On November 1st, 2025, , the site of a railway canopy collapse that killed sixteen people just a year prior. Novi Sad railway station, intended to be a symbol of modernization after renovations led by , instead became a demonstration of how quickly corruption can turn deadly. Student-led protests quickly began, calling for accountability and a transparent investigation on the incident; however, as resistance and negligence continued, the movement quickly grew to a revolt against an entire system deemed corrupt. Aleksander Vučić, the president of Serbia and founder of the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), has long defined his rule in Serbia through increasing autocratization. His anti-democratic methods have incited more outrage, but also made it more difficult to realize change. What are some of the successes and challenges that have defined the movement so far? What are possible next steps?

Success through community

One of the most notable features of the protests was the ability to mobilize vast sectors of the population. Leaders like Vučić are very skilled at making citizens feel shut out from politics; the protests have reawakened a sense of agency and power among society. The students leading the protest have been able to gain the support of the , , , and . Students have made an effort to include marginalized voices, which has bridged the divide between urban-rural populations, cultural groups, and sectors. Key to the organization has been its leaderless and decentralized form. Rather than establishing any new kind of hierarchy, the protests have opted for horizontal forms of authority, which ensure all participants are equal. for debates and decisions. This has also allowed all participants to feel that they are actively involved in their own governance and society, rather than remaining disenfranchised. The tactics used by the protestors have also aided its success. Actions that are symbolic, yet peaceful and legal, have made resistance approachable. These include traffic blockades, inter-city marches, social media campaigns, and marathons to Brussels.

The protests have pushed the resignation of select key officials, including the . An investigation was opened, but the lack of progress and reality of state power of the judiciary remain an issue. Similarly, partial documents around the construction project have been released, but much information . The protesters, after much campaigning, have received official support on October 22, 2025. This could have impacts on the ability for external actors to pressure Vučić. The sustained cooperation and power of the protests remain its biggest success, demonstrating the power of the people and the ability for citizens to regain their voice.

Challenges: state pushback

Crackdowns on civil society, control over free press, patronage networks, and election interference have become characteristic of Vučić’s office, undermining Serbia’s development as well as its pathway to democracy and EU accession. This has led to many calling for a leadership change. Vučić has responded by attacking the protestors, labelling them as . Physical attacks, smear campaigns, doxxing, unlawful questioning/detainment, and the controversial continue to be ongoing threats levied against protestors. Attacks on the educational sector have also been strong, with teachers facing pay cuts and threats since the beginning of the protests. Over the summer, government response became increasingly violent, with . This has drawn international criticism and has exponentially increased the threat level for protest participants. The government has also organized , though they remain smaller than their opposition.

State pushback and unwillingness to discuss have impeded the ability of meaningful dialogue and reform to occur; however, the system was designed this way. For protestors, it is difficult to translate actions into meaningful reform through the barring of political participation in civil society. , and social-political structures are captured by the state. Additionally, the has stood out for being very reticent in their support, likely due to fears over economic uncertainty following a new government, or to their own connections to .

An additional area where more support would be instrumental relates to international and external actors. The EU’s formal resolution came after months of relative disengagement from events in Serbia. Many may view student protests as a potentially unstable bet, however there should be strong support for civil society and the principles the protestors are advocating for. For a long time, international actors who support Vučić (such as Russia and China) have been louder than those in support. Considerable political transformation must take place in order to pressure Vučić, both internally and externally.

Where to next?

Currently, the protest sits at a defining moment. The past year has seen success through mass mobilization, the resignation of key officials, and the EU’s resolution of support for the protest. However, the government remains strong, and while . This has raised the issue of how to navigate these challenges. A major debate surrounds how the students should engage in the electoral arena. A student’s list of outsider candidates is being developed, however . It is difficult to justify joining the very system seen as corrupt, and there are concerns the election will not actually reform the system, just change the face. Additionally, attempts from are a growing internal issue that risks causing further division and factionalism. It may require the protestors to set ideological lines, countering its primarily apolitical image.

The protests in Serbia demonstrate the power of collective action and citizen mobilization. Its year-long anniversary marks a crossroads where the collective needs to decide its next steps. How they choose to orient themselves could have deep implications on the success of the protests and the growing political voice of the people.

The post Reflecting on 1 year post Novi Sad: Where to next? appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

When Albania’s Prime Minister Edi Rama joked that his new artificial intelligence (AI) “minister,” Diella (Albanian for Sun), was “pregnant with 83 children” (a metaphor for 83 digital assistants that will serve members of parliament), he turned an . The move to incorporate AI into governance itself is considered by many to be amusing, unsettling, and even revealing, as it shows how easily AI can be warped into a spectacle while subtly re-wiring how decisions about money and power are made. Diella is also the world’s first AI system formally appointed as Minister of State for Artificial Intelligence, with responsibility for.

From Virtual Assistant to Cabinet-Level Minister

as a virtual assistant on the , intended to assist Albanian citizens in accessing documents and other online public services. Nine months later, in September 2025, following a decree that authorized a virtual minister, Rama had elevated Diella to the rank of Minister of State for Artificial Intelligence, .

Such an unorthodox move has garnered plenty of international coverage, as many have framed it as both an anti-corruption experiment and a form of political branding, describing Diella as a digital assistant dressed in traditional clothing, now tasked with making public tenders free of corruption. However, some have also pointed out that procurement in Albania has long been dominated by political elites and oligarch-like figures, making .

A Spectacle?

Writer/researcher : essentially shifting political responsibility to digital actors and presenting them as being pure, incorruptible, and tireless, standing in for distrusted political elites. Perhaps accidental, this comes across as not a neutral design choice. Presenting the system as a woman in traditional costume frames digitalization as care and service rather than control, pulling on gendered stereotypes while also making it difficult to contest the new political innovation without appearing as “anti-modern” or “anti-progress.” The “” metaphor pushes this further, casting Diella as a digital mother of dozens of subordinate systems that will monitor and help with parliamentary work. It infantilizes MPs as being dependent on an algorithm, and suggests that political conflict within parliament can be processed by a neutral machine rather than by openly accountable representatives.

The move to incorporate AI into governance sits at the intersection of EU accession politics and digital dependency, as Diella is likely based on OpenAI models hosted on Microsoft Azure, which is precisely the kind of . Hypothetically speaking, if Albania were to obtain EU membership and Diella were to operate within the EU, it would be flagged as a high-risk system under the new , where stringent requirements are imposed on the usage of AI in public services and resource allocation. Such frameworks do not yet bind Albania; however, it is clearly experimenting in exactly the domain in which the Act targets, that being algorithmic governance, where constitutional accountability is thin.

Canada’s “Sovereign AI” Moment

Canada is moving quickly in a similar direction by embedding AI into state structures, but with a different approach. The announces $925.6 million over five years for “large-scale sovereign public AI infrastructure,” including a Sovereign Canadian Cloud to support research and public-sector AI use. The federal government is implementing AI and .

Canada already has a formal governance “toolkit” or framework for implementing public-sector AI. The government’s and its official guidelines require “algorithmic impact assessments,” the formal documentation of the systems used, and alternative mechanisms for performing similar functions when automated decisions may potentially affect rights and interests. Moreover, the further defines sovereignty as the ability to manage and protect government data, systems, and infrastructure independently in a globally interconnected environment.

However, Canadian experts warn that infrastructure and branding risks could outpace efforts to control them. As noted by , Canada’s dependence on American companies is one of the most significant risks and complications facing Canadian digital sovereignty, particularly given the dominance of US providers in digital and cloud services.

Put side by side, Albania and Canada reveal the same underlying question: who actually controls AI in the state, and under what rules? Diella is clearly an extreme case of AI as spectacle: an AI minister is “pregnant” with assistants, purity, and efficiency in a system still wrestling with corruption and weak checks. Whereas Canada’s “sovereign AI” push is more technocratic, but it faces its own temptation to treat big AI spending and a branded cloud as proof of control, even while key infrastructure and AI models remain under foreign corporate jurisdictions.

The core lesson for Canada is not to mock Diella, but to avoid a more subtle version of the same trap. As AI becomes more integrated into sectors that the federal government may deem appropriate, the real test will be whether such systems are contestable or even grounded in enforceable law, rather than merely marketed as innovative or sovereign, as it is easy to get caught up in the media storm and publicity such reforms seem to command. Canada’s task should be to ensure that its “sovereign AI” remains democratic, even when there is no digital “minister” on the screen.

The post Democracy Meets AI appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

It was during the first days of Russia’s full-scale invasion that Ukrainians were initially given only a few days to survive; the Russian Army was perceived to have a significant advantage in both military personnel and weaponry. Ukrainian civilians nonetheless mobilized quickly in response to support the sovereignty effort – be it through joining the front lines via voluntary military service or through the organization of humanitarian aid and fundraisers for military equipment. These grassroots initiatives have become a critical area where Ukrainians continue to succeed and make a tangible difference in the broader war effort. Ukraine has not only challenged the military might of one of the world’s largest armies but has also transformed modern warfare as we know it through innovative tactics, most notably, the increased and creative use of drones.  

It is alongside these technological advancements in drone technology and warfare that Ukraine has also pioneered a new form of media warfare, wherein press officers from different battalions as well as social media managers from Ukrainian and international charities leverage creative campaigning strategies and real-time battlefield footage to engage a global audience. By making military operations visible online, Ukrainian soldiers have brought the harsh realities of war into the public eye. This transparency, combined with the widespread organization of grassroots fundraisers, has empowered civilians and foreign supporters to actively participate in the war effort, while also ensuring that more distant audiences do not lose sight of what Ukraine is fighting for. Such civic engagement challenges the traditional notion that serving in wartime is limited to frontline military service, highlighting new ways that ordinary people contribute to national defence. The following piece will examine how grassroots fundraising campaigns, innovative drone warfare, and media strategies have enabled ordinary Ukrainians, and their global supporters, to play a vital role in the resistance from Russian expansion. It will also explore how this widespread civic engagement is reshaping traditional ideas of military service and influencing Ukrainian military policy, offering lessons for other countries on mobilizing civilian participation in modern warfare.Ěý

Fundraising Campaigns  

While there are many organizations supporting Ukraine’s war effort, some of the most prominent include Come Back Alive, the Prytula Foundation, Hospitallers, Sternenko’s community, and United24 – a government-led fundraising and media platform. Simultaneously, many battalions have their own affiliated foundations dedicated to fundraising efforts. The civilian volunteer movement in Ukraine has existed since 2014, when Russia first launched its invasion of Ukrainian territory. However, the scale of this movement has increased drastically since 2022. While some foundations focus on providing humanitarian relief, medical aid, and support for , many are dedicated to increasing military capacity by procuring and purchasing defense equipment in collaboration with various government departments, as well as by providing direct support to battalions. 

One notable example is the . Since the start of the full-scale invasion, the team has worked in direct coordination with soldiers on the ground. This began early on, when soldiers quickly recognized during the full-scale invasion the revolutionary use of kamikaze drones on the battlefield and began fundraising to supply battalions directly. Even before the foundation was formally established, they had already delivered over 145,000 FPV drones to the army, along with many other supplies, including vehicles, Mavic drones, radios, Starlink terminals, sea drones, and long-range drones. Earlier this year, the community was officially registered as a foundation in order to streamline internal processes and increase its capacity to support the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU). The foundation posts daily drone supply reports, providing video and photo proof of deliveries to battalions. As a fundraising tactic, they often share footage of drones being used effectively on the battlefield, including targeting and eliminating enemy troops.  

A key figure behind this initiative is Serhii Sternenko, a Kyiv-based Ukrainian activist known both for his military fundraising and for publicly raising concerns about Ukrainian military leadership. He often acts as a liaison, bringing soldiers’ concerns directly to high-ranking military officials. Due to his activism, Sternenko has been a repeated target of Russian-orchestrated assassination attempts, the most recent being in May 2025. To support the fundraising campaign “Rusoriz,” which focuses on drone procurement, Sternenko hosts livestreams every Sunday, inviting popular Ukrainian activists, politicians, and soldiers. On average, these streams raise on average about 1,000,000 UAH (approximately 33,500 CAD). In addition, during the stream Sternenko also runs knife giveaways to engage supporters. One of the speculations about why Sternenko chose to give away knives is linked to an attempted assassination in 2018. Sternenko managed to disarm his attacker and used the knife in an act of self-defence. Since then, he has often showcased his extensive knife collection and has collaborated with various battalions to create exclusive engravings, increasing their value in order to raise more funds for the AFU. Another fundraising strategy used by the foundation has included a merchandise campaign featuring T-shirts and other items, with a portion of the sales going to support the war effort. The most popular designs include, “Our Russophobia is not enough,” a slogan often repeated by Sternenko on his social media profiles and during YouTube streams.  

The idea of selling merchandise to support the Ukrainian Army quickly gained popularity among Ukrainian businesses of all kinds. For example, the Ukrainian bank PUMB launched a social initiative called “We Are of One Blood,” which offers Ukraine-themed hoodies, T-shirts, and jewelry collections. The project raises funds to support blood donation initiatives, as well as funds to support the purchase hemostatic supplies and tactical medical gear for Ukrainian soldiers. Half of the cost of each purchase is donated by the bank to the non-profit organizations DonorUA, Blood Agents, and Hospitallers. In addition, the initiative supports Ukrainian manufacturers and promotes local art.  

While there are organizations raising funds on a large scale, many Ukrainians are launching grassroots campaigns to support their loved ones who have joined the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Since the start of the full-scale invasion, Ukrainians have been actively mobilizing, with large portions of the population donating regularly. However, as the war enters its third year, the geopolitical situation – marked by increasing global instability and shifting dynamics in the Trump administration – has started to impact national morale and well-being. The increasing normalization (and even valorization) of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s presence on the global stage reflects a troubling shift in the international order for Ukrainians. Despite Russia’s clear pursuit of imperial ambitions, Putin is nonetheless being tolerated – if not welcomed – within certain arenas of international politics and security that have long been associated with great power status. Such normalization signals a form of “norm diffusion” (; , whereby authoritarian governance and revisionist practices are tolerated as legitimate forms of state behaviour, particularly amidst raising global instability and the erosion of the liberal international order as we know it. For Ukrainians on the ground, this widening window of tolerance to Russian claims of great power status not only compounds upon the Ukrainian struggle for sovereignty, but also underscores the structural challenge of resisting an international political environment that is increasingly shaped by the practices and discourses of authoritarian leaders.    

Despite these challenges, numerous successful individual campaigns have evolved into grassroots movements. This paper suggests that such a momentum created by these grassroots actors can be systematized into a broader strategy to strengthen Ukraine’s military capacity and deepen civilian engagement in national resilience efforts. One such example is a movement launched to support the Azov Regiment, known as “T˛â±ô´Ç±ą˛â°ě˛â” or “Azov’s Rear People.” The core idea behind this campaign is to mobilize many individuals to collectively raise large sums through smaller, manageable contributions. In 2023, the Ukrainian bank Monobank saw a surge in popularity for its “Jar” feature (Banka). Originally designed to help users set aside money for planned purchases, the feature became a powerful fundraising tool thanks to its simplicity and flexibility. Monobank enhanced the user experience by enabling top-ups via Apple Pay, Google Pay, and other banks’ cards without fees, and by assigning a unique card number to each Jar. The service now includes raffles for donors, smartphone widgets, social media templates, and IBAN details to facilitate sharing and engagement.  

In May 2024, Monobank introduced a new feature called “Friendly Collections.” This allows multiple people to fundraise toward a common goal by dividing the total amount among themselves into separate Jars. Unlike informal methods, this official feature reduces micromanagement, as organizers no longer have to spend as much time tracking who has transferred which share. The “Azov’s Rear People” movement leverages the Jar feature to break down large fundraising targets into smaller goals that ordinary Ukrainians can reach within their personal circles and communities. To date, they have collectively raised over 220 million UAH (approximately 7.7 million CAD), demonstrating the remarkable effectiveness of this decentralized, people-powered fundraising model.  

Redefining “Service” in Wartime & Lessons for the World 

The traditional notion of service during wartime tends to focus on military enlistment or government-led mobilization efforts, as well as various humanitarian initiatives targeting civilian evacuation and the relocation of internally displaced persons (). However, Ukrainians today are demonstrating another form of direct engagement and participation with the battlefront: through grassroots fundraising efforts for military equipment, technical gear, medical supplies, vehicles, and drones. Donation culture is becoming the norm among Ukrainians, with media strategies and social media campaigns playing a central role in civic engagement. These tools are increasingly used to raise funds aimed at boosting military capacity. A major challenge in Ukraine’s defence efforts continues to be personnel shortages. With a significantly smaller population than Russia, Ukraine naturally has a more limited mobilization pool. One of our previous analyses explores the challenges surrounding mobilization, which is available here: /eetn/2025/new-recruitment-initiatives-face-backlash-amid-ukraines-war-effort 

While many civilians are contributing large sums of money to support the AFU, ethical questions persist around whether it is appropriate to “buy” one’s way out of mobilization. For instance, Lieutenant Colonel Kyrylo Veres, Commander of the 20th Separate Unmanned Systems Regiment “K-2,” in a recent interview on the tangible value provided by such financial contributions. He noted that a significant percentage of drones used by his soldiers come from volunteers rather than through official government supply chains. Veres emphasized that, in some cases, it may be more effective for individuals, such as business owners, to remain in their civilian roles, continuing to fund and supply drones and other military systems, rather than being drafted to serve on the front lines. At the same time, he expressed frustration with those who make minimal financial contributions and claim they are fighting on the “economic frontline,” especially as his unit continues to face a persistent shortage of personnel for military operations.  

The Kyiv Independent that in 2024 alone, individual volunteers and fundraisers raised nearly $1 billion to support the Armed Forces of Ukraine, highlighting a powerful culture of giving. This grassroots movement often taps into creativity and humor to engage the public. To explore the donation culture in Ukraine and the role creativity plays in successful fundraising, please consider watching this example from Kyiv Independent:

The success of Ukrainian fundraising campaigns often lies in their ability to bypass complex bureaucratic processes, allowing aid to reach the front lines almost immediately – a critical factor during wartime to ensure soldiers are properly equipped. This success also reflects shared between the AFU and Ukrainian civilians, tied together through a strong sense of belonging, shared purpose, and a commitment to participate in the war effort and the defeat of Russian forces (). The transparency of these campaigns works to reinforce public confidence.; indeed, many average Ukrainians believe their donations are being used as intended, thanks to clear reporting, proper documentation, and even photos and videos from soldiers expressing their gratitude. While grassroots fundraising cannot match the scale of government aid or international military support, it plays a vital role in rapid procurement and targeted delivery of equipment. , rooted in civilian empowerment andĚý ongoing, intersubjective engagement between the AFU and Ukrainians, offers a potential blueprint for other countries, including Canada, to enhance public participation in national defence or crisis response.Ěý

The post Civilian Frontlines: Drones, Fundraising, and Evolving Military Policy appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

Rooted in colonial ambitions and imperial revisionism, Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine aims to dismantle the rules-based international order that many have taken for granted since WW2’s conclusion in 1945. The Russian Federation’s primary ontological claim centres around the belief that Ukraine was the creation of Russia and therefore, has no legitimate right to exist or exercise sovereignty. This narrative is often accompanied by accusations of the suppression of Russian-speaking Ukrainians that need to allegedly be “rescued” from Western influence. While territorial conquest has been a key objective of the Russian invasion, a significant focus has also been placed on erasing Ukrainian cultural identity, language, and heritage. Previous analyses explored this cultural destruction and colonial legacy that the war in Ukraine continues to expose. Despite these justifications, the Russian military has faced fierce resistance from both the Ukrainian Armed Forces and ordinary civilians. The Kremlin’s original plan to seize Ukraine within days collapsed in the face of extraordinary Ukrainian bravery and resilience, both on the battlefield and in the informational space, where Russian propaganda aimed to sway international opinion and sow division within Ukraine itself. , launched with the support of the Office of the President of Ukraine, the Cabinet of Ministers, the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy, and the Ministry of Digital Transformation, amplified the message of courage and resilience as a national resource, one that Ukrainians draw from their ancestors in a generational struggle against Russian expansion.Ěý

Canada’s most recent defence policy, , emphasizes national security and sovereignty as top priorities, particularly in relation to Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic and northern regions. Learning from Ukraine’s example, where national and cultural identity have served as strategic assets in strengthening military morale and national resilience, Canada should recognize Indigenous cultural knowledge and pride as vital components of its national security framework. Ukraine’s struggle to protect its national identity in the face of brutal Russian aggression resonates with the experiences of Indigenous peoples across Turtle Island, creating opportunities for solidarity and cultural diplomacy. While Canada has shown strong support for Ukraine’s resistance efforts, the government continues to overlook its responsibilities toward its own Indigenous population. This analysis will examine the role of Indigenous, particularly Inuit, communities in Canadian defence policy, with a focus on their involvement in the Canadian Rangers program. It will also explore the broader connection between cultural identity and national defence strategy, highlighting how cultural resilience can serve as a foundational pillar of security.  

Arctic Defence in a Changing Security Landscape and Canadian Rangers  

outlines the key security challenges facing Canada’s security landscape today. These include climate change, which is reshaping the Arctic landscape; rising global instability, particularly the return of war to Europe following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine; and the rapid advancement of technology, which is transforming the nature of warfare and understandings of security as we know it. While the Canadian government has recently taken steps to increase its NATO spending and strengthen partnerships with allies beyond NATO, Arctic defence remains a central pillar of its defence policy. Please refer to our earlier analyses to learn about New Defence Partnerships Beyond NATO and Canada’s evolving opportunities to contribute to European Security.  

When it comes to demonstrating the strength of the Canadian military in the Arctic, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) approximately 300 full-time personnel, alongside 1,700 Canadian Rangers. Additional personnel are regularly flown in for exercises designed to showcase operational capabilities such as surveillance and threat detection. , often referred to as the “eyes and ears of the North,” play a critical role in maintaining territorial integrity and security in the region, helping to reaffirm Canadian sovereignty.  

The Canadian Rangers, a subcomponent of the Canadian Army Reserve, serve only when placed on active duty or called upon during emergencies. T As many operations take place within and around Indigenous communities, nations, and territories, the Rangers’ engagement with traditional Indigenous knowledge and their deep connection to the land have proven critical over time. In addition to their operational duties, Rangers also train CAF personnel in survival skills and land-based knowledge, bridging military capabilities with Indigenous stewardship and expertise. As of November 2022, Indigenous peoples made up 2.9% of the overall CAF, while approximately 23% of Canadian Rangers self-identify as Indigenous.  

In March 2025, members of the CAF to conduct a training exercise simulating what a northern defense operation might look like in the event of an attack. The annual exercise took place near the Cree Nation of Chisasibi in Eeyou Istchee, with buildings belonging to the Nation used as headquarters. Harsh weather conditions, snow, and temperatures dropping far below zero mirrored typical Arctic environments and served as a realistic challenge for the soldiers. The proximity to the Indigenous community also played an important role. Canadian Rangers, some of whom are members of the local community, participated in the exercise and shared their traditional knowledge on survival techniques, such as how to build shelters using small trees and other natural materials.  

An essential step on the path toward reconciliation in Canada involves recognizing the distinct identities encompassed within the term “Indigenous communities,” which refers collectively to First Nations, MĂ©tis, and Inuit peoples. Each of these groups possesses unique cultural traditions, identities, knowledge systems, histories, and worldviews. While the Canadian federal government continues to work toward fulfilling the 94 Calls to Action outlined by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the persistent underrepresentation of Indigenous voices in policy-making processes remains a significant challenge. Historically, federal policy Inuit communities in efforts to assert Canadian sovereignty in the North. One notable example is the forced relocation of 17 Inuit families from Inukjuak, Northern Quebec, to remote High Arctic settlements in 1953 and 1955. These relocations were executed with little concern for the hardships imposed on the 92 individuals involved; instead, they were intended to bolster national sovereignty in the face of perceived Danish and American territorial claims, as well as to provide low-cost labor for RCMP and RCAF installations.  

In recent years, the federal government has highlighted initiatives like the Canadian Rangers as key examples of innovative Arctic defence strategies aimed at reinforcing Canadian sovereignty. During the 2025 federal election, support for the Canadian Rangers as a rare point of consensus among the Liberal, Conservative, and New Democratic parties. However, this emphasis on sovereignty-driven defence initiatives risks reinforcing a historical pattern wherein Indigenous participation is leveraged to advance national interests, while the distinct social, economic, and cultural priorities of Inuit communities may be overlooked, marginalized, or misunderstood. 

Language, Culture, and Security 

A notable example of a successful campaign that used culture as a unifying force and an effective tool for information dissemination, both domestically and internationally, is the , “What We Are Fighting For.” highlights the unique cultural and historical characteristics of each Ukrainian region through a series of 26 articles, available in both English and Ukrainian. Developed in collaboration with leading national historical institutions and experts, the campaign offers an in-depth exploration of the authentic and diverse history of Ukraine’s 24 regions, including Crimea. Many of these insights challenge long-standing Russian disinformation narratives, particularly those related to Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk. The campaign adopted the slogan, “We have 603,628 reasons for what we are fighting for”, a reference to the total area of independent Ukraine in square kilometers. This message reinforces the idea that, despite regional differences and distinct local traditions, Ukrainians remain united in their resistance to unjustified Russian aggression and territorial encroachment.  

While Ukraine has actively mobilized cultural identity and historical narrative as tools of national resilience and international communication, Canada’s engagement with Indigenous communities, particularly through programs like the Canadian Rangers, reveals a more complex relationship, shaped by a history of colonialism and ongoing challenges in fully recognizing and supporting Indigenous knowledge, language, and self-determination. The historical concept of the Canadian Rangers is rooted in the incorporation of the unique knowledge and perspectives of northern Indigenous communities to support efficient military operations, while also providing an opportunity for the northern Indigenous population to participate in the CAF and bring their community-first perspective into the equation. Traditional skills such as living off the land, along with holistic well-being, are central to Indigenous communities. In the case of Inuit communities, these include survival skills in harsh Arctic conditions, skills that, if not shared and practiced, could be at risk of being lost. Their celebration and sharing through joint military exercises point to the increasing recognition of the value of Indigenous traditional knowledge and the appreciation of their unique identity.  

Language plays a vital role in shaping any culture. This is evident among Ukrainians, who have made significant efforts to preserve and promote their language as a key marker of national identity, distinct from Russia. A similar commitment to language preservation can be seen in many Indigenous communities across Canada. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission highlighted how the residential school system sought to erase Indigenous identities by forbidding children from speaking their native languages, often punishing them for doing so.  

In their report , Lackenbauer and Kikkert emphasize the importance of language in both community-building and cultural preservation. They note how Ranger patrols have created opportunities for intergenerational learning, with young Rangers practicing and improving their Inuinnaqtun under the guidance of senior leaders. These leaders encourage youth to use traditional terms for place names and give commands in their native tongue, all while building confidence and strengthening cultural identity.  

While military strength is often measured in terms of equipment, technology, or the number of personnel, the cultural dimension of defence is frequently overlooked. Canada can learn from Ukraine’s example, where national identity and cultural heritage have been strategically mobilized to strengthen resistance and resilience. In particular, Canada has the opportunity to recognize and integrate the unique knowledge systems of Indigenous communities, such as the survival expertise of Inuit peoples in the Arctic, into its broader defence strategy. This approach not only enhances national security but also aligns with Canada’s commitments under the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s Calls to Action. Strengthening public awareness of the Canadian Rangers and their critical role in Arctic defence is essential, especially as global power dynamics shift and actors like Russia increasingly challenge the international rules-based order, including through heightened interest in the Arctic. By valuing Indigenous knowledge and fostering inclusive defence frameworks, Canada can build a more resilient and ethical approach to national security. 

The post Defending the North: How Cultural Identity Shapes Security Policy in Canada and Ukraine appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

Russian aggression in Ukraine has not only undermined the rules-based international order in a bid to reconfigure the global system, but is also characterized by colonial and imperial logics that recall the practices of the Russian Empire and Soviet Union – where the erasure of national identities of smaller nations and republics was a core tactic of domination. This analysis explores how Russian aggression in Ukraine is not merely a territorial conflict but a war over culture, language, and control over a historical narrative. It also considers what Canada, with its own complex colonial legacy, can learn about cultural awareness as a vital component of future foreign and defence policies.  

In its quest to conquer Ukrainian territory, the Russian government is attacking Ukrainian culture, language, and artistic expression. While the exact number of Ukrainian artists killed in the war remains unknown, as of December 2025, PEN Ukraine, a non-governmental organization dedicated to protecting and promoting authors’ rights, of artists, musicians, actors, and other cultural figures whose lives have been lost to Russian aggression. According to Ukraine’s Minister of Culture, Russian soldiers more than 1,000 cultural heritage sites, underscoring a deliberate effort to erase Ukrainian identity for future generations. This violence against culture is not new; it draws from a long-standing Russian playbook: From Catherine II’s 1763 ban on the Ukrainian language (among others), to the Soviet Union’s “Executed Renaissance,” which saw the repression and execution of hundreds of Ukrainian intellectuals and artists, cultural suppression has long served as a deliberate Russian strategy. Today, Ukraine faces a new generation of “executed artists” (as referenced by the Ukrainian Minister of Culture). 

Mourning as Resistance: Cultural Memory and National Identity 

On June 19, 2025, hundreds of Ukrainians farewell to Ukrainian soldier and former actor Yuriy Felipenko, who was killed in action on the front lines. Yuriy’s death was the latest blow to Ukraine’s artistic community, as he symbolized for many a new era of modern, young Ukrainian actors. Yuriy served in the Achilles Strike Drone Battalion, one of the most effective drone units in the country. His wife, Ukrainian blogger and influencer Kateryna Motrych, the moment to remind Ukrainians of the root cause of their suffering:  

“I don’t blame anyone for this death, except Russia. I want to ask everyone here to kill everything Russian inside themselves. Forget this language and this culture forever, because it is only because of Russia that we are all forced to be here now.”  

Motrych’s words resonated widely, becoming a rallying cry and a reminder of who started the war at a time when many Ukrainians are experiencing fatigue from relentless nightly drone attacks and a shifting geopolitical climate; this has been made even more acute through the Trump administration’s varied stand on supporting the war.Ěý Ten days after Yuriy’s death, Motrych a fundraiser with the goal of raising 2 million Ukrainian hryvnias – approximately 70,000 Canadian dollars – to support his battalion. Many Ukrainians joined her effort, and the campaign ultimately raised nearly 6 million hryvnias – around 200,000 Canadian dollars. The fundraiser then evolved into a mass flash mob, with Ukrainians across the country and abroad showing support as it became a powerful symbol of public mourning. Beyond its political message, the fundraiser became a symbol of collective cultural memory. Even strangers mourned Yuriy’s death alongside his family, recognizing that Russia is not only killing Ukrainians, but also targeting a future generation of artists who have worked to promote Ukrainian culture at home and abroad.Ěý

The collective mourning of Yuriy’s death served as a stark reminder to Ukrainians that they are fighting not only to preserve their national identity, but also to resist Russia’s colonial ambitions – to seize territory and erase their culture, language, and art. Just as Yuriy’s death underscored the broader struggle against this erasure of Ukrainian identity, another example of this colonial violence at work is the forced removal of Ukrainian children from their families – an attempt to sever future generations from their cultural practices, expression, and homeland. For more details, please refer to the analysis Stolen Generation: How Russia is Erasing Ukraine’s Future, One Child at a Time.ĚýĚý

Russia’s unjustified aggression against Ukraine has affected all spheres of Ukrainian cultural expression. Among those killed in combat or as a result of missile attacks, a common tactic employed by Russia, are numerous artists, writers, and cultural figures. One such loss was , a Ukrainian nonfiction writer who had turned to documenting war crimes. She died in July 2023 after sustaining fatal injuries during a Russian missile strike on a restaurant in Kramatorsk. Since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale reinvasion, Amelina had been actively raising awareness about the atrocities committed in Ukraine. Her final project evolved into a book titled , which focused on the experiences of Ukrainian women seeking justice. Amelina also played a crucial role in preserving the cultural memory of the war; she recovered the diary of Ukrainian writer , who was abducted and later killed by Russian forces. She posthumously edited and published his diary as , a vital testimony of life under Russian occupation and an account of the early months of the invasion. Another tragic loss is that of , a Ukrainian designer and member of the Sixtiers movement, a dissident cultural movement during the Soviet era. Panchenko was living alone in Bucha during the Russian occupation. She died of starvation, deprived of social assistance and trapped under occupation – a death that underscores the precarity of Ukraine’s elder cultural generation, including those who had previously survived the Soviet regime. . While these examples illustrate the profound impact of the Russian aggression on Ukraine’s cultural sphere, the full extent of such losses remains difficult to quantify. For more accounts of artists and cultural workers who have been killed, please read     

Ukraine’s ongoing effort to distance itself from the concept of the Russkii Mir, a worldview in which Russian culture, history, and language are considered superior, is by the Kremlin as a direct threat to the idea of a “Great Russia” that would encompass the so-called lost territories of the former Soviet Union. In its attempt to reconnect with its imperial past, modern Russia does not envision a future in which Ukrainians, or so-called “Little Russians,” have the right to self-determination over their political, economic, and overall global trajectory. 

Canada’s Colonial Legacy and Its Global Responsibility 

Canada’s early recognition of Ukrainian independence and its robust support of Ukrainian culture – both within its borders and abroad – reflect a longstanding commitment and partnership, shaped in part by its vibrant Ukrainian diaspora. At the same time, this outward-facing solidarity must be accompanied by an inward-facing reckoning with its settler colonial foundations. , settler colonialism is not a past event but an ongoing structure that aims to eliminate Indigenous presence in order to secure settler sovereignty over land. As Simpson highlights, this operates through a variety of public and private mechanisms, including legal frameworks, governance structures, and broader civil society organizations, each of them masking the ongoing dispossession and colonial violence. In doing so, colonialism is often portrayed as a historical moment of the past, one that has since been resolved despite it actively continuing through economic, political, and symbolic means.  

The legacy of Indigenous dispossession and its entanglement with contemporary defence and sovereignty discourses – particularly in relation to the Arctic – are increasingly salient, especially as narratives from the United States (U.S.) continue to challenge Canada’s geopolitical autonomy.  

highlighted that Canada committed cultural genocide against Indigenous communities. As a result, many Indigenous cultural practices, traditions, and languages were either lost entirely or are now on the verge of extinction. Indigenous communities across Canada have been working to hold the federal government accountable for fulfilling , which address areas such as child welfare, education, and the criminal justice system, with the goal of creating space for Indigenous peoples in Canada to thrive alongside other Canadians. 

Shared Histories, Shared Struggles  

Ukraine’s struggle to protect its national identity in the face of brutal Russian aggression resonates with the experiences of Indigenous peoples across Turtle Island, creating opportunities for solidarity and cultural diplomacy. Historically, Indigenous peoples welcomed the first Ukrainian settlers who arrived on the Canadian Prairies; a visual symbol of this unique connection is the kokum scarf, or Ukrainian hustka. In a show of solidarity following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Indigenous people across Canada to express their support for Ukrainians.

Some even went so far as to answer the Ukrainian president’s call to volunteer as fighters at the beginning of the full-scale invasion. One of them, Austin Lathlin-Bercier from Opaskwayak Cree Nation, was killed in combat in 2023 in Donetsk Oblast. He was a member of the International Legion and had previously received training with the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) through the Bold Eagle program, a unique initiative that combines Indigenous culture and teachings with military training. In May 2025, awarded the Ukrainian Canadian Sacrifice Medal.ĚýĚý

Canada’s response to Russia’s war against Ukraine has included federally coordinated humanitarian aid and military support, alongside strong grassroots mobilization from community members who recognize the threat this aggression poses to both European stability and the broader rules-based international order. As a country in the process of reconciling with its own colonial past, Canada holds a unique responsibility to stand up for nations under threat, whether Indigenous communities at home or Ukrainians abroad. The analysis to come in the weeks ahead will explore the role of Indigenous communities in Canadian defence policy, with particular attention to their participation in the Canadian Rangers program. It will also examine the broader connection between cultural identity and national defence strategy, highlighting how cultural resilience can serve as a critical pillar of security.  

If you are interested in exploring the topic of Russian aggression and its impact on Ukrainian culture in greater depth, please refer to the resources listed below. 

• Art under attack: How Russia destroys Ukraine’s cultural heritageĚý

To watch a reportage from Kyiv Independent: Ěý

• Uncovering FSB’s secret operation to steal Ukraine’s valuable artĚýĚý

To watch a reportage from Kyiv Independent:    

The post “Where’s Ukraine’s Dostoevsky? Being Killed by Russia.” Cultural Destruction, Colonial Legacies and What Canada Must Learn from Russia’s War on Ukrainian Identity appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

On May 9, 2025, coinciding with Russia’s Victory Day parade, foreign ministers from EU and allied countries of a special tribunal to prosecute Russia’s top leadership for the crime of aggression against Ukraine. Although trials are unlikely to begin before 2026, the emerging political consensus on the imperative of justice marks a decisive turning point in the war; charges are anticipated to be laid against 20 senior Russian officials, including Vladimir Putin and Sergey Lavrov, as well as leaders from Belarus and potentially North Korea. This initiative draws historical parallels to the post-World War II Nuremberg Trials and underscores the international community’s growing commitment to accountability.  

The foundation of international humanitarian law lies in the four , which establish legal protections for victims of armed conflict and assign the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) a central role in promoting these norms and ensuring that those affected by war and violence receive adequate assistance. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, to uphold these legal standards. Meanwhile, Russia has largely evaded accountability for its violations. However, these warrants have not led to any tangible enforcement, and effectiveness of existing mechanisms to uphold international law. Russia’s persistent mistreatment of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) and its resistance to fair and reciprocal exchanges reinforce the urgent need for both a stronger global humanitarian response and the pursuit of international accountability. While the exact number of Ukrainian soldiers held in Russian captivity as POWs remains unknown, . Ukraine does not publicly disclose the number of its POWs held by Russia. though this number has not been independently verified. The ICRC , preventing any third-party verification of the conditions or total number of detainees. 

Available reports from former detainees and human rights organizations paint a grim picture of systemic abuse. Ukrainian POWs are often subjected to prolonged isolation, torture, lack of medical care, and total disconnection from the outside world. , such treatment constitutes incommunicado detention and amounts to inhumane and degrading treatment under international law. The deliberate denial of oversight by international organizations, combined with evidence of physical and psychological abuse, indicates a broader strategy of erasing legal protections for POWs. These practices, occurring within the broader context of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, meet the threshold for war crimes under international humanitarian law.  

On May 6, 2025, Ukraine conducted its most recent prisoner exchange with the Russian Federation, successfully repatriating 205 POWs. , this event marked the fifth confirmed POW exchange in 2025 and the 64th since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. Despite these ongoing efforts, the pace and scale of exchanges remain limited. , President Volodymyr Zelenskyy reaffirmed Ukraine’s readiness to engage in a comprehensive “all-for-all” exchange, characterizing it as a fair and humane solution. However, progress toward such a large-scale agreement has been hindered by Russia’s continued resistance. As noted by , if Russia had been genuinely interested in a full reciprocal exchange, it would have already occurred. 

After the fall of the Azovstal steel plant, over 2,500 Ukrainian defenders surrendered, including several hundred Azov fighters. Despite being registered as POWs by the ICRC, many were denied legal protections under the Geneva Conventions, as Russia has classified them as terrorists. This characterization enabled unlawful and extended detentions, closed-door trials, and widespread reports of physical, sexual, and psychological abuse and torture. As of 2025, around 900 Azov servicemen remain in Russian captivity, with some sentenced to lengthy prison terms in proceedings condemned by international legal experts. The 2022 Olenivka prison explosion, which killed more than 50 Ukrainian POWs—primarily Azovstal defenders—further exemplifies the brutality. Russia blocked all independent investigations, and no accountability has followed. The treatment of Azov prisoners stands as a stark symbol of Russia’s broader violations of international humanitarian law.  

Originating in 2022 and gaining momentum in subsequent years, the movement organizes weekly rallies—often held in symbolic locations like Kyiv’s Maidan—blending solemn remembrance with visible public pressure. The Russian propaganda machine has spent years spreading disinformation about the Azov Brigade, making it especially challenging to advocate for their return and ensure they are treated as lawful POWs.ĚýĚý

The systematic mistreatment of Ukrainian POWs by Russian authorities not only contravenes the Geneva Conventions but also exposes a chronic deficit in the enforcement of international legal doctrines. At the same time, that its role is to remain politically neutral in order to sustain dialogue with all parties involved in the armed conflict and to assist civilians, for example, by providing humanitarian aid in Russian-occupied territories. While the creation of a special tribunal represents an important step, its execution remains to be seen as previously discussed, the ICC issued a warrant for Putin’s arrest, yet he remains at large. The international community must face the question of whether there is space to create an enforcement mechanism within international humanitarian law, what such a mechanism might look like, and how to prevent its instrumentalization by states selectively applying the law to serve their own agendas and interests. 

Learn More:  

The post Abuses and Accountability: Unmasking Russia’s War Crimes Against Ukrainian Soldiers as Prisoners of War Under International Humanitarian Law appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

saw Armenia and Azerbaijan announce a major step towards normalization, raising the prospect of a near-term peace agreement. However, these post-2023 negotiations present Armenia with stark choices: potentially sacrificing national identity, sovereignty, or international justice access. With the pre-2020 status quo no longer viable, Armenia must confront compromises largely dictated by Azerbaijan, raising the crucial question of what will be lost and whether national unity can be maintained.

This white paper analyzes how Armenia’s weak negotiating position, regional isolation, and limited leverage hinder its pursuit of a just and lasting peace. It explores the impact of power imbalances in conflict resolution, the influence of external actors or the lack thereof in post-conflict stabilization, the crucial role of social reconciliation given the absence of international justice, and unresolved human rights issues within the peace process. The paper argues that international justice will likely be sacrificed in this process, potentially deepening generational trauma in Armenia, and risk perpetuating regional violence. Ultimately, the paper concludes that preserving Armenia’s absolute sovereignty is a critical redline for ensuring the nation’s survival.

The Peace Process: How to Ensure a Fair Settlement Facing Asymmetry

Since 1994, multilateral diplomacy—primarily through the —has failed to resolve the core issues of the region’s peace process. Weakened by escalating geopolitical rivalries and the influence of Russian imperialist policies in the former Soviet Union, the Minsk Group and the OSCE’s monitoring mission were unable to prevent outbreaks of violence between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This failure created an opportunity for TĂĽrkiye to expand its role in the conflict, providing political and military support to Azerbaijan and significantly shifting the balance of power.

Following the 2020 Second Karabakh War, multilateral efforts were largely supplanted by direct external mediation led by Russia, which yielded limited results. Although Moscow brokered a ceasefire and deployed a peacekeeping mission, it proved either unable or unwilling to prevent violations of Armenia’s sovereignty in 2022. The war fundamentally shifted the balance of power in Azerbaijan’s favour, a dynamic further reinforced after the one-day war in 2023.

In September 2023, Azerbaijan launched a new military offensive to retake the breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh, mainly populated by ethnic Armenians. Although in violation of the 2020 ceasefire, the operation was designed to take over the region while Russia remained bogged down in Ukraine and mainly uninterested in fulfilling its mandate as peace guarantors of the 2020 accords. After a swift Azerbaijani military victory over Armenian separatist forces in Nagorno-Karabakh, ethnic Armenians fled, fearing for their lives. The scale and swiftness of this ethnic cleansing was reminiscent of what happened in former Yugoslavia in the 1990s.

Following Armenia’s military defeat and the failed ceasefire brokered by Russia, TĂĽrkiye’s growing influence, coupled with Azerbaijan’s military victory, marked the decline of multilateral diplomacy in the South Caucasus. As a result, , sidelining previous mediation efforts and moving away from Russia’s self-interested approach to conflict resolution. 

The negotiation process has been skewed by Azerbaijan’s dominant position in the conflict, a lack of external constraints, and the absence of a mutually hurting stalemate. This concept, defined by Zartmann (1985), describes a situation where neither side believes it can win the war, and further conflict would be unbearably harmful to all involved. Baku’s control of most negotiation leverage has led to relative intransigence in accepting compromise and negotiating in good faith. While Armenia has shown willingness to compromise on some maximalist demands regarding the status of Karabakh and transitional justice, Azerbaijan’s willingness to make concessions remains less apparent.

The burden of peace largely falls on Armenia. The country faces a difficult balancing act: its limits its leverage at the negotiating table, while internal political dynamics constrain its ability to accept a settlement perceived as a national defeat. Moreover, the progress of direct negotiations between Armenia and TĂĽrkiye is contingent on the results of bilateral discussions between Armenia and Azerbaijan. TĂĽrkiye’s prioritization of its support for Azerbaijan outweighs its need for a bilateral agreement with Armenia.

Rather than repeating the mistakes made after the 2018 revolution—when the government adopted a rigid stance and withdrew from the negotiation process (Grigoryan 2024)—Armenia appears to have adopted a proactive approach. This means defining its core priorities and determining what it is willing to compromise in this short but critical window of opportunity to establish peace with Azerbaijan. However, an important level of uncertainty continues to surround Azerbaijan’s willingness to commit to the peace accord.

In this context, a peace agreement that imposes minimal concessions on Azerbaijan—without external enforcement mechanisms or meaningful diplomatic costs—could severely undermine Armenia’s security, leaving it vulnerable to further coercion. Azerbaijan’s demands for directly challenge Armenia’s sovereignty and could serve as a Trojan horse, increasing Armenia’s vulnerability to Azerbaijan’s maximalist claims. Precedents for granting extraterritorial rights in post-conflict negotiations are extremely rare. The 1995 Dayton Accords included a territorial exchange to create the Goražde corridor, avoiding the need to grant extraterritorial rights. However, this exchange was part of a broader settlement based on territorial control established during the civil war. While Armenia has expressed willingness to honour its commitments under the 2020 ceasefire and has proposed a bilateral agreement on transportation through the Zangezur corridor, Azerbaijan has refused to grant reciprocal access to Nakhchivan. As a result, both sides have agreed to put negotiations over the corridor and its access on hold.

For some , the delay to sign a peace treaty even after Armenia’s formal recognition of Azerbaijan territorial integrity underlines a careful approach seeking to avoid negative consequences of a premature peace treaty as observed with the Dayton and Minsk Accord. However, time does not play in Armenia’s favour; it only worsens Armenia’s bargaining position. While negotiating, Azerbaijan continues to implement a policy seeking to transform the Karabakh region and deconstruct previous as well as targeting its . It seeks to eliminate the option of a return to the status quo ante bellum and de facto prevent the return of refugees in the absence of a de jure option.

Peace Accord and Enforcement: The Imperative of a Reliable Guarantor

Negotiations where one side holds all the leverage often lead to a victor’s peace.  Without an external mediator or balancing force, the dominant party can push for maximalist and recurring demands—a pattern Azerbaijan has followed since September 2023. Azerbaijan’s insistence that Armenia amend its constitution exemplifies this growing pressure.

Even in the context of a prospective peace accord, with no significant international or domestic pressure, Azerbaijan can escalate its demands on Armenia with minimal political repercussions. In asymmetric negotiations, the more dominant party is often incentivized to renege on agreements and push for further concessions (Fearon 1996). In a victor’s peace, where there is no external pressure to curb maximalist demands, one of the few restraining factors is the recognition that excessive demands could backfire in the long run or that a mutually beneficial economic arrangement offers a more sustainable alternative.

More than mediation, this peace process requires external guarantors. Guarantors typically engage in conflict resolution when they have strategic incentives or significant stakes in the outcome. At present, no strong external guarantor is pressuring Azerbaijan to uphold any potential settlement with Armenia. The issue at hand in the South Caucasus is not necessarily security guarantees, as in Ukraine, but rather assurances that any bilateral agreement will be upheld by both parties, preventing negotiated compromises from becoming leverage for further demands.

Relying solely on good faith and trust often leads to disappointment, as seen in many post-Soviet peace processes. As seen in the cases of the Minsk Process and the Accords, the absence of an external guarantor often benefits the stronger belligerent, allowing it to reshape the agreement, refuse to implement it, and escalate its demands while the weaker party bears the consequences.

Escalating demands from Ankara and Baku highlight that without a reliable enforcement mechanism, Armenia risks being in a weaker position if it proceeds with signing an agreement. exemplifies this risk. After the 2020 ceasefire, Azerbaijan imposed restrictions on the only road connecting Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh, citing security concerns over alleged arms transfers. This move directly violated the Russian-brokered peace agreement and further infringed on the rights of the Armenian minority. The blockade effectively starved the Armenian population, depriving them of essential resources and threatening their survival in Karabakh for several months. It underscores the dangers of asymmetrical power dynamics between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the absence of a credible international guarantor. Russia has failed to enforce the ceasefire or uphold the 2020 agreement, leaving power politics as the primary driver of bilateral negotiations.

Even in a victorious scenario, such as in the First Chechen War, the absence of international support can hinder the consolidation of peace. Despite achieving a decisive military victory against the Russian Federation in 1996 and holding free and fair presidential elections in 1997, Chechnya struggled to implement political reforms and state-building measures due to its international isolation. While Russia reneged on its commitments under the , the international community failed to impose sanctions on Moscow. This lack of external support contributed to the rise of warlordism and laid the groundwork for the Second Chechen War. The (EUMA) is a cautious first step, distancing external actors from purely geopolitical motives, unlike Russia’s role in the 2000s and especially after 2020. However, the recent between the parties suggests a willingness to . Long-lasting peace in protracted ethnic conflicts, such as in Northern Ireland, hinge on legal commitments to renounce violence. Given the geopolitical tensions in the South Caucasus, strong legal commitments may be the only viable path to achieving sustainable peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Armenia’s relative regional and international isolation heightens its vulnerability to Azerbaijan’s growing and maximalist demands, and the risk of Baku reneging on a peace treaty despite Armenia’s significant concessions.

Armenia at the Crossroads: Navigating Regional and Global Isolation

Russia’s inaction to protect Armenia in 2020 and its subsequent inability to fulfill its mandate as a peace guarantor has led to Armenia’s decision to sever its security ties with Russia and withdraw from the CSTO, ultimately creating an opportunity for Armenia to rethink its security strategy as a whole. Armenia’s recent pivot to the West places it in a precarious position as it seeks to challenge the victor’s peace imposed by Azerbaijan and its Turkish ally. Although its current isolation is not a permanent state but rather a transitional phase, it has complicated Armenia’s efforts to secure an international guarantor for a peace settlement.

In peace processes, isolation can be used to pressure states into renouncing revanchist demands, engaging in transitional justice, or joining negotiations as observers—such as Serbia in the early 2000s. However, Armenia’s situation is different. Its isolation benefits Azerbaijan, reinforcing its intransigent stance on peace, human rights, and Armenian sovereignty. Moreover, Armenia’s isolation encourages Azerbaijan’s territorial ambitions and reluctance to engage in a transitional justice process.

To mitigate its isolation, Armenia has leveraged its democratization process and pivot toward the EU as a signal of its intention to pursue strategic changes and its urgent need for international support in implementing the peace process. As Prime Minister framed it, peace and normalized relations with Türkiye and Azerbaijan are sine qua non conditions for a successful democratization process in Armenia. However, in the broader context of democratic backsliding in the United States, Pashinyan’s strategy of positioning Armenia as the new beacon of democracy in the South Caucasus could backfire in the coming years. He may ultimately face a difficult choice between aligning more closely with the EU or the U.S. in his bid for political backing. While democratic values present themselves as the moral choice, the more pressing survival imperative remains a firm and expedited commitment to a lasting peace settlement.

Armenia has also moved to strengthen its strategic partnerships, signing agreements with France in 2024 and with the United States and the Netherlands in 2025. France, in particular, has expanded its role in the South Caucasus, positioning itself as a key actor in providing Armenia with increased support and . At the same time, Armenia should avoid overestimating the impact of its recent weapons procurement from France and India as a means of altering the current status quo. Weapon systems remain mostly defensive and do not represent a game-changer in terms of military parity with Azerbaijan. Previous miscalculations before the 2020 war have demonstrated the risks of adopting a hardline approach to peace settlements.

Overall, Armenia remains in a precarious position, where a military solution to its predicament is not foreseeable, and limited foreign support hinders its ability to re-establish a balance of power in the negotiation process.

Pathways to Peace: Leveraging Economic and Political Incentives for Win-Win Solutions

With limited external constraints, Baku’s uncompromising approach makes a balanced agreement increasingly difficult. The absence of a win-win peace scenario could become a source of future grievances, fueling deep-seated conflicts, as seen in the cases of Russia’s in Chechnya and in Georgia. Sustainable peace, however, requires both sides to be willing to compromise rather than escalating their demands.

Conflict resolution experiences highlight the critical role of economic and political incentives in fostering peace (Mansfield and Snyder 1995). Achieving historical justice and addressing deep-seated tensions are essential for peace, but sustainable peace also requires that all parties see it as a preferable alternative to continued violence—particularly in cases where local populations have been polarized and mobilized over long periods of time.

Win-win scenarios provide long-term solutions by fostering cooperation between warring factions. For such solutions to be viable, both sides must perceive the peace settlement as politically and economically beneficial for them rather than as a loss of something fundamental to their identity and interests. Shifting negotiations away from emotionally charged issues of identity, justice, and blame could create a more constructive path forward.

Economic cooperation, when framed as a fair and reciprocal partnership rather than a victory imposing dominance over the other, can serve as a foundation for trust-building and de-escalation. Additionally, emphasizing economic imperatives and tangible successes over nationalist narratives can help demobilize hardliners and foster a more pragmatic .

The post-1945 German-French reconciliation, the 1998 Belfast Agreement, and peace settlements in the former Yugoslavia underscore the powerful role of economic incentives in fostering reconciliation. In the latter case, a combination of Serbia’s regional isolation and the European Union’s (EU) integration incentives facilitated the implementation of transitional justice. These factors encouraged warring parties to seek compromises, leading Serbia to rebuild its relationships with Kosovo and Croatia. For instance, the EU’s requirement for full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) as a condition for accession played a crucial role in advancing the peace process. Each side recognized the necessity of setting aside historical grievances in pursuit of economic opportunities.

A mutually beneficial solution in the South Caucasus remains elusive. Few countries or international institutions currently possess the will to compel Azerbaijan to negotiate in good faith with Armenia. The European energy sector continues to rely on Azeri gas, often turning a blind eye to Baku’s role in circumventing energy sanctions on Russia. Unlike other regional actors, Azerbaijan is not seeking EU integration and instead prioritizes its relationships with Türkiye and, more recently, Central Asia. The proposed by Armenia entitled the “Crossroad of Peace,” along with broader discussions on economic and logistical cooperation between Azerbaijan, Türkiye, Armenia, and Iran, present the most significant opportunity for an economic-driven peace process in the region. In the current bargaining context, Armenia perceives itself as facing significant sacrifices. However, framing the Zangezur corridor within a broader vision of regional economic integration—rather than as a unilateral loss—could help mitigate the perception of total defeat among the Armenian population.

Reframing the negotiation process around regional economic cooperation rather than the loss of Karabakh could help stabilize relations, despite decades of armed conflict. While the current outcome of recent wars is not what Armenia had hoped for, the country must navigate this suboptimal reality and focus on achievable, mutually beneficial goals. Concessions should not always be seen as historical defeats but rather as strategic steps toward a more stable and prosperous future.

The Peace Process and the Erosion of International Law

In March 2025, the two countries agreed to withdraw, dismiss, or settle their legal disputes in international courts, particularly at the International Court of Justice (ICJ). However, the agreement remains silent on alternative mechanisms for addressing international crimes committed over the past forty years of conflict. Nor does it provide a framework for societal reconciliation—a sine qua non for long-term peace.

Addressing international crimes committed by both sides over an extended period presents a significant challenge for peacebuilding and transitional justice. International justice and accountability for war crimes are often among the first concessions states make to secure a peace deal, as seen in Nicaragua, Cambodia, and Colombia. Conflict resolution literature suggests that while such compromises may facilitate agreements, they carry long-term consequences. For instance, blanket amnesties for crimes against humanity have shown limited effectiveness in sustaining lasting peace (Dancy 2018). The absence of transitional justice fosters generational trauma, erodes confidence in international law, and increases the likelihood of future conflicts. Addressing international crimes is therefore crucial to preventing cyclical violence, as demonstrated in Rwanda, Cambodia, and, to a lesser extent, the former Yugoslavia.

The ICJ is also currently reviewing potential war crimes committed during the 2020 War, including the destruction of Armenian cultural heritage as a possible crime against humanity, alongside a countersuit from Azerbaijan. However, Armenia’s international legal has resigned amid the impending agreement with Azerbaijan. In the present case, the ICJ has explicitly stated that it will restrict its inquiry to incidents occurring after , affecting Azerbaijan’s willingness to engage with international justice

Armenia also joined the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2024, but the tribunal has yet to open an investigation into crimes committed in the recent conflicts. Largely due to a tacit agreement with Azerbaijan, has refrained from referring the 2023 one-day war, the blockade of the Lachin corridor, and the ongoing destruction of its cultural heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh to the ICC.

Since May 2022, Armenia has retroactively accepted the ICC’s jurisdiction, meaning crimes committed in Nagorno-Karabakh after that date could fall under its purview, provided certain legal conditions are met. Drawing a parallel to the procedure initiated regarding crimes against Rohingyas in in 2016 and 2017, the ICC could explore the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh despite the alleged crimes taking place within Azerbaijan’s internationally recognized borders. Even though Azerbaijan is not a party to the Rome Statute, ICC prosecutors could build a case by arguing that certain crimes, such as the deportations resulting in ethnic cleansing, had consequences that occurred within Armenia’s territory.

A growing opposition in Armenia and its diaspora has criticized the Armenian government for considering the withdrawal of its legal proceedings at the ICC and ICJ. Furthermore, in April 2024, an petitioned the ICC prosecutor to investigate potential crimes against humanity and acts of genocide committed in Karabakh. The claim of genocide has also been raised in policy circles, notably by a .

Unless the peace settlement ensures long-term stability and fosters a mutually beneficial partnership, sidelining justice may prove to be a short-term fix that exacerbates generational trauma and reignites tensions between the belligerents. Moreover, while the Armenian government and its negotiators may see the strategic value in compromising on international justice, such a decision risks further alienating the Armenian population—potentially undermining the very peace process it seeks to uphold.

Crimes Against Humanity in Nagorno-Karabakh: The Imperative for Action

The political and social costs of abandoning these cases appear significantly higher than Armenia’s formal recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh as sovereign Azerbaijani territory—a move that aligns with international law and does not impact the right of refugees to return. As the ICJ and other tribunals prepare to deliver historic rulings on the crime of aggression and genocide in three major cases—South Africa v. Israel, Ukraine v. Russian Federation, and The Gambia v. Myanmar (with seven states intervening)—Armenia’s decision to abandon legal proceedings may prove to be a costly choice in the long run. 

Even if Armenia chooses not to pursue the case itself, ICC state parties such as Canada or France have the authority to refer the situation to the ICC prosecutor for investigation, as was done in Ukraine regarding war crimes committed by Russian Armed Forces. Furthermore, the ICC prosecutor can launch a proprio motu investigation if sufficient evidence exists that a crime under the court’s jurisdiction has been committed. Moreover, the Statute of the International Court of Justice permits state parties, under specific conditions, to institute legal proceedings concerning crimes perpetrated in armed conflicts, as demonstrated by in relation to Israel’s conduct in Gaza.

For the moment, the international community has been cautious not to jeopardize the peace process by advocating for judicial accountability regarding crimes committed during the recent conflicts between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This restraint contrasts sharply with the approach taken in the case of Russia’s war against Ukraine. The Armenian government and the international community must be mindful not to sacrifice justice and human rights in pursuit of a temporary peace with Azerbaijan.

The Unclear Path to Social Reconciliation: Navigating the Challenges

The current peace negotiations and the March 2025 preliminary announcement on normalization remain vague on reconciliation and accountability mechanisms. This silence raises concerns about an Azeri-imposed peace process that lacks a formal approach to addressing international crimes or, at the very least, establishing a path forward to confront their impact on both civil societies. Social reconciliation does not necessarily require the establishment of an international tribunal. While the two countries have agreed to abandon legal proceedings, this should not mean abandoning the principle of accountability—especially in the context of a victor’s peace. Creating the conditions for sustainable peace and successful conflict resolution requires addressing generational trauma, myths, and historical distortions that perpetuate cycles of hatred. A genuine peace process should prioritize tackling the root causes of violence rather than merely addressing its symptoms, which result from ongoing negative interactions between the belligerents.

In the context of the South Caucasus peace process, it is essential for each party to adopt an introspective and analytical approach to the international crimes committed since 1988. An unfortunate tendency in peace settlements is often to focus on the most recent crimes and limit the historical period covered by transitional justice or social reconciliation mechanisms (Schabas 2006). However, in the case of Armenia and Azerbaijan, such a narrow approach risks perpetuating a cycle of hatred and grievances. For that reason, alternative approaches to international courts can provide the necessary flexibility, as international courts often face temporal limitations regarding the scope of their investigations, which ultimately feed into the cycle of grievances between parties.

While accountability mechanisms such as international tribunals and truth commissions are not always universally accepted by all parties in a conflict, they play a crucial role in bringing closure to victims and laying the groundwork for a shared historical narrative. The ICTY has been instrumental in addressing crimes committed in Bosnia-Herzegovina, particularly the Srebrenica genocide, by providing both a legal and historical framework for prosecuting atrocities under international law. The recognition of Srebrenica as genocide is now firmly established in international legal jurisprudence. Although political actors in Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina continue to contest this legal interpretation, the ICTY’s rulings have significantly shaped the historical narrative that international institutions continue to build upon.

Due to Azerbaijan’s prioritization of a victor’s peace and Armenia’s weak negotiating position, the peace process is ill-equipped to address social reconciliation, especially given the dismissal of cases in international courts. This relative absence of a transitional justice process led by international institutions, accountability mechanisms or mutual consent to address human rights violations remains one of the most significant obstacles to lasting peace. Combined with Azerbaijan’s unreliability as a partner, this lack of foresight regarding reconciliation in the peace accord increases the risk of future armed conflict.

How Unresolved Human Rights Issues Imperil the Peace Process

As the peace process appears to have entered its final stage, many human rights violations remain unaddressed, undermining once again the prospects for a lasting peace accord. For example, the status of and the grim conditions they face in captivity underscore how much remains to be done to achieve reconciliation and foster a cooperative environment based on the standards of international law.

In addition to the status of prisoners of war, many legal questions on the right to return of Armenian refugees, and Armenia’s cultural heritage remain unaddressed. Following its military victory, Azerbaijan’s lack of commitment to respecting fundamental principles of international human rights law in Nagorno-Karabakh casts a doubt on the sustainability of any peace accords.

Whereas the period between 1994 and 2023 was marked by a between self-determination and territorial integrity, enabling each party to invoke international lawt, he right of return represents an inalienable right, and the protection of cultural heritage constitutes a legal obligation for Azerbaijan. The affirming the right of safe return for Armenian refugees from the region “in a safe, unimpeded, and expeditious manner.”

Despite the ICJ’s ruling and the need for both sides to demonstrate a willingness to engage in good faith negotiations, Azerbaijan has effectively erased Armenian existence in Karabakh. The lack of a proactive approach to address the issue of lost properties and compensation further highlights Baku’s unwillingness to seriously consider its obligations under international law. On the contrary, Azerbaijan has introduced strategies to hinder or discourage the return of individuals including the destruction of Armenian cultural heritage.

Although it is not surprising that the right to a safe and sustainable return is not strictly enforced, what is striking is Azerbaijan’s ability to openly violate this right without facing any consequences. Warring parties are typically willing to recognize the right of return in peace settlements, while simultaneously creating conditions that prevent refugees from returning. For instance, the Dayton Accords, which aimed to address the aftermath of ethnic cleansing in and Croatia, established the framework for the right of return. However, the return of Serbs from Krajina and Bosnian Muslims from Eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina never materialized. Similarly, the issue of return for Palestinians following the Nakba highlights the difficulties in addressing the right to return during peace negotiations.

Reconciliation without a genuine process of return is likely to fail, leading to profound resentment as observed in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo in the 1990s and 2000s. As many Armenians point out, is seen as a sacred part of their homeland and cultural identity. In such an emotionally-charged context, a failure to facilitate return almost guarantees profound generational trauma. Future generations may adopt this trauma as a defining part of their collective identity. Historical narratives and conflict understandings become centered around this trauma, making healing and peacebuilding particularly difficult, as seen in the aftermath of the 1944 Chechen deportation.

Cultural Heritage in Artsakh: An Ongoing Crime

Since its full occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023, has destroyed entire villages, historical monuments, cemeteries, khachkars, churches, and other religious sites, as well as governmental and administrative buildings. So far, has provided one of the most comprehensive lists of such violations of international law through its interactive map and research report. These violations have continued throughout the negotiation process between the two countries, highlighting the difficulty of trusting Azerbaijan to uphold its commitments in any forthcoming peace settlement. They also underscore Azerbaijan’s disregard for its international obligations toward Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Although extensive cultural destruction is recognized as a crime against humanity under the Rome Statute, the Court would unfortunately not have jurisdiction on crimes committed in Azerbaijan. However, such crimes could be prosecuted under international jurisdiction as it was done for some crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in Syria.

More broadly, alongside the displacement of the Armenian population in September 2023, their inability to return to Nagorno-Karabakh, and the 10-month blockade of the Lachin Corridor, the destruction of Armenian cultural heritage in the region further reinforces claims of ethnic cleansing—a crime against humanity—committed by Azerbaijani forces. The destruction of Armenian cultural heritage in Azerbaijan could be used to support a legal argument of criminal intent behind the deportation.

While Armenia has the sovereign right to withdraw or refrain from pursuing international legal action against Azerbaijan, other countries are not bound by its decisions. On the contrary, international law may obligate them to explore alternative avenues for prosecuting such crimes. In this context, an international tribunal—or even a hybrid one—could be instrumental in documenting and establishing the historical record of this latest phase of the conflict. Overall, this situation as a whole undermines the implementation of a peace settlement, perpetuating the violation of international human rights law by one of the parties. Azerbaijan’s actions in Nagorno-Karabakh after 2023 cast serious doubt on its reliability as a negotiating partner and its willingness to uphold its obligations after the signing of a peace treaty. This issue underscores the critical importance of legal guarantees, or a third-party state acting as a guarantor, as well as the role of international law in the settlement of the conflict.

Conclusion

This white paper highlights the significant challenges Armenia faces in asymmetrical peace negotiations with Azerbaijan, where Azerbaijan’s dominant position allows it to dictate terms. The paper contends that Armenia is forced to make a painful choice between its sovereignty, identity, security, and the pursuit of international justice. Even if Armenia decides to make considerable sacrifices to achieve a peace agreement, Azerbaijan’s adherence to treaty obligations remains questionable given Armenia’s current regional and international isolation and overall geopolitical vulnerability.

The potential sacrifices of Nagorno-Karabakh and the abandonment of legal proceedings regarding crimes committed after 2020 are major concessions Armenia should only make if Azerbaijan demonstrates a firm commitment to the peace accord. Without international guarantors or significant international pressure, it seems improbable that Azerbaijan will moderate its recurring and expanding demands.

In any case, the current peace process is unlikely to succeed unless it establishes mutually beneficial conditions, including a genuine societal reconciliation process and a win-win economic framework for peace. As long as Azerbaijan interprets the negotiation for the Zangezur corridor through a geopolitical lens, the current process is more likely to be a temporary truce before future conflict rather than a sustainable plan for peace.

Without concrete mechanisms for social reconciliation integrated into the peace process to effectively address deep-seated mistrust and generational trauma, and compounded by the largely political nature of international , the peace process risks further alienating the civilian population on both sides, reinforcing generational traumas, and ultimately fueling a new cycle of violence.

Given the continued obstruction of the Armenian right to return to Karabakh and the ongoing destruction of their historical heritage, it is understandable that the Armenian population will harbor resentment toward their government for what they perceive as sacrifices on deeply emotional issues, and further animosity toward Azerbaijan

Bibliography

Geoff Dancy. “Deals with the Devil? Conflict Amnesties, Civil War, and Sustainable Peace.” International Organization, vol. 72, no. 2, 2018, pp. 387–421.

Arman Grigoryan. Revolutionary Governments, Recklessness, and War: The Case of the Second Karabakh War, Security Studies, vol.33, no.3, 2024 pp. 372-406.

James Fearon, “Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict,” in David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, eds., The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996.

Edward D. Mansfield, and Jack Snyder. “Democratization and the Danger of War.” International Security, vol. 20, no. 1, 1995, pp. 5–38.

William A. Schabas. The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

William Zartman. Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985.

The post The Price of Peace: Armenia’s Impossible Choice Between Identity, Sovereignty, and Justice appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.