Introduction

Since the 1970s, the European Economic Community (EEC)/European Union (EU) has sought to play a complementary role to the United States (US) in the pursuit of security and stability in the Middle East. This has occurred mostly through soft security measures: diplomacy; economic and financial aid to Palestinians; civilian missions focused on stability; and dialogue with Arab states. In this regard, it is worth mentioning the Euro-Arab Dialogue: a political and economic cooperation framework launched in 1974 between the EEC and the Arab League to strengthen the relationship between the parties after the Yom Kippur War and oil crisis. However, despite these efforts, the limits of the EU’s unique institutional set-up have prevented it from playing a major role in regional affairs. The ongoing war in the Gaza Strip between Israel and Hamas has highlighted the limits of the EU’s diplomatic action. In the meantime, President Donald Trump’s Peace Plan for Gaza has re-energized, once again, the role of the , prompting some to draw historical parallels to earlier US-brokered efforts – from Camp David to the failed Oslo Accords. What role could the EU play in the American plan? How can its involvement be decisive to achieve a just and lasting peace in the region?

Context

The 2006 electoral victory of Hamas in the Gaza Strip led to a severe escalation with Israel. With Hamas taking over the territory from the Fatah-controlled Palestinian Authority (PA), Israel considered the Palestinian military group a security threat, as it refused to recognize the Jewish state, renounce violence, or accept previous peace agreements brokered by the PA and Israel. Hamas’ accession to power in 2006 constituted a critical historical juncture that transformed governance in Gaza and its overall relationship with Israel. This shift was accompanied by the return of a range of familiar political practices – including diplomatic negotiations, economic sanctions, and ongoing military engagement – that continue to define this governance period.

In the meantime, two other factors made the relationship between the parties more strained. On the one hand, on November 29, 2012, the , which upgraded Palestine from a “non-member observer entity” to a “non-member observer State.” This historic vote granted Palestine implicit recognition of statehood and was seen as a move to revive the two-state solution, a move strongly opposed by the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. On the other hand, the US-brokered Abraham Accords were signed in 2020, aiming to normalize diplomatic, economic, and security relations between Israel and several Arab nations (including the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan). Palestinians overwhelmingly opposed the Abraham Accords, perceiving the agreements as an abandonment of the long-standing consensus among Arab states that negotiations with Israel were contingent on ending occupation.

On October 7, 2023, Hamas initiated an attack on Israel. . The Israeli response was a full-scale military invasion of the Gaza Strip which, by December 2025, has killed 71,266 Palestinians, left most schools and hospitals in ruins, and caused long-term damage to the local society and economy.

The EU’s response to Gaza was characterized by contradictions and divisions between its member states. Some countries such as Czech Republic, Austria, Hungary, Italy, and Germany, stood with Israel, backing its military campaign and avoiding criticism of Netanyahu’s regime. Other governments, such as Belgium, Spain, France and Ireland – while strongly condemning Hamas – called for a ceasefire and criticized Israel for violating international humanitarian law. These differing positions prevented the EU from having a coordinated stance at the UN when voting on a on December 12, 2023, which called for a humanitarian ceasefire.

Divergencies appeared not only between member states but also across EU institutions. While European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen showed a stronger emphasis on Israel’s right to defence, the European Council issued a more cautious joint statement aimed at highlighting the EU as a unified voice. The statement took a more neutral tone than President von der Leyen, emphasizing both Israel’s right to defence as well as the crucial need for humanitarian aid, civilian protection, and adherence to international law. A third voice, EU’s foreign policy chief Josep Borrell, was more critical of Israel, . The inertia resulting from lack of consensus among member states and across institutions severely undermines the EU’s position as mediator, letting the Americans play a leading role once again.

On September 29, 2025, President Trump announced his plan to “end the Gaza war” and address the broader Middle Eastern crisis. The so-called was negotiated with the consultation of Arab states, namely Egypt, Qatar and Türkiye. The EU played no formal role in the negotiations; it made no proposals of its own, despite being both a major donor to Palestine and an important partner of Israel.

Endorsed by UN Security Council , Trump’s plan includes the deployment of an International Stabilization Force (ISF) in Gaza, a multinational military body that will ensure the demilitarization and security of the Gaza Strip; and the creation of a Board of Peace (BoP), a committee led by Trump that will oversee the political transition in Gaza until a reformed Palestinian Authority can take over governance in 2027. Formally launched at the 56th World Economic Forum in January 2026, the BoP claims its main purpose is the promotion of peacekeeping all around the world, not only in Gaza. Countries wishing to participate in the BoP are required to contribute US$1 billion to the organization to renew their membership, and Trump, as its chairman, is not subject to term limits, holding the sole authority to nominate his successor.

to ending the war in Gaza; however, many EU member states have expressed concern over the possibility of the BoP overshadowing the role of the UN. Currently, Bulgaria and Hungary are the only two EU countries to have joined the initiative. France, Spain, Poland, and Germany declined to participate, while Italy, Romania, Greece and Cyprus joined as observers. The EU Commission also decided to join as an observer, sending the Commissioner for the Mediterranean, Dubravka Šuica, to Washington, DC, to attend the inaugural meeting of the BoP on February 19, 2026. In a sign of continued disunity, , calling it a “mistake”, as the EU supports a two-state solution and “cannot participate” in any body that excludes the Palestinian National Authority.

Problems

Even if Trump’s plan represents an important step towards a peace deal, it contains critical aspects which might hinder its implementation. The current plan effectively grants Israel a veto power over peace, as its military redeployments are conditioned on Hamas’ demilitarization and reform of the PA. At the same time, Israel is not required to make any formal commitments towards halting settlement expansion in the West Bank or respecting the autonomy of a Palestinian state. On this issue Israel’s stance is clear: Netanyahu declared that , as it is an “existential threat to Israel.” Therefore, there is a real risk that, without guarantees for the Palestinian people and a plan to address occupation, Trump’s plan may fail or lead to an unjust and unstable peace agreement that steamrolls Palestinian rights and territories recognized by international law.

On the other hand, Trump’s peace plan has confirmed that the US continues to play a . However, some , such as Francesca Albanese, Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian Occupied Territory, criticized the plan. UN Special Adviser on Sustainability, Jeffrey Sachs, labelled the US proposal as “.” According to them, Trump is behaving in Gaza like a 19th-century colonial broker, placing himself at the helm of the BoP to oversee a foreign territory’s governance, with the overall aim of advancing US interests in the region. The Middle East has figured prominently in the first and second Trump administrations’ foreign policy. President Trump’s main goal is to broker agreements between Israel and other Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, to . This attitude could prove counterproductive and place EU interests at risk.

Strategic Outlook and Policy Recommendations

A more active role of the EU in the region is necessary to guarantee success and counter risks of instability, which may have severe implications for European security, including energy supply limitations, new security threats, and an increase of migration and refugee flows. It is in the EU’s interest to enhance its influence in the region. What practical steps should the EU take to avoid marginalization and make a meaningful contribution to peace?

1. The EU should consider holding an enhanced observer status at the BoP as a necessary counterweight to US and Israeli pressures and hegemony in decision-making. Of course, the EU has to maintain a steadfast commitment to strengthening and reforming the UN, confirming it as the core of a rules-based international order and multilateralism. However, enhanced observer status at the BoP could allow the EU to monitor negotiations and participate in debates specifically devoted to making interventions, peace proposals, and amendments. The presence of the EU, with its traditional concern for Palestinian issues, could ensure meaningful Palestinian involvement. This is fundamental to legitimate the transitory governance of the Gaza Strip and preserve Palestinian decision-making power. A more active EU at BoP could also contribute to reforming the PA.

The divergences between member states and across EU institutions negatively impact the EU’s international role. Therefore, the EU should take a cohesive stance on its participation at the BoP, bearing in mind some key arguments. Firstly, “” provides direct insight into how decisions are implemented, serving as a channel for influence. The EU is the largest donor to Palestinian recovery and its involvement in the BoP could help the EU shape outcomes rather than merely fund them, aligning its significant financial contributions with the necessary humanitarian, governance, and security strands of the peace plan. Moreover, “” is vital for influencing the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2803.

2. The EU should be part of the International Security Force. Together with The European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) Rafah Mission and EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS), involvement in the ISF could contribute to the maintenance of the ceasefire. Participation in the ISF could enhance European influence on Israel, for example, by convincing the Israeli government to review its settlement policy and improve living conditions for the Palestinians.

3. The EU should use economic and financial tools to enhance its political influence. On the Palestinian side, the European Commission recently . On the Israeli side, the EU should overcome its reluctances and suspend the EU-Israel Association Agreement if the Israeli government continues to violate human rights in Gaza, as required by Article 2 of the Agreement. The suspension of this Agreement could influence Israel to respect the , following preliminary rulings about a “plausible” genocide occurring in Gaza. The EU could link Israeli participation in EU funding programs, such as Horizon Europe, to the full withdrawal from Gaza, the end of settlements in the West Bank, and apartheid policy against Palestinians.

4. The EU should invest in the implementation of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), an economic initiative designed to enhance connectivity and integration between Asia, the Middle East, and Europe, based on three pillars: energy, transportation, and digital connectivity. IMEC should be a core interest for Europeans, as it , increasing political and economic ties between participating counties. Moreover, it could enhance the EU’s political influence in the area, counterbalancing China and the US. The implementation of some projects as part of the IMEC – such as the EastMed Gas Pipeline – could make the EU a relevant player in terms of future economic cooperation projects, allowing it to increase its weight in the Middle East peace process.

The EU could influence, for example, the implementation of the so-called “Green Blue Deal” between Jordan and Israel, which provides for the supply of water from Israel in exchange for Jordanian supplies of solar power. The Gaza war stopped the project, but the ceasefire created hope that it may be relaunched in such a way that the Gaza Strip and the West Bank can also benefit from it.

Conclusion

While the US commitment has been the sine qua non for a ceasefire in Gaza, the EU holds key cards to ensure the successful implementation of Trump’s peace plan. With its traditional regional approach, a more active observer role of the EU in the BoP and its participation in the ISF could balance American – and Israeli – influence and ensure a more equitable peace solution. In doing so, it may also help ensure that Palestinian rights recognized by international law are considered against the backdrop of ongoing ceasefire and conflict negotiations. In addition, the use of economic leverage as well as the implementation of the IMEC corridor could enhance the EU political weight in the area, preventing the dawn of a new era of regional instability and insecurity with direct impact on Europe itself.

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Introduction

In recent years, Europe’s geopolitical centre of gravity has shifted toward the Northeast, with the Baltic region emerging as a . As , the Organization’s member countries are increasingly focused on deterrence and defence. Traditional conceptions of deterrence are constructed around three pillars: . This memo focuses on the second “C” â€“ credibility â€“ by examining prospects for strengthening the resilience of NATO’s military supply chains in the Baltic region through defence industrial cooperation between the three enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) framework nations (Canada, Germany, and the United Kingdom (UK)) and the three host nations (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia). 

As a response to Russia’s military aggression and hybrid warfare against Ukraine since 2014, the 2016 NATO Warsaw summit marked a significant step towards reinforcing the security of the Baltic region. Canada, Germany, and the UK assumed leadership as framework nations for eFP battlegroups in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, respectively. While the eFP signals a strong multinational Allied presence in the Baltic states, lessons from Ukraine since 2022 inevitably raise critical questions: is NATO ready to fight for a prolonged period? And can NATO secure supply chains so that they remain close to the war fighters? 

This policy brief first analyses how resilient supply chains lay the foundation for credible long-term deterrence. Second, it examines the role and prospects of defence industrial cooperation between eFP framework nations and host nations, before finally concluding with three concrete policy recommendations.  

WhyĚýDoesĚýSecurity of Supply Matter?Ěý

There is an old saying attributed to Dwight. E. Eisenhower that . It is also true that , as each nation brings its own peculiarities while the combined force must act as a single organization. To put this into perspective, the Canadian-led NATO Multinational Brigade in Latvia (formerly, the eFP battlegroup) is composed of 14 nations, making it NATO’s  military unit. 

Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, NATO began scaling the three eFP battlegroups in the Baltics into brigade-sized units. Germany’s 45^th Panzer brigade has been relocated to Lithuania and is expected to achieve . Canada is also considering  in Latvia.  

Regardless of how its war against Ukraine ends, Russia will remain an existential security threat to the Baltic states. To deter and, if necessary, defend against Russia in the Baltic region, NATO Allies â€“ especially the eFP framework nations â€“ must demonstrate both the capacity and the resolve to fight alongside the host nations for as long as it takes to defend NATO territory. This, in turn, requires a continuous and resilient flow of supplies through to the battlefield.  

While experts have called for the  to sustain operational capability in the longer term, this approach has clear limitations – most importantly because stockpiles are finite in the event of a prolonged conflict. To secure an uninterrupted supply, it is essential to develop local defence industrial capacities. 

Security of supply extends beyond the availability of raw materials and manufacturing components. Latvia’s  defines security of supply as a guarantee of access to the materiel and services required by the National Armed Forces to fulfil its tasks. This understanding emphasizes that the defence industrial base is an integral part of comprehensive defence strategy across the peace-crisis-war spectrum. It also implies that the defence industries of eFP host nations must be able to supply not only their national militaries but also Allied armed forces. However, defence industries in the Baltic states, while growing rapidly, are still relatively nascent, and there may not be sufficient latent industrial capacity to scale up production quickly in time of crisis.  

Failure to secure military supply chains would pose strategic risks that are particularly acute given the geographic characteristics of the Baltic states. A close proximity to Russia and reliance on the roughly 65km-wide  to link the region to the rest of Europe exacerbate supply vulnerabilities. To ensure that NATO forces deployed in the region can fight a prolonged war, it is necessary to establish short, resilient, and regionally-anchored military supply chains and, at the same time, to deepen defence industrial cooperation between the eFP framework nations and host nations. 

Enhancing the Enhanced Forward PresenceĚý

The  posits that the Baltic states constitute a single area of operations. This means that regional cooperation should be understood as a key enabler of credible deterrence and effective defence. This logic applies not only to trilateral Baltic cooperation but also among all Allies deployed in the region.  

To improve coordination between the three framework nations and the three host nations, the  was launched in 2023. Although it was originally envisaged as a platform for political and strategic dialogue in areas of common interest, such as training and exercises, it also holds untapped potential to serve as a venue for industrial cooperation and joint supply chain management. 

There are already examples of bilateral cooperation in this area. Recently, the Latvian Ministry of Defence signed a  (MoU) with the Canadian Commercial Corporation â€“ Canada’s government-to-government contracting agency –  concerning bilateral cooperation in military equipment, services, infrastructure, and industry. 

However, since the Baltics consider themselves to be a single area of operations, a broader relationship of regional cooperation between the framework and host nations is needed. Dialogue must take place at all levels – political, strategic, operational, tactical, as well as between defence industries. Regular information sharing and practical measures to harmonize defence investment and industrial policies will strengthen the security of supply and help forge new defence industrial partnerships.

WhatĚýDo Host Nations Have to Offer?Ěý

The three host nations are  in NATO. With defence budgets reaching 5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2026, the Baltic states are actively developing local defence industrial capabilities. In recent years, . There are notable success stories, such as the production of  and subsequent expansion into assembly and maintenance of more advanced systems such as . Nevertheless, the Baltic defence industries remain primarily focused on niche technological areas and generally lack the scale to support full production cycles of heavy armaments or other advanced military systems. At the same time, their relatively small size makes Baltic defence industries flexible, innovation-oriented, and able to rapidly adapt. 

This environment creates opportunities for foreign defence companies to enter the market and address the existing gaps in cooperation with local partners. As of 2025, all three framework nations allocate at least 2% of GDP to defence and have committed to increase defence expenditure up to 5% of GDP by 2035. Consequently, there is a strong push to build homegrown . 

Recently, German defence companies have been particularly active in the Baltic states. For example,  to establish 155mm artillery ammunition production facilities. More recently, Lithuania Defense Services, a joint venture established in 2022 by Rheinmetall and KNDS Germany, announced plans to .  

 and  are also pursuing ambitious efforts to expand their defence industrial capacities. For example, a Canadian company  to establish assembly lines for its BlackWolf tactical armoured vehicles in Latvia. Of the three eFP framework nations, such partnerships are especially relevant for Canada given the geographical distance between Canada and the Baltic region. Partnering Canadian defence industry with local companies in Latvia not only facilitates access to new markets but also helps build viable defence industrial capacity in the Baltic states for warfighting purposes, especially in a prolonged conflict.  

This logic extends beyond the manufacture of original equipment to also encompass access to critical components and materials. For example, last year the Canadian company â€“ a component that is essential for sensors and electronic systems widely used in defence technology, such as aircraft, missiles, and drones. 

The new geopolitical reality, growing defence budgets, and commitment to develop defence industrial capabilities underscore the need to coordinate defence investment and industrial policies within the 3+3 format. Such coordination would help secure military supply chains precisely where they are needed the most. This approach would align with broader NATO efforts to ramp up defence industrial capacities, such as  and .  

Conclusions andĚýRecommendationsĚý

Secured supply chains through defence industrial cooperation are not just desirable; they are a strategic necessity for credible deterrence. Since its creation, , from which the defence industries of framework and host nations stand to benefit. 

To harness the potential of defence industrial cooperation within the 3+3 format, the policymakers in the three framework nations and the three host nations should consider the following actions: 

1. Expand the Scope of 3+3 Format to Include Defence Industrial Cooperation.  

TheĚý3+3ĚýagendaĚýshouldĚýbeĚýbroadened byĚýhavingĚýregular meetings of keyĚýrepresentativesĚý– such asĚýNational Armaments DirectorsĚý–Ěýfrom the Baltic states, Canada, Germany, and theĚýUKĚýto promote dialogue, coordinate policies,Ěýand identify opportunitiesĚýforĚýdefence industrial cooperation andĚýstrengtheningĚýsecurity of supplyĚýacross the region.ĚýĚý

2. Establish an Annual 3+3 Defence Industry Forum.  

To facilitate the establishment of cross-border partnerships between defence companies, regular and open dialogue is essential. As several bilateral defence industry events already exist, a dedicated 3+3 Defence Industry Forum could be built on these foundations, providing a multilateral platform for collaboration. 

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Host nations and framework nations should invest in new production facilities and reinforce supply chains for the militaries deployed in the Baltic region. Framework nations’ defence industry national champions should take a leading role and integrate host nations’ defence industries into regional supply chains. This approach would promote transfer of knowledge and technology, as well as strengthen the overall capacity to sustain operations over a prolonged period. 

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Executive Summary  

Transatlantic relations are currently facing growing uncertainty due to significant strategic divergences in the fields of trade, security, technology, and global governance. From the trade tariff disputes to President of the United States (US) Donald Trump’s territorial claims on Greenland, ties between the European Union (EU) and the US are under growing stress. This tension has heavy repercussions on the EU and its member states. Fears about an effective transatlantic decoupling have reenergized calls for the EU to acquire a capacity to act on its own. In this context, Canada can play a decisive role. Stronger EU-Canada cooperation could provide an answer to this new strategic anxiety. It would also allow to reduce dependency on the US and help develop both Canadian and European strategic autonomy.  

Changing Transatlantic Relations: An Opening for Deeper Canada-EU Ties 

While the first Trump administration tested traditional transatlantic relations, Trump’s second term has marked a significant recalibration of US foreign policy that has fundamentally challenged the core values that have underpinned this relationship for the last 80 years. From recurring trade tariff disputes to territorial claims over Greenland, Trump’s actions have often questioned â€“ and even opposed â€“ the US’s role as the principal guarantor of transatlantic stability and security. His administration has delegitimized multilateralism in favour of a “selective engagement” strategy with individual US partners. The recent US , released in November 2025, formalized this major shift in American foreign policy. This new strategy reorders global priorities, reframes NATO Allies’ roles, and seeks stability in Europe to allow Washington to redirect its focus and resources to the Indo-Pacific and the Western Hemisphere. At the same time, it adopts  toward the EU, portraying it as a source of instability and accusing it of undermining political liberty, sovereignty, and social cohesion. 

These dynamics raise fundamental questions about the stability, predictability, and future shape of the transatlantic relationship. For the EU, the implications are immediate: increased strategic risk, reduced certainties, and stronger pressure to develop autonomous capabilities and diversified partnerships. 

Why Canada Matters to the EU (and why the EU Matters to Canada) 

In this rapidly-changing international environment marked by geopolitical fragmentation, erratic US behaviour, and Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine, the EU must meet three conditions in order to become a more credible and decisive actor at the global level: one, it must sway sufficient economic power; two, it must demonstrate political will to act cohesively both amongst its member states and with its international partners; and three, it must be perceived as a legitimate and credible entity by other . 

To achieve these conditions, the EU needs to strengthen its ties with like-minded democracies, such as . Among them, Canada appears as an especially natural and highly compatible partner for the EU. Throughout the last 50 years, Canada and the EU have built an exemplary partnership based on shared democratic values and worldview. But in today’s challenging global landscape, the EU and Canada stand together more firmly than ever as stable and trusted partners. And while the  and  serve as the foundation of the contemporary EU-Canada relationship, increased cooperation to both reinforce current areas of coopetition – such as security and defence â€“ as well as joint ventures in new sectors â€“ including the digital domain – will play key roles in the near future.

Security and Defence Cooperation Between Canada and the EU: A Win-Win Opportunity 

Canada’s contribution to European security and defence policy is hardly new: Ottawa has been a valued contributor to EU-led security and defence efforts for over a decade. It was the first country to establish a Security and Defence Dialogue with the EU in 2015; it participates in  and has contributed to . 

However, at the 20^th EU–Canada Summit in Brussels last June, AntĂłnio Costa, President of the European Council, Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, and Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada, together pledged to further strengthen their bilateral cooperation. Both sides committed to an ambitious and comprehensive partnership, the new , aimed at deepening cooperation across key areas such as trade, security, energy and other critical sectors. 

As part of their re-energized relationship, the EU High Representative of Foreign Affairs, Kaja Kallas, the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Anita Anand, and the Canadian Minister of Defense, David J. McGuinty, also signed the , which provides a framework for cooperation on cyber defence, hybrid threats, space security, maritime issues, crisis response and assistance to partners, such as Ukraine. This agreement also includes provisions for joint research in emerging technologies, which can help position both Canada and the EU as global leaders in these fields.  

This new agreement importantly lays the groundwork for increased defence procurement collaboration, primarily related to the EU’s . It also opened the door for   â€“ a new European loan instrument for joint procurement – and for an administrative arrangement between Canada and the European Defence Agency, the body that supports cooperative European  and provides a forum for European ministries of defence to coordinate their policies. As a result of this increased cooperation, both Brussels and Ottawa have made tangible steps to diversify their defence partnership and become less reliant and vulnerable to Washington’s shifting moods on collective security. Similarly, this new agreement enhances the resiliency of the European pillar within NATO, without either undermining the NATO Alliance or trying to substitute it. 

New Areas of Cooperation in the Digital Domain 

As part of their cooperative efforts, the Canadian Minister of Artificial Intelligence and Digital Innovation, Evan Solomon, and the Executive Vice-President of the European Commission for Technological Sovereignty, Security and Democracy, Henna Virkkunen, have also agreed to strengthen cooperation in the . On 8 December 2025, the first meeting of the EU-Canada Digital Partnership Council took place in Montreal, Quebec. The  made at the conclusion of that meeting showed that both sides recognized the importance that digital partnership plays in advancing bilateral efforts to boost competitiveness, innovation, and economic resilience. This meeting also resulted in Canada and the EU  This meeting also resulted in Canada and the , one on cooperation on artificial intelligence, and another on digital credentials, digital identity wallets, and trust services. This new partnership will guide collaboration on AI governance, quantum technologies, cybersecurity, and digital standards. The  of this partnership is to build digital systems that are secure, transparent, and centred on public trust.

Conclusion

The ongoing reconfiguration of US foreign policy and the end of predictable transatlantic relations have led the EU and its member states to reconsider their strategic goals and explore alternative strategies to promote their own interests and societal well-being. In this context, cooperation with Canada would be a win-win opportunity, allowing both sides to reduce dependencies on the US and bolster collective defence capabilities without undermining NATO. Strengthening the EU-Canada relationship could also help show other countries that â€“ in an era of re-emerging great power rivalry â€“ there is still an opportunity for states to create and benefit from collective partnerships. 

Policy Recommendations  

In order to make the EU-Canada cooperation effective and concrete, both sides should consider the following policy recommendations: 

• Take an active approach to , including encouragement of domestic defence industries to actively utilize this instrument to gain increased access to external markets. 

• Encourage all EU member states to ratify CETA, as only 17 member states have ratified the agreement thus far. Finalizing the ratification of CETA would ensure stability and continuity for the agreement and would signal increased confidence in the overall Canada-EU trade relationship going forward.  

• Strengthen efforts aimed at enhancing their bilateral , to advance and diversify trade, promote economic security and resilience, and create investment opportunities. 

• Increase cooperation in the extraction and trading of . Deepening ties in this area could help reduce dependencies on unreliable partners while strengthening internal supply chains.  

• Improve cooperation on  while at the same time continue working together in order to balance innovation with ethical considerations and standards. This includes joint investments on AI-driven sustainability solutions, the adoption of accountability measures for violators of AI regulations, and the enforcement of policies that support both technological advancement and societal well-being. 

• Utilize the strong EU-Canada relationship as a stepping stone to reinforce multilateral partnerships with like-minded democratic partners, such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, and Taiwan. 

The post Not just the United States: Canada and the Future of European Transatlantic Cooperation appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

The current geopolitical climate has increased fears surrounding war and instability across the transatlantic. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has brought along with it a rapidly changing conventional mode of warfare to the European continent for the first time in decades, destabilizing a previous sense of peace. In addition to traditional warfighting, several malign actors – including revisionist actors such as Russia Federation and the People’s Republic of China – are increasingly using hybrid tactics in hopes of destabilizing the relationship between NATO members. Importantly, hybrid warfare includes tactics that fall short of traditional armed aggression but nonetheless have adverse effects against their target and broader citizenry, including disinformation and propaganda campaigns, offensive cyber operations, espionage, and attacks on critical infrastructure. Since 2022, numerous European states – such as Germany, Poland, France, and the Baltics – have identified an increase in hybrid attacks as a prominent part of this rapidly changing and uncertain threat landscape. Most recently, these attempts to breach NATO sovereignty and place a strain on partnerships have taken the form of cyber attacks, drone incursions, and disinformation campaigns. The rise in hybrid warfare has thus generated questions on how NATO may improve its collective responses to evolving tactics in such an uncertain international landscape. Article 5 remains a core part of the Alliance’s defensive operations but is facing questions regarding its overall effectiveness. This is largely due to the challenges created by grey-scale conflicts in establishing concrete and cohesive countermeasures. New types of war are challenging traditional conventions of collective defence, and require NATO to adapt. By analyzing the mechanisms of Article 5, it becomes evident that additional safeguards should be implemented to reinforce the power of collective defence.

Article 5 and NATO countermeasures

NATO was first formed in in the context of the Cold War. Its primary goal was to engage all Western partners in an attempt to shield them from influence of the Warsaw Pact. By declaring that an attack on one is an attack on all, Article 5 has constituted the foundation of the NATO alliance through its enshrining of the principle of collective defence. Article 5, however, does not define specifics of what constitutes an “armed attack,” nor what measures should be implemented when such an act occurs. The Article is intentionally vague in this respect, giving member states the room to maneuver and to respond on a case-by-case basis pursuant to a threat’s overall status. To trigger Article 5, a formal unanimous consensus must be reached among NATO members. Through its history, Article 5 has only been invoked once following the in New York City.

Article 4 is also an important element of collective defence, which gives members the right to call a . Article 4 was initially triggered at the outset of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 by Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. Since then, it has been triggered by and in response to Russian airspace violations[KN1]. Most recently, Romanian officials discussed using Article 4 after a Article 4 is an essential tool for countries to collaborate on defence responses, which is even more important now as threats are increasingly unconventional and unprecedented.

This escalation of hybrid warfare has challenged traditional assumptions and led to questions of what collective defence may look like in the twenty-first century. Since 2016, , including cyber attacks. At the Madrid Summit in 2022, the , formalizing their strategy against hybrid threats. The Alliance generally outlined their commitment to building resilience through preparedness, deterrence, and defence. Several coordinated initiatives, such as and counter-hybrid support teams, have strengthened collective resilience. NATO continues to also work at being a ; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents; critical infrastructure; cyber defence; energy security; and international terrorism. At a glance, this signals that NATO is adopting a multitude of policies, frameworks, and teams to address threats of hybrid attacks; however, . Article 4 consultations have helped to address airspace incursions, but a wide range of other threats have yet to be formally addressed. Article 5 has thus far not been invoked. A major problem remains, however, one which does not stem from the Treaty itself but rather countermeasures that are not cohesive or consistent enough. To improve NATO’s positioning against hybrid threats, a better framework and strategy must be adopted, which can in turn clarify the use of Article 5 in grey-scale conflict.

Next steps?

A major question surrounding Article 5 is determining how severe of an attack may call for its invocation. Would it be the cutting of a major undersea cable? A large-scale hacking incident? indicate that these threats would likely not be sufficient enough to call on collective defence. Hybrid attacks fundamentally operate below conventional thresholds on purpose. Therefore, NATO should move to assessing threats not only based on force (i.e. what hybrid tactics are equivalent to an armed attack), but rather, focus on aggregate impact on a target country. While one singular attack is unlikely to cause intensive harm, long-term campaigns are aimed at intensely eroding societal infrastructure and citizen resolve. An aggregate threat framework can provide more accurate judgements on member’s security and sovereignty.

            Another area of improvement can be further standardization of member responses based on the type of hybrid attack. Broad counter-hybrid support teams could be developed into specialized units, such as AI or cybercrime teams. Existing organizations, such as the and the , can be leveraged to develop specialized response mechanisms. Establishing cohesive procedures in response to hybrid incidents will make it easier for the Alliance to act in coordination, which is essential in deterring ongoing Russian attempts to weaken the whole of European society. This may also lead to reduced friction among between members and narrow the gap for Russia to exploit these internal vulnerabilities and tensions. Establishing improved, specialized mechanisms regarding collective defence will also help to clarify for members how to assemble if Article 5 is triggered, and to do so in a timely fashion.  Finally, an additional recommendation is to further develop a counter-hybrid warfare strategy which goes beyond defence mechanisms to engage sectors like education, transportation, and technology.

Such a counter-hybrid strategy could follow the approach, a move increasingly being embraced by many nations. The strategy could also look to establish a minimum guideline or set of requirements for member states to follow to have adequate safety net. The strategy should also target ways to improve preventative measures for member states. Integral to this will be improving intelligence-sharing and collective tracking to improve attribution. Improving attribution will help clarify who is behind such hybrid attacks. Furthermore, ensuring that countries are investing in defense or dual-use infrastructure which supports a coordinated net of European security will improve prevention.

Conclusion

NATO’s commitment to collective defense is more important than ever when addressing newly-emerging ways to fight wars in the twenty-first century. Article 5 remains a key part of this approach to security, and it should be noted its ambiguity does serve a strategic purpose. Article 4 also remains as a powerful tool for countries to leverage. However, for collective defence to be actionable in the case of grey-scale conflict, it must be supported within a strong framework that deeply engages with new offensive tactics. Without this, Article 5 can continue to be seen as vague or ineffective, which provides malign actors with more capacity to exploit vulnerabilities. These adaptations will help to improve transatlantic security from a myriad of malign actors.

The post Evaluating Article 5 and NATO in hybrid warfare appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

Prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukraine was one of the world’s largest exporters of grain, with its Black Sea ports in Odesa, Chornomorsk, and Pivdennyi serving as key stops in global shipment routes. The ongoing war has severely impeded Ukraine’s exporting capabilities, which has had critical impacts domestically and abroad. Ukraine has been able to adapt by establishing alternative shipping routes, but this has also created new potential vulnerabilities. The Port of Constanta, Romania’s Black Sea port, has emerged as a central node in stabilizing global grain supply as a result of the war. This development provides an opportunity for intraregional cooperation, as well as further EU and NATO presence through key littoral states. Understanding the geopolitical implications of shifting supply routes gives insight into a primary target for economic pressure by Russia, and how this has influenced regional development.

Securitization of Shipping Routes in the Black Sea

A key element of Russia’s war strategy in Ukraine has been to target industry and infrastructure to deplete Ukraine’s economy and overall capacity to defend itself. The Black Sea and Danube shipping routes are instrumental to this strategy. Odesa is Ukraine’s largest port on the Black Sea. Rail and road transport connect Odesa to the Danube, so goods can be shipped upstream to the rest of Europe or out to international destinations. Prior to the war, Odesa was the main hub for exports of grain, sunflower products, and oilseeds, . When shipping out of Odesa and other Black Sea ports became inviable due to Russian attacks, transport shifted to rail, truck, and barge; however, this rapid increase in land traffic quickly led to chokepoints and delays. The inability for Ukraine to export grain created shortages around the world – particularly in Africa, Asia, and – and also had a severe impact on Ukraine’s economy, . Therefore, disruptions had a huge impact on Ukraine’s economy, as well as global markets. As a result, in 2022 the was brokered to enable Ukrainian exports. A UN-brokered deal between Russia, Ukraine, and Türkiye, this Initiative established safe passages, inspections, and additional security for commercial vessels during the war. However, it only lasted a year before Russia withdrew. Since then, Russian attacks on Ukraine’s ports on both the Black Sea and the Danube have been consistent and destructive. While Ukraine has been able to partially restore grain exports since 2023, these exports still remained in 2025. Alternative shipping routes have been critical in providing an outlet for this grain, notably , transport across the Danube, and the . To support these new routes, regional partners have helped Ukraine by taking in more imports to domestic markets and by exporting more Ukrainian grain through domestic facilities. The Port of Constanta in Romania has played a central part in this shift and serves as a primary example of how the war is strengthening cooperation between Ukraine and the European Union (EU).

Port of Constanta

The Port of Constanta, located on the coast of Romania, is the EU’s largest port on the Black Sea. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion, this port has become a major grain hub with a . In 2023, as Ukrainian cereal and grain was redirected there after the war started. Bridging Europe, Asia, and Africa, this port holds significant strategic importance while also serving as . Additionally, the port’s proximity to the Danube River emphasizes its connectivity to Ukraine. Since the war, the Danube River corridor has become a vital alternative route for Ukrainian grain exports, making the Port of Constanta an essential aspect of Ukraine’s export flows. Additionally, the geopolitical importance of the Port has motivated large-scale modernization of facilities and broader infrastructural upgrades. The EU has been pivotal in funding key projects involving the Port of Constanta such as a , , and . Private companies have also contributed to ramping up operational capacity at the Port. This includes a new with specialized equipment, , and a . At this point, Russia has not launched direct attacks on Romanian port infrastructure on the Black Sea or the Danube. This is because Romania is a part of NATO, and therefore an attack risks triggering Article 5. However, fallout from attacks on their Ukrainian ports such as Izmail along the Danube affects Romanian facilities and villages by the water. Infrastructural damage affects the ability for shipments along the waterway to run smoothly. Additionally, , and a .

Geopolitical Implications

The securitization of Black Sea shipping routes have provided new geopolitical challenges while also accelerating already existing intraregional issues. The integral role exports play for the Ukrainian economy make it essential for routes to be protected to avoid further economic destabilization. Additionally, the inability for Ukraine to ship regular capacities of grain out of the Black Sea has placed additional stress on the Solidarity Lanes into neighbouring countries of Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia. This decreased capacity, in turn, has created political tensions between Ukraine and its Eastern European neighbours as , negatively affecting the livelihoods of local farmers who cannot compete with the influx of supply. As a result of this influx, the which limit trade liberalization for key products like wheat and sugar. However, Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary still maintain their , which has further increased tensions within the EU. This blockade has contributed to worsening relations between these countries and Ukraine, as well as preventing unified EU action on this issue. The destabilizing effects of Russia’s attacks on shipment routes needs to be addressed in order to ensure Ukraine does not face additional material pressures in the war. Stabilizing the region will also be integral to protecting networks such as the , which rely on the Black Sea to connect goods between Asia and Europe.

These security needs present EU littoral states a unique opportunity to establish their own presence in the region, both politically and economically. Romania has expressed strong interest in becoming a key EU representative in the region, which could be pivotal in breaking through the current disagreements. Engaging in deeper ties with other countries like Bulgaria and Georgia could also increase prosperity and development within the region. For example, Georgia and Romania recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding on a new , which can reinforce energy security that has been consistently undermined by Russian attacks. An outcome of this increased cooperation could be strengthened collaboration with the EU and NATO through these littoral states. The EU has already played a strong role as an investor and economic partner for countries like Romania and Bulgaria. NATO, through and the Mines Countermeasure exercise, improves deterrence and defence in the region. Using the EU/NATO umbrella also helps to bring in key external partners in the region. For example, engaging with Georgia on this initiative is an important opportunity to push back against Russian expansionism and influence on the other side of the Black Sea.

Conclusion

The Black Sea region acts as a crossroads between several different trade routes, making it pivotal as both an economic and military target. Russia’s actions in the region have been effective in destabilizing the Ukrainian economy and reducing the capacity of preexisting trade routes in the region. However, these challenges have been mitigated by the ability of Ukraine and its neighbours to adapt under difficult circumstances. Moving forward, further coordinated action in the region can further enhance its stability and even contribute to future prosperity. Existing pan-European and even transatlantic cooperation in the region has already provided a strong foundation to protect and support littoral partners. Leveraging these ties further provides an opportunity to counter Russian strategies and contain its expansionist ambitions.

The post Navigating the Waters: Trade Routes in the Black Sea After 2022 appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

Following the Brexit vote in 2016 the defence relationship between the UK and the EU has since been relatively unfettered. This strength can largely be attributed to the increasing coordination through NATO institutions and the establishment of the Coalition of the Willing, creating functional cooperation without deepening policy integration between the UK and the EU. Yet this relationship has clear limits. As EU defence policy focuses inward on industry and procurement, the effects of Brexit now have immediate impacts on European capacity building.

To read the full policy brief, click the download button below.

The post SAFE is not so Safe: The Limits of UK–EU Defence Cooperation appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

Introduction

On January 5th, 2026, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced the appointment of former Canadian Deputy Prime Minister and Member of Parliament, Chrystia Freeland, as Economic Advisor to the Office of the President of Ukraine. In a post on X, Zelenskyy stated, “Ukraine needs to strengthen its internal resilience – both for the sake of Ukraine’s recovery if diplomacy delivers results as swiftly as possible, and to reinforce our defence if, because of delays by our partners, it takes longer to bring this war to an end.” In the following days, Freeland confirmed she accepted President Zelenskyy’s appointment and that she would be resigning as a Member of Parliament, taking effect as of January 9th, 2026.

Freeland’s appointment as voluntary Economic Advisor to the Office of the President of Ukraine is being made against the larger and developing backdrop of ongoing diplomatic negotiations between the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the United States (US) to come to an agreed upon pathway to peace. This negotiation process continues to be arduous for Ukraine. It also comes alongside a deepening of foreign diplomatic relations between Canada and Ukraine under the Mark Carney government; this, coming on the back of Prime Minister Carney’s historical , where he stressed the end of the rules-based international order and hinted at the decline of American hegemony – a speech that have held to ultimately represent the beginning of a multipolar era in world politics.

In the coming months, the Eastern European and Transatlantic Network (EETN) will publish a series analyzing key developments shaping the war; these include prospective pathways to peace, ongoing diplomatic negotiations and tensions, and the shifting security and economic governance landscape in Ukraine. Freeland is an integral node among an emerging and vital network aimed at supporting Ukraine and its future as the anniversary of the full-scale invasion nears and passes. This series aims to make clear that Russia is not only engaged in a war of attrition so as to try to reclaim its great power status, but that Ukraine is increasingly prepared to respond to this war of attrition with strategies and methods of asymmetric and hybrid warfare. Ukraine is prepared to make the strategic, economic, and relational moves necessary to better guarantee its future, as well as its success on the battlefield and in diplomatic negotiations.

This first brief of the series reflects on Freeland’s appointment and builds upon an argument first offered by Ukrainian scholar Valeriia Gusieva, where she suggested that cultural resilience is a foundational pillar to security. I extend her argument here by suggesting that cultural resilience and situated experience are also crucial to sustaining a coherent and effective attritional war strategy – Freeland’s appointment, in this case, should be understood light through the lens of political habituation.

Chrystia Freeland: A Ukrainian-Canadian MP and Soviet War Crimes Researcher

Chrystia Freeland was born in Peace River, Alberta in 1968 to a Ukrainian mother and Canadian father. Though she formally entered Canadian federal politics in 2013, she is perhaps most known through her association with former Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and his government. Under Trudeau, Freeland was appointed to serve as Minister of International Trade in Trudeau’s cabinet. In this position, she was a key negotiator in the hard-fought Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) (which replaced the North American Free Trade Agreement, or NAFTA, in 2020), as well as the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with the European Union (EU) that was signed in 2016.

While it is fair to assume that many Western audiences are familiar with the whiplash antics of American President Donald Trump, who often combines “,” less well known are the tensions that characterized the negotiation process of CETA. As researchers , CETA encountered historical diplomatic tensions throughout its negotiation process: “This challenge becomes evident at various stages in the trade policy process, but it is most pronounced in the ratification of bilateral agreements, which require approval in all member states.”

On paper, arriving at CETA was through the bilateral process of negotiation between Canada and the EU; in reality, however, Freeland was situated in a much more difficult negotiating position. Because the subsequent ratification of CETA would require the approval of all EU member states, such a negotiating process proved to be a lesson for both Freeland and the European Commission, who was charged with ensuring the twenty-eight member states were in alignment. Indeed, as scholar Joris Larik , the alleged crisis of CETA negotiations soon became a “cautionary tale” about the “cumbersome and vulnerable EU treaty-making procedures, where internal politics and technical legal discussions detracted from the merits (or demerits) of the actual agreement.”

This became most visible through the tensions experienced with the Wallonia Parliament in Belgium, an autonomous regional government with veto power over EU trade deals. In late 2016, the Walloon government publicly rejected CETA, in part because of their worry that the trade deal would “.” Walloon regional minister-president, Paul Magnette, told reporters the following: “I don’t consider this as a funeral, I don’t consider this as a veto without any conditions. I consider this as a request to reopen negotiations so that European leaders could hear the legitimate demands which have been forcefully expressed by an organized, transparent civil society.” As Larik however, this crisis led to “profound internal reflections on EU trade policy, causing even a shift in the EU’s practice in concluding trade agreements.

It was largely in response to these tensions and apparent deadlock within Wallonia that Freeland made the public decision to walk out on CETA negotiations with our European allies. Following her decision, Freeland with Canadian journalists candidly: “It’s become evident for me, for Canada, that the European Union isn’t capable now to have an international treaty even with a country that has very European values like Canada. And even with a country so nice, with a lot of patience like Canada.” At the time, the move was taken by some in Canadian media as an “” response; Conservative critics in the House of Commons Freeland’s walk out as a “meltdown,” alleging she required “adult supervision” – language that carried clear sexist and gendered connotations. Still others this walk out is exactly what the negotiation process needed, as it eventually led to the signing of the trade agreement.

Reflecting on her CETA negotiation experience in 2026, Freeland the following about negotiating with European allies, which is worth quoting at-length here:

“You can sort of have two kinds of negotiations. Some negotiations start with a kind of win-win premise where the two parties come together wanting a deal, wanting to be friends, seeing each other as long-term partners, and they’ll disagree about stuff, but the negotiation is really about everyone working hard together to find the best possible landing zone. I would say Canada’s negotiations with the EU about our trade deal with Europe, CETA, were conducted in that way, and they were hard, right? … Our final slightly melodramatic moments in Namur, in Wallonia, you know, proceeded by moments in Vienna, in Germany, in the European Parliament. I mean, it was a long slog and there were lots of obstacles and there was some drama, but it was clear there was goodwill on all sides.”

In this interview, Freeland goes on to characterize how Trump falls into an alternative negotiation camp compared to that which characterized CETA; she the idea that the American President abides by the logic of a zero-sum game: “…when you are dealing with a party that has that kind of a view [zero-sum game logic] and that kind of an attitude, then I think you have to be very clear in your own mind about red lines. And you have to be very prepared to say, thus far and no further, we’re not gonna capitulate our approach.”

Freeland later went on to become Canada’s Minister of Finance in 2020, where she was responsible for introducing four federal budgets, including federal aid measures related to Canada’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic. She was the first woman to serve in this role, a fact that would later be considered by the as crucial in the decay of her relationship with Trudeau prior to his own resignation in late-2025.

Beyond her political career, Freeland’s academic and journalistic works span two decades and have drawn the ire of the Kremlin. While pursuing graduate studies in Russian history and literature at Harvard, where she was responsible for documenting and translating archival and investigative materials related to the – an unmarked, mass burial site used by the NKVD (the secret police of the Soviet Union) to dispose of executed dissidents and prisoners. It remains one of the largest mass burial sites in Ukraine, even Russia’s current invasion. Her research played a decisive role in debunking the Stalin-era myth that the executions were exclusively carried out by the Nazis during World War Two. This research eventually attracted the attention of the KGB – the main security agency of the Soviet Union – who then assigned Freeland the codename “Frida,” closely surveilling and building a case against her throughout the course of her study.

As a Canadian with Ukrainian heritage, Freeland has been among the most outspoken advocates for sustained Canadian support to Ukraine. In response, she is one of thirteen Canadian officials barred from entering Russia under retaliatory sanctions imposed by Vladimir Putin himself in 2014 and has been the target of various . Freeland has also faced public attacks from American President Donald Trump, who on several occasions has described her in disparaging terms, including “,” a “,” a “,” and an overall “.” From a feminist perspective, Freeland’s experience navigating such attacks underscores her familiarity with the gendered power dynamics employed by – an experience that may indeed prove to be a strategic asset in a war whose social construction and conduct are themselves . While much of international politics Freeland nonetheless works against the masculine grain in a pursuit of fair and just agreements and futures.

Contextualizing the Habituation of Freeland and Concluding Remarks

As this series continues to examine changes within President Zelenskyy’s inner circle in response to both Ukrainian domestic pressures and Russia’s growing attritional war strategy, I suggest that Freeland’s appointment as a voluntary Economic Advisor to Ukraine signals an awareness within Ukrainian leadership and its closest allies that responding to Russia’s attritional warfare in 2026 cannot be confined to military operations alone. No longer are we in an era where hard power capabilities are the only measure of a nation’s strength; the personal and personnel also matter.

Freeland will be an important figure to watch, particularly as it relates to dialogue between Ukrainian feminists and the pro-democracy movement – not because Freeland herself has expressed a desire to pursue a feminist agenda in Ukraine’s economic reconstruction, but because her presence reflects the often-implicit reality that gendered political experience shapes how the dynamics of endurance, credibility, and trust are produced and sustained in wartime economies. In a war of attrition, where authority is continuously reaffirmed under conditions of prolonged uncertainty, reputational attack, and economic strain, such situated experience becomes strategically relevant, I suggest, as a form of habituation to sustained delegitimization.

The notion of habituation draws from a long philosophical tradition – mostly commonly, Aristotelian ethics, where habituation (hexis) was used to refer to repeated exposure and practice from durable dispositions rather than momentary or instantaneous reaction. In contemporary political thought, philosophers and scholars inspired by phenomenologists such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty have upon this idea to explain how subjects develop capacities for political action through ongoing relational strain. In feminist ethics, habituation helps to explain how – often oppressed – actors learn to endure, navigate, and act within conditions of prolonged vulnerability, scrutiny, and marginalization over time. It moves beyond experience; it is an engaged and embodied vision and practice.

In an attritional war where legitimacy is not necessarily secured through fast-paced or singular victories but continually reproduced across various political, economic, and social structures, as well as through relations of alliance management and public trust, this mode of habituation takes on strategic significance. Indeed, for President Zelenskyy, it works in his favour to cultivate and incorporate actors habituated to sustained delegitimization because it acts as a shock absorber to the , partner unreliability in a so-called newly-founded “” world, and economic fatigue increasingly characterizing this phase of the war and ongoing occupation. The hope is that these hybrid shocks are absorbed by such a habituation without suffering from significant strategic drifts that may carry over into the battlefield.

, nations and militaries perceived to possess greater status and capabilities – that is, the greater of two powers – engage in warfare by attrition. Those familiar with Russia and the former Soviet Union’s historical record of aggression, occupation, interference, and war across Eastern Europe will also recognize this mode of warfare, perhaps all too familiarly. The Baltics, the Balkans, Poland, Chechnya, Georgia – they all know this playbook. The Russian Federation continues to seek what it perceives as its rightful seat at the table of great-power politics; even those of us who reject John J. Mearsheimer’s structuralist projections onto Eastern Europe as lying within a fixed Russian “sphere of influence” cannot ignore such an imperial desire percolating within the Russian state since the unipolar moment.

In attritional war, time is a previous resource. As Sun Tzu , prolonged conflict could be of great risk to either warring side, on account of exhausting the state apparatus, undermining domestic order and morale, and eroding strategic advantage; for him, military strategy was a subtle and complex technique whose success depended on minimizing the temporal risks and costs of war. While Sun Tzu viewed attritional war as a strategic failure, the work of military theorist and general requires us to remember that wars of attrition often emerge as a political condition over time, shaped by friction, uncertainty, and an overall inability to achieve decisive political outcomes. What Ukraine demonstrates to the international community, this series aims to show, is that Russia’s apparent great power strategy grounded in attrition – like empire itself – can burn out.

It is by sources close to both Freeland and Prime Minister Carney that Freeland received Zelenskyy’s offer on December 22nd, 2025; by December 24th, she had shared with the Prime Minister her intentions to leave Canadian parliament to join the Ukrainian team. In responding to the Kremlin’s continued war of attrition, concerns beyond immediate hard power capabilities, military strategy, and command structures must be addressed. Freeland possesses a unique form of habituation to sustain delegitimation; her appointment may indeed be an important shock absorber to Russia’s ongoing disinformation campaigns, American partner unreliability, and the economic fatigue increasingly characterizing this war.

At the level of a broader wartime strategy, I suggest this capacity can also function as a form of resilience; it signals to communities, civil society, international partners, and adversaries alike that broader Ukraine’s leadership is prepared to govern through a liminal phase of uncertain futurity rather than govern toward a rapid endpoint. This is a strategy in stark contrast to Putin’s assumption that a “quick military operation” could sweep Ukraine in 2022, or that , once elected, could end the war in Ukraine in the first 24-hours of his second term. In this sense, it is important to emphasize that habituation is not merely an individual trait or disposition, but also a culturally sedimented capacity that is experienced transnationally and relationally. As Gusieva has argued, cultural resilience constitutes a foundational pillar of security; indeed, classical realist how such resilience at times is what pushes a nation beyond survival towards victory. I extend this logic here by suggesting that such cultural resilience is forged through repeated exposure to, and embeddedness within, enduring imperial projects and traditionalist military practices – in this case, namely, Russia’s ongoing attempts to reclaim imperial-great power status, legitimate its occupations, and sustain attritional warfare alongside its hybrid threats towards Europe.

In Ukraine, cultural habituation operates as resilience, but it is neither neutral nor abstract; rather, its experience is deeply racialized, ethnicized, and gendered. It is racialized and ethnicized through the persistent positioning of the nation as materially peripheral to Europe while cast as subordinate to Russia’s so-called historical sphere of influence; it is gendered through the paternalizing narratives directed at Ukraine and other Eastern European states aspiring to EU membership, as well as in the recurring trope of Ukraine as the “little brother” to a masculinized “Mother Russia.” More specifically, we see this reproduced through the hegemonically masculine practices embodied by state actors in political negotiations of economic and security matters; these behaviours continue to structure much of how political negotiation, listening, and diplomatic exchange take place. Freeland, in this respect, is a node within a broader relational structure of habituation and diplomatic practice in wartime Ukraine – one whose own political endurance aligns with, and stands to reinforce, Ukraine’s culturally embedded capacity to govern through attrition.

Please stay tuned for the next installment of this series, which will analyze Ukraine’s 2025 energy scandal and subsequent political moves undertaken President Zelenskyy following a state investigation that exposed high-level embezzlement within the nation’s energy sector.

The post Habituation in War: The Appointment of Chrystia Freeland as a Node in Ukraine’s Attritional War Strategy appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

With Hungary set to have its , Prime Minister Viktor Orbán is facing arguably the first serious challenge to his almost 16-year rule. The Respect and Freedom party – commonly referred to as the Tisza party – is led by Péter Magyar and has emerged as a viable alternative to the Orbán regime. Campaigning on an anti-corruption platform, Tisza has been able to resonate with a domestic population that is increasingly frustrated with Orban’s Fidesz party.

Internationally, Orbán has soured relations with historical allies over opposing aid to Ukraine, bouts of rising illiberalism, as well as recurring appeals to right-wing populism. Importantly, he is a figure charged with largely leading throughout Europe – a loosely coordinated but growing, transnational populist movement that combines social and cultural conservatism with anti-liberal, anti-globalist politics. Domestically, frustration within Hungary has risen over the inability to revive the economy from inflation and instability. This is reflected in the polls, where Fidesz has fallen to Tisza, 37% to 49%, respectively. The outcome of this election will have serious long-term implications on Hungary’s future political trajectory and offers the nation an opportunity to pivot away from an illiberal-populist trajectory. In turn, the election may also influence the dynamics of the European Union (EU), which has long suffered from Hungary’s divisive role as a wedge to political consensus.

Who is Tisza?

, Tisza is a centre-right party that has been growing in popularity. Tisza has focused its campaign largely on anti-corruption, promising initiatives such as strengthening judicial independence. This is a powerful message for Hungarians who have continued to face economic struggle while the ruling party has benefited from state resources.

Tisza also openly positions itself as anti-Orbán, criticizing the leader for nepotism and allegedly funding an oligarchy. They have been able to convert some loyal Fidesz supporters but much of their support stems from luring voters from various opposition bases. Magyar himself was at one point , working as public administrator. He later resigned following a scandal where Hungary’s former President, , pardoned the former the deputy director of the Kossuth Zsuzsa’s Children’s Home in Bicske, who had been . After his resignation, Magyar as corrupt and authoritarian and has since continued to consolidate opposition.

Magyar has promised to on democratic issues related to the rule of law and human rights – two points the EU has increasingly been pressing in applying political pressure to the Orbán regime. The ongoing dispute has caused vital EU assets to be frozen and being able to access them could provide a necessary economic boost; however, the two parties would still have competing interests, as . Part of their appeal has been that they are neither pro-EU or anti-EU, but rather opt to prioritize the interests of Hungary and the V4 countries (Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia). This indicates that Tisza’s approach may still be rooted in right-wing and nationalist values shared amongst their neighbours. These risks inciting further tension with the EU, who have been critical of these values on the basis that they work against collective action and Western liberal democracy.

Differing ideologies and rhetorics can continue to fracture relations between Brussels and Eastern Europe. Regarding Russia and China, Magyar seeks to establish what he calls “.” This would prioritize mutual strategic interests and values rather than personal ties. Tisza has also highlighted the need to ; however, this is unlikely to revolutionize the Hungarian-Russian relationship, as the former remains reliant on Russia’s crude oil and gas. Magyar has stated openness to renegotiating projects like the and remains wary of Chinese foreign direct investment.

How likely is a Tisza win?

While polls are indicating a strong lead, the real battleground will be during the election period. Fidesz is notorious for influencing elections by using state resources to create an uneven political playground. Orbán himself has been known to use tactics such as . In addition, opponents are strongly disadvantaged in their ability to campaign. Fidesz’s makes it easy to push smear campaigns and pro-Fidesz content, while the opposition has less platforms to use. To secure Parliament, Tisza will have to navigate a severely rigged, competitive, political environment. The challenge for the Fidesz party will be to determine how far they may interfere with elections, risking potential backlash from the population. Currently, Orbán has already launched a campaign against Tisza, .

What impact would a Tisza win have?

A change in government will improve Hungary’s domestic situation in the long-term, but in the short-term, and internationally, the results will be mixed. on corruption can help undermine the increasingly powerful oligarchy and reduce clientelism. The party has also promised to , which could improve rule of law in the country. Additionally, the possibility of EU funds can be vital for improving the economy and social infrastructure, should it be utilized effectively; however, many of these benefits will take time to materialize. Many members within Orbán’s government will still have the rest of their terms to serve. This could prevent the necessary cultural change within constitutional institutions that needs to take place for democracy to recuperate after corruption, further slowing the (re)adoption of democratic values, including proper checks and balances. Dismantling the oligarchy will also take time and consistent effort from both the top and the bottom. Therefore, while Tisza is likely to pivot away from democratic backsliding, this will be a slow process.

While Tisza aims to restore democratic values such as rule of law, voting rights, and judicial independence, it has yet to be determined if they will do the same for so-called “liberal” values. Tisza has shied away from taking a stance on controversial issues, including Hungary’s LGBTQIA+ community and migration policies. This leaves uncertainty around whether they are willing to tackle social issues.

The popularity of both Tisza and Fidesz means Parliament may be run by right-wing parties come spring. Left-wing parties such as Democratic Coalition and Mi Hazanak . Under Orbán, , supporting the formation of a coalition of socially conservative, anti-EU, populist leaders. This includes prominent figures such as in Slovakia and in the Czech Republic. This coalition includes strong and persistent Euroskeptics that have stalled key EU decisions and leveraged recurring attacks against Brussels. While a Tisza government would not eliminate opposing standpoints, pursuing institutional compromises and negotiations instead of veto politics could ease internal hostilities. However, if Tisza elects to continue strengthening the right-wing flank, right-wing populism may become even more embedded into Europe’s institutional and political infrastructure. This could exacerbate polarization and division among communities, further destabilizing Europe’s political climate at a time when the world is already increasingly experiencing shifts in polarity and great power contestation.

Conclusion

The parliamentary elections in April 2026 have opened the opportunity for a change in governance for Hungary. This has the potential to strengthen democratic institutions, rule of law, and civil freedoms; however, Tisza will have to navigate a hostile electoral environment and consolidate a base strong enough to outweigh external interference. If they win, Hungary will be at a crossroads. Their decisions on social issues, the Russia-Ukraine war, and ties with the EU will help determine the nature of Hungary’s democracy moving forward.

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After a contentious summit – one that saw European Union (EU) members divided on the future of funding to Ukraine as the war nears its fourth year – the EU has created a plan to secure an . This plan depends on using cash from secured capital markets, deviating from the to use frozen Russian assets. The summit comes at a time where and . While the EU’s major goal of securing a funding package was achieved, internal fractures are increasingly felt and spreading, with the discussion inflaming verbal attacks and disagreements between Hungary, Slovakia, and other EU members.

Risky or revolutionary?

The EU’s final iteration of its funding package comes as a much safer development from the Commission’s initial Reparations Loan. That initial package would have secured funding from since the start of the full-scale invasion. Days before the summit, the EU agreed to , which primarily belong to the Russian Central Bank, held through Euroclear. The Commission maintained there was no breach of ethics on account of the agreement not affecting the Russian Central Bank’s intellectual property and Euroclear would be bound to repay it. Despite this, the plan elicited heated controversy among EU members.

Strong opposition largely stems from Euroclear and Belgium – where the financial company is based. Euroclear’s concerns pertain to the international trust in the euro and the company itself; it also expressed concern that it may be undermined by what they deemed a “.” Belgium fears Russian retaliation through international courts. The and promised if the plan were to go ahead. Retaliation from Russia could also include various hybrid strategies such as cyberattacks, sabotage of critical infrastructure, or even drone incursions. Hungary and Slovakia have also opposed the plan. The two countries have become increasingly critical of EU sanctions against Russia due to their own political and energy connections and dependencies on the country. Both nations to indefinitely freeze Russian assets, eliminating their veto power. Prime Ministers and slammed the plan on social media, implying it betrays important normative and legal architecture of the European Union.

Ultimately, the Reparations Loan in its original form was not passed, with members saying it was “too complex” and politically risky to go through with now. The primary concern was that Belgium needed . This brought mixed reactions and the guarantees could not be met. The EU’s main strategic goal to avoid escalation with Russia also made this move too risky, with the threat of financial and legal repercussions too costly.

What’s next for Ukraine?

The loan will be based on , requiring Ukraine to pay it back once they begin receiving reparations after the war has ended. The current plan eases the burden for some struggling with financing Ukraine directly, while also not affecting the obligations of countries like . This guarantee also paved the way for these countries to support the loan, making the decision smoother. The loan will be used to support Ukraine’s financial needs, particularly for investing in Ukrainian defence technology and industry. The country has identified a need for additional funding beyond its current IMF program, calling for up to .

What does this say about the EU?

One thing that has become abundantly clear during the summit is the increasing fractures between members of the European Union regarding the war in Ukraine. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and its continued influence throughout Eastern Europe is beginning to sow real discord within the EU, proving to be an increasingly complex issue as the war rolls on. Currently, the EU has made several moves that mitigate the ability for countries that sympathize with Russia to disrupt aid to Ukraine; however, the new plan also gives a noteworthy “out” to these countries by allowing them not to contribute. Disagreements over the war are also combined with strong anti-bureaucratic and anti-EU rhetoric from leaders, who operate from a populist and, at times, illiberal base of governance. The EU will need to be vigilant and cautious about the influence and relationship to Russia that current member states have. The destabilization and weakening of the EU will be strategically advantageous to Russia, divisions that have already begun to exploit.

What will be interesting to see is how funding will evolve as time goes on. The EU . Will later developments prompt this risky move? Additionally, what will the reaction of Moscow be in these current conditions? It will be important to follow developments as they relate to renewed funding, as this could (re)invigorate either party and change future strategies and funding scenarios. Whether this will result in strategic pressures with positive outcomes or a further destabilization of the European continent, has yet to be seen.

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Prior to 2022, Europe’s defence posture relied heavily on NATO deterrence and the United States’ (US) security guarantee, underscoring the absence of a fully realized shared strategic vision within the European Union (EU). Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, coupled with growing , exposed the risks of this reliance and accelerated the EU’s push for greater strategic autonomy. For the first time, the EU financed the through the European Peace Facility and under the 2023–25 European Defence Industrial Programme. Defence spending soared across the continent, and what had long been an aspirational concept of strategic autonomy became an urgent necessity, even if its full realization remains a long-term project.

Yet, as Russia’s war in Ukraine exceeds its third year, the EU faces a lingering challenge: the rise of far-right governments in many of its member states. While strategic autonomy is still top of mind for EU leaders, materialized through the introduction of , several members states are increasingly pursuing nationalist defence agendas. As a result, the EU finds itself caught between advancing the architecture of collective defence while simultaneously contending with leaders who instrumentalize this same mechanism for domestic political gain. This tension has direct implications for Europe’s credibility as a security actor. It complicates efforts to align defence procurement, weakens the consistency of sanctions and aid policies, and risks eroding the transatlantic trust which Europe still depends on for deterrence.

The Far-Right Populist and Defence

The far right’s influence on European defence policy does not manifest through outright obstruction but through . Rather than rejecting Brussels’ new defence architecture, nationalist leaders have learned to operate within it, appropriating both its funding mechanism and its language to advance sovereignty-based agendas. These actors recognize that participating in EU-funded defence initiatives confers both material and symbolic rewards: access to industrial contracts, regional investment, and the legitimacy that comes from being seen as a responsible European partner. What distinguishes them is not withdrawal, but the ability to convert cooperation into a narrative of national strength. In doing so, they hollow out the collective rationale of defence integration, turning what should be a shared European project into a vehicle for domestic legitimacy.

Hungary illustrates this pattern most overtly. Under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, the Hungarian government while remaining ambivalent toward the collective logic underpinning the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In 2017, Budapest initiated the , a €13 billion modernization effort aimed at creating domestic supply chains for arms and munitions. German firms such as , establishing joint ventures that anchor Hungary’s defence industry within the European market while strengthening Orban’s narrative of rebuilding the Hungarian military. The , co-financed through EU cohesion funds and national investment subsidies, is emblematic of this dual logic: it deepens Hungary’s integration in the EU defence economy even as Orban portrays it as proof of national self-reliance.

Yet while leveraging these partnerships, Hungary remains one of the least aligned member states when it comes to the that underpin the EU’s CSDP overall goal. Budapest consistently resists the forms of coordination that give CSDP substance, shared threat assessments, deeper PESCO commitments, and capability-pooling arrangements that would bind national planning to collective European priorities. At the same time, Budapest has sought access to funding under the EU’s new support for Ammunition and Firearms Expansion loan instrument, , while opposing proposals to link disbursements to rule-of-law compliance. Orban repeatedly frames defence modernization as integral to protecting Hungary’s national identity, emphasizing that . Hungary supports EU investment when it serves its industrial base, such as the Security Action for Europe and European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement schemes, that would make these mechanisms genuinely European. Orban’s model thus envisions a Europe of self-reliant states loosely connected through markets and contracts, not through . The result is a form of instrumental integration, wherein Hungary contributes materially to Europe’s rearmament while eroding the institutional cohesion that collective security demands.

The EU’s Response

The dual challenge of Russian aggression and internal fragmentation has forced EU leaders to harden both its defence and governance instruments. The EU’s post-2022 defence agenda has expanded at a pace unseen since the bloc’s creation. The Readiness 2030 initiative, announced in 2025, seeks to mobilize over and establish new fiscal flexibility for member states to allocate up to 1.5 percent of GDP to defence without breaching budget-deficit rules. A is intended to finance joint procurement of military products, while the European Defence Industrial Strategy lays the groundwork for a with harmonized rules to enable faster and larger-scale production.

At the same time, recognizing Russia’s active hybrid warfare strategy and the role illiberal and populist actors play in it, the EU has coupled defence integration with measures to safeguard its democratic infrastructure. The now empowers Brussels to audit social-media platforms and penalize those that facilitate foreign influence operations. The EU has also invested in counter-hybrid capabilities, from cyber-resilience frameworks to a proposed along its eastern frontier, reflecting the growing convergence of internal and external security.

Conclusion – A Contested Path Forward

Europe’s defence awakening has built the structure of strategic autonomy but not its political foundation. The EU now commands funding instruments, industrial incentives, and procurement schemes approaching a true defence union, yet its legitimacy in this area still remains fragile. Without a mandate rooted in democratic accountability and public debate, these mechanisms risk becoming a technocratic enterprise that populists can exploit for their domestic gain. Leaders such as Viktor Orbán have learned to navigate this gap, appropriating the language and benefits of European rearmament to validate nationalist narratives while obstructing collective decision-making.

Yet public sentiment offers an opening. .The task for Brussels is to transform this diffuse approval into a clear mandate, linking defence to agency, accountability, and shared purpose. Strategic autonomy will only endure if it becomes political as well as industrial, anchored in legitimacy, communication, and leadership that make Europe not just rearmed, but united.

Policy Recommendations: From Technocracy to Political Cohesion

To combine Europe’s strategic autonomy and close the legitimacy gap that populist actors exploit, the EU must move beyond institutional design to political consolidation. The following measures outline how Brussels can align its defence ambitions with democratic cohesion.

Mobilize public consent through strategic communication and civic engagement – The EU should institutionalize structured citizen dialogue on security and defence, modelled on the Conference on the Future of Europe, to engage Europeans in shaping the Union’s strategic priorities.

Form a European Strategic Communication Taskforce for Defence – The EU should establish a Strategic Communication Taskforce for Defence to counter the populist narratives that reframe collective defence as a threat to sovereignty or a national achievement. Housed within the European External Action Service and building on existing StratCom capabilities, the taskforce would coordinate messaging across member states, highlight the local benefits of EU-funded defence projects, and proactively counter disinformation about European rearmament.

Strengthen role of European Defence Commissioner and unify procurement authority – The establishment of a Defence and Space Commissioner marks progress, but the portfolio currently lacks the political weight and institutional tools needed to meaningfully coordinate EU defence initatives. With responbilities dispersed between the European External Action Service, the Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space, and the European Defence Agency, strengthening the Commissioner’s mandate, particularly in unified procurement and capability planning, would reduce fragmentation and advance Europe’s strategic sovereignty.

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