The issue

In November 2023, Latvia ratified the , a core international treaty which aims to prevent violence towards women, including domestic and sexual violence. The Istanbul Convention has since then been at the centre of a contentious political debate in Latvia, becoming a in Latvia’s cultural wars, and bringing about a clash of ideologies on gender, nationality, and constitutional issues.

The debate on the Istanbul Convention reflects a broader shift in societal values and political loyalties in Latvia. On 30 October 2025, a majority vote in the Saeima (Latvia’s parliament) to denounce the Istanbul Convention unexpectedly succeeded, as one of the partners in the ruling coalition – Union of Greens and Farmers – . The vote led to public protests: on October 29, at least 5,000 people protested outside the Saeima against Latvia’s withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention; on November 6, at least 10,000 protested at Dome Square in Riga, organizing a petition with more than 67,000 signatures. A veto by has put the issue on the back burner until after the parliamentary elections scheduled for early October 2026. Depending on the results of that election, to withdraw from the Istanbul Convention.

This policy brief aims to examine how disinformation narratives and radicalization risks emerged and evolved throughout the public debate on the Istanbul Convention in Latvia from 2023 to 2025. For each phase (the ratification phase in 2023; the withdrawal mobilization phase in 2025; and the post-decision phase in late-2025), the study reviews the 15 most popular Facebook posts and the 80 most liked comments (a total of 45 posts and 240 comments) by manually coding them for narrative type, emotional intensity, disinformation indicators, and evidence of radicalization. This methodological approach was chosen to select a representative but manageable sample of a highly visible discourse. The policy brief is structured as a three-phase analysis of the debate, followed by a synthesis of findings and concluding remarks.

Phase 1: Ratification and Immediate Online Backlash (2023)

Division and debate over the Istanbul Convention appeared immediately after the Latvian parliament voted – by incredibly slim margins – to ratify the Convention on November 30, 2023. Women’s rights organizations and liberal bloggers in Latvia saw this as proof of . On the other hand, an ardent anti-Convention movement sprang up in social networks, claiming that ratifying the Conventions was a betrayal of national interests and gender values. Furthermore, right-wing politicians publicly criticized lawmakers for violating Latvian values in support of the Convention.

The anti-Convention group was represented in public declarations by the former social welfare minister Ramona Petraviča, who argued that “.” In monitoring disinformation about the Convention, included many misconceptions about the Convention circulating in the last quarter of 2023. On Facebook and on Latvian blogging sites, rumors spread about new policies to be gay at school; about gender reassignment surgeries taking place at the age of 14 without parents’ consent for children interested in such procedures; and about . Such misinformation, usually centered around the were disseminated by right-leaning bloggers such as musician Kaspars Pudniks and author Vija Beinerte, who both claimed that ratifying the Convention would involve teaching in schools about gender transition .

Thus, the showed considerable polarization, moving away from its actual goal of combating domestic violence. Instead of focusing on the objectives of the Istanbul Convention, the online discussion turned into a moral battle between those who claimed to defend traditional gender values and those who were perceived to represent a radical liberal agenda. In this regard, the ratification of the Istanbul Convention fueled cultural conflicts online, thereby undermining positive communication and discussions on how to end domestic violence.

Phase 2: Disinformation Surge and Withdrawal Campaign (2025)

Latvia’s ratification of the Istanbul Convention remained a key issue for Latvian far-right movements thorough the post-ratification period. This opposition reached a new level in September 2025, when started a campaign advocating for the withdrawal of Latvia from the Istanbul Convention. The political movement initiated a flood of conspiratorial posts on social media platforms and messaging applications. Facebook continued to be the central platform wherein these posts were made, but heated debates also took place on Telegram and TikTok, where messaging was aimed at specific target groups. in the online disinformation campaign. His Facebook posts in 2025 clearly demonstrated the use of shifting the debate from the Convention’s legal purpose of preventing violence against women and domestic violence to alleged threats to children, the “natural family”, national sovereignty, and traditional values. A group of started a campaign advocating for the withdrawal of Latvia from the Istanbul Convention. The political movement initiated a flood of conspiratorial posts on social media platforms and messaging applications.

Šlesers has himself claimed, without any evidence in the treaty text, that the Istanbul Convention forces the on Latvia, which aims to “threaten the natural family.” This video represents another case of complex problems being reduced to ‘us vs. them’ dichotomies, fostering polarization and discord in society. According to research done by , platforms like TikTok and YouTube are flooded with memes about culture wars as well as general fear-mongering content. This finding fits with the posting trend of Šlesers and others in this group, who lashed out at progressive actors being “[]/global gangsters” – often pairing these posts with accompanying memes and manipulated photos – in addition to their specific opposition to the Convention.

For instance, Linda Liepiņa, a parliament member of the Latvia First Party who originally advocated for the ratification of the Convention in 2023, also began to criticize the Convention on Facebook and Telegram. , which was delivered in the Saeima and reached large audiences online, claiming that a “foreign ideology tries to creep into our everyday lives” and that “what’s abnormal will be declared normal.” She also argued that “.” Another MP, Mārcis Jencītis, also a member of the Latvia First Party, called the Convention a “,” a term that was subsequently .

By mid-2025, anti-Convention-related online activism increased; yet, the shift in parliamentary voting was mainly caused by political trends that developed at the time. In the period from 2023 to 2025, splits in the ruling coalition in the Saeima became more pronounced, and some MPs readjusted their stances because of pressure from conservative groups and their voters. Furthermore, the problem became more politically relevant and was recast by the opposition in terms of the issues of sovereignty and values, which resonated with the pre-election discourse.

At the same time, continuous online activism contributed to perceptions of growing popular dissent, which affected the decisions of many MPs and forced them to change their stances, especially among those whose constituencies were electorally competitive. By 2025, supporting withdrawal from the European Convention became a useful political tool to reach out to conservatives and demonstrate a distinct position,

Phase 3: President’s Intervention and Digital Aftermath (Late 2025)

The Saeima’s vote in late October to withdraw from the Convention was a shock to many Latvians and reflected and a high level of polarization in Latvian politics. The result also surprised President Edgars Rinkēvičs, who declined to sign the bill into law and instead called for a period of reflection. On the 5th and 6th of November, the Saeima agreed to postpone the decision until the next parliamentary term, that is, after the 2026 election scheduled for early October. The online reactions to these moves were mixed, with at the decision. Supporters of the Convention , with Prime Minister Evika Silina posting on her Facebook page that the decision to postpone the decision

This intervention effectively stalled Latvia’s exit from the Istanbul Convention, throwing a lifeline to supporters and provoking a new wave of hostile . Online, Rinkēvičs’ move was met with an outpouring of both relief and vitriol – reflecting entrenched polarization. On one side, women’s rights organizations and liberal civil society celebrated the veto as a courageous step against populism. Activists like Beata Jonite of the MARTA Centre – an organization that provides specialized support to victims of domestic violence and human trafficking – shared the President’s message via social media. Jonite, who had been posting on TikTok and Instagram throughout the fall to debunk myths and rally youth support, posted an emotional TikTok video thanking Rinkēvičs for “.” That video garnered tens of thousands of views and comments expressing sentiments like “Finally, sanity prevails!” and “Thank you, President!” Meanwhile, a Manabalss.lv petition urging the President to gathered over 67,000 signatures .

Based on public opinion polls on the issue, Latvian society has not been divided into two clear camps, despite the polarization that appears online. In reality, there appears to be a relatively large segment of the population that is opposed to withdrawal, a relatively small segment of the population that is in favour of withdrawal, and a large segment of the population that is undecided. carried out in May 2023 by Berg Research indicate a high level of public support for the ratification of the Convention, with 71% of the total number of respondents showing their approval in May; the results of the survey conducted in June 2023 among Latvian citizens show a similar level of support, with 73% of the total number of respondents showing their approval.

These results show that support for the Convention among the general public was relatively strong in terms of the . In contrast, the Berg Research survey conducted in October 2025 shows that there was greater division among respondents in terms of their positions but not necessarily polarization. Specifically, 49% of respondents were against withdrawing from the Convention, 31% were in favor of it, and 20% were still undecided. These results support the position of this policy brief that the rhetoric surrounding the issue has been able to produce the illusion of greater polarization compared to what public opinion figures actually show. While anti-Convention narratives had gained a lot of traction and emotional appeal online, public opinion was actually more complex and could be influenced by both political parties involved.

Emotional Sentiment and Ideological Framing in Latvia’s Istanbul Convention Debate

The force of public engagement may thus be seen as emanating from the change in the nature of the Convention, from being primarily a legal document dealing with violence against women to becoming a symbol representing a number of emotionally charged topics, including children, family, nationhood, sovereignty, and skepticism toward political elites. The shift served to increase the potency of the disinformation narrative, which was no longer tied to any deep familiarity with the text of the Convention but, instead, tapped into preexisting emotions

and value differences. Hence, the case represents one more feature of modern Latvian online political communication: the tendency for a complicated policy issue to quickly transform into a medium for simplified culture wars, where emotion and suspicion often outweigh law and facts.

According to Google Trends data, public interest in the Istanbul Convention remained relatively low from early 2023 to the point where a strong surge occurred towards the end of 2025. These findings of increased searches towards the end of 2025 do correspond with renewed political struggles and mobilization efforts in the form of mass protests and intensive debates within parliament on withdrawing from the Convention. One of the most interesting findings is how public interest is geographically distributed regarding the searches conducted, where smaller towns (Inčukalns, Lielvārde, Ozolnieki, Garkalne, and Sigulda) show the greatest levels of activity.

Figure 1. Google Trends search interest in the Istanbul Convention in Latvia, 2023- 2025.

Figure 2. Geographic distribution of Google searches related to the Istanbul Convention in Latvia.

The data indicates that online engagement has not been isolated to Riga and major cities, as rural communities are just as likely to search for this topic online.

The analysis of the discourse on the Istanbul Convention on Facebook in Latvia reveals a clear pattern of coordinated disinformation, emotionally polarized audiences, and radicalization of political discourse. The dominant discourse against the Istanbul Convention is based on three distinct narratives: (1) the notion that the Convention promotes a dangerous “gender ideology” that undermines traditional morality and family values (45% of the analyzed content); (2) the idea that the Convention is an external threat to national sovereignty and legal independence of Latvia (30%); and (3) the notion that the Convention has no practical benefits in combating violence and instead distracted from legitimate issues, such as the rights of the LGBT community (20%). The dominant disinformation in the discourse on the Istanbul Convention in Latvia was not peripheral; instead, it was central to the dominant discourse.

The persistence of disinformation, such as the trope of the ‘117 genders,’ the claim that the Convention would replace the words ‘mother’ and ‘father’ with ‘Parent 1 and 2,’ and the claim that the Convention would sexualize children, were all widespread. Not only was this this disinformation apparent in all three phases of the Convention debate, but it was also visible in the rhetoric of Latvian parliamentarians, suggesting that it had become normalized in the political discourse on the Convention.

The audience’s reactions varied depending on the narrative. The ‘gender ideology’ threat narrative elicited the highest number of ‘angry’ emoji reactions (50%). This was closely followed by the ‘sovereignty’ narrative (45%). The audience reactions to the narrative on the protection of women were different. In this case, ‘Like’ and ‘Love’ combined for 40% of the audience reactions; ‘Angry’ was seen in 15% of reactions. The ‘Laughing’ emoji reactions were higher in the case of the ‘exaggerated’ narrative (20%). These findings show that while the audience reacted with anger to the ideological threat narrative, another part of the audience reacted with mockery to the exaggerated narrative.

The analysis also shows that there are signs of discursive political radicalization. Of the approximately 30 high-engagement posts, 6-8 showed strong signs of radicalization. These included alarmist rhetoric, conspiracy theories, and delegitimization of democratic actors. Radicalization was also more evident in the comments sections of each post. In some posts, 15% to 25% of the comments contained dehumanizing metaphors, accusations of treason, or appeals for silencing or expelling political opponents. The politicians who took the side of the Convention were called “traitors,” “foreign agents”, or “corrupt pigs,” while the veto of the withdrawal decision by the President was described as “betrayal.” Some of the comments also contained appeals for “rising up”, “expelling” the supporters of the Convention, and “saving the nation.”

The radicalization of the discourse was also asymmetrical. The posts of the supporters of the Convention sometimes showed signs of frustration or irony but rarely used hostile language or rejected the idea of democratic pluralism. Arguments mostly focused on the legal content of the Convention, women’s rights, and the refutation of disinformation. However, the level of engagement of the posts was significantly lower than that of the opponents.

Conclusion

Across all three phases, the Latvia-based discussion on the Istanbul Convention illustrates the manner in which a policy debate can be transformed into a debate on cultural values via disinformation and powerful emotive appeals. Disinformation was consistently used to galvanize opposition and link the Convention to unrelated concerns, such as those surrounding children, gender ideology, and identity. As such, highly emotive and divisive messages achieved greater traction than evidence-based messages, undermining the space for constructive debate and normalizing hostile, delegitimizing rhetoric.

The case highlights the extent to which online discourse may distort the perception of public opinion. According to polls, Latvian society was not divided into two equally strong groups; instead, an active online minority shaping part of the discussion gave the impression of wider opposition. More generally, Latvia is symptomatic of a gender backlash that is taking place across Europe, including in post-Soviet and Central-Eastern countries. In this backlash, gender equality policies are presented as endangering the traditional family, children, national identity, and even state sovereignty.

In Latvia, the convention came to symbolize an ideological struggle over gender norms and social values. The debate is still ongoing, with the final resolution scheduled for sometime after the October 2026 Saeima elections. Thus, the Convention will continue to be a relevant topic on the political agenda. Without a consensus, the survival of the Istanbul Convention in Latvia will depend on the next parliamentary composition and the willingness of actors to keep spreading anti-gender narratives or return to fact-based discussions about violence prevention and victim protection.

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Key Takeaways��

• �Ӱ�ԭ�� one in three residents of Estonia and Latvia say they would do nothing��in the event of��a military threat, with even lower likelihood to act among ethnic Russians.����

• Interest in��participating��through non-combat roles (e.g.,��financial contributions) is higher than in combat roles��but still does not reflect��a significant��portion��of the population��in either Latvia or Estonia.��

• NATO (and Canada) should��address��the��societal resilience��gap among local��communities.��Targeted grants for trusted local organizations, coupled with strong monitoring and evaluation, can help build social cohesion and civic preparedness across Estonia and Latvia, particularly in regions with a significant ethnic Russian population.��

Background��

Recent polling data from Estonia and Latvia suggest there is a significant gap in societal resilience among the residents of both countries. While Russia is overwhelmingly perceived as a security threat within these nations, an overall willingness to act in the event of a military threat is low. This gap is particularly pronounced along demographic lines, with lower willingness to act among ethnic Russians in Estonia and Latvia. As the Baltic states are likely targets for potential future Russian aggression, this deficit in resilience has direct implications for Canadian and NATO security commitments in the region.  

Since their post-Soviet independence, Estonia and Latvia have invested heavily in defence preparedness through joining NATO, bolstering their cyber networks, and educating their youth on mis- and disinformation. After Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, Canada joined its NATO Allies in strengthening defence structures in Eastern and Central Europe under , currently the Canadian Armed Forces’ (CAF) largest overseas mission. Recognizing the particular vulnerability of the Baltic states to Russian aggression, Canada took the initiative to lead the Multinational Battlegroup in Latvia in 2017. After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Canada committed to scaling this presence into a full . Following his election in Spring 2025, Prime Minister Mark Carney emphasized that these operations work to reinforce NATO at a time of great global instability and change. 

To meet NATO’s Article 3 , Estonia and Latvia have adopted “Total Defence” models, recognizing that societal resilience and civilian participation are just as crucial as military structures for overall defence of the country. Learning from the success of the Ukrainian Territorial Defence Forces in fighting the Russian military,  is working to promote its own reservist force through public awareness campaigns, increased daily allowances for reservists, and crisis preparedness education.  similarly promotes civil protection while identifying “political trust” and “inter-ethnic cohesion” as vital to national security. Both Baltic countries are also working to increase civil support for their law enforcement agencies, fire departments, and medical systems.  

As highlighted in the Latvian defence plan, social cohesion and confidence in state institutions and partnerships are essential for building and maintaining civil engagement in total defence. The  in Riga engages in public diplomacy, information operations, and psychological operations to align national efforts with NATO’s strategic objectives. The Latvian government has also partnered with the  – an NGO with the goal of informing the public about NATO and Latvia’s participation in it.  

Social cohesion between ethnic communities has been a focus of national and local NGOs, as Russian-speaking minorities remain less likely to trust NATO or volunteer for national defence than their neighbours. In the northeastern region of Estonia,  works mostly with Russian speakers of all ages on projects developing critical thinking and media literacy. These projects promote active citizenship and social entrepreneurship through youth work and international exchanges. VitaTiim already has international partnerships, including with the European Solidarity Corps and the US Embassy in Estonia. In Latvia, the organization  focuses on education, culture, media, and civic engagement in the Baltics and beyond, specifically striving to foster open dialogue and social inclusion for underrepresented ethnic minorities.  

Despite these institutional frameworks and nonprofit initiatives, recent polling reveals a high likelihood amongst the public to do nothing to defend Estonia and Latvia from a military threat, as well as a persistent gap in how different ethnic communities perceive national security and threats to their country. To better understand these dynamics, the following data examines security perceptions across the region. 

Survey Evidence: Societal Resilience Gaps in Estonia and Latvia��

Polling from �Ӱ�ԭ�� University’s Eastern European and Transatlantic Network (EETN) shows that,��as of Spring 2025, many people in Estonia and Latvia do not see themselves as active participants in defence during a crisis. Most significantly, about 30% of Estonians and Latvians say they are likely to do nothing��in the event of��a military threat.����

Demographic and geographic��characteristics of��this vulnerability��show a stark division:��almost half��of ethnic Russians��(46%)��residing��in Latvia and Estonia��would��do nothing��if��their��respective countries face a military threat.��Four in 10��(43%)��polled��residents��of��Latgale, a region of Latvia directly on the border with Russia��comprised��of a��large Russian-speaking minority,��say they would not act.��Half of those polled��in Northeastern Estonia��(51%), another region sharing a border with Russia��and having a similar demographic composition as Latgale, are also likely to do nothing.��

Reported willingness to participate in national defence is low. When asked whether they would join the active-duty military in the event of a military threat, only about 20% of Estonians and Latvians say they are likely to do so, and only about 30% are likely to join the military reserves or territorial forces in response to the same threat.  

While more people are willing to take up non-combat forms of national defence, still, even such likelihood is low. Estonians appear to be more likely to assist in this way than Latvians, approximately six in 10 (59%) of Estonians are likely to volunteer to contribute with physical labour, versus 44% in Latvia. �Ӱ�ԭ�� half (48%) of Estonians are likely to volunteer to contribute financially, compared to only 29% of Latvians.  

Ethnic Russians in both countries are even less likely to be active defenders in the event of a military threat. A staggering 80% of ethnic Russians in Latvia and Estonia are unlikely to join the active-duty military, military reserves, or territorial forces. In Estonia, 41% of ethnic Russians are likely to volunteer to contribute with physical labour, but this number drops significantly in Latvia, with only 29% of ethnic Russians likely to do so. Finally, only about 20% of ethnic Russians, in both Estonia and Latvia, are likely to volunteer to contribute financially.  

From a policy perspective, this polling data highlights��both��a��gap and an��opportunity. If a significant segment of the population is unlikely to��contribute to the active defence of their country, resilience-building efforts must expand beyond military��deployments. To foster the social cohesion necessary for resilience, trust��and cooperation between minority and majority communities must be bolstered. NATO and Canada can do this through collaboration with local community networks��–��such as��VitaTiim��and New East��–��that are already on the ground��in��the region.��

Conclusion��

Recent polling data from Estonia and Latvia suggests a region with a significant gap in societal resilience. While Russia is overwhelmingly perceived as a security threat, willingness to act��in the event of��a military threat is low. This gap is particularly pronounced along��demographic��lines, with lower willingness to act among��ethnic Russians. As��Estonia and Latvia��are��likely targets��for potential future Russian aggression, this deficit in resilience has direct implications for Canadian and NATO security commitments in the region. By supporting well-monitored projects with local organizations that build social cohesion and civic preparedness, Canada and NATO can help ensure Estonia and Latvia are more resilient and better prepared to withstand a military threat.����

Policy Recommendations��

1. NATO and Canada should create a dedicated societal resilience grant to support local NGOs such as VitaTiim and New East that advance social cohesion and civic preparedness. Supported projects should have bilingual messaging (in Russian and Estonian or Latvian) and may include media literacy and cyber safety training, community initiatives fostering dialogue across demographic lines, and projects that engage citizens as partners in international governance. 

The grant should emphasize collaboration between local and international organizations, promoting a shared responsibility in local, national, and international governance. Priority should go to local initiatives in regions with large Russian-speaking populations. 

2. Each NATO/Canadian-supported project should be required to include a monitoring, evaluation, and feedback plan in alignment with NATO’s . Thorough monitoring is necessary in order to accurately evaluate how effective projects are at bolstering societal resilience and civic preparedness.  

3. Canada and NATO should use existing NATO StratCom COE platforms to highlight successful partnerships in relatable ways to the Estonians and Latvians, including through multilingual media and public events. Positive views of NATO and the West expressed by individuals and organizations that already have credibility in their communities should be amplified to . 

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Amidst continued uncertainty regarding Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine, Latvia and other Baltic states are considering ending their support for the Ottawa Landmine Treaty in the name of national defence. While the decision underscores Latvia’s current fears of vulnerability to Russian aggression, it also poses complex implications for NATO operational cooperation and Canada’s humanitarian commitments. This policy memo examines the implications of the Baltic states’ possible withdrawal from the Treaty on Canada’s leadership and joint NATO operations in Latvia. It offers recommendations on how Canada can retain its international legal obligations while continuing to work successfully with Latvia and the rest of NATO through joint military operations.

Russia’s Threat

Russia’s persistent aggression towards Ukraine has led many of its neighbours to reassess their national security strategies. Poland and the Baltic states have expressed rising concerns, claiming that the regional security environment has ““. Although Russia remains primarily focused on Ukraine, Western intelligence agencies have warned of its long-term plans to challenge NATO’s Eastern flank. In the next three to four years, it is theorized that Russia plans to rebuild and strengthen its military forces, leading to the large potential of an escalated attack . Due to Latvia’s proximity to Russia and location on NATO’s Eastern flank, anticipation of a future attack and motivation to test NATO’s defence readiness are . The Latvian defence intelligence community recently presented heightened warnings of Russia’s military developments and threats, such as infiltrating Latvia’s rural areas.

Treaty Details

was adopted in 1972 to ban the current and future possession, production, and transfer of anti-personnel landmines. The international agreement is currently , excluding Russia and the United States.

Latvia, Poland, Lithuania, and Estonia from the Ottawa Treaty Agreement in late March 2025, amidst rising national security concerns regarding Russian aggression. On April 16th, Latvia’s parliament (the Saeima) voted to officially withdraw from the agreement. With this vote, Latvia became to formally apply to leave the Ottawa Treaty. members of parliament voted in favour of the withdrawal, leaving fourteen against and two abstentions. Latvia set the stage for Lithuania’s parliament (the Seimas) to follow, to leave the treaty just a few weeks later on . Riigikogu, Estonia’s parliament, on June 4th, with 81 members in favour, out of 101 members. The Baltic states must inform all other treaty parties, as well as the United Nations Security Council and Secretary General, of their intentions to withdraw. The state must then wait a before the treaty ceases to apply. This period now gives the Baltic states an opportunity to address concerns with other NATO states on their plans for navigating the future of their defence against Russia.

Despite all three countries being politically aligned to support the decision, they have nonetheless faced backlash from global humanitarian organizations and humanitarian diplomatic figures. Examples include the large banner placed on Geneva’s iconic broken chair statue by the as a direct message to the Baltic states, Finland, and Poland, advocating against withdrawal discussions. Opposition has been expressed from various humanitarian organizations, including a statement by a top human rights official, Volker Türk, from the and , denouncing the decision. A key Canadian leader in diplomatic efforts to establish the Ottawa Treaty, that this move will risk long-term humanitarian consequences in the region.

Apart from a global humanitarian response, gauging local civilian perspectives on the withdrawal remains difficult. Literature or data regarding citizen opinion on the issue across all three Baltic states is scarce, making it a challenge to assess domestic support or opposition

Implications for Canada and NATO

Despite Canada’s continued commitment to the Ottawa Treaty, the potential exit of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia raises questions about the future of Canada’s operational relationship with each of these Baltic states. This question arises because the Ottawa Treaty extends beyond the possession, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines to also of any state using landmines. The Canada-Latvia relationship is especially sensitive to this change, as Lativa currently hosts approximately 1,600 members of the Canadian Armed Forces deployed under . This operation has been extended by Mark Carney for three more years.

Canada also leads a NATO brigade in Latvia made up of troops from 13 Allies. Last year, this brigade successfully conducted , which was the first major field exercise . As activity in this region grows, it is necessary to continue assessing the alignment of the Baltic states with Canada’s treaty obligations and commitments to NATO cooperation as a whole. Canadian leadership plans to expand its brigade by adding 2,200 Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) members apart of the operation .

NATO as an organization prioritizes a collective defence strategy; however, states still hold a level of sovereignty to make military-related decisions. The decision by Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia to leave the Ottawa Treaty suggests that humanitarian concerns are being sidelined in favour of state survival. Whether this shift has an effect on the level of cooperation between Canada and the Baltic states remains to be seen. In order to mitigate this potential change, this policy memo provides two recommendations for Canadian government officials to consider as they assess their relationship with their Baltic Allies.

Recommendation: Canada-Latvia Bilateral Dialogue on Operational Framework

An initial bilateral meeting between Canada and Latvia should take place focusing on creating a plan for navigating new legal circumstances as they emerge in the international security arena. Although Prime Minister Mark Carney did in late August to discuss the extension of military operations in the region, there was no public indication that the topic of landmines was discussed. It is necessary for Canada to engage with Latvian counterparts at the level of defence ministers and senior military leadership. By involving both political authority and operational expertise, both states can ensure that diplomatic commitments are aligned with on-the-ground coordination of operative measures. Assessments should be made to weigh the need for additional legal documents such as non-involvement clauses to ensure that Canada would not engage in activity that would undermine the Treaty.

During initial meetings, Canadian and Latvian officials should seek to establish an understanding of the effects that Latvia’s withdrawal may have on joint operations. A discussion around Canada’s legal obligations should be at the forefront of the discussion. Future NATO exercises and training should be reviewed, and new scenarios should be drawn, should Latvia indicate an intention to incorporate anti-personnel landmines into joint training activities.

To institutionalize this collaboration, both states should consider establishing a Canada-Latvia Operational Working Group. This group would create a permanent, ongoing cooperation between both parties, which would address legal and logistical updates as needed.

While the priority lies in communication with Latvia due to operational duties, Canada should consider exploring avenues for broader engagement with Lithuania and Estonia to strengthen diplomatic relationships in light of changing political and legal conditions.

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Russia’s war in Ukraine has fueled political radicalization in Latvia with far-reaching implications for national security. This policy brief examines how radical attitudes and behaviours have evolved in Latvia’s society – particularly online – under the influence of Russian propaganda, disinformation, and cyber operations since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022.

 Latvia, in response to Russia’s aggression and anxiety regarding its shared border, has embarked on a set of to secure national security and decouple from the Soviet past. These consisted of extensive , humanitarian, and to Ukraine, securing the national information space and shaping historical memory. The Latvian government has taken steps to prohibit and related online sites. and symbols have been removed from public places. While these efforts were done in the name of preserving Latvian sovereignty, they also , many of whom perceived this as an attempt to rewrite history.

Thus, Latvia faces a risk of radicalization among specific segments of its population as a direct and indirect consequence of Russia’s hybrid warfare. Hybrid threats have been systematically used to deepen societal cleavages and foment extremist sentiments. The Russian-speaking community (making up slightly more than one-third of Latvia’s population) is a target of Kremlin propaganda, wherein Latvia is framed as “Russophobic”, thus allowing Russia to spread its narratives among these populations.

This trend threatens Latvia’s internal security and has an added strategic security dimension as a polarized and unstable Latvia, a key NATO member, would benefit Russia and its efforts to undermine the solidarity of the NATO Alliance.

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Amid the ongoing war in Ukraine, Latvia is increasingly confronting the issue of companies using third countries to evade international sanctions. Many companies, particularly in the information and communication technology (ICT) sector, use transit jurisdictions, undermining international efforts and national security. Traditional sanctions alone are insufficient, as . This memo explores the potential of corporate self-regulation through corporate social responsibility (CSR) as a proactive alternative.  

CSR allows companies to voluntarily exclude themselves from unethical practices, ensuring that each employee takes responsibility for compliance with established norms. Participation in such ethical business practices could enhance . This issue is particularly pressing as the to finance Russia’s war against Ukraine, making it a matter of national security. While the circumvention of sanctions occurs across various industries, this paper focuses on the self-regulation mechanisms implemented by Latvian ICT companies. An assessment of Latvia’s five largest ICT companies shows considerable variation in their compliance with self-regulatory standards. Only a few meet most criteria, likely because prior reputational issues have prompted greater efforts. Key gaps include: weak public advocacy, limited third-party transparency, and insufficient training on sanctions compliance.   

This memo concludes that self-regulation practices concerning sanctions compliance among Latvian ICT companies are insufficient, especially in light of the war in Ukraine. Recommendations include encouraging CSR-based compliance frameworks, improving transparency, and considering a legal model similar to the United Kingdom (UK) Bribery Act 2010 to promote ethical business conduct and accountability. As sanctions circumvention directly impacts Latvia’s economic security and geopolitical independence from Russia and Belarus, promoting stronger self-regulatory and legal mechanisms are essential. This approach could also be applied to other high-risk sectors such as construction and extractive industries.

The Problem

The issue of sanctions circumvention, particularly through third countries, has become acute since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. indicates that many Latvian companies use states in Caucasus and Central Asia as intermediaries to get around international sanctions. For example, in 2024 the Deputy Director of the Customs Administration – without disclosing the names of specific companies – noted a sharp increase in the number of sanctions violations committed by Lativan companies. The export of goods was prohibited in more than related specifically to Central Asian countries. This report highlighted that the goods being intercepted are mostly various mechanical devices, vehicles, and electrical equipment. Similar increases have been observed in Germany, as reported in a by Robin Brooks. There is about the need for against companies that facilitate such activities. However, it is evident that this approach is not , as it often fails to address the , namely, that the same individuals can establish new legal entities, continue their operations under a different owner, or employ alternative schemes to .  

The Context

In the case of CSR, compliance with economic sanctions is not a well-documented subject. According to relevant literature on the topic, sanctions compliance could be indirectly linked with topics, such as ; corruption risks associated with ; as well as s. CSR is also generally accompanied by an that aids in internalizing and implementing its provisions, as well as adhering to its own established standards and norms. Furthermore, the literature emphasizes the necessity of a proactive and innovative approach in developing supplementary mechanisms that beyond mere regulatory compliance. 

There are related but not directly addressed topics about sanctions compliance within CSR. In 2025, the United Nations Working Group on Business and Human Rights released a implying that businesses should comply with all relevant legal frameworks, which could include sanctions. Maayan Menashe that international standards can become embedded as social norms within corporations, influencing their behaviour even when legal enforcement is weak or absent. Similarly, sanctions compliance can be reinforced by market and societal expectations, making circumvention more reputationally and financially costly. According to Hortense Jongen, the private sector is facing pressure to , particularly in areas like anti-bribery and corporate responsibility, because of scrutiny from . Just as firms voluntarily align their CSR policies with international standards to maintain credibility, according to Bryan R. Early and Timothy M. Peterson, they may also adopt stricter compliance policies regarding sanctions to avoid being . A strong example of corporate response to geopolitical events is the reaction to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with over 1,000 companies publicly announcing the beyond the minimum legal requirements imposed by international sanctions. 

 A recent study by Keith A. Preble and Bryan R. Early claims that a critical aspect of compliance with economic sanctions is , with enforcement agencies leveraging “naming and shaming” tactics to deter violations. Firms fearing reputational damage are less likely to engage in risky transactions with sanctioned entities, and the heightened scrutiny on large corporations creates industry-wide compliance pressures. However, the authors also , with American institutions imposing significantly higher fines on foreign entities to ensure global compliance. Similar conclusions come from a study which , particularly those imposed on Russia after its 2022 invasion of Ukraine, through a survey of 610 medium-sized companies in Germany, Poland, and the United States (US). This analysis finds that, while external pressure generally encourages compliance and even overcompliance, it can also push some firms toward sanctions circumvention. Compliance is often accompanied by proactive business strategies aimed at finding legal loopholes to continue operations. The results of this study underscore the – US firms, for instance, face stronger legal enforcement mechanisms, whereas firms located in the European Union (EU) , particularly in Germany and Poland, exhibit a wider spectrum of compliance behaviors. These findings suggest the need for stronger enforcement mechanisms, standardized regulatory guidance, and targeted measures to curb both undercompliance and sanctions circumvention. 

To gain insight into how such regulatory measures are implemented by Latvian ICT companies and what the most popular approaches are, this memo examines the largest ICT enterprise, including a review of corporate statutes, annual reports, as well as open and publicly available data. The evaluation is conducted based on criteria aligned with  international standards. However, the criteria used in this memo are modified to reflect the existing narrative on sanctions circumvention, specifically addressing political involvement, corruption risks associated with third-party involvement, and public anti-corruption stance. The assessment is conducted based on a scoring system, where “Yes” is assigned 1 point, “Partially” is assigned 0.5 points, and “No” is assigned 0 points, depending on the extent to which the information found in the company’s documentation aligns with the methodological criteria.  

The methodology to review the most popular approaches is based on ISO 37001 (), ISO 26001 standards (), (training programs), (third-party involvement and whistle-blowing) and (sanctions compliance and restricted parties). State-owned companies or companies that have previously been state-owned are excluded from the study. Primarily, publicly available information about companies is included, and letters requesting answers to specific questions were sent out to relevant companies as a secondary source.  

Table No.1 Criteria to review most popular self-regulatory approaches 

Table No.2 Evaluation of the largest Latvian ICT companies 

Overall, self-regulatory approaches and their implementation among the five largest Latvian ICT companies can be characterized as insufficient according to the utilized methodologies. There are significant disparities in the extent to which companies comply with the requirements, with some demonstrating full or near-full compliance, while others fail to comply with any of them.  

The lowest performance was observed in areas such as advocacy for sanctions compliance, transparency regarding meetings with public authorities, and disclosure of industry association memberships. In addition, most companies disclose only their own offices and a limited number of partners, failing to provide comprehensive disclosure of partners across different jurisdictions. Furthermore, there is insufficient recognition of anti-corruption and anti-bribery compliance programmes, and whistleblowing mechanisms for employees are largely absent. Additionally, based on the analysis of social media and website content, as well as information obtained through formal correspondence, existing training programmes appear to inadequately cover all key topics. Typically, employees across all levels receive uniform training content on anti-corruption and compliance, with no specific reference to sanctions compliance. 

Conclusion and Recommendations

Given the inconsistent approaches among businesses in implementing sanctions compliance policies, it may be beneficial to consider a legal framework similar to the . This legislation has motivated both domestic and foreign companies operating in the UK to establish , as failure to do so may result in legal liability. A comparable framework could be developed for sanctions compliance in Latvia – clearly defining what constitutes a sanctions violation and establishing enforcement mechanisms. Such a framework should also include provisions for holding companies accountable for failing to prevent sanctions circumvention or violations. 

At the same time, such measures may be considered controversial, as critics might claim that these regulations internationally, potentially undermining short-term competitiveness. Criticism of this regulatory framework often comes from and various private sector actors – particularly those where law enforcement institutions are less advanced. In such contexts, companies based in developed economies can exploit institutional weaknesses to serve their own interests. This issue underscores the broader phenomenon whereby business actors from developed countries ‘export corruption’ and take advantage of their cooperation partners in developing countries. To mitigate such practices, only a few jurisdictions have introduced specific regulations, for instance, foreign bribery committed by U.S. nationals or persons located in the country is addressed under the . 

Analysis of ICT companies in Latvia reveals differing approaches to sanctions compliance. It is important to acknowledge that , , long term, often involving tax avoidance, tax evasion, tax fraud, and money laundering. Given Latvia’s current , there is a strong case that implementing such a regulatory framework could positively influence corporate decision-making, especially in selecting international partners. The evaluation shows that only Tietoevry Latvia has largely met most criteria, likely as a result of efforts to involving Belarus. In other cases, the extent of compliance remains incomplete.  

In sum, based on the analysis conducted, the following recommendations are proposed for Latvian policymakers and other relevant stakeholders: 

1. Develop a comprehensive legal framework for sanctions compliance. It is recommended that policymakers establish a legal framework for sanctions compliance and prevention of foreign bribery, modelled on the UK’s Bribery Act 2010; 

2. Promote enhanced corporate due diligence in partner selection. Companies should be encouraged to strengthen their due diligence practices, particularly when selecting international business partners, especially in high-risk geopolitical contexts; 

3. Expand compliance evaluation to other high-risk sectors. It is advisable to apply the compliance evaluation methodology currently used in the ICT sector to other high-risk industries, including construction and extractive sectors. 

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