On 2 July 2026, the University of Latvia hosted the one-day international “Emerging Scholars Workshop” co-organized by the Eastern Europe and Transatlantic Network (EETN) and the University of Latvia. The EETN is an initiative funded by Canada’s Department of National Defence through the Mobilizing Insights in Defence and Security program and is hosted by the Institute of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies at ĐÓ°ÉÔ­´´ University, Canada.

The workshop brought together emerging researchers and experts from the University of Latvia, ĐÓ°ÉÔ­´´ University, the University of Helsinki, the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, the University of Roma Tre and other institutions. The programme combined academic analysis with practical security-policy perspectives, focusing on Russia’s war against Ukraine, hybrid threats, NATO deterrence, strategic stability, political memory and radicalization risks in the digital environment.

The central insight of the workshop was that security today extends beyond the military domain. The keynote discussions on Baltic security challenges and NATO deterrence underscored that Europe is currently operating in a strategic environment situated between peace and open conflict. As one presentation put it: “Not at peace, not at war.” The phrase captures a reality in which military presence, political signalling, societal resilience, technological innovation and strategic communication have become interconnected instruments of deterrence.

The first panel, on Russia’s war, hybrid threats and European security, demonstrated the diversity of hybrid warfare. Presentations on the Sahel and the Western Balkans showed how Russian influence often exploits political fragmentation, weak media environments, historical grievances and the promise of alternative partnerships. The presentation on Russia’s adaptation to drone warfare in Ukraine emphasized that technological change on the battlefield has direct political consequences: it affects operational capabilities, but also a state’s ability to sustain a narrative of control and competence. A key takeaway was that hybrid attacks against Europe can simultaneously weaken support for Ukraine, test vulnerabilities and normalize grey-zone incidents.

The second panel, on strategic stability and regional realignments, addressed Europe’s capacity to become a more autonomous strategic actor. The presentations discussed the weakening of arms control regimes, the compression of decision-making timelines caused by hypersonic weapons and artificial intelligence, and the need to strengthen air and missile defence, drones and counter-drone systems, cyber resilience, ammunition production and military mobility. One presentation formulated the challenge clearly: “Superpower or not, Europe must become a capable & autonomous strategic actor.” In the Latvian context, this discussion was complemented by a presentation on defence innovation and layered deterrence.

The third panel broadened the understanding of security beyond the narrowly military sphere. Presentations on Armenian resistance to Sovietization, minority schools, Russia’s strategic national mythmaking, wartime media and legal framings of domestic violence, and radicalization trends in Latvian social media showed that state power, memory politics, law and the digital environment are all security-relevant. The Latvian case was particularly important: society as a whole is not radicalized, but risks are concentrated in specific groups and discourses. Prevention therefore needs to be targeted, evidence-based and focused on strengthening democratic resilience.

Overall, the workshop showed that military deterrence, technological innovation, alliance politics, societal resilience, historical memory and the information space form one security ecosystem. The workshop also highlighted Canada’s growing contribution to European and transatlantic security. Through its leadership of the NATO Multinational Brigade Latvia and a long-standing commitment to supporting Ukraine, Canada is increasingly engaged in addressing the military, technological, and societal dimensions of contemporary security challenges. At the same time, Canada’s engagement extends beyond the military sphere to include defence innovation, resilience-building, research collaboration, and policy dialogue, reflecting the increasingly comprehensive nature of contemporary security.

The main added value of the workshop was interdisciplinary dialogue, allowing emerging scholars to connect empirical case studies with broader questions about the future of European security. In this context, Riga became an important discussion point on NATO’s eastern flank, where theoretical debates on deterrence and hybrid threats carry direct political significance.

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The Emerging Scholars Workshop in Riga: Security, Resilience and Strategic Thinking in a Changing Europe appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

Security in a Turbulent World: Canada, Eurasia, and the Arctic

In March, the Eastern Europe and Transatlantic Network hosted Security in a Turbulent World: Canada, Eurasia, and the Arctic at ĐÓ°ÉÔ­´´ University. The event brought together scholars and practitioners to examine Russia’s war against Ukraine, transatlantic security, Arctic dynamics, and disinformation.

Panel One: Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine, Year 5: Conciliation or Continued Conflict

The first panel examined how four years of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine have shaped Russian, Ukrainian, and neighbouring societies, as well as what the ongoing nature of the war means for the future of the region. The panel featured Dr. Olena Lennon, University of New Haven; Dr. Erica Marat, National Defence University; and Dr. Brian Taylor, Syracuse University. It was moderated by EETN Co-Lead Dr. Jeff Sahadeo, ĐÓ°ÉÔ­´´ University.

Dr. Olena Lennon: Why Ukraine Endures

Dr. Lennon framed her presentation around the underlying strategies of Russia and Ukraine in the ongoing war, as well as how the war itself has evolved battlefield strategy.

She argued that Ukraine has been largely successful in limiting Russian strategic and territorial gains. At the same time, Russia’s increased focus on eliminating Ukraine’s physical and cultural statehood continues to pose a major strategic concern.

This strategy includes the destruction of infrastructure, extensive mine-laying campaigns, and the abduction and forced re-education of Ukrainian children.

Dr. Lennon emphasized that Russia’s high casualty count and limited territorial gains represent a major strategic failure. However, she cautioned that Western states should not assume these costs will necessarily push President Vladimir Putin toward ending the war.

In her view, Putin’s decision-making is not primarily shaped by the war’s economic or personnel costs, but by the goal of inflicting maximum damage on Ukraine’s sovereignty.

She described Russia’s current approach as a “new Cold War,” in which Moscow attempts to compensate for battlefield failures by targeting civilian energy infrastructure during the winter months in an effort to weaken Ukrainian morale.

During the 2025–2026 winter season, Russia’s maximum pressure campaign created serious hardship for Ukrainian society, but failed to turn public opinion against the war.

Dr. Lennon highlighted several ways in which Ukrainian society has adapted, including rolling blackouts, rapid repairs to damaged energy infrastructure, and increased electricity imports from regional partners.

She concluded that Ukrainian endurance remains central to the country’s ability to survive a war of attrition against Russia, despite the imbalance in military and economic resources.

At the same time, she argued that the war is likely to continue because both Russia and Ukraine still believe that victory is possible and that defeat is unacceptable.

Dr. Erica Marat: Ukrainian Resistance and the South Caucasus

State-level responses

Dr. Marat discussed how countries in the South Caucasus and the broader Eastern European region have learned from Ukrainian resistance, and how this has strengthened similar processes across the region.

She divided her presentation into lessons learned at both the state and societal levels.

At the state level, Dr. Marat highlighted recent regional political and economic partnership projects that have helped countries in the South Caucasus distance themselves from Russian political and economic pressure.

Two major examples were the Organization of Turkic States and the Middle Corridor Trade Network. These initiatives use intra-regional integration to create distance from Russia’s sphere of influence in culture, infrastructure, and trade.

Economically, Dr. Marat argued that South Caucasus states are learning to use their geographic position between Asia, Africa, Europe, and the Middle East to balance partnerships with actors such as China and TĂĽrkiye.

At the societal level, she argued that Russian aggression, culminating in the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, has encouraged people across the former Soviet Union to question how history is told and whether inherited narratives can be reframed.

She explained that these efforts often connect the transition to independence after the dissolution of the Soviet Union with processes of decolonization in Africa and Southeast Asia during the 1960s.

By drawing these parallels, former Soviet states increasingly emphasize their own histories and cultures as distinct from Russia.

Dr. Marat also noted that this process is taking root within the Asian Russian diaspora, where Russian-dominated narratives about the history and culture of Eastern Russia are being challenged.

She concluded by discussing how these developments are raising questions about whether communities within Eastern Russia should push for greater autonomy, and in some cases even independence, in the future.

Dr. Brian Taylor: Does Russia Want Peace?

Dr. Taylor focused on Russia’s strategic goals as the war enters its fifth year, and whether a realistic peace agreement is currently possible.

He argued that Russia’s maximalist goals, including territorial control and influence over Ukrainian culture and politics, continue to shape Moscow’s decision-making and make peace extremely difficult to achieve.

Dr. Taylor identified three key issues in negotiations between Russia and Ukraine: territory, security, and Ukrainian domestic politics.

Territorial issues receive the most media and political attention and are often presented as the area where compromise may be most possible. However, Dr. Taylor stressed that this is only in comparison to even more difficult issues of security and domestic politics.

Russia continues to demand full control over territories in eastern Ukraine occupied during the initial phase of the war. Ukraine rejects these demands, as they would violate its constitution and undermine its sovereignty.

Dr. Taylor argued that American diplomatic efforts have placed strong emphasis on the territorial dimension of the war. He suggested that this has led some negotiators to see territory as the primary obstacle to peace, while underestimating the importance of security and political sovereignty.

On security, Russia demands that Ukraine remain neutral and non-nuclear, abandon present and future NATO aspirations, and significantly limit the size of its post-war military.

These demands directly conflict with Ukraine’s continued push for closer ties with NATO and its rejection of limits on its military capacity.

On domestic politics, Russia continues to demand the “de-Nazification” of Ukraine. Dr. Taylor described this as a veiled attempt to gain control over Ukraine’s democratic decision-making, cultural policy, and education system.

For Ukraine, these demands remain unacceptable and would represent a fundamental violation of sovereignty.

Dr. Taylor concluded that although Russian and Ukrainian diplomats may present negotiations in positive terms, a true end to the war remains far off.

Q&A: Key Themes

Western support

Ukraine seeks stronger ties with NATO.
It views membership as a way to secure long-term independence.

Aid and transparency

Ukraine has faced corruption concerns.
However, it continues to emphasize transparency and cooperation with Western partners.

Global context

The US-Israeli war with Iran may benefit Russia in the short term.
However, it also signals a broader shift toward great-power competition.

European security

The war has changed European thinking.
The EU now focuses more on defence readiness and strategic autonomy.

Panel 2: The Transatlantic Security Architecture: NATO, European Defence Initiatives, and Canada’s Role

The second panel examined the changing global security environment and its impact on NATO’s role and strategy. The discussion focused on the return of war to the European continent, increased American unilateralism and isolationism, and the broader weakening of the rules-based international order. The panel featured Dr. Alex Moens, Simon Fraser University; Dr. Luca Ratti, University of Rome III; and Dr. Chantal Lavallee, Royal Military College Saint-Jean. It was moderated by Dr. Crina Viju-Miljusevic, ĐÓ°ÉÔ­´´ University.

Dr. Alex Moens: NATO and Political Leadership

Dr. Moens outlined two major conditions that have historically allowed NATO to function effectively: persuasive political power, primarily stemming from the United States’ ability to consolidate allies, and the willingness of the United States to lead in terms of military capacity, quality, and readiness.

He argued that because these two factors have been central to NATO’s success, reduced American cooperation creates serious challenges for the alliance.

However, Dr. Moens did not suggest that NATO is defunct. Instead, he argued that Europe can provide new pillars of support.

He noted that Europe is in a stronger position to do so than in the past, as political will and military preparedness have become major priorities for many countries.

He highlighted France and the United Kingdom as examples of countries that have become less skeptical of European security cooperation.

Dr. Moens also emphasized that the growing relationship between Canada and Europe creates an important opportunity for more effective transatlantic action.

At the same time, he argued that NATO still requires what he called a “benevolent executor of political will”: a leader capable of coordinating and directing a 32-member alliance.

Dr. Luca Ratti: NATO’s Adaptation and Resilience

Dr. Ratti offered a historical analysis of NATO’s development and emphasized the alliance’s long history of adaptation. He argued that NATO has repeatedly adjusted to changing geopolitical conditions, and that this adaptability is one of its sources of resilience. From this perspective, decreased American cooperation presents serious challenges, but also opportunities for NATO to reinvent itself.

Dr. Ratti emphasized that European states must strengthen their commitment and capabilities if NATO is to remain effective. If this is done successfully, he argued, NATO may become better equipped to make strategic decisions that reaffirm both its values and strategic ambitions. He also identified internal ideological fractures within Europe as a major vulnerability, noting that these divisions affect both the principles and policies of member states.

Despite these challenges, Dr. Ratti offered a more optimistic outlook on NATO’s continued strength and cautioned against viewing changes in American positioning as the determining factor in the alliance’s future.

Dr. Chantal Lavallee: A Changing Transatlantic Partnership

Dr. Lavallee argued that the transatlantic partnership is evolving due to a broader paradigm shift and changing political momentum. She identified a shift toward wartime readiness, which has pushed NATO to mobilize more effectively. This shift is visible both at the level of the European Union and within domestic politics across member states. For European states, a growing threat perception has created a stronger sense of responsibility to establish a coordinated security framework. Examples include the Versailles Declaration of the European Union and the return of compulsory military service in several member states.

For Canada, Dr. Lavallee argued that this paradigm shift is reflected in domestic policy and creates an opportunity to strengthen partnerships within NATO.

She concluded that this shift is essential for understanding the framing of NATO’s current strategies and decisions.

Q&A

The Q&A period focused on American unilateralism and whether current developments represent a new phenomenon or an intensification of earlier American behaviour. The discussion also addressed how NATO might be rebalanced and what kind of leadership would be needed if a new coordinating actor were to emerge.

This raised broader concerns about fragmentation within Europe and the need to balance current and future relations with Russia.

Canada’s role was another central theme. Participants discussed Canada as a support system for European countries and as a potential cornerstone in protecting the liberal international order.

Panel Three: From Cooperation to Contestation: Security Dynamics in the Circumpolar North

The third panel examined changing security dynamics in the Circumpolar North, including Arctic defence, the legal status of the Northwest Passage, the European Union’s Arctic role, and Russian strategic narratives.
The panel featured Dr. Andrea Charron, University of Manitoba; Dr. Suzanne Lalonde, Université de Montréal; Dr. Andreas Raspotnik, High North Centre, Nord University; and Dr. Kari Roberts, Mount Royal University.
The panel was chaired by Balkan Devlen, Macdonald-Laurier Institute.

Dr. Andrea Charron: The Arctic as an Avenue of Attack

Dr. Charron emphasized that the Arctic is a critical strategic frontier for North American security.

The Arctic Ocean provides potential adversaries with the most direct approach to the continent. Across this polar corridor, hostile states can project power using long-range missiles, strategic bombers, submarines, and other advanced weapons systems.

These capabilities could threaten the United States and Canada and constrain North America’s ability to support European and other allies during a crisis.

Dr. Charron explained that this geostrategic reality is not new. It has long served as a foundational rationale for the establishment and evolution of the North American Aerospace Defense Command, known as NORAD.

While the United States, Canada, and Russia generally refer to the region as the “Arctic,” NATO and many European actors prefer the term “High North.”

She noted that the nature of the threat differs across the Atlantic space. For North America, the principal concern remains aerospace threats approaching over polar routes. For Europe, maritime access in the northern seas represents a primary vulnerability.

Alaska occupies a particularly important position because it is exposed to both air and maritime vectors, including potential threats from Russia and, increasingly, China.

Dr. Charron outlined NORAD’s three core missions: aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning. These are carried out through a unique binational command structure that reflects the shared responsibility of the United States and Canada for continental defence.

Because most Canadian defence infrastructure is concentrated in the southern part of the country, the North relies heavily on surveillance and projection capabilities.

Current modernization efforts therefore, focus on strengthening Arctic detection and awareness systems. These include Arctic Over-the-Horizon Radar, expanded satellite and space-based sensing, and maritime sensor networks.

Dr. Charron also noted that cooperation across the transatlantic space is improving, especially in multidomain coordination between North America and European allies.

Within this evolving architecture, Greenland has acquired renewed importance as a strategic location for sensor installations capable of extending surveillance across polar approaches.

Dr. Suzanne Lalonde: The Legal Status of the Northwest Passage

Dr. Lalonde discussed Canada’s legal position regarding the Northwest Passage. Canada maintains that the waters of the Arctic Archipelago constitute Canadian internal waters by virtue of historic title. According to this position, the waters enclosed by baselines drawn around the Arctic Archipelago fall under Canadian sovereignty and do not constitute an international strait.

Under international law, a state may establish historic title if it can demonstrate that it has exercised effective and exclusive authority over a maritime area for a considerable period of time, and that this authority has been accepted by other states, particularly those directly affected. Canada’s argument therefore rests on the claim that its administration and regulation of Arctic waters, combined with the absence of sustained international navigation through the Northwest Passage, supports the status of these waters as internal waters.

This interpretation contrasts with the official position of the United States, which maintains that an international strait passes through the Archipelago. Under this view, ships and aircraft of all nations would have a right of transit passage. The American position reflects a broader concern among maritime powers to preserve the principle of unimpeded navigation and overflight, especially through major international chokepoints. Canada rejects the applicability of this logic to the Northwest Passage, arguing that the route has never historically served as a corridor of international navigation and therefore does not meet the criteria of an international strait.

Dr. Lalonde emphasized that Canadian policy has focused on stewardship and regulatory responsibility rather than the closure of the waters to navigation. Measures such as the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act of 1970 reflect Canada’s claim of responsibility for regulating navigation in order to protect the fragile Arctic environment and the welfare of Inuit and other northern inhabitants. The scale of the Arctic Archipelago, which includes a major share of Canada’s landmass, coastline, and islands, reinforces the strategic and legal significance of these waters for Canadian sovereignty.

At the same time, Canada has managed its dispute with the United States pragmatically. The 1988 Arctic Cooperation Agreement established a practice whereby US icebreaker voyages through waters claimed by Canada as internal are conducted with the consent of the Canadian government, while both countries preserve their legal positions.

This “agree to disagree” arrangement reflects the broader recognition that designating an international strait through Canada’s Arctic Archipelago may not serve North American or allied security interests, especially as the region becomes more strategically important.

Dr. Andreas Raspotnik: Redefining Arctic Alliances

Dr. Raspotnik examined the European Union’s evolving role in the Arctic and its attempt to articulate a broader political vision for Europe’s Northern Dimension. Although the European Union is not an Arctic coastal actor, it increasingly presents itself as an Arctic actor. This position has been institutionalized through the development of an Arctic policy framework beginning in 2008.

Rather than a comprehensive strategy, the EU’s Arctic policy has largely revolved around three priorities: addressing climate change, supporting sustainable development in the European Arctic, and contributing to peace and stability in the region. Within these areas, the EU has become the largest funder of Arctic climate research. This reflects its effort to shape Arctic governance through scientific cooperation, environmental stewardship, and regulatory influence. However, Dr. Raspotnik emphasized that the European Arctic remains politically fragmented. Individual European states maintain their own Arctic policies, strategies, and guidelines, often reflecting national interests that do not always align with the broader EU framework.

This fragmentation has complicated the emergence of a unified European Arctic vision, especially as crises elsewhere in Europe have pushed Arctic issues down the policy agenda. Nevertheless, renewed strategic attention to Greenland, the growing relevance of Arctic-Baltic connectivity, and the region’s potential as a source of critical minerals have drawn the Arctic back into European strategic debates. Dr. Raspotnik argued that these developments raise key questions about the future of Europe’s engagement in the region.

These include whether the EU needs a more clearly articulated Arctic strategy, what counts as a strategic interest in the Arctic, and how Arctic security should be understood. In European debates, security increasingly includes not only traditional military concerns, but also environmental resilience, human security, and economic sustainability. The evolving discussion therefore reflects a search for a new narrative capable of situating the Arctic within Europe’s broader geopolitical and economic landscape.

Dr. Kari Roberts: Russian Foreign Policy Priorities and Strategic Narratives

Dr. Roberts discussed how contemporary Russian Arctic policy is shaped by dominant narratives that present the region as central to Russia’s status, development, and geopolitical positioning. The first narrative frames the Arctic as a domain through which Russia can present itself as a powerful and independent global actor, capable of operating as a peer competitor to the United States and China. This narrative emphasizes sovereignty, strategic reach, and the revival of Russia’s great-power status through significant remilitarization of the Arctic. This includes the reopening of Soviet-era bases and the strengthening of capabilities for defence and power projection along the Northern Sea Route.

The second narrative reflects Russia’s broader geopolitical reorientation toward Eurasia, emphasizing closer partnerships with China, India, and other non-Western actors. Cooperation with China has become especially significant in areas such as resource extraction, infrastructure development along the Northern Sea Route, and the broader economic integration of Arctic shipping corridors.

The third narrative links Arctic policy to the social and economic development of the Russian North. In this framing, the Northern Sea Route is presented as a strategic artery that can stimulate regional growth while strengthening Russia’s control over maritime transit across the Arctic.

Dr. Roberts also discussed Russia’s use of hybrid instruments in the region, including electronic jamming, sabotage, interference with undersea communication cables, and the use of civilian vessels for surveillance and covert activity. Despite this, official Russian narratives continue to emphasize peace and international law, portraying Russia as a responsible Arctic steward while accusing Western actors of destabilizing the region. This dual messaging reflects a broader strategy of ambiguity and political warfare.

Domestically, Russian propaganda highlights alleged imperial ambitions of the United States, including claims that American interest in Greenland reflects fear of Russian power. Dr. Roberts argued that these narratives allow Moscow to legitimize its own military and geopolitical activities in the Arctic while framing them as defensive responses to Western encroachment.

Panel Four: Disinformation and Strategic Narratives in Russia’s War on Ukraine

The final panel examined how Russian disinformation circulates, why some audiences are more receptive to it than others, and what governments, researchers, and civil society can do to respond more effectively. Across the three presentations, a common theme emerged: disinformation is not only about false content, but also about trust, credibility, and the structure of the media environments through which narratives travel. The panel was chaired by Dr. Paul Goode, ĐÓ°ÉÔ­´´ University.

Dr. Juris Pupcenoks: Public Opinion and Trust in NATO

Dr. Pupcenoks focused on public opinion and the role of institutional trust in shaping attitudes toward Russia’s war against Ukraine. Drawing on survey research conducted across NATO countries, including Canada, he argued that trust in NATO is one of the strongest predictors of whether people accept the view that Russia is responsible for the war, or instead become more open to narratives claiming that the West provoked it.

In the Canadian data presented, a large majority blamed Russia for the war, while a much smaller share blamed the West, NATO, or Ukraine. Dr. Pupcenoks stressed that people who trust NATO are far more likely to accept NATO’s framing of the war, while lower trust correlates with greater openness to Kremlin-aligned narratives. He suggested that countering disinformation, therefore, requires more than fact-checking alone. It also requires building institutional legitimacy, “prebunking” manipulative narratives before they spread, and communicating NATO’s relevance to Canadians in concrete terms, including security and Arctic stability.

He also proposed that public trust in NATO should be treated as an early warning indicator of vulnerability to hostile narratives.

Dr. Philip Mai: Mapping Kremlin Propaganda Online

Dr. Mai presented the work of the Social Media Lab at Toronto Metropolitan University on mapping Kremlin propaganda and disinformation online. He introduced the lab’s Conflict Misinfo Research Portal and dashboard, which aggregate fact-checks related to Russia’s war against Ukraine from more than 200 fact-checking organizations worldwide.

The project was designed to make scattered and multilingual information more accessible to researchers, analysts, diplomats, and the public. Dr. Mai noted that the database now contains more than 7,000 fact-checks dating back to December 2021, with claims standardized into categories such as true, false, or misleading. He also highlighted related research from the lab, including survey work in Canada, suggesting that more conservative respondents and those who are highly online are more likely to believe some Russian narratives.

Additional experimental work showed that content warnings, blur screens, and footnotes can reduce engagement with misinformation, even as some platforms have moved away from these interventions.

Dr. Anatoliy Gruzd: Telegram and Networked Disinformation

Dr. Gruzd closed the panel with a case study on Telegram as a key information space in the war.

Using Telegram’s API and a snowball sampling method, his team began with a core set of Russia-Ukraine-related channels and expanded the dataset across multiple iterations, ultimately mapping a large network of public channels and groups.

Dr. Gruzd argued that this ecosystem is only weakly contested and is dominated by Russian and pro-Russian actors, with Ukrainian accounts forming only one part of a much broader pro-Kremlin environment.

His analysis paid particular attention to English-language verified Telegram channels, which can appear more credible to Western audiences.

These channels often act as bridges between official Russian messaging and influencers in North America and other English-speaking contexts.

Dr. Gruzd noted that some of these actors may amplify Kremlin narratives ideologically, while others have reportedly been connected to more direct forms of influence.

The presentation emphasized that the structure of these networks makes them resilient. Removing individual channels does little to disrupt the broader system.

Dr. Gruzd suggested that future research should continue examining English-language channels, unverified actors, and official Russian diplomatic accounts that push divisive messaging to Western audiences.

Conclusion

Overall, Security in a Turbulent World: Canada, Eurasia, and the Arctic highlighted the interconnected nature of contemporary security challenges.

Across the four panels, speakers examined Russia’s war against Ukraine, the future of NATO and transatlantic defence, the growing strategic importance of the Arctic, and the role of disinformation in shaping public opinion and political narratives.

The event underscored that security today cannot be understood through military developments alone. It also depends on political trust, institutional resilience, regional cooperation, public communication, and the ability of democratic societies to respond to both conventional and hybrid threats.

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Security in a Turbulent World: Canada, Eurasia, and the Arctic appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

Event Details

The event NATO at a Crossroads: Present Challenges and Future Trajectories was held on Friday November 7 to examine various challenges and demands NATO is currently facing due to an increasingly multipolar and conflictual world. The emergence of new hostile actors, hybrid threats, and attacks on the neoliberal order places an additional need for NATO to be adaptive and resilient.

As an influential member in NATO, Canada’s defence strategy is taking a noteworthy shift in light of a rapidly changing international environment. Prime Minister Mark Carney’s budget – referred to as Canada Strong – plans to invest an estimated , aimed at strengthening the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) while reaffirming its role in multinational organizations and NATO exercises. With this rapidly evolving domestic and international contexts in mind, EETN’s conference brought together an array of academics and political practitioners to discuss ongoing developments with the Alliance, its current status, as well as critical next steps to ensure a stable future.

Panel One: Academic Institutions

Our first panel convened scholars and researchers from diverse disciplinary backgrounds to reflect on NATO’s future, as well as the evolving landscape of Canadian defence and security. Speakers addressed persistent gaps in Canada’s defence posturing; they went on to highlight the need for more transparency and open communication with the public on national security priorities. They also examined how external actors– including the United States (US) and key European Allies – shape NATO’s strategic direction and, in turn, Canada’s position within the Alliance.

Speaker One: Dr. Christian Leuprecht (Professor, Royal Military College and Queen’s University)

Dr. Leuprecht’s presentation looked at the grand strategy of the US to reflect on how this has influenced NATO to previously change its approaches to global security, as well as how Canada should organize its own strategy. Dr. Leuprecht remarked on how despite the current unreliability of the US Administration, we should not be excessively concerned for the future of the Alliance. He highlighted that the grand strategy of the US has shifted historically and unpredictably since 2000. In 2007, its pivot towards Asia and the Indo-Pacific reflected a similar systemic shift; this being said, its land mission in Europe remains a priority requiring continued collaboration.

While the US may not be able to support Europe in the same way it has historically as a result of ongoing domestic economic struggles, it will remain essential for additional actors to supplant resources to boost European defence. Dr. Leuprecht identified that a major issue for Canada continues to be its lack of engagement and depth to its international partnerships. For example, Canada continues to struggle to establish deep and effective ties with the European Parliament. Dr. Leuprecht advised that it is a necessity for Canada to partner with fellow middle powers to reaffirm its international role and relevance. This includes countries in the Black Sea region, as well as the Weimar triangle – regions that remain critical threat vectors in the war with Russia and integral to maintaining peace in Europe. Therefore, Canada should look to give more to these partners and deepen bonds. When it comes to increasing defence spending, he states we need to clearly identify what we need to buy, how it is bought, and how it is paid for.

Additionally, considering when to focus on defence investment versus procurement remains a critical question. Overall, if Canada hopes to improve its ability to support its partners as well as cement its role in the international order, such domestic considerations, external pressures, and ongoing shifts need to be made transparent and clear.

Speaker Two: Dr. Benjamin Zyla (Professor, University of Ottawa)

Dr. Zyla’s presentation focused on four key themes: ongoing debates surrounding how much defence spending is “enough”; the diminishing coherence and contested meaning of “the West”; the importance of avoiding excessive pessimism when assessing global security trends; and the effects of no living memory of great war in Canada. On the question of minimum spending, Dr. Zyla noted this was a question of reduced importance; instead, policymakers need to identify where the maximum lies, what the money is spent on, and how this balances against sectors being cut. Money allocated to defence often does not get completely spent in a fiscal year, raising questions about internal logistics. Additionally, the grand story of why Canada needs additional defence spending is missing, making it difficult to convince the public that such spending is necessary. This disconnect can cause further friction between citizens and the government.

In response to the decline and diminished coherence of the West – a trend targeted and exploited by Russian actors – Dr. Zyla noted how much of this decline comes from within. The erosion of democratic norms within the transatlantic community, he highlights, has contributed to such a decline in status, enabling interference and external attacks by foreign actors. The solution to this normative decline must come from within the transatlantic community itself, and more importantly, it is vital Canadians remain optimistic. The current international system provides many opportunities for middle powers to work together, including in instances of mediation, niche diplomacy, and multilateral cooperation.

Finally, Dr. Zyla suggested that Canadian decision-makers must contend with the fact that the current generation has no living memory of great war. This has a significant impact on the ways threats are framed in society, the way civil society perceives such frames, as well as the government’s ability to respond through defence spending. A major takeaway from his presentation is that improving Canada’s defence is not about obvious concrete actions, but the subtler ones which work to legitimate and support Canada’s national and international ambitions.

Speaker Three: Dr. Anne Fitz-Gerald (Professor and Director of Balsillie School of International Affairs)

Dr. Fitz-Gerald focused her presentation on the importance of considering data and technology in future defence planning. She suggests these dimensions of war have changed in recent years, requiring new approaches to address cognitive and data-driven tactics. Power has become increasingly vested in who owns the most intellectual property (IP) and who controls data, having ramifications for a nation’s sovereignty.

Dr. Fitz-Gerald suggests this new technological environment continues to be a major weak point for Canada, who has not built up the skills, products, and resources to excel in this industry. Civil and government workers do not have the tools to navigate this intangible world, both in policy and in threat responses. Decisions on deployment and sunsetting of legacy systems, along with innovation towards future ones, will have to be made. She presents Canada as an excellent candidate to become a specialist within this new context if the appropriate steps are taken.

A key component to this strategy is the Arctic, as reflected in Carney’s budget, which has the ideal environmental conditions to store, process, and receive data. Developing data centers in northern climates would also provide Canada with a stake in setting the rules of the technological game. Canada can use this to advocate for safe and responsible use of technology, reinforcing liberal values. Canada requires value-added products and services to prosper, which would create a technical specialist role, create passive income through IP, and create opportunities for collaboration with international partners. Otherwise, Canada may continue to face a drain on talent and patents, remaining ill-equipped to handle the new emerging frontiers of security.

Speaker Four: Dr. Luca Ratti (Professor, University of Rome III)

Dr. Ratti outlined the various historical crossroads that NATO has faced and advocated for its ability to resurrect itself. NATO’s history of adaptation makes it well-equipped to be able to handle various challenges and structural changes, suggesting that there should be a more positive outlook on the future of the Alliance. He noted how the crossroads today look different than before; there will certainly be setbacks, but the need to pivot is not a new experience.

Dr. Ratti went on to outline four major dynamics for the current resurrection of NATO: the revival of American leadership; the need for Europe to back up its defence promises with concrete action; the consolidation of the Nordic and Eastern flanks; and the consolidation of NATO’s values. The first two points both create an opportunity for transformation within European members, where countries can begin to strengthen their commitments and capabilities. This will create a stronger NATO, and in doing so, a stronger Europe. The final two points emphasize the need for geographic and ideological consolidation; the two newest members, Sweden and Finland, demonstrate good progress in consolidating flanks closest to Russia, leaving hope for the future. Finally, the neoliberal values of NATO need to be reaffirmed and fully committed too. The fractures between neoliberalism versus more traditional conservative ideologies have caused internal conflict, polarization, and an overall lack of cohesion, leaving NATO vulnerable.

Speaker Five: Dr. David Sichinava (Adjunct Research Professor, ĐÓ°ÉÔ­´´ University)

Dr. Sichinava presented the results of his survey research conducted in Estonia, Latvia, Armenia, and Georgia. The goal of the study was to track the perception of public and security issues in the Baltics and South Caucasus. Conducted via interviews, the result provided interesting information regarding perceived threats, sentiments regarding allies, as well as challenges perceived by citizens. His study measured many different questions, however a few key ones stood out.

Regarding the perception of the biggest threat to their country, publics in Estonia, Latvia, and Georgia all ranked Russia as the first; Armenia ranked Azerbaijan as its leading concern. Political instability was the second biggest threat to all. The impact of actors like Russia, China, and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) were mixed, but generally skewed negatively (especially in Baltic states). Alternatively, Western organizations were seen more positively, though with mixed answers in the South Caucasus. Publics in the Baltics voiced strong support for the West, stating they believed the West would come to their aid in the case of an attack. Other countries however, still charged themselves with their own protection and survival. The impact of Canada was seen positively in the Baltics and inconclusive elsewhere.

Important conclusions drawn from the study include notes reflecting on the positive perceptions towards NATO and the European Union (EU) continuing to be common, even in the South Caucasus, where much uncertainty and distrust remains. This means there is still space for organizations that promote neoliberal values to connect with the population and mitigate autocratic influence. Additionally, in the South Caucasus, an area especially vulnerable to malign influence, there is a strong awareness and readiness to mobilize against threatening actors.

Speaker Six: Dr. Mihai Sebe (Lecturer, University of Bucharest and Head of the European Affairs Department; European Institute of Romania)

The final speaker of the panel discussed the importance of the Black Sea in the shifting geopolitical context, advocating for NATO to pay more attention to this region. The Black Sea region (BSR) is both a critical target for Russian threats, and a vital part of international trade with Europe. Dr. Sebe suggested that Romania as an important emerging actor in this region, highlighting its strategic geography and ongoing security initiatives. Critical to Romania’s strategy to defend the Black Sea is the Danube River, an important trade route that connects to the Balkans and beyond, which Dr. Sebe argued must be better utilized.

Looking to the future, the rebuilding of Ukraine will involve these trade routes, further underscoring its importance. Productive involvement from the BSR necessitates better and deeper cooperation with TĂĽrkiye, an area of opportunity.

A key part of Russia’s actions in the BSR is the development of hybrid tactics, which NATO needs to improve its responses to. Dr. Sebe pointed to the increasing automation of warfare, which has several important security implications, including the need for improved general regulation of technology, especially in domains of artificial intelligence (AI). In conclusion, the Eastern flank and BSR continue to experience rapid developments; NATO must be prepared to support and respond to these challenges.

Panel Two: Policymakers and Practitioners

Our second panel brought together four practitioners from the fields of defence, foreign policy, and diplomacy. Their discussions largely concentrated on the concrete steps already being taken to bolster NATO’s defence capabilities, as well as the strategic initiatives shaping the Alliance’s future trajectory.

Speaker One: H.E. Witold Dzielski (Ambassador, Embassy of Poland)

Witold Dzielski, Abassador to the Embassy of Poland, took the time to discuss the commitments that Poland has made towards NATO spending, bolstering the Eastern flank, as well as improvements that can be made to the strategic defence of Europe. As one of the top spenders in NATO, Poland has invested a greal deal in procurement, providing a robust defence framework. Dzielski also highlighted the extensive defence partnership that exist between Poland and Canada. The two have a long history of joint military cooperation and training bilaterally, as well as through NATO exercises. He noted how Canada recognizes the significant contributions of Poland in supporting Ukrainian refugees at the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion, as well as Ukrainian resilience and defence capabilities overall. For Canada, deepening its ties with Poland is an important strategic move. This is reflected through the recent announcement from Prime Minister Mark Carney and Prime Minister Donald Tusk that they will continue to enhance interoperability and collaboration. This will be an important move in reaffirming Canadian partnerships to cement its role in defending European security.

Speaker Two: Eric Laporte (Executive Director, Defence and Security Relations Division, Global Affairs)

Eric Laporte focused on discussing how the framework of decision-making and strategy-setting have changed. He suggests that we are witnessing a reversion back to “classical” geopolitical norms and dynamics, in which power politics, balancing behaviour, and strategic interdependence are growing increasing important, accompanied by renewed concerns over absolute gains. There is also a renewed focus on deterrence as countries seek to contain various malign actors.

For Canada, key questions on sovereignty have emerged: what is sovereign capability? And what does it look like in a Canadian context? Important to agenda-setting will be determining what Canada needs in order to reinforce its independent capabilities, and how this will be acquired. Laporte also emphasized that the way hard power is implemented has changed, influencing the direction of spending.

Laporte ended with a reflection on how NATO is being enhanced through transformation, as the Alliance adapts itself to respond to a new reality. He outlines some key developments from Canada that should boost innovation in defence technology. First, a new climate change centre in Quebec that addresses the unique security risks that are emerging as a result of climate change; and second, the NATO Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) has opened its North American Regional Office in Halifax, Nova Scotia. These recent events indicate important ways that Canada is contributing to NATO’s ongoing transformation.

Speaker Three: Kerry-Lynn Nankivell (Director, NATO and Europe, ADM(Pol) Department of National Defence)

Nankivell discussed the importance of policy alignment between Canada, NATO, the Department of National Defence (DND), and Global Affairs Canada (GAC). She identified a high level of alignment with NATO through the replication of key bureaucratic structures in Canada’s defence policymaking. She also emphasized that DND and GAC work closely together to ensure objectives and procedures are closely aligned, creating a robust policy framework for Canada. Canada is responding to not only Russia, but also the threat of Russia with others. This creates a need for a comprehensive defence plan between Canada and others in the international community.

Nankivell identified several challenges that need to be resolved, including responsible spending, which is an area of increasing concern and responsibility. She also identifies challenges around innovation and increasing the amount of available personnel for the CAF. She generally had a positive assessment towards the steps that Canada is making, and will be making, to ensure it establishes a productive role on the global stage.

Speaker Four: BGen Scott McKenzie (Director General, Canadian Joint Operations Command)

Scott McKenzie provided a presentation as a security practitioner on Canada’s ability to support NATO readiness. Canadian presence in Latvia has been a key part of this support, which has brought lessons and growth. The importance of pre-positioning was emphasized, where Canada participates in collective actions so that it can mobilize as fast as possible if a real threat occurs. Canada is increasingly participating in decision-making, rehearsals, plans, and drills which contributes to its role in NATO.

Since 2022, with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, NATO has been rapidly evolving and mobilizing, which Canada must ensure it keeps up with. McKenzie establishes that the fundamental problem facing NATO in regards to European security is its ability to demonstrate a sustained capacity to combat Russian threats over a long duration. The key to warding off Russia will be to demonstrate strength, which requires intense amounts of consolidation and cooperation. Consolidation remains an integral problem, as NATO countries still struggle to integrate forces on tactical and strategic levels. Countries also need to work on standardizing systems and equipment between each other to improve interoperability. Infrastructure also needs to be improved (ports, hospitals, borders, etc.) to enable rapid mobilization. This requires cooperation between militaries, governments, and private industries. Therefore, McKenzie advocates that overcoming logistical problems such as these are key to improving the effectiveness and success of NATO forces.

The post Event Report
NATO at a Crossroads: Present Challenges and Future Trajectories appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

Report Details: This event was held on Friday March 21st from 9:00 am to 5:00 pm to examine key security and defence issues in Eurasia and the Arctic regions that will shape Canada’s strategic landscape in 2025, particularly amid the uncertainty of a new U.S. presidential administration. As an Arctic country and NATO member, Canada has critical interests in evolving Northern and Eurasian security and defence environments. Canada has pledged to continue assistance to Ukraine and to safeguard its interests in the Arctic, has expanded its diplomatic presence in the Caucasus and must account for China’s ever-shifting global role, including in Central Asia. Bringing together scholars and practitioners, this conference will explore regional and global trends, identifying both emerging challenges and new opportunities for Canada in this complex security environment.

This event was organized by Eastern European and Transatlantic Network (EETN). For more, download the full report below:

The post EVENT REPORT: Navigating a Changed World: Security Challenges for Canada, Eurasia, and the Arctic appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

Overview: This hybrid event was held at ĐÓ°ÉÔ­´´ University aon Monday, April 7, 2025, from 4:00 pm to 5:30 pm, and co-hosted by the Eastern Europe and Transatlantic Network (EETN) and the Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence. The event featured a 50-minute lecture followed by a 40-minute Q&A discussion. Prof. Dr. Sven Biscop gave a compelling and timely lecture on the shifting realities of international politics, starting with Trump’s second presidency, followed by what it means for four key areas: Ukraine policy, European defence architecture, European decision-making, and global power politics.

Speaker: , lectures at Ghent University and leads the Europe in the World Programme at the Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations in Brussels. He is a member of the Royal Academy for Overseas Sciences of Belgium and an honorary fellow of the European Security and Defence College of the EU.

Lecture summary: After the actions taken by US President Donald Trump’s administration, Dr. Biscop emphasized that we must stop relying on incremental responses, rather than committing to preparing for worst-case scenarios and forging an independent path forward for Europe. He outlined three of his guiding principles on which decision-makers can ground their strategies going forward: Trump will continue siding with Putin; there is the possibility of a J.D Vance’s presidency following Trump; Europe will be left on its own if there is to be a conventional war with Russia. Dr. Biscop elaborated on the following four key points:

Ukraine Policy

In response to Trump’s sidelining of both Ukraine and its allies, all the while undermining NATO solidarity, Europe must take the lead in shaping Ukraine’s security and future. Dr. Biscop argued that increasing defence spending and uniting Europe will aid in securing the continent rather than retrenching within national borders.

Europe should continue the EU accession process for Ukraine, maintain its independent sanction policy, and provide military support via the “coalition of the willing.”

Establishing a reassurance force to provide a security guarantee to deter further Russian aggression, ensuring Ukraine’s future security after a potential ceasefire.

Abandoning Ukraine would risk losing Moldova, Georgia, and other strategic access to the resources of Caucasus and connection with Central Asia while allowing Russia to expand its influence in eastern Europe.

If a ceasefire is reached, confirmation through the UN Security Council would be a novel way of pressuring China while ensuring Russian compliance given it would be politically difficult to veto their own ceasefire.

European Defense and Security Architecture

The EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has fallen short due to its internal paradox – European governments do not trust a scheme for the harmonization of defence planning that does not include the US. However, it is vital that this scheme is implemented as the US may not join. Currently, without the strategic power that US provides, Europe has a sizeable force that is unable to achieve full operational coherency.

• Developing a European pillar within NATO and its defence planning process (not an EU-only pillar) ensures operational readiness without US support.
• Reaching military autonomy would require a shared investment in large-scale defence capabilities lasting at least 5 to 10 years, but planning must start now.
• The UK and France – Europe’s two nuclear powers – must be at the core, with other non-EU states like Canada, welcomed into the defence industrial framework through flexible cooperation.
• The role of the EU is to supports its member states to meet these targets by relaxing budgetary regulation, investing in the defence industry through the EU’s budget, reforming the borrowing power of member states, and facilitating coordination between member and partner states.
• Dr. Biscop emphasized the value of France’s independent nuclear arsenal, suggesting that an expanded French guarantee – co-funded by those under its protection – may be a viable path to a European nuclear backstop, while also prompting a reassessment of the UK’s American-dependent nuclear deterrent.

European Decision-Making

The European security architecture is complex and there is no single place to discuss all relevant aspects. Additionally, the current decision-making framework within the EU and NATO, which requires consensus or unanimity, is not agile enough to respond to today’s fast-moving geopolitical environment and crises. That is why an ad hoc format of the “coalition of the willing” must be implemented.

• The de facto war cabinet sits within the coalition of the willing and would include key states like France, the UK, Germany, Italy, and Poland, alongside institutional leaders.
• Non-EU countries like Canada and Turkey could be closely associated, as their involvement brings additional weight, legitimacy, military capability, and industrial mass.
• Such a coalition could eventually influence NATO’s command structure so that even if the US no longer wishes to act as the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe (SACEUR), Europeans can assume full and independent operational control.

Impact on the Great Power Politics

The world is not entering a “new” order, but rather returning to a multipolar system where great powers constantly compete, cooperate, and rival with each other, with the balance of power is consistently shifting. Furthermore, the unique post-WWII transatlantic alliance is unravelling, especially under Trump’s transactional approach, which may weaken trust and embolden adversaries.

Europe and Canada still have the resources, capabilities, and strategic options to act.

The erosion of US commitment to its allies signals that security guarantees can no longer be taken for granted, making the global environment more volatile.

The US under Trump is not replacing one alliance with another but with transactionalism.

China is neither a friend nor an enemy of Europe. There exists a plethora of issues that Europe and China can work cooperatively on, while remaining cautious and conditional in it approach.

Europe must now reinforce ties with like-minded middle powers, such as Canada and Global South countries, who share an interest in maintaining a rules-based international order and avoiding a global cold war between US and China.

The retreating of the US and its undermining of multilateral architecture raises the question of whether a multilateral system is viable without US.

The post EVENT REPORT: The The Rediscovery of Great Power Politics, Presented by Dr. Sven Biscop appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

Report Details: The event, which took place on January 31st, covered various topics concerning defence and security issues in the South Caucasus. Some participants discussed the future of peace talks and conflict resolutions in Armenia and Georgia regarding the ongoing political turmoil. Geographical disputes and election results framed presentations on protests and regional tensions within the Caucasus. Finally, a look at Canada’s role in supporting the security and development challenges facing Armenia and Georgia rounded out the presentations, leaving participants thinking about how to approach these issues from an international perspective. 

This event was organized by the Eastern Europe and Transatlantic Network (EETN).

For more, download the full report below.

The post Event Report: Armenia and Georgia on the Edge appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

Sneak Peak: The 30 October 2024 hybrid expert panel conference on the results of the 26 October 2024 Georgian elections was held at ĐÓ°ÉÔ­´´ University, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, and in a virtual format via Zoom.

This event was organized by the Eastern Europe and Transatlantic Network (EETN) and the Institute of Russian and Eurasian Studies (EURUS) at ĐÓ°ÉÔ­´´ University in context of the Georgian Parliamentary election, which determined the country’s path to either a pro-European or pro-Russian orientation. The event hosted academic experts from Canada and Georgia to discuss the integrity of the election results, and the domestic, geopolitical, security, and future implications thereof, given the anti-Western sentiment in the re-elected governing party, Georgian Dream. 

For more, download the full report below.

The post Event Report: Between Europe and Russia appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.