The issue

In November 2023, Latvia ratified the , a core international treaty which aims to prevent violence towards women, including domestic and sexual violence. The Istanbul Convention has since then been at the centre of a contentious political debate in Latvia, becoming a in Latvia’s cultural wars, and bringing about a clash of ideologies on gender, nationality, and constitutional issues.

The debate on the Istanbul Convention reflects a broader shift in societal values and political loyalties in Latvia. On 30 October 2025, a majority vote in the Saeima (Latvia’s parliament) to denounce the Istanbul Convention unexpectedly succeeded, as one of the partners in the ruling coalition – Union of Greens and Farmers – . The vote led to public protests: on October 29, at least 5,000 people protested outside the Saeima against Latvia’s withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention; on November 6, at least 10,000 protested at Dome Square in Riga, organizing a petition with more than 67,000 signatures. A veto by has put the issue on the back burner until after the parliamentary elections scheduled for early October 2026. Depending on the results of that election, to withdraw from the Istanbul Convention.

This policy brief aims to examine how disinformation narratives and radicalization risks emerged and evolved throughout the public debate on the Istanbul Convention in Latvia from 2023 to 2025. For each phase (the ratification phase in 2023; the withdrawal mobilization phase in 2025; and the post-decision phase in late-2025), the study reviews the 15 most popular Facebook posts and the 80 most liked comments (a total of 45 posts and 240 comments) by manually coding them for narrative type, emotional intensity, disinformation indicators, and evidence of radicalization. This methodological approach was chosen to select a representative but manageable sample of a highly visible discourse. The policy brief is structured as a three-phase analysis of the debate, followed by a synthesis of findings and concluding remarks.

Phase 1: Ratification and Immediate Online Backlash (2023)

Division and debate over the Istanbul Convention appeared immediately after the Latvian parliament voted – by incredibly slim margins – to ratify the Convention on November 30, 2023. Women’s rights organizations and liberal bloggers in Latvia saw this as proof of . On the other hand, an ardent anti-Convention movement sprang up in social networks, claiming that ratifying the Conventions was a betrayal of national interests and gender values. Furthermore, right-wing politicians publicly criticized lawmakers for violating Latvian values in support of the Convention.

The anti-Convention group was represented in public declarations by the former social welfare minister Ramona Petravi�a, who argued that “.� In monitoring disinformation about the Convention, included many misconceptions about the Convention circulating in the last quarter of 2023. On Facebook and on Latvian blogging sites, rumors spread about new policies to be gay at school; about gender reassignment surgeries taking place at the age of 14 without parents’ consent for children interested in such procedures; and about . Such misinformation, usually centered around the were disseminated by right-leaning bloggers such as musician Kaspars Pudniks and author Vija Beinerte, who both claimed that ratifying the Convention would involve teaching in schools about gender transition .

Thus, the showed considerable polarization, moving away from its actual goal of combating domestic violence. Instead of focusing on the objectives of the Istanbul Convention, the online discussion turned into a moral battle between those who claimed to defend traditional gender values and those who were perceived to represent a radical liberal agenda. In this regard, the ratification of the Istanbul Convention fueled cultural conflicts online, thereby undermining positive communication and discussions on how to end domestic violence.

Phase 2: Disinformation Surge and Withdrawal Campaign (2025)

Latvia’s ratification of the Istanbul Convention remained a key issue for Latvian far-right movements thorough the post-ratification period. This opposition reached a new level in September 2025, when started a campaign advocating for the withdrawal of Latvia from the Istanbul Convention. The political movement initiated a flood of conspiratorial posts on social media platforms and messaging applications. Facebook continued to be the central platform wherein these posts were made, but heated debates also took place on Telegram and TikTok, where messaging was aimed at specific target groups. in the online disinformation campaign. His Facebook posts in 2025 clearly demonstrated the use of shifting the debate from the Convention’s legal purpose of preventing violence against women and domestic violence to alleged threats to children, the “natural family�, national sovereignty, and traditional values. A group of started a campaign advocating for the withdrawal of Latvia from the Istanbul Convention. The political movement initiated a flood of conspiratorial posts on social media platforms and messaging applications.

Å lesers has himself claimed, without any evidence in the treaty text, that the Istanbul Convention forces the on Latvia, which aims to “threaten the natural family.â€� This video represents another case of complex problems being reduced to ‘us vs. them’ dichotomies, fostering polarization and discord in society. According to research done by , platforms like TikTok and YouTube are flooded with memes about culture wars as well as general fear-mongering content. This finding fits with the posting trend of Å lesers and others in this group, who lashed out at progressive actors being “[]/global gangstersâ€� – often pairing these posts with accompanying memes and manipulated photos – in addition to their specific opposition to the Convention.

For instance, Linda Liepiņa, a parliament member of the Latvia First Party who originally advocated for the ratification of the Convention in 2023, also began to criticize the Convention on Facebook and Telegram. , which was delivered in the Saeima and reached large audiences online, claiming that a “foreign ideology tries to creep into our everyday livesâ€� and that “what’s abnormal will be declared normal.â€� She also argued that “.â€� Another MP, MÄ�rcis JencÄ«tis, also a member of the Latvia First Party, called the Convention a “,â€� a term that was subsequently .

By mid-2025, anti-Convention-related online activism increased; yet, the shift in parliamentary voting was mainly caused by political trends that developed at the time. In the period from 2023 to 2025, splits in the ruling coalition in the Saeima became more pronounced, and some MPs readjusted their stances because of pressure from conservative groups and their voters. Furthermore, the problem became more politically relevant and was recast by the opposition in terms of the issues of sovereignty and values, which resonated with the pre-election discourse.

At the same time, continuous online activism contributed to perceptions of growing popular dissent, which affected the decisions of many MPs and forced them to change their stances, especially among those whose constituencies were electorally competitive. By 2025, supporting withdrawal from the European Convention became a useful political tool to reach out to conservatives and demonstrate a distinct position,

Phase 3: President’s Intervention and Digital Aftermath (Late 2025)

The Saeima’s vote in late October to withdraw from the Convention was a shock to many Latvians and reflected and a high level of polarization in Latvian politics. The result also surprised President Edgars Rinkēvi�s, who declined to sign the bill into law and instead called for a period of reflection. On the 5th and 6th of November, the Saeima agreed to postpone the decision until the next parliamentary term, that is, after the 2026 election scheduled for early October. The online reactions to these moves were mixed, with at the decision. Supporters of the Convention , with Prime Minister Evika Silina posting on her Facebook page that the decision to postpone the decision

This intervention effectively stalled Latvia’s exit from the Istanbul Convention, throwing a lifeline to supporters and provoking a new wave of hostile . Online, Rinkēvi�s’ move was met with an outpouring of both relief and vitriol – reflecting entrenched polarization. On one side, women’s rights organizations and liberal civil society celebrated the veto as a courageous step against populism. Activists like Beata Jonite of the MARTA Centre – an organization that provides specialized support to victims of domestic violence and human trafficking – shared the President’s message via social media. Jonite, who had been posting on TikTok and Instagram throughout the fall to debunk myths and rally youth support, posted an emotional TikTok video thanking Rinkēvi�s for “.� That video garnered tens of thousands of views and comments expressing sentiments like “Finally, sanity prevails!� and “Thank you, President!� Meanwhile, a Manabalss.lv petition urging the President to gathered over 67,000 signatures .

Based on public opinion polls on the issue, Latvian society has not been divided into two clear camps, despite the polarization that appears online. In reality, there appears to be a relatively large segment of the population that is opposed to withdrawal, a relatively small segment of the population that is in favour of withdrawal, and a large segment of the population that is undecided. carried out in May 2023 by Berg Research indicate a high level of public support for the ratification of the Convention, with 71% of the total number of respondents showing their approval in May; the results of the survey conducted in June 2023 among Latvian citizens show a similar level of support, with 73% of the total number of respondents showing their approval.

These results show that support for the Convention among the general public was relatively strong in terms of the . In contrast, the Berg Research survey conducted in October 2025 shows that there was greater division among respondents in terms of their positions but not necessarily polarization. Specifically, 49% of respondents were against withdrawing from the Convention, 31% were in favor of it, and 20% were still undecided. These results support the position of this policy brief that the rhetoric surrounding the issue has been able to produce the illusion of greater polarization compared to what public opinion figures actually show. While anti-Convention narratives had gained a lot of traction and emotional appeal online, public opinion was actually more complex and could be influenced by both political parties involved.

Emotional Sentiment and Ideological Framing in Latvia’s Istanbul Convention Debate

The force of public engagement may thus be seen as emanating from the change in the nature of the Convention, from being primarily a legal document dealing with violence against women to becoming a symbol representing a number of emotionally charged topics, including children, family, nationhood, sovereignty, and skepticism toward political elites. The shift served to increase the potency of the disinformation narrative, which was no longer tied to any deep familiarity with the text of the Convention but, instead, tapped into preexisting emotions

and value differences. Hence, the case represents one more feature of modern Latvian online political communication: the tendency for a complicated policy issue to quickly transform into a medium for simplified culture wars, where emotion and suspicion often outweigh law and facts.

According to Google Trends data, public interest in the Istanbul Convention remained relatively low from early 2023 to the point where a strong surge occurred towards the end of 2025. These findings of increased searches towards the end of 2025 do correspond with renewed political struggles and mobilization efforts in the form of mass protests and intensive debates within parliament on withdrawing from the Convention. One of the most interesting findings is how public interest is geographically distributed regarding the searches conducted, where smaller towns (In�ukalns, Lielv�rde, Ozolnieki, Garkalne, and Sigulda) show the greatest levels of activity.

Figure 1. Google Trends search interest in the Istanbul Convention in Latvia, 2023- 2025.

Figure 2. Geographic distribution of Google searches related to the Istanbul Convention in Latvia.

The data indicates that online engagement has not been isolated to Riga and major cities, as rural communities are just as likely to search for this topic online.

The analysis of the discourse on the Istanbul Convention on Facebook in Latvia reveals a clear pattern of coordinated disinformation, emotionally polarized audiences, and radicalization of political discourse. The dominant discourse against the Istanbul Convention is based on three distinct narratives: (1) the notion that the Convention promotes a dangerous “gender ideology� that undermines traditional morality and family values (45% of the analyzed content); (2) the idea that the Convention is an external threat to national sovereignty and legal independence of Latvia (30%); and (3) the notion that the Convention has no practical benefits in combating violence and instead distracted from legitimate issues, such as the rights of the LGBT community (20%). The dominant disinformation in the discourse on the Istanbul Convention in Latvia was not peripheral; instead, it was central to the dominant discourse.

The persistence of disinformation, such as the trope of the ‘117 genders,’ the claim that the Convention would replace the words ‘mother’ and ‘father’ with ‘Parent 1 and 2,’ and the claim that the Convention would sexualize children, were all widespread. Not only was this this disinformation apparent in all three phases of the Convention debate, but it was also visible in the rhetoric of Latvian parliamentarians, suggesting that it had become normalized in the political discourse on the Convention.

The audience’s reactions varied depending on the narrative. The ‘gender ideology’ threat narrative elicited the highest number of ‘angry’ emoji reactions (50%). This was closely followed by the ‘sovereignty’ narrative (45%). The audience reactions to the narrative on the protection of women were different. In this case, ‘Like’ and ‘Love’ combined for 40% of the audience reactions; ‘Angry’ was seen in 15% of reactions. The ‘Laughing’ emoji reactions were higher in the case of the ‘exaggerated’ narrative (20%). These findings show that while the audience reacted with anger to the ideological threat narrative, another part of the audience reacted with mockery to the exaggerated narrative.

The analysis also shows that there are signs of discursive political radicalization. Of the approximately 30 high-engagement posts, 6-8 showed strong signs of radicalization. These included alarmist rhetoric, conspiracy theories, and delegitimization of democratic actors. Radicalization was also more evident in the comments sections of each post. In some posts, 15% to 25% of the comments contained dehumanizing metaphors, accusations of treason, or appeals for silencing or expelling political opponents. The politicians who took the side of the Convention were called “traitors,� “foreign agents�, or “corrupt pigs,� while the veto of the withdrawal decision by the President was described as “betrayal.� Some of the comments also contained appeals for “rising up�, “expelling� the supporters of the Convention, and “saving the nation.�

The radicalization of the discourse was also asymmetrical. The posts of the supporters of the Convention sometimes showed signs of frustration or irony but rarely used hostile language or rejected the idea of democratic pluralism. Arguments mostly focused on the legal content of the Convention, women’s rights, and the refutation of disinformation. However, the level of engagement of the posts was significantly lower than that of the opponents.

Conclusion

Across all three phases, the Latvia-based discussion on the Istanbul Convention illustrates the manner in which a policy debate can be transformed into a debate on cultural values via disinformation and powerful emotive appeals. Disinformation was consistently used to galvanize opposition and link the Convention to unrelated concerns, such as those surrounding children, gender ideology, and identity. As such, highly emotive and divisive messages achieved greater traction than evidence-based messages, undermining the space for constructive debate and normalizing hostile, delegitimizing rhetoric.

The case highlights the extent to which online discourse may distort the perception of public opinion. According to polls, Latvian society was not divided into two equally strong groups; instead, an active online minority shaping part of the discussion gave the impression of wider opposition. More generally, Latvia is symptomatic of a gender backlash that is taking place across Europe, including in post-Soviet and Central-Eastern countries. In this backlash, gender equality policies are presented as endangering the traditional family, children, national identity, and even state sovereignty.

In Latvia, the convention came to symbolize an ideological struggle over gender norms and social values. The debate is still ongoing, with the final resolution scheduled for sometime after the October 2026 Saeima elections. Thus, the Convention will continue to be a relevant topic on the political agenda. Without a consensus, the survival of the Istanbul Convention in Latvia will depend on the next parliamentary composition and the willingness of actors to keep spreading anti-gender narratives or return to fact-based discussions about violence prevention and victim protection.

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Since its establishment in 1949, the foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany was grounded in the concept of Zivilmacht (civilian power), a model based on the renunciation of military force, multilateral cooperation, and economic diplomacy. However, the Russian Federation’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 acted as a significant catalyst for change in Germany’s foreign policy and broader geopolitical positioning. Following these shifts in the European strategic environment, then-Chancellor Olaf Scholz proclaimed Zeitenwende (a turning point in history) had arrived, which would redefine Germany’s security policy through increased defence spending and a more prominent place in international affairs. The electoral victory of Friedrich Merz as current Chancellor has ultimately shifted Germany’s international role to a more assertive and openly strategic posture, distancing itself from the civilian power model of the past.

This essay examines Germany’s evolution from a culture of military restraint toward one of new strategic posturing, analyzing whether this transformation represents a definitive abandonment of its identity as a civilian power in favour of a return to a modern form Machtpolitik (power politics). Through an examination of the historical trajectory from the Cold War to the chancellorship of Friedrich Merz starting in 2025, this essay suggests that Germany is not reverting to aggressive militarism but is instead adopting a form of defensive and integrated Machtpolitik, necessary to ensure security within the Euro-Atlantic order.

The Erosion of the Civilian Power Paradigm

For over seven decades, the Federal Republic of Germany defined its national identity through the lens of a (civilian power). Emerging from the ruins of 1945, it anchored itself in the West under Konrad Adenauer’s policy of (western integration), replacing traditional power politics with a culture of military restraint, multilateralism, and rejection of nuclear arms. This identity consolidated during the Cold War through and the diplomatic success of Willy Brandt’s (eastern policy), which favoured economic interdependence and dialogue over the use of military force. Even after reunification in 1990, Germany struggled to move beyond this posture, exposing a lasting tension between its expanding economic influence and its unwillingness to deploy its military – an approach that NATO Allies frequently criticized as “.�

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 shattered these certainties. Then-Chancellor Olaf Scholz proclaimed a Zeitenwende had taken place, and promising a massive investment in defence through a . However, the Scholz era (2021–2025) was marked by a profound gap between rhetoric and reality. Hampered by bureaucratic bottlenecks, internal coalition disputes, and a lingering culture of pacifism, the implementation of the Zeitenwende proved difficult. Scholz’s reluctance to supply ‘offensive’ weapons – – combined with concerns about Germany’s actual capacity to increase defence spending levels, caused political inconsistency and eroded trust in his leadership at home and abroad. Consequently, the collapse of the Scholz’s governing coalition in late 2024, , paved the way for a more radical transformation under Friedrich Merz.

The Merz Chancellorship: Enforcing Zeitenwende 2.0

The election of Friedrich Merz as Chancellor in February 2025 marked the definitive end of Germany’s post-war strategic ambiguity. Merz’s rise to power envisioned a “,â€� a strategy that aimed to translate the previous government’s hesitant rhetoric into concrete, assertive action. Under Merz’s leadership, Germany has accelerated its transition from a reluctant partner to a burgeoning military leader in Europe, driven by the dual pressures of Russian aggression and uncertainty in the transatlantic security relationship following the second election of Donald Trump to the Presidency of the United States (US).

Unconditional Support for Ukraine and Strategic Assertiveness

The most immediate shift under Chancellor Merz has been the abandonment of self-imposed “red linesâ€� regarding the war in Ukraine. In stark contrast to Scholz’s , Merz’s government adopted a stance of support with “,â€� strengthening Germany’s role as the leading military supporter of Kyiv in Europe. Crucially, the Merz administration on German-supplied weaponry, allowing Ukraine to strike military targets within Russian territory – a decision that signalled a clear break from the fear of escalation that characterized Scholz’s government. This policy is supported by Germany’s continued commitment to , separate from domestic defence spending, although the level of assistance remains . By framing Ukraine’s defence as essential to preserving the European security order, Friedrich Merz has effectively normalized the use of military force as a legitimate and necessary instrument of Germany’s foreign policy.

In line with this strategic imperative, the Merz government has extended its commitment beyond military assistance, actively seeking to reshape Europe’s broader geopolitical frameworks. To shield Eastern Europe from shifting transatlantic dynamics, Merz has recently proposed supporting Ukraine to become an “� within the EU. This proposal would see Ukraine attend high-level EU meetings as an observer without voting rights, effectively allowing it to gain access to EU decision-making forums while it progresses through the legal and administrative work of becoming a full EU member state.

Rearmament and the “Kriegstüchtigkeit” of the Bundeswehr

Domestically, the Merz chancellorship has been defined by an unprecedented drive for rearmament, aiming to transform the Bundeswehr into “.� Following the , Germany committed to significant new spending targets: 3.5% of GDP by 2029, rising to 5% by 2035. To finance the increase defence spending, the German government pushed through a controversial reform of the constitutional debt brake, .

This financial commitment has been matched by structural reforms aimed at achieving Kriegstüchtigkeit (war readiness). The adoption of the designates Germany as the central logistical hub for NATO in Europe, preparing the nation to serve as the transit corridor and operational base for Allied troops in the event of a large-scale conflict with Russia. This shift acknowledges that Germany is no longer just a security contributor, but a frontline state exposed to hybrid threats, requiring full coordination between military forces and civilian infrastructure.

The Return of Conscription and Societal Friction

Perhaps the most socially divisive aspect of Merz’s security overhaul has been the move to address the personnel crisis within the armed forces. In late 2025, the government passed the with the ambition of reaching 260,000 active personnel by the 2030s. This legislation relies on a hybrid model: while initially prioritizing voluntary service with financial incentives, it also established the legal framework for a “� (Bedarfsabhängige Dienstpflicht) that can be activated if volunteer targets are not met.

The potential reintroduction of conscription, which had been abolished in 2011, has sparked significant . Younger generations view the move as a regression to militarism, highlighting a disconnect between the government’s strategic objectives and the pacifist undercurrents of German civil society. The friction reveals that while the German political elite have embraced a harsher security and foreign policy, under a modern form of defensive and integrated Machtpolitik, the societal transition away from the civilian power identity remains incomplete and contested.

European Autonomy and the “Atomic Zeitenwende�

The geopolitical context of Merz’s chancellorship is heavily influenced by second Trump administration in the US. In the wake of President Trump’s “� foreign policy strategy, Merz has pushed for more and an urgent strengthening of German defence. This has led to a breaking of the ultimate German taboo: the nuclear question.

While explicitly ruling out the acquisition of a nuclear arsenal, the Merz government is pursuing an “� through an integration strategy. Germany has deepened cooperation with Europe’s two nuclear powers, France and the United Kingdom (UK), within the framework of the – an informal trilateral forum originally established in 2003 to coordinate diplomatic efforts over Iran’s nuclear program. Despite Brexit complicating its institutional dimension, the E3 has evolved into a broader platform for strategic coordination, . Through initiatives such as the – and in the context of strengthened Franco-British nuclear cooperation through the – Germany is seeking to link European security more closely to Franco-British nuclear deterrents. These developments mark a deep cultural shift: nuclear deterrence is no longer discarded but instead embraced as a necessary component of European defence, with Germany acting as a key political facilitator of this shared capability.

Theoretical Analysis: A Return to Machtpolitik? Neoclassical realist approach

The radical transformation of German security policy under Friedrich Merz raises a fundamental question: has Germany abandoned its identity as a Zivilmacht in favour of a return to Machtpolitik? The evidence suggests that while the civilian power model in its idealistic and pacifist form has largely faded, Germany is not returning to the aggressive, unilateral power politics of the pre-1945 era. Instead, it is adopting a defensive and integrated Machtpolitik.

The theory of helps explain why Germany could no longer remain a civilian power after 2022 while also highlighting the variables that have complicated this transformation. External pressures, such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine, altered the distribution of power and threat perception in Europe, compelling the German government to embark on a Zeitenwende to adapt its material capabilities. Yet the theory recognizes that systemic imperatives are filtered through domestic variables. Perceptions of policy-makers, institutional constraints such as the debt brake, and a society shaped by pacifist norms have all slowed decision-making and implementation of reforms, reflecting what Hanns W. Maull defined as , or, a “lack of realism� or “oblivion of power.�

Under these conditions, Germany’s rearmament is not simply about accumulating hard power, but instead about responding to a shifting geopolitical environment in an integrated and defensive manner. Integration () occurs through NATO and EU institutions, allowing Berlin to exercise influence and maximize security without alarming Allies. The defensive dimension () focuses on denying Russian victory and protecting the status quo rather than redrawing Europe’s borders. This approach illustrates a neoclassical realist compromise: Germany adapts to systemic requirements while being constrained and shaped by internal political and societal factors, explaining why its strategic transformation has been slow and deliberate.

Overcoming Machtvergessenheit

As argued by , Germany is in the process of overcoming its “forgetting of power.� For decades, the Federal Republic of Germany operated under the illusion that European economic interdependence and normative power projection were sufficient to secure its interests – characteristically liberal ideals. The Merz era reflects a growing recognition that civilian power may require the support of military strength to remain credible.

The Merz government has realized that to preserve the liberal international order – a core objective of the Zivilmacht concept – it must employ the tools of Machtpolitik. Thus, the dichotomy traditionally rendered between the two ontologies is false. Germany is not choosing power over law; rather, it frames the strengthening of its military as part of a broader effort to provide security for Europe and the liberal international order. Its refusal to pursue an independent nuclear arsenal while simultaneously seeking deeper integration into Allied nuclear frameworks demonstrates this nuanced position. Initiatives such as the establishment of a high-level , or the debate at this year’s Munich Security Conference on to safeguard Europe’s future, demonstrate that Germany remains firmly anchored in the institutions that have shaped its identity since its founding. At the same time, Germany is discussing options with European partners to develop a deterrence posture that is autonomous, independent, and credible.

Recent diplomatic developments strongly illustrate this assertive and autonomous stance. On the diplomatic front, Friedrich Merz has cast aside any lingering hesitation, explicitly accusing the Trump administration of allowing itself to be during the course of the ongoing US-Iran conflict. This position reflects a pragmatic call for European self-reliance in response to unpredictable US diplomacy, rather than an open challenge to the NATO Alliance.

Conclusion

The chancellorship of Friedrich Merz has placed the Federal Republic of Germany on a decisive path towards a difficult, yet necessary, transformation. The hesitation and ambiguity that defined the Scholz era and the Zeitenwende 1.0 have been replaced by a strategic clarity that acknowledges the harsh realities of the current security environment.

By challenging fiscal constraints with the €500 billion fund, addressing societal taboos with the reintroduction of conscription, and engaging with previously avoided strategic debates, Germany has fundamentally redefined its role. It has transitioned from a reluctant partner, long constrained by neglect of military power and capability development, to an emerging pillar of European stability, actively shaping defence initiatives and security cooperation.

However, this transition carries significant perils. Societal backlash against conscription and concerns over Germany’s military buildup underscore the fragility of both internal and external support. The success of a defensive, integrated Machtpolitik depends not only on the . Furthermore, fears of a potential authoritarian turn – partly driven by rising domestic support for the – continues to create anxieties among the Allies.

Ultimately, Germany has not yet returned to the aggressive nationalism of its past. Instead, it is slowly becoming a “normal� geopolitical power by acknowledging that, in a multipolar world, abstaining from projections of power may undermine chances for survival.

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Over the past two decades, nuclear weapons have returned to the centre of European security as a result of consistent and compounding changes to global geopolitics. For most of the post-Cold War era, weapons of mass destruction appeared to have lost salience as the disappearance of bipolar confrontation, the expansion of cooperative security frameworks, and the consolidation of arms control regimes fostered the belief that large-scale interstate conflict in Europe was a phenomenon of the past. However, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the collapse of arms control frameworks and agreements, and growing uncertainty surrounding the durability of security guarantees from the United States (US) have altered these assumptions, forcing a reassessment of the role of nuclear deterrence in Europe. Nuclear weapons have now regained centrality in European security as instruments of coercion, signalling, and strategic reassurance.

These dynamics have rekindled a nuclear debate in a number of European states, including the United Kingdom (UK) and France – Western Europe’s only two nuclear powers – who came together in July 2025 to sign the Northwood Declaration. This Declaration represents a significant political step for European nuclear security as, for the first time, both French and British governments publicly recognize that their independent nuclear forces must be thought of as a nuclear tandem in upholding the security of Europe. The political significance of this Declaration is much greater than its technical content and raises the following questions: does Northwood Declaration represent a strategic turning point in Franco-British nuclear cooperation in the context of perceived US disengagement from Europe and renewed Russian assertiveness? Can this renewed commitment to cooperation bridge the UK and France’s historically distinct strategic traditions regarding nuclear weapons?

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Nuclear relations between the UK and France have always been shaped by a triangulated great power partnership that necessarily involved the US. The UK’s nuclear program was deeply embedded in Anglo-American cooperation from the Second World War onward. The 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement institutionalized this relationship, giving the UK access to American technology, materials, and missile systems. The credibility of the British deterrent therefore rested not only on national capability but also on continued US support.

France followed the opposite path. Excluded from early nuclear cooperation and sceptical of extended deterrence, Paris developed its force de frappe as an explicit sovereign instrument. The French nuclear doctrine emphasized national decision-making, freedom of action, and the political symbolism of independence. Deterrence was not merely military protection; it was a guarantee of strategic autonomy.

These divergent trajectories repeatedly complicated bilateral cooperation between France and the UK. During the Cold War, the UK could not easily share nuclear information without American approval while France refused to subordinate its deterrent to any external framework, including NATO. Even moments of diplomatic convergence produced mostly rhetorical statements rather than operational coordination.

After 1991, the issue temporarily lost urgency. Arms control agreements, reduced geopolitical tensions, and the shift toward crisis management operations moved nuclear questions into the background. Franco-British defence cooperation deepened through initiatives such as the Saint-Malo Declaration (1998) and later the Lancaster House Treaties (2010), though these agreements focused largely on conventional capabilities and technical collaboration. Nuclear policy remained politically sensitive and largely separate from coordinated strategic planning.

TheÌıReturn ofÌıNuclearÌıPolitics in EuropeÌı

The strategic environment, already undergoing gradual change, shifted dramatically after 2014. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of armed conflict in Donbas marked the return of conventional warfare in Europe. More importantly,  While these signals remained largely indirect at the time, they reintroduced the nuclear dimension into European security. Since 2022, Russian rhetoric has become far more overt, . 

At the same time, the institutional foundations of nuclear stability weakened. The  (8 May 2018), the  (2 August 2019), the  (5 February 2026), and the broader erosion of arms control norms removed many stabilizing constraints inherited from the Cold War. These developments coincided with a gradual reorientation of US strategy toward the Indo-Pacific. . Although Washington did not disengage from NATO, successive administrations placed growing emphasis on burden-sharing and regional prioritization, encouraging European Allies to assume greater responsibility for their own security.  

For European states, the combination of Russian coercion and America’s shifting security priorities created a dilemma. NATO’s deterrence remained credible, yet its perceived unconditionality weakened. European security increasingly depended on whether Europeans could carry a larger share of the burden of deterrence in a crisis directly affecting the continent, rather than relying exclusively on automatic US escalation. In this context, nuclear discourse has regained political salience for European NATO Allies. The issue is no longer deterrence itself, but who will be responsible for making deterrence credible in a crisis directly affecting Europe. 

The Northwood DeclarationÌı

The 2025 Northwood Declaration must be understood in the context of this shifting dynamic. This Declaration does not create a joint Franco-British nuclear force; however, its significance lies in its political message that British and French nuclear deterrents can be coordinated and jointly considered in the management of European security. 

The creation of the UK-France Nuclear Steering Group through this Declaration introduces a permanent mechanism for political consultation across nuclear policy, capabilities, and operations. However, national decision-making authority remains unaffected and both France and the UK retain explicit sovereignty over their nuclear arsenals. This step represents an important qualitative change.  Nuclear policy itself remained politically insulated. Northwood, by contrast, brings nuclear cooperation into the political sphere. For the first time, . 

The Declaration also restates the long-standing formulation that the vital interests of one country cannot be threatened without affecting those of the other, a wording that originates from the . In the contemporary context, this relational language carries broader implications than in the 1990s, as it signals a shared willingness to extend nuclear deterrence across Europe. 

ReconcilingÌıAtlanticismÌıandÌıAutonomyÌı

Does this development have broader implications for transatlantic security? Does it reconcile the United Kingdom’s US-integrated deterrent posture with France’s doctrine of independent nuclear decision-making? The answer is both yes and no. The UK has not abandoned its reliance on the US. . Participation in NATO nuclear planning and the acquisition of dual-capable aircraft further reinforce transatlantic integration. France, on the other hand, has not diluted its doctrine of independence. It remains outside NATO’s nuclear planning structures and continues to emphasize sovereign decision-making, as   

The Northwood Declaration therefore does not produce doctrinal convergence. Instead, it provides functional political alignment. Both states retain their respective strategic identities while deepening political cooperation in response to a shared perception of risk. The significance of this shift lies precisely in its pragmatism. Rather than forcing institutional integration – which would be politically unacceptable to both sides – the declaration creates a cooperative interface. The UK derives credibility from its integration with NATO and its nuclear relationship with the US, whereas France derives that same credibility from autonomous national decision-making. The political coordination provided by the Northwood Declaration therefore does not merge the two deterrents but instead creates parallel centres of nuclear decision-making aligned in a common strategic posture, complicating an adversary’s assessment of escalation. 

In effect, coordination substitutes for doctrinal reconciliation. The Declaration does not remove the structural tension between NATO dependence and strategic autonomy; it manages this tension by transforming it into coordinated political signalling. 

Implications for EuropeanÌıDeterrenceÌı

The Northwood Declaration importantly does not create a European nuclear deterrent. No extended guarantee is offered, no shared command established. Hence, US extended deterrence and NATO remain central for many European states. However, the Declaration does still alter the strategic landscape in Europe.  

By coordinating their deterrents politically, the UK and France introduce a European layer of nuclear signalling within the transatlantic system. This European layer operates through identifiable mechanisms. For European NATO Allies, the public coordination of the two nuclear powers signals that deterrence credibility does not depend exclusively on immediate US escalation. For a potential adversary, the existence of two politically aligned but nationally independent nuclear decision-makers introduces uncertainty about escalation thresholds and responses. At the same time, the political burden of deterrence is no longer borne solely by Washington, as London and Paris visibly assume a larger role in strategic signalling and crisis management. 

The result is best understood as a hedge. It is designed to supplement American guarantees rather than replace them. In a crisis, adversaries must consider not only NATO and the US, but also the combined political stance of Europe’s two nuclear powers. Over time, this may influence how deterrence is discussed within Europe. While not establishing a European nuclear force, the Northwood Declaration makes European nuclear responsibility a legitimate topic of policy rather than a theoretical debate.  

The Northwood Declaration fits within a broader pattern in which nuclear deterrence is no longer confined to NATO’s internal mechanisms. In this sense, the Declaration may represent a catalyst for deeper dialogue and coordination between European nuclear and non-nuclear actors. An early indication of this dynamic emerged with the  through which the UK and the Federal Republic of Germany agreed to pursue deep exchanges on deterrence, nuclear issues and arms control, as well as a permanent dialogue on defence matters, while also envisaging intensified trilateral cooperation with France. Furthermore, . 

More recently, this broader trend has been further reinforced by the French President’s proposal of a  which envisages deeper forms of political and strategic coordination between France and a group of willing European partners, including both nuclear and non-nuclear states. While stopping short of creating a European nuclear deterrent, . 

Limits andÌıConstraintsÌı

Despite its significance, the Declaration faces important limitations. Structural asymmetries remain profound. The US still possesses nuclear capabilities vastly exceeding those of either France or the UK, but the relevant comparison is broader:  and . 

A further limitation concerns the autonomy of the British deterrent. Although the UK retains sovereign political control over its nuclear forces, it also remains deeply intertwined with the US through the Mutual Defence Agreement, , and broader technological cooperation. This creates structural limits on how far the UK can engage in deeper nuclear cooperation with its European nuclear and non-nuclear partners and how far the British nuclear deterrent can be Europeanized. However, the novelty concerning the French doctrine of “advanced deterrenceâ€� could be seen as another step towards a more extended deterrence. 

Divergent defence-industrial partnerships also complicate long-term convergence. France’s cooperation with Germany contrasts with Britain’s global partnerships such as the . Regional priorities differ as well. The UK has increasingly oriented its security policy toward Northern Europe, most notably through its leadership of the , a regional military framework bringing together Nordic and Baltic states for rapid crisis response and defence cooperation. 

For these reasons, the Northwood Declaration should not be interpreted as the beginning of a fully integrated European nuclear structure. Its strength lies in political signalling rather than institutional transformation. 

ConclusionÌı

The Northwood DeclarationÌırepresentsÌıa strategic turning point in Franco-British nuclear cooperation, but in a specific and carefully bounded sense. It does not dismantle the structural differences between British Atlanticism and French strategic autonomy. Rather, it lays the foundations forÌıthese two systemsÌıtoÌıoperateÌıtogether. By publicly acknowledging coordination and institutionalizing consultation, the Declaration moves cooperation from symbolic reassurance to structured political practice. The UK continues to rely on the US; France continues to emphasize autonomy. Yet bothÌıthe UK and FranceÌırecognize that, in this current era of intense geopolitical tension, the credibility of European deterrence increasingly depends onÌıtheirÌıpolitical leadership. The Northwood Declaration is a strong signal that they are willing to assume that role together.Ìı

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Introduction

Since the 1970s, the European Economic Community (EEC)/European Union (EU) has sought to play a complementary role to the United States (US) in the pursuit of security and stability in the Middle East. This has occurred mostly through soft security measures: diplomacy; economic and financial aid to Palestinians; civilian missions focused on stability; and dialogue with Arab states. In this regard, it is worth mentioning the Euro-Arab Dialogue: a political and economic cooperation framework launched in 1974 between the EEC and the Arab League to strengthen the relationship between the parties after the Yom Kippur War and oil crisis. However, despite these efforts, the limits of the EU’s unique institutional set-up have prevented it from playing a major role in regional affairs. The ongoing war in the Gaza Strip between Israel and Hamas has highlighted the limits of the EU’s diplomatic action. In the meantime, President Donald Trump’s Peace Plan for Gaza has re-energized, once again, the role of the , prompting some to draw historical parallels to earlier US-brokered efforts – from Camp David to the failed Oslo Accords. What role could the EU play in the American plan? How can its involvement be decisive to achieve a just and lasting peace in the region?

Context

The 2006 electoral victory of Hamas in the Gaza Strip led to a severe escalation with Israel. With Hamas taking over the territory from the Fatah-controlled Palestinian Authority (PA), Israel considered the Palestinian military group a security threat, as it refused to recognize the Jewish state, renounce violence, or accept previous peace agreements brokered by the PA and Israel. Hamas’ accession to power in 2006 constituted a critical historical juncture that transformed governance in Gaza and its overall relationship with Israel. This shift was accompanied by the return of a range of familiar political practices – including diplomatic negotiations, economic sanctions, and ongoing military engagement – that continue to define this governance period.

In the meantime, two other factors made the relationship between the parties more strained. On the one hand, on November 29, 2012, the , which upgraded Palestine from a “non-member observer entity� to a “non-member observer State.� This historic vote granted Palestine implicit recognition of statehood and was seen as a move to revive the two-state solution, a move strongly opposed by the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. On the other hand, the US-brokered Abraham Accords were signed in 2020, aiming to normalize diplomatic, economic, and security relations between Israel and several Arab nations (including the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan). Palestinians overwhelmingly opposed the Abraham Accords, perceiving the agreements as an abandonment of the long-standing consensus among Arab states that negotiations with Israel were contingent on ending occupation.

On October 7, 2023, Hamas initiated an attack on Israel. . The Israeli response was a full-scale military invasion of the Gaza Strip which, by December 2025, has killed 71,266 Palestinians, left most schools and hospitals in ruins, and caused long-term damage to the local society and economy.

The EU’s response to Gaza was characterized by contradictions and divisions between its member states. Some countries such as Czech Republic, Austria, Hungary, Italy, and Germany, stood with Israel, backing its military campaign and avoiding criticism of Netanyahu’s regime. Other governments, such as Belgium, Spain, France and Ireland – while strongly condemning Hamas – called for a ceasefire and criticized Israel for violating international humanitarian law. These differing positions prevented the EU from having a coordinated stance at the UN when voting on a on December 12, 2023, which called for a humanitarian ceasefire.

Divergencies appeared not only between member states but also across EU institutions. While European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen showed a stronger emphasis on Israel’s right to defence, the European Council issued a more cautious joint statement aimed at highlighting the EU as a unified voice. The statement took a more neutral tone than President von der Leyen, emphasizing both Israel’s right to defence as well as the crucial need for humanitarian aid, civilian protection, and adherence to international law. A third voice, EU’s foreign policy chief Josep Borrell, was more critical of Israel, . The inertia resulting from lack of consensus among member states and across institutions severely undermines the EU’s position as mediator, letting the Americans play a leading role once again.

On September 29, 2025, President Trump announced his plan to “end the Gaza war� and address the broader Middle Eastern crisis. The so-called was negotiated with the consultation of Arab states, namely Egypt, Qatar and Türkiye. The EU played no formal role in the negotiations; it made no proposals of its own, despite being both a major donor to Palestine and an important partner of Israel.

Endorsed by UN Security Council , Trump’s plan includes the deployment of an International Stabilization Force (ISF) in Gaza, a multinational military body that will ensure the demilitarization and security of the Gaza Strip; and the creation of a Board of Peace (BoP), a committee led by Trump that will oversee the political transition in Gaza until a reformed Palestinian Authority can take over governance in 2027. Formally launched at the 56th World Economic Forum in January 2026, the BoP claims its main purpose is the promotion of peacekeeping all around the world, not only in Gaza. Countries wishing to participate in the BoP are required to contribute US$1 billion to the organization to renew their membership, and Trump, as its chairman, is not subject to term limits, holding the sole authority to nominate his successor.

to ending the war in Gaza; however, many EU member states have expressed concern over the possibility of the BoP overshadowing the role of the UN. Currently, Bulgaria and Hungary are the only two EU countries to have joined the initiative. France, Spain, Poland, and Germany declined to participate, while Italy, Romania, Greece and Cyprus joined as observers. The EU Commission also decided to join as an observer, sending the Commissioner for the Mediterranean, Dubravka Šuica, to Washington, DC, to attend the inaugural meeting of the BoP on February 19, 2026. In a sign of continued disunity, , calling it a “mistake�, as the EU supports a two-state solution and “cannot participate� in any body that excludes the Palestinian National Authority.

Problems

Even if Trump’s plan represents an important step towards a peace deal, it contains critical aspects which might hinder its implementation. The current plan effectively grants Israel a veto power over peace, as its military redeployments are conditioned on Hamas’ demilitarization and reform of the PA. At the same time, Israel is not required to make any formal commitments towards halting settlement expansion in the West Bank or respecting the autonomy of a Palestinian state. On this issue Israel’s stance is clear: Netanyahu declared that , as it is an “existential threat to Israel.� Therefore, there is a real risk that, without guarantees for the Palestinian people and a plan to address occupation, Trump’s plan may fail or lead to an unjust and unstable peace agreement that steamrolls Palestinian rights and territories recognized by international law.

On the other hand, Trump’s peace plan has confirmed that the US continues to play a . However, some , such as Francesca Albanese, Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian Occupied Territory, criticized the plan. UN Special Adviser on Sustainability, Jeffrey Sachs, labelled the US proposal as “.� According to them, Trump is behaving in Gaza like a 19th-century colonial broker, placing himself at the helm of the BoP to oversee a foreign territory’s governance, with the overall aim of advancing US interests in the region. The Middle East has figured prominently in the first and second Trump administrations’ foreign policy. President Trump’s main goal is to broker agreements between Israel and other Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, to . This attitude could prove counterproductive and place EU interests at risk.

Strategic Outlook and Policy Recommendations

A more active role of the EU in the region is necessary to guarantee success and counter risks of instability, which may have severe implications for European security, including energy supply limitations, new security threats, and an increase of migration and refugee flows. It is in the EU’s interest to enhance its influence in the region. What practical steps should the EU take to avoid marginalization and make a meaningful contribution to peace?

1. The EU should consider holding an enhanced observer status at the BoP as a necessary counterweight to US and Israeli pressures and hegemony in decision-making. Of course, the EU has to maintain a steadfast commitment to strengthening and reforming the UN, confirming it as the core of a rules-based international order and multilateralism. However, enhanced observer status at the BoP could allow the EU to monitor negotiations and participate in debates specifically devoted to making interventions, peace proposals, and amendments. The presence of the EU, with its traditional concern for Palestinian issues, could ensure meaningful Palestinian involvement. This is fundamental to legitimate the transitory governance of the Gaza Strip and preserve Palestinian decision-making power. A more active EU at BoP could also contribute to reforming the PA.

The divergences between member states and across EU institutions negatively impact the EU’s international role. Therefore, the EU should take a cohesive stance on its participation at the BoP, bearing in mind some key arguments. Firstly, “� provides direct insight into how decisions are implemented, serving as a channel for influence. The EU is the largest donor to Palestinian recovery and its involvement in the BoP could help the EU shape outcomes rather than merely fund them, aligning its significant financial contributions with the necessary humanitarian, governance, and security strands of the peace plan. Moreover, “� is vital for influencing the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2803.

2. The EU should be part of the International Security Force. Together with The European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) Rafah Mission and EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS), involvement in the ISF could contribute to the maintenance of the ceasefire. Participation in the ISF could enhance European influence on Israel, for example, by convincing the Israeli government to review its settlement policy and improve living conditions for the Palestinians.

3. The EU should use economic and financial tools to enhance its political influence. On the Palestinian side, the European Commission recently . On the Israeli side, the EU should overcome its reluctances and suspend the EU-Israel Association Agreement if the Israeli government continues to violate human rights in Gaza, as required by Article 2 of the Agreement. The suspension of this Agreement could influence Israel to respect the , following preliminary rulings about a “plausible� genocide occurring in Gaza. The EU could link Israeli participation in EU funding programs, such as Horizon Europe, to the full withdrawal from Gaza, the end of settlements in the West Bank, and apartheid policy against Palestinians.

4. The EU should invest in the implementation of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), an economic initiative designed to enhance connectivity and integration between Asia, the Middle East, and Europe, based on three pillars: energy, transportation, and digital connectivity. IMEC should be a core interest for Europeans, as it , increasing political and economic ties between participating counties. Moreover, it could enhance the EU’s political influence in the area, counterbalancing China and the US. The implementation of some projects as part of the IMEC – such as the EastMed Gas Pipeline – could make the EU a relevant player in terms of future economic cooperation projects, allowing it to increase its weight in the Middle East peace process.

The EU could influence, for example, the implementation of the so-called “Green Blue Deal� between Jordan and Israel, which provides for the supply of water from Israel in exchange for Jordanian supplies of solar power. The Gaza war stopped the project, but the ceasefire created hope that it may be relaunched in such a way that the Gaza Strip and the West Bank can also benefit from it.

Conclusion

While the US commitment has been the sine qua non for a ceasefire in Gaza, the EU holds key cards to ensure the successful implementation of Trump’s peace plan. With its traditional regional approach, a more active observer role of the EU in the BoP and its participation in the ISF could balance American – and Israeli – influence and ensure a more equitable peace solution. In doing so, it may also help ensure that Palestinian rights recognized by international law are considered against the backdrop of ongoing ceasefire and conflict negotiations. In addition, the use of economic leverage as well as the implementation of the IMEC corridor could enhance the EU political weight in the area, preventing the dawn of a new era of regional instability and insecurity with direct impact on Europe itself.

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Executive Summary 

• Russia’s ability to sustain its war against Ukraine depends not only on military capacity but on how the state manages the social and economic pressures placed on families. 

• So-called “traditionalâ€� spiritual-moral values provide the ideological framework through which the state justifies sacrifice, promotes compliance, and assigns meaning to the disruption of family life caused by the war in Ukraine. 

• Extensive financial and social benefits for military families help stabilize the home front and support recruitment, but these measures are costly and may be difficult to sustain over time. 

• The war’s impact on families is uneven across regions, creating long-term demographic and social vulnerabilities that could undermine Russia’s post-war stability. 

• Russian family policy prioritizes material support and narrative control while existing structures are inadequately prepared to address key problems of veteran reintegration, including mental health challenges and increased risks of domestic violence. 

The post Understanding Russia’s Family Policy for Wartime Resilience appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

Introduction

ÌıFor the first time since 1972,ÌıwhenÌıSALT I negotiations yielded the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the Interim Agreement on offensive arms, the strategic relationship between Washington and Moscow is entirely unconstrained by a legal framework.Ìı.ÌıAs the current normative vacuum is unprecedented in the modern era, theÌıNorth Atlantic TreatyÌıOrganizationÌı(NATO)ÌıAlliance facesÌıa new ‘strategic trilemma’:Ìıthe simultaneous and often contradictory imperativesÌıof maintaining credible extended deterrence;Ìıenhancing conventional defence against hybrid and missile threats;Ìıand reconstructing a confidence-building, risk-reduction framework to prevent accidental escalation. The central policy problem is that the traditional tools of strategic stabilityÌı– quantitative and qualitative ceilings, inspections, and transparencyÌı–Ìıhave been discarded in favour of verticalÌınuclearÌıproliferation. NATO must navigate an environment whereÌıthe absence of constraints increases the risk of miscalculations, potentially leading to an unmanaged arms race that reduces the securityÌıfor allÌıNATO Allies.ÌıÌı

Context: The Long Transition and the Paradox of the New STARTÌı

TheÌıinternationalÌıarms control regime, which persisted through various systemic shifts from 1972 until 2026, has finally fractured. However, a rigorous assessmentÌıof its lifespanÌısuggests that the final pillar of this regime,Ìıthe New START,Ìıwas already flawed.ÌıÌıThis omission allowed Moscow to channel its modernization efforts toward lethal, MIRV-capable systems,Ìıwhile remaining formallyÌıcompliant toÌıthe treaty limit of 1,550 warheads.Ìı,ÌıMoscow’s StrategicÌıRocketÌıForces (RVSN) and the missile industry exploited this normativeÌı‘shield’Ìıto initiate a massiveÌı‘re-MIRVing’Ìıprocess. This modernization was driven by aÌıÌıwithin the Russian military-industrial complex. By focusing on systems that exploited New START’s qualitative loopholes, institutional actors, such as theÌı, secured long-term funding and development pathways for a new generation of delivery vehicles. This momentumÌıfacilitatedÌıthe emergence of a direct nexus between treaty-compliant modernization and the later deployment of advanced long-range capabilities on the Ukrainian battlefield.Ìı

The Strategic Trilemma between Extended Deterrence and the ‘Upload’ DisparityÌı

The end of New START has transformed the re-MIRVing process into a catalyst for a new arms race. In this new unconstrained environment, the US possesses a significant technical advantage. . If the US opts to utilize its technological edge, it would effectively out-deploy Moscow, potentially doubling its arsenal to levels above the failed treaty’s limits.  In response, Moscow may prioritize asymmetrical offset centred on long-range theatre strike capabilities. This likely reaction is deeply rooted in the bureaucratic momentum of Russian military-industrial complex, favouring dual capable systems that operate in regulatory grey zones.   

Defence, Resilience, and the Hypersonic Decision Gap

ÌıUnlike traditionalÌıICBMs, which allow for a 25-plus minutes warning window, a hypersonic system launched from central Europe can reach critical command nodes in Moscow in less than 10 minutes. ThisÌıÌıin decision time undermines de-escalatory signalling and placesÌıÌıon the adversary’s early warning systems, potentially triggering automated ‘launch on warning’ responses. Even a conventional strike on communications, command-and-control (C3) centres would be strategically relevant. Therefore,Ìıthe deployment of such systems in substantial numbers would create a ‘launch-on-warning’ incentive for Moscow, further destabilizing the offensive-defensiveÌıbalance and increasing the risk of automated nuclear response.ÌıÌı

Managing UncertaintyÌıin a Multipolar SystemÌı

Emerging from a Cold War environment coalesced around a bipolar international power-distribution, traditional arms control has proven ill-suited for the asymmetrical, multipolar international disorder of the last two decades.  In a world without inspections, stability depends on predictability. To achieve this goal, the international community must work to prevent accidental escalation through transparency and launch notifications. The reconstruction of a stabilizing framework is currently stymied by two primary structural hurdles: Russia’s current lack of trustworthiness and China’s strategic intentions.  

The main obstacle to reopening dialogue with Russia is the paradox of negotiating limits on the same systems being employed in the current war in Ukraine. It would be politically fraught for the US to engage in fresh negotiations, while Russia utilizes these assets as tool of active coercion and battlefield destruction. . This move puts Washington in an uneasy negotiating position, forcing it to negotiate over assets that France and the United Kingdom (UK) consider non-negotiable. This is hardly a novel tactic:  Putin’s proposal risks to exacerbate infra-systemic fault lines, foster suspects of decoupling, and ‘fears of abandonment’ between the US and its European Allies. Simultaneously, China’s strategic stalling (and its own ambitions to increase its arsenal) prevents the necessary transition toward a trilateral framework. By hiding behind the rhetoric of minimal deterrence, Beijing refuses to accept any oversight while rapidly expanding its nuclear and conventional inventory.  

While the American and Russian nuclear stockpiles greatly exceed those of all other nuclear-weapon states, the strategic equation has irrevocably shifted from a bipolar to a multipolar calculus through China’s ambitions to drastically increase its own arsenal.  These missiles provide Beijing with a high-precision, non-nuclear capability to hold regional strategic assets in the mire, including forward air bases, carrier strike groups, and command-and-control (C2) nodes.  This scenario of ‘conventional entanglement’ complicates the global force posture of NATO’s primary security provider, the US.   

Technological Acceleration: The AI-Hypersonic NexusÌı

The ‘Strategic Trilemma’ is further complicated by the integration ofÌıÌıand launch-control systems. As theÌıÌıthrough the deployment of Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs), the decision-making window for political leaders has shrunk from thirty minutes to mere seconds.Ìı.ÌıHowever, the ‘black-box’ nature of neural network-based AI introduces unprecedentedÌı. Because these models recognize patterns in ways that are non-replicable and often incomprehensible to human operators, they are prone to hallucinations or false positives – interpreting unusual atmospheric phenomena or cyber-spoofing as an incoming strike. In a strategic environment dominated by fast-flying systems like theÌıDark EagleÌıorÌıOreshnik, the reliance on AI-driven recommendations could lead to a ‘compressed escalation’ where a machineÌıinitiatesÌıa retaliatory strike before human deliberation even occurs. This technological entanglementÌınecessitatesÌıthat any futureÌıarmsÌıcontrol negotiations must deal not only with warheads and delivery systems, but also with the algorithms governing their employment.ÌıÌı

The Shift towards Integrated DeterrenceÌı

In response to this acceleration, NATO has transitioned toward a posture of integrated deterrence. With the expiration of New START in sight, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) moved to solidify the Alliance’s defensive architecture.  This strategic shift was codified on February 12, 2026, when several NATO Allies launched  to develop next-generation sensors designated to counter ballistic and hypersonic threats (like the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS)). These initiatives, alongside a new  for drone-based deep precision strike capability, signal a move away from static, treaty-based stability, toward a dynamic denial posture. Furthermore, the  reinforces this approach by emphasizing trans-regional deterrence, acknowledging that while NATO remains a regional alliance, its security is inextricably tied to the ‘two-peer’ challenge.  

Policy Recommendations:ÌıÌı

1. Rediscover a dual approach: Combine military modernization with a standingÌınegotiatingÌıofferÌıto both Russia andÌıChinaÌıon Strategic Stability Dialogue,Ìıwhich wouldÌılikely benefitÌıNATOÌıAlliance cohesion by reassuring the most risk-adverse NATOÌımemberÌıstates.ÌıÌı

2. Prioritize Qualitative Limits: Advocate for a Multilateral MIRV-freeze to mitigate first-strike incentives and neutralize the advantage of rapid uploading.ÌıÌıIn the post-START environment, the primary risk is no longer aggregate warheads counts, but the rapid surgeÌıinÌıcapacity,Ìıafforded by US upload potential and Russia’s modernization of MIRV-capable systems.ÌıA ‘freeze’ approach would be aimed at neutralizing the perceived advantages of rapid arsenal expansion, signalling a commitment to strategic sufficiency rather than theÌırecklessÌıpursuit of superiority.ÌıÌı

3. EstablishÌı‘Cold WarÌıPlus’ÌıCommunication Channels: Strengthen secure, real-time links between military headquarters to manage crisis in an era of hypersonic weapons.ÌıNATO should strengthen secure, real-time links between military headquarters – specificallyÌıthe Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)Ìıand the Russian Ministry of Defence – to manage crisis in an era defined by HGVs. These channels must be hardened against cyber-interferences and electronic warfare to ensure theyÌıremainÌıviableÌıduring high-intensity grey zone friction or hybrid confrontations.ÌıÌı

4. Manage AI Integration in Command and Control:ÌıEstablishÌı‘human-in-the-loop’ standards between launch commands and early warning systems toÌıpreventÌıAIÌısystemsÌıfrom triggering accidental escalation during high-speed hypersonic encounters.ÌıWhile AI may become indispensable for processing massive data streams from next-generationÌısensors like the HBTSS, it must neverÌıpossessÌıthe autonomous authority toÌıinitiateÌıa response. Hence, theÌıNATOÌıAlliance should champion an international protocol that mandatesÌıa ‘’ for human commanders, even in high-speed hypersonic confrontations.Ìı

5. Define a Clear Doctrine for Conventional Hypersonic: Clarify that systems likeÌıDark EagleÌıare forÌı,Ìıwhile acknowledging thatÌıÌıremainsÌıinherently destabilizing.ÌıNATO should explicitly disavow ‘decapitation’ or strategic nuclear roles for these assets to reduce the risk of Russia misperceiving conventional precision strikes as existential threats to itsÌıC2Ìıarchitecture.Ìı

6. Strengthen Hybrid Resilience: Protect undersea and digital infrastructure as a coreÌıcomponentÌıof strategic stability to preventÌıhybrid,Ìınon-kinetic bypassing of deterrence.ÌıBy neutralizing low-cost, high-impact hybrid threats, theÌıNATOÌıAlliance prevents adversaries from bypassing deterrence thresholdsÌıand undermining stability at the lowest level of the escalation ladder. This approach ensures that the emerging new capabilities in air, missile, and drone-defence would not beÌıcompromisedÌıby asymmetric disruption aimed at eroding domestic resilience and political will during a crisis.ÌıÌı

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Introduction

In 2025, the United States (US)-Türkiye relationship moved beyond the traditional logic of NATO Alliance cohesion and entered a phase of strategic bargaining. Once anchored almost exclusively in NATO solidarity and Cold War–era security imperatives, bilateral ties between the nations are now being increasingly shaped by two defining and interconnected issues: Türkiye’s calibrated position on the war in Ukraine and its growing relevance in the geopolitics of rare earth elements and critical minerals.¹ These dynamics reflect a broader transformation of the international system and intra-alliance dynamics in which great power competition, fragmented supply chains, and regional autonomy are increasingly overriding ideological alignment.  

For Washington, Türkiye remains indispensable but unreliable; for Ankara, the US is a necessary but constraining partner. The challenge for both sides is how to construct a functional partnership that accommodates a divergence of alignment while still delivering strategic value. Rare earth elements and Türkiye’s role in Ukraine offer precisely such a framework: material, interest-based, and adaptable to a world defined by competition with Russia and China. 

Türkiye, Ukraine, and the Logic of Strategic AutonomyÌı

Türkiye’s response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has crystallized its broader foreign policy doctrine. Ankara condemned the invasion, supported Ukraine’s territorial integrity, supplied Kyiv with military equipment, and closed the Turkish Straits to military traffic under the Montreux Convention. At the same time, it refused to impose sanctions on Russia and preserved energy, trade, and diplomatic ties with Moscow. 

This approach is often described in Washington as “â€� but from Ankara’s perspective, it is a rational expression of strategic autonomy.&²Ô²ú²õ±è;°Õü°ù°ì¾±²â±ğ&²Ô²ú²õ±è;views the war not only as a European security crisis but also a  with direct implications for its own stability, energy security, and economic resilience. Full alignment with Western sanctions would expose Türkiye to severe economic costs, exacerbate inflation, and jeopardize energy supplies, while full alignment with Russia would undermine its role in NATO. 

Türkiye’s early mediation efforts following the invasion of Ukraine have reinforced its self-image as an indispensable intermediary between Russia and the West. Unlike most NATO Allies, Ankara retains the ability to communicate credibly with both sides. For the US, this role is double-edged: it dilutes Alliance discipline but preserves a diplomatic channel with Russia that would otherwise not exist. 

US Expectations and Limits of Alliance DisciplineÌı

Throughout the second Trump presidency, the US has viewed the war in Ukraine less as a fundamental test of the rules-based international order and more as a measure of Allied burden-sharing and loyalty to US interests. Washington’s discard of normative alignment and expectations of tangible demonstrations of support carries deep implications for Türkiye that benefits substantially from NATO security guarantees. In this context, Ankara’s refusal to impose sanctions on Russia and its continued economic engagement with Moscow are not seen as violations of shared principles, but rather as opportunistic behaviour that undermines NATO cohesion and reinforces perceptions of Allies â€˜freeloading’ off US protection. 

Yet, these expectations reflect an older model of Alliance behaviour that is increasingly difficult to sustain. In a multipolar system, medium powers like Türkiye are less willing to subordinate their interests to bloc politics. Ankara’s behaviour in Ukraine is not an anomaly but a signal of how smaller and middle powers navigate systemic competition: hedging, mediating, and extracting leverage from multiple relationships simultaneously. 

This suggests that pressuring the Turkish government into full alignment may be counterproductive. Excessive coercion risks accelerating Ankara’s drift toward alternative partnerships, while reducing US influence over Turkish strategic choices. The challenge for Washington, therefore, is not to put an end to Turkish autonomy, but to channel it toward outcomes compatible with US interests. 

Rare EarthÌıElementsÌıand the New Geopolitics of Supply ChainsÌı

In October 2025, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced that Türkiye had identified the world’s second largest reserve of rare earth elements, containing an estimated 694 million tons of mineral resources in Beylikova, located in northwestern Türkiye. The discovery includes .&²Ô²ú²õ±è;°Õü°ù°ì¾±²â±ğ&²Ô²ú²õ±è; developing rare-earth reserves in western Anatolia with the US after similar talks with China and Russia were halted amid disagreements over control; it is also engaging with  on potential cooperation. Türkiye plans on building a refinery in Beylikova, which contains ore with more than 1% rare-earth oxide by weight.  In addition, Ankara plans to apply to the Australian Institute of Geoscientists for certification under the JORC Code, which sets minimum standards for how companies publicly report exploration results and would reveal the size of deposits for potential investors. 

Ankara’s talks with Western partners come as the US and the European Union (EU) step up efforts to reduce China’s dominance in the production and processing of rare earth elements. The Turkish government has sought to balance its ties with both the West and China amid growing global trade tensions. In September 2025, Türkiye joined a  led by the US and EU aimed at diversifying critical mineral supply chains; however, it has also been offered partner-country status to the BRICS group of emerging-market powers and attracted Chinese investment in electric vehicle production. In 2026, the EU  a new agreement with US and Japan to cooperate on critical raw materials supply chains.  

It is within this context that rare earth elements and critical minerals acquire strategic significance. The global competition over rare earth elements has become a central front in US-China geopolitical rivalry. China’s dominant position across extraction, processing, and downstream manufacturing of these elements represents a structural vulnerability for the US and its partners. For Ankara, cooperation supports its goal of moving up the global value chain, reducing reliance on external suppliers, and strengthening its role in strategic industries, such as defense systems, medical technologies, and consumer electronics. For Washington, Türkiye represents a politically and geographically viable partner in efforts to diversify supply chains for key technological and defence products while reducing dependence on China without concentrating production in a limited number of partner countries. 

Diversifying supply chains is therefore a national security imperative and Türkiye is increasingly relevant for three reasons: firstly, it possesses geological potential for rare earth elements and other strategic minerals; second, it has a substantial industrial base capable of supporting processing and manufacturing; and third, its geographic position makes it a hub connecting Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. 

Linking Rare EarthÌıElementsÌıand Ukraine: Strategic ComplementarityÌı

The intersection between cooperation on rare earth elements and Türkiye’s position on Ukraine is not coincidental. Both issues raise the same underlying question: how much strategic autonomy can Türkiye exercise while remaining embedded in the Western alliance structure?  

Economic interdependence in critical sectors creates incentives for alignment that political pressure alone cannot achieve. A structured US-Türkiye partnership on rare earth exploration, processing, and technology transfer would deepen mutual dependence, making a sharp geopolitical rupture less likely. Such cooperation would strengthen Türkiye’s stake in a Western-oriented economic order, indirectly shaping its calculations on Ukraine. While it would not compel Ankara to adopt sanctions or abandon mediation, it would raise costs of drifting too far from US strategic priorities. This logic is visible in US efforts to structure critical mineral partnerships with Ukraine, suggesting that resource cooperation is emerging as a broader instrument of strategic alignment rather than a case-specific initiative. 

Russia, China, andÌıTürkiye’s Hedging StrategyÌı

Türkiye’s approach to rare earths must also be understood in the context of its broader hedging strategy vis-à-vis Russia and China. Moscow remains a key energy supplier and a critical actor in the Black Sea, while Beijing is an increasingly important trade and investment partner for Türkiye. 

China’s dominance in the rare earth industry presents Ankara with both an opportunity and a constraint. On the one hand, Chinese investment and technology are an attractive prospect for developing Türkiye’s mineral sector. On the other, excessive reliance on China would undermine Türkiye’s aspiration for strategic autonomy and expose it to geopolitical pressure from its Western partners A US-Türkiye partnership on rare earth elements offers Ankara an alternative path â€“ one that diversifies external dependencies. For Washington, engaging with Türkiye reduces the likelihood that Ankara will default to China. 

Türkiye’s value extends well beyond economics. Its control of access to the Black Sea, close proximity to Ukraine, Russia, and the Middle East, and strong military capabilities make it a cornerstone of NATO’s southern and eastern flanks. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has reinforced the strategic importance of the Black Sea as a contested space where naval power, energy routes, and regional stability intersect. Türkiye’s enforcement of the Montreux Convention has limited Russian naval reinforcement and demonstrated Ankara’s capacity to shape the operational environment without direct military confrontation. This contribution, though often overlooked, has tangible value for Ukraine, the US and other NATO Allies. Maintaining Türkiye’s integration within NATO is therefore essential, even as undercurrents persist. Cooperation on rare earth elements complements this objective by reinforcing Türkiye’s embeddedness in the Western order. 

Scenarios for the Evolution of US-Türkiye RelationsÌı

Several trajectories could shape US-Türkiye relations in the coming years. 

Scenario 1: Strategic Convergence Through Economic Anchoring 

In this scenario, the US and Türkiye deepen cooperation on rare earth elements and other critical minerals, integrating cooperation with broader collaboration in defense technologies, energy transition, and industrial policy. Deepening economic interdependence would help stabilize the bilateral relationship and provide a practical framework for managing political differences. Türkiye would continue to act as a semi-autonomous NATO Ally â€“ aligned with the US on core security interests, while retaining flexibility in its diplomatic engagement with other powers and partners. 

Scenario 2: Strategic Drift and Competitive Hedging 

If cooperation on rare earth elements fails to materialize and political tensions over Ukraine intensify, Türkiye may deepen its ties with Russia and China. In this scenario, Ankara’s mediation role loses value for Washington, and the relationship becomes increasingly transactional and distrustful. NATO cohesion weakens, and supply chain cooperation shifts elsewhere. 

Scenario 3: Managed Autonomy and Functional Partnership 

In the most realistic scenario, the US accepts Türkiye’s strategic autonomy while selectively deepening cooperation in areas of high mutual value, particularly rare earth elements and Black Sea security.&²Ô²ú²õ±è;°Õü°ù°ì¾±²â±ğ&²Ô²ú²õ±è;continues to mediate Ukraine, and Washington leverages this role pragmatically, even as political differences persist. 

Policy Options for the United States 

US policy toward Türkiye should place cooperation on rare earth elements and critical minerals at the centre of the bilateral agenda, elevating it to a strategic pillar within broader efforts to reduce supply chain dependence on China. This would require the adoption of concrete measures, including investment, technology sharing, and regulatory coordination. At the same time, Washington should continue to reassess Türkiye’s approach to Ukraine by focusing more on practical outcomes, recognizing that Ankara’s efforts and selective support for Kyiv can contribute to regional stability in ways that rigid conformity may not. Strengthening high-level institutional dialogue that links security, economic, and industrial policy would help reduce misunderstandings and prevent tensions from overshadowing the broader relationship. Finally, the US should reaffirm Türkiye’s central role within NATO while accepting that member country cohesion in a multipolar environment will inevitably involve tension and diversity in policies and approaches,  

Conclusion: From Alignment to Strategic InterdependenceÌı

The US-Türkiye relationship in 2025 highlights how NATO may increasingly be shaped by pragmatism and negotiated interests, alongside â€“ but not replaced by â€“ shared values and ideological affinity. In this context, values remain relevant but may no longer be sufficient on their own to sustain strategic partnerships. Instead, cooperation is structured through selective interdependence across security, economic, and technological domains. Türkiye’s calibrated approach to Ukraine and its growing role in rare earth elements and critical mineral supply chains should therefore be seen as interdependent strategies, offering broader theoretical insights regarding contemporary alliance patterns. 

For the US, this shift may require a recalibration of expectations. The ultimate choice is not between accepting Turkish autonomy or attempting to impose alliance discipline, but between shaping that autonomy through sustained engagement or allowing it to evolve in ways increasingly misaligned with US interests. Treating Türkiye’s behaviour as a problem of non-compliance risks overlooking the structural forces driving Ankara’s decisions. A strategy centred on pressure alone is unlikely to succeed and may intensify Türkiye’s temptations to turn toward alternative partnerships. Instead, over time, deepening interdependence could play a stabilizing role, mitigate political disputes and increase the costs of strategic divergence on both sides. 

Ultimately, in an era defined by multipolar competition and systemic rivalry, resilience will depend more on flexible, interest-based cooperation. The combination of cooperation on rare earth elements and pragmatic engagement on Ukraine offers a framework through which the US and NATO can adapt their approach to Türkiye without relinquishing core strategic objectives. By prioritizing realism, mutual benefit, and long-term interdependence, Washington can help ensure that Türkiye remains a pivotal â€” if unconventional â€” partner, capable of contributing to Western security and economic resilience in an increasingly fragmented world. 

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Introduction

In recent years, Europe’s geopolitical centre of gravity has shifted toward the Northeast, with the Baltic region emerging as a . As , the Organization’s member countries are increasingly focused on deterrence and defence. Traditional conceptions of deterrence are constructed around three pillars: . This memo focuses on the second “Câ€� â€“ credibility â€“ by examining prospects for strengthening the resilience of NATO’s military supply chains in the Baltic region through defence industrial cooperation between the three enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) framework nations (Canada, Germany, and the United Kingdom (UK)) and the three host nations (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia). 

As a response to Russia’s military aggression and hybrid warfare against Ukraine since 2014, the 2016 NATO Warsaw summit marked a significant step towards reinforcing the security of the Baltic region. Canada, Germany, and the UK assumed leadership as framework nations for eFP battlegroups in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, respectively. While the eFP signals a strong multinational Allied presence in the Baltic states, lessons from Ukraine since 2022 inevitably raise critical questions: is NATO ready to fight for a prolonged period? And can NATO secure supply chains so that they remain close to the war fighters? 

This policy brief first analyses how resilient supply chains lay the foundation for credible long-term deterrence. Second, it examines the role and prospects of defence industrial cooperation between eFP framework nations and host nations, before finally concluding with three concrete policy recommendations.  

WhyÌıDoesÌıSecurity of Supply Matter?Ìı

There is an old saying attributed to Dwight. E. Eisenhower that . It is also true that , as each nation brings its own peculiarities while the combined force must act as a single organization. To put this into perspective, the Canadian-led NATO Multinational Brigade in Latvia (formerly, the eFP battlegroup) is composed of 14 nations, making it NATO’s  military unit. 

Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, NATO began scaling the three eFP battlegroups in the Baltics into brigade-sized units. Germany’s 45^th Panzer brigade has been relocated to Lithuania and is expected to achieve . Canada is also considering  in Latvia.  

Regardless of how its war against Ukraine ends, Russia will remain an existential security threat to the Baltic states. To deter and, if necessary, defend against Russia in the Baltic region, NATO Allies â€“ especially the eFP framework nations â€“ must demonstrate both the capacity and the resolve to fight alongside the host nations for as long as it takes to defend NATO territory. This, in turn, requires a continuous and resilient flow of supplies through to the battlefield.  

While experts have called for the  to sustain operational capability in the longer term, this approach has clear limitations – most importantly because stockpiles are finite in the event of a prolonged conflict. To secure an uninterrupted supply, it is essential to develop local defence industrial capacities. 

Security of supply extends beyond the availability of raw materials and manufacturing components. Latvia’s  defines security of supply as a guarantee of access to the materiel and services required by the National Armed Forces to fulfil its tasks. This understanding emphasizes that the defence industrial base is an integral part of comprehensive defence strategy across the peace-crisis-war spectrum. It also implies that the defence industries of eFP host nations must be able to supply not only their national militaries but also Allied armed forces. However, defence industries in the Baltic states, while growing rapidly, are still relatively nascent, and there may not be sufficient latent industrial capacity to scale up production quickly in time of crisis.  

Failure to secure military supply chains would pose strategic risks that are particularly acute given the geographic characteristics of the Baltic states. A close proximity to Russia and reliance on the roughly 65km-wide  to link the region to the rest of Europe exacerbate supply vulnerabilities. To ensure that NATO forces deployed in the region can fight a prolonged war, it is necessary to establish short, resilient, and regionally-anchored military supply chains and, at the same time, to deepen defence industrial cooperation between the eFP framework nations and host nations. 

Enhancing the Enhanced Forward PresenceÌı

The  posits that the Baltic states constitute a single area of operations. This means that regional cooperation should be understood as a key enabler of credible deterrence and effective defence. This logic applies not only to trilateral Baltic cooperation but also among all Allies deployed in the region.  

To improve coordination between the three framework nations and the three host nations, the  was launched in 2023. Although it was originally envisaged as a platform for political and strategic dialogue in areas of common interest, such as training and exercises, it also holds untapped potential to serve as a venue for industrial cooperation and joint supply chain management. 

There are already examples of bilateral cooperation in this area. Recently, the Latvian Ministry of Defence signed a  (MoU) with the Canadian Commercial Corporation â€“ Canada’s government-to-government contracting agency –  concerning bilateral cooperation in military equipment, services, infrastructure, and industry. 

However, since the Baltics consider themselves to be a single area of operations, a broader relationship of regional cooperation between the framework and host nations is needed. Dialogue must take place at all levels – political, strategic, operational, tactical, as well as between defence industries. Regular information sharing and practical measures to harmonize defence investment and industrial policies will strengthen the security of supply and help forge new defence industrial partnerships.

WhatÌıDo Host Nations Have to Offer?Ìı

The three host nations are  in NATO. With defence budgets reaching 5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2026, the Baltic states are actively developing local defence industrial capabilities. In recent years, . There are notable success stories, such as the production of  and subsequent expansion into assembly and maintenance of more advanced systems such as . Nevertheless, the Baltic defence industries remain primarily focused on niche technological areas and generally lack the scale to support full production cycles of heavy armaments or other advanced military systems. At the same time, their relatively small size makes Baltic defence industries flexible, innovation-oriented, and able to rapidly adapt. 

This environment creates opportunities for foreign defence companies to enter the market and address the existing gaps in cooperation with local partners. As of 2025, all three framework nations allocate at least 2% of GDP to defence and have committed to increase defence expenditure up to 5% of GDP by 2035. Consequently, there is a strong push to build homegrown . 

Recently, German defence companies have been particularly active in the Baltic states. For example,  to establish 155mm artillery ammunition production facilities. More recently, Lithuania Defense Services, a joint venture established in 2022 by Rheinmetall and KNDS Germany, announced plans to .  

 and  are also pursuing ambitious efforts to expand their defence industrial capacities. For example, a Canadian company  to establish assembly lines for its BlackWolf tactical armoured vehicles in Latvia. Of the three eFP framework nations, such partnerships are especially relevant for Canada given the geographical distance between Canada and the Baltic region. Partnering Canadian defence industry with local companies in Latvia not only facilitates access to new markets but also helps build viable defence industrial capacity in the Baltic states for warfighting purposes, especially in a prolonged conflict.  

This logic extends beyond the manufacture of original equipment to also encompass access to critical components and materials. For example, last year the Canadian company â€“ a component that is essential for sensors and electronic systems widely used in defence technology, such as aircraft, missiles, and drones. 

The new geopolitical reality, growing defence budgets, and commitment to develop defence industrial capabilities underscore the need to coordinate defence investment and industrial policies within the 3+3 format. Such coordination would help secure military supply chains precisely where they are needed the most. This approach would align with broader NATO efforts to ramp up defence industrial capacities, such as  and .  

Conclusions andÌıRecommendationsÌı

Secured supply chains through defence industrial cooperation are not just desirable; they are a strategic necessity for credible deterrence. Since its creation, , from which the defence industries of framework and host nations stand to benefit. 

To harness the potential of defence industrial cooperation within the 3+3 format, the policymakers in the three framework nations and the three host nations should consider the following actions: 

1. Expand the Scope of 3+3 Format to Include Defence Industrial Cooperation.  

TheÌı3+3ÌıagendaÌıshouldÌıbeÌıbroadened byÌıhavingÌıregular meetings of keyÌırepresentativesÌı– such asÌıNational Armaments DirectorsÌı–Ìıfrom the Baltic states, Canada, Germany, and theÌıUKÌıto promote dialogue, coordinate policies,Ìıand identify opportunitiesÌıforÌıdefence industrial cooperation andÌıstrengtheningÌısecurity of supplyÌıacross the region.ÌıÌı

2. Establish an Annual 3+3 Defence Industry Forum.  

To facilitate the establishment of cross-border partnerships between defence companies, regular and open dialogue is essential. As several bilateral defence industry events already exist, a dedicated 3+3 Defence Industry Forum could be built on these foundations, providing a multilateral platform for collaboration. 

3. D±ğ±¹±ğ±ô´Ç±è&²Ô²ú²õ±è;¸é±ğ²µ¾±´Ç²Ô²¹±ô±ô²â&²Ô²ú²õ±è;´¡²Ô³¦³ó´Ç°ù±ğ»å&²Ô²ú²õ±è;±Ê°ù´Ç»å³Ü³¦³Ù¾±´Ç²Ô&²Ô²ú²õ±è;°ä²¹±è²¹³¦¾±³Ù¾±±ğ²õ.   

Host nations and framework nations should invest in new production facilities and reinforce supply chains for the militaries deployed in the Baltic region. Framework nations’ defence industry national champions should take a leading role and integrate host nations’ defence industries into regional supply chains. This approach would promote transfer of knowledge and technology, as well as strengthen the overall capacity to sustain operations over a prolonged period. 

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Executive Summary

Authoritarian states are increasingly using police organizations to target diaspora communities in democratic countries. This is especially evident in the misuse of Interpol’s Red Notice system to bypass extradition barriers and pursue dissidents abroad. When politically motivated notices are dispersed through Canadian policing systems, they risk compromising the integrity of international law enforcement cooperation, increasing the likelihood of refoulement which violates Canada’s legal obligations, and exacerbates a chilling effect among diaspora communities. In doing so, these notices expose the vulnerabilities in Canada’s domestic protections by allowing foreign states the ability to project coercive influence through Canadian political institutions.  

While this brief focuses on the misuse of INTERPOL mechanisms as a specific form of Transnational Repression (TR), it sits within a broader context of state-led repression ranging from the People’s Republic of China to India. It uses Tajikistan as a case study to highlight vulnerabilities in INTERPOL’s vetting process, including insufficient pre-screening and the burden placed on victims to prove their innocence. These weaknesses enable states to exploit Canadian institutions to harass and deport political refugees, a practice known as Transnational Repression (TR).  

TR has occurred in Canada, demonstrating the urgent need for a governmental response.  The focus of this policy brief is on the use of INTERPOL to target dissidents. To address these challenges, this brief proposes specific procedural enhancements to protect the asylum process and strengthen pre-existing domestic protections to protect Canada’s diaspora communities. 

To read the full policy brief, use the button below to download the full policy memo.

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Introduction

Recent think tank and policy discussionsÌıaboutÌıtheÌıRussianÌıFederationÌıhave primarily focused on three issues: the prospects of a peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine;Ìıdevelopments on the battlefield;Ìıand the limits of Russia’s resilience to Western economic sanctions (). While these questions are undoubtedly centralÌıto the ongoing war, they risk obscuring a critical dimension of European securityÌı–Ìıthat is, the future of enemy politics, orÌı“enemization,â€�ÌıinÌıpost-war Russia.Ìı

In this policy brief, enemization refers to the systematic construction and reproduction of internal and external enemy images by political elites and state-controlled media, framing so-called “enemiesâ€� as existential threats to national survival, identity, and sovereignty. Enemization serves crucial political functions such as legitimizing authoritarian governance, mobilizing public support for repressive and confrontational domestic and foreign policies (; ). While enemization has radicalized during the war against Ukraine, it reflects a broader and longer-standing pattern in Russian politics. Even if the war ends, enemization is likely to remain one of the central organizing frameworks shaping how Russian political discourse interprets international relations, if an authoritarian regime continues. In this case, the European Union (EU) is likely to continue being framed as an adversary, limiting prospects for stable post-war engagement across Eurasia and sustaining long-term security risks.  

Therefore, understanding how enemization functions, why it persists, and how it shapes Russia’s postwar behaviour is essential for developing realistic and effective EU policy responses. Even though enemization also occurs in other countries of various political systems, the case of Russia â€“ as a neighbouring country that has demonstrated willingness to use force â€“ plays substantial relevance for European security. This policy brief examines the persistence of enemization in Russia and evaluates its implications for European security and long-term post-war engagement, arguing that under conditions of continued authoritarian rule, enemy narratives are likely to remain a durable feature of Russian politics regardless of war outcomes or leadership configurations.

Continuity andÌıEscalation ofÌıEnemizationÌıin RussiaÌı

Enemization in Russia has been a recurring feature of Russian public discourse since at least the 1990s, when political, social, and economic instability revived threat and enemy perceptions, conspiracy theories, and nostalgia for “glorious pastâ€� and a strong state (Gudkov 2005¹; ). The Chechen wars and terrorist attacks further reinforced enemy framing, while trust in military and security institutions, including the presidency, grew stronger (Gudkov 2005). Under Putin, negative mobilization of the population around the ideas of enemies, threats, and other symbolic constituents of the besieged fortress narrative has become a core component of regime communication and governance (; ).  

Enemization dynamics are visible in concrete rhetorical and legislative practices. Russian propaganda, following a long-established Soviet mechanism of using references to Nazis or Fascists to delegitimize political opponents (), routinely frames Ukraine as a “Nazi regimeâ€� (), or Western values as aimed to destroy Russian culture, while domestic opposition and various social minorities are labelled as foreign agents, traitors, or extremists. Legislative measures continue to limit human rights and freedoms of these alleged enemies (), while intensifying public glorification of wartime sacrifices and spreading binary logic of enmity into education and other spheres of social life.  

The full-scale invasion of Ukraine represents the culmination of the enemization in Russian public discourse. To justify aggressive foreign policies and domestic repressions against its own citizens, the Russian regime has strengthened and radicalized its propaganda of enmity. Russian social surveys results, although requiring cautious interpretation, consistently demonstrate a widespread public endorsement, usually between 70 and 80% of respondents, of enemy images portraying Russia as a besieged fortress surrounded by hostile actors (). These enemy images are reflected in official state communications and state media framing of Ukraine as a “Nazi regimeâ€�; the West as seeking Russia’s collapse; and active narration of foreign agents and traitors among domestic political opposition and other social groups such as religious and sexual minorities. Such narratives reinforce the perception of existential threats to the Russian worldview – also commonly referred to as Ruskiy Mir â€“ and legitimize aggressive foreign policies and repressions at home.  

Although questions remain as to what extent Russian elites genuinely believe in these enemy narratives or opportunistically instrumentalize them, public opinion data shows widespread support of enemy perceptions with official messaging (). Even if the Russian regime adopts less confrontational rhetoric, the institutionalization and long-term reproduction of enemy narratives across political discourse, media, and education may suggest that such perceptions will persist at least for a certain period. This persistence reflects not an inherent social disposition, but rather the cumulative effect of sustained propaganda of enmity which resonates, among other things, with certain popular – though not uniform – perceptions, biases, opinions, and worldviews present within a society (). For Europe, this means that rhetorical moderation alone should not be read as evidence of rapid de-escalation, since the drivers reproducing enemy narratives may remain in place after the formal conclusion of the war. 

TheÌıDrivers ofÌıPost-WarÌıEnemizationÌıin RussiaÌı

Enemization in Russia should not be understood as a temporary wartime social and political mobilization tool, but as a longstanding political instrument and condition. First, a substantial and meaningful reversal of enemy narratives would require a major disruption of the Russian political and informational environment that sustains it. Second, enemization in wartime Russia predates the war and has become institutionalized in Russian politics throughout history. The routinized enemy narratives tend to be self-reinforcing, shaping public expectations and interpretations even after the immediate conditions that intensified them have changed. Finally, enemization is closely linked to a broader narrative of confrontation with the West, within which the war against Ukraine is framed as a separate episode in a bigger geopolitical struggle (); a particular possible scenario if Putin remains in power. Thus, even if hostilities end, the drivers that reinforce enemization are likely to persist, allowing enemy narratives remain in place and manifest.  

Although military outcomes of the war against Ukraine remain obscure, they will likely shape the tone and targets of Russian enemization in distinct ways while keeping the underlying logic intact. Russian authorities will likely declare any war outcomes as victorious, and such declarations will reinforce enemization by legitimizing the use of military force as an effective foreign policy instrument, and the use of repression as an effective domestic policy instrument (); both are based on the perception of enemies and threats. If the war ends in a prolonged stalemate without clear successes and lines drawn, the Kremlin could credibly sell narratives to the population; enemization may shift from triumphalist to resentful tones, picturing Russia as constrained or undermined by hostile external and internal forces which prevented the country from achieving a complete victory. Finally, possible military defeat could intensify revanchist narratives and scapegoating directed at already constructed enemies. Thus, across these outcomes, enemization is likely to be adapted and reformulated but not abandoned. 

One may hope that substantial regime change may positively affect enemization by beginning its partial or even full demobilization. This unlikely possibility requires us to look deeper into the phenomenon. While political leadership in autocratic Russia shapes policy choices, enemization also draws on pre-existing historical perceptions and biases in parts of society; rather than inventing enemies from scratch, Russian propaganda amplifies and rearticulates such narratives by promoting the most useful ones in a given political context (Gudkov 2005). These enemy narratives are embedded in state institutions, public expectations about politics, security, and national identity. As a result, Russian political elites operate within pre-determined moral boundaries that constrain the range of discursive options, including how enemies are defined, justified, and, if needed, de-enemized (). Even in the event of elite change, successor elites would likely be motivated to maintain at least elements of familiar narratives of enemization to avoid accusations of weakness, betrayal, and capitulation, especially from those we define as ultra-patriotic and nationalist radicals. In turn, to secure some stability amidst the leadership’s change, the new elites may find it easier to reproduce familiar enemy constructs, instead of dismantling them altogether, as historical experience in post-Soviet Russia in the 1990s suggests.   

To conclude, post-war Russia is likely to remain dependent on enemization as a policy instrument across a range of plausible war outcomes. While the specific targets and intensity of enemization may shift, the institutional framework that supports them will likely persist. Even a regime change would not automatically disband enemy narratives as the new elites may face strong incentive to continue employing in some way such enemy rhetoric to secure their own power. That is why Europe should prepare for a strong possibility to deal with Russia, in which enemization remains politically usable even if its form evolves over time.

PolicyÌıImplications andÌıRecommendations for EuropeÌı

As demonstrated above, enemization depends on propaganda’s resonance with pre-existing social and historical biases and perceptions. State messages about a hostile West or treacherous domestic political opposition draw much of its legitimacy from this resonance. Accordingly, it is unlikely that certain changes in European policies or rhetoric would suffice to transform elite threat messaging. Despite contemporary censorship conditions in Russia, however, European actions remain visible and preferable to at least some segments of Russian society. Therefore, Europe should prioritize reaching Russian society directly through its policies to mitigate enemization narratives. Even though Europe cannot directly dismantle enemization narratives within Russia, EU policies could influence the credibility and resonance of such narratives while showing that it does not consider Russian society as a whole to be a threat nor an actor to be punished.  

1. European post-war strategic communication planning should aim for long-term deterrence over rapid or even gradual normalization.  

Europe needs to base their post-war planning on the assumption that enemization in Russia will persist after the end of active hostilities in Ukraine and that it will affect Russian foreign and domestic political agendas. Although the EU has already invested substantial resources in becoming more independent from Russian energy and raw materials, as well as in its military industrial complex, such planning also requires a well-planned discursive strategy of communicating with not only the Russian regime or state elites, but Russian society as a whole. Expectations that Russia will become more pacifist and less prone to use militant instruments due to its losses in Ukraine appear to be wishful thinking, so it is essential to embrace the opposite possibility to manage the security effects of this enemization. 

2. Utilize discursive restraint in official communication.  

European officials should avoid using rhetorical frames in public speeches and documents that portray Russia as a civilizational enemy or a permanently hostile society. This, however, by no means implies that the official rhetoric needs to be softened towards the Russian government â€“ the condemnation of Russian aggression is necessary and justified. Discursive restraint, suggested here as the policy instrument, should be understood not as conciliation but rather as a tool to limit the discursive reproduction of enemization.  

3. Clearly differentiate between the Russian regime and the population.  

Although the issue of moral responsibility of the society in an authoritarian regime for the crimes committed throughout the war is a subject of academic and political debates, avoiding the narrative of collective responsibility may be beneficial, specifically in this case of mitigating the risks of enemization for European security. Messaging that brings together the regime and the population contributes to the regime’s claim that it represents the nation as a whole and validates narratives of collective punishment and guilt. This in turn leads to consolidation of the Russian public around their leaders or, at the very least, around the narratives framing Europe as a threat and enemy to Russians.  

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