Introduction

Since the 1970s, the European Economic Community (EEC)/European Union (EU) has sought to play a complementary role to the United States (US) in the pursuit of security and stability in the Middle East. This has occurred mostly through soft security measures: diplomacy; economic and financial aid to Palestinians; civilian missions focused on stability; and dialogue with Arab states. In this regard, it is worth mentioning the Euro-Arab Dialogue: a political and economic cooperation framework launched in 1974 between the EEC and the Arab League to strengthen the relationship between the parties after the Yom Kippur War and oil crisis. However, despite these efforts, the limits of the EU’s unique institutional set-up have prevented it from playing a major role in regional affairs. The ongoing war in the Gaza Strip between Israel and Hamas has highlighted the limits of the EU’s diplomatic action. In the meantime, President Donald Trump’s Peace Plan for Gaza has re-energized, once again, the role of the , prompting some to draw historical parallels to earlier US-brokered efforts – from Camp David to the failed Oslo Accords. What role could the EU play in the American plan? How can its involvement be decisive to achieve a just and lasting peace in the region?

Context

The 2006 electoral victory of Hamas in the Gaza Strip led to a severe escalation with Israel. With Hamas taking over the territory from the Fatah-controlled Palestinian Authority (PA), Israel considered the Palestinian military group a security threat, as it refused to recognize the Jewish state, renounce violence, or accept previous peace agreements brokered by the PA and Israel. Hamas’ accession to power in 2006 constituted a critical historical juncture that transformed governance in Gaza and its overall relationship with Israel. This shift was accompanied by the return of a range of familiar political practices – including diplomatic negotiations, economic sanctions, and ongoing military engagement – that continue to define this governance period.

In the meantime, two other factors made the relationship between the parties more strained. On the one hand, on November 29, 2012, the , which upgraded Palestine from a “non-member observer entity” to a “non-member observer State.” This historic vote granted Palestine implicit recognition of statehood and was seen as a move to revive the two-state solution, a move strongly opposed by the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. On the other hand, the US-brokered Abraham Accords were signed in 2020, aiming to normalize diplomatic, economic, and security relations between Israel and several Arab nations (including the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan). Palestinians overwhelmingly opposed the Abraham Accords, perceiving the agreements as an abandonment of the long-standing consensus among Arab states that negotiations with Israel were contingent on ending occupation.

On October 7, 2023, Hamas initiated an attack on Israel. . The Israeli response was a full-scale military invasion of the Gaza Strip which, by December 2025, has killed 71,266 Palestinians, left most schools and hospitals in ruins, and caused long-term damage to the local society and economy.

The EU’s response to Gaza was characterized by contradictions and divisions between its member states. Some countries such as Czech Republic, Austria, Hungary, Italy, and Germany, stood with Israel, backing its military campaign and avoiding criticism of Netanyahu’s regime. Other governments, such as Belgium, Spain, France and Ireland – while strongly condemning Hamas – called for a ceasefire and criticized Israel for violating international humanitarian law. These differing positions prevented the EU from having a coordinated stance at the UN when voting on a on December 12, 2023, which called for a humanitarian ceasefire.

Divergencies appeared not only between member states but also across EU institutions. While European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen showed a stronger emphasis on Israel’s right to defence, the European Council issued a more cautious joint statement aimed at highlighting the EU as a unified voice. The statement took a more neutral tone than President von der Leyen, emphasizing both Israel’s right to defence as well as the crucial need for humanitarian aid, civilian protection, and adherence to international law. A third voice, EU’s foreign policy chief Josep Borrell, was more critical of Israel, . The inertia resulting from lack of consensus among member states and across institutions severely undermines the EU’s position as mediator, letting the Americans play a leading role once again.

On September 29, 2025, President Trump announced his plan to “end the Gaza war” and address the broader Middle Eastern crisis. The so-called was negotiated with the consultation of Arab states, namely Egypt, Qatar and TĂŒrkiye. The EU played no formal role in the negotiations; it made no proposals of its own, despite being both a major donor to Palestine and an important partner of Israel.

Endorsed by UN Security Council , Trump’s plan includes the deployment of an International Stabilization Force (ISF) in Gaza, a multinational military body that will ensure the demilitarization and security of the Gaza Strip; and the creation of a Board of Peace (BoP), a committee led by Trump that will oversee the political transition in Gaza until a reformed Palestinian Authority can take over governance in 2027. Formally launched at the 56th World Economic Forum in January 2026, the BoP claims its main purpose is the promotion of peacekeeping all around the world, not only in Gaza. Countries wishing to participate in the BoP are required to contribute US$1 billion to the organization to renew their membership, and Trump, as its chairman, is not subject to term limits, holding the sole authority to nominate his successor.

to ending the war in Gaza; however, many EU member states have expressed concern over the possibility of the BoP overshadowing the role of the UN. Currently, Bulgaria and Hungary are the only two EU countries to have joined the initiative. France, Spain, Poland, and Germany declined to participate, while Italy, Romania, Greece and Cyprus joined as observers. The EU Commission also decided to join as an observer, sending the Commissioner for the Mediterranean, Dubravka Ơuica, to Washington, DC, to attend the inaugural meeting of the BoP on February 19, 2026. In a sign of continued disunity, , calling it a “mistake”, as the EU supports a two-state solution and “cannot participate” in any body that excludes the Palestinian National Authority.

Problems

Even if Trump’s plan represents an important step towards a peace deal, it contains critical aspects which might hinder its implementation. The current plan effectively grants Israel a veto power over peace, as its military redeployments are conditioned on Hamas’ demilitarization and reform of the PA. At the same time, Israel is not required to make any formal commitments towards halting settlement expansion in the West Bank or respecting the autonomy of a Palestinian state. On this issue Israel’s stance is clear: Netanyahu declared that , as it is an “existential threat to Israel.” Therefore, there is a real risk that, without guarantees for the Palestinian people and a plan to address occupation, Trump’s plan may fail or lead to an unjust and unstable peace agreement that steamrolls Palestinian rights and territories recognized by international law.

On the other hand, Trump’s peace plan has confirmed that the US continues to play a . However, some , such as Francesca Albanese, Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian Occupied Territory, criticized the plan. UN Special Adviser on Sustainability, Jeffrey Sachs, labelled the US proposal as “.” According to them, Trump is behaving in Gaza like a 19th-century colonial broker, placing himself at the helm of the BoP to oversee a foreign territory’s governance, with the overall aim of advancing US interests in the region. The Middle East has figured prominently in the first and second Trump administrations’ foreign policy. President Trump’s main goal is to broker agreements between Israel and other Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, to . This attitude could prove counterproductive and place EU interests at risk.

Strategic Outlook and Policy Recommendations

A more active role of the EU in the region is necessary to guarantee success and counter risks of instability, which may have severe implications for European security, including energy supply limitations, new security threats, and an increase of migration and refugee flows. It is in the EU’s interest to enhance its influence in the region. What practical steps should the EU take to avoid marginalization and make a meaningful contribution to peace?

1. The EU should consider holding an enhanced observer status at the BoP as a necessary counterweight to US and Israeli pressures and hegemony in decision-making. Of course, the EU has to maintain a steadfast commitment to strengthening and reforming the UN, confirming it as the core of a rules-based international order and multilateralism. However, enhanced observer status at the BoP could allow the EU to monitor negotiations and participate in debates specifically devoted to making interventions, peace proposals, and amendments. The presence of the EU, with its traditional concern for Palestinian issues, could ensure meaningful Palestinian involvement. This is fundamental to legitimate the transitory governance of the Gaza Strip and preserve Palestinian decision-making power. A more active EU at BoP could also contribute to reforming the PA.

The divergences between member states and across EU institutions negatively impact the EU’s international role. Therefore, the EU should take a cohesive stance on its participation at the BoP, bearing in mind some key arguments. Firstly, “” provides direct insight into how decisions are implemented, serving as a channel for influence. The EU is the largest donor to Palestinian recovery and its involvement in the BoP could help the EU shape outcomes rather than merely fund them, aligning its significant financial contributions with the necessary humanitarian, governance, and security strands of the peace plan. Moreover, “” is vital for influencing the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2803.

2. The EU should be part of the International Security Force. Together with The European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) Rafah Mission and EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS), involvement in the ISF could contribute to the maintenance of the ceasefire. Participation in the ISF could enhance European influence on Israel, for example, by convincing the Israeli government to review its settlement policy and improve living conditions for the Palestinians.

3. The EU should use economic and financial tools to enhance its political influence. On the Palestinian side, the European Commission recently . On the Israeli side, the EU should overcome its reluctances and suspend the EU-Israel Association Agreement if the Israeli government continues to violate human rights in Gaza, as required by Article 2 of the Agreement. The suspension of this Agreement could influence Israel to respect the , following preliminary rulings about a “plausible” genocide occurring in Gaza. The EU could link Israeli participation in EU funding programs, such as Horizon Europe, to the full withdrawal from Gaza, the end of settlements in the West Bank, and apartheid policy against Palestinians.

4. The EU should invest in the implementation of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), an economic initiative designed to enhance connectivity and integration between Asia, the Middle East, and Europe, based on three pillars: energy, transportation, and digital connectivity. IMEC should be a core interest for Europeans, as it , increasing political and economic ties between participating counties. Moreover, it could enhance the EU’s political influence in the area, counterbalancing China and the US. The implementation of some projects as part of the IMEC – such as the EastMed Gas Pipeline – could make the EU a relevant player in terms of future economic cooperation projects, allowing it to increase its weight in the Middle East peace process.

The EU could influence, for example, the implementation of the so-called “Green Blue Deal” between Jordan and Israel, which provides for the supply of water from Israel in exchange for Jordanian supplies of solar power. The Gaza war stopped the project, but the ceasefire created hope that it may be relaunched in such a way that the Gaza Strip and the West Bank can also benefit from it.

Conclusion

While the US commitment has been the sine qua non for a ceasefire in Gaza, the EU holds key cards to ensure the successful implementation of Trump’s peace plan. With its traditional regional approach, a more active observer role of the EU in the BoP and its participation in the ISF could balance American – and Israeli – influence and ensure a more equitable peace solution. In doing so, it may also help ensure that Palestinian rights recognized by international law are considered against the backdrop of ongoing ceasefire and conflict negotiations. In addition, the use of economic leverage as well as the implementation of the IMEC corridor could enhance the EU political weight in the area, preventing the dawn of a new era of regional instability and insecurity with direct impact on Europe itself.

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Executive Summary

Authoritarian states are increasingly using police organizations to target diaspora communities in democratic countries. This is especially evident in the misuse of Interpol’s Red Notice system to bypass extradition barriers and pursue dissidents abroad. When politically motivated notices are dispersed through Canadian policing systems, they risk compromising the integrity of international law enforcement cooperation, increasing the likelihood of refoulement which violates Canada’s legal obligations, and exacerbates a chilling effect among diaspora communities. In doing so, these notices expose the vulnerabilities in Canada’s domestic protections by allowing foreign states the ability to project coercive influence through Canadian political institutions.  

While this brief focuses on the misuse of INTERPOL mechanisms as a specific form of Transnational Repression (TR), it sits within a broader context of state-led repression ranging from the People’s Republic of China to India. It uses Tajikistan as a case study to highlight vulnerabilities in INTERPOL’s vetting process, including insufficient pre-screening and the burden placed on victims to prove their innocence. These weaknesses enable states to exploit Canadian institutions to harass and deport political refugees, a practice known as Transnational Repression (TR).  

TR has occurred in Canada, demonstrating the urgent need for a governmental response.  The focus of this policy brief is on the use of INTERPOL to target dissidents. To address these challenges, this brief proposes specific procedural enhancements to protect the asylum process and strengthen pre-existing domestic protections to protect Canada’s diaspora communities. 

To read the full policy brief, use the button below to download the full policy memo.

The post Closing Canada’s INTERPOL Gap: Preventing Politicized Red Notice Abuse appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

Disclaimer: This profile is based on an extended interview conducted with a serving member of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The soldier’s name and call sign are used with consent.

Dmytro, known by his nom de guerre “Student,” has spent the past three years in uniform. He joined the Armed Forces of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the first day of Russia’s full-scale invasion, answering a call to what he describes not as a sudden impulse, but as a moral certainty. Now a combat medic in the Reconnaissance Company of the 106th Separate Territorial Defence Brigade, Dmytro was just twenty-two years old when the full-scale invasion began.

When the air raid woke him up on the morning of the 24th, he already knew where he was going. His father had been helping Ukrainian soldiers since 2014, after Russia first occupied Crimea. Dima grew up inside that world: distributing bulletproof vests, learning military equipment, and often participating in training at the local polygon. Ironically, February 24 was meant to be a shooting practice day and his gear was already packed.

“I woke up to the siren and my first thought was that I already knew where to go”, he recalls.

When he arrived at the recruitment centre, there were already too many people. There was nowhere to sleep. He was issued a uniform and sent home, told to return later. That first night, nine people shared four beds, rotating sleep while others stood watch.

“I never second-guessed my choice” Dmytro says. “I knew it was my responsibility to protect my homeland, my family and my people.”

For him, civilian life was no longer an option. He explained that the existence of a frontline, where people were dying every day, made the idea of continuing life as before feel morally impossible.

“There are moments when it is objectively terrifying,” he admits. “When an enemy drone is flying nearby, I even start to believe in God.” What keeps him going after all this time is not adrenaline but as a combat medic, he sees the impact his work makes. His brigade has suffered a minimal number of casualties, something he connects directly to planning, training and logistics. He designs evacuation plans down to the smallest detail, ensures vehicles are stocked with proper medical equipment and provides extensive medical training to fellow soldiers.

“I like to achieve things,” he says. “When I see that someone comes back alive from a mission because I planned their evacuation, stocked the vehicles properly, trained the unit, that keeps me going.”

When asked about the role civic identity played in his decision, he said that civic identity is inseparable from action. He speaks less about rights and more about responsibility.

“I believe in basic values, fairness, and truth,” he explains. “If you are a man, you have to prove it through your actions. Patriotism and honour are not words.”

Loving one’s country, in his view, does not mean accepting its failures. If something is broken, whether in government, institutions, or the military, it must be changed.

“I don’t want to come back from war and see that everything stayed the same,” he says. “We need change.”

Even amid constant Russian attacks, Ukrainians continue to demonstrate a deep commitment to a pro-democracy civil society. Ukraine consciously chose a democratic path, and despite the strains of war, the country persists in building resilient institutions and reinforcing democratic governance. The summer 2025 protest emerged in response to a high-profile corruption scandal involving a close advisor to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and the resignation that followed. This protest and subsequent cabinet reshufflings highlight how public pressure and demands for accountability continue to shape political decision-making in Ukraine, even in the midst of war. These events demonstrate that Ukrainian civil society remains active and engaged, insisting on transparency and reform while the state simultaneously fights for national survival.

Dmytro’s experience on the frontlines reflects the same sense of civic responsibility. His commitment to serve, improve systems within his unit, and protect his comrades resonates with the broader determination of Ukrainians to defend not only their territory, but also the democratic values and institutions they have worked so hard to build.

Life at the Front: Environment and Morale

Life at the front is defined by simplicity and scarcity. Routine is dictated by opportunity, not preference. “If you have a chance to do your laundry, you do your laundry,” Dima says. “Because the next chance might be in a month.” Units often stay in abandoned houses. They take care of the property and of the animals left behind. Dogs and cats are fed before soldiers worry about themselves. “It’s funny sometimes,” he smiles. “We might be able to eat very little for a few days, but the pets must be taken care of.”

The army has reshaped his understanding of human nature. Age, once synonymous with authority, no longer guarantees respect. “I used to think age gives wisdom,” he reflects. “Now I know that only actions do.”

Despite constant danger, Dima does not feel that his life is on hold. He does not plan far ahead for a future after demobilization, not because he lacks hope, but because his focus is anchored firmly in the present. “My life is here,” he says. “I want to be useful to my team.”

He continues to make plans for improving systems within his unit, refining processes and improving the quality of life for his comrades. The war has made him stronger and more resilient, but it has also sharpened his understanding of what matters. He sees his family approximately thirty days a year and the distance has reordered his priorities. “Before, I avoided family time,” he admits. “Now I know my family is my home.”

Fear is constant, but it is contextualized. “You can be afraid now under a Ukrainian flag,” he says, “or later under an occupation flag, forced to fight on their side.”

When asked about the challenges soldiers face and the support available to them, Dmytro reflects on the growing emotional and psychological toll of the war. After years of continuous fighting, fatigue is setting in, and the weight of that responsibility is becoming harder to carry. While soldiers remain deeply committed to their mission, they also recognize that they deserve stronger systems of care in return, especially when it comes to mental health support. He further reflects:

“The work is difficult, and there are psychological supports offered, but we are lacking a systemic approach to mental health for both soldiers and veterans. There are simply too many people and individual support is hard to provide. It’s also not normalized to ask for help. What has helped me personally is physical activity and maintaining a good nutrition routine. We sometimes have presentations or webinars about breathing techniques or wellness tips, but there isn’t consistent one-on-one support.”

The War Beyond the Ukrainian Trench: International Support and Its Limitations

From the frontline, international support is not an abstract policy debate.

“Definitely, you can feel the support from Western countries at a systemic level, through additional education, training and supplies,” Dima says. “As a combat medic, I would not be able to do my job without Western support.” At the same time, he is acutely aware of its limits. Assistance often arrives slowly, entangled in bureaucracy, disconnected from the immediacy of frontline needs. “War is expensive,” he says. “You need a lot, in large quantities, and ideally you needed it yesterday and not in two months.” Because of these delays, individual soldiers and units frequently organize personal fundraisers to improve their chances of survival. Our past piece on Civilian Frontlines: Drones, Fundraising, and Evolving Military Policy unpack the role informal fundraising plays out on the Ukrainian battlefield.

Dima spends much of his salary ensuring his unit is properly equipped. He does not have savings for civilian life. “I spend my salary so that me and my comrades come back alive,” he says. His battalion has a CASEVAC vehicle. Many others do not. From his perspective, there is often no systemic understanding of what is urgently required on the ground.

General geopolitical narratives also shape morale. He recalls how speculation abroad about quick diplomatic solutions led some soldiers to relax, a dangerous illusion. “If you relax on the frontline, you are dead,” he says. “Or your comrade is dead. That’s the reality.”

Dima believes many countries underestimate Russia because they have never experienced its occupation or repression firsthand. “A lot of the world doesn’t understand what kind of evil Russia is,” he says. “They’ve never had direct contact with occupation.” At the same time, reliance on Western support should not replace internal responsibility. Ukraine, he argues, must continue working toward self-sufficiency. “We can’t wait for someone to come and save us,” he says. “We need education and training early, so people are ready to show their love for the country through action.”

Recruitment, Mobilization and the Weight of Reality

According to Dmytro, recruitment and mobilization remain deeply flawed. War, he argues, is often romanticized, while the reality is left unspoken. “We need a healthy approach to recruitment,” he says. “And from early on, we need to teach young people about responsibility as citizens of Ukraine.” He is blunt about demographic reality: young, healthy people are needed at the front. A fully professional contract army is a goal, but not a current reality during a full-scale invasion. “We are not close to winning this war,” he says. “The government needs to explain that protection of the homeland comes through military service.” He also points to systemic issues inside the army: recognition that does not always reflect contribution, bureaucracy that resists innovation and tensions between volunteers and career military personnel.

“The full-scale invasion showed how two different worlds met,” he explains. “Volunteers came with creativity and initiative, while career military often do everything strictly by the book. But the frontline changes fast. We need new solutions.” Many talented people from civilian fields are now in uniform, trying to improve systems while navigating internal resistance. “For volunteers, rules are sometimes more flexible,” he says. “But internal battles with bureaucracy still exist.” For him personally, financial incentives or benefits were never a consideration. “I wasn’t thinking about money when I joined,” he says. “My role is to implement changes that can save lives or health.”

Dmytro also reflected on how gender continues to shape realities on the frontline. “Throughout my service, I have seen women occupy a wide range of roles, from frontline positions to more supportive ones, and many of them demonstrate remarkable courage, strength, and resilience, often exceeding that of their male counterparts. One challenge I have observed is the assumption that the combat medic role is inherently more suitable for women because it is associated with healthcare. In reality, the position is extremely demanding. A significant part of the role involves physically evacuating wounded soldiers from frontline positions, who are often much larger in size, requiring specific physical capacities.

There are, of course, many stereotypes about women in the military, most of which are still perpetuated by older career personnel. At the same time, I have served alongside many women who are exceptionally strong and capable, while continuing to carry their femininity within an environment that remains deeply masculine and physically demanding.”

Rethinking Victory

When asked what victory means, Dima rejects the term entirely.

“We should ban the word ‘victory,’” he says. “It has a positive connotation, but what happened to us, especially to people in occupied territories, is a tragedy.” For him, the end goal is not celebration, but accountability. “The collapse of the Russian Federation would not bring back lost lives,” he says. “But at least we could say that, at a heavy price, we defeated evil.”

Narratives about victory are often amplified through social media in Ukraine and sometimes presented as morale-boosting policies by the government. However, when asked whether he feels a disconnect from civilians during short breaks in areas far from the frontlines, Dmytro is quick to acknowledge that civilians will never fully understand a soldier’s experience simply because they have never been there. It is a particular type of as Donna Haraway defines it. He says you cannot put yourself in the shoes of a soldier and that it is okay. You do not need frontline combat experience to show empathy. What Ukrainians are lacking, he believes, is basic respect for people in uniform and for soldiers.

Dmytro is clear that soldiers deserve understanding and recognition from civilians, but he is even more demanding of the government. In his view, the state owes them guarantees of a decent life after demobilization and meaningful support in return for everything they have done to preserve Ukraine’s sovereignty. He is honest about the challenges ahead, including reintegration, PTSD, and other psychological struggles, and he stresses that society should already be preparing to welcome soldiers back and help them rehabilitate. He firmly believes that as strong as Ukrainian society is, there is still a lot of work to do, starting with improving access to medical services, resources, and knowledge about what support exists.

When asked about the scariest experience he has had, Dmytro described the first time he truly felt that death was close. During a massive attack by Russian forces, he ran toward a trench and heard a mine explode right behind him. He still does not understand how he survived. That moment, he says, made him realize just how fragile life on the frontline can be. While the Ukrainian government has not officially disclosed the number of soldiers who were not as lucky as Dmytro and were killed in action, . Many Ukrainian soldiers remain in Russian captivity, a situation that requires urgent attention from the international community and sustained efforts to secure their release.

At the time of this writing, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has surpassed the length of the Soviet Union’s war against Nazi Germany. Dmytro’s story is not unique. The resilience of Ukraine rests in the hands of people like him who answered the call to serve their country, carrying not only the weight of the battlefield but the hopes of an entire nation. Their courage should serve as a reminder to us all that the values of freedom, human rights, and democracy are often inseparable from the willingness to defend them on the battlefield.

The post “I Never Gave Myself a Choice”: A Ukrainian Combat Medic on War, Responsibility and Freedom appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

On November 1st, 2025, , the site of a railway canopy collapse that killed sixteen people just a year prior. Novi Sad railway station, intended to be a symbol of modernization after renovations led by , instead became a demonstration of how quickly corruption can turn deadly. Student-led protests quickly began, calling for accountability and a transparent investigation on the incident; however, as resistance and negligence continued, the movement quickly grew to a revolt against an entire system deemed corrupt. Aleksander Vučić, the president of Serbia and founder of the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), has long defined his rule in Serbia through increasing autocratization. His anti-democratic methods have incited more outrage, but also made it more difficult to realize change. What are some of the successes and challenges that have defined the movement so far? What are possible next steps?

Success through community

One of the most notable features of the protests was the ability to mobilize vast sectors of the population. Leaders like Vučić are very skilled at making citizens feel shut out from politics; the protests have reawakened a sense of agency and power among society. The students leading the protest have been able to gain the support of the , , , and . Students have made an effort to include marginalized voices, which has bridged the divide between urban-rural populations, cultural groups, and sectors. Key to the organization has been its leaderless and decentralized form. Rather than establishing any new kind of hierarchy, the protests have opted for horizontal forms of authority, which ensure all participants are equal. for debates and decisions. This has also allowed all participants to feel that they are actively involved in their own governance and society, rather than remaining disenfranchised. The tactics used by the protestors have also aided its success. Actions that are symbolic, yet peaceful and legal, have made resistance approachable. These include traffic blockades, inter-city marches, social media campaigns, and marathons to Brussels.

The protests have pushed the resignation of select key officials, including the . An investigation was opened, but the lack of progress and reality of state power of the judiciary remain an issue. Similarly, partial documents around the construction project have been released, but much information . The protesters, after much campaigning, have received official support on October 22, 2025. This could have impacts on the ability for external actors to pressure Vučić. The sustained cooperation and power of the protests remain its biggest success, demonstrating the power of the people and the ability for citizens to regain their voice.

Challenges: state pushback

Crackdowns on civil society, control over free press, patronage networks, and election interference have become characteristic of Vučić’s office, undermining Serbia’s development as well as its pathway to democracy and EU accession. This has led to many calling for a leadership change. Vučić has responded by attacking the protestors, labelling them as . Physical attacks, smear campaigns, doxxing, unlawful questioning/detainment, and the controversial continue to be ongoing threats levied against protestors. Attacks on the educational sector have also been strong, with teachers facing pay cuts and threats since the beginning of the protests. Over the summer, government response became increasingly violent, with . This has drawn international criticism and has exponentially increased the threat level for protest participants. The government has also organized , though they remain smaller than their opposition.

State pushback and unwillingness to discuss have impeded the ability of meaningful dialogue and reform to occur; however, the system was designed this way. For protestors, it is difficult to translate actions into meaningful reform through the barring of political participation in civil society. , and social-political structures are captured by the state. Additionally, the has stood out for being very reticent in their support, likely due to fears over economic uncertainty following a new government, or to their own connections to .

An additional area where more support would be instrumental relates to international and external actors. The EU’s formal resolution came after months of relative disengagement from events in Serbia. Many may view student protests as a potentially unstable bet, however there should be strong support for civil society and the principles the protestors are advocating for. For a long time, international actors who support Vučić (such as Russia and China) have been louder than those in support. Considerable political transformation must take place in order to pressure Vučić, both internally and externally.

Where to next?

Currently, the protest sits at a defining moment. The past year has seen success through mass mobilization, the resignation of key officials, and the EU’s resolution of support for the protest. However, the government remains strong, and while . This has raised the issue of how to navigate these challenges. A major debate surrounds how the students should engage in the electoral arena. A student’s list of outsider candidates is being developed, however . It is difficult to justify joining the very system seen as corrupt, and there are concerns the election will not actually reform the system, just change the face. Additionally, attempts from are a growing internal issue that risks causing further division and factionalism. It may require the protestors to set ideological lines, countering its primarily apolitical image.

The protests in Serbia demonstrate the power of collective action and citizen mobilization. Its year-long anniversary marks a crossroads where the collective needs to decide its next steps. How they choose to orient themselves could have deep implications on the success of the protests and the growing political voice of the people.

The post Reflecting on 1 year post Novi Sad: Where to next? appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

When Albania’s Prime Minister Edi Rama joked that his new artificial intelligence (AI) “minister,” Diella (Albanian for Sun), was “pregnant with 83 children” (a metaphor for 83 digital assistants that will serve members of parliament), he turned an . The move to incorporate AI into governance itself is considered by many to be amusing, unsettling, and even revealing, as it shows how easily AI can be warped into a spectacle while subtly re-wiring how decisions about money and power are made. Diella is also the world’s first AI system formally appointed as Minister of State for Artificial Intelligence, with responsibility for.

From Virtual Assistant to Cabinet-Level Minister

as a virtual assistant on the , intended to assist Albanian citizens in accessing documents and other online public services. Nine months later, in September 2025, following a decree that authorized a virtual minister, Rama had elevated Diella to the rank of Minister of State for Artificial Intelligence, .

Such an unorthodox move has garnered plenty of international coverage, as many have framed it as both an anti-corruption experiment and a form of political branding, describing Diella as a digital assistant dressed in traditional clothing, now tasked with making public tenders free of corruption. However, some have also pointed out that procurement in Albania has long been dominated by political elites and oligarch-like figures, making .

A Spectacle?

Writer/researcher : essentially shifting political responsibility to digital actors and presenting them as being pure, incorruptible, and tireless, standing in for distrusted political elites. Perhaps accidental, this comes across as not a neutral design choice. Presenting the system as a woman in traditional costume frames digitalization as care and service rather than control, pulling on gendered stereotypes while also making it difficult to contest the new political innovation without appearing as “anti-modern” or “anti-progress.” The “” metaphor pushes this further, casting Diella as a digital mother of dozens of subordinate systems that will monitor and help with parliamentary work. It infantilizes MPs as being dependent on an algorithm, and suggests that political conflict within parliament can be processed by a neutral machine rather than by openly accountable representatives.

The move to incorporate AI into governance sits at the intersection of EU accession politics and digital dependency, as Diella is likely based on OpenAI models hosted on Microsoft Azure, which is precisely the kind of . Hypothetically speaking, if Albania were to obtain EU membership and Diella were to operate within the EU, it would be flagged as a high-risk system under the new , where stringent requirements are imposed on the usage of AI in public services and resource allocation. Such frameworks do not yet bind Albania; however, it is clearly experimenting in exactly the domain in which the Act targets, that being algorithmic governance, where constitutional accountability is thin.

Canada’s “Sovereign AI” Moment

Canada is moving quickly in a similar direction by embedding AI into state structures, but with a different approach. The announces $925.6 million over five years for “large-scale sovereign public AI infrastructure,” including a Sovereign Canadian Cloud to support research and public-sector AI use. The federal government is implementing AI and .

Canada already has a formal governance “toolkit” or framework for implementing public-sector AI. The government’s and its official guidelines require “algorithmic impact assessments,” the formal documentation of the systems used, and alternative mechanisms for performing similar functions when automated decisions may potentially affect rights and interests. Moreover, the further defines sovereignty as the ability to manage and protect government data, systems, and infrastructure independently in a globally interconnected environment.

However, Canadian experts warn that infrastructure and branding risks could outpace efforts to control them. As noted by , Canada’s dependence on American companies is one of the most significant risks and complications facing Canadian digital sovereignty, particularly given the dominance of US providers in digital and cloud services.

Put side by side, Albania and Canada reveal the same underlying question: who actually controls AI in the state, and under what rules? Diella is clearly an extreme case of AI as spectacle: an AI minister is “pregnant” with assistants, purity, and efficiency in a system still wrestling with corruption and weak checks. Whereas Canada’s “sovereign AI” push is more technocratic, but it faces its own temptation to treat big AI spending and a branded cloud as proof of control, even while key infrastructure and AI models remain under foreign corporate jurisdictions.

The core lesson for Canada is not to mock Diella, but to avoid a more subtle version of the same trap. As AI becomes more integrated into sectors that the federal government may deem appropriate, the real test will be whether such systems are contestable or even grounded in enforceable law, rather than merely marketed as innovative or sovereign, as it is easy to get caught up in the media storm and publicity such reforms seem to command. Canada’s task should be to ensure that its “sovereign AI” remains democratic, even when there is no digital “minister” on the screen.

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Canada’s history of nation-building has often unfolded at the intersection of infrastructure development and perceived security threats. From the transcontinental railway conceived in part to secure the young Dominion against American encroachment, to Cold War northern radar lines and continental defence networks, major national projects have frequently been justified not only as economic necessities but as strategic imperatives. As the elevates defence priorities and strategic infrastructure, particularly in the Arctic and across continental supply chains, it raises a familiar question and uncomfortable idea: does Canada only undertake ambitious infrastructure development when compelled by external threats? By revisiting the historical relationship between security threats and national project building, this article considers what this pattern reveals about Canada’s political past and the lessons it offers for contemporary policy and transatlantic comparative studies.

The Coastal Axis: CPR and Early Infrastructure

The Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) stands as a foundational example of this logic. Conceived amid and the risk that an unsettled West could drift economically and politically toward the United States (US), the CPR functioned as a strategic bulwark that anchored Canadian sovereignty across the continent. By enabling settlement, troop movement, and the extension of federal authority into the Prairies, most notably during the 1885 , the railway served not only as an economic artery but also as a mechanism for internal security and territorial consolidation. At the same time, it linked Canada more tightly to the British Empire’s , simultaneously reinforcing imperial strategy and the emerging Canadian . 
Much like the CPR, the Trans-Canada Highway and other Cold War-era infrastructure projects reveal continuity in Canada’s security-driven nation-building logic. Beyond facilitating civilian mobility and economic integration, the and northern air routes allowed for the rapid deployment of troops and equipment in response to potential Soviet threats and domestic emergencies. Similarly, the (DEW) Line established early-warning capabilities across the Arctic, asserting Canadian sovereignty in the North while contributing to continental defence under (North American Aerospace Defence Command). 
In both eras, the federal government prioritised projects that reinforced territorial integrity and strategic control over those motivated purely by domestic economic or social needs, demonstrating a persistent Canadian pattern: transformative infrastructure tends to be realised most decisively when framed as essential to national security.
These security-driven infrastructure projects also entrenched Canada’s strategic integration with the United States, marking a gradual. As the two countries emerged as close allies through the First and Second World Wars, Canadian security concerns shifted toward fortifying the North American continent, exporting its security logic into a shared framework institutionalised through NORAD. Cold War-era highways, ports, and northern transport corridors not only enhanced continental security but also. By embedding Canadian development within a North American strategic orbit, these projects created enduring dependencies, rendering Canada’s capacity to transport resources and sustain its economy increasingly contingent on US logistical systems and policy priorities.
This historical pattern offers a critical lens for interpreting the 2025 federal budget, which continues to and , while recalibrating American dependence. Through , , and , the government is reorienting Canada away from exclusive US dependence while maintaining continental interoperability. Central to this objective is the creation of the , which seeks to streamline approvals, coordinate federal oversight, and accelerate nationally controlled infrastructure and resource projects, thereby “untangling” Canada’s development pathways from excessive external dependency. At the same time, this recalibration foregrounds persistent questions about , underpinned by , and , regarding the and Arctic.

Analysis: Security, Trade, and Governance

Between 1885 and 1945, Canadian nation-building and infrastructure development followed a deliberate, security and export-driven logic. the sparsely settled Prairies to eastern markets while eastern manufacturing hubs processed raw materials for export to Britain and eventually the United States, reflecting the . Infrastructure projects were often , punctuated by accelerated development during the First and Second World Wars. in the Prairies were integral to this strategy, as European settlers were encouraged westward to solidify sovereignty and develop agricultural production, often displacing Indigenous communities. Across this period, infrastructure and population policies were from nation-building objectives, in which strategic, economic, and territorial imperatives drove the scope and pace of Canada’s development.
The 1970s illustrated the vulnerability inherent in Canada’s US-oriented economic integration. on key Canadian exports, including lumber, steel, and agricultural products, exposed the risks of over-reliance on a single partner. In response, Canada pursued “”, diversifying trade by building stronger ties with the European Economic Community (EEC), expanding exports, and investing in diplomatic and industrial capacity abroad. This episode illustrates a recurring tension in Canadian planning: infrastructure and resource networks often bind the country to dominant powers, but trade and security shocks push the government to seek alternative markets and greater autonomy, a tension that remains relevant when evaluating the 2025 budget and the conflation between nation-building and infrastructure projects, especially in the context of the current Canada-US relationship.

The Axial Shift: Arctic Expansion and Contemporary Policy

The 2025 federal budget continues this historical logic. The government is investing $1 billion over four years in an , supporting dual-use transport projects (airports, seaports, and all-season roads) that serve both civilian communities and the Canadian Armed Forces. A backed by $6.6 billion over five years aims to strengthen domestic defence manufacturing and reduce reliance on external suppliers. Investments in and reflect lessons from past vulnerabilities, seeking to ensure Canada can reach non-US markets while maintaining continental security. At the same time, hiring new Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) officers and deploying modern surveillance technology highlights an emphasis on border integrity, sovereignty, and alignment with .
However, these initiatives, in particular those related to transport infrastructure, carry serious trade-offs, particularly for Canada’s northern Indigenous populations. Historically neglected communities have endured profound infrastructure deficits. This includes a lack of reliable , , , and access to , contributing to devastating outcomes such as and other . Framing new infrastructure and connectivity projects primarily in terms of security and critical mineral extraction risks repeating patterns of utilitarian development: resources and logistics are prioritised for national and global strategic benefit, rather than meeting long-standing basic needs of Canadian citizens. 
Unlike provinces, whose powers are constitutionally entrenched, Canada’s northern territories derive their authority from federal statute, meaning their . The territory of Nunavut is a prime example of this, as its government operates with delegated authority, meaning Ottawa . While comprehensive land claim and self-government agreements, such as the and the , grant significant rights to Indigenous communities, these protections are rather than inherent under the Constitution. This distinction has important implications: Arctic projects framed primarily as security measures may proceed under federal authority, potentially overriding community priorities and reproducing historical patterns of federal control over resource frontiers.
Beyond Indigenous concerns, prioritising defence and security-linked infrastructure risks diverting funds from other social programs, and environmental : Arctic roads, ports, and extraction-linked infrastructure can accelerate , threaten , and . Enhanced border security and may further reinforce dependence on the United States, limiting true strategic autonomy. These tensions echo historical patterns: Canadian infrastructure, trade, and settlement have long sought to balance sovereignty, economic resilience, and security imperatives, often at the expense of social equity and environmental sustainability.

The Future of Security-Focused Nation-Building

Canada’s nation-building trajectory, from the CPR to Cold War highways, the DEW Line, and today’s Arctic investments, reveals a persistent intertwining of infrastructure, security, and sovereignty. The 2025 federal budget continues this logic, funnelling resources into projects meant to bolster resilience, protect supply chains, and advance Canada’s position within an increasingly competitive international landscape. Yet, as history consistently demonstrates, these initiatives carry significant trade-offs. Communities long excluded from meaningful infrastructure and basic services risk being once again overlooked as national strategy takes precedence. Through this historical lens, it becomes clear that Canada’s contemporary approach to nation-building remains a delicate balancing act: enhancing sovereignty and strategic autonomy while avoiding the reproduction of long-standing inequities in regions most affected by federal intervention.
Meeting these challenges will require embedding strategic ambition within governance practices that prioritise transparency, accountability, and genuine partnership. Sustaining good-faith relationships with Indigenous nations, particularly those in the North who bear the immediate consequences of security-framed development, is essential if Canada is to move beyond utilitarian conceptions of the Arctic. While recent developments, such as and , signal federal recognition of Indigenous self-determination, these statutory frameworks remain and , unlike constitutionally entrenched rights. Consequently, Indigenous control over northern resources and infrastructure is not fully secure, leaving communities potentially exposed to decisions driven by national or continental strategic priorities. Extending reconciliation into international circumpolar relations, such as structured nation-to-nation dialogue between Inuit and Sámi communities, would further demonstrate a commitment to Indigenous leadership in shaping the region’s future as Canada deepens strategic and security relationships with Arctic states such as , , and . By grounding national security policy in inclusive, community-informed frameworks, Canada can pursue the infrastructure and defence capabilities required for an uncertain geopolitical era while avoiding the reproduction of historical exclusions and marginalisation that have long defined national development.

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The separatist Moldovan region of Transnistria has plunged into a humanitarian crisis . The strategically important Kuchurgan thermal power plant is no longer able to supply Moldova with electricity, causing stability to erode and putting Transnistria under economic and humanitarian strain. Although the military risk posed by Russian troops stationed in Transnistria is relatively limited, dependence on energy resources is an important geopolitical tool in Russia’s hybrid warfare. The situation provides Canada with an opportunity to strengthen its economic and political engagement in Eastern Europe, encourage energy diversification policies, and ensure regional stability.

Historical context

The history of the separatist region of Transnistria began in 1940, when the Soviet Union annexed the Romanian region of Bessarabia (now Moldova). In this predominantly Romanian-speaking region; the decision was made to incorporate part of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic to add a Russian-speaking population to the newly founded Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic. Located across the Dniester River, this territory was named Transnistria. The aim was to the territory around this new linguistic minority, which would consequently be the centre of the Soviet industrialization process of the Moldovan SSR.

During the USSR’s disintegration, Transnistria declared its independence from Moldova, fearing a weakening of its linguistic rights. Fights broke out between the Moldovan military and Transnistrian forces, supported by the Russian 14th Army stationed in Tiraspol. This conflict when a ceasefire agreement was signed between the parties. This agreement provided for the deployment of Russian and Moldovan troops in Transnistria, which has since become a de facto state benefiting from Russia’s military, political, and economic support.

The 2025 energy crisis

In the current context, Transnistria is an important territory to analyze given Russia’s military presence, as well as Moldova’s intention to move closer to the European Union (EU). Moldova is a strategic priority for Russia, which still sees opportunities to bring the country back into its sphere of influence, and does not hesitate to destabilize the Republic by using various means of political and economic pressure. However, Russia’s military threat to Moldova does not currently count as one of these pressure points. As of 2022, , all of which are lightly equipped solely for the purpose of maintaining the ceasefire. More importantly, there is no naval access nor any airports that could support a high-intensity conflict.

Instead, Moldova’s dependence on Russian energy poses the greatest threat for its security. comes from the Kuchurgan thermal power plant in Transnistria, which runs on Russian gas transmitted via pipelines through Ukraine. While Moldova pays for the gas it accesses through these pipelines, Transnistria receives its supply free of charge. Critically, deliveries to Kuchurgan were halted on January 1, 2025, . Without such gas deliveries, the Transnistrian electricity grid went offline, across the region. by offering Moldova and Transnistria electricity supplies from Romania and financial solutions to diversify its gas supplies, but despite the critical humanitarian situation that was developing. Critical infrastructure could not function without electricity, and . Today, Transnistria produces its electricity from coal, but this remains insufficient compared to previous levels. from a lack of power. Purchasing electricity from Moldova and the EU is essential to support its society, but represents a cost that it has never had to bear before.

The Moldovan energy crisis of 2025 highlights how Russia’s energy policy is intrinsically linked to its foreign policy objectives. While Russia’s ambition to divert Moldova away from European integration is clear, Moldova seems to be resisting. In 2024, and . For Transnistria, the threat is existential, as free deliveries of Russian gas kept Moldova dependent on Russia, justifying Moscow’s investment in Tiraspol. Without this connection, Russia’s political influence over Transnistria is likely to weaken while calls for reunification with Moldova are expected to grow stronger. Indeed, without the possibility of gas deliveries through Ukrainian pipelines and with the closure of the eastern border, Transnistria has no choice but to diversify its trading partners and turn to the EU. However, reunification of Moldovan territory would not mean an end to Russian interference as Moscow intensifies its leading to the exploitation of Russian-speaking minorities beyond its own borders. A scenario similar to the Baltic states remains possible.

Recommendations

While the situation in Moldova may seem distant to Canada, the energy crisis of 2025 represents a key political and economic lesson, as Canada also faces a need to diversify its trading partners.

While energy dependence is now considered a weapon in Russia’s hybrid war against the EU, , mainly for economic reasons but also because of the difficulty of diversifying their trading partners. Canada could become a privileged partner in European energy policy and increasingly replace Europe’s dependence on Russian gas. Doing so would help boost Canada’s own efforts to diversify its trading partners while simultaneously deepening Canada-Europe economic and political relations.

To achieve this goal, it is necessary to develop infrastructure to transport Canadian gas eastward, given that almost all facilities are located on the west coast. The construction of an East-West oil and gas pipeline has previously been met with sharp opposition from , , and across the country for environmental, territorial, and economic reasons. However, in the face of the American threat, the need to diversify trading partners could provide favourable momentum, as recently demonstrated by . Any revival of a cross-country pipeline will have to involve significant consultation and involvement of provinces and First Nations in order to receive both legislative and public approval. If this occurs, Canada could see itself become a much more important partner in helping Europe meet its energy needs.

Version française

La rĂ©gion sĂ©paratiste moldave de Transnistrie est plongĂ©e dans une crise humanitaire . D’une importance stratĂ©gique majeure, la centrale thermique de Kuchurgan n’a plus la capacitĂ© de fournir Ă  la Moldavie de l’électricitĂ©, si bien que la stabilitĂ© s’est Ă©rodĂ©e et la Transnistrie a Ă©tĂ© soumise Ă  des pressions Ă©conomiques et humanitaires. Bien que le risque militaire des troupes russes stationnĂ©es en Transnistrie soit relativement limitĂ©, la dĂ©pendance Ă  l’égard des ressources Ă©nergĂ©tiques constitue un outil gĂ©opolitique important et un outil dans la guerre hybride menĂ©e par la Russie. La situation offre au Canada l’occasion de renforcer son engagement Ă©conomique et politique en Europe de l’Est, d’encourager les politiques de diversification Ă©nergĂ©tique et d’assurer la stabilitĂ© rĂ©gionale.

Contexte historique

L’histoire de la rĂ©gion sĂ©paratiste de Transnistrie dĂ©bute en 1940, quand l’Union soviĂ©tique annexe la rĂ©gion roumaine de la Bessarabie (actuelle Moldavie). Dans cette rĂ©gion majoritairement roumanophone, la dĂ©cision sera prise d’y incorporer une partie de la RĂ©publique socialiste soviĂ©tique ukrainienne afin d’ajouter une population russophone dans la nouvellement fondĂ©e RĂ©publique socialiste soviĂ©tique moldave, situĂ©e au-delĂ  du fleuve Dniestr. Ce territoire est nommĂ© Transnistrie. L’objectif Ă©tait alors le territoire autour de cette nouvelle minoritĂ© linguistique, qui sera au centre de la campagne d’industrialisation de la Moldavie soviĂ©tique.

Lors de la dĂ©sintĂ©gration de l’Union soviĂ©tique, la Transnistrie dĂ©clarera son indĂ©pendance de la Moldavie sous le motif de crainte d’un affaiblissement de leurs droits linguistiques. Des combats auront lieu entre l’armĂ©e moldave et les forces transnistriennes, soutenues par la 14ᔉ armĂ©e russe stationnĂ©es Ă  Tiraspol, le conflit quand un cessez-le-feu sera signĂ©. Celui-ci prĂ©voit le dĂ©ploiement de troupes russes et moldaves en Transnistrie, qui devient un État de facto bĂ©nĂ©ficiant du soutien militaire, politique et Ă©conomique de la Russie.

Crise énergétique de 2025

Dans le contexte actuel, la Transnistrie est un territoire Ă  surveiller, Ă©tant donnĂ© la prĂ©sence militaire russe et les intentions moldaves de se rapproche de l’Union europĂ©enne (UE). La Moldavie est une prioritĂ© stratĂ©gique pour la Russie, qui voit encore ses chances de la faire retomber dans sa zone d’influence et n’hĂ©site pas Ă  provoquer de la dĂ©stabilisation dans la rĂ©publique en usant des moyens de pression politiques et Ă©conomiques. La menace militaire ne fait pas partie de ces moyens de pression. Si, officiellement, la Russie maintient , ces troupes sont lĂ©gĂšrement Ă©quipĂ©es dans l’unique but de maintenir le cessez-le-feu. Il n’y a ni accĂšs naval ni aĂ©rien pouvant leur apporter le nĂ©cessaire Ă  un conflit de grande intensitĂ©.

La vulnĂ©rabilitĂ© Ă©nergĂ©tique reprĂ©sente une menace plus importante pour sa sĂ©curitĂ©, alors que de la centrale thermique de Kuchurgan, en Transnistrie, et fonctionne au gaz russe livrĂ© Ă  travers de pipelines traversant l’Ukraine. Si la Moldavie paye pour ces livraisons, la Transnistrie non. Les livraisons vers Kuchurgan cesseront le 1er janvier 2025 russes Ă  traverser l’Ukraine. Sans ces livraisons de gaz, le rĂ©seau Ă©lectrique Transnistrien est passĂ© hors-ligne, causant des Ă  travers le territoire. L’UE en offrant Ă  la Moldavie et Ă  la Transnistrie des livraisons d’électricitĂ© depuis la Roumanie et des solutions financiĂšres afin de diversifier ses livraisons de gaz, mais , bien que la situation humanitaire soit critique. Les infrastructures critiques ne pouvaient fonctionner sans Ă©lectricitĂ© e. Aujourd’hui, la Transnistrie produit son Ă©lectricitĂ© grĂące au charbon, mais cela reste insuffisant comparativement aux niveaux prĂ©cĂ©dents, d’un manque d’électricitĂ©. L’achat d’électricitĂ© Ă  la Moldavie et Ă  l’UE est indispensable pour soutenir la sociĂ©tĂ©, mais reprĂ©sente un coĂ»t qu’elle n’a jamais eu Ă  assumer.

La crise Ă©nergĂ©tique moldave de 2025 met en lumiĂšre comment la politique Ă©nergĂ©tique de la Russie est intrinsĂšquement liĂ©e Ă  ses objectifs en matiĂšre de politique Ă©trangĂšre. Alors que son ambition en Moldavie est affichĂ©e — dĂ©tourner le pays de son intĂ©gration europĂ©enne —, celle-ci semble rĂ©sister. En 2024, . Pour la Transnistrie, la menace est existentielle alors que les livraisons gratuites de gaz russe maintenaient la Moldavie dans un Ă©tat de dĂ©pendance vis-Ă -vis de la Russie, justifiant l’investissement de Moscou Ă  Tiraspol. Un affaiblissement de la prĂ©sence russe en Transnistrie est probable, tout autant que le scĂ©nario d’une rĂ©unification. En effet, sans possibilitĂ© de livraison de gaz par les pipelines ukrainiens et avec la fermeture de la frontiĂšre est, la Transnistrie n’a pas d’autre choix que de diversifier ses partenaires commerciaux et de se tourner vers l’UE. Une rĂ©unification du territoire moldave ne signifierait cependant pas la fin de l’ingĂ©rence russe, alors que Moscou intensifie sa doctrine de , provoquant l’instrumentalisation des minoritĂ©s russophones au-delĂ  de ses propres frontiĂšres. Un scĂ©nario similaire Ă  celui des pays baltes demeure possible.

Recommandations

Si la situation moldave semble lointaine pour le Canada, la crise énergétique de 2025 représente une opportunité politique et économique, alors que nous faisons aussi face à un besoin de diversification de nos partenaires commerciaux.

Alors que la dĂ©pendance Ă©nergĂ©tique est maintenant considĂ©rĂ©e comme une arme de la guerre hybride de la Russie contre l’UE, , principalement par considĂ©rations Ă©conomiques, mais aussi par difficultĂ© de diversifier les partenaires commerciaux. Le Canada pourrait devenir un partenaire privilĂ©giĂ© dans la politique Ă©nergĂ©tique europĂ©enne en proposant une alternative Ă  la dĂ©pendance au gaz russe. Un tel projet aiderait le Canada Ă  diversifier ses partenaires commerciaux tout en dĂ©veloppant les relations transatlantiques.

Suivant cet objectif, il est nĂ©cessaire de dĂ©velopper les infrastructures de transport de gaz canadien vers l’est, alors que la quasi-totalitĂ© des installations se trouvent sur la cĂŽte ouest. La construction d’olĂ©oducs est-ouest pour le pĂ©trole et le gaz Ă©tait autrefois reçue avec hostilitĂ© par le , et les Ă  travers le pays, invoquant des raisons environnementales, territoriales et Ă©conomiques. Cependant, devant la menace amĂ©ricaine, le besoin de diversification des partenaires commerciaux pourrait soutenir une Initiative favorable, comme dĂ©montrĂ© rĂ©cemment par les au projet. Toute tentative de retour de ce projet devra comprendre une profonde consultation et coopĂ©ration avec les provinces et les PremiĂšres Nations afin de non seulement obtenir l’appui lĂ©gislatif, mais aussi de l’opinion publique. Dans cette optique, le Canada pourrait devenir un partenaire majeur dans la politique Ă©nergĂ©tique europĂ©enne.

The post The 2025 Moldovan energy crisis and the challenges for Europe – La crise Ă©nergĂ©tique Moldave de 2025 et les dĂ©fis pour l’Europe appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

The Kyrgyz Republic’s under-digitised public healthcare system presents an emerging vector for foreign digital influence and strategic vulnerability. As China advances its global data ambitions through the Digital Silk Road and affiliated Health Silk Road, Beijing is positioning itself to dominate the digitisation of Kyrgyzstan’s public healthcare system by offering technologies often tied to opaque governance and hidden data extraction risks. 

The health sector, often overlooked in traditional security assessments, contains vast quantities of personal and biometric data. In the absence of competitive alternatives, Kyrgyzstan risks entrenching Chinese digital standards, undermining its data sovereignty —a crucial component of strategic autonomy —and becoming increasingly dependent on authoritarian-aligned technologies.

China’s Digital Expansion and Kyrgyzstan’s Authoritarian Drift

Once viewed as an in post-Soviet Central Asia, the Kyrgyz Republic has taken an increasingly under the regime of President Sadyr Japarov. While domestic drivers underpin this trajectory, China’s has provided essential support (for further context, see: Exporting Surveillance: China’s Authoritarian Blueprint in the Kyrgyz Republic).Ìę

, long considered apolitical and largely removed from most conversations about security and strategic autonomy, is emerging as a new frontier. As Kyrgyzstan its health sector, Beijing has developed attractive and under the banner of the . These are often deployed under non-transparent agreements that provide state-affiliated corporations access to data that can facilitate , , , and of populations. 

Biometric Data and Medical Records: An Overlooked Threat

data refers to unique physiological characteristics used to identify individuals. In the context of healthcare, this includes high-tech identifiers such as facial scans, fingerprints, and retinal patterns, as well as lower-tech data like height, weight, blood type, dental records, menstrual cycles, and handwritten signatures. While this may seem innocuous, when combined with the wider scope of , these figures become inadvertently sensitive. 

For example, menstrual cycle data can signal pregnancy, fertility patterns, and reproductive irregularities, making it highly valuable in contexts where states seek to control reproduction. In China, where population management has historically been enforced through the and, more recently, through the of Uyghur women in Xinjiang, the raises serious security and human rights concerns. 

As Chinese–Kyrgyz relations deepen, particularly through security and technological cooperation involving the increased monitoring and surveillance of Kyrgyzstan’s Uyghur population. This extension of surveillance infrastructure, combined with the digitisation of health data, risks replicating the same reproductive control measures seen in Xinjiang.

Access to a nation’s health records and biometric data also provides information about the population’s demographics, such as death rates, birth rates, and infant mortality. In addition to these historical security concerns about population demographics, this data can also current health risks and disparities, and forecast future health outcomes like disease outbreaks. The potential for misuse makes this information particularly vulnerable in insecure or foreign-controlled digital systems.

Unauthorised access to biometric and health data is a . It can enable foreign actors to monitor populations, coerce political figures, or target dissent. In authoritarian contexts, such data can be weaponised to suppress opposition and influence the behaviour of populations. , while framed as developmental aid, threaten to introduce asymmetric dependencies, data extraction risks, and strategic leverage over host governments.

Without robust safeguards or competitive alternatives, Kyrgyzstan’s adoption of foreign digital infrastructure risks eroding data sovereignty, weakening institutional independence, and embedding long-term vulnerabilities that can be exploited for geopolitical influence.

Healthcare Vulnerabilities 

Kyrgyzstan’s healthcare system, shaped by Soviet-era centralisation, has since independence through reforms and international partnerships. It now delivers both private care through clinics as well as publicly funded universal care. The public sector of healthcare remains underdeveloped and largely paper-based. Digital systems, where they exist, are fragmented, lacking both interoperability and .

This systemic weakness has real-world consequences. During a research visit to Kyrgyzstan in the summer of 2025, I sustained multiple injuries in a mountain biking accident and was treated at Bishkek’s National Hospital. While clinical care was excellent, the lack of digital infrastructure was stark: I had to photograph CT scans and X-rays with my personal smartphone and carry handwritten medical records between appointments. This informal data handling not only complicates care but also demonstrates the demand for the digitisation of Kyrgyz healthcare.

My experience is not unique. From conversations with medical professionals across Kyrgyzstan, diagnostic imaging, lab results, and patient histories are stored in siloed or offline systems with minimal security protocols. These conditions create strategic vulnerabilities, particularly as China offers digital solutions through the Health Silk Road, accompanied by opaque contracts and back-end access provisions.

Policy Recommendation

To mitigate the growing influence of Chinese digital infrastructure and strengthen Kyrgyzstan’s strategic autonomy, Canada should take a proactive role in supporting the digitisation of Kyrgyzstan’s public healthcare system. This sector, which is rich in sensitive personal and biometric data, is increasingly targeted by China through its Digital and Health Silk Road initiatives. By supporting secure, interoperable, and rights-respecting alternatives, Canada can help prevent the entrenchment of authoritarian digital norms and reduce Kyrgyzstan’s dependency on foreign-controlled platforms.

Canada is well-positioned to contribute meaningfully. With in public health, , and , Canada can offer technical support, capacity-building, and policy guidance grounded in transparency and accountability. This effort should align with ongoing multilateral initiatives, such as the , and be framed as part of a broader push to reinforce democratic digital governance in a strategically contested region.

Beyond technical assistance, this is also an opportunity for Canada to repair and reframe its relationship with Kyrgyzstan, particularly in light of the reputational damage caused by the . Supporting the digitisation of Kyrgyzstan’s healthcare system, which is a vital public service that directly affects citizens’ daily lives, would demonstrate Canada’s commitment to inclusive, rights-based development and offer a constructive step forward in strengthening bilateral cooperation. It would also allow Canada to project soft power, build goodwill, and lead by example in a region where democratic engagement is urgently needed to counterbalance rising authoritarian influence.

Conclusion

Kyrgyzstan’s underdeveloped and fragmented digital health infrastructure has created a strategic vacuum which has increasingly been filled by Chinese technologies deployed through the Health Silk Road. While these systems are marketed as development tools, they often come bundled with embedded dependencies that undermine data sovereignty and weaken institutional resilience. In an era where biometric and health data have become strategic assets, the digitisation of public services like healthcare is no longer a purely technical matter. It is now a question of national security and democratic integrity.

Amid China’s expanding digital influence and Russia’s declining regional engagement post-2022, Kyrgyzstan faces a narrowing set of choices. Without meaningful alternatives, it risks entrenching authoritarian-aligned technologies that could shape not only its healthcare system but also its political and civic landscape.

Canada has both the normative interest and the technical capacity to offer an alternative. By supporting the secure, rights-based digitisation of Kyrgyzstan’s healthcare sector, Canada can reinforce democratic digital norms, help safeguard strategic autonomy, and re-engage with a region that has seen limited Canadian involvement since 2021. Such a contribution would signal a shift toward inclusive, citizen-focused development, moving beyond a low-intensity economic relationship, towards a constructive, long-term partnership.

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Through the multi-nodal design of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Chinese state has developed a “” level of structural coercion in the nations of Central Asia. These function as hubs of communication within decentralised networks of information sharing and technological exchange. Such a degree of interconnection is embedded within aspects of “,” a concept which describes how dominant states leverage asymmetric access to global networks (such as trade, finance, or technology) to exert coercive influence over weaker states. Within the CCP’s BRI project, this dynamic enables China to entrench its strategic control while projecting stability under its own terms. The states of Central Asia (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan) are growing more susceptible to Beijing’s influence, not only due to proximity and economic dependency but also through the increasing centralisation of technology. China’s broader strategy seeks to export its model of illiberal governance and to implement security-oriented practices, including surveillance, policing, and border control, that reflect a broader process of regional securitisation. 

These efforts are tightly interwoven with economic and technological interdependence, enabling Beijing to through weaponised interdependence. This strategy is met not just with passive acquiescence but with active enthusiasm from domestic actors in the Kyrgyz Republic, where a growing appetite for authoritarian governance provides Beijing with willing partners. Kyrgyzstan’s underrepresentation in Western strategic discourse, despite its geographic proximity to Xinjiang and growing entanglement with Chinese security initiatives, makes it an essential focal point for assessing China’s regional ambitions. While conducting fieldwork in Kyrgyzstan, I encountered firsthand how securitisation and digital surveillance shape movement, access, and everyday life. These experiences inform the analytical lens of this paper and underscore the tangible impact of China’s expanding security architecture in the region. Through weaponised interdependence and a decentralised network of private and state actors, Beijing has embedded itself into the core of Central Asia’s security landscape, with the Kyrgyz Republic offering a compelling case study of how local political dynamics can both enable and amplify China’s authoritarian export model. Ultimately, China’s influence under the Belt and Road framework presents not only an economic opportunity for Central Asia, but a growing risk of entrenched authoritarian governance, regional dependency, and diminished sovereignty.

Structural Coercion Through Multi-Nodal Interdependence

The increasing complication and centralisation of technology has allowed Beijing to emerge as a global leader in the ever-changing technological sector. With this increased complexity and centralisation, Beijing has moved to implement the “” framework, which would see China become the primary global data hub. This hegemony of technology grants the CCP oversight over a wide range of data flows, including cross-border communications, financial transactions, e-commerce logistics, biometric records, and metadata. While not overtly coercive at this stage, this interdependence creates structural asymmetries that China may later exploit as leverage, a dynamic explored in subsequent sections.

Coacting with the multi-nodal structure of the BRI and the growing digitisation and technological dominance, China has established the “” (BRNSIS), which utilises private actors, primarily Chinese private security contractors. These actors primarily assist Chinese embassies in Central Asia with information gathering, accessible to various government institutions through a centralized database. Chinese private security contractors employed by the BRNSIS in gathering intelligence, which is stored in a centralised database accessible across Chinese government ministries, enhancing the state’s ability to coordinate regional surveillance. In addition, growing trade networks with Central Asia have also provided power asymmetries that allow for growing data gathering from individual traders acting as independent nodes. 

Targeting the Uyghur Diaspora: Exporting Securitisation

As China begins consolidating its influence in Central Asia, largely replacing Russia as the regional hegemon post-2022, the diaspora Uyghur population has fallen victim to methodologies of Beijing’s securitisation. are a Turkic Muslim ethnic group indigenous to the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in western China. Since 2017, China has faced widespread international condemnation for its of over a million Uyghurs in so-called “reeducation” camps, with some governments, , labelling these policies as genocide. Many Uyghurs have fled persecution and now live in Central Asian countries, where they remain under the surveillance and coercive reach of Chinese security practices. In Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, has been sold to authoritarian regimes to identify political dissidents and protest participants. As this technology becomes increasingly centralised, Chinese intelligence services also gain , which they can use to identify individuals deemed security threats, particularly among the Uyghur diaspora in Central Asia. While Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan possess deeper bilateral relations with China in terms of security, the Kyrgyz Republic, which, along with Kazakhstan, borders the region of Xinjiang, does not possess this same set of relations. However, the Chinese and Kyrgyz states have begun with joint policing exercises directed towards anti-terrorist measures. The lack of formalised security ties suggests that China’s model of regional influence does not rely solely on official agreements. It also operates through ad hoc cooperation, technological penetration, and strategic pressure, especially in states like Kyrgyzstan, where domestic authoritarian appetites are beginning to align with Beijing’s interests.

Kyrgyzstan’s Security Alignment with Beijing Post-2016

Largely influencing this alignment of Kyrgyz domestic security with Chinese regional objectives was the 2016 Chinese embassy bombing in the Kyrgyz capital of Bishkek. In the of the attack, China began rejecting visas to Kyrgyz citizens and applied pressure to the Kyrgyz state to hold the perpetrators accountable and release the information gathered during the investigation. The State Committee on National Security (GKNB) found that it was a targeted committed by the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (), a transnational Uyghur organisation active across Central Asia.

Three years later, in 2019, a new police command centre was established in Bishkek, incorporating the same used in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. A protest, which developed into a riot, took place soon after the completion of the police command centre, fueled by Kyrgyz fears over in the nation. Public hostility toward Beijing’s influence was fueled by rising Chinese immigration into the Kyrgyz Republic and reports of in “vocational education training centres” in Xinjiang. 

The SCO, RATS, and Authoritarian Learning

Within the construction of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), there is a strong focus on anti-terrorism efforts, emphasised by the pillar of the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS). Within the framework of RATS, cooperation across member states to promote is encouraged. In June 2023, Kyrgyz Interior Ministry representatives travelled to Xinjiang for demonstrations , which showcased crowd control and counterterrorism techniques. At the conclusion of the visit, representatives of both countries under which Chinese security officials “will conduct and organise training for (Kyrgyz) employees of police districts adjacent to the border.” As China will gain utility from increased regional cooperation and subsequent codependency, the Kyrgyz delegation, under the growing authoritarianism of the Japarov regime, into building an improved surveillance state. This reflects a domestic openness in Kyrgyzstan to adopt illiberal governance models, revealing a reciprocal dynamic where China’s export of authoritarian practices meets local political appetite, thus enhancing both states’ objectives. According to the Interior Ministry statement, had opportunities “to study new achievements in the digitalization of the Chinese police, to familiarize themselves with the work of the police using unmanned aerial vehicles, to study methods of combating religious extremism 
 (and) familiarization with the actions and methods and means used by the police during mass riots.” Chinese officials also for the Kyrgyz visitors, demonstrating “the work of a special forces detachment, as well as public order services, and their actions during riots.”

Interaction-2024 and Japarov’s Strategic Calculus

A recent development within RATS is “,” a joint counter-terrorism exercise between China and the states of Central Asia, which involved specialised operations intended to enhance the operational capabilities of member states. In February of 2025, Kyrgyz president Sadyr Japarov visited Beijing for a visit with Chinese president Xi Jinping. Xi Jinping emphasised the historic and geographic between China and the Kyrgyz Republic as well as the rapid growth of bilateral relations in recent years. The Chinese president added that the two sides should continue to explore new ideas, focus on cooperation, and deepen mutually beneficial cooperation. China is willing to continue to expand cooperation and enhance connectivity by continuing construction of the a railway connecting China, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. that Kyrgyzstan will continue to protect the of Chinese investors in the country.

Border Control and Securitisation

Demonstrating the expansion of connectivity is the reopening and ongoing development of the border crossing connecting the Kyrgyz settlement of Barskon, located along the south shore of Lake Issyk-Kul, to the region of Xinjiang. The Bedel Pass crossing is the third border district connecting China to Kyrgyzstan, with the other two being the in the Kyrgyz region of Naryn and the in the Osh Region. However, the entirety of the Chinese-Kyrgyz border is along the region of Xinjiang. This contributes to Beijing’s desire to police the regions as many Uyghurs flee and seek refuge in the Kyrgyz Republic, as well as of the East Turkestan Liberation Organisation (ELTO), a secessionist Uyghur organisation training in the border regions of the Kyrgyz Republic. Increased securitisation on the Kyrgyz border side has assumed Xi Jinping’s demands for Kyrgyzstan to “”. Along the entirety of the 1,063-kilometre border between China and Kyrgyzstan, a extending 50 kilometres from the de facto border has been established. To enter the Border Zone, a , which can only be obtained from Kyrgyz authorities, ensuring that only authorised individuals can enter these securitised areas.

Due to the securitisation of the Border Zone, the centralisation of technology and the ongoing digitisation of police activities, I did not travel closer than the village of Chiy-Tala in the Osh Region, located 140 kilometres from the Erkeshtam Pass border crossing.

Domestic Nationalism and Foreign Leverage

However, in the capital of Bishkek, securitisation in the historic Uyghur-run Madina Market can be observed from first-hand accounts and primary sources. During repeated visits to the market throughout my fieldwork, I consistently noted a heightened police presence, which included both uniformed and plainclothed officers. Compared to the two larger markets in the city, Osh Bazaar and Dordoi Bazaar, this visible security presence appeared disproportionate and politically charged. Conversations with Uyghur merchants revealed a sense of anxiety with several vendors speaking cautiously and avoiding political discussions. In contrast, some ethnic Kyrgyz locals I spoke with openly expressed suspicion toward the Uyghur presence in the market. These sentiments reflect how Chinese securitisation narratives, particularly the conflation of Uyghur identity with extremism, have filtered into public discourse, helping to justify increased surveillance and legitimise discriminatory practices in local contexts.

The neo-nationalist Kyrgyz grassroots movement, , has been calling for the from the Madina Market since 2015. While previously Kyrk Choro enjoyed complacency from security officials and state actors in the Kyrgyz Republic, under the populist platform of Sadyr Japarov, the group’s ideology has benefited from presidential policies such as Japarov’s , which aims to protect the “traditions and values of Kyrgyz families” by discriminating against ethnic minorities, rolling back women’s rights, and centralising media and journalism, capturing support from nationalistic and subsequently anti-Uyghur political movements. China’s exportation of illiberal governance aligns with a growing domestic appetite for authoritarianism in Kyrgyzstan, where nationalist movements and political elites actively embrace these models to strengthen their own power. This dynamic grants Kyrgyz actors agency in shaping the country’s authoritarian trajectory, making the relationship with Beijing a mutually reinforcing process rather than a simple external imposition. Official state action reflects domestic nationalist sentiments while simultaneously satisfying China’s desires for stability and securitisation. 

In 2023, the against the founder of the Madina Market, Tursuntai Salimov and his son Ilshan. Tursuntai was also the leader of Ittipak, a Kyrgyz-Uyghur diaspora political organisation advocating for cultural preservation. In 2024, both Tursuntai and Ilshan Salimov were for the laundering of criminal proceeds in the interest of Kamchybek Asanbek’s organised crime group. 

The assets of the Salimov family, including Madina Market, were rapidly transferred to Tarim Trade, a company owned by the son of Khabibula Abdukadyr. Abdukadyr, a close ally of Japarov, had successfully built a trading monopoly which transits . Abdukadyr is also a business partner of a close friend of the president’s son, who , which are an integral part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

Conclusion: A New Security Order under Chinese Patronage

By utilising the pre-existing frameworks of the SCO, the infrastructure of the BRI, and the centralisation of technology via the Digital Silk Road, China has constructed a vast and adaptive apparatus of regional surveillance and control and a comprehensive security architecture in the form of the Belt and Road National Security Intelligence System. Through weaponised interdependence and a decentralised network of private and state actors, Beijing has embedded itself into the core of Central Asia’s security landscape. China’s broader strategy seeks to export its model of illiberal governance and practices of securitisation as a means to impose regional stability, thereby facilitating deeper economic engagement and political interaction under Beijing’s terms. Importantly, this approach resonates with domestic actors in Kyrgyzstan, where an existing appetite for illiberalism and nationalist governance provides agency to local elites, enabling them to actively participate in and shape this evolving security architecture. While framed as cooperation or development, the deeper consequence is a significant erosion of regional sovereignty and the externalisation of China’s internal securitisation model. The targeting of Uyghur diaspora communities, the co-optation of nationalist movements, and the strategic transfer of economic assets all underscore the convergence of surveillance, economic control, and authoritarian governance under Beijing’s influence.

As China supplants Russia as Central Asia’s dominant external power, its approach represents not merely a shift in regional geopolitics but a reconfiguration of sovereignty itself, one grounded in digital oversight, security codependence, and authoritarian learning. Without meaningful safeguards or regional pushback, the Belt and Road may no longer be simply a path to economic development but a conduit for asymmetrical control and systemic repression.

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In August 2025, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the United States signed a three-way agreement to end the long-standing conflict between the two nations, built upon the preliminary agreements established between Armenia and Azerbaijan in March 2025. The prospective peace deal further includes a clause for the creation of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), a transport corridor through the Zangezur region. The TRIPP establishes a 99-year partnership granting the U.S. exclusive rights to develop transportation and energy infrastructure within Armenia’s Zangezur corridor to create a new Asia-Europe transit route that bypasses Russia and Iran.

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