The Caspian and Black Sea regions hold significant geopolitical importance for Europe’s energy security, due to their strategic location, abundant resources, and critical role as transit corridors linking energy-producing areas with consumer markets. .  The significance of these regions also extends beyond energy and trade, encompassing economic potential and a strategic role in regional stability and broader security dynamics. Given their geopolitical and geostrategic value, ensuring the security of these regions has become a priority for external actors, often from geopolitically opposing sides. The regions’ energy reserves, trade flows, and transportation infrastructure increasingly influence both regional and transregional stability and security frameworks. 

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During his time as Iran’s President from 2021–2024, Seyed Ebrahim Raisi spearheaded a marked recalibration of Iran’s foreign policy characterized by heightened distrust and skepticism toward Europe and its efforts to play a central diplomatic role in resolving current United States (US)-Iran tensions. Diverging from the positions of the previous Rouhani presidency, Raisi’s administration viewed Europe less as an independent geopolitical actor and more as an extension of a declining US-dominated international order.ÌýÌý

As a result, Raisi demonstrated little willingness to engage with European powers, consistently voicing skepticism regarding their intentions and portraying them as strategically subordinate to the US (). Reflecting this shift in tone, Raisi’s addresses to the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in September 2024 repeatedly underscored the perceived decline of US hegemony, declaring that the “project to Americanize the world has failedâ€� and that the “old liberal order … has been pushed asideâ€�Ìý (). During this speech, he urged European states to distance themselves from US expansionist policies and to honour their commitments to Iran, warning that “US unilateralism is not in the interest of anyone.â€� Although Raisi expressed conditional interest in economic cooperation with Europe, he simultaneously cautioned against what he termed as “alienâ€� interference in shaping these relations ().Ìý

Differences Between Raisi and Rouhani Administrations Regarding Relations with Europe

A key distinction between Raisi’s administration and that of Rouhani was the former’s renewed emphasis on strengthening the “resistance economyâ€� in Iran. Originally introduced by Ayatollah Khamenei but largely sidelined during Rouhani’s tenure, this strategy aimed to achieve economic self-sufficiency and neutralize the impact of foreign sanctions. Under Raisi, this strategy translated into a more deliberate policy of boosting domestic production, expanding non-oil exports, and reducing reliance on imports (Tasnim News, 2019). This focus marked a clear departure from Rouhani’s approach, which prioritized diplomacy with the West as the primary way to reduce economic isolation and improve Iran’s security. Contrarily, by publicly decoupling Iran’s economic trajectory from the success of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Raisi’s administration sought to minimize perceived external leverage over its nuclear program. This posture allowed Iran to maintain a firm stance on its demands despite European pressure, as the immediate economic necessity for a deal was downplayed domestically (Mashregh News, 2022a). Though this strategy hardened Iran’s negotiating position, it also contributed to the prolonged nature of negotiations by diminishing the perceived urgency for Iran to make a compromise ().Ìý

In parallel, the long-standing “Look Eastâ€� policy, championed by Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei, has gained unprecedented momentum during Raisi’s presidency. This doctrine was based on the belief that the current US-led international system would lose influence to an emerging global order centred around Asia. Raisi’s administrated followed this policy by strengthening Iran’s ties with its Eastern partners, particularly China and Russia, as a means to counter the diplomatic isolation and sanctions imposed by the US and Europe (; ). This strategic pivot further limited prospects for cooperation with Europe, as Tehran increasingly perceived Europe and the US as being aligned, thus leading Iran to prioritize partnerships with Asian powers over engagement with the West (; ). 

During this time, Iranian official discourse on nuclear negotiations with Europe also adopted a much more firm and critical tone. For example, Raisi openly condemned the US and the E3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (UK)) for what he described as a “very improperâ€� act of advancing a resolution at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors that was sharply critical of Iran while all sides were still engaged in negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program (). Raisi also questioned the reliability of US and European negotiators, stressing that Iran would not allow negotiations to be for negotiations’ sake and insisting that any dialogue must be results-oriented and produce tangible outcomes for Iran (; ). Central to this administration’s stance was the categorical rejection of expanding the scope of negotiations, particularly through Raisi’s assertion that – despite being a core concern for Europe – Iran’s ballistic missile program was non-negotiable (; ). 

Late 2021: Initial Stalemates in EU-Iran Nuclear Negotiations

The Raisi administration’s approach to negotiating  its nuclear program with Europe began with the seventh round of the ‘Vienna talks’ in November 2021. Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian and Iran’s chief negotiator Ali Bagheri Kani consistently emphasized two central demands during these talks: one, the complete and verifiable lifting of all sanctions imposed after the US withdrawal in 2018; and two, legally binding guarantees to prevent any future US administration from abandoning the agreement (). Additionally, Iran’s negotiating team sought assurances that sanctions relief would result in tangible and sustainable economic benefits for their country (). These demands were proposed to mitigate against the negative effects of the first JCPOA, where the absence of such guarantees led to significant economic disruption for Iran after the US’ unilateral exit in 2018. During the Vienna talks, Iran submitted two documents outlining proposals on sanctions removal and nuclear commitments, with a third document on guarantees and verification that they were abiding by the JCPOA. In presenting these proposals, Bagheri Kani asserted that Iran’s position during these talks was based on principles accepted by all parties, despite European dissatisfaction (). 

European partners, particularly the E3, reiterated their commitment to reviving the JCPOA, viewing it as the most effective means to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. However, they also expressed mounting concerns over Iran’s accelerated nuclear activities (). According to IAEA reports, these advancements undermined the non-proliferation benefits of the original deal and sharply reduced Iran’s breakout time to produce weapons-grade uranium (). Shortly after Raisi assumed office in August 2021, Iran began enriching uranium to 60% while also producing uranium metal. By the start of the November 2021 Vienna talks, Iran had accumulated 113.8 kilograms of 20% enriched uranium. Enriching to 20% completes almost all the necessary work to produce the fissile material for a bomb (), a threshold Iran surpassed with its 113.8 kilogram stockpile. While European officials acknowledged Iran’s concerns regarding sanctions relief, they viewed the demand for legally binding guarantees as particularly difficult to fulfill, especially in the context of Iran’s renewed effort to enrich its uranium (). 

2022 to Early 2023: Escalation of Tensions and Diplomatic Impasse

From 2022 to early 2023, the diplomatic climate surrounding the European Union (EU)-Iran nuclear talks deteriorated sharply; this breakdown was caused by two major events.  

The first was Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Before the invasion, Russia had played a relatively constructive role in Iran–IAEA relations. While occasionally criticizing Iran for its breaches of the nuclear accord and delays in the JCPOA negotiations, Russia largely positioned itself as a mediator between Iran and the West. However, the full-scale invasion and resulting war between Russia and Ukraine fundamentally altered this dynamic, introducing significant challenges for the already faltering nuclear negotiations between Iran and European powers (). 

Iran’s response to the war has gone beyond mere rhetorical support for Russia. Tehran has provided significant military assistance to Moscow, particularly in the form of loitering munitions such as the Shahed 131 and Shahed 136 drones, which have been widely used by Russian forces on the battlefield Ukrainian conflict (). In October 2022, reports emerged suggesting that Iran was also preparing to supply Russia with short-range ballistic missiles, thus deepening its involvement in the conflict (). Iranian officials, including Amirabdollahian, defended providing Russia with these weapons and asserted that the drones did not violate UN Security Council Resolution 2231. This Resolution, which was adopted to lift sanctions on Iran as part of the JCPOA, regulates the transfer of goods that could potentially contribute to nuclear weapon delivery systems (). Iran’s ambassador to the UN further supported this stance, arguing that these military transfers were outside the scope of the Resolution (). 

The geopolitical shift triggered by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine had a direct impact on the stalled JCPOA negotiations. As Russia grew increasingly dependent on Iran for both economic and military support, Moscow’s leverage over Tehran in the nuclear talks diminished (). This new dependence reduced Russia’s ability – and, perhaps more critically, its willingness – to mediate the nuclear discussions effectively. As the war in Ukraine continues, Russia’s stance on Iran’s nuclear ambitions has become more tolerant. In fact, Moscow now appears to view Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapon capabilities as beneficial to its own strategic interests. From Russia’s perspective, a broader confrontation between Iran and the West could serve to further complicate the West’s foreign policy focus, creating additional pressure on the liberal international order at a time of heightened geopolitical tensions (; ). 

This shift in Russia’s approach, transforming from a constructive mediator to a more disengaged partner, has further undermined European efforts to revive the nuclear deal. For European nations, Iran’s military assistance to Russia has become a significant point of contention. The EU swiftly condemned Iran’s actions to provide Russia with military drones and missiles to use in the war. In response, the E3 and other European countries imposed new rounds of sanctions targeting Iranian officials and entities for human rights abuses and military cooperation – sanctions that were separate from those tied to Iran’s nuclear program (). Tehran quickly retaliated by sanctioning European individuals and organizations, accusing them of inciting unrest and meddling in its sovereign affairs (). This cycle of punitive measures and countersanctions has further eroded trust and severely disrupted communication channels between the two sides. The introduction of these new, non-nuclear sanctions, coupled with Iran’s reciprocal measures, signaled a broader breakdown in bilateral relations, making it increasingly difficult to compartmentalize the nuclear negotiations from other contentious issues. 

The second factor contributing to the breakdown of the EU-Iran relationship during this period was the death of Masha Amini in September 2022 and the resulting political unrest in Iran. Amini died in police custody after being arrested for improperly wearing her hijab. The Iranian government’s handling of the protests criticizing the government drew strong condemnation and sanctions from European nations which, in turn, affected the prospects for the nuclear program negotiations. European governments, now reconsidering their approach to Iran, became increasingly hesitant to advance a deal with Tehran under its conservative conditions. Amirabdollahian also repeatedly denounced European statements and actions regarding the protests, accusing them of interference in Iran’s internal affairs and acting on a double standard (). This highly charged political environment further complicated any possibility of a diplomatic breakthrough on the nuclear issue, as European policy toward Iran began to increasingly incorporate conditions tied to domestic human rights concerns (; ).

Conclusion

As the Raisi administration ended in May 2024, Iran-Europe relations were left strained, and the nuclear negotiations remained at a standstill. Despite existing communication channels aimed at preventing a complete diplomatic breakdown, trust further dissolved as the talks became increasingly entangled with broader disputes over Iran’s human rights record and its military support for Russia. European frustration deepened as Iran’s nuclear program advanced through higher enrichment levels and expanded centrifuge capacity, pushing the revival of the JCPOA further out of reach and prompting consideration of alternative strategies. As a result, Raisi’s legacy has been defined by an unyielding approach that emphasized resilience and national demands over compromise. This stance, while projecting Iran as a powerful and resilient actor, nevertheless prolonging the deadlock as well as Iran’s economic and political isolation. Raisi’s successor, Masoud Pezeshkian, now has to navigate balancing Iran’s emboldened nuclear program with his political ambitions to return to a more open and constructive relationship with Europe ().Ìý

References

Ahqaqi, A. (2021). Mohamtaren chÄ�lesh-e dowr-e haftom-e mozÄ�kerÄ�t-e VÄ«n chÄ«st? [What is the most important challenge of the “seventh round” of Vienna talks?]. ISNA.  

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The post Iran-Europe Relations: The Impact of Raisi’s Presidency on Nuclear Negotiations and Diplomatic Tensions appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), concluded in Vienna on July 14, 2015, marked a significant milestone in international diplomacy by forging a comprehensive agreement between Iran and the P5+1 nations (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US)), alongside the European Union (EU) (.). The primary goal of this agreement was to ensure Iran’s nuclear program remained exclusively peaceful in exchange for substantial sanctions relief. The plan would work by rolling back Iran’s nuclear capabilities, effectively extending its “breakout time” from several months to a minimum of one year (.). Key provisions included stringent limits on uranium enrichment, reducing Iran’s low-enriched uranium stockpile to 300 kg and restricting enrichment levels to 3.67%. Operational centrifuge numbers were capped, and critical facilities such as Fordow and Arak were repurposed for civilian use under continuous monitoring from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)  (; ; ). The EU, led by its High Representative, played a pivotal role in these diplomatic efforts, championing the JCPOA as a successful model of multilateral engagement and a pathway to broader diplomatic relations with Iran  (). 

The diplomatic success of the JCPOA began to unravel dramatically on May 8, 2018, when the US, under President Donald Trump, unilaterally withdrew from the agreement (; ). While evidence from the IAEA indicated that Iran was complying with the deal, the US cited perceived deficiencies in the agreement itself and reinstated extensive primary and secondary sanctions on Iran. This “maximum pressure” campaign effectively cut off Iran’s access to the international financial system, thereby negating the economic benefits that had been fundamental to Iran’s cooperation with the JCPOA’s conditions (). In retaliation to the US withdrawal and the lack of the anticipated economic relief, Iran began a phased reduction of its commitments to the JCPOA starting in July 2019. This included surpassing limits on its enriched uranium stockpile and progressively raising enrichment levels, initially to 4.5% and later to 60% (). Furthermore, Iran reduced its cooperation with the IAEA, limiting the ability for the organization to oversee Iran’s nuclear development.ÌýÌý

Europe’s Inability to Save the JCPOAÌý

The EU consistently positioned itself as a key diplomatic actor in the Iran nuclear issue. Since 2006, the EU High Representative has led diplomatic initiatives involving the E3/EU+3 and Iran, culminating in the JCPOA. The EU’s approach has been centered on engagement and critical dialogue with Iran, driven by the dual goals of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and reducing the risk of regional conflict (). Even after the US backed out of the JCPOA, the EU reaffirmed its commitment to the agreement, expressing deep regret over America’s decision to re-impose sanctions (). In the immediate aftermath of the US withdrawal, Iran called on Europe to take a leading role in upholding the agreement by helping to protect Iranian oil from the reinstated US sanctions. For its part, the EU updated its Blocking Statute in order to distance itself from complying with the American sanctions (). However, this measure proved largely symbolic, as many European companies, fearing exposure to US secondary sanctions, chose to withdraw from Iran (). The dominance of the US dollar and the allure of the larger US market therefore severely hindered European attempts to maintain trade with Iran. 

Despite Europe’s stated ambitions for strategic autonomy, particularly in foreign policy and trade, the reality of its deep economic and financial integration with the US posed significant challenges in upholding the JCPOA without America.  Within some Iranian political circles, the EU’s inability to provide any meaningful alternative to the benefits of the JCPOA was perceived as a failure to uphold its commitments, with some commentators going far enough to call the EU’s inaction as an implicit approval of America’s withdrawal (). 

Inability for INSTEX to Replace the JCPOAÌý

Despite being highly sensitive towards American sanctions, Europe worked to maintain the core agreements of the JCPOA through the creation of the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX). Established by the E3 (France, Germany, and the UK) on January 31, 2019, INSTEX aimed to circumvent US sanctions and facilitate legitimate trade between Europe and Iran, particularly for ‘humanitarian trade’ in medicine and food (; ). 

In response, Iran created the Special Trade and Finance Instrument (STFI) to collaborate with INSTEX. Initially, Iranian officials had high hopes for the mechanism, expecting it to address the country’s economic challenges by facilitating significant trade with Europe (). However, these expectations weren’t met. Iranian officials, including Deputy Foreign Minister Seyed Abbas Araghchi and Central Bank Governor Abdolnaser Hemmati, expressed frustration with this new program. They acknowledged that INSTEX hadn’t delivered the promised results for humanitarian trade and failed to expand into other vital sectors, such as oil and other commodities promised under the JCPOA (Mashregh News, 2020; ). 

From a European perspective, INSTEX failed because of Iran’s refusal to comply with Financial Action Task Force (FATF) standards on anti-money laundering and terrorism financing. Without Iran’s cooperation in these areas, the INSTEX program was never implemented in full, thus leading to underwhelming economic benefits for Iran (). As an intergovernmental organization, the FATF aims to combat money laundering and terrorist financing by setting international standards and promoting their effective implementation (). Iran has been reluctant to fully ratify FATF agreements, such as the Palermo Convention and the Combating the Financing of Terrorism bill, because it fears that compliance would hinder its efforts to bypass sanctions and fund regional activities, including supporting para-military  resistance groups, some of which are designated as ‘terrorist organizations’ by Western governments (). Adhering to these standards would also make Iran more heavily reliant on the international monetary system, a system from which it has a proven history of being cut off due to unilateral decisions from the US ().  

The situation reflected a cyclical dynamic: Europe, constrained by US pressure, offered a limited solution that Iran found inadequate for its broader needs. Iran’s subsequent non-compliance with the FATF provided Europe with a justification for the mechanism’s failure, thus entrenching the impasse. Both sides blamed each other, but the core issue remains in the US’ ability to dominate international finance and trade flows. 

Iranian Domestic Critique of Western DiplomacyÌý

Principlist factions within Iran have consistently portrayed European diplomatic efforts as superficial, suggesting they merely mask a deeper alignment with US interests. The longstanding metaphor of a “velvet glove” concealing an “iron fist,” is frequently invoked by Iran’s Guardian Jurist¹ to describe EU foreign policy, reflecting a deep-rooted mistrust of Western intentions (). In a notable 2022 speech, the Guardian Jurist asserted, “the support promised by Western powers to compliant governments is illusory; it never materializes. All governments must come to understand this… Today, the world’s bullies have shed the velvet glove, revealing their iron fistsâ€� (). This rhetoric has been widely echoed by Principlist circles, who express strong alignment with and loyalty to the country’s head of state. 

This deep-seated mistrust towards the West was a primary reason why the Principlist group opposed the JCPOA from the outset (). Viewing negotiations with the West as a form of colonial coercion, Principlist leaders argued that it was Iran’s “military and nuclear strengthâ€� that had compelled the US to engage diplomatically (). Principlists repeatedly cautioned against trusting European powers, accusing them of repeatedly betraying Iran throughout history. In line with this perspective, they categorically rejected any dialogue concerning Iran’s nuclear program, framing the program as an essential pillar of the country’s defensive posture. This group also vehemently opposed efforts to ratify the FATF regulations, contending that compliance would undermine Iran’s strategic flexibility and further constrain its ability to sustain a functioning economy under the weight of international sanctions ( ). 

Iranian Reformist Advocacy for Engagement with EuropeÌý

In contrast, Reformists aligned with the Rouhani administration advocated for closer cooperation with Europe as a means to isolate the US and alleviate the impact of sanctions following Washington’s withdrawal from the JCPOA. Reformist media outlets embraced what they saw as progress in nuclear negotiations, anticipating that the INSTEX agreement would yield tangible economic and diplomatic benefits. Iranian media, echoing the administration’s policy outlook, highlighted support from the European business community for the deal, reinforcing the Rouhani government’s optimism about the opportunities of the new agreement ().Ìý

Transition from Rouhani’s Optimism to Raisi’s DefianceÌý

The internalization of America’s decision to quit the JCPOA proved pivotal in reshaping Iran’s political landscape towards cooperation with the West. Although the Rouhani administration had championed the JCPOA as a pathway to economic relief, the US withdrawal from the agreement and Europe’s subsequent failure to find an alternative significantly bolstered Principlist credibility. Seizing on widespread disillusionment with a decade-long policy of engagement with the West, Principlists portrayed diplomatic outreach and reliance on European mediation as both futile and harmful to Iran’s national interests. The collapse of the JCPOA, coupled with the failure of the INSTEX mechanism, prompted a shift toward a more assertive nuclear policy and a rejection of European mediation (). 

Propelled, in part, by the failure of the JCPOA, Iran’s 2021 presidential elections brought Principlist Seyed Ebrahim Raisi to power. Raisi adopted a more confrontational approach toward the West, making the resumption of nuclear negotiations conditional on the full lifting of sanctions and firmly excluding Iran’s ballistic missile program and regional activities from the negotiating agenda (; ). His presidency marked a clear departure from Rouhani’s cooperative stance, signaling the consolidation of Principlist influence across all branches of government. The dynamics of negotiation under Raisi’s leadership, in contrast to his predecessor, will be examined in the next article, with a focus on the evolving contours of Iran’s diplomatic strategy. 

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Tabnak. (2023). Panje-ye chadani zÄ«r-e dastkesh-e makhmali: BÄ�zkhwÄ�nÄ«-ye negÄ�h-e Rahbar-e EnqelÄ�b beh rusÄ�-ye jomhÅ«r-e Ä€mrÄ«kÄ� [Iron fist in a velvet glove: A reading of the Supreme Leader’s view on U.S. presidents].  

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The 2025 BRICS Summit, hosted in Rio de Janeiro by Brazil, featured noticeably more divergence in terms of political priorities when compared to last year’s Summit in Russia. This group, which began as an informal bloc of emerging economies (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), has since morphed into a politically diverse alliance of 11 countries, which have different perceptions on how to reshape the international system. Historically, Russia and China have utilized the BRICS institutions to promote an . Meanwhile, Brazil’s and India’s approach is non-aligned and focused on promoting economic cooperation with the West and other emerging economies.  

During the 2025 BRICS Summit, the parties released a that highlights these diverging priorities. The declaration outlines 126 commitments focused primarily on promoting the interests of – India and Brazil. These commitments range from . On the geopolitical side, the declaration condemns the Israeli attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities and Ukrainian attacks on Russian civil infrastructure but makes no mention of United States involvement in either conflict. Indeed, argue that the relatively more moderate agenda at this year’s Summit was an intentional effort to not antagonize Trump due to his . 

In contrast, last year’s BRICS Summit was framed by Russia as “â€� in the country, showcasing its resilience to Western sanctions and its ability . The 2024 Summit also introduced a new partnership status for members and called for de-dollarization, as well as building an alternative financial system to sanction-proof key members.  

Another notable difference is that the 2024 Summit had greater diplomatic representation than the 2025 Summit. The 2024 Summit was attended by 22 heads of state, including the newly joined members of . That Summit also included representation from . Conversely, the 2025 BRICS Summit was attended by only 11 leaders, with call in order to avoid arrest on war crime charges issued by the International Criminal Court in 2023. Xi Jinping did not attend the Summit, . The disinterest of certain BRICS leaders underscores how some may prefer to avoid the Summit if it is not used as a platform to promote anti-Western rhetoric. 

These leadership absences highlight deeper political divisions within the group, including differing views on the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East. This division was most prominent in Iran, a newly joined member, . Such breaks in unity are also present when looking at how different members view the future of BRICS. For instance, during the 2024 BRICS Summit, some members . These countries feared that the bloc was favouring the inclusion of autocracies as a way to consolidate Russian and Chinese influence over emerging economies at the expense of promoting democracy. These rifts make the ideological trajectory of the BRICS increasingly uncertain as divisions deepen between authoritarian and democratic members. 

Considering that India will host the next BRICS Summit in 2026, the bloc is likely to focus on issues related to economic cooperation rather than anti-Western rhetoric, which may lead to some greater political rifts. The coming years will reveal how the BRICS alliance will either develop a unified geopolitical identity or remain a fragmented alliance.ÌýÌý

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Russia’s relationship with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is defined by cautious yet purposeful engagement, rooted in shared interests rather than deep strategic alignment. This dynamic was on display during the 7th Russia-GCC Strategic Dialogue held in Riyadh in September 2024, where both sides reaffirmed their commitment to cooperating on a wide range of areas including trade, security, and sustainable development as set out in their 2023-2027 Joint Action Plan. ().

At the heart of this engagement lies a mutual emphasis on multilateral diplomacy and conflict resolution. Russia, seeking to assert itself as a counterweight to Western influence, has carefully positioned its diplomacy in the Gulf as part of a broader strategy of global repositioning. For the GCC states, engagement with Moscow serves a more tactical purpose: maintaining open lines with all major powers while preserving strategic autonomy. The partnership facilitates diversification of international relations, coordination within the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the broader OPEC+ group, as well as a role in managing regional crises, particularly those involving Syria and Iran ().

Economic Partnerships and Investment

Economic cooperation – especially in the energy sector – has become a cornerstone of Russia’s engagement with the GCC, rooted in shared interests and Moscow’s strategic efforts to evade Western sanctions. As the world’s second-largest oil and gas producer, Russia plays a critical role in coordinating global energy markets, particularly through OPEC+ and the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF). From Russia’s perspective, collaborative efforts within these multilateral frameworks not only serve its long-term national interests but also help stabilize the economies of participating states. The 62% increase in trade volume with Saudi Arabia in 2024, which has since quadrupled in the first quarter of 2025, reflects how energy coordination has deepened into broader economic engagement (; ).

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has emerged alongside Saudi Arabia as a particularly significant economic partner for Russia. Bilateral trade between Russia and the UAE rose from US$3.5 billion in 2019 to US$11.2 billion in 2023 before dropping slightly to US$9.5 billion by the end of 2024. Concurrently, shipments from the UAE to Russia rose sharply – from US$300 million to US$800 million – over the same period. This surge is largely due to the establishment of approximately 4,000 Russian companies in the UAE, many of which facilitate parallel imports of Western goods and streamline payments, effectively turning the UAE into a critical logistics and financial hub for Russia’s international trade ().

Investment relations between Russia and the Gulf states have also strengthened significantly. Over the past decade, Russia and Saudi Arabia have launched more than 40 joint investment projects across key sectors including IT, transport, infrastructure, and petrochemicals (). The creation of the Russian-Saudi Economic Council (RSEC) in 2019 formalized this cooperation, focusing on large-scale ventures, localizing production in Saudi Arabia, and facilitating Russian business entry into the Kingdom’s markets (). In the UAE, Russian investment exceeded US$30 billion, while Emirati investments in Russia reached US$16.8 billion by 2024, further highlighting the depth of bilateral economic integration ().

Beyond energy and investment, new areas of collaboration are emerging. Tourism between Russia and Saudi Arabia has grown nearly fivefold over five years, with a sixfold rise in Saudi citizens visiting Russia in 2024 (). Russia also ranked second in terms of total visitors to the UAE that year, accounting for 7% of all entries (). In the automotive sector, the assembly of the Russian luxury car Aurus Senat began in Abu Dhabi in November 2023, with plans for SUV production currently underway. Financial ties have expanded as well, with the UAE sovereign wealth fund acquiring a 6.86% stake in the Moscow Stock Exchange in late 2024. Additionally, a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between Russia and the UAE – part of a broader pact with the Eurasian Economic Union – is expected by the end of June 2025 (). Notably, Russia’s proposal to establish a BRICS Grain Exchange was discussed in June 2025, highlighting an effort to further diversify trade and strengthen food security among BRICS nations ().

Military and security outreach

Since the early 2010s, Russia’s potential entry into the Persian Gulf arms market has been a subject of ongoing discussion, spurred by Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s exploration of defence cooperation with Moscow. Saudi Arabia expressed interest in acquiring advanced Russian military hardware, such as the S-400 air defence system and anti-tank guided missile systems, leading to a formal military cooperation agreement signed in August 2021. This move was seen as part of Riyadh’s broader strategy to diversify defence partnerships and reduce reliance on the US. Similarly, the UAE has engaged in talks with Russia, including discussions on jointly producing the Su-57 fighter jet. Despite these initiatives, actual implementation has been limited, likely influenced by Gulf states’ cautious approach to balancing their diversification efforts with longstanding security ties to Washington. While refraining from joining Western sanctions after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Gulf states have maintained a neutral stance to preserve ongoing military dialogues with Russia ().

Despite expressions of interest and signed agreements, Russian arms exports to the broader Middle East have significantly declined in recent years. Between 2019 and 2023, Russia accounted for just 4.6% of the region’s total arms imports, a sharp drop of 61% compared to the 2014–2018 period. In 2022, there were no reported major arms exports from Moscow to the Middle East. This decline reflects both logistical disruptions from the war in Ukraine and a growing preference among regional buyers for Western or domestically produced systems ().

Soft Power via Religion (Orthodox-Islamic dialogue), Media, and Disinformation.

With Islam as Russia’s second-largest religion, the Kremlin leverages this cultural and religious connection as a foundation for strengthening ties with the Middle East. Initiatives like the Islamic banking pilot program, aimed at fostering financial cooperation and mutual understanding, are designed to attract investment from Gulf countries. Additionally, events such as KazanForum 2025 promote economic, scientific, and cultural collaboration, highlighting shared civilizational values. Together, these efforts underscore Russia’s pragmatic strategy of using soft power and cultural affinity to deepen its relationships with GCC states ().

This approach reflects what some scholars call “authoritarian soft power,â€� which contrasts with Western models focused on promoting liberal democratic values. Rather than advocating for democracy or civil society, Russia emphasizes stability, sovereignty, and traditionalism, resonating with regimes in the Middle East that are wary of Western liberalism. By positioning itself as a consistent, non-interventionist partner, Russia seeks to fill the gap left by declining Western influence and the increasing demand for alternative partnerships. Unlike Joseph Nye’s model, which defines soft power as the ability to attract through culture, political values, and foreign policy, Russia’s version of soft power is rooted in authoritarian ideals. It uses cultural diplomacy, religious affinity, and economic cooperation to appeal to actors who value hierarchy, conservatism, and order, thereby reinforcing alternative models of governance and social organization ().

Local Perceptions within the GCC States

The evolving relationship between Russia and the GCC states reflects a complex interplay of strategic pragmatism, geopolitical recalibration, and cautious engagement. Official Gulf media coverage and regional think tank analyses reveal a carefully managed narrative that highlights cooperation with Russia within multilateral frameworks like OPEC+ and BRICS, while maintaining an overarching policy of neutrality and diversification. As the global order becomes increasingly multipolar and US regional commitments appear more uncertain, GCC states are actively expanding ties with non-Western powers such as Russia and China. However, this realignment is not without its challenges, particularly given Russia’s deepening ties with Iran and its divergent stances on critical regional conflicts, such as those in Syria and Yemen.

Media Opinion

Coverage of Russia in official Gulf media outlets is generally limited and not highly divergent, reflecting a cautious and pragmatic editorial line. While differences in emphasis exist, reporting tends to align with state policies of neutrality and strategic balancing. The overview provided here offers a general sense of how Russia-related developments are framed across key platforms, rather than capturing deep editorial contrasts.

Saudi outlets such as the Saudi Press Agency (SPA) regularly report on Russia’s foreign policy activities, including high-level meetings such as those between Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and European Union (EU) officials concerning the Libyan crisis (). SPA also highlights events like the “Russia and the Islamic World: Practical Steps in Media Cooperation” conference, emphasizing Russia’s historical ties and growing engagement with Islamic countries (). Coverage of OPEC+ meetings is prominent, often commending Saudi Arabia’s leadership in ensuring oil market stability while noting Russia’s compliance with production cuts and its role as a cooperative partner ().

The Emirates News Agency (WAM) focuses on Russia’s role within the BRICS framework, reporting on joint initiatives in areas such as science, innovation, healthcare, culture, and security (). WAM underscores the significance of OPEC+ as a six-year partnership built on mutual trust among 23 oil-producing countries  (). It reflects the UAE’s broader diplomatic philosophy of maintaining balanced relations globally, describing the country’s approach as having “friends everywhere,â€� with strong ties to Russia, China, India, Europe, and the US ().

The Qatar News Agency (QNA) provides coverage of Russia-related developments through a geopolitical lens, including EU sanctions on Russia’s oil tanker fleet (). It also reports on Russia’s updated foreign policy strategy, which reflects Moscow’s view of a transformed international system and identifies the US as the central force behind anti-Russian initiatives ().

A Perspective from Leading Arab Think Tanks

Arab think tanks broadly agree that one of the main drivers behind the GCC’s diversification of international relations is the perceived ambiguity and shifting priorities of US policy in the Middle East. The strategy of “peaceful and low-cost solutions� adopted by the Biden administration was interpreted by the Gulf States as enabling rivals like Iran to re-assert their power in the region. In response, GCC countries have adopted a proactive strategy to enhance strategic autonomy, motivated not only by the uncertainty surrounding US commitments, but also by the need for varied sources of military, technical, and diplomatic support ().

This shift is framed by analysts as a deliberate policy of active neutrality, allowing GCC states to assert their international standing and build relationships with non-Western powers, including Russia and China. Rather than pivoting away from the West entirely, Gulf countries are leveraging the multipolar global order to broaden their options and reduce dependency on any single external actor. The emergence of a China-Russia axis provides greater room for maneuvering, thus enabling the pursuit of national interests even when they diverge from those of the US (; ; ).

However, this diversification comes with complications, particularly in light of the deepening Russia-Iran partnership. The proposed “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty” between Moscow and Tehran raises serious concerns in the Gulf, especially regarding joint cooperation on issues such as Yemen and nuclear technology, which could pose direct security concerns to GCC states. While some Arab countries see value in engaging with the Russia-China bloc to potentially curb Iran’s regional ambitions, the difference between Russia and China complicates this calculus. China has sought to mediate between Gulf states and Iran, whereas Russia maintains strong ties with Tehran while balancing its OPEC+ interests with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi ().

Additional tensions arise from conflicting positions on key regional issues, most notably Syria and Yemen. Russia’s previous longstanding support for Bashar al-Assad, in opposition to GCC-backed rebel groups, has placed it at odds with Gulf strategies, particularly when factoring in Iran and Hezbollah’s roles in the conflict. These divergences underscore the complexity of Russia-GCC relations, which, while offering strategic opportunities, also introduce new layers of geopolitical friction ().

References

Gulf Research Center. (2025). Russia – GCC Relations. Gulf Research Center.



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Russia and Iran increasingly view the United States (US)-led international order not as a guarantor of stability, but as a direct threat to their sovereignty and national interests. This perception has become a defining feature of their foreign policy orientation (). For Russia, confrontation with the West has evolved into a broader ideological and geopolitical contest, not just over the sovereignty of states like Ukraine, but over the very structure of the global order. This logic of confrontation now deeply informs Moscow’s regional strategy (). For Iran, this dynamic resonates with its own post-revolutionary worldview, which has long framed its foreign policy as part of a broader anti-colonial struggle. Since 1979, the Islamic Republic has positioned itself as a challenger to Western dominance, viewing the liberal order as an extension of American imperialism and seeking to assert its sovereignty through resistance to perceived external interference ().

Moscow and Tehran both advocate for a multipolar world order grounded in “sovereign internationalism,� a model that prioritizes national autonomy and cultural pluralism over liberal interventionism. This vision argues that no single state or coalition should dominate the global system or impose a universal ideological framework. Instead, the emphasis is on the coexistence of diverse political systems and civilizational models. In this context, Iran emerges not just as a regional partner for Russia, but as a strategic ally in a shared effort to reconfigure the global order away from US hegemony (; ).

Building upon the shared perception of the US-led international order as a threat and their mutual vision for a multipolar world, the subsequent analysis will delve into the manifestations of the strategic partnership between Iran and Russia. It will first examine their cooperation in the Syrian conflict, highlighting the military and political coordination that propped up the Assad regime. Following this, the discussion will pivot to the significant shifts in their defence partnership, particularly in the context of the war in Ukraine and its impact on arms sales and military technology transfers, as well as their ongoing collaboration in civilian nuclear energy. Finally, the analysis will explore the internal Iranian perspectives on this alliance, contrasting the historical distrust and pragmatic engagement of the elite with the distinct views of Principlist and Reformist factions on the benefits and limitations of their country’s relationship with Russia.

Cooperation in Syria

Iran and Russia have developed a robust partnership rooted in shared strategic interests, most notably in the Syrian conflict, where both powers were instrumental in propping up the Assad regime. Their cooperation encompassed military operations, intelligence sharing, and political coordination. United in their opposition of Western-backed efforts to overthrow Assad, Moscow and Tehran initially collaborated to suppress the Syrian opposition and combat the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL). Russia brought airpower and advanced military capabilities to the battlefield, while Iran supplied ground forces, intelligence, and logistical support through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and affiliated militias such as Hezbollah.

This collaboration intensified in 2015, when the Assad regime teetered on the brink of collapse following the fall of Palmyra to ISIL. The turning point came after Qassem Soleimani, the now deceased commander of the Quds Force, made a covert visit to Moscow in order to meet with President Vladimir Putin and Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu ( ). This meeting laid the groundwork for a major military intervention in Syria. Soon after, Russia and Iran – alongside Syria and Iraq – formed the so-called RSII coalition (also referred to as the 4+1, with Hezbollah as the fifth actor) and established joint operation centers in Damascus and Baghdad to synchronize their campaign against ISIL (). This unprecedented intelligence-sharing alliance marked a significant step in institutionalizing the Iran-Russia military partnership.

While Russia has long viewed Iran as a critical partner in stabilizing regions vulnerable to extremism – including Central Asia, the Northern Caucasus, and Chechnya – this relationship is not without its competitive undertones. Both powers seek influence over post‑war Syria, and their interests do not always align (). Tensions have emerged over military coordination, such as disagreements on air support for Iranian-backed ground forces in Khan Tuman and disputes over basing rights, which have occasionally resulted in operational friction on the ground. Additionally, each country has pursued economic and strategic footholds: Russia through its naval base at Tartus and air facility in Latakia, Iran through its role in shaping Syrian militias and economic reconstruction. These dueling interests have created ongoing bureaucratic and diplomatic rivalries despite continued large-scale cooperation (). Despite this friction, Russia and Iran remain aligned through their shared objective of undermining Western influence in Syria and the broader Middle East.

The Strategic Evolution of Russia-Iran Military Cooperation

The war in Ukraine has significantly reshaped Russia’s role in the global arms trade, directly influencing its defence partnership with Iran. Once one of the world’s leading arms exporters, Russia has seen a dramatic decline in its global military exports as a result of the war (). As Moscow diverts its military-industrial resources toward sustaining its own war effort, it has increasingly turned to Iran for key battlefield technologies, marking a striking reversal in traditional arms trade dynamics.

The clearest manifestation of this shift is Russia’s reliance on Iranian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), particularly the Shahed series of loitering munitions, widely referred to as “kamikaze� drones (; ). These weapons have played a key role in Russia’s battlefield tactics in Ukraine, offering a low-cost means of striking Ukrainian infrastructure and military positions. For Iran, the war provides an opportunity to test and refine its drone technology under live combat conditions. Iran has drawn valuable insights from Russia’s war with Ukraine to inform its own confrontations with Israel and involvement in regional proxy wars ().

Military cooperation between Tehran and Moscow now extends well beyond the simple exchange of weapons. Russia has started localizing the production of Iranian drones within its own borders, while Iran is reportedly acquiring Russian hardware and technological know-how with the intent to reverse-engineer and produce advanced systems domestically ().

On the other side, Iran has struggled for decades to modernize its air force, which is still heavily reliant on aging American aircraft acquired prior to the 1979 revolution. Russia has emerged as a potential supplier, particularly with the highly capable Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jet. Reports suggest that Iran finalized a purchase of Su-35s in early 2025, although deliveries have faced delays (; ). These jets are vital for enhancing Iran’s air superiority and regional defence posture. Alongside aircraft, Iran has also long sought advanced air defence systems from Russia. While the S-300 system was delivered following the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement, speculation continues around the possible acquisition of the more advanced S-400 ().

Nuclear Cooperation and Civilian Ambitions

Iran’s nuclear program remains a central component of its relationship with Russia. The two nations maintain long-standing cooperation in the civilian nuclear sector. The Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, completed by Russia in 2013, stands as a landmark in this collaboration. It helped revive Russia’s post-Soviet nuclear industry and provided Iran with a symbol of energy independence and technological progress ().

Russia supplies and retrieves spent fuel from Bushehr, thereby addressing concerns over the potential diversion of nuclear material for weapons use (). Despite growing international scrutiny and intensifying sanctions, Russia and Iran continue to pursue the expansion of nuclear infrastructure. Iran aims to triple its nuclear power generation capacity, with Russia assisting in the construction of additional facilities. This includes ongoing work on Bushehr Units 2 and 3 and plans for new reactors in Sirik or Karun. A major development came in January 2025, when Presidents Vladimir Putin and Masoud Pezeshkian signed a new agreement outlining the construction of eight nuclear power plants in Iran, four of which are to be located in Bushehr (; ).

Popular Sentiment: Historical Distrust Rooted in Imperial Legacy

A prevalent narrative within Iranian political discourse interprets Russia’s regional strategy through the lens of a historical “policy of access to open waters.� This concept – rooted in the 19th-century Iran-Russia wars and reinforced by the Soviet occupation of Iran during the Second World War – sees Russia as having long harboured ambitions to expand southward into Iran in order to gain access to the Persian Gulf (). Iranian historians and commentators frequently reference the Iran-Russia conflicts of the 1800s and the events of 1941 as key moments that shaped this suspicion ().
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These tensions are reflected in the Treaty of Golestan (1813), signed after Iran’s defeat in war and amid internal unrest. The Treaty forced Iran to cede vast territories – including present-day Georgia, Dagestan, and parts of Armenia – to Russia. It also gave Russia exclusive rights to deploy naval vessels in the Caspian Sea and allowed for Russian interference in Iran’s internal succession politics. In Iranian society, this agreement – along with the Treaty of Turkmenchay (1828) that followed – is commonly described as a “disgraceful� treaty,�[1] a label that continues to shape public perceptions of Russia’s intentions (). The 1979 Islamic Revolution institutionalized this deep-rooted skepticism through its foundational foreign policy principle of “Neither East nor West,� which rejected dominance by either Cold War superpower.

Iranian Elite View: Russia as a Useful but Unreliable Partner

Despite these historical grievances, Iran’s post-Revolutionary foreign policy has evolved toward pragmatic engagement with Russia. Shared opposition to US hegemony and a mutual interest in preserving regional sovereignty have driven this strategic alignment. For Iran, Russia differs from Western powers because of Moscow’s apparent non-interference in Iran’s internal political structure – a stark contrast to the West’s perceived advocacy for regime change or domestic transformation ().
Iran’s strategic relationship with Russia is rooted in the perception that Moscow does not seek to change Iran’s power structure, constitution, or cultural identity. Instead, Russia engages with the Islamic Republic on its own terms, respecting its political autonomy – a stance viewed as more conducive to long-term cooperation. Despite this favourable perception of Russia as a non-interfering partner, domestic disagreement persists over how deeply Iran should align itself with Moscow. This disagreement is generally divided between the Principlist[2] and Reformist camps.

Principlist View

Principlists consistently highlight Russia’s central role in resisting Western pressure, particularly emphasizing its ability to veto United Nations Security Council resolutions against Iran. Russia’s resistance is portrayed as a concrete advantage of the strategic partnership, as Iran – which maintains its status as an independent and influential actor – can partner with Russia to form a “regional transformation with global impact� in order to move towards a “new world order� (). Importantly, this narrative goes beyond rhetoric to serve as the ideological foundation for the Iran-Russia relationship. Cooperation with Russia is depicted as a practical embodiment of the “Resistance Economy,� a key Principlist doctrine focused on achieving self-sufficiency and resilience in the face of external threats ().

The Iran-Russia relationship is heavily anchored in military-security cooperation and aligned regional positions, especially in Syria and in opposition to perceived actions of the “Zionist regime� in Israel (). This points to a deep, mutually reinforcing bond rooted in shared adversaries and compounded by Western sanctions. Economic cooperation is equally central in Principlist discourse. The partnership is framed as strategic and mutually beneficial, expanding across energy, transportation, agriculture, and technology. Collaboration in the energy sector – particularly gas and oil trade – is viewed as critical for reducing dependence on Western markets and creating alternative supply routes ().

One major initiative is the integration of Iran’s railway network with Russia’s, touted as a top priority to boost trade and regional connectivity. The gas agreement signed in 2024, allowing up to 300 million cubic meters of gas to flow between the two countries per day, is heralded as the most significant gas contract in Iran’s history (). This positions Iran as a potential transit hub for Russian gas en route to India. Improvements in financial and banking ties through bilateral and multilateral currency agreements and the use of national and digital currencies are reported to have significantly enhanced trade. In the first ten months of 2024, Iranian exports to Russia rose by 20% in weight and 12% in value compared to the previous year, amounting to $889 million in non-oil exports ().

Reformist View

While recognizing the geopolitical realities that necessitate engagement with Russia, the Reformist camp in Iranian politics and society approaches the partnership with caution and pragmatism. They stress the importance of balance and transparency in Iran’s foreign policy, arguing that national interests are best served through diversified relations with all major global powers, rather than aligning exclusively with either China or Russia ().

This approach reflects an understanding of Iran’s geopolitical leverage, which – if managed wisely – could enable Tehran to extract concessions from both Eastern and Western blocs. Reformists contend that the strategic agreement with Russia will only yield meaningful results if pursued within a broader, balanced foreign policy framework. They often cite countries like Türkiye and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which engage strategically with both the East and West on their own terms – not out of necessity, but through conscious choice ().

Economic concerns also figure prominently in Reformist critiques. They highlight the relatively shallow economic and cultural ties between Iran and Russia, noting that trade volumes remain far lower than those with China or Türkiye (). Reformists also argue that Russia and Iran are more rivals than partners in the energy sector and that Iran’s current policies risk ceding too much ground to Russian interests. This camp also questions the reliability of Russia and China as partners, asserting that if either had a genuine interest in supporting Iran, they would have done so more meaningfully over the past two decades ().

Reformist voices regularly point out Russia’s limited capacity to deliver the capital and technology Iran needs to advance its industrial and scientific sectors. They also draw attention to domestic challenges such as administrative inefficiency and the undue influence of entrenched economic elites all of which, they argue, undermine the implementation of large-scale bilateral projects ().

Reformist opinions frequently advocate for a more pragmatic, interest-based foreign policy – one less shaped by ideological posturing and more attuned to the complexities of global engagement. A recurring theme in these narratives is the detrimental impact of internal political rivalries and factionalism on foreign policy, with Reformists warning that narrow political calculations often come at the expense of broader national interests. Ultimately, their discourse seeks to redefine “national interest� in a more comprehensive and less ideologically rigid way – one that avoids over-reliance on any single global power ().

Heading

[1] In everyday Iranian discourse, the Treaties of Turkmenchay and Golestan are commonly invoked as the ultimate symbols of national humiliation and defeat—often labeled as a qarardad-e nangin (a “disgraceful treaty”).

[2] Principlists in Iranian politics emphasize strict adherence to Islamic revolutionary ideals and resistance to liberal influence, differing from traditional conservatives who favour small governments, economic liberalization, and fiscal moderation over ideological purity.

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