorporating training in emergency services for conscripts identifying as conscientious objectors. While similar in principle to Norway’s system, Sweden differs in its inclusion of mandatory civil service. Reintroduced in 2017, Swedish compulsory civil service provides training in emergency health and energy services.

The variations seen in Sweden and Norway thus serve as more applicable examples for Canadian consideration. While these Scandinavian countries have much smaller land masses and population sizes than Canada, their limited styles of conscription would fit within the Canadian context, particularly with an expanded acceptance of immediate security priorities. The Norway-Sweden system has been taken up by other Allies as a model already – namely Germany. Like Canada, Germany is a federal state, with a healthy amount of (which it abandoned in 2011) and a population much larger than the Scandinavian countries. In , the German cabinet passed a draft bill introducing a national service system that took direct inspiration from the Swedish example, with the major difference being that the new system would be voluntary (for now). Once implemented, the system will have all Germans turning 18 sent a questionnaire asking about their physical fitness and if they are interested in volunteering for the military. While the future success of the German policy is unclear, the adoption of a modified Norway-Sweden model of national service shows the system’s potential flexibility to meet the unique requirements of a particular country. It may also serve as an example on adapting the system to the context of a larger and more diverse state.

Contentious and Ongoing Debates amongst Canada’s Allies

In assessing the applicability of Scandinavian models of national service in addressing Canada’s military needs, the consideration of alternative models provides useful context. Mandatory national service options have already been debated by some of Canada’s closest Allies.

During the 2024 United Kingdom (UK) general election, the incumbent Conservative government a form of mandatory military or civilian service for all 18-year-olds. Denounced by critics as a misguided electioneering stunt, the proposal came from then-Prime Minister Rishi Sunak without the knowledge of some of his cabinet ministers. The announcement from an historically unpopular government, directly preceding an embarrassing election loss, made a out of national service in the UK. However, in June 2025 the Labour government that succeeded Sunak endorsed the consideration of a system of voluntary ‘military gap years’ for young people based on a model offered by the Australian Defence Force.

A similar attempt at volunteer national service is seen in France’s Service National Universel (). Targeted towards French citizens aged 15-17, SNU was explicitly designed as a method of civic education. The to include mandatory participation has been discussed since its creation in 2019. However, the feasibility of national service, personally championed by President Emmanuel Macron, is heavily debated even as a voluntary program. In , the French Senate voted to slash the SNU budget against Macron’s pleadings.

As these examples illustrate, issues of practical implementation can be of immense importance in the ensuing debate over national service models. Framing and messaging of national service in these debates is also critical. Communicating a logical reason for national service can be disrupted if the messaging is incompatible with the political and cultural realities of the country. A practical policy debate is hindered by the assumption of national service as an ad hoc response to military conflict threatening national existence. Under this assumption, any attempt to explore national service in a security context that is not characterised by imminant invasion is plagued by denunciation as an impractical infringement on civil liberties, as happened in the UK. However, the attempt to bypass controversy by framing national service as primarily a tool of civic education presents the issue of lacking urgency and thus decreasing the sense of priority, as has been seen in France and Australia. It is therefore important to reframe the debate to highlight the security rationale for national service that poses immediate threat without necessarily aligning a relation to combat.

Application to Canada – Immediate Threats and Challenges

A New Security Context: European Projection and Self-Sufficiency

Canada can no longer rely on the myth of its removal from immediate territorial threats. It is no longer, as once famously quipped, “a fire-proof house far from inflammable materials.” The idea that national service is only relevant in the immediate preparation for a war threatening the integrity of national territory is nullified by the existence of numerous present security threats, both stemming from environmental and geopolitical challenges. In the international political context of President Trump questioning Canadian security, Canada’s ability to project the image of a strong, independent military actor are vital for ensuring that it can secure its own borders. The Scandinavian models of self-sufficiency through mandatory national service can be used to address several of Canada’s immediate security challenges.

The Arctic

National service applied to the assertion of Arctic sovereignty may have the benefit of strengthening cultural awareness of Canada’s Arctic identity. It may also strengthen Canadian ties with its Nordic Allies through a shared approach to security, while lessening dependence on the US. Recent to strengthen Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic include $420 million to expand military operations in the region. Canada may also take note of Denmark’s recent actions. After President Trump made several threatening remarks about his desire for an American acquisition of Greenland, the Danish government made moves to increase its presence in the autonomous territory. admitting women into mandatory national service, increasing the period of service from 4 to 11 months, and raising the number of recruits from approximately 5,000 to 7,500 by 2033. Rather than a traditional military role, the possibilities for Arctic service could include community support, healthcare, and infrastructural maintenance roles.

Environmental Crises

With the increase of environmental crises, most visible through the in the number of wildfires across Canada every summer, there is a need to expand national security to address natural disasters. Aiding in environmental catastrophes such as wildfires, floods, or earthquakes has the potential to be a major focus of a civilian national service option in Canada. As an immediate security issue, such environmental crises may serve as a viable justification for national service in public opinion. There is precedent for conscription to fight wildfires in Canada. Under British Columbia’s (2004), the Crown has the power to “order a person who is 19 years of age or older to assist in fire control”. A Swedish-style compulsory civil service model, which provides to conscripts, would have potential applications in preparing individuals to assist during environmental crisis events, whether through fighting fires or aiding infrastructural maintenance or emergency response.

Military Culture

Cultural problems have plagued Canada’s military for years, with criticisms coming from both the and . While the Conservative party calls for the return of pride in the military, the Liberal government has spoken out about the need to address cultural issues of misogyny, racism, and political extremism. Either way, the political milieu has resulted in a drastic decrease in recruitment. The to both men and women in Norway (2013), Sweden (2017), and Denmark (2025) has triggered important cultural discussions in facilitating gender parity. In Denmark, the has been presented as a way to trigger the military to practically address documented problems of sexual harassment, assault, and discrimination against women while strengthening its capabilities and purpose. The pioneering move by Norway in instituting gender equality in conscription was as having triggered significant changes in many areas, including “leadership and organizational culture”. The policy was designed to increase the number of women in the military and remove the assumption that men have a higher suitability for military responsibilities. By providing a sense of duty, purpose, and responsibility, national service can provide a culture of confidence and equality to combat the presence of discriminatory behaviour in the military.

Assessment

The Scandinavian approach to national service is not solely associated with the immediate preparation for defensive war. It carries an encompassing view of national security that focuses on the prevention of conflict and the facilitation of citizen engagement and responsibility. The aggressive rhetoric from President Trump, the war in Ukraine, and the increasingly destructive environmental crises have been cited as reasons to consider the Nordic style of conscription by political commentators in both and publications. This conversation is important in reframing the general association of conscription with the immediate onset of nation-threatening conflict. Canada faces a variety of immediate and projected threats that can be addressed by a rationalized, skills-oriented, and limited system of national service as seen in Norway and Sweden. The Norway-Sweden model facilitates choice and conscientious objection while encouraging the responsibility of citizens to protect their country. However, the prospect of implementing a system of national service in Canada would require taking into account the variabilities of diverse political responses that could be expected to such a proposal.

Reframing Security and Addressing Potential Opposition

There are some notable political and cultural differences that would make a Canadian adoption of Scandinavian conscription policies a challenge. Some that the likelihood of Canadian implementation of mandatory national service policy remains low, both due to projected issues related to public opinion and constitutional challenges. A potential court challenge regarding civil liberties under could be a barrier to any national service legislation not related to an imminent threat to Canadian sovereignty. While the notwithstanding clause of the Charter could be used by parliament to advance a policy of national service against such challenges, such a move would inevitably prove . The current Liberal government’s desire to use of the notwithstanding clause makes any potential use against a civil liberties challenge unlikely. Additionally, public opinion challenges may stem from historic cultural influences related to the US, where there is a strong distrust of conscription associated with the experiences of the Vietnam War in the 1960s-70s. The legacy of Canada’s willingness to harbour over draft-age American men and women during the Vietnam War lends some credence to a potential distaste for mandatory service. While opposition to national service along libertarian lines has been , Canada’s own historical experience with anti-conscription riots in Quebec during the First World War serves as a more significant cultural influence. In modern circumstances, however, such concerns can be addressed by adapting a new conception of what mandatory national service entails, as inspired by the Norway-Sweden example.

The emphasis on a broad definition of security to encompass climate crisis preparedness, Arctic sovereignty, and other civil duties can serve to adapt the public assumption of the meaning of national service. An noted that, while mandatory service in the military remains a contentious issue among respondents – with 44% opposing and 43% supporting – other alternative service options were much more popular. Public health support service saw 74% support, while environmental support saw 73% support. The general sympathy towards national civilian service and the relative distaste for military service is in line with the historic association of military conscription with involuntary participation in far-flung conflict overseas (such as perceptions that imperialism was the motivating factor behind the First World War, or likewise the imperialist imagery associated with the Vietnam War by so-called ‘’).

In addition, national service can be highlighted as an important opportunity for investment in developing and applying the skills of young Canadians. The aforementioned poll by the recorded the popularity of this aspect of national service, showing that 82% of respondents thought mandatory civilian service would improve the personal development of young adults. The mandatory questionnaire system used in the Norway-Sweden model can be used to gauge skills, aptitude, and interest in order to provide training where needed and encourage healthy competition for placements. Such a policy could be incorporated into an expansion of existing components of the Canadian Armed Forces, such as the Canadian Rangers. As explored by Valeriia Gusieva, the Rangers already represent a bridge between Canadian defence priorities in the Arctic and the utilisation of unique cultural knowledge found among Indigenous communities. There is great potential in the Canadian Rangers as a way to align the development of Canada’s human potential with the assertion of its sovereignty and security.

There may be an inclination to avoid public stigma against conscription by implementing a voluntary national service system, which would align Canada with France, as well as the current debates in Germany and the UK. Such an option would be less effective in addressing Canadian defence needs or in advancing an association between Canadians and national security than the selective compulsory system seen in Norway and Sweden. The Norway-Sweden model, though officially mandatory, provides a level of flexibility that facilitates an essentially voluntary system which nonetheless communicates the imperative need for security awareness and preparedness. The voluntary system in France exists instead as a compromise paired with an official desire for expansion to compulsory service. As such, they remain vulnerable to the changing whims of the legislature. The mandatory nature of national service, paired with an allowance for effective decision-making on the part of those compelled to fill in the assessment questionnaire, is necessary in order to align the redefined security focus and cultural reforms with an appreciation of the longstanding traditions associated with the Canadian military.

Therefore, the implementation of national service in Canada, in aid of fulfilling its international obligations, NATO Alliance pressures, and strategic vulnerabilities, would be best aligned with a system inspired by the Norway-Sweden model. In redefining the popular image of national security to include the immediate yet non-conflict-oriented threats of climate disasters and Arctic sovereignty assertion, national service can be disassociated from traditional military conflict and instead integrated into the public image of civic responsibility.

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Summary

● Since 2022, the Arctic has evolved from a region of cooperation and to one of competition and division.

● Previously deemed ‘exceptional’ due to its collaborative status quo’s resilience against geopolitical changes, increased militarization and economic competition indicates an abandonment of this norm, along with decreased prioritization in environmental security, climate change, and scientific exchanges.

● These shifts further compound environmental and climate consequences – as militarization and economic development pose great risks to Arctic environmental security and temperatures.

● Policies from Russia (since 2022) and the United States (since January 2025) have pivoted towards economic development, along with a decrease in efforts to foster sustainable development. Russia has also included an explicit pillar of militarization to its main strategic priorities.

● Canada and other NATO countries have stated environmental and climate commitments in policy and have also increased militarization in their Arctic regions.

Background

Prior to 2022, the Arctic was governed in a spirit of cooperation in large part due to its unforgiving environmental conditions and longstanding culture of multilateralism between states, Inuit, and other Arctic Indigenous communities through institutions like the Arctic Council. This institution was used to foster sustainable development, reduce risks of environmental accidents, as well as environmental degradation. It functioned as a forum for the negotiation of Arctic agreements.

Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, increased militarization and attention has been devoted to the Arctic by both Russian and NATO-Arctic nations. In March 2022, the A7 members of the Arctic Council announced a diplomatic pause in protest of Russia’s invasion. Currently, Russia does not participate and has for the council. The region has been increasingly divided into , ruining decades of progress as well as sidelining Indigenous voices and cooperative initiatives. As a result, the region has shifted from a culture of cooperation to competition, leaving scientists isolated, and with fewer opportunities for bilateral, multilateral, and scientific collaboration in the name of protecting the Arctic’s future.

Rising global temperatures have led to an increase of melting ice in the Arctic, contributing to longer shipping seasons, increasing traffic in the region, and more opportunities for resource extraction, including mining of critical minerals and other sources of energy. These potential economic prospects are largely with the region’s unforgiving operational conditions and lack of infrastructure. Regardless, the Arctic is growing increasingly vulnerable to exploitation due to climate change and the fracturing of the Arctic status-quo. The latter has resulted in policy shifts from collaboration and prioritization – albeit, not equal across all states – of environmental security, to securitization and economic development.

Russian Arctic Policy/Strategy since 2022

Russia’s Arctic Strategy is centred around securitization and economic development, with little regard for environmental security or sustainability. In response to Western sanctions, Russia has framed economic development and defense in the Arctic as a tenet of national security, . In addition, NATO’s northern expansion, with Sweden and Finland becoming full-members, has aggravated Russia’s fear of encirclement, rooted in its view of the Arctic as ‘’. Increased militarization, such as the Safe Arctic 2025 Exercise, underscore Russia’s strategic priority for defense posturing in the Arctic.

NSR is a large tenet of Russian economic development in the Arctic, which provides faster shipping routes between Europe and Asia, most notably for Russian energy. Increased naval traffic in the Arctic region, compounded by a lack of coast guard and joint-surveillance cooperation initiatives, increases the risk of oil spills and shipping accidents. In addition, pollution and ecological damage are symptomatic of unsustainable development. Russia is expected to release a new soon, unveiling its updated development priorities.

NATO Countries and New Arctic Strategies

NATO’s northern expansion has led to increased militarization of the Nordic Arctic. NATO’s Arctic approach focuses largely on “”. After joining NATO, Sweden and Finland committed to its defense spending guidelines, resulting in . In addition, increasing from Russia have prompted further development of defense capabilities. Although NATO remains dedicated to environmental security protection, observers urge the organization to for the Arctic that considers its unique vulnerabilities, operational challenges, and various regarding climate change, including environmental and human security. Further policy development is needed to its Climate Change and Security Action Plan to the Arctic’s idiosyncrasies.

The balances sustainable development and security concerns, whilst maintaining a level of non-political cooperation. Though recent incursions on NATO countries’ and spaces, notably in , pose serious challenges for any prospect of Arctic cooperation with Russia. Denmark’s highlights its effort to bolster its presence and defense capabilities in the Arctic. Denmark has increased its militarization in Greenland since 2022, and most prominently since the start of Donald Trump’s second term, given the latter’s continued ontological threats.

(March, 2025) stresses close ties between Canada and the United States to “secure North American homeland”, as well as with its Nordic Allies. It will initiate “Arctic security dialogue” with “like-minded states”, further alluding to Canada’s recent shift towards ‘friendshoring’ in foreign policy, as well as increasing polarization among Arctic actors. Although Canada remains dedicated to its – which prioritizes the wellbeing of northern communities, development of Arctic research, and environmental security – its increase in Arctic securitization and economic development necessitates further policy adaptation to the changing geopolitical environment.

The second term of Donald Trump marks a major shift in the from one of prioritizing security, climate change, sustainable development, and international governance, to a more “business-like” strategy that prioritizes large-scale resource extraction in Alaska. President Trump’s tariffs and annexation threats to American Arctic Allies further allude to this major shift. In addition, the Trump Administration has rescinded the previous Administration’s restrictions on resource development in order to unleash “”, including new , and projects in previously protected parks and forests. In addition, climate research is being dismantled and the once central to American Arctic policy is now cut out. At the between Putin and Trump in August 2025, Putin alluded to further cooperation in the United States by making mention of the Arctic, though emphasizing more diplomatic and economic cooperation, not environmental.

Conclusion- Risks to Environmental Security and Climate Change

Increased militarization in the Arctic risks environmental consequences. Military training exercises can lead to in training areas, in addition to levels of noise-pollution that harm humans and wildlife. Militarization can also severely disrupt Indigenous livelihoods across the Arctic region, with communities like the and relying on a longstanding tradition of land-based sustenance.

Decreased research collaboration severely reduces scientists’ abilities to track changes in the Arctic climate and ecology. in June indicate that prior to 2022, bilateral cooperation allowed for standardization of data collection, optimization of research processes through pooling of resources and skills, as well as increased habitat conservation and better outcomes for wildlife, eventually leading to the adoption of international market standards and best management practices. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, these scientists have had virtually no communication, resulting in a massive knowledge gap in understanding Arctic changes, as well as a decline in trust. In addition, pressing security risks such as , affecting infrastructure, food security, and public health, are lacking in crucial data, rendering it unpredictable and difficult to manage.

This new status quo of polarization and militarization is chipping away at every avenue for bilateral cooperation, which has tangible effects on Arctic environmental security. The longstanding between Norway and Russia, dating back to 1976, had persevered through these geopolitical changes. It is now at risk due to a recent Russian ultimatum to Norway to close its economic zone to its vessels. This occurred in light of Norway’s sanctions against companies Norebo and Murman Seafood in July 2025. A breakdown of this agreement would increase risks of poaching and unsustainable fishing, as well as pose serious risks to the region’s ecosystem. Overall, these strategic shifts indicate an abandonment of the previous norm of collaboration in the Arctic, and the emerging norm of competition, polarization and militarization, all of which pose grave dangers to the natural world in the Arctic.

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Amidst continued uncertainty regarding Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine, Latvia and other Baltic states are considering ending their support for the Ottawa Landmine Treaty in the name of national defence. While the decision underscores Latvia’s current fears of vulnerability to Russian aggression, it also poses complex implications for NATO operational cooperation and Canada’s humanitarian commitments. This policy memo examines the implications of the Baltic states’ possible withdrawal from the Treaty on Canada’s leadership and joint NATO operations in Latvia. It offers recommendations on how Canada can retain its international legal obligations while continuing to work successfully with Latvia and the rest of NATO through joint military operations.

Russia’s Threat

Russia’s persistent aggression towards Ukraine has led many of its neighbours to reassess their national security strategies. Poland and the Baltic states have expressed rising concerns, claiming that the regional security environment has ““. Although Russia remains primarily focused on Ukraine, Western intelligence agencies have warned of its long-term plans to challenge NATO’s Eastern flank. In the next three to four years, it is theorized that Russia plans to rebuild and strengthen its military forces, leading to the large potential of an escalated attack . Due to Latvia’s proximity to Russia and location on NATO’s Eastern flank, anticipation of a future attack and motivation to test NATO’s defence readiness are . The Latvian defence intelligence community recently presented heightened warnings of Russia’s military developments and threats, such as infiltrating Latvia’s rural areas.

Treaty Details

was adopted in 1972 to ban the current and future possession, production, and transfer of anti-personnel landmines. The international agreement is currently , excluding Russia and the United States.

Latvia, Poland, Lithuania, and Estonia from the Ottawa Treaty Agreement in late March 2025, amidst rising national security concerns regarding Russian aggression. On April 16th, Latvia’s parliament (the Saeima) voted to officially withdraw from the agreement. With this vote, Latvia became to formally apply to leave the Ottawa Treaty. members of parliament voted in favour of the withdrawal, leaving fourteen against and two abstentions. Latvia set the stage for Lithuania’s parliament (the Seimas) to follow, to leave the treaty just a few weeks later on . Riigikogu, Estonia’s parliament, on June 4th, with 81 members in favour, out of 101 members. The Baltic states must inform all other treaty parties, as well as the United Nations Security Council and Secretary General, of their intentions to withdraw. The state must then wait a before the treaty ceases to apply. This period now gives the Baltic states an opportunity to address concerns with other NATO states on their plans for navigating the future of their defence against Russia.

Despite all three countries being politically aligned to support the decision, they have nonetheless faced backlash from global humanitarian organizations and humanitarian diplomatic figures. Examples include the large banner placed on Geneva’s iconic broken chair statue by the as a direct message to the Baltic states, Finland, and Poland, advocating against withdrawal discussions. Opposition has been expressed from various humanitarian organizations, including a statement by a top human rights official, Volker Türk, from the and , denouncing the decision. A key Canadian leader in diplomatic efforts to establish the Ottawa Treaty, that this move will risk long-term humanitarian consequences in the region.

Apart from a global humanitarian response, gauging local civilian perspectives on the withdrawal remains difficult. Literature or data regarding citizen opinion on the issue across all three Baltic states is scarce, making it a challenge to assess domestic support or opposition

Implications for Canada and NATO

Despite Canada’s continued commitment to the Ottawa Treaty, the potential exit of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia raises questions about the future of Canada’s operational relationship with each of these Baltic states. This question arises because the Ottawa Treaty extends beyond the possession, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines to also of any state using landmines. The Canada-Latvia relationship is especially sensitive to this change, as Lativa currently hosts approximately 1,600 members of the Canadian Armed Forces deployed under . This operation has been extended by Mark Carney for three more years.

Canada also leads a NATO brigade in Latvia made up of troops from 13 Allies. Last year, this brigade successfully conducted , which was the first major field exercise . As activity in this region grows, it is necessary to continue assessing the alignment of the Baltic states with Canada’s treaty obligations and commitments to NATO cooperation as a whole. Canadian leadership plans to expand its brigade by adding 2,200 Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) members apart of the operation .

NATO as an organization prioritizes a collective defence strategy; however, states still hold a level of sovereignty to make military-related decisions. The decision by Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia to leave the Ottawa Treaty suggests that humanitarian concerns are being sidelined in favour of state survival. Whether this shift has an effect on the level of cooperation between Canada and the Baltic states remains to be seen. In order to mitigate this potential change, this policy memo provides two recommendations for Canadian government officials to consider as they assess their relationship with their Baltic Allies.

Recommendation: Canada-Latvia Bilateral Dialogue on Operational Framework

An initial bilateral meeting between Canada and Latvia should take place focusing on creating a plan for navigating new legal circumstances as they emerge in the international security arena. Although Prime Minister Mark Carney did in late August to discuss the extension of military operations in the region, there was no public indication that the topic of landmines was discussed. It is necessary for Canada to engage with Latvian counterparts at the level of defence ministers and senior military leadership. By involving both political authority and operational expertise, both states can ensure that diplomatic commitments are aligned with on-the-ground coordination of operative measures. Assessments should be made to weigh the need for additional legal documents such as non-involvement clauses to ensure that Canada would not engage in activity that would undermine the Treaty.

During initial meetings, Canadian and Latvian officials should seek to establish an understanding of the effects that Latvia’s withdrawal may have on joint operations. A discussion around Canada’s legal obligations should be at the forefront of the discussion. Future NATO exercises and training should be reviewed, and new scenarios should be drawn, should Latvia indicate an intention to incorporate anti-personnel landmines into joint training activities.

To institutionalize this collaboration, both states should consider establishing a Canada-Latvia Operational Working Group. This group would create a permanent, ongoing cooperation between both parties, which would address legal and logistical updates as needed.

While the priority lies in communication with Latvia due to operational duties, Canada should consider exploring avenues for broader engagement with Lithuania and Estonia to strengthen diplomatic relationships in light of changing political and legal conditions.

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Canada’s role in the Black Sea Mine Countermeasures Task Force supports regional security by helping clear naval mines and ordnance threatening vital shipping routes. Working alongside Romania, Türkiye, and Bulgaria, Canada enhances NATO interoperability and gains critical experience in multi-domain naval operations. The mission highlights Canada’s strategic interest in the Black Sea and its potential role in postwar recovery. Continued engagement could strengthen Canada’s regional presence, support allied capabilities, and advance readiness for future maritime challenges.

To view the whole report, download the report below.

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Executive Summary

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has had far-reaching consequences for global security, particularly for regions and areas outside the European Union (EU), such as the South Caucasus, post-Soviet Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Mongolia. Although these areas are geographically far from the conflict zone, security ripple effects have been significant, as the Russian Federation has remained historically dominant and influential in these regions. However, the war in Ukraine has raised concerns about the security challenges and terrorism threats in Central Asia and South Caucasus.

This white paper explores the strategic consequences of Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine for broader security architecture with a focus on four critical areas: the South Caucasus, Central Asia, Mongolia, and Afghanistan. It offers a regional assessment of shifting military alignments, hybrid threats, counterterrorism dynamics, and Canada’s emerging security interests in this evolving landscape.

Key Findings

· Russia’s military overstretch has significantly weakened its role as a regional security guarantor, particularly in Central Asia and the South Caucasus.

· Traditional alliances are being re-evaluated; new security actors such as Turkiye, China, and smaller Western states are filling the resulting vacuum.

· Hybrid threats are rising in formerly Russian-dominated regions, increasing instability and risk.

· The resurgence of terrorism and border insecurity in Central Asia and Afghanistan poses renewed threats to regional and global stability.

· Canada has vital strategic interests in contributing to the mitigation of these risks, leveraging its role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and longstanding regional partnerships.

· Poland and Romania, as key actors in NATO and EU strategic initiatives, offer replicable models for Canadian-supported deterrence and resilience across Eurasia.

Introduction

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has not only redefined the contemporary nature of war but exposed deep strategic vulnerabilities within Europe’s security architecture. NATO’s eastern flank was shown to be underprepared for full-scale military aggression, and debates over enlargement and deterrence capabilities have been reinvigorated. Compounding this is the growing uncertainty surrounding US foreign policy under a second Trump administration, casting doubt on the consistency and reliability of transatlantic security commitments.

These shifting dynamics raise critical questions for states on the periphery of NATO and Russia’s former sphere of influence. As they navigate the emerging multipolar order, the need for new strategic calculations, and potentially, alternative or diversified security guarantees, has become paramount.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 marked a turning point in global security relations. While much focus has remained on NATO’s eastern flank and Western Europe, the war’s ripple effects are being acutely felt across post-Soviet Eurasia. Countries that once relied on Russia for military protection are now exploring new alignments, hedging their defense dependencies, or recalibrating their neutrality.

In addition, this war has been influencing NATO’s counterterrorism strategy. The war has created new opportunities for terrorist groups to exploit and ultimately increase their influence to fill the security vacuum. Among these groups we can mention IS-K/IS-KP – Islamic State in Khorasan Province, the branch of IS – Islamic State – which has been spreading its propaganda in Western societies as well. During the war, Russia has continued to be a trusted partner for Iran, hosting members of another radical group Hamas previously in Moscow. Anti-Western propaganda is familiar for Russia as it has often blamed Western countries in facilitating the rise of terrorist organizations. For example, Maria Zabolotskaya, deputy permanent representative of Russia in United Nations (UN), has argued that emergence of IS in the Middle East and Africa can be blamed on the failed US withdrawal and intervention in Iraq and Libya. She added that the situation in Afghanistan is a vivid example of the West leveraging counterterrorism issues to serve their “selfish geopolitical interests”.

This white paper examines the impacts of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on the South Caucasus, Central Asia, Mongolia, and Afghanistan, which have been historically influenced by Russian (and Soviet) military presence, as well as political and economic interests, but are navigating an increasingly fragmented and uncertain security environment. While it is true that the war may not be immediately felt within these regions, it will still nevertheless have significant indirect implications for regional security dynamics by potentially escalating terrorism and extremism. Groups like IS, Al-Qaeda, and other Islamist militant organizations remain active not only in conflict zones, but also in launching global terror operations.

For Canadian policymakers, these developments raise key questions about strategic engagement, NATO cooperation, counterterrorism strategy, and regional stability.

Methodology

This white paper employs a qualitative research design, utilizing a combination of primary and secondary sources to investigate the multifaceted challenges faced by selected states in the context of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Primary sources include government strategy papers, defense white papers, and formal statements issued by international organizations, such as NATO and the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE). Secondary sources include academic literature, policy briefs or analyses from research institutions or think tanks as well as insights derived from expert interviews.

A case study methodology underpins the country-level analysis, enabling in-depth examination of the geopolitical and security implications for Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, and Afghanistan. This approach facilitates comparative insights regarding the regional ramifications of the war in Ukraine, particularly concerning national resilience, foreign policy realignments, and security sector responses.

Historical and Geopolitical Context

For decades following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia maintained its influence over the South Caucasus and Central Asia through a combination of hard military presence, economic dependencies, and soft power. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), bilateral military treaties, and strategic basing agreements, such as those in Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, reflected Moscow’s central role in regional security. As have argued, Russia’s approach was rooted in the belief that the Eastern European neighbourhood should remain within its exclusive sphere of influence, serving both as a security buffer and a geopolitical assertion of status. However, the war in Ukraine has fundamentally destabilized this architecture.

Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine accelerated a visible erosion of Russia’s hegemonic posture in the broader Eurasian region. Yet this war did not begin in 2022; it is the culmination of a broader imperial strategy that began with Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia and the 2014 annexation of Crimea. These earlier incursions served as testing grounds for military aggression, hybrid warfare, and the West’s tolerance for territorial revisionism.

The 2008 war in Georgia, which resulted in the occupation of 20% of Georgian territory, was met with limited international pushback and no enduring deterrent mechanisms. This failure arguably emboldened the Kremlin’s further actions in Ukraine and elsewhere, reinforcing a perception of impunity. The erosion of credible deterrence, both conventional and hybrid, has challenged the assumptions underpinning NATO’s posture in Eastern Europe.

The war in Ukraine has also tested the transatlantic relationship, revealing an over-reliance on US leadership and exposing uncertainties about the durability of Western unity, particularly in light of shifts in American administrations. The conflict has reignited debates in Europe about strategic autonomy, defense investment, and burden-sharing within NATO.

While much attention remains focused on Ukraine, the shockwaves of the war have rippled well beyond its borders. Eurasia, particularly the South Caucasus, Central Asia, Mongolia, and Afghanistan have felt the tremors. These regions, historically shaped by Russia’s military and political dominance, now face a strategic vacuum. Russia’s overextension, domestic fragility, and inability to honor security commitments have altered the geopolitical balance. The result is a complex reordering of alliances, threat perceptions, and defense strategies across a vast and vulnerable geography.

Countries like Kazakhstan, traditionally aligned with Moscow, have resisted pressure to support the Kremlin’s war aims and have actively diversified their foreign policy strategies. Some scholars identify a growing trend of “strategic hedging” among Central Asian states, an effort to reduce overdependence on Russian security while cautiously engaging other powers. Meanwhile, Armenia’s disillusionment with the CSTO following Russia’s passivity during the 2020 and 2023 Nagorno-Karabakh crises reflects a broader questioning of Moscow’s reliability.

This erosion has created space for other actors. China, once cautious in its military profile, is now establishing a more visible security footprint in Central Asia. As Raffaello Pantucci (2023) notes, Beijing has invested in border surveillance, counterterrorism cooperation, and limited joint exercises in Tajikistan

and Kyrgyzstan. These changes indicate a transition from Russian-centric security alignment to multipolar, flexible, and interest-based configurations.

NATO’s role in Eurasian security is also undergoing a significant transformation. While formal enlargement remains politically sensitive, NATO has pursued partnership formats, especially with Georgia and, increasingly, Mongolia, to build interoperability and signal political support. Michael Rühle discusses the strategic importance of “NATO’s global partnerships,” which allow for flexible collaboration without formal membership. Georgia’s engagement through the NATO–Georgia Substantial Package has been one of the examples of this evolving cooperation. The Alliance’s “open door” policy is also being undermined by strategic ambiguity, raising doubts among aspirant states about the credibility of Western security guarantees.

In the Georgian case, what was once a society firmly committed to Euro-Atlantic integration has, in recent years, seen a partial retrenchment. Public support for NATO remains high, but political dynamics and growing disillusionment with Western inaction in the face of Russian occupation have fueled uncertainty. This creates both risk and opportunity: risk in the form of democratic backsliding and regional instability, and opportunity for Canada and NATO allies to re-engage with clear, consistent support for democratic reform and territorial integrity.

Yet, NATO’s ability to provide credible security guarantees short of membership remains contested. highlight how ambiguity in NATO’s posture toward aspirant states undermines deterrence and opens space for adversarial manipulation. These concerns are further compounded by shifting US policies and uncertain commitment levels, especially under new administrations. For states in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, this ambiguity feeds the appeal of diversification.

focuses on the new security landscape created by Russia’s war in Ukraine to adapt the new strategy of counter-terrorism and hybrid warfare. According to a particular NATO document, three main tasks has been identified: collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security. As analyzes, this document “identifies terrorism as one of the primary asymmetric threats to the alliance, alongside hybrid warfare…”. Also, the Washington Summit Declaration of 2024 highlighted to prevent the spread of radical ideologies and adapt the counter-terrorism policy.

mentions three main challenges for security architecture: “low-level terrorism,” digital “value chain,” and proliferation of arms. He suggests that NATO’s counter-terrorism strategy should take up a practice of selective reevaluation to answer new terrorism threats. As NATO’s adaptive strategy from the 1990s to the 2000s was focused on strengthening its counter-terrorism efforts, the new security landscape is reshaping NATO’s strategy to be more focused on answering these new threats connecting to arms trafficking from conflict zones. Stockhammer includes the example of when

The literature also emphasizes the growing prevalence of hybrid threats, disinformation campaigns, and covert paramilitary activity. theorize that hegemonic decline is often accompanied by a rise in grey zone tactics, as waning powers seek to maintain influence without triggering direct confrontation. Russia’s increased use of cyber and disinformation tools in Georgia and Kazakhstan supports this thesis. Similarly, China’s security strategy in Central Asia increasingly includes digital authoritarianism, with exported surveillance technologies and cyber-cooperation compacts.

These hybrid methods are particularly concerning in contexts of weak governance and democratic fragility, where external manipulation can exploit societal divisions. Scholars like have long warned about the vulnerability of aspiring democracies on Russia’s border, and recent events in Georgia and Armenia suggest that these vulnerabilities are being actively exploited in the post-Ukraine war environment.

The South Caucasus region – including Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan – remains vulnerable to terrorism largely due to its proximity to unstable areas such as the North Caucasus, Turkiye, and Iran, as well as the movement of foreign terrorist fighters (FTF) linked to conflicts in Syria and Iraq that have involved IS and other radical Islamist groups. These conflicts have created fertile ground for radicalization that some scholars suggest may further intensify the risk of radicalization; they express concern regarding the possibility of individuals returning home and further engaging with radical ideologies among local communities. While Armenia has been less affected by Islamist movements, the instability following the Karabakh conflict may nonetheless have left fertile ground for hybrid threats to form. In addition, there are concerns about Syrian militants (mainly from groups with ties to jihadist organizations) being transported to the South Caucasus to fight alongside Azerbaijani forces, particularly since the second Nagorno-Karabakh war. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine could exacerbate the , with some potentially being diverted to the South Caucasus, either

The Pankisi Gorge region in Georgia gained notoriety in the 2000s as a site of jihadist recruitment, a refuge site for Islamic militants, and a key transit route. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Western intelligence raised alarms on presence of Al-Qaeda in the Gorge. According to various sources, Arab foreign fighters who participated in the Chechen wars also received training in the region – a practice that Russia frequently cited in its accusations of Georgia harboring terrorists and failing to control its borders. From 2014 to 2015, Georgia re-emerged in international media coverage when IS rose to power in Iraq, drawing foreign fighters from around the world – including Georgia – to the battlefields of Iraq and subsequently, Syria. According to different sources, approximately 50 to 200 fighters left Georgia to fight in the ranks of IS or other terrorist organizations. As the war in Ukraine continues, it may present Russia with yet another opportunity to accuse others of providing safe haven to foreign terrorist fighters.

Recent reflections, including by , highlight that international engagement in Afghanistan, particularly by Western powers including Canada, was compromised by flawed diplomatic design and operational fragmentation. In his assessment of the , Rahim identifies key failures such as the exclusion of the Afghan government, unrealistic timelines imposed by the United States, and a lack of impartial mediation as primary factors in the collapse of political settlement efforts. These deficiencies, compounded by internal divisions among Afghan elites, resulted in a fragile negotiating structure vulnerable to collapse under Taliban pressure. Canada’s mission, like that of its NATO allies, was constrained by unclear objectives and shifting operational mandates, a point echoed by Canadian commentators in major outlets like The Globe and Mail (2023).

The collapse of the Afghan Republic and the Taliban’s return to power has had immediate and long-term security spillovers in the region. Central Asian states are particularly concerned about cross-border terrorism, refugee surges, narcotics trafficking, and the spread of extremist ideologies. With Russia distracted and weakened by its invasion of Ukraine, and China reluctant to assume deep security commitments, the region

faces a growing vacuum of counterterrorism leadership. In this context, Rahim’s critique serves as a cautionary framework for future interventions: local legitimacy, inclusive diplomacy, and long-term strategic alignment must form the foundation of external engagement. Canada’s policy going forward should include lessons learned from Afghanistan’s collapse, as well as new mechanisms to support border-state resilience through coordinated regional intelligence, multilateral diplomacy, and support for community-level stabilization initiatives.

Afghanistan, however, presents another dimension of strategic instability. The US forces withdrawal and the Taliban’s return to power have turned the country into a potential source of terrorist activity and transnational criminal networks. Reports by the International Crisis Group and the United States Institute of Peace warn of the risks posed by IS-KP and other extremist groups to regional security, particularly in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. The new atmosphere gave more flexibility to various extremist groups to regroup or collaborate with each other. There are three main terrorist groups operating in Afghanistan now: the .

Afghanistan falling to Taliban rule has created a multitude of challenges for international relations. Despite the fact that no country or international organization formally recognizes the leadership of Taliban, some maintain diplomatic relations. Central Asian countries such as Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan continue to engage in diplomatic talks with Taliban, focusing mostly on regional economic issues. All five Central Asian states have kept embassies in Kabul despite the fallout.

As Russia focuses more on Ukraine, IS-KP has more possibility to increase its influence outside Afghanistan too. IS-KP is estimated to have about , including foreign recruits from Central Asia and Europe. IS-KP carried out its first terrorist attack at Kabul airport immediately after the US military withdrawal in 2021, signaling its intent to challenge the Taliban for control over Afghanistan. As result of the , 170 Afghans and 13 US militants were killed. And although IS has lost its territorial strongholds in Iraq and Syria, the group has nonetheless quickly shifted its strategy to forming smaller factions across various countries: “”.

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has expressed concern over the situation in Afghanistan and IS-KP since the US withdrawal in 2021. As Vladimir Voronkov, UN Under-Secretary-General mentioned, “”. In this context, some scholars consider IS-KP as the most formidable extremist group, with . It has plotted more terrorist attacks since 2021 when Taliban came to power. The reasons of the increased terrorist attacks are the tactical shift that began in 2019 and chaos and vacuum in Afghanistan. while the Taliban referred to IS-KP members as Salafis or Khawarij, or heretical extremists.

It is important to mention that IS-KP members, which became one of the main threats for the security of Afghanistan and Central Asia, who organize terrorist attacks in Afghanistan, are from Central Asian countries and mainly, Tajikistan. For example, the first terrorist attack following the onset of the Ukraine war occurred in Kabul in 2022 and was carried out by of IS. In March 2023, a Tajik militant assassinated the , , who had been a promient figure in the fight against the IS-KP network in Nangarhar. Later, in December 2023, a member from Central Asia residing in Germany . These attacks were flollowed by several terrorist attacks in Iran – killing 90 people – and Turkiye – killing one person.

This continued into 2024, where IS-KP orchestrated a series of terrorist attacks across Afghanistan. Among the most notable was an assault on , the Afghan Taliban governor of Nimroz, who narrowly escaped execution by a faction of IS-KP Tajik member. On March 21, 2024, an Uzbek national affiliated with . Following this, IS expanded its operations beyond the Khorasan region and launched several high-profile attacks. Among them was a widely publicized suicide bombing in Kerman province, Iran, during the anniversary procession of the General Qassem Soleimani’s death. According to the Iranian investigators, one of the terrorists was of who had received training instructions in Afghanistan (Table 1).

Furthermore, among those noteworthy included terrorist attacks attributed to IS-KP on March 24, 2024, which saw Tajik nationals storm and kill 145 people. Such terrorist attacks showed the tendency, that since IS-KP became active in Afghanistan, more individuals from Central Asian countries – mainly ethnic Tajiks – have been engaged in terrorist activities. This trend created the fertile ground for radicalization in Central Asia’s region that already experienced Islamic radical movements in the 1990s.

2025 was no exception to terrorist violence, as several high-profile terrorist attacks in Turkiye and Russia took place. In an effort to thwart future terrorist attacks, the Turkish government carried out a series of operations targeting IS cells across the country. More than three hundred individuals were arrested, most of them originating from Central Asia. Subsequent investigations revealed that several of the detainees were high-ranking members of the IS-KP network operating across Central Asia, Turkiye, and the Caucasus.

Due to IS-KP’s terrorist activities beyond Afghanistan’s borders, neighbouring countries – particularly in – have found it necessary to engage with the Taliban, not only to pursue counterterrorism objectives but to also advance their own economic and political interests in the region. Unlike the IS-KP, which poses a greater regional security threat, the Taliban has been viewed as a more viable partner in reshaping the regional security landscape. Central Asian countries have maintained their embassies in Kabul, signaling a pragmatic approach to diplomacy with Taliban governance. As Turgunbaeva & Ghiasi suggest, for Central Asian countries, the Taliban proves to be the better partner than IS-KP, as the latter has already attacked two Central Asian countries: Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Additionally, while China seeks stability in Afghanistan for fulfilling the interests served by the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and to prevent the spread the radical ideology, Central Asian countries also try to stabilize the region.

The persistence of Central Asian militants remains an overwhelming challenge to international security. Since 2023, the region has been a wellspring of terrorist operations organized by its nationals, whose reach has extended from Europe to the Middle East. These attacks, carried out across countries such as Iran, Russia, Afghanistan, and Turkiye, bear the unmistakable imprint of Central Asian involvement. Although, despite the troubling export of violence, the post-Soviet Central Asian states themselves have, thus far, remained largely untouched by such acts of terrorism on their own soil.

Uzbekistan was the first country to host a Taliban delegation, led by the Deputy Prime Minister Mawlawi Abdul Salam Hanafi in September 2022. In 2024 the Uzbek Prime Minister visited Kabul to discuss the trade projects. Kyrgyzstan’s relations with Afghanistan continue to be shaped in part by the presence of a strong Afghan-Kyrgyz minority in the nation. In 2021, Deputy Chairman of the Security Council Taalatbek Masadykov met with Taliban ministers to address issues important to this Afghan-Kyrgyz electorate. In September 2024, cooperation had expanded to include trade and energy infrastructure, which was soon followed by agreements in agriculture and transit.

Kazakhstan has focused its engagement with Afghanistan on economic opportunities, particularly in the chemical, mining, and metallurgical sectors. The Kazak Prime Minister led a delegation to Kabul to participate in a Kazakhstan-Afghanistan business forum, highlighting growing bilateral commercial ties.

Tajikistan, despite being the main regional opponent of the Taliban, has established trade relations with Afghanistan and signed an agreement worth $120 million USD. In addition, in 2023, Tajikistan opened five joint border markets with Afghanistan.

Turkmenistan maintains a neutral stance and primarily engages with Afghanistan through the lens of energy cooperation. Its principal interest lies in the progress of the TAPI – Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India gas pipeline. As a result, Turkmen officials’ meetings with the Taliban have mostly focused on advancing this strategic energy TAPI project.

While not a formal diplomatic move, the US has also begun to engage with the Taliban on a limited basis. On March 23, 2025, they removed three high-profile members of the Haqqani network – including Sirajuddin Haqqani, the group’s leader and the Taliban’s acting Interior Minister – from its most-wanted list. According to the Taliban, are Sirajuddin Haqqani’s brother and nephew.

The United States added the Haqqani Network as one of the deadliest groups connected to Taliban – operating in Pakistan and bordering Afghanistan – to the foreign terrorist organizations list in 2012. In doing so, they offered $5 to 10 USD reward for information leading to the capture of its leaders. However, , causing larger questions to arise regarding the future role and presence of US hegemony in the region. As scholars mention, this removal followed the Taliban’s release of US citizen George Glezmann, who had been detained in Afghanistan since 2022.

With Russia weakened and NATO’s reach limited, alternative security and development frameworks have gained prominence. The Central Asia–Caucasus–Europe (CACE) corridor, for example, envisions a strategic and economic bridge from Central Asia through the South Caucasus to Europe, bypassing Russian-controlled routes and creating new geoeconomic fault lines. Meanwhile, the , spearheaded by Poland and supported by NATO allies, connects the Adriatic, Baltic, and Black Seas in a project of economic resilience, energy diversification, and digital infrastructure.

In considering NATO members’ strategic roles, Romania has been emphasized in discussions about NATO’s deterrence on the eastern flank and the EU’s updated Black Sea Strategy (). Romania stands at the intersection of NATO’s military initiatives and the EU’s efforts to enhance connectivity, economic resilience, and maritime security in the Black Sea. Also, Poland’s assertive role in the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) highlights a regional approach to infrastructure, energy security, and defense cooperation. The 3SI provides a framework for enhanced Central European resilience in the face of growing Russian assertiveness and fluctuating US involvement in Europe.

Graham highlights Mongolia’s position as a neutral buffer balancing Russian and Chinese pressures. The Ukraine war has further encouraged Mongolia to diversify security and economic partnerships, including through engagement with Canada and other liberal democracies. Mongolia is geographically distant from Ukraine, although the war’s influence on global security dynamics may affect the region’s stability and terrorism risks. Mongolia is close to China and Russia, rendering them an indirect target for the potential exporting of radical ideologies from the extremist groups. As a neutral power between China and Russia, Mongolia may be targeted by the extremist groups allied with the Russian and Chinese state – countries which are on the same side in Ukraine war.

Mongolia recognizes the global threat that terrorism and violent extremist present to an increasingly uncertain and multipolar world. Since 2023, Mongolia has been a member of the UN Office Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) program and established the Passenger Information Unit of Mongolia. It became the fourth country to join this program and the first Asian country to establish an UNOCT unit (). According to the UN representative of Mongolia, the country is continuing to take steps to increase awareness of, and fight against, disinformation and propaganda. In 2024, Mongolia hosted the conference titled “Addressing the prevailing Digital Information Disorder: Countering the Use of the Internet by Terrorists and Extremists,” organized by OSCE Transnational Threats Department together with the National Counter-Terrorism Council of Mongolia (). In addition, the “Case for Central Asia–Caucasus Engagement” () proposes a new strategic platform to integrate diplomatic, development, and deterrence policy toward post-Soviet Eurasia. This vision aligns closely with Canada’s potential for flexible engagement and soft security.

Against this backdrop, countries are hedging their bets. While some still look to NATO as the ultimate guarantor, others have diversified their options, seeking bilateral arrangements, new regional alignments, or transactional partnerships with authoritarian powers. Strategic pluralism, rather than bloc politics, defines the new Eurasian security order.

Canadian Strategic Engagement

Poland, through its leadership in the Three Seas Initiative (3SI), represents a strategic anchor for Central and Eastern Europe in countering Russian influence and fostering Euro-Atlantic cooperation. As highlighted by , Poland has played a central role in building regional infrastructure, energy interconnectivity, and digital resilience across the 3SI member states. These efforts reduce dependency on Russian-controlled supply lines and enhance regional autonomy in the face of hybrid and conventional threats.

The 3SI complements broader NATO and EU frameworks by focusing on practical development and connectivity between the Adriatic, Baltic, and Black Seas. For countries in the South Caucasus and Central

Asia, it offers a vision of post-Soviet regionalism that emphasizes integration, resilience, and Western alignment. Integrating the Three Seas Initiative into Canadian policy considerations provides a valuable model for aligning economic development with security stabilization across the broader post-Soviet periphery.

As regional actors seek to build more autonomous strategic and economic futures, new frameworks such as the proposed Central Asia–Caucasus–Europe (CACE) corridor have gained traction. The CACE initiative, as highlighted by The National Interest (2025), envisions a geoeconomic and geopolitical link connecting Central Asia and the South Caucasus directly to Europe, bypassing traditional Russian-controlled routes. The corridor promotes diversified energy exports, secure supply chains, and multilateral infrastructure cooperation. It also reinforces the strategic importance of Georgia and Azerbaijan as transit hubs between East and West.

In this context, offers an alternative regional architecture that counters Russian and Chinese monopolies on overland infrastructure. For Canada, supporting such corridors may serve dual objectives: reducing regional dependency on adversarial actors, and facilitating sustainable development and security cooperation among emerging democracies. Integrating the CACE vision into Canadian foreign policy also complements NATO’s military posture with a civilian, development-focused track aimed at long-term stabilization.

Recent policy commentary underscores two interlinked narratives in Eurasia’s evolving security order: the significance of credible NATO-aligned deterrence models (as seen in Romania), and the consequences of softening international stances toward Russia’s occupation of Crimea. Recognizing Russia’s annexation of Crimea as legitimate would embolden other revisionist powers and fundamentally erode international legal norms regarding sovereignty. Meanwhile, Romania has demonstrated how mid-sized NATO allies can reinforce the alliance’s eastern posture through infrastructure development, multinational coordination, and hybrid threat management.

These examples illustrate the critical importance of defending international legal standards and investing in alliance readiness. Canada’s strategic outlook would benefit from incorporating these dual lessons: defending non-recognition policies in contested regions like Crimea while simultaneously learning from NATO forward-deployed frameworks in countries like Romania. Taken together, these academic and policy perspectives provide the analytical foundation for understanding Eurasia’s post-Ukraine security recalibration – and for formulating Canada’s strategic options in response.

Regional Security Implications

Across the South Caucasus, Central Asia, Mongolia, and Afghanistan, Russia’s declining influence has triggered regional realignments, new threat landscapes, and emerging opportunities for external engagement. For Canada, understanding these dynamics is critical to shaping effective policy responses.

In the South Caucasus, Armenia has grown increasingly disillusioned with Russia, particularly following Moscow’s failure to act during Azerbaijan’s 2023 offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh. Yerevan is now actively pursuing closer ties with the EU and the United States. Azerbaijan, meanwhile, has capitalized on Russia’s invasion in Ukraine to boost its military cooperation with Turkiye and Israel, positioning itself as a dominant regional power. Georgia, while maintaining its strategic commitment to NATO integratio

struggle with domestic political instability and the enduring occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Russian forces.

In Central Asia, countries like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have distanced themselves from Moscow’s geopolitical agenda. Kazakhstan notably refused to recognize Russia’s annexation of Ukrainian territories, reaffirming its commitment to territorial integrity as a core foreign policy principle. Kazakhstan has deepened defense partnerships with Turkiye, NATO, and select Western actors, while Uzbekistan – traditionally outside the CSTO – has pursued independent counterterrorism and security dialogues with the United States and China. China’s growing footprint, especially in Tajikistan, highlights Beijing’s transactional interest in border security and regime stability rather than full-spectrum defense cooperation.

At the same time, the region is facing increased pressure from transnational threats. The reassertion of Taliban control in Afghanistan and the resurgence of IS-KP have heightened fears of terrorism, arms trafficking, and extremist ideology spilling into Central Asia. Weak border management capacities and the erosion of Russia’s traditional role as a security bulwark have created a dangerous vacuum. Parallel to these trends, cyber and information warfare have intensified. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and others have been targeted by Russian disinformation campaigns aiming to undermine public trust in democratic institutions and discourage Western engagement. These hybrid threats have led to growing interest in cyber cooperation with NATO-aligned actors.

Mongolia, long maintaining a neutral foreign policy posture, is also recalibrating. Concerns about Russian unpredictability and Chinese dominance have pushed Ulaanbaatar to pursue closer security and economic ties with democratic partners, including the US, Japan, and Canada. Mongolia’s strategic location and democratic credentials position it as a valuable partner for middle-power engagement.

Afghanistan remains a critical axis of instability. The Taliban’s unchecked consolidation of power, Russia’s diminished role, and China’s limited security ambition have allowed terrorist groups such as IS-KP to flourish. Cross-border smuggling of arms and narcotics continues to destabilize the region. For bordering states like Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, this poses a direct security threat, prompting interest in greater intelligence-sharing and joint counterterrorism mechanisms.

Together, these developments suggest that Canada has an opportunity to deepen its role as a stabilizing actor. This includes advancing NATO partnerships, co-sponsoring cybersecurity and counterterrorism initiatives, and investing in diplomatic and development programs that enhance regional resilience.

Future Security Scenarios and Policy Recommendations

remains one of the most significant violations of international law in recent history. Recognizing this act, or failing to robustly oppose it, would send dangerous signals to other revisionist powers seeking to alter borders by force. As noted in the analysis by The National Interest (2024), legitimizing Russia’s control over Crimea would reward aggression and erode international norms surrounding sovereignty and territorial integrity.

For aspiring NATO-aligned nations such as Georgia and Moldova, the failure to maintain a firm stance on Crimea undermines the credibility of international deterrence. It also emboldens separatist movements supported by external powers, particularly in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria. In Central Asia,

states with Russian-speaking minorities observe the situation closely, wary of Moscow’s justifications for intervention under the pretense of “protecting compatriots.”

Canada’s unwavering support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity remains essential. Backsliding on Crimea would not only harm Kyiv’s war effort but also undermine Canadian diplomatic credibility across Eurasia. As part of NATO’s eastern flank engagement, Canadian policymakers must continue advocating for non-recognition, bolster security assistance to at-risk states, and ensure hybrid threats exploiting ambiguous status territories do not escalate into new conflicts.

Romania has emerged as a pivotal actor in NATO’s Black Sea strategy, showcasing how smaller but committed allies can meaningfully reinforce alliance posture in contested regions. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Romania rapidly expanded its defense spending, modernized its armed forces, and upgraded key infrastructure, including the Mihail Kogălniceanu Air Base — set to become one of NATO’s largest air hubs in Europe. Romania’s role is further reinforced through its leadership in regional maritime security efforts, including trilateral cooperation with Bulgaria and Turkiye to counter drifting mines in the Black Sea.

Moreover, Romania has played a critical role in supporting Ukraine’s economic resilience by facilitating the transit of over 29 million tons of Ukrainian grain through its ports, despite Russian attempts to blockade Black Sea maritime routes. It also hosts the Headquarters Multinational Corps Southeast in Sibiu, enhancing NATO’s regional command and control capacity in crisis scenarios.

Canada can view Romania as a strategic partner and operational hub within NATO’s Black Sea architecture. Joint participation in military exercises would help build interoperability with Romanian and other allied forces. Canada could contribute cyber defense expertise, helping Romania counter hybrid threats and disinformation campaigns that have intensified in the region. Infrastructure support and humanitarian collaboration could also be explored to reinforce Canada’s commitment to Eastern European security and resilience. This model of NATO-aligned deterrence in Romania can serve as a valuable reference for engaging other aspirant or front-line states, particularly Georgia and Armenia, as they navigate uncertain security environments amid a weakening Russian presence and ambiguous Western guarantees.

As Eurasian states reassess their security futures in the post-Ukraine context, two contrasting strategic directions are emerging:

Option A: NATO as a security anchor despite its limited footprint beyond Eastern Europe, some aspirant states (like Georgia) still view the alliance as the ultimate guarantor of their sovereignty and territorial integrity. For these countries, deepening interoperability with NATO standards, participating in joint exercises, and securing bilateral defense commitments from individual NATO members are seen as vital steps toward eventual membership or at least enhanced deterrence.

Option B: Strategic diversification and bilateral guarantees given uncertainties surrounding NATO’s future enlargement and potential policy shifts under a new US administration, other regional actors may opt for diversified security partnerships. This could include closer defense ties with China, or even non-aligned groupings. These actors may pursue flexible arrangements that prioritize regime security, border control, or cyber defense, rather than full-spectrum alliance integration.

Strategic Recommendations for Canada

• Expand NATO regional initiatives through technical support and military training missions.

• Deepen defense cooperation with Mongolia, Georgia, and Kazakhstan.

• Invest in regional CT capacity-building, particularly in border zones adjacent to Afghanistan.

• Contribute to hybrid threat awareness and resilience by supporting anti-disinformation programs.

• Engage multilaterally in regional defense forums, including OSCE dialogues and confidence-building platforms.

• Enhance counterterrorism cooperation with Central Asian Republics, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Mongolia

• Participate on framing the Security Policy and border control mechanisms together with Central Asian and South Caucasus countries

• Deradicalization programs – several countries in the region of Central Asia and South Caucasus have implemented de-radicalization programs to counter extremist ideologies – collaborating in adopting such programs will facilitate the process that thus far, been struggling to gain political traction.

• Advance Strategic Engagement with CACE states through:
  • Backing multilateral efforts that increase the corridor’s resilience to hybrid threats.
  • Encouraging diplomatic alignment with CACE-participating states as part of Canada’s broader Eurasia engagement strategy
  • Supporting infrastructure financing and regional governance frameworks through international institutions.
• Consider engagement with the 3SI through:
  • Investment in critical infrastructure and digital connectivity projects led by trusted allies like Poland.
  • Policy dialogue and technical assistance in the 3SI’s energy and cyber defense pillars.
  • Support for South Caucasus participation in transregional linkages with 3SI corridors, particularly through Georgia.

Conclusion

The ripple effects of Russia’s war in Ukraine extend far beyond Europe. In Eurasia, the reshuffling of defense alignments and emergence of new security actors are already reshaping the regional landscape. Canada, as a capable actor within NATO and the global security community, must engage strategically to protect its interests, support its allies, and contribute to long-term regional stability.

This white paper underscores the urgency of proactive engagement across counterterrorism and multilateral defense diplomacy. The evolving security vacuum must be addressed with foresight, allied coordination, and a renewed commitment to regional security partnerships.

Canada has both a responsibility and an opening. By advancing its contributions to NATO’s deterrence efforts, supporting resilience-focused development corridors like the Three Seas Initiative and the Central

Asia–Caucasus–Europe platform, and deepening counterterrorism cooperation with frontline states, Canada can reinforce stability and uphold democratic values in an increasingly contested region.

Table 1

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