Since the onset of the joint United States鈥揑sraeli military campaign against Iran in February 2026, developments in the Middle East have emerged as a primary driver of global strategic assessments. The conflict is simultaneously generating significant secondary effects in the South Caucasus, reshaping regional alignments and the relationship between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

By assessing Iran鈥檚 relationships with Armenia and Azerbaijan, its core strategic interests in the South Caucasus, and its operational partnership with Moscow, this policy memo examines how the ongoing war against Iran, combined with the August 2025 Washington Accords, has disrupted Tehran鈥檚 long-standing hedging strategy and could undermine its regional influence.

To illustrate this shift, the memo first analyzes Iran鈥檚 traditional foreign policy toward Armenia and Azerbaijan and how the Washington Accords have diminished Iran鈥檚 geoeconomic role as a buffer between Armenia and Azerbaijan, thereby constraining its ability to exert leverage over both states. It further evaluates how the agreement heightens Iran鈥檚 strategic vulnerabilities in the face of growing Turkish, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and U.S. presence in the region, and highlights the increasingly divergent interests and approaches of Moscow and Tehran in shaping the future of the South Caucasus.

Engaging with the outcomes of the United States鈥揑sraeli military campaign against Iran, the policy memo concludes by analyzing Tehran鈥檚 shifting strategic posture in the South Caucasus. This assessment is situated within the context of Iran鈥檚 amicable yet strategically incongruent relationship with Moscow, as well as its intensifying competition with 罢眉谤办颈测别 for regional influence.

Iran鈥檚 Core Interests in the South Caucasus: Economic Pragmatism over Ideology

Iran views the South Caucasus as part of its immediate rather than a distant foreign region. While Tehran has historical and cultural ties with the region, its policy toward the area has been driven primarily by geopolitical stability, border security, and connectivity considerations rather than ideological or religious affinity. Although Tehran formally maintained neutrality during the Armenia鈥揂zerbaijan conflict, in practice it pursued a balancing strategy aimed at preventing regional dominance by any single actor. Much like Russia鈥檚 approach in the region, the protracted Nagorno-Karabakh conflict generated a degree of political instability that enabled Tehran and Moscow to preserve their influence over both Armenia and Azerbaijan, while simultaneously constraining 罢眉谤办颈测别鈥檚 ability to expand its regional presence. Iran鈥檚 strategy has also emphasized the importance of preventing alterations to internationally recognized borders and safeguarding its access to European markets.

In the aftermath of Armenia鈥檚 military defeats in 2020 and 2023, and amid Moscow鈥檚 failure to uphold its perceived security commitments under the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) framework and its peacekeeping mandate, Iran increasingly came to be portrayed as one of Armenia鈥檚 most reliable regional partners. Iran鈥揂rmenia post-Soviet relations have been stable and cooperative. Since Armenia鈥檚 independence, Iran has consistently maintained , supporting Armenia, both state and people, during regional crises and serving as a key transit partner. In the aftermath of the Turkish鈥揂zerbaijani blockade of the 1990s, Iran has functioned as a critical terrestrial access route and economic partner. The two countries are also involved in many trade and energy partnerships and collaborate in the transit of goods between Europe and Asia.

While both nations share a foundational identity as Shia-majority states, the bilateral relationship between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Republic of Azerbaijan has been characterized by persistent strategic friction since 1991. Central to Tehran鈥檚 security concerns is Baku鈥檚 deepening military-industrial and energy partnership with Israel, which, alongside Azerbaijan’s “one nation, two states” alliance with 罢眉谤办颈测别, is viewed by Iranian policymakers as a coordinated effort to contain Iranian regional influence.

This tension is further exacerbated by the geopolitical implications of the Zangezur Corridor. From Tehran’s perspective, any Azerbaijani effort to establish a sovereign land link through southern Armenia constitutes a “red line,” as it threatens to sever Iran鈥檚 critical northern transit link to Europe and the Caucasus. Despite these structural rivalries, the relationship maintains a degree of pragmatic stability. Both states remain tethered by mutual economic interests, specifically their shared roles in the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (Middle Corridor) and Baku鈥檚 continued reliance on Iranian territory for transit to its Nakhchivan exclave.

Iran鈥檚 regional approach has been shaped less by the Muslim鈥揅hristian divide or ideological concerns and more by practical and security concerns over Turkish influence, Israeli presence near its borders, transit routes affecting its access to Eurasia, and the potential domestic repercussions among its own Azeri population. Iran views the Caucasus as its 鈥渉istoric security margin鈥� and its immediate security and economic environment.

The 2025 Washington Agreement and its Initial Implementation Framework

In August 2025, Armenia and Azerbaijan signed the Washington Accords under the mediation of the President of the United States, launching the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) and establishing a 99-year economic partnership between the United States and Armenia. The Washington Accords create opportunities for significant shifts in regional transit dynamics, including the movement of goods, energy infrastructure, and the broader interconnection between Asia and Europe. These developments have implications for the roles traditionally played by Russia, Iran, Central Asia, and the South Caucasus in Eurasian transport and trade networks. It reduces Central Asian countries鈥� dependency on Chinese and Russian infrastructures as well as bypassing Iran鈥檚 role in the Middle Corridor.

, the United States and Armenia signed the providing exclusive rights to develop the transit infrastructure. The framework excludes extraterritorial rights to American entities preserving Armenia鈥檚 sovereignty including the border management aspect of the transit corridor. In this partnership, the TRIPP Development Company, a joint venture with Armenia mostly controlled by Washington, provides a monopoly in the development business surrounding the route and its infrastructure. The agreement seeks to develop the Syunik region as a hub of economic activity and local development, with the objective of enhancing transit and connectivity between Asia and Europe, connecting Azerbaijan with its autonomous region of Nakhichevan. More broadly, the TRIPP becomes a competitive alternative to the Baku鈥揟bilisi鈥揔ars (BTK) railroad and future alternative pipeline to Europe, competing with Baku鈥揟bilisi-Ceyhan pipeline by securing European access to Central Asian hydrocarbons.

In the energy domain, the normalization process between Armenia and Azerbaijan reshapes the region鈥檚 broader transit and supply landscape. Most notably, Armenia could become significantly less dependent on Russian and Iran natural gas, thereby opening possibilities for access to Central Asian hydrocarbons and, potentially, to Azerbaijani energy sources. Turkmen and Azerbaijani gas competes with Iran鈥檚 gas output, offering a cheaper and potentially more politically reliable alternative for European countries. launched the construction of energy infrastructure, including a new transit powerline to export to Europe through 罢眉谤办颈测别.

The Accord has inaugurated a new phase of cooperation between the former belligerents, notably facilitating the renewed transit of goods between the two states. This includes the movement of hydrocarbons originating in Azerbaijan as well as grain exports from Russia and various Central Asian countries. The emerging prospects for a peace accord between Armenia and Azerbaijan have broadened the diplomatic space for both states, transforming their engagement into a more intricate and multidimensional interaction. Furthermore, the effectively eliminates Moscow鈥檚 role as established in the November 2020 agreement, which delegated some administrative control over border management to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB).

Although the Washington Accords do not provide any security guarantees from the United States or include enforcement mechanisms directed toward Azerbaijan, Armenia leaders hope that increased American investment would encourage a more active role by Washington and put an end to Baku鈥檚 strategy of outbidding Yerevan in their bilateral relationship.

Overall, the TRIPP represents, for Armenia, an additional step toward the West, thereby weakening Moscow鈥檚 influence in the South Caucasus, while also providing an opportunity to normalize relations with Ankara and Baku. For Azerbaijan, the Washington Accords consolidate its military victory, while re-establishing direct access to Nakhchivan and stimulating its transit-based economy. Furthermore, the TRIPP reduces Baku鈥檚 dependency and uncertainties link to its main transit route to Europe going through Georgia.

Iran鈥檚 Strategic Approach in the South Caucasus after the Washington Accords

Much of the and commentary has framed recent developments as a geostrategic, zero鈥憇um contest in which the United States and 罢眉谤办颈测别 have successfully marginalized both Iran and Russia from regional influence. While geostrategic and security considerations remain central, it is necessary to look beyond great power and regional competition to understand how Iran and Russia are recalibrating their relationships with Armenia and Azerbaijan and assessing areas of mutual convergence to avoid strategic marginalization.

Following the Washington Declaration and TRIPP announcement, the Iran official diplomatic position was articulated by in a telephone conversation with his Armenian counterpart. While welcoming peace efforts and regional connectivity, Araghchi specified Iran鈥檚 red lines: there must be no extraterritorial corridor or special status undermining Armenian sovereign control, and no changes that alter regional geopolitics or disadvantage Iran鈥檚 strategic access. He further emphasized full respect for borders, territorial integrity, and national jurisdiction, and stressed that connectivity must not isolate Iran from established or alternative transit routes.

However, an examination of various members of the Foreign Policy establishment could shed light on various aspects of Iran鈥檚 understanding of this situation. On 9 August 2025, , former Minister of Foreign Affairs and a senior advisor to the former Supreme Leader of Iran, framed the TRIPP as a rebranding of the Zangezur corridor concept. He said that the implementation of this project would restrict Iran鈥檚 transport routes in the north and northwest to (only) 罢眉谤办颈测别, and that Iran will confront this move 鈥榳hether with Russia or without it.鈥� He likened NATO鈥檚 presence along this route to a 鈥榲iper鈥� that wants to lie down between Iran and Russia and warned that Iran will not allow this alliance to approach its northern borders. The former himself in a meeting with Prime Minister Pashinyan, in July 2024, had mentioned that Iran recognizes that the Zangezur Corridor is against Armenia鈥檚 interests and stands in this position.

Other Iranian officials however, adopted a more moderate position and sought further clarification as the details, terms, and conditions of the TRIPP are not clear yet. In a meeting with Armenia鈥檚 National Security Council Secretary, the former head of Iran鈥檚 Strategic Council on Foreign Relations, , welcomed Armenia鈥揂zerbaijan connectivity but requested clarification regarding the governing legal and security framework of the route, particularly any external involvement. The Armenian side emphasized that border control and security would remain under Armenian authority. This exchange illustrates Tehran鈥檚 core concern: not connectivity itself, but the jurisdictional and security regime under which it would operate.

Noting the travel of , to Israel, Iran observes a 鈥榙eviation鈥� from historical relationships. Kostanyan is closely involved in the implementation of the TRIPP initiative. The trip may therefore be understood not only as a diplomatic engagement but also as part of Armenia鈥檚 efforts to advance the corridor and related regional connectivity arrangements. From the Iranian perspective, Armenia has not sufficiently taken Tehran鈥檚 鈥榗oncerns鈥� into account while proceeding with the project, which gives the visit broader regional significance beyond bilateral diplomacy. Current uncertainties and tensions are therefore portrayed not as a structural rivalry but as a recent policy shift by Armenia toward Western initiatives, which Tehran views as inconsistent with the traditionally predictable relationship.

Although these responses appear to represent hard-line and moderate positions, they in fact reflect Iranian concerns articulated at two different levels of policy. Velayati鈥檚 warning conveys the strategic perception of the corridor as a geopolitical and security challenge that could alter regional balances and introduce external influence near Iran鈥檚 borders. Kharrazi鈥檚 more measured statements address the operational level, focusing on the legal and jurisdictional arrangements governing the route and the necessity of preserving Armenian sovereignty and local border control. Taken together, they are complementary rather than contradictory: the first signals Iran鈥檚 red lines in terms of regional balance of power, while the second defines the specific conditions under which connectivity could be tolerated. This dual messaging suggests that Tehran鈥檚 opposition is directed not at transport connectivity itself, but at any arrangement that diminishes Iran鈥檚 strategic position or creates a non-sovereign security regime along its northwestern frontier.

Drawing on Russia鈥檚 conduct in cases such as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the Syrian Civil War, Iranian assessments of Moscow鈥檚 position on the TRIPP are broadly consistent with longer-standing perceptions of Russia across Iran鈥檚 political spectrum. These range from proponents of deeper strategic alignment with Russia, to more skeptical voices that view reliance on Moscow as a strategic liability, such as those featured in Etemad and Shargh newspapers. Between these poles, a significant group of policymakers and experts adopts a position of cautious realism, advocating sustained engagement with Russia while maintaining a clear political safety margin featured in Donya-e-Eqtesad newspaper. Notably, across these perspectives there is a shared underlying assumption: Russia is not regarded as a fully predictable or reliably-aligned partner.

The Erosion of Iran鈥檚 Transit Hub Centrality

Iran鈥檚 policy toward the South Caucasus cannot be understood without reference to its broader economic strategy. In recent years, Tehran has increasingly framed its foreign policy around geo-economics rather than solely sanctions resistance and relief. A strategic guidance issued by the and the (June 2024) explicitly direct the government to activate Iran鈥檚 鈥榞eopolitical advantages鈥� by transforming the country into a regional hub for trade, transport, and energy through regulatory reforms and infrastructure development.

The Development Plan intends to institutionalize this objective. It mandates the creation of a Regional Energy Trade Steering Committee, chaired by the President and composed of the Ministers of Oil, Foreign Affairs, and Energy, with parliamentary participation. The Committee is responsible for designing Iran鈥檚 regional energy diplomacy roadmap and approving export, import, swap, transit, and electricity exchange arrangements. These measures show that Iran is indeed attempting to convert geography into economic resilience: transit fees, energy swaps, and logistics services are intended to compensate for sanctions-related restrictions on direct trade and investment.

A central quantitative target of the Development Plan is to increase annual transit cargo volume from approximately 16 million tons at the beginning of the Plan to 40 million tons by its conclusion. The South Caucasus plays a crucial role in achieving this goal because it constitutes Iran鈥檚 shortest overland connection to Eurasian markets. The Iran-Armenia border effectively blocks a continuous 罢眉谤办颈测别-Azerbaijan land corridor, thereby preserving 罢眉谤办颈测别鈥檚 dependence on Iranian transit routes toward Azerbaijan and Central Asia.

Iran participates in wider regional energy arrangements, including gas swap agreements with Turkmenistan and 罢眉谤办颈测别. These arrangements allow Tehran to earn transit revenue, estimated at roughly $1鈥�1.5 billion annually, while maintaining relevance in regional energy distribution networks. It also conducts gas and electricity swaps with Azerbaijan to supply the Nakhchivan exclave. Additionally, it serves as a trucking corridor between 罢眉谤办颈测别 and Central Asia, currently of Turkish trucks annually.

However, emerging infrastructure projects threaten to erode this position. The , operational since March 2025, already reduces Nakhchivan鈥檚 dependence on Iranian gas swaps. If an additional pipeline link across southern Armenia were completed, Azerbaijan would obtain a direct energy connection to its exclave, while . With the TRIPP, Turkmenistan鈥檚 and Azerbaijan鈥檚 natural gas exports directly compete with Iran鈥檚 output by providing Armenia with flexibility and lower鈥慶ost alternatives.

More broadly, the proposed TRIPP corridor could connect 罢眉谤办颈测别 to Central Asia via Azerbaijan and the Caspian basin, thereby rendering the second route of the Middle Corridor practically feasible as a bypass to Iranian transit routes connecting China and Central Asia to Europe. Furthermore, the TRIPP would strengthen the Middle Corridor and its overreliance on .

For Tehran, the issue is not merely symbolic. Such routes would divert trucking flows, logistics investment, and energy transit away from Iran, potentially reducing transit income by a significant margin and weakening incentives for infrastructure development. estimate potential losses reaching up to 2.6 billion dollars annually over time when indirect effects on logistics, investment, and associated services are considered.

Even more important than immediate revenue is what Iranian policymakers call 鈥�.鈥� Iran seeks to preserve independent land access to the Caucasus and Europe that does not depend exclusively on Turkish鈥揂zerbaijani territory. The South Caucasus therefore functions not only as an economic opportunity but as a strategic economic lifeline. Any corridor that structurally marginalizes Iranian transit routes is perceived in Tehran not as a normal infrastructure project but as a long-term reduction of Iran鈥檚 geopolitical and economic leverage.

A Trojan Horse on Iran鈥檚 Doorstep: After 罢眉谤办颈测别 and Israel, now NATO and the USA

Tehran鈥檚 security concerns centre on preserving the sovereignty structure along its northwestern frontier. Iranian officials emphasize the maintenance of internationally recognized borders and oppose any extraterritorial or internationally supervised transit arrangements in the Syunik province. In Iranian strategic perception, a transport corridor is not merely an infrastructure project but a potential : if administered or monitored by external actors, it could facilitate intelligence collection, surveillance, and the institutionalization of foreign, especially American and Israeli, presence near sensitive Iranian regions. The Washington Accords remain vague regarding which actors will be responsible for providing daily security along the TRIPP corridor, even though Armenia is formally recognized as retaining sovereignty over its territory. This ambiguity leaves open the possibility that could assume a role in protecting the route. Consequently, Iran鈥檚 opposition is directed less at connectivity itself than at any arrangement that alters jurisdictional control or introduces external security actors along its immediate border.

The intensity of Velayati鈥檚 remarks is best understood by factoring in the role of the U.S. in this initiative. According to , a former Iranian diplomat, in Iranian foreign policy thinking, where some officials regard antagonism with the U.S. as structural, any development in which Washington emerges as the agent of regional normalization would be viewed negatively. He therefore situates the corridor within Iran鈥檚 long-standing confrontation with the U.S., arguing that it would elevate Washington鈥檚 position as a political arbiter in the South Caucasus while creating a connectivity framework from which all regional actors – 罢眉谤办颈测别, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Western partners – would benefit, except Iran. In this interpretation, the corridor itself is not the principal concern; rather, the accompanying political arrangements could institutionalize U.S. influence and leave Iran structurally excluded from emerging regional trade and security networks. Velayati鈥檚 rhetoric thus reflects a broader fear of geopolitical marginalization under a U.S.-backed regional order.

罢眉谤办颈测别鈥檚 Pan鈥慣urkic Orientation and Its Strategic Implications for Iran

Iran opposes any extraterritorial corridor arrangements that would create a continuous 罢眉谤办颈测别- Azerbaijan land connection and facilitate the Middle Corridor linking 罢眉谤办颈测别, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia. Iranian assess that such a route would shift the regional balance in favor of 罢眉谤办颈测别, structurally reduce Iran鈥檚 role in east鈥搘est connectivity, and diminish Tehran鈥檚 leverage in Eurasian trade and energy networks. Following the recent wars between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the Washington Accord, 罢眉谤办颈测别 appears a step closer toward its regional ambitions focused on pan-Turkism ranging from Anatolia to Central Asia.

Tehran interprets the TRIPP as a rebranded Zangezur Corridor that constitutes a that could undermine Iran鈥檚 geoeconomic relevance in the transit between Asia and Europe by reducing dependency of regional actors on Iranian transit routes.

Within Iranian strategic discourse, the project is also interpreted as part of a broader geopolitical realignment across Eurasia. Iranian officials and senior advisers have argued that a continuous transport axis from Anatolia to Central Asia would expand Turkish political and economic influence, weaken Iran鈥檚 geoeconomic centrality, and potentially enable a wider external security presence in the South Caucasus. From Tehran鈥檚 perspective, the concern is less ideological than structural: a functioning Middle Corridor could bypass Iranian territory while embedding new political, military, and intelligence partnerships near Iran鈥檚 northwestern frontier.

At the same time, Iran appears to have avoided the worst鈥慶ase scenario that had emerged following the one鈥慸ay 2023 conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia and the subsequent escalation in Azerbaijani rhetoric, particularly the invocation of the 鈥榃estern Azerbaijan鈥� concept.3 Likewise, Baku鈥檚 promotion of a 鈥榮pecial corridor鈥欌�� envisioned within the broader Zangezur Corridor framework and implying strong Azerbaijani鈥揟urkish control 鈥� had raised significant concerns in Tehran regarding potential geopolitical and territorial encroachments. It would have materially shifted regional power toward the Turkish bloc and most likely completely exclude Iran from connectivity, linking Europe to Asia.

Between Alignment and Competition: Russia and Iran鈥檚 South Caucasus Strategy

In the South Caucasus, Russian and Iranian foreign policies converge in their shared willingness to counter Western influence and to constrain Ankara鈥檚 expanding regional role. This alignment is also reflected in their cooperation within the International North鈥揝outh Transport Corridor, which both states have leveraged to mitigate the impact of Western sanctions. However, the North鈥揝outh Transport Corridor remains inefficient and weakened by the prospects of the TRIPP and future Azerbaijan and Armenia collaboration.

At the same time, Moscow and Tehran continue to pursue distinct regional and geopolitical objectives aimed at advancing their own interests and influence in the South Caucasus rather than form a cohesive strategic approach as a functional partnership. The Washington Accords highlight these underlying frictions, particularly in revealing the absence of a coordinated Russian鈥揑ranian position toward the TRIPP. The corridor itself is part of a wider geopolitical contest over connectivity, influence, and control in the South Caucasus, where transport routes translate directly into political and economic leverage.

Just like Iran, Moscow has voiced general concerns and skepticism regarding the TRIPP, its implementation, and its impact on the region. to the Washington Declaration reflects this partial but imperfect convergence. The Russian Foreign Ministry responded cautiously, emphasizing regional stability and existing agreements while avoiding direct confrontation with the initiative. Moscow has been careful not to antagonize Washington or to openly criticize American President Donald Trump, while underscoring its indispensable role in ensuring the success of the TRIPP.

Iranian commentary, however, interpreted this as an ambiguous position and expressed dissatisfaction that Moscow did not oppose the project more explicitly. The observes that Russia is transitioning from dominant security hegemon in the Caucasus to a constrained, reactive actor that seeks to manage decline through selective cooperation and behind-the-scenes leverage. From Tehran鈥檚 perspective, Russia is expected to resist new mediation formats that elevate Western involvement in the South Caucasus; Moscow鈥檚 restrained response therefore raised concerns in Iran about the reliability of Russian support. The episode illustrates that, although Iran and Russia share reservations about a U.S.-centred regional framework, their threat perceptions and priorities are not identical, and cooperation between them remains situational rather than fully coordinated.

In this context, Iran finds areas of partial convergence with Russia鈥檚 policy in the South Caucasus. Both states regard the proposed corridor with caution, as it could enable a new connectivity and mediation architecture in the region that would diminish their influence while expanding the presence of external actors 鈥� primarily 罢眉谤办颈测别 and the United States, but potentially China as well. Although their motivations differ, the project is perceived in both capitals as contributing to a regional order in which Western-backed arrangements gain prominence at the expense of Iranian and Russian leverage and the increasing influence of NATO countries in the South Caucasus. Furthermore, it weakens existing regional frameworks involving Russia, Iran, and 罢眉谤办颈测别, such as the and the . Additionally, Armenia鈥檚 shift toward Western influence is perceived by both countries as a growing risk to their regional interests.

For Tehran, the primary concerns relate to border security and the risk of exclusion from emerging regional transit networks. For Moscow, the issue is more closely tied to the erosion of its longstanding role as the principal security arbiter in the South Caucasus and, more broadly, to the setbacks confronting its neoimperial ambitions in the region weakened by Russia鈥檚 war against Ukraine.

While Russia and Iran share a primary interest in resisting the growing presence of NATO and Western influence in the South Caucasus, persistent divergences have prevented them from coordinating an effective strategic approach. Even prior to the TRIPP initiative, certain analysts, such as , Iran鈥檚 former ambassador to Baku, had warned over Russia鈥檚 ambiguous position on Zangezur corridor. Iranian analysts often describe Russia鈥檚 position as ambiguous and more flexible than Tehran鈥檚, particularly on 鈥榳ho manages鈥� an eventual arrangement. They believe that Russia鈥檚 position on the Zangezur corridor reflects a broader pattern in its relationship with Iran: it is not a truly strategic partnership but rather a transactional one driven by shifting interests. In this context, the implicit message for Iran is to exercise caution. Russia may not be a reliable partner and could instrumentalize Iran鈥檚 position to advance its own regional objectives. For example, in 2026, Moscow sought to renew its influence in the South Caucasus by seeking to fix its relationship with , as well as influencing the democratic process in and the election of a pro-Russian government.

The February 2026 War and Its Implications

On 28 February 2026, the United States and Israel launched joint military operations against Iran, targeting its nuclear and missile capabilities with broader regime-change ambitions. While military objectives appear achievable in the short term, the political outcome remains deeply uncertain. The South Caucasus has thus far remained largely insulated from the conflict, despite Azerbaijan’s ties to Israel and limited Iranian strikes on and alleged supported by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps targeting the Baku鈥揟bilisi鈥揅eyhan pipeline. Iran’s posture toward 罢眉谤办颈测别 and the broader region remains ambiguous mainly due to precarious geopolitical positions and its internal turmoil. , however, despite certain immediate challenges such as increased energy prices, sees opportunities in consolidating its status as a regional energy hub and crossroads.

Russia鈥檚 response to the war has been evaluated as insufficient 鈥� even unacceptable 鈥� by . He attributes this restraint to Russia鈥檚 self-interest, particularly economic gains and strategic distractions linked to Ukraine. His assessment implies that despite rhetoric of strategic partnership, Russia behaves as a pragmatic actor that supports Iran only when it aligns with its own interests, raising serious doubts about its reliability in moments of crisis. At the same time, Russia appears to be playing a low-profile but consequential role by supplying Tehran with on U.S. military targets, as well as with operational lessons derived from the war in Ukraine, particularly regarding the employment of unmanned aerial systems and electronic warfare capabilities. This collaboration represents a full circle, following Iran鈥檚 transfer of Shahed drones to Russia at the outset of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Tehran not only provided the drones themselves but also offered technical support and assistance that enabled Moscow to establish its own production line for the Geran-2, the Russian version of the Shahed drone.

Regardless of the outcomes of the 2026 military campaign or the prospect of regime change in Iran, Tehran鈥檚 geostrategic competition with 罢眉谤办颈测别 over Eurasian transit routes is likely to remain a powerful geographic and economic force shaping the South Caucasus. 罢眉谤办颈测别鈥檚 ambition to establish a pan-Turkic corridor linking Anatolia to Central Asia via the Caspian Sea 鈥� while bypassing Iranian territory 鈥� poses a sustained threat to Iran鈥檚 transit revenues and strategic depth, irrespective of the composition of the governing regime in Tehran.

Even in the event of regime collapse and its replacement by a government aligned with U.S. and broader Western preferences, or a significantly weakened state deprived of key military instruments for projecting influence in the South Caucasus, competition between Iran and 罢眉谤办颈测别 over Eurasian transit corridors is likely to persist. This rivalry predates the establishment of the Islamic Republic and would almost certainly outlast it. No Iranian government will find Turkish dominance of the Eurasian corridor to be in Iran’s national interest. This is a structural feature of the regional balance of power rather than an ideological preference.

While the nature of the governing regime in Tehran may shape the extent and modalities of Iran鈥檚 participation in the TRIPP, it is unlikely to fundamentally alter the underlying structural competition with 罢眉谤办颈测别 and the lack of a common strategic approach with Russia. A more democratic Iranian government could, in fact, pursue a more proactive integration into the TRIPP-linked infrastructure, potentially positioning Iran as a critical southern corridor connecting Eurasian transit networks to the Persian Gulf. A pro-Western Iran, freed from sanctions and able to attract Western investment, may prove a more effective competitor to Turkish corridor dominance than the Islamic Republic was 鈥� because it can engage international financial systems and offer regional partners a credible alternative. Along this line, some within the Iranian government have already highlighted a potential role for Iran in the TRIPP, particularly by linking the proposed railway to a broader North鈥揝outh axis that would connect Iran to the project.

Overall, the most likely scenario is a weakened Iran embroiled in prolonged transition and domestic challenges, where the outcomes of the 2026 war and the popular mobilization against the regime forces the Islamic Republic into a posture of survival and tactical concession, producing a prolonged period of U.S.-Iran negotiations. Although the TRIPP constitutes a secondary concern relative to regime survival, particularly in a context of elite fragmentation and competition over residual state assets, including security forces, revenue streams, and territorial authority, it nevertheless reflects deeper structural dynamics. Specifically, regional competition with 罢眉谤办颈测别 is likely to remain a defining feature of Iran鈥檚 strategic environment.

Overall, Iran鈥檚 capacity to oppose the TRIPP would be significantly diminished in a context of internal fragmentation, where the central government struggles to maintain a coherent and strategic policy orientation. As domestic contestation over authority, resources, and coercive instruments intensifies, Tehran is unlikely to either mount an effective opposition to the TRIPP or engage with it in a consistent and constructive manner. This erosion of state capacity would, in turn, weaken Iran鈥檚 position along its northern frontier with Armenia, potentially transforming the Syunik region into both an economic and security vulnerability.

For 罢眉谤办颈测别, the 2026 war could constitute a strategic window of opportunity to consolidate its influence in the South Caucasus. With Iran internally weakened and Russia preoccupied with the war in Ukraine, Ankara face fewer constraints in advancing the Middle Corridor pan-Turkic connectivity agenda. In such a scenario, both Armenia and Azerbaijan may increasingly view 罢眉谤办颈测别 as a reliable regional partner, particularly if Ankara鈥檚 initiatives are reinforced by support from the United States and the Trump administration and by broader Western engagement. At the same time, the weakening of Iran could result on unintended consequences, such as the renewal of at Turkish borders.

Conclusion

The renewed U.S. engagement in the South Caucasus catalyzed by the Washington Accords and the TRIPP constitutes a strategic advantage for 罢眉谤办颈测别 and Azerbaijan. It helps remove existing to the project鈥檚 implementation and circumvents longstanding opposition, particularly from Iran and Russia. For Armenia, the TRIPP represents a rare opportunity to stimulate economic development, consolidate its strategic reorientation toward the West, and rebalance its negotiating position vis-脿-vis Baku, while simultaneously benefiting from the expanding trade and connectivity generated by the Middle Corridor.

By reconfiguring regional connectivity, the United States seeks to weaken both Iranian and Russian influence in the South Caucasus. Within this new strategic environment, any Iranian effort to obstruct the corridor in practice would no longer confront Azerbaijan or 罢眉谤办颈测别 alone, but rather the United States itself. Such opposition would also risk damaging Iran鈥檚 relationship with Yerevan and undermine its access to the North鈥揝outh Corridor, thereby weakening Iran鈥檚 broader connectivity to Europe.

Although Iran and Russia share certain tactical positions, most notably their skepticism toward externally driven regional initiatives such as the TRIPP, their strategic interests diverge. Russia鈥檚 posture remains pragmatic and situational, shaped by its wider global priorities and flexibility in regional bargaining. Iranian officials, by contrast, increasingly perceive the TRIPP as a direct geopolitical threat, one that could marginalize Iran economically and strategically within emerging Eurasian trade networks.

Overall, the Washington Accords have the potential to reshape the geostrategic and geoeconomic landscape of the South Caucasus and to challenge Iran鈥檚 traditional regional foreign policy. However, the realization of these outcomes will depend on the successful implementation of an ambitious infrastructure agenda requiring sustained Western engagement, as well as the finalization of a durable peace settlement between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

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The Caspian and Black Sea regions hold significant geopolitical importance for Europe’s energy security, due to their strategic location, abundant resources, and critical role as transit corridors linking energy-producing areas with consumer markets. .  The significance of these regions also extends beyond energy and trade, encompassing economic potential and a strategic role in regional stability and broader security dynamics. Given their geopolitical and geostrategic value, ensuring the security of these regions has become a priority for external actors, often from geopolitically opposing sides. The regions鈥� energy reserves, trade flows, and transportation infrastructure increasingly influence both regional and transregional stability and security frameworks. 

The post The Strategic Importance of the Caspian and Black Sea Regions for Europe鈥檚 Energy Security appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

During his time as Iran鈥檚 President from 2021鈥�2024, Seyed Ebrahim Raisi spearheaded a marked recalibration of Iran鈥檚 foreign policy characterized by heightened distrust and skepticism toward Europe and its efforts to play a central diplomatic role in resolving current United States (US)-Iran tensions. Diverging from the positions of the previous Rouhani presidency, Raisi鈥檚 administration viewed Europe less as an independent geopolitical actor and more as an extension of a declining US-dominated international order.听听

As a result, Raisi demonstrated little willingness to engage with European powers, consistently voicing skepticism regarding their intentions and portraying them as strategically subordinate to the US (). Reflecting this shift in tone, Raisi鈥檚 addresses to the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in September 2024 repeatedly underscored the perceived decline of US hegemony, declaring that the 鈥減roject to Americanize the world has failed鈥� and that the 鈥渙ld liberal order … has been pushed aside鈥澨� (). During this speech, he urged European states to distance themselves from US expansionist policies and to honour their commitments to Iran, warning that 鈥淯S unilateralism is not in the interest of anyone.鈥� Although Raisi expressed conditional interest in economic cooperation with Europe, he simultaneously cautioned against what he termed as 鈥渁lien鈥� interference in shaping these relations ().听

Differences Between Raisi and Rouhani Administrations Regarding Relations with Europe

A key distinction between Raisi鈥檚 administration and that of Rouhani was the former鈥檚 renewed emphasis on strengthening the 鈥渞esistance economy鈥� in Iran. Originally introduced by Ayatollah Khamenei but largely sidelined during Rouhani鈥檚 tenure, this strategy aimed to achieve economic self-sufficiency and neutralize the impact of foreign sanctions. Under Raisi, this strategy translated into a more deliberate policy of boosting domestic production, expanding non-oil exports, and reducing reliance on imports (Tasnim News, 2019). This focus marked a clear departure from Rouhani鈥檚 approach, which prioritized diplomacy with the West as the primary way to reduce economic isolation and improve Iran鈥檚 security. Contrarily, by publicly decoupling Iran鈥檚 economic trajectory from the success of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Raisi鈥檚 administration sought to minimize perceived external leverage over its nuclear program. This posture allowed Iran to maintain a firm stance on its demands despite European pressure, as the immediate economic necessity for a deal was downplayed domestically (Mashregh News, 2022a). Though this strategy hardened Iran鈥檚 negotiating position, it also contributed to the prolonged nature of negotiations by diminishing the perceived urgency for Iran to make a compromise ().听

In parallel, the long-standing 鈥淟ook East鈥� policy, championed by Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei, has gained unprecedented momentum during Raisi鈥檚 presidency. This doctrine was based on the belief that the current US-led international system would lose influence to an emerging global order centred around Asia. Raisi鈥檚 administrated followed this policy by strengthening Iran鈥檚 ties with its Eastern partners, particularly China and Russia, as a means to counter the diplomatic isolation and sanctions imposed by the US and Europe (; ). This strategic pivot further limited prospects for cooperation with Europe, as Tehran increasingly perceived Europe and the US as being aligned, thus leading Iran to prioritize partnerships with Asian powers over engagement with the West (; ). 

During this time, Iranian official discourse on nuclear negotiations with Europe also adopted a much more firm and critical tone. For example, Raisi openly condemned the US and the E3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (UK)) for what he described as a 鈥渧ery improper鈥� act of advancing a resolution at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors that was sharply critical of Iran while all sides were still engaged in negotiations on Iran鈥檚 nuclear program (). Raisi also questioned the reliability of US and European negotiators, stressing that Iran would not allow negotiations to be for negotiations鈥� sake and insisting that any dialogue must be results-oriented and produce tangible outcomes for Iran (; ). Central to this administration鈥檚 stance was the categorical rejection of expanding the scope of negotiations, particularly through Raisi鈥檚 assertion that 鈥� despite being a core concern for Europe 鈥� Iran鈥檚 ballistic missile program was non-negotiable (; ). 

Late 2021: Initial Stalemates in EU-Iran Nuclear Negotiations

The Raisi administration鈥檚 approach to negotiating  its nuclear program with Europe began with the seventh round of the 鈥榁ienna talks鈥� in November 2021. Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian and Iran鈥檚 chief negotiator Ali Bagheri Kani consistently emphasized two central demands during these talks: one, the complete and verifiable lifting of all sanctions imposed after the US withdrawal in 2018; and two, legally binding guarantees to prevent any future US administration from abandoning the agreement (). Additionally, Iran鈥檚 negotiating team sought assurances that sanctions relief would result in tangible and sustainable economic benefits for their country (). These demands were proposed to mitigate against the negative effects of the first JCPOA, where the absence of such guarantees led to significant economic disruption for Iran after the US鈥� unilateral exit in 2018. During the Vienna talks, Iran submitted two documents outlining proposals on sanctions removal and nuclear commitments, with a third document on guarantees and verification that they were abiding by the JCPOA. In presenting these proposals, Bagheri Kani asserted that Iran鈥檚 position during these talks was based on principles accepted by all parties, despite European dissatisfaction (). 

European partners, particularly the E3, reiterated their commitment to reviving the JCPOA, viewing it as the most effective means to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. However, they also expressed mounting concerns over Iran鈥檚 accelerated nuclear activities (). According to IAEA reports, these advancements undermined the non-proliferation benefits of the original deal and sharply reduced Iran鈥檚 breakout time to produce weapons-grade uranium (). Shortly after Raisi assumed office in August 2021, Iran began enriching uranium to 60% while also producing uranium metal. By the start of the November 2021 Vienna talks, Iran had accumulated 113.8 kilograms of 20% enriched uranium. Enriching to 20% completes almost all the necessary work to produce the fissile material for a bomb (), a threshold Iran surpassed with its 113.8 kilogram stockpile. While European officials acknowledged Iran鈥檚 concerns regarding sanctions relief, they viewed the demand for legally binding guarantees as particularly difficult to fulfill, especially in the context of Iran鈥檚 renewed effort to enrich its uranium (). 

2022 to Early 2023: Escalation of Tensions and Diplomatic Impasse

From 2022 to early 2023, the diplomatic climate surrounding the European Union (EU)-Iran nuclear talks deteriorated sharply; this breakdown was caused by two major events.  

The first was Russia鈥檚 full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Before the invasion, Russia had played a relatively constructive role in Iran鈥揑AEA relations. While occasionally criticizing Iran for its breaches of the nuclear accord and delays in the JCPOA negotiations, Russia largely positioned itself as a mediator between Iran and the West. However, the full-scale invasion and resulting war between Russia and Ukraine fundamentally altered this dynamic, introducing significant challenges for the already faltering nuclear negotiations between Iran and European powers (). 

Iran’s response to the war has gone beyond mere rhetorical support for Russia. Tehran has provided significant military assistance to Moscow, particularly in the form of loitering munitions such as the Shahed 131 and Shahed 136 drones, which have been widely used by Russian forces on the battlefield Ukrainian conflict (). In October 2022, reports emerged suggesting that Iran was also preparing to supply Russia with short-range ballistic missiles, thus deepening its involvement in the conflict (). Iranian officials, including Amirabdollahian, defended providing Russia with these weapons and asserted that the drones did not violate UN Security Council Resolution 2231. This Resolution, which was adopted to lift sanctions on Iran as part of the JCPOA, regulates the transfer of goods that could potentially contribute to nuclear weapon delivery systems (). Iran’s ambassador to the UN further supported this stance, arguing that these military transfers were outside the scope of the Resolution (). 

The geopolitical shift triggered by Russia鈥檚 full-scale invasion of Ukraine had a direct impact on the stalled JCPOA negotiations. As Russia grew increasingly dependent on Iran for both economic and military support, Moscow鈥檚 leverage over Tehran in the nuclear talks diminished (). This new dependence reduced Russia’s ability 鈥� and, perhaps more critically, its willingness 鈥� to mediate the nuclear discussions effectively. As the war in Ukraine continues, Russia鈥檚 stance on Iran鈥檚 nuclear ambitions has become more tolerant. In fact, Moscow now appears to view Iran鈥檚 pursuit of nuclear weapon capabilities as beneficial to its own strategic interests. From Russia鈥檚 perspective, a broader confrontation between Iran and the West could serve to further complicate the West鈥檚 foreign policy focus, creating additional pressure on the liberal international order at a time of heightened geopolitical tensions (; ). 

This shift in Russia鈥檚 approach, transforming from a constructive mediator to a more disengaged partner, has further undermined European efforts to revive the nuclear deal. For European nations, Iran鈥檚 military assistance to Russia has become a significant point of contention. The EU swiftly condemned Iran鈥檚 actions to provide Russia with military drones and missiles to use in the war. In response, the E3 and other European countries imposed new rounds of sanctions targeting Iranian officials and entities for human rights abuses and military cooperation 鈥� sanctions that were separate from those tied to Iran鈥檚 nuclear program (). Tehran quickly retaliated by sanctioning European individuals and organizations, accusing them of inciting unrest and meddling in its sovereign affairs (). This cycle of punitive measures and countersanctions has further eroded trust and severely disrupted communication channels between the two sides. The introduction of these new, non-nuclear sanctions, coupled with Iran鈥檚 reciprocal measures, signaled a broader breakdown in bilateral relations, making it increasingly difficult to compartmentalize the nuclear negotiations from other contentious issues. 

The second factor contributing to the breakdown of the EU-Iran relationship during this period was the death of Masha Amini in September 2022 and the resulting political unrest in Iran. Amini died in police custody after being arrested for improperly wearing her hijab. The Iranian government鈥檚 handling of the protests criticizing the government drew strong condemnation and sanctions from European nations which, in turn, affected the prospects for the nuclear program negotiations. European governments, now reconsidering their approach to Iran, became increasingly hesitant to advance a deal with Tehran under its conservative conditions. Amirabdollahian also repeatedly denounced European statements and actions regarding the protests, accusing them of interference in Iran鈥檚 internal affairs and acting on a double standard (). This highly charged political environment further complicated any possibility of a diplomatic breakthrough on the nuclear issue, as European policy toward Iran began to increasingly incorporate conditions tied to domestic human rights concerns (; ).

Conclusion

As the Raisi administration ended in May 2024, Iran-Europe relations were left strained, and the nuclear negotiations remained at a standstill. Despite existing communication channels aimed at preventing a complete diplomatic breakdown, trust further dissolved as the talks became increasingly entangled with broader disputes over Iran鈥檚 human rights record and its military support for Russia. European frustration deepened as Iran鈥檚 nuclear program advanced through higher enrichment levels and expanded centrifuge capacity, pushing the revival of the JCPOA further out of reach and prompting consideration of alternative strategies. As a result, Raisi鈥檚 legacy has been defined by an unyielding approach that emphasized resilience and national demands over compromise. This stance, while projecting Iran as a powerful and resilient actor, nevertheless prolonging the deadlock as well as Iran鈥檚 economic and political isolation. Raisi鈥檚 successor, Masoud Pezeshkian, now has to navigate balancing Iran鈥檚 emboldened nuclear program with his political ambitions to return to a more open and constructive relationship with Europe ().听

References

Ahqaqi, A. (2021). Mohamtaren ch膩lesh-e dowr-e haftom-e moz膩ker膩t-e V墨n ch墨st? [What is the most important challenge of the “seventh round” of Vienna talks?]. ISNA.  

Akbari, R. H. (2021). Raisi, the Presidency and Iran’s foreign policy. United States Institute of Peace.  

Arms Control Association. (2022). Restoring the JCPOA’s nuclear limits.  

Avdaliani, E. (2024). Iran and Russia enter a new level of military cooperation. Stimson Center.  

Council on Foreign Relations. (2023). How do countries create nuclear weapons?  

Court, J. K., Contini, K. E., Stauber, A. M., Llewellyn, A. A. W. C., Clark, M. G., & Wood, J. E. (2024, February 28). US, UK and EU announce new measures against Iran and Russia. Sanctions News.  

Deutsche Welle. (2022). EU agrees to sanction Iran over protests crackdown.  

Donya-e-Eqtesad. (2024). Ta’neh-ye b墨-vaqfe-ye Jalil墨 be Pezeshki膩n/ Pezeshki膩n: Barn膩me-r墨z墨-ye 膩mer膩ne r膩 qab奴l nad膩ram/Gozaresh-e dovvom墨n mon膩zere-ye entekh膩b膩t-e riy膩sat-e jomh奴r墨 [Jalili’s incessant taunts to Pezeshkian/ Pezeshkian: I do not accept authoritarian planning/Report on the second presidential election debate].  

E3. (2022). Iran’s nuclear commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action: E3 statement, November 2022. GOV.UK.  

Fars News Agency. (2023). Kanaani dar v膩konesh be tahr墨mh膩-ye Orup膩 va Engelis: Haqq-e khod r膩 bar膩-ye p膩sokh mahf奴z mi-d膩rim [Kanaani in response to European and British sanctions: We reserve our right to respond].  

IPD Middle East Research Team. (2021). Foreign Policy Brief: Ebrahim Raisi’s foreign policy views. Peace and Diplomacy.  

IRNA. (2021). Am墨r-Abdull膩hiy膩n: Hadaf-e mosh膩rakat-e 莫r膩n dar moz膩ker膩t-e laghv-e tahr墨mh膩 ast [Amirabdollahian: Iran’s goal in sanctions lifting negotiations is participation].  

IRNA. (2022). Am墨r-Abdull膩hiy膩n: Mod膩khele-ye keshvarh膩-ye gharb墨 dar om奴r-e d膩khel墨-ye 莫r膩n r膩 mahk奴m [Amirabdollahian condemns Western countries’ interference in Iran’s internal affairs]. IRNA.  

IRNA English. (2022). Pres. Raisi tells nation: Improper act by US, E3 to submit IAEA resolution.  

Jamshidi, A. (2022). Matn-e k膩mel-e sokhanr膩n墨-ye Ebr膩h墨m Ra鈥櫮玸墨 dar Majma鈥�-e 鈥楿m奴m墨-ye S膩zm膩n-e Mellal [Full text of Ebrahim Raisi鈥檚 speech at the UN General Assembly]. Khordad News.  

Javan Online. (2022). Tehr膩n: Pahp膩dh膩-ye 莫r膩n rabt-i be qat’n膩me-ye 2231 nad膩rad [Tehran: Iran’s drones have nothing to do with Resolution 2231].  

Kunertova, D. (2023). Drones have boots: Learning from Russia鈥檚 war in Ukraine. Contemporary Security Policy, 44(4), 576鈥�591.  

Lynch, S. (2022). EU set to hit Iran with sanctions over protest crackdown. Politico.  

Mashregh News. (2022). Agar be eqtes膩d-e mog膩vamati tavajjoh m墨-shod, moshkel膩t-e emr奴z r膩 nad膩sht墨m [If attention had been given to a resistance-based economy, we wouldn鈥檛 have today鈥檚 problems].  

Mashregh News. (2022). Pahp膩d-e 莫r膩n墨 dar jang-e 弄kr膩墨n; sen膩ry奴y墨 ke 墨n r奴zh膩 dar h膩l-e pokht va paz-e 膩n hastand [Iranian drone in the Ukraine war; A scenario that is being cooked these days].  

Mashregh News. (2025). Taf膩vot-h膩-ye moz膩ker膩t dar dowlat-e Ra鈥櫮玸墨 b膩 dowlat-e p墨sh墨n ch墨st? [What are the differences in negotiations under Raisi鈥檚 government compared to the previous one?].  

News University ANA. (2025). Ra示墨s墨: 膧mr墨k膩 va Or奴p膩墨-h膩 dar qeb膩l-e 莫r膩n girift膩r-e eshteb膩h-e moh膩sab膩t墨 hastand [Raisi: The U.S. and Europeans are making a miscalculation regarding Iran]. ANA News Agency.  

Notte, H. (2022). Don鈥檛 expect any more Russian help on the Iran nuclear deal. War on the Rocks.  

Notte, H. (2023). The Iran nuclear price tag. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.  

Tasnim News. (2019). Goz膩resh-e tahl墨l墨-ye Tasn墨m- 膧q膩-ye Ra鈥櫮玸-e Jomh奴r! Magar goz膩sht墨d eqtes膩d abz膩r-e qodrat b膩shad? [Tasnim鈥檚 analytical report – Mr. President! Did you allow the economy to be a tool of power?]  

Tasnim News. (2025). Cher膩 moz膩ker膩t-e haste-墨 dar dowlat-e Shah墨d-e Ra示墨s墨 be natije na-ras墨d? [Why did the nuclear negotiations not reach a conclusion during the administration of martyr Raisi?].  

Velayati, A. A. (2022). Ir膩n, R奴siyah va Ch墨n; seh qudrat-e mohem va mostaqel dar mogh膩bel-e towse鈥榓峁璦labi-ye 膧mrik膩 va Gharb [Iran, Russia, and China: Three important and independent powers against the expansionism of the U.S. and the West] (Dialogue). Khamenei.ir.  

Vinjamuri, L., Ayd谋n-D眉zgit, S., Bajpaee, C., Cooley, A., de Hoop Scheffer, A., Emmers, R., Fravel, M. T., Lind, J., Nasr, V., Quencez, M., Stelzenm眉ller, C., Della Costa Stuenkel, O., Vakil, S., & Zarakol, A. (2025). Competing visions of international order: Responses to US power in a fracturing world. Chatham House.  

The post Iran-Europe Relations: The Impact of Raisi’s Presidency on Nuclear Negotiations and Diplomatic Tensions appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), concluded in Vienna on July 14, 2015, marked a significant milestone in international diplomacy by forging a comprehensive agreement between Iran and the P5+1 nations (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US)), alongside the European Union (EU) (.). The primary goal of this agreement was to ensure Iran’s nuclear program remained exclusively peaceful in exchange for substantial sanctions relief. The plan would work by rolling back Iran’s nuclear capabilities, effectively extending its “breakout time” from several months to a minimum of one year (.). Key provisions included stringent limits on uranium enrichment, reducing Iran’s low-enriched uranium stockpile to 300 kg and restricting enrichment levels to 3.67%. Operational centrifuge numbers were capped, and critical facilities such as Fordow and Arak were repurposed for civilian use under continuous monitoring from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)  (; ; ). The EU, led by its High Representative, played a pivotal role in these diplomatic efforts, championing the JCPOA as a successful model of multilateral engagement and a pathway to broader diplomatic relations with Iran  (). 

The diplomatic success of the JCPOA began to unravel dramatically on May 8, 2018, when the US, under President Donald Trump, unilaterally withdrew from the agreement (; ). While evidence from the IAEA indicated that Iran was complying with the deal, the US cited perceived deficiencies in the agreement itself and reinstated extensive primary and secondary sanctions on Iran. This “maximum pressure” campaign effectively cut off Iran’s access to the international financial system, thereby negating the economic benefits that had been fundamental to Iran鈥檚 cooperation with the JCPOA鈥檚 conditions (). In retaliation to the US withdrawal and the lack of the anticipated economic relief, Iran began a phased reduction of its commitments to the JCPOA starting in July 2019. This included surpassing limits on its enriched uranium stockpile and progressively raising enrichment levels, initially to 4.5% and later to 60% (). Furthermore, Iran reduced its cooperation with the IAEA, limiting the ability for the organization to oversee Iran鈥檚 nuclear development.听听

Europe鈥檚 Inability to Save the JCPOA听

The EU consistently positioned itself as a key diplomatic actor in the Iran nuclear issue. Since 2006, the EU High Representative has led diplomatic initiatives involving the E3/EU+3 and Iran, culminating in the JCPOA. The EU’s approach has been centered on engagement and critical dialogue with Iran, driven by the dual goals of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and reducing the risk of regional conflict (). Even after the US backed out of the JCPOA, the EU reaffirmed its commitment to the agreement, expressing deep regret over America鈥檚 decision to re-impose sanctions (). In the immediate aftermath of the US withdrawal, Iran called on Europe to take a leading role in upholding the agreement by helping to protect Iranian oil from the reinstated US sanctions. For its part, the EU updated its Blocking Statute in order to distance itself from complying with the American sanctions (). However, this measure proved largely symbolic, as many European companies, fearing exposure to US secondary sanctions, chose to withdraw from Iran (). The dominance of the US dollar and the allure of the larger US market therefore severely hindered European attempts to maintain trade with Iran. 

Despite Europe’s stated ambitions for strategic autonomy, particularly in foreign policy and trade, the reality of its deep economic and financial integration with the US posed significant challenges in upholding the JCPOA without America.  Within some Iranian political circles, the EU鈥檚 inability to provide any meaningful alternative to the benefits of the JCPOA was perceived as a failure to uphold its commitments, with some commentators going far enough to call the EU鈥檚 inaction as an implicit approval of America鈥檚 withdrawal (). 

Inability for INSTEX to Replace the JCPOA听

Despite being highly sensitive towards American sanctions, Europe worked to maintain the core agreements of the JCPOA through the creation of the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX). Established by the E3 (France, Germany, and the UK) on January 31, 2019, INSTEX aimed to circumvent US sanctions and facilitate legitimate trade between Europe and Iran, particularly for 鈥榟umanitarian trade鈥� in medicine and food (; ). 

In response, Iran created the Special Trade and Finance Instrument (STFI) to collaborate with INSTEX. Initially, Iranian officials had high hopes for the mechanism, expecting it to address the country鈥檚 economic challenges by facilitating significant trade with Europe (). However, these expectations weren’t met. Iranian officials, including Deputy Foreign Minister Seyed Abbas Araghchi and Central Bank Governor Abdolnaser Hemmati, expressed frustration with this new program. They acknowledged that INSTEX hadn’t delivered the promised results for humanitarian trade and failed to expand into other vital sectors, such as oil and other commodities promised under the JCPOA (Mashregh News, 2020; ). 

From a European perspective, INSTEX failed because of Iran鈥檚 refusal to comply with Financial Action Task Force (FATF) standards on anti-money laundering and terrorism financing. Without Iran鈥檚 cooperation in these areas, the INSTEX program was never implemented in full, thus leading to underwhelming economic benefits for Iran (). As an intergovernmental organization, the FATF aims to combat money laundering and terrorist financing by setting international standards and promoting their effective implementation (). Iran has been reluctant to fully ratify FATF agreements, such as the Palermo Convention and the Combating the Financing of Terrorism bill, because it fears that compliance would hinder its efforts to bypass sanctions and fund regional activities, including supporting para-military  resistance groups, some of which are designated as ‘terrorist organizations’ by Western governments (). Adhering to these standards would also make Iran more heavily reliant on the international monetary system, a system from which it has a proven history of being cut off due to unilateral decisions from the US ().  

The situation reflected a cyclical dynamic: Europe, constrained by US pressure, offered a limited solution that Iran found inadequate for its broader needs. Iran鈥檚 subsequent non-compliance with the FATF provided Europe with a justification for the mechanism鈥檚 failure, thus entrenching the impasse. Both sides blamed each other, but the core issue remains in the US鈥� ability to dominate international finance and trade flows. 

Iranian Domestic Critique of Western Diplomacy听

Principlist factions within Iran have consistently portrayed European diplomatic efforts as superficial, suggesting they merely mask a deeper alignment with US interests. The longstanding metaphor of a “velvet glove” concealing an “iron fist,” is frequently invoked by Iran鈥檚 Guardian Jurist¹ to describe EU foreign policy, reflecting a deep-rooted mistrust of Western intentions (). In a notable 2022 speech, the Guardian Jurist asserted, 鈥渢he support promised by Western powers to compliant governments is illusory; it never materializes. All governments must come to understand this… Today, the world鈥檚 bullies have shed the velvet glove, revealing their iron fists鈥� (). This rhetoric has been widely echoed by Principlist circles, who express strong alignment with and loyalty to the country鈥檚 head of state. 

This deep-seated mistrust towards the West was a primary reason why the Principlist group opposed the JCPOA from the outset (). Viewing negotiations with the West as a form of colonial coercion, Principlist leaders argued that it was Iran鈥檚 鈥渕ilitary and nuclear strength鈥� that had compelled the US to engage diplomatically (). Principlists repeatedly cautioned against trusting European powers, accusing them of repeatedly betraying Iran throughout history. In line with this perspective, they categorically rejected any dialogue concerning Iran鈥檚 nuclear program, framing the program as an essential pillar of the country鈥檚 defensive posture. This group also vehemently opposed efforts to ratify the FATF regulations, contending that compliance would undermine Iran鈥檚 strategic flexibility and further constrain its ability to sustain a functioning economy under the weight of international sanctions ( ). 

Iranian Reformist Advocacy for Engagement with Europe听

In contrast, Reformists aligned with the Rouhani administration advocated for closer cooperation with Europe as a means to isolate the US and alleviate the impact of sanctions following Washington鈥檚 withdrawal from the JCPOA. Reformist media outlets embraced what they saw as progress in nuclear negotiations, anticipating that the INSTEX agreement would yield tangible economic and diplomatic benefits. Iranian media, echoing the administration鈥檚 policy outlook, highlighted support from the European business community for the deal, reinforcing the Rouhani government’s optimism about the opportunities of the new agreement ().听

Transition from Rouhani’s Optimism to Raisi’s Defiance听

The internalization of America鈥檚 decision to quit the JCPOA proved pivotal in reshaping Iran鈥檚 political landscape towards cooperation with the West. Although the Rouhani administration had championed the JCPOA as a pathway to economic relief, the US withdrawal from the agreement and Europe鈥檚 subsequent failure to find an alternative significantly bolstered Principlist credibility. Seizing on widespread disillusionment with a decade-long policy of engagement with the West, Principlists portrayed diplomatic outreach and reliance on European mediation as both futile and harmful to Iran鈥檚 national interests. The collapse of the JCPOA, coupled with the failure of the INSTEX mechanism, prompted a shift toward a more assertive nuclear policy and a rejection of European mediation (). 

Propelled, in part, by the failure of the JCPOA, Iran鈥檚 2021 presidential elections brought Principlist Seyed Ebrahim Raisi to power. Raisi adopted a more confrontational approach toward the West, making the resumption of nuclear negotiations conditional on the full lifting of sanctions and firmly excluding Iran鈥檚 ballistic missile program and regional activities from the negotiating agenda (; ). His presidency marked a clear departure from Rouhani鈥檚 cooperative stance, signaling the consolidation of Principlist influence across all branches of government. The dynamics of negotiation under Raisi鈥檚 leadership, in contrast to his predecessor, will be examined in the next article, with a focus on the evolving contours of Iran鈥檚 diplomatic strategy. 

References听

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Jamshidi, A. (2020). Tasv墨b-e FATF r膩h-e ch膩neh-zan墨-ye Or奴p膩 r膩 b膩z m墨-konad [Passing FATF opens Europe鈥檚 bargaining path]. Farhikhtegan Daily.  

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Lopez, H. (2018). Europe must not give in to US pressure on Iran. Euractiv.  

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Mashregh News. (2020). 士Araqch墨: E士tem膩d墨 beh Or奴p膩墨-h膩 va INSTEX nad膩r墨m [Araghchi: We do not trust Europeans or INSTEX]. Mashregh News.  

Mashregh News. (2023, July 22). Eqted膩r-e nez膩m墨-ye 莫r膩n 膧mr墨k膩 r膩 v膩dar beh moz膩kerah kard [Iran鈥檚 military power has compelled the U.S. to negotiate]. Mashregh News.  

Mehr News Agency. (2020). Barj膩m, abz膩r-e fesh膩r-e Or奴p膩 bar 莫r膩n: Ejr膩-ye protokol-e elh膩q墨 motavaqef shod [JCPOA as Europe鈥檚 pressure tool on Iran: Implementation of Additional Protocol suspended]. Mehr News.  

Mehr News Agency. (2022). Ra示墨s墨: naf士-e mellat-e khodm膩n r膩 dar moz膩kerah b膩 膧mr墨k膩 nem墨-b墨n墨m [Raisi: We see no benefit to our nation in negotiating with the U.S.]. Mehr News.  

Mehr News Agency. (2024). Barrasi-ye j膩m鈥榚h-ye goruh-e vizheh-e eqd膩m-e m膩l墨 pol鈥憇huyi: doroy-e sekkeh鈥憏e FATF bar膩ye Ir膩n [A comprehensive review of the Financial Action Task Force: FATF’s double-edged sword for Iran]. Mehr News.  

Parsi, R., & Bassiri Tabrizi, A. (2020, October). State of play of EU鈥揑ran relations and the future of the JCPOA (Policy Department for External Relations, Directorate鈥慓eneral for External Policies, PE鈥�603.515). European Parliament.  

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Tabnak. (2023). Panje-ye chadani z墨r-e dastkesh-e makhmali: B膩zkhw膩n墨-ye neg膩h-e Rahbar-e Enqel膩b beh rus膩-ye jomh奴r-e 膧mr墨k膩 [Iron fist in a velvet glove: A reading of the Supreme Leader鈥檚 view on U.S. presidents].  

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The 2025 BRICS Summit, hosted in Rio de Janeiro by Brazil, featured noticeably more divergence in terms of political priorities when compared to last year鈥檚 Summit in Russia. This group, which began as an informal bloc of emerging economies (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), has since morphed into a politically diverse alliance of 11 countries, which have different perceptions on how to reshape the international system. Historically, Russia and China have utilized the BRICS institutions to promote an . Meanwhile, Brazil鈥檚 and India鈥檚 approach is non-aligned and focused on promoting economic cooperation with the West and other emerging economies.  

During the 2025 BRICS Summit, the parties released a that highlights these diverging priorities. The declaration outlines 126 commitments focused primarily on promoting the interests of 鈥� India and Brazil. These commitments range from . On the geopolitical side, the declaration condemns the Israeli attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities and Ukrainian attacks on Russian civil infrastructure but makes no mention of United States involvement in either conflict. Indeed, argue that the relatively more moderate agenda at this year鈥檚 Summit was an intentional effort to not antagonize Trump due to his . 

In contrast, last year鈥檚 BRICS Summit was framed by Russia as 鈥溾�� in the country, showcasing its resilience to Western sanctions and its ability . The 2024 Summit also introduced a new partnership status for members and called for de-dollarization, as well as building an alternative financial system to sanction-proof key members.  

Another notable difference is that the 2024 Summit had greater diplomatic representation than the 2025 Summit. The 2024 Summit was attended by 22 heads of state, including the newly joined members of . That Summit also included representation from . Conversely, the 2025 BRICS Summit was attended by only 11 leaders, with call in order to avoid arrest on war crime charges issued by the International Criminal Court in 2023. Xi Jinping did not attend the Summit, . The disinterest of certain BRICS leaders underscores how some may prefer to avoid the Summit if it is not used as a platform to promote anti-Western rhetoric. 

These leadership absences highlight deeper political divisions within the group, including differing views on the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East. This division was most prominent in Iran, a newly joined member, . Such breaks in unity are also present when looking at how different members view the future of BRICS. For instance, during the 2024 BRICS Summit, some members . These countries feared that the bloc was favouring the inclusion of autocracies as a way to consolidate Russian and Chinese influence over emerging economies at the expense of promoting democracy. These rifts make the ideological trajectory of the BRICS increasingly uncertain as divisions deepen between authoritarian and democratic members. 

Considering that India will host the next BRICS Summit in 2026, the bloc is likely to focus on issues related to economic cooperation rather than anti-Western rhetoric, which may lead to some greater political rifts. The coming years will reveal how the BRICS alliance will either develop a unified geopolitical identity or remain a fragmented alliance.听听

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Russia鈥檚 relationship with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is defined by cautious yet purposeful engagement, rooted in shared interests rather than deep strategic alignment. This dynamic was on display during the 7th Russia-GCC Strategic Dialogue held in Riyadh in September 2024, where both sides reaffirmed their commitment to cooperating on a wide range of areas including trade, security, and sustainable development as set out in their 2023-2027 Joint Action Plan. ().

At the heart of this engagement lies a mutual emphasis on multilateral diplomacy and conflict resolution. Russia, seeking to assert itself as a counterweight to Western influence, has carefully positioned its diplomacy in the Gulf as part of a broader strategy of global repositioning. For the GCC states, engagement with Moscow serves a more tactical purpose: maintaining open lines with all major powers while preserving strategic autonomy. The partnership facilitates diversification of international relations, coordination within the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the broader OPEC+ group, as well as a role in managing regional crises, particularly those involving Syria and Iran ().

Economic Partnerships and Investment

Economic cooperation 鈥� especially in the energy sector 鈥� has become a cornerstone of Russia鈥檚 engagement with the GCC, rooted in shared interests and Moscow鈥檚 strategic efforts to evade Western sanctions. As the world鈥檚 second-largest oil and gas producer, Russia plays a critical role in coordinating global energy markets, particularly through OPEC+ and the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF). From Russia鈥檚 perspective, collaborative efforts within these multilateral frameworks not only serve its long-term national interests but also help stabilize the economies of participating states. The 62% increase in trade volume with Saudi Arabia in 2024, which has since quadrupled in the first quarter of 2025, reflects how energy coordination has deepened into broader economic engagement (; ).

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has emerged alongside Saudi Arabia as a particularly significant economic partner for Russia. Bilateral trade between Russia and the UAE rose from US$3.5 billion in 2019 to US$11.2 billion in 2023 before dropping slightly to US$9.5 billion by the end of 2024. Concurrently, shipments from the UAE to Russia rose sharply 鈥� from US$300 million to US$800 million 鈥� over the same period. This surge is largely due to the establishment of approximately 4,000 Russian companies in the UAE, many of which facilitate parallel imports of Western goods and streamline payments, effectively turning the UAE into a critical logistics and financial hub for Russia鈥檚 international trade ().

Investment relations between Russia and the Gulf states have also strengthened significantly. Over the past decade, Russia and Saudi Arabia have launched more than 40 joint investment projects across key sectors including IT, transport, infrastructure, and petrochemicals (). The creation of the Russian-Saudi Economic Council (RSEC) in 2019 formalized this cooperation, focusing on large-scale ventures, localizing production in Saudi Arabia, and facilitating Russian business entry into the Kingdom鈥檚 markets (). In the UAE, Russian investment exceeded US$30 billion, while Emirati investments in Russia reached US$16.8 billion by 2024, further highlighting the depth of bilateral economic integration ().

Beyond energy and investment, new areas of collaboration are emerging. Tourism between Russia and Saudi Arabia has grown nearly fivefold over five years, with a sixfold rise in Saudi citizens visiting Russia in 2024 (). Russia also ranked second in terms of total visitors to the UAE that year, accounting for 7% of all entries (). In the automotive sector, the assembly of the Russian luxury car Aurus Senat began in Abu Dhabi in November 2023, with plans for SUV production currently underway. Financial ties have expanded as well, with the UAE sovereign wealth fund acquiring a 6.86% stake in the Moscow Stock Exchange in late 2024. Additionally, a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between Russia and the UAE 鈥� part of a broader pact with the Eurasian Economic Union 鈥� is expected by the end of June 2025 (). Notably, Russia鈥檚 proposal to establish a BRICS Grain Exchange was discussed in June 2025, highlighting an effort to further diversify trade and strengthen food security among BRICS nations ().

Military and security outreach

Since the early 2010s, Russia’s potential entry into the Persian Gulf arms market has been a subject of ongoing discussion, spurred by Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s exploration of defence cooperation with Moscow. Saudi Arabia expressed interest in acquiring advanced Russian military hardware, such as the S-400 air defence system and anti-tank guided missile systems, leading to a formal military cooperation agreement signed in August 2021. This move was seen as part of Riyadh’s broader strategy to diversify defence partnerships and reduce reliance on the US. Similarly, the UAE has engaged in talks with Russia, including discussions on jointly producing the Su-57 fighter jet. Despite these initiatives, actual implementation has been limited, likely influenced by Gulf states’ cautious approach to balancing their diversification efforts with longstanding security ties to Washington. While refraining from joining Western sanctions after Russia鈥檚 full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Gulf states have maintained a neutral stance to preserve ongoing military dialogues with Russia ().

Despite expressions of interest and signed agreements, Russian arms exports to the broader Middle East have significantly declined in recent years. Between 2019 and 2023, Russia accounted for just 4.6% of the region鈥檚 total arms imports, a sharp drop of 61% compared to the 2014鈥�2018 period. In 2022, there were no reported major arms exports from Moscow to the Middle East. This decline reflects both logistical disruptions from the war in Ukraine and a growing preference among regional buyers for Western or domestically produced systems ().

Soft Power via Religion (Orthodox-Islamic dialogue), Media, and Disinformation.

With Islam as Russia’s second-largest religion, the Kremlin leverages this cultural and religious connection as a foundation for strengthening ties with the Middle East. Initiatives like the Islamic banking pilot program, aimed at fostering financial cooperation and mutual understanding, are designed to attract investment from Gulf countries. Additionally, events such as KazanForum 2025 promote economic, scientific, and cultural collaboration, highlighting shared civilizational values. Together, these efforts underscore Russia鈥檚 pragmatic strategy of using soft power and cultural affinity to deepen its relationships with GCC states ().

This approach reflects what some scholars call 鈥渁uthoritarian soft power,鈥� which contrasts with Western models focused on promoting liberal democratic values. Rather than advocating for democracy or civil society, Russia emphasizes stability, sovereignty, and traditionalism, resonating with regimes in the Middle East that are wary of Western liberalism. By positioning itself as a consistent, non-interventionist partner, Russia seeks to fill the gap left by declining Western influence and the increasing demand for alternative partnerships. Unlike Joseph Nye’s model, which defines soft power as the ability to attract through culture, political values, and foreign policy, Russia鈥檚 version of soft power is rooted in authoritarian ideals. It uses cultural diplomacy, religious affinity, and economic cooperation to appeal to actors who value hierarchy, conservatism, and order, thereby reinforcing alternative models of governance and social organization ().

Local Perceptions within the GCC States

The evolving relationship between Russia and the GCC states reflects a complex interplay of strategic pragmatism, geopolitical recalibration, and cautious engagement. Official Gulf media coverage and regional think tank analyses reveal a carefully managed narrative that highlights cooperation with Russia within multilateral frameworks like OPEC+ and BRICS, while maintaining an overarching policy of neutrality and diversification. As the global order becomes increasingly multipolar and US regional commitments appear more uncertain, GCC states are actively expanding ties with non-Western powers such as Russia and China. However, this realignment is not without its challenges, particularly given Russia鈥檚 deepening ties with Iran and its divergent stances on critical regional conflicts, such as those in Syria and Yemen.

Media Opinion

Coverage of Russia in official Gulf media outlets is generally limited and not highly divergent, reflecting a cautious and pragmatic editorial line. While differences in emphasis exist, reporting tends to align with state policies of neutrality and strategic balancing. The overview provided here offers a general sense of how Russia-related developments are framed across key platforms, rather than capturing deep editorial contrasts.

Saudi outlets such as the Saudi Press Agency (SPA) regularly report on Russia鈥檚 foreign policy activities, including high-level meetings such as those between Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and European Union (EU) officials concerning the Libyan crisis (). SPA also highlights events like the “Russia and the Islamic World: Practical Steps in Media Cooperation” conference, emphasizing Russia鈥檚 historical ties and growing engagement with Islamic countries (). Coverage of OPEC+ meetings is prominent, often commending Saudi Arabia鈥檚 leadership in ensuring oil market stability while noting Russia鈥檚 compliance with production cuts and its role as a cooperative partner ().

The Emirates News Agency (WAM) focuses on Russia鈥檚 role within the BRICS framework, reporting on joint initiatives in areas such as science, innovation, healthcare, culture, and security (). WAM underscores the significance of OPEC+ as a six-year partnership built on mutual trust among 23 oil-producing countries  (). It reflects the UAE鈥檚 broader diplomatic philosophy of maintaining balanced relations globally, describing the country鈥檚 approach as having 鈥渇riends everywhere,鈥� with strong ties to Russia, China, India, Europe, and the US ().

The Qatar News Agency (QNA) provides coverage of Russia-related developments through a geopolitical lens, including EU sanctions on Russia鈥檚 oil tanker fleet (). It also reports on Russia鈥檚 updated foreign policy strategy, which reflects Moscow鈥檚 view of a transformed international system and identifies the US as the central force behind anti-Russian initiatives ().

A Perspective from Leading Arab Think Tanks

Arab think tanks broadly agree that one of the main drivers behind the GCC鈥檚 diversification of international relations is the perceived ambiguity and shifting priorities of US policy in the Middle East. The strategy of 鈥減eaceful and low-cost solutions鈥� adopted by the Biden administration was interpreted by the Gulf States as enabling rivals like Iran to re-assert their power in the region. In response, GCC countries have adopted a proactive strategy to enhance strategic autonomy, motivated not only by the uncertainty surrounding US commitments, but also by the need for varied sources of military, technical, and diplomatic support ().

This shift is framed by analysts as a deliberate policy of active neutrality, allowing GCC states to assert their international standing and build relationships with non-Western powers, including Russia and China. Rather than pivoting away from the West entirely, Gulf countries are leveraging the multipolar global order to broaden their options and reduce dependency on any single external actor. The emergence of a China-Russia axis provides greater room for maneuvering, thus enabling the pursuit of national interests even when they diverge from those of the US (; ; ).

However, this diversification comes with complications, particularly in light of the deepening Russia-Iran partnership. The proposed “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty” between Moscow and Tehran raises serious concerns in the Gulf, especially regarding joint cooperation on issues such as Yemen and nuclear technology, which could pose direct security concerns to GCC states. While some Arab countries see value in engaging with the Russia-China bloc to potentially curb Iran鈥檚 regional ambitions, the difference between Russia and China complicates this calculus. China has sought to mediate between Gulf states and Iran, whereas Russia maintains strong ties with Tehran while balancing its OPEC+ interests with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi ().

Additional tensions arise from conflicting positions on key regional issues, most notably Syria and Yemen. Russia鈥檚 previous longstanding support for Bashar al-Assad, in opposition to GCC-backed rebel groups, has placed it at odds with Gulf strategies, particularly when factoring in Iran and Hezbollah鈥檚 roles in the conflict. These divergences underscore the complexity of Russia-GCC relations, which, while offering strategic opportunities, also introduce new layers of geopolitical friction ().

References

Gulf Research Center. (2025). Russia – GCC Relations. Gulf Research Center.



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Russia and Iran increasingly view the United States (US)-led international order not as a guarantor of stability, but as a direct threat to their sovereignty and national interests. This perception has become a defining feature of their foreign policy orientation (). For Russia, confrontation with the West has evolved into a broader ideological and geopolitical contest, not just over the sovereignty of states like Ukraine, but over the very structure of the global order. This logic of confrontation now deeply informs Moscow鈥檚 regional strategy (). For Iran, this dynamic resonates with its own post-revolutionary worldview, which has long framed its foreign policy as part of a broader anti-colonial struggle. Since 1979, the Islamic Republic has positioned itself as a challenger to Western dominance, viewing the liberal order as an extension of American imperialism and seeking to assert its sovereignty through resistance to perceived external interference ().

Moscow and Tehran both advocate for a multipolar world order grounded in 鈥渟overeign internationalism,鈥� a model that prioritizes national autonomy and cultural pluralism over liberal interventionism. This vision argues that no single state or coalition should dominate the global system or impose a universal ideological framework. Instead, the emphasis is on the coexistence of diverse political systems and civilizational models. In this context, Iran emerges not just as a regional partner for Russia, but as a strategic ally in a shared effort to reconfigure the global order away from US hegemony (; ).

Building upon the shared perception of the US-led international order as a threat and their mutual vision for a multipolar world, the subsequent analysis will delve into the manifestations of the strategic partnership between Iran and Russia. It will first examine their cooperation in the Syrian conflict, highlighting the military and political coordination that propped up the Assad regime. Following this, the discussion will pivot to the significant shifts in their defence partnership, particularly in the context of the war in Ukraine and its impact on arms sales and military technology transfers, as well as their ongoing collaboration in civilian nuclear energy. Finally, the analysis will explore the internal Iranian perspectives on this alliance, contrasting the historical distrust and pragmatic engagement of the elite with the distinct views of Principlist and Reformist factions on the benefits and limitations of their country鈥檚 relationship with Russia.

Cooperation in Syria

Iran and Russia have developed a robust partnership rooted in shared strategic interests, most notably in the Syrian conflict, where both powers were instrumental in propping up the Assad regime. Their cooperation encompassed military operations, intelligence sharing, and political coordination. United in their opposition of Western-backed efforts to overthrow Assad, Moscow and Tehran initially collaborated to suppress the Syrian opposition and combat the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL). Russia brought airpower and advanced military capabilities to the battlefield, while Iran supplied ground forces, intelligence, and logistical support through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and affiliated militias such as Hezbollah.

This collaboration intensified in 2015, when the Assad regime teetered on the brink of collapse following the fall of Palmyra to ISIL. The turning point came after Qassem Soleimani, the now deceased commander of the Quds Force, made a covert visit to Moscow in order to meet with President Vladimir Putin and Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu ( ). This meeting laid the groundwork for a major military intervention in Syria. Soon after, Russia and Iran 鈥� alongside Syria and Iraq 鈥� formed the so-called RSII coalition (also referred to as the 4+1, with Hezbollah as the fifth actor) and established joint operation centers in Damascus and Baghdad to synchronize their campaign against ISIL (). This unprecedented intelligence-sharing alliance marked a significant step in institutionalizing the Iran-Russia military partnership.

While Russia has long viewed Iran as a critical partner in stabilizing regions vulnerable to extremism 鈥� including Central Asia, the Northern Caucasus, and Chechnya 鈥� this relationship is not without its competitive undertones. Both powers seek influence over post鈥憌ar Syria, and their interests do not always align (). Tensions have emerged over military coordination, such as disagreements on air support for Iranian-backed ground forces in Khan Tuman and disputes over basing rights, which have occasionally resulted in operational friction on the ground. Additionally, each country has pursued economic and strategic footholds: Russia through its naval base at Tartus and air facility in Latakia, Iran through its role in shaping Syrian militias and economic reconstruction. These dueling interests have created ongoing bureaucratic and diplomatic rivalries despite continued large-scale cooperation (). Despite this friction, Russia and Iran remain aligned through their shared objective of undermining Western influence in Syria and the broader Middle East.

The Strategic Evolution of Russia-Iran Military Cooperation

The war in Ukraine has significantly reshaped Russia鈥檚 role in the global arms trade, directly influencing its defence partnership with Iran. Once one of the world鈥檚 leading arms exporters, Russia has seen a dramatic decline in its global military exports as a result of the war (). As Moscow diverts its military-industrial resources toward sustaining its own war effort, it has increasingly turned to Iran for key battlefield technologies, marking a striking reversal in traditional arms trade dynamics.

The clearest manifestation of this shift is Russia鈥檚 reliance on Iranian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), particularly the Shahed series of loitering munitions, widely referred to as 鈥渒amikaze鈥� drones (; ). These weapons have played a key role in Russia鈥檚 battlefield tactics in Ukraine, offering a low-cost means of striking Ukrainian infrastructure and military positions. For Iran, the war provides an opportunity to test and refine its drone technology under live combat conditions. Iran has drawn valuable insights from Russia鈥檚 war with Ukraine to inform its own confrontations with Israel and involvement in regional proxy wars ().

Military cooperation between Tehran and Moscow now extends well beyond the simple exchange of weapons. Russia has started localizing the production of Iranian drones within its own borders, while Iran is reportedly acquiring Russian hardware and technological know-how with the intent to reverse-engineer and produce advanced systems domestically ().

On the other side, Iran has struggled for decades to modernize its air force, which is still heavily reliant on aging American aircraft acquired prior to the 1979 revolution. Russia has emerged as a potential supplier, particularly with the highly capable Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jet. Reports suggest that Iran finalized a purchase of Su-35s in early 2025, although deliveries have faced delays (; ). These jets are vital for enhancing Iran鈥檚 air superiority and regional defence posture. Alongside aircraft, Iran has also long sought advanced air defence systems from Russia. While the S-300 system was delivered following the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement, speculation continues around the possible acquisition of the more advanced S-400 ().

Nuclear Cooperation and Civilian Ambitions

Iran鈥檚 nuclear program remains a central component of its relationship with Russia. The two nations maintain long-standing cooperation in the civilian nuclear sector. The Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, completed by Russia in 2013, stands as a landmark in this collaboration. It helped revive Russia鈥檚 post-Soviet nuclear industry and provided Iran with a symbol of energy independence and technological progress ().

Russia supplies and retrieves spent fuel from Bushehr, thereby addressing concerns over the potential diversion of nuclear material for weapons use (). Despite growing international scrutiny and intensifying sanctions, Russia and Iran continue to pursue the expansion of nuclear infrastructure. Iran aims to triple its nuclear power generation capacity, with Russia assisting in the construction of additional facilities. This includes ongoing work on Bushehr Units 2 and 3 and plans for new reactors in Sirik or Karun. A major development came in January 2025, when Presidents Vladimir Putin and Masoud Pezeshkian signed a new agreement outlining the construction of eight nuclear power plants in Iran, four of which are to be located in Bushehr (; ).

Popular Sentiment: Historical Distrust Rooted in Imperial Legacy

A prevalent narrative within Iranian political discourse interprets Russia鈥檚 regional strategy through the lens of a historical 鈥減olicy of access to open waters.鈥� This concept 鈥� rooted in the 19th-century Iran-Russia wars and reinforced by the Soviet occupation of Iran during the Second World War 鈥� sees Russia as having long harboured ambitions to expand southward into Iran in order to gain access to the Persian Gulf (). Iranian historians and commentators frequently reference the Iran-Russia conflicts of the 1800s and the events of 1941 as key moments that shaped this suspicion ().
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These tensions are reflected in the Treaty of Golestan (1813), signed after Iran鈥檚 defeat in war and amid internal unrest. The Treaty forced Iran to cede vast territories 鈥� including present-day Georgia, Dagestan, and parts of Armenia 鈥� to Russia. It also gave Russia exclusive rights to deploy naval vessels in the Caspian Sea and allowed for Russian interference in Iran鈥檚 internal succession politics. In Iranian society, this agreement 鈥� along with the Treaty of Turkmenchay (1828) that followed 鈥� is commonly described as a 鈥渄isgraceful鈥� treaty,鈥�[1] a label that continues to shape public perceptions of Russia鈥檚 intentions (). The 1979 Islamic Revolution institutionalized this deep-rooted skepticism through its foundational foreign policy principle of 鈥淣either East nor West,鈥� which rejected dominance by either Cold War superpower.

Iranian Elite View: Russia as a Useful but Unreliable Partner

Despite these historical grievances, Iran鈥檚 post-Revolutionary foreign policy has evolved toward pragmatic engagement with Russia. Shared opposition to US hegemony and a mutual interest in preserving regional sovereignty have driven this strategic alignment. For Iran, Russia differs from Western powers because of Moscow鈥檚 apparent non-interference in Iran鈥檚 internal political structure 鈥� a stark contrast to the West鈥檚 perceived advocacy for regime change or domestic transformation ().
Iran鈥檚 strategic relationship with Russia is rooted in the perception that Moscow does not seek to change Iran鈥檚 power structure, constitution, or cultural identity. Instead, Russia engages with the Islamic Republic on its own terms, respecting its political autonomy 鈥� a stance viewed as more conducive to long-term cooperation. Despite this favourable perception of Russia as a non-interfering partner, domestic disagreement persists over how deeply Iran should align itself with Moscow. This disagreement is generally divided between the Principlist[2] and Reformist camps.

Principlist View

Principlists consistently highlight Russia鈥檚 central role in resisting Western pressure, particularly emphasizing its ability to veto United Nations Security Council resolutions against Iran. Russia鈥檚 resistance is portrayed as a concrete advantage of the strategic partnership, as Iran 鈥� which maintains its status as an independent and influential actor 鈥� can partner with Russia to form a 鈥渞egional transformation with global impact鈥� in order to move towards a 鈥渘ew world order鈥� (). Importantly, this narrative goes beyond rhetoric to serve as the ideological foundation for the Iran-Russia relationship. Cooperation with Russia is depicted as a practical embodiment of the 鈥淩esistance Economy,鈥� a key Principlist doctrine focused on achieving self-sufficiency and resilience in the face of external threats ().

The Iran-Russia relationship is heavily anchored in military-security cooperation and aligned regional positions, especially in Syria and in opposition to perceived actions of the 鈥淶ionist regime鈥� in Israel (). This points to a deep, mutually reinforcing bond rooted in shared adversaries and compounded by Western sanctions. Economic cooperation is equally central in Principlist discourse. The partnership is framed as strategic and mutually beneficial, expanding across energy, transportation, agriculture, and technology. Collaboration in the energy sector 鈥� particularly gas and oil trade 鈥� is viewed as critical for reducing dependence on Western markets and creating alternative supply routes ().

One major initiative is the integration of Iran鈥檚 railway network with Russia鈥檚, touted as a top priority to boost trade and regional connectivity. The gas agreement signed in 2024, allowing up to 300 million cubic meters of gas to flow between the two countries per day, is heralded as the most significant gas contract in Iran鈥檚 history (). This positions Iran as a potential transit hub for Russian gas en route to India. Improvements in financial and banking ties through bilateral and multilateral currency agreements and the use of national and digital currencies are reported to have significantly enhanced trade. In the first ten months of 2024, Iranian exports to Russia rose by 20% in weight and 12% in value compared to the previous year, amounting to $889 million in non-oil exports ().

Reformist View

While recognizing the geopolitical realities that necessitate engagement with Russia, the Reformist camp in Iranian politics and society approaches the partnership with caution and pragmatism. They stress the importance of balance and transparency in Iran鈥檚 foreign policy, arguing that national interests are best served through diversified relations with all major global powers, rather than aligning exclusively with either China or Russia ().

This approach reflects an understanding of Iran鈥檚 geopolitical leverage, which 鈥� if managed wisely 鈥� could enable Tehran to extract concessions from both Eastern and Western blocs. Reformists contend that the strategic agreement with Russia will only yield meaningful results if pursued within a broader, balanced foreign policy framework. They often cite countries like 罢眉谤办颈测别 and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which engage strategically with both the East and West on their own terms 鈥� not out of necessity, but through conscious choice ().

Economic concerns also figure prominently in Reformist critiques. They highlight the relatively shallow economic and cultural ties between Iran and Russia, noting that trade volumes remain far lower than those with China or 罢眉谤办颈测别 (). Reformists also argue that Russia and Iran are more rivals than partners in the energy sector and that Iran鈥檚 current policies risk ceding too much ground to Russian interests. This camp also questions the reliability of Russia and China as partners, asserting that if either had a genuine interest in supporting Iran, they would have done so more meaningfully over the past two decades ().

Reformist voices regularly point out Russia鈥檚 limited capacity to deliver the capital and technology Iran needs to advance its industrial and scientific sectors. They also draw attention to domestic challenges such as administrative inefficiency and the undue influence of entrenched economic elites all of which, they argue, undermine the implementation of large-scale bilateral projects ().

Reformist opinions frequently advocate for a more pragmatic, interest-based foreign policy 鈥� one less shaped by ideological posturing and more attuned to the complexities of global engagement. A recurring theme in these narratives is the detrimental impact of internal political rivalries and factionalism on foreign policy, with Reformists warning that narrow political calculations often come at the expense of broader national interests. Ultimately, their discourse seeks to redefine 鈥渘ational interest鈥� in a more comprehensive and less ideologically rigid way 鈥� one that avoids over-reliance on any single global power ().

Heading

[1] In everyday Iranian discourse, the Treaties of Turkmenchay and Golestan are commonly invoked as the ultimate symbols of national humiliation and defeat鈥攐ften labeled as a qarardad-e nangin (a “disgraceful treaty”).

[2] Principlists in Iranian politics emphasize strict adherence to Islamic revolutionary ideals and resistance to liberal influence, differing from traditional conservatives who favour small governments, economic liberalization, and fiscal moderation over ideological purity.

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