The South Caucasus region has historically been regarded as one of the most complex regions in the world, where geopolitical rivalries, ethnic disputes, and energy security risks collide. One of the longest-lasting conflicts in the region is the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh.

This paper aims to study the Washington Peace Declaration between Armenia and Azerbaijan and its potential impact on security and economic integration in the South Caucasus region. TRIPP and related transport initiatives could enable Armenia and Azerbaijan to serve as critical components of a strategic transit corridor linking Europe and Asia. US and EU engagement is highlighted as essential for maintaining stability and attracting investment in the region.

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Executive Summary

This policy memo evaluates Canada’s current measures to combat disinformation, identifies key gaps, and proposes policy options to address such gaps by drawing upon international best practices from Finland, Ukraine, Estonia, and Germany. The analysis offers evidence-based recommendations tailored to Canada’s context, including implementing a National Media Literacy Curriculum, creating a Media Literacy Toolkit, and establishing a Centre for Strategic Communications to monitor and counter disinformation. It is also recommended that Canada invest in OSINT training for journalists and expand international collaboration with experts from Finland, Ukraine, and Estonia.

Background

presents a to Canada’s national security, public trust, and democratic integrity. State-sponsored actors, , use digital platforms to manipulate public discourse, spread false narratives, and deepen polarisation within Canadian society. Other foreign actors, including , , and , have also engaged in disinformation activities targeting Canada. Canada’s open democracy and advanced digital infrastructure make it an appealing target for these campaigns, necessitating the need for a coordinated, strategic response. Effectively addressing these challenges will require close collaboration across all levels of government, including provincial and territorial partners, given their responsibilities in education, community services, and public engagement.

To date, Canada has taken steps to address disinformation through led by Public Safety Canada, the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), the Department of National Defence (DND), and Global Affairs Canada (GAC), including the , the , and the . However, these efforts fail to address the complexity and scale of evolving disinformation tactics. To address these challenges, Canada requires a cohesive, proactive strategy that integrates these efforts while adapting best practices from international leaders such as Finland, Ukraine, Estonia, and Germany, which have developed effective, forward-looking approaches to countering disinformation through national education strategies, coordinated communications, digital literacy, and interagency cooperation.

Why Current Efforts are Insufficient

Despite these initiatives, Canada’s response to disinformation remains ;

• Educational initiatives are either absent or limited to specific schools, with no standardized or compulsory approach nationwide.
• Existing programs operate independently, across different levels of government, leading to inefficiencies and missed opportunities for collaboration.
• Canada lacks a centralized unit to monitor and respond to disinformation campaigns as they unfold, a gap exploited by foreign actors.

International Best Practices in Disinformation Response

Finland:

Finland is for its effective counter-disinformation strategies, which are grounded in a . This approach combines cross-sector collaboration, the integration of digital literacy into public education, and public trust. Finland’s whole-of-society engagement is supported by a strong tradition of media literacy and institutional transparency, resulting in a society highly resilient to disinformation.

1. Finland’s Cross-sector Collaboration: The Finnish government collaborates with private companies, civil society, academia, and media to combat disinformation. Government task forces made up of government officials, experts, and researchers .

2. Finland’s Mandatory Media Literacy in Public Education: Digital and media literacy is integral to Finland’s counter-disinformation efforts and has been made a . This education begins as early as primary school, , and continues throughout students’ academic journeys. The curriculum focuses on critical thinking, source evaluation, and recognizing media bias. Beyond schools, libraries serve as hubs for public education, offering resources and training to adults and seniors. Non-governmental organizations and local leaders also play an active role in outreach, ensuring broad accessibility to these tools and skills across the community.

Ukraine:

Ukraine in countering disinformation, particularly when sustaining information warfare from Russia. By leveraging , Ukraine empowers journalists and the public to identify and combat false narratives effectively.

1. Centre for Strategic Communications and Information Security: leads national efforts to counter disinformation and information warfare. The centre analyzes disinformation trends, crafts counter-narratives, and disseminates accurate information to combat malign propaganda, especially from Russia. Working in collaboration with government agencies, organizations, and international partners, the centre also promotes media literacy, equipping citizens with tools to recognize and resist false narratives.

2. Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) Training for Journalists: Ukraine has prioritized extensive training in . These enable professionals to verify information, analyze digital content, and expose malicious narratives effectively. Training covers the critical assessment of sources, geolocation analysis, and the authentication of multimedia content, such as images and videos. This focus has strengthened the capacity of Ukrainian media professionals to report accurately and debunk disinformation, creating further public trust in credible information sources and a more informed and resilient society.

Other International Best Practices

involves the creation of an interagency task force to combat the influence of false messaging on its democratic processes and enhance media literacy for students in high school. Germany has implemented several proactive strategies, specifically the , which both mandates social media platforms to remove illegal content such as hate speech and disinformation, ensuring accountability through penalties and transparency requirements.

Policy Recommendations for Canada

Digital and Media Literacy

1. National Media Literacy Curriculum

While curriculum development falls under provincial jurisdiction, Public Safety Canada, in coordination with Canadian Heritage and provincial partners, can support the development and implementation of a National Digital and Media Literacy Curriculum by funding awareness campaigns, developing outreach materials, and promoting shared standards for digital and media literacy education for elementary and high school students (K–12). Educating children early is essential, as young people are among the most active users of digital platforms and are frequently exposed to mis- and disinformation. Without the tools to critically evaluate online content, they are more vulnerable to manipulation, bias, and false narratives that can shape their worldview, decision-making, and trust in democratic institutions. Equipping students with the tools to critically assess the information they encounter is essential to building long-term societal resilience to disinformation. This curriculum would teach students to:

• Identify credible sources and distinguish between reliable and unreliable content.
• Verify facts and recognize manipulative narratives.
• Understand the mechanics of social media algorithms and their role in shaping information consumption, including the risks of echo chambers and bias.

Through practical exercises, such as analyzing news articles and debunking viral claims, students would gain real-world skills to combat disinformation. Teacher training and institutional support would be prioritized to ensure educators are equipped to handle evolving disinformation tactics. Provincial collaboration would facilitate the rollout of this curriculum nationwide.

2. Media Literacy National Toolkit

A Media Literacy National Toolkit could be developed to provide resources for the public. This toolkit would be accessible online and available in public libraries to ensure low-barrier access and inclusivity. Resources would include educational guides and workshops for librarians and staff to support community engagement, as well as materials to answer public inquiries and facilitate self-directed learning. The toolkit would be offered in both official languages, with accessibility features that meet the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines to ensure usability for individuals with visual, auditory, or cognitive impairments. The toolkit should also be available in Indigenous languages, such as Cree, Ojibway, Dene, Inuktitut, and Mi’kmaq, as well as other languages widely spoken across Canada, including Punjabi, Mandarin, Arabic, Tagalog, Spanish, and Ukrainian.

Including these languages from the outset would promote equitable access, strengthen public resilience, and help ensure that all Canadians are equipped with the tools needed to navigate today’s information environment. Expanding the toolkit’s reach in this way would also reduce reliance on siloed, one-time translation efforts and encourage a more integrated, inclusive approach to the Media Literacy National Toolkit. Delivery would require collaboration with provincial, territorial, and municipal partners, including library networks and community organizations, to ensure regional relevance and effective implementation.

This Canadian media literacy initiative would align with existing Canadian frameworks, such as the Digital Charter and provincial education standards. To ensure relevance, the curriculum and toolkit would include regular assessments and feedback from educators, students, and the public. Funding would be required for curriculum development, teacher training, the creation of the toolkit, and a public awareness campaign that would promote these resources, ensuring their widespread adoption and utilization.

Conclusion

While Canada has acknowledged the growing threat of disinformation, current efforts remain fragmented and inadequate to address its scale and complexity. Existing policy frameworks, awareness campaigns, and international partnerships have not yet been translated into integrated, sustained action. To strengthen national resilience, Canada must adopt a proactive, coordinated strategy grounded in international best practices. Key recommendations include implementing a National Media Literacy Curriculum, developing a Media Literacy Toolkit, and establishing a Centre for Media Integrity and Disinformation Resilience. Canada should also invest in Open-Source Intelligence training for journalists and deepen collaboration with international experts from Finland, Ukraine, Estonia, and Germany.

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This policy memo examines the complex and evolving security threats posed by Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) in the Black Sea region, particularly in the context of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war. This memo assesses the scale of the FTF threat across key Black Sea states, including TĂĽrkiye, Georgia, Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania, and Moldova, and outlines the multifaceted risks posed by returning or transiting fighters, including future terrorist activity, regional destabilization, and violations of international humanitarian law. In response, the memo calls for a comprehensive and cooperative regional security strategy that includes Canadian support. Recommended actions include strengthening border surveillance, enhancing intelligence-sharing mechanisms, expanding legal frameworks aligned with international human rights standards, and implementing community-based deradicalization and reintegration programs. Canadian experience in counterterrorism and human rights advocacy is positioned to facilitate regional dialogue, contribute technical expertise, and promote long-term security in this geopolitically volatile region.

To view the whole report, download the report below.

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The Caspian and Black Sea regions hold significant geopolitical importance for Europe’s energy security, due to their strategic location, abundant resources, and critical role as transit corridors linking energy-producing areas with consumer markets. .  The significance of these regions also extends beyond energy and trade, encompassing economic potential and a strategic role in regional stability and broader security dynamics. Given their geopolitical and geostrategic value, ensuring the security of these regions has become a priority for external actors, often from geopolitically opposing sides. The regions’ energy reserves, trade flows, and transportation infrastructure increasingly influence both regional and transregional stability and security frameworks. 

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This policy memo argues that Russia’s ongoing efforts to dominate the Black Sea region are not isolated historical events, but part of a broader and deliberate geopolitical strategy aimed at challenging Western influence, undermining democratic sovereignty, and reasserting imperial power. Understanding these dynamics is crucial as the region stands at the frontline of the confrontation between authoritarian resurgence and democratic resilience. By analyzing Russia’s evolving foreign policy tools – ranging from military aggression to hybrid warfare – this memo aims to show how the Black Sea has become a key battleground for the future of European and international security. 

The Context

Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, a large part of the Black Sea region was firmly embedded within its strategic orbit along the region’s coastline. Ukraine, Georgia, Bulgaria, and Romania were either under direct Soviet control or part of the Warsaw Pact, leaving TĂĽrkiye as the NATO member in the region. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the strategic landscape changed dramatically – Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova regained their independence, while Bulgaria and Romania became NATO members. This fundamentally altered the geopolitical significance of the Black Sea, opening the region up to Western integration as Russian influence waned.  

The dissolution of the Soviet Union led to a power vacuum as the post-Soviet republics of Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova forged paths to sovereignty. However, despite the birth of new regional powers that challenged Russia’s historical interests in the region, Moscow sought to develop leverage and instruments to maintain its sphere of influence. This creates a precedent for crude interference by Russia, demonstrating that its attempt to maintain a remains relevant. 

In the 1990s, Russia pursued a strategy that involved supporting in Abkhazia (Georgia), South Ossetia (Georgia), and Transnistria (Moldova), thereby attempting to weaken the fledgling states. In the 2000s, under the rule of Vladimir Putin, a more assertive and targeted approach was developed, . Examples of this more assertive approach can be seen in events such as the  

To this day, Russia’s primary motivations remain centred on obstructing the expansion of NATO and the European Union (EU), while simultaneously promoting narratives that frame Western institutions and organizations as existential threats to both the region and broader global order. Today, the Black Sea is not only a geographical crossroads but a strategic fault line between . The struggle for control over this region is no longer just about territory – it is about global ideological competition, security, and the future of Europe’s eastern flank.

Russia and the Black Sea Region: Geopolitical Situation and Strategic Interests 

The Black Sea region pits post-Soviet states against . The Kremlin’s goals within the region remain concentrated on weakening NATO unity and preventing the accession of Ukraine and Georgia to the Alliance. Accordingly, the Black Sea serves as a key platform for Moscow to consolidate its broader influence not only in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, but also across . Russia’s post-Soviet entanglements have turned the Black Sea into a militarized zone, wherein Russian warships, aircraft, and artillery systems (particularly in Crimea) are stationed. Nevertheless, Russia’s dominant position in the region remains a contentious issue due to Ukraine’s naval resistance, NATO involvement, and TĂĽrkiye’s growing regional influence. TĂĽrkiye’s strategic role in NATO has significantly increased in recent years, allowing it to play a greater role in regional security and diplomacy. When discussing TĂĽrkiye as an actor in the Black Sea region, the Montreux Convention cannot be ignored. Signed in 1936, the Montreux Convention gives TĂĽrkiye control over the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits, making it a key player in regulating military access to the Black Sea. 

From one perspective, the Montreux Convention serves as an advantage for Russia, as it restricts the permanent presence of non-Black Sea NATO fleets, which aids Russia’s dominance in the region; however, the agreement also limits Russia’s ability to freely move military vessels during conflicts. Thus, the Convention is vital for maintaining a relative balance of security in the Black Sea – hindering militarization by external powers, while giving TĂĽrkiye certain leverage during regional crises. 

Romania and Bulgaria have gained more control over their Exclusive Economic Zones within the Black Sea with both countries moving closer to NATO and the EU, further emphasizing their role in regional security. It is also noteworthy that the United States and its allies are , as reflected in calls for the development of a comprehensive Black Sea strategy. Such a strategy aims to increase coordination with NATO and the EU, deepen economic ties, and strengthen democratic principles. 

The Black Sea thus remains a region in contest. For Russia, the Black Sea represents a means of expanding geopolitical influence, projecting military power, and controlling vital energy routes, while other players in the region are actively combating Russian influence and fostering closer ties with the West. Consequently, the region is a hub of geopolitical conflict, wherein Russia’s pursuit of dominance often conflicts with the aspirations of neighbouring countries seeking independence, security, and a sovereign role on the global stage. 

Conflicts in the Region 

The Black Sea’s are key factors that underscore contemporary political tensions. By the end of the 20th century, a strong sentiment for the preservation and return of national identity emerged in post-Soviet states. , Moldova, and Ukraine have direct experience of confrontation with Russia; they have repeatedly and consistently represented the front of ideological clashes under the pretext of obtaining and maintaining independence or free political will. Memories of collective Soviet identity serve as barriers for relatively small states that wish to integrate, assimilate, and align politically with the West. , in which Russian-backed separatists opposed Georgia, serves as a clear example of Moscow’s approach towards the region. A similar scenario occurred in Moldova in 1992, which to this day remains a frozen conflict in Transnistria. 

The politics of recognizing the rights of separatists and pseudo-independence is a strategic hallmark of Moscow aimed at presenting its actions as consistent with contemporary political systems and international legal norms. From the perspective of the international community, this policy had been seen as doomed to fail. A clear example of the undermining of free and sovereign political will can be found in the (1994–1996; 1999–2009), which were motivated by a desire to maintain regional hegemony and suppress Chechen self-determination within the framework of state sovereignty. 

Rather than serving as a balancing and humanitarian force, Russia embodies a contradictory presence that undermines the very norms it claims to value and uphold. ” The annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 thus only lend further evidence to the realities of separatist recognition by Russia. These events have changed the political dynamics of not only the Black Sea region, but global perceptions of the appropriateness of state behaviour, the scope of international law, the diffusion of nuclear weapons, the importance of human rights, and overall global security. 

Hybrid Warfare

Hybrid warfare is currently one of the most relevant issues in the Black Sea region. 

Russia’s active use of this tactic is particularly noteworthy as it is a crucial tool to further the region’s destabilization and its own imperialistic ambitions. Hybrid warfare centres on the use of cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, economic pressure, and other technological means of warfare. 

Ukraine remains a key arena where Russia has employed hybrid warfare. The 2014 annexation of Crimea was not solely a military operation; it involved a coherent and deliberate dissemination of propaganda narratives and disinformation campaigns. Russia’s “little green men” – an anonymous force of soldiers in green uniforms – appeared in Crimea in 2014, representing Russian special forces. In reality, these “little green men” are only one of the many illustrative examples of hybrid warfare, part of a much . This combination of unmarked military forces alongside concerted disinformation campaigns and political manipulation continues to be among Russia’s primary approaches aimed at achieving its strategic objectives in the region by ultimately sowing confusion and uncertainty, thereby avoiding an immediate international reaction. 

Georgia and Moldova have also been targets of Russia’s hybrid tactics. After the 2008 war in Georgia, Russia actively began the so-called “creeping borderization” in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, along Georgia’s borders. This was accompanied by intense disinformation and propaganda campaigns. In Moldova, the presence of Russian troops in Transnistria continues against the backdrop of a strong disinformation narrative. In the information sphere, Russian state media and online “troll bots” are actively working to spread disinformation in the region, targeting both the local populations of Beyond military objectives, these efforts are aimed at eroding trust in Western democratic and security institutions – particularly NATO and the EU – deepening internal divisions and advancing a broad anti-Western narrative across the region.

Economic Interests 

Russia’s economic interests in the Black Sea region are closely intertwined with its . Gaining control and influence over this region would facilitate the easier distribution of exports such as . Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, Moscow’s economic leverage and instruments of influence have been strengthened, expanded, and diversified, considering the resources and potential trade opportunities available in the region.  

Russia is a major global grain exporter. Maintaining and developing this capacity is vital.  For Russia, the Black Sea region serves as a transit hub for this purpose. Novorossiysk, a city in Russia, is a clear example of how this country interprets and approaches the economic utilization of the Black Sea basin and its surrounding areas. Novorossiysk remains one of the most strategically important ports in the region. As sanctions intensified between 2014 and 2022, Russia chose to leverage this asset to maintain its trade routes by bypassing Western-controlled ports. This capability has become a tool of soft power, particularly in the Middle East, North Africa, and developing economies. Through grain diplomacy, Russia strengthens its ties with countries heavily reliant on food imports, especially during times of supply chain crises or disruptions.  

The ongoing war and Russia’s continued targeting of Ukraine’s agricultural infrastructure represent a massive blow to the Ukrainian economy. Despite Ukraine’s efforts to find new trade routes and possible leverage to work with, the mentioned phenomenon represents a complex, diverse problem by creating a significant hole in its economy and impacting global food security. While analyzing the current geopolitical landscape, tendencies, and strategies, it becomes evident that we are facing a neocolonial reality: Ukraine’s grain exports are becoming increasingly unprofitable and vulnerable, particularly in African markets. The reason is clear – Russia’s active involvement in BRICS, African summits, and bilateral forums has strengthened its economic leverage by lowering prices and positioning itself as a reliable, affordable, and powerful trade partner. We are confronted with a harsh truth: grain has become a weapon. Export markets have turned into a battlefield between Ukraine and Russia, with the region’s food economy increasingly shaped by a single, dominant political actor. Russia derives substantial strategic and economic advantages from its influence and dominance over the Black Sea region, which in turn strengthens its overall presence on global political and trade platforms. – rooted in the region’s geopolitical significance — further diversifies Moscow’s potential instruments of power.

Conclusion

The Black Sea region remains a geopolitically complex and strategically important zone, functioning as both a crossroads and a contested space for power struggles among Russia, regional actors, and Western powers such as NATO and the EU. The Black Sea’s geopolitical position is closely tied to Russian interests and motivations to control and bring the states in this area back under its sphere of influence. Despite their initiative and aspiration to embrace Western values, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine remain within a vulnerable zone – largely due to Moscow’s aggressive and coercive actions. Russia’s approach reflects a deliberate strategy to expand its sphere of influence at the expense of neighbouring countries.  

The annexation of Crimea, support for separatist movements in Georgia and Moldova, the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and many other actions are clear manifestations of imperial ambitions, demonstrating how Moscow systematically violates international law and the sovereignty of neighboring states. In addition, through intense hybrid warfare – along with disinformation, cyberattacks, economic pressure, and covert military operations – Russia actively exploits the weaknesses of smaller, democratic countries. It is equally important to recognize that the countries in the Black Sea region are by no means passive players. Ukraine is actively resisting the Russian invasion through both military and diplomatic means. Moldova and Georgia are striving to align more closely with European and Euro-Atlantic states, while NATO members such as Romania and Bulgaria are strengthening their defensive capabilities. Accordingly, regional cooperation and Western support are gradually increasing. Yet, it is still crucial to acknowledge that the threat of Russian aggression and domination remains real and persistent. The Black Sea region continues to be one of the most important transit, transport, and trade routes for a variety of international actors. The ongoing Russo-Ukraine war clearly shows that security-related challenges in the region still exist and are likely to persist in the future. This competition complicates the formation of a stable geopolitical environment under the aforementioned political landscape. Russia is not just a geopolitical competitor; it is the main source of destabilization in the Black Sea region. So long as its ambitions are based on aggression and conquest, the region will remain the frontline of authoritarian expansion. For this reason, it is essential to strengthen democratic institutions and reinforce Western partnerships in order to defuse geopolitical tensions in the region and prevent future threats as well as possible confrontations. 

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The Black Sea has long held historical importance due to various political, economic, and trade factors. For centuries, the area was disputed by the Russian and Ottoman Empires. Since the 20^th century, the region’s geopolitical landscape has grown more complex, especially because three important countries in the region – TĂĽrkiye, Bulgaria, and Romania – are North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies.  

Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine, which culminated in the full-scale invasion of 2022, has further increased the fragility and complexity of the Black Sea region. In addition to military threats, the region also faces a multitude of other security hazards such as economic, environmental and migratory concerns. Interestingly, most of these issues have direct links to Russian aggression in the region. 

It is no accident that Russia is at the centre of the majority of conflicts that have been fought in this region. In 2004, Russia did not have sufficient power to challenge Bulgaria and Romania’s NATO accession. However, when Georgia and Ukraine moved towards joining NATO following the Bucharest Summit of 2008, Russia responded with military force. In 2008, Russia invaded Georgia and occupied parts of its territory; in 2014, Russia annexed Crimea, and eight years later, launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. 

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Russia’s war in Ukraine has fueled political radicalization in Latvia with far-reaching implications for national security. This policy brief examines how radical attitudes and behaviours have evolved in Latvia’s society – particularly online – under the influence of Russian propaganda, disinformation, and cyber operations since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022.

 Latvia, in response to Russia’s aggression and anxiety regarding its shared border, has embarked on a set of to secure national security and decouple from the Soviet past. These consisted of extensive , humanitarian, and to Ukraine, securing the national information space and shaping historical memory. The Latvian government has taken steps to prohibit and related online sites. and symbols have been removed from public places. While these efforts were done in the name of preserving Latvian sovereignty, they also , many of whom perceived this as an attempt to rewrite history.

Thus, Latvia faces a risk of radicalization among specific segments of its population as a direct and indirect consequence of Russia’s hybrid warfare. Hybrid threats have been systematically used to deepen societal cleavages and foment extremist sentiments. The Russian-speaking community (making up slightly more than one-third of Latvia’s population) is a target of Kremlin propaganda, wherein Latvia is framed as “Russophobic”, thus allowing Russia to spread its narratives among these populations.

This trend threatens Latvia’s internal security and has an added strategic security dimension as a polarized and unstable Latvia, a key NATO member, would benefit Russia and its efforts to undermine the solidarity of the NATO Alliance.

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Since the outbreak of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, a significant number of American citizens have voluntarily traveled to fight alongside Ukrainian forces. These individuals, motivated by a mix of personal convictions and opportunistic motivations, have joined the conflict despite the United States not being formally involved in the war. 

Utilizing an original open-source dataset, this report firstly profiles American foreign fighters in Ukraine post-2022, examining their motivations, supporting organizations, and wartime roles. Subsequently, it analyzes the challenges and vulnerabilities confronting returning American fighters, with a focus on mental health needs, available reintegration programs in the United States (U.S.), and the broader social and political landscape, including potential implications of a second Trump presidency. It concludes that while not ideologically attracted to extremist ideologies or indoctrinated in Ukraine, these fighters still pose a non-negligible security risk due to a lack of recognition for their efforts, limited psychological support, and the changing political climate in the country. 

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