Introduction

Since the 1970s, the European Economic Community (EEC)/European Union (EU) has sought to play a complementary role to the United States (US) in the pursuit of security and stability in the Middle East. This has occurred mostly through soft security measures: diplomacy; economic and financial aid to Palestinians; civilian missions focused on stability; and dialogue with Arab states. In this regard, it is worth mentioning the Euro-Arab Dialogue: a political and economic cooperation framework launched in 1974 between the EEC and the Arab League to strengthen the relationship between the parties after the Yom Kippur War and oil crisis. However, despite these efforts, the limits of the EUā€™s unique institutional set-up have prevented it from playing a major role in regional affairs. The ongoing war in the Gaza Strip between Israel and Hamas has highlighted the limits of the EUā€™s diplomatic action. In the meantime, President Donald Trumpā€™s Peace Plan for Gaza has re-energized, once again, the role of the , prompting some to draw historical parallels to earlier US-brokered efforts ā€“ from Camp David to the failed Oslo Accords. What role could the EU play in the American plan? How can its involvement be decisive to achieve a just and lasting peace in the region?

Context

The 2006 electoral victory of Hamas in the Gaza Strip led to a severe escalation with Israel. With Hamas taking over the territory from the Fatah-controlled Palestinian Authority (PA), Israel considered the Palestinian military group a security threat, as it refused to recognize the Jewish state, renounce violence, or accept previous peace agreements brokered by the PA and Israel. Hamasā€™ accession to power in 2006 constituted a critical historical juncture that transformed governance in Gaza and its overall relationship with Israel. This shift was accompanied by the return of a range of familiar political practices ā€“ including diplomatic negotiations, economic sanctions, and ongoing military engagement ā€“ that continue to define this governance period.

In the meantime, two other factors made the relationship between the parties more strained. On the one hand, on November 29, 2012, the , which upgraded Palestine from a ā€œnon-member observer entityā€ to a ā€œnon-member observer State.ā€ This historic vote granted Palestine implicit recognition of statehood and was seen as a move to revive the two-state solution, a move strongly opposed by the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. On the other hand, the US-brokered Abraham Accords were signed in 2020, aiming to normalize diplomatic, economic, and security relations between Israel and several Arab nations (including the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan). Palestinians overwhelmingly opposed the Abraham Accords, perceiving the agreements as an abandonment of the long-standing consensus among Arab states that negotiations with Israel were contingent on ending occupation.

On October 7, 2023, Hamas initiated an attack on Israel. . The Israeli response was a full-scale military invasion of the Gaza Strip which, by December 2025, has killed 71,266 Palestinians, left most schools and hospitals in ruins, and caused long-term damage to the local society and economy.

The EUā€™s response to Gaza was characterized by contradictions and divisions between its member states. Some countries such as Czech Republic, Austria, Hungary, Italy, and Germany, stood with Israel, backing its military campaign and avoiding criticism of Netanyahuā€™s regime. Other governments, such as Belgium, Spain, France and Ireland ā€“ while strongly condemning Hamas ā€“ called for a ceasefire and criticized Israel for violating international humanitarian law. These differing positions prevented the EU from having a coordinated stance at the UN when voting on a on December 12, 2023, which called for a humanitarian ceasefire.

Divergencies appeared not only between member states but also across EU institutions. While European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen showed a stronger emphasis on Israelā€™s right to defence, the European Council issued a more cautious joint statement aimed at highlighting the EU as a unified voice. The statement took a more neutral tone than President von der Leyen, emphasizing both Israelā€™s right to defence as well as the crucial need for humanitarian aid, civilian protection, and adherence to international law. A third voice, EUā€™s foreign policy chief Josep Borrell, was more critical of Israel, . The inertia resulting from lack of consensus among member states and across institutions severely undermines the EUā€™s position as mediator, letting the Americans play a leading role once again.

On September 29, 2025, President Trump announced his plan to ā€œend the Gaza warā€ and address the broader Middle Eastern crisis. The so-called was negotiated with the consultation of Arab states, namely Egypt, Qatar and °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š. The EU played no formal role in the negotiations; it made no proposals of its own, despite being both a major donor to Palestine and an important partner of Israel.

Endorsed by UN Security Council , Trumpā€™s plan includes the deployment of an International Stabilization Force (ISF) in Gaza, a multinational military body that will ensure the demilitarization and security of the Gaza Strip; and the creation of a Board of Peace (BoP), a committee led by Trump that will oversee the political transition in Gaza until a reformed Palestinian Authority can take over governance in 2027. Formally launched at the 56th World Economic Forum in January 2026, the BoP claims its main purpose is the promotion of peacekeeping all around the world, not only in Gaza. Countries wishing to participate in the BoP are required to contribute US$1 billion to the organization to renew their membership, and Trump, as its chairman, is not subject to term limits, holding the sole authority to nominate his successor.

to ending the war in Gaza; however, many EU member states have expressed concern over the possibility of the BoP overshadowing the role of the UN. Currently, Bulgaria and Hungary are the only two EU countries to have joined the initiative. France, Spain, Poland, and Germany declined to participate, while Italy, Romania, Greece and Cyprus joined as observers. The EU Commission also decided to join as an observer, sending the Commissioner for the Mediterranean, Dubravka Å uica, to Washington, DC, to attend the inaugural meeting of the BoP on February 19, 2026. In a sign of continued disunity, , calling it a ā€œmistakeā€, as the EU supports a two-state solution and ā€œcannot participateā€ in any body that excludes the Palestinian National Authority.

Problems

Even if Trumpā€™s plan represents an important step towards a peace deal, it contains critical aspects which might hinder its implementation. The current plan effectively grants Israel a veto power over peace, as its military redeployments are conditioned on Hamasā€™ demilitarization and reform of the PA. At the same time, Israel is not required to make any formal commitments towards halting settlement expansion in the West Bank or respecting the autonomy of a Palestinian state. On this issue Israelā€™s stance is clear: Netanyahu declared that , as it is an ā€œexistential threat to Israel.ā€ Therefore, there is a real risk that, without guarantees for the Palestinian people and a plan to address occupation, Trumpā€™s plan may fail or lead to an unjust and unstable peace agreement that steamrolls Palestinian rights and territories recognized by international law.

On the other hand, Trumpā€™s peace plan has confirmed that the US continues to play a . However, some , such as Francesca Albanese, Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian Occupied Territory, criticized the plan. UN Special Adviser on Sustainability, Jeffrey Sachs, labelled the US proposal as ā€œ.ā€ According to them, Trump is behaving in Gaza like a 19th-century colonial broker, placing himself at the helm of the BoP to oversee a foreign territoryā€™s governance, with the overall aim of advancing US interests in the region. The Middle East has figured prominently in the first and second Trump administrationsā€™ foreign policy. President Trumpā€™s main goal is to broker agreements between Israel and other Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, to . This attitude could prove counterproductive and place EU interests at risk.

Strategic Outlook and Policy Recommendations

A more active role of the EU in the region is necessary to guarantee success and counter risks of instability, which may have severe implications for European security, including energy supply limitations, new security threats, and an increase of migration and refugee flows. It is in the EUā€™s interest to enhance its influence in the region. What practical steps should the EU take to avoid marginalization and make a meaningful contribution to peace?

1. The EU should consider holding an enhanced observer status at the BoP as a necessary counterweight to US and Israeli pressures and hegemony in decision-making. Of course, the EU has to maintain a steadfast commitment to strengthening and reforming the UN, confirming it as the core of a rules-based international order and multilateralism. However, enhanced observer status at the BoP could allow the EU to monitor negotiations and participate in debates specifically devoted to making interventions, peace proposals, and amendments. The presence of the EU, with its traditional concern for Palestinian issues, could ensure meaningful Palestinian involvement. This is fundamental to legitimate the transitory governance of the Gaza Strip and preserve Palestinian decision-making power. A more active EU at BoP could also contribute to reforming the PA.

The divergences between member states and across EU institutions negatively impact the EUā€™s international role. Therefore, the EU should take a cohesive stance on its participation at the BoP, bearing in mind some key arguments. Firstly, ā€œā€ provides direct insight into how decisions are implemented, serving as a channel for influence. The EU is the largest donor to Palestinian recovery and its involvement in the BoP could help the EU shape outcomes rather than merely fund them, aligning its significant financial contributions with the necessary humanitarian, governance, and security strands of the peace plan. Moreover, ā€œā€ is vital for influencing the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2803.

2. The EU should be part of the International Security Force. Together with The European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) Rafah Mission and EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS), involvement in the ISF could contribute to the maintenance of the ceasefire. Participation in the ISF could enhance European influence on Israel, for example, by convincing the Israeli government to review its settlement policy and improve living conditions for the Palestinians.

3. The EU should use economic and financial tools to enhance its political influence. On the Palestinian side, the European Commission recently . On the Israeli side, the EU should overcome its reluctances and suspend the EU-Israel Association Agreement if the Israeli government continues to violate human rights in Gaza, as required by Article 2 of the Agreement. The suspension of this Agreement could influence Israel to respect the , following preliminary rulings about a ā€œplausibleā€ genocide occurring in Gaza. The EU could link Israeli participation in EU funding programs, such as Horizon Europe, to the full withdrawal from Gaza, the end of settlements in the West Bank, and apartheid policy against Palestinians.

4. The EU should invest in the implementation of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), an economic initiative designed to enhance connectivity and integration between Asia, the Middle East, and Europe, based on three pillars: energy, transportation, and digital connectivity. IMEC should be a core interest for Europeans, as it , increasing political and economic ties between participating counties. Moreover, it could enhance the EUā€™s political influence in the area, counterbalancing China and the US. The implementation of some projects as part of the IMEC – such as the EastMed Gas Pipeline – could make the EU a relevant player in terms of future economic cooperation projects, allowing it to increase its weight in the Middle East peace process.

The EU could influence, for example, the implementation of the so-called ā€œGreen Blue Dealā€ between Jordan and Israel, which provides for the supply of water from Israel in exchange for Jordanian supplies of solar power. The Gaza war stopped the project, but the ceasefire created hope that it may be relaunched in such a way that the Gaza Strip and the West Bank can also benefit from it.

Conclusion

While the US commitment has been the sine qua non for a ceasefire in Gaza, the EU holds key cards to ensure the successful implementation of Trumpā€™s peace plan. With its traditional regional approach, a more active observer role of the EU in the BoP and its participation in the ISF could balance American ā€“ and Israeli ā€“ influence and ensure a more equitable peace solution. In doing so, it may also help ensure that Palestinian rights recognized by international law are considered against the backdrop of ongoing ceasefire and conflict negotiations. In addition, the use of economic leverage as well as the implementation of the IMEC corridor could enhance the EU political weight in the area, preventing the dawn of a new era of regional instability and insecurity with direct impact on Europe itself.

The post Security in the Middle East after Gaza: The Role of the EU appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

Introduction

ĢżFor the first time since 1972,ĢżwhenĢżSALT I negotiations yielded the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the Interim Agreement on offensive arms, the strategic relationship between Washington and Moscow is entirely unconstrained by a legal framework.Ģż.ĢżAs the current normative vacuum is unprecedented in the modern era, theĢżNorth Atlantic TreatyĢżOrganizationĢż(NATO)ĢżAlliance facesĢża new ā€˜strategic trilemmaā€™:Ģżthe simultaneous and often contradictory imperativesĢżof maintaining credible extended deterrence;Ģżenhancing conventional defence against hybrid and missile threats;Ģżand reconstructing a confidence-building, risk-reduction framework to prevent accidental escalation. The central policy problem is that the traditional tools of strategic stabilityĢżā€“ quantitative and qualitative ceilings, inspections, and transparencyĢżā€“Ģżhave been discarded in favour of verticalĢżnuclearĢżproliferation. NATO must navigate an environment whereĢżthe absence of constraints increases the risk of miscalculations, potentially leading to an unmanaged arms race that reduces the securityĢżfor allĢżNATO Allies.ĢżĢż

Context: The Long Transition and the Paradox of the New STARTĢż

TheĢżinternationalĢżarms control regime, which persisted through various systemic shifts from 1972 until 2026, has finally fractured. However, a rigorous assessmentĢżof its lifespanĢżsuggests that the final pillar of this regime,Ģżthe New START,Ģżwas already flawed.ĢżĢżThis omission allowed Moscow to channel its modernization efforts toward lethal, MIRV-capable systems,Ģżwhile remaining formallyĢżcompliant toĢżthe treaty limit of 1,550 warheads.Ģż,ĢżMoscowā€™s StrategicĢżRocketĢżForces (RVSN) and the missile industry exploited this normativeĢżā€˜shieldā€™Ģżto initiate a massiveĢżā€˜re-MIRVingā€™Ģżprocess. This modernization was driven by aĢżĢżwithin the Russian military-industrial complex. By focusing on systems that exploited New STARTā€™s qualitative loopholes, institutional actors, such as theĢż, secured long-term funding and development pathways for a new generation of delivery vehicles. This momentumĢżfacilitatedĢżthe emergence of a direct nexus between treaty-compliant modernization and the later deployment of advanced long-range capabilities on the Ukrainian battlefield.Ģż

The Strategic Trilemma between Extended Deterrence and the ā€˜Uploadā€™ DisparityĢż

The end of New START has transformed the re-MIRVing process into a catalyst for a new arms race. In this new unconstrained environment, the US possesses a significant technical advantage. . If the US opts to utilize its technological edge, it would effectively out-deploy Moscow, potentially doubling its arsenal to levels above the failed treatyā€™s limits.  In response, Moscow may prioritize asymmetrical offset centred on long-range theatre strike capabilities. This likely reaction is deeply rooted in the bureaucratic momentum of Russian military-industrial complex, favouring dual capable systems that operate in regulatory grey zones.   

Defence, Resilience, and the Hypersonic Decision Gap

ĢżUnlike traditionalĢżICBMs, which allow for a 25-plus minutes warning window, a hypersonic system launched from central Europe can reach critical command nodes in Moscow in less than 10 minutes. ThisĢżĢżin decision time undermines de-escalatory signalling and placesĢżĢżon the adversaryā€™s early warning systems, potentially triggering automated ā€˜launch on warningā€™ responses. Even a conventional strike on communications, command-and-control (C3) centres would be strategically relevant. Therefore,Ģżthe deployment of such systems in substantial numbers would create a ā€˜launch-on-warningā€™ incentive for Moscow, further destabilizing the offensive-defensiveĢżbalance and increasing the risk of automated nuclear response.ĢżĢż

Managing UncertaintyĢżin a Multipolar SystemĢż

Emerging from a Cold War environment coalesced around a bipolar international power-distribution, traditional arms control has proven ill-suited for the asymmetrical, multipolar international disorder of the last two decades.  In a world without inspections, stability depends on predictability. To achieve this goal, the international community must work to prevent accidental escalation through transparency and launch notifications. The reconstruction of a stabilizing framework is currently stymied by two primary structural hurdles: Russiaā€™s current lack of trustworthiness and Chinaā€™s strategic intentions.  

The main obstacle to reopening dialogue with Russia is the paradox of negotiating limits on the same systems being employed in the current war in Ukraine. It would be politically fraught for the US to engage in fresh negotiations, while Russia utilizes these assets as tool of active coercion and battlefield destruction. . This move puts Washington in an uneasy negotiating position, forcing it to negotiate over assets that France and the United Kingdom (UK) consider non-negotiable. This is hardly a novel tactic:  Putinā€™s proposal risks to exacerbate infra-systemic fault lines, foster suspects of decoupling, and ā€˜fears of abandonmentā€™ between the US and its European Allies. Simultaneously, Chinaā€™s strategic stalling (and its own ambitions to increase its arsenal) prevents the necessary transition toward a trilateral framework. By hiding behind the rhetoric of minimal deterrence, Beijing refuses to accept any oversight while rapidly expanding its nuclear and conventional inventory.  

While the American and Russian nuclear stockpiles greatly exceed those of all other nuclear-weapon states, the strategic equation has irrevocably shifted from a bipolar to a multipolar calculus through Chinaā€™s ambitions to drastically increase its own arsenal.  These missiles provide Beijing with a high-precision, non-nuclear capability to hold regional strategic assets in the mire, including forward air bases, carrier strike groups, and command-and-control (C2) nodes.  This scenario of ā€˜conventional entanglementā€™ complicates the global force posture of NATOā€™s primary security provider, the US.   

Technological Acceleration: The AI-Hypersonic NexusĢż

The ā€˜Strategic Trilemmaā€™ is further complicated by the integration ofĢżĢżand launch-control systems. As theĢżĢżthrough the deployment of Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs), the decision-making window for political leaders has shrunk from thirty minutes to mere seconds.Ģż.ĢżHowever, the ā€˜black-boxā€™ nature of neural network-based AI introduces unprecedentedĢż. Because these models recognize patterns in ways that are non-replicable and often incomprehensible to human operators, they are prone to hallucinations or false positives ā€“ interpreting unusual atmospheric phenomena or cyber-spoofing as an incoming strike. In a strategic environment dominated by fast-flying systems like theĢżDark EagleĢżorĢżOreshnik, the reliance on AI-driven recommendations could lead to a ā€˜compressed escalationā€™ where a machineĢżinitiatesĢża retaliatory strike before human deliberation even occurs. This technological entanglementĢżnecessitatesĢżthat any futureĢżarmsĢżcontrol negotiations must deal not only with warheads and delivery systems, but also with the algorithms governing their employment.ĢżĢż

The Shift towards Integrated DeterrenceĢż

In response to this acceleration, NATO has transitioned toward a posture of integrated deterrence. With the expiration of New START in sight, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) moved to solidify the Allianceā€™s defensive architecture.  This strategic shift was codified on February 12, 2026, when several NATO Allies launched  to develop next-generation sensors designated to counter ballistic and hypersonic threats (like the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS)). These initiatives, alongside a new  for drone-based deep precision strike capability, signal a move away from static, treaty-based stability, toward a dynamic denial posture. Furthermore, the  reinforces this approach by emphasizing trans-regional deterrence, acknowledging that while NATO remains a regional alliance, its security is inextricably tied to the ā€˜two-peerā€™ challenge.  

Policy Recommendations:ĢżĢż

1. Rediscover a dual approach: Combine military modernization with a standingĢżnegotiatingĢżofferĢżto both Russia andĢżChinaĢżon Strategic Stability Dialogue,Ģżwhich wouldĢżlikely benefitĢżNATOĢżAlliance cohesion by reassuring the most risk-adverse NATOĢżmemberĢżstates.ĢżĢż

2. Prioritize Qualitative Limits: Advocate for a Multilateral MIRV-freeze to mitigate first-strike incentives and neutralize the advantage of rapid uploading.ĢżĢżIn the post-START environment, the primary risk is no longer aggregate warheads counts, but the rapid surgeĢżinĢżcapacity,Ģżafforded by US upload potential and Russiaā€™s modernization of MIRV-capable systems.ĢżA ā€˜freezeā€™ approach would be aimed at neutralizing the perceived advantages of rapid arsenal expansion, signalling a commitment to strategic sufficiency rather than theĢżrecklessĢżpursuit of superiority.ĢżĢż

3. EstablishĢżā€˜Cold WarĢżPlusā€™ĢżCommunication Channels: Strengthen secure, real-time links between military headquarters to manage crisis in an era of hypersonic weapons.ĢżNATO should strengthen secure, real-time links between military headquarters ā€“ specificallyĢżthe Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)Ģżand the Russian Ministry of Defence ā€“ to manage crisis in an era defined by HGVs. These channels must be hardened against cyber-interferences and electronic warfare to ensure theyĢżremainĢżviableĢżduring high-intensity grey zone friction or hybrid confrontations.ĢżĢż

4. Manage AI Integration in Command and Control:ĢżEstablishĢżā€˜human-in-the-loopā€™ standards between launch commands and early warning systems toĢżpreventĢżAIĢżsystemsĢżfrom triggering accidental escalation during high-speed hypersonic encounters.ĢżWhile AI may become indispensable for processing massive data streams from next-generationĢżsensors like the HBTSS, it must neverĢżpossessĢżthe autonomous authority toĢżinitiateĢża response. Hence, theĢżNATOĢżAlliance should champion an international protocol that mandatesĢża ā€˜ā€™ for human commanders, even in high-speed hypersonic confrontations.Ģż

5. Define a Clear Doctrine for Conventional Hypersonic: Clarify that systems likeĢżDark EagleĢżare forĢż,Ģżwhile acknowledging thatĢżĢżremainsĢżinherently destabilizing.ĢżNATO should explicitly disavow ā€˜decapitationā€™ or strategic nuclear roles for these assets to reduce the risk of Russia misperceiving conventional precision strikes as existential threats to itsĢżC2Ģżarchitecture.Ģż

6. Strengthen Hybrid Resilience: Protect undersea and digital infrastructure as a coreĢżcomponentĢżof strategic stability to preventĢżhybrid,Ģżnon-kinetic bypassing of deterrence.ĢżBy neutralizing low-cost, high-impact hybrid threats, theĢżNATOĢżAlliance prevents adversaries from bypassing deterrence thresholdsĢżand undermining stability at the lowest level of the escalation ladder. This approach ensures that the emerging new capabilities in air, missile, and drone-defence would not beĢżcompromisedĢżby asymmetric disruption aimed at eroding domestic resilience and political will during a crisis.ĢżĢż

The post Strategic Stability in Flux: Can NATO Balance Deterrence, Defence, and Arms Control in a New Missile Age? appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

Introduction

In recent years, Europeā€™s geopolitical centre of gravity has shifted toward the Northeast, with the Baltic region emerging as a . As , the Organizationā€™s member countries are increasingly focused on deterrence and defence. Traditional conceptions of deterrence are constructed around three pillars: . This memo focuses on the second ā€œCā€ ā€“ credibility ā€“ by examining prospects for strengthening the resilience of NATOā€™s military supply chains in the Baltic region through defence industrial cooperation between the three enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) framework nations (Canada, Germany, and the United Kingdom (UK)) and the three host nations (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia). 

As a response to Russiaā€™s military aggression and hybrid warfare against Ukraine since 2014, the 2016 NATO Warsaw summit marked a significant step towards reinforcing the security of the Baltic region. Canada, Germany, and the UK assumed leadership as framework nations for eFP battlegroups in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, respectively. While the eFP signals a strong multinational Allied presence in the Baltic states, lessons from Ukraine since 2022 inevitably raise critical questions: is NATO ready to fight for a prolonged period? And can NATO secure supply chains so that they remain close to the war fighters? 

This policy brief first analyses how resilient supply chains lay the foundation for credible long-term deterrence. Second, it examines the role and prospects of defence industrial cooperation between eFP framework nations and host nations, before finally concluding with three concrete policy recommendations.  

WhyĢżDoesĢżSecurity of Supply Matter?Ģż

There is an old saying attributed to Dwight. E. Eisenhower that . It is also true that , as each nation brings its own peculiarities while the combined force must act as a single organization. To put this into perspective, the Canadian-led NATO Multinational Brigade in Latvia (formerly, the eFP battlegroup) is composed of 14 nations, making it NATOā€™s  military unit. 

Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, NATO began scaling the three eFP battlegroups in the Baltics into brigade-sized units. Germanyā€™s 45^th Panzer brigade has been relocated to Lithuania and is expected to achieve . Canada is also considering  in Latvia.  

Regardless of how its war against Ukraine ends, Russia will remain an existential security threat to the Baltic states. To deter and, if necessary, defend against Russia in the Baltic region, NATO Allies ā€“ especially the eFP framework nations ā€“ must demonstrate both the capacity and the resolve to fight alongside the host nations for as long as it takes to defend NATO territory. This, in turn, requires a continuous and resilient flow of supplies through to the battlefield.  

While experts have called for the  to sustain operational capability in the longer term, this approach has clear limitations ā€“ most importantly because stockpiles are finite in the event of a prolonged conflict. To secure an uninterrupted supply, it is essential to develop local defence industrial capacities. 

Security of supply extends beyond the availability of raw materials and manufacturing components. Latviaā€™s  defines security of supply as a guarantee of access to the materiel and services required by the National Armed Forces to fulfil its tasks. This understanding emphasizes that the defence industrial base is an integral part of comprehensive defence strategy across the peace-crisis-war spectrum. It also implies that the defence industries of eFP host nations must be able to supply not only their national militaries but also Allied armed forces. However, defence industries in the Baltic states, while growing rapidly, are still relatively nascent, and there may not be sufficient latent industrial capacity to scale up production quickly in time of crisis.  

Failure to secure military supply chains would pose strategic risks that are particularly acute given the geographic characteristics of the Baltic states. A close proximity to Russia and reliance on the roughly 65km-wide  to link the region to the rest of Europe exacerbate supply vulnerabilities. To ensure that NATO forces deployed in the region can fight a prolonged war, it is necessary to establish short, resilient, and regionally-anchored military supply chains and, at the same time, to deepen defence industrial cooperation between the eFP framework nations and host nations. 

Enhancing the Enhanced Forward PresenceĢż

The  posits that the Baltic states constitute a single area of operations. This means that regional cooperation should be understood as a key enabler of credible deterrence and effective defence. This logic applies not only to trilateral Baltic cooperation but also among all Allies deployed in the region.  

To improve coordination between the three framework nations and the three host nations, the  was launched in 2023. Although it was originally envisaged as a platform for political and strategic dialogue in areas of common interest, such as training and exercises, it also holds untapped potential to serve as a venue for industrial cooperation and joint supply chain management. 

There are already examples of bilateral cooperation in this area. Recently, the Latvian Ministry of Defence signed a  (MoU) with the Canadian Commercial Corporation ā€“ Canadaā€™s government-to-government contracting agencyā€Æā€“ā€Æ concerning bilateral cooperation in military equipment, services, infrastructure, and industry. 

However, since the Baltics consider themselves to be a single area of operations, a broader relationship of regional cooperation between the framework and host nations is needed. Dialogue must take place at all levels ā€“ political, strategic, operational, tactical, as well as between defence industries. Regular information sharing and practical measures to harmonize defence investment and industrial policies will strengthen the security of supply and help forge new defence industrial partnerships.

WhatĢżDo Host Nations Have to Offer?Ģż

The three host nations are  in NATO. With defence budgets reaching 5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2026, the Baltic states are actively developing local defence industrial capabilities. In recent years, . There are notable success stories, such as the production of  and subsequent expansion into assembly and maintenance of more advanced systems such as . Nevertheless, the Baltic defence industries remain primarily focused on niche technological areas and generally lack the scale to support full production cycles of heavy armaments or other advanced military systems. At the same time, their relatively small size makes Baltic defence industries flexible, innovation-oriented, and able to rapidly adapt. 

This environment creates opportunities for foreign defence companies to enter the market and address the existing gaps in cooperation with local partners. As of 2025, all three framework nations allocate at least 2% of GDP to defence and have committed to increase defence expenditure up to 5% of GDP by 2035. Consequently, there is a strong push to build homegrown . 

Recently, German defence companies have been particularly active in the Baltic states. For example,  to establish 155mm artillery ammunition production facilities. More recently, Lithuania Defense Services, a joint venture established in 2022 by Rheinmetall and KNDS Germany, announced plans to .  

 and  are also pursuing ambitious efforts to expand their defence industrial capacities. For example, a Canadian company  to establish assembly lines for its BlackWolf tactical armoured vehicles in Latvia. Of the three eFP framework nations, such partnerships are especially relevant for Canada given the geographical distance between Canada and the Baltic region. Partnering Canadian defence industry with local companies in Latvia not only facilitates access to new markets but also helps build viable defence industrial capacity in the Baltic states for warfighting purposes, especially in a prolonged conflict.  

This logic extends beyond the manufacture of original equipment to also encompass access to critical components and materials. For example, last year the Canadian company ā€“ a component that is essential for sensors and electronic systems widely used in defence technology, such as aircraft, missiles, and drones. 

The new geopolitical reality, growing defence budgets, and commitment to develop defence industrial capabilities underscore the need to coordinate defence investment and industrial policies within the 3+3 format. Such coordination would help secure military supply chains precisely where they are needed the most. This approach would align with broader NATO efforts to ramp up defence industrial capacities, such as  and .  

Conclusions andĢżRecommendationsĢż

Secured supply chains through defence industrial cooperation are not just desirable; they are a strategic necessity for credible deterrence. Since its creation, , from which the defence industries of framework and host nations stand to benefit. 

To harness the potential of defence industrial cooperation within the 3+3 format, the policymakers in the three framework nations and the three host nations should consider the following actions: 

1.ā€ÆExpand the Scope of 3+3 Format to Include Defence Industrial Cooperation.ā€Æ 

TheĢż3+3ĢżagendaĢżshouldĢżbeĢżbroadened byĢżhavingĢżregular meetings of keyĢżrepresentativesĢżā€“ such asĢżNational Armaments DirectorsĢżā€“Ģżfrom the Baltic states, Canada, Germany, and theĢżUKĢżto promote dialogue, coordinate policies,Ģżand identify opportunitiesĢżforĢżdefence industrial cooperation andĢżstrengtheningĢżsecurity of supplyĢżacross the region.ĢżĢż

2.ā€ÆEstablish an Annual 3+3 Defence Industry Forum.  

To facilitate the establishment of cross-border partnerships between defence companies, regular and open dialogue is essential. As several bilateral defence industry events already exist, a dedicated 3+3 Defence Industry Forum could be built on these foundations, providing a multilateral platform for collaboration. 

3.ā€ÆD±š±¹±š±ō“Ē±č&²Ō²ś²õ±č;ø鱚²µ¾±“Ē²Ō²¹±ō±ō²ā&²Ō²ś²õ±č;“”²Ō³¦³ó“Ē°ł±š»å&²Ō²ś²õ±č;±Ź°ł“Ē»å³Ü³¦³Ł¾±“Ē²Ō&²Ō²ś²õ±č;°ä²¹±č²¹³¦¾±³Ł¾±±š²õ.ā€Æ  

Host nations and framework nations should invest in new production facilities and reinforce supply chains for the militaries deployed in the Baltic region. Framework nationsā€™ defence industry national champions should take a leading role and integrate host nationsā€™ defence industries into regional supply chains. This approach would promote transfer of knowledge and technology, as well as strengthen the overall capacity to sustain operations over a prolonged period. 

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Executive Summary

Authoritarian states are increasingly using police organizations to target diaspora communities in democratic countries. This is especially evident in the misuse of Interpolā€™s Red Notice system to bypass extradition barriers and pursue dissidents abroad. When politically motivated notices are dispersed through Canadian policing systems, they risk compromising the integrity of international law enforcement cooperation, increasing the likelihood of refoulement which violates Canadaā€™s legal obligations, and exacerbates a chilling effect among diaspora communities. In doing so, these notices expose the vulnerabilities in Canadaā€™s domestic protections by allowing foreign states the ability to project coercive influence through Canadian political institutions.  

While this brief focuses on the misuse of INTERPOL mechanisms as a specific form of Transnational Repression (TR), it sits within a broader context of state-led repression ranging from the Peopleā€™s Republic of China to India. It uses Tajikistan as a case study to highlight vulnerabilities in INTERPOLā€™s vetting process, including insufficient pre-screening and the burden placed on victims to prove their innocence. These weaknesses enable states to exploit Canadian institutions to harass and deport political refugees, a practice known as Transnational Repression (TR).  

TR has occurred in Canada, demonstrating the urgent need for a governmental response.  The focus of this policy brief is on the use of INTERPOL to target dissidents. To address these challenges, this brief proposes specific procedural enhancements to protect the asylum process and strengthen pre-existing domestic protections to protect Canadaā€™s diaspora communities. 

To read the full policy brief, use the button below to download the full policy memo.

The post Closing Canadaā€™s INTERPOL Gap: Preventing Politicized Red Notice Abuse appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

Introduction

Recent think tank and policy discussionsĢżaboutĢżtheĢżRussianĢżFederationĢżhave primarily focused on three issues: the prospects of a peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine;Ģżdevelopments on the battlefield;Ģżand the limits of Russiaā€™s resilience to Western economic sanctions (). While these questions are undoubtedly centralĢżto the ongoing war, they risk obscuring a critical dimension of European securityĢżā€“Ģżthat is, the future of enemy politics, orĢżā€œenemization,ā€ĢżinĢżpost-war Russia.Ģż

In this policy brief, enemization refers to the systematic construction and reproduction of internal and external enemy images by political elites and state-controlled media, framing so-called ā€œenemiesā€ as existential threats to national survival, identity, and sovereignty. Enemization serves crucial political functions such as legitimizing authoritarian governance, mobilizing public support for repressive and confrontational domestic and foreign policies (; ). While enemization has radicalized during the war against Ukraine, it reflects a broader and longer-standing pattern in Russian politics. Even if the war ends, enemization is likely to remain one of the central organizing frameworks shaping how Russian political discourse interprets international relations, if an authoritarian regime continues. In this case, the European Union (EU) is likely to continue being framed as an adversary, limiting prospects for stable post-war engagement across Eurasia and sustaining long-term security risks.  

Therefore, understanding how enemization functions, why it persists, and how it shapes Russiaā€™s postwar behaviour is essential for developing realistic and effective EU policy responses. Even though enemization also occurs in other countries of various political systems, the case of Russia ā€“ as a neighbouring country that has demonstrated willingness to use force ā€“ plays substantial relevance for European security. This policy brief examines the persistence of enemization in Russia and evaluates its implications for European security and long-term post-war engagement, arguing that under conditions of continued authoritarian rule, enemy narratives are likely to remain a durable feature of Russian politics regardless of war outcomes or leadership configurations.

Continuity andĢżEscalation ofĢżEnemizationĢżin RussiaĢż

Enemization in Russia has been a recurring feature of Russian public discourse since at least the 1990s, when political, social, and economic instability revived threat and enemy perceptions, conspiracy theories, and nostalgia for ā€œglorious pastā€ and a strong state (Gudkov 2005¹; ). The Chechen wars and terrorist attacks further reinforced enemy framing, while trust in military and security institutions, including the presidency, grew stronger (Gudkov 2005). Under Putin, negative mobilization of the population around the ideas of enemies, threats, and other symbolic constituents of the besieged fortress narrative has become a core component of regime communication and governance (; ).  

Enemization dynamics are visible in concrete rhetorical and legislative practices. Russian propaganda, following a long-established Soviet mechanism of using references to Nazis or Fascists to delegitimize political opponents (), routinely frames Ukraine as a ā€œNazi regimeā€ (), or Western values as aimed to destroy Russian culture, while domestic opposition and various social minorities are labelled as foreign agents, traitors, or extremists. Legislative measures continue to limit human rights and freedoms of these alleged enemies (), while intensifying public glorification of wartime sacrifices and spreading binary logic of enmity into education and other spheres of social life.  

The full-scale invasion of Ukraine represents the culmination of the enemization in Russian public discourse. To justify aggressive foreign policies and domestic repressions against its own citizens, the Russian regime has strengthened and radicalized its propaganda of enmity. Russian social surveys results, although requiring cautious interpretation, consistently demonstrate a widespread public endorsement, usually between 70 and 80% of respondents, of enemy images portraying Russia as a besieged fortress surrounded by hostile actors (). These enemy images are reflected in official state communications and state media framing of Ukraine as a ā€œNazi regimeā€; the West as seeking Russiaā€™s collapse; and active narration of foreign agents and traitors among domestic political opposition and other social groups such as religious and sexual minorities. Such narratives reinforce the perception of existential threats to the Russian worldview ā€“ also commonly referred to as Ruskiy Mir ā€“ and legitimize aggressive foreign policies and repressions at home.  

Although questions remain as to what extent Russian elites genuinely believe in these enemy narratives or opportunistically instrumentalize them, public opinion data shows widespread support of enemy perceptions with official messaging (). Even if the Russian regime adopts less confrontational rhetoric, the institutionalization and long-term reproduction of enemy narratives across political discourse, media, and education may suggest that such perceptions will persist at least for a certain period. This persistence reflects not an inherent social disposition, but rather the cumulative effect of sustained propaganda of enmity which resonates, among other things, with certain popular ā€“ though not uniform ā€“ perceptions, biases, opinions, and worldviews present within a society (). For Europe, this means that rhetorical moderation alone should not be read as evidence of rapid de-escalation, since the drivers reproducing enemy narratives may remain in place after the formal conclusion of the war. 

TheĢżDrivers ofĢżPost-WarĢżEnemizationĢżin RussiaĢż

Enemization in Russia should not be understood as a temporary wartime social and political mobilization tool, but as a longstanding political instrument and condition. First, a substantial and meaningful reversal of enemy narratives would require a major disruption of the Russian political and informational environment that sustains it. Second, enemization in wartime Russia predates the war and has become institutionalized in Russian politics throughout history. The routinized enemy narratives tend to be self-reinforcing, shaping public expectations and interpretations even after the immediate conditions that intensified them have changed. Finally, enemization is closely linked to a broader narrative of confrontation with the West, within which the war against Ukraine is framed as a separate episode in a bigger geopolitical struggle (); a particular possible scenario if Putin remains in power. Thus, even if hostilities end, the drivers that reinforce enemization are likely to persist, allowing enemy narratives remain in place and manifest.  

Although military outcomes of the war against Ukraine remain obscure, they will likely shape the tone and targets of Russian enemization in distinct ways while keeping the underlying logic intact. Russian authorities will likely declare any war outcomes as victorious, and such declarations will reinforce enemization by legitimizing the use of military force as an effective foreign policy instrument, and the use of repression as an effective domestic policy instrument (); both are based on the perception of enemies and threats. If the war ends in a prolonged stalemate without clear successes and lines drawn, the Kremlin could credibly sell narratives to the population; enemization may shift from triumphalist to resentful tones, picturing Russia as constrained or undermined by hostile external and internal forces which prevented the country from achieving a complete victory. Finally, possible military defeat could intensify revanchist narratives and scapegoating directed at already constructed enemies. Thus, across these outcomes, enemization is likely to be adapted and reformulated but not abandoned. 

One may hope that substantial regime change may positively affect enemization by beginning its partial or even full demobilization. This unlikely possibility requires us to look deeper into the phenomenon. While political leadership in autocratic Russia shapes policy choices, enemization also draws on pre-existing historical perceptions and biases in parts of society; rather than inventing enemies from scratch, Russian propaganda amplifies and rearticulates such narratives by promoting the most useful ones in a given political context (Gudkov 2005). These enemy narratives are embedded in state institutions, public expectations about politics, security, and national identity. As a result, Russian political elites operate within pre-determined moral boundaries that constrain the range of discursive options, including how enemies are defined, justified, and, if needed, de-enemized (). Even in the event of elite change, successor elites would likely be motivated to maintain at least elements of familiar narratives of enemization to avoid accusations of weakness, betrayal, and capitulation, especially from those we define as ultra-patriotic and nationalist radicals. In turn, to secure some stability amidst the leadershipā€™s change, the new elites may find it easier to reproduce familiar enemy constructs, instead of dismantling them altogether, as historical experience in post-Soviet Russia in the 1990s suggests.   

To conclude, post-war Russia is likely to remain dependent on enemization as a policy instrument across a range of plausible war outcomes. While the specific targets and intensity of enemization may shift, the institutional framework that supports them will likely persist. Even a regime change would not automatically disband enemy narratives as the new elites may face strong incentive to continue employing in some way such enemy rhetoric to secure their own power. That is why Europe should prepare for a strong possibility to deal with Russia, in which enemization remains politically usable even if its form evolves over time.

PolicyĢżImplications andĢżRecommendations for EuropeĢż

As demonstrated above, enemization depends on propagandaā€™s resonance with pre-existing social and historical biases and perceptions. State messages about a hostile West or treacherous domestic political opposition draw much of its legitimacy from this resonance. Accordingly, it is unlikely that certain changes in European policies or rhetoric would suffice to transform elite threat messaging. Despite contemporary censorship conditions in Russia, however, European actions remain visible and preferable to at least some segments of Russian society. Therefore, Europe should prioritize reaching Russian society directly through its policies to mitigate enemization narratives. Even though Europe cannot directly dismantle enemization narratives within Russia, EU policies could influence the credibility and resonance of such narratives while showing that it does not consider Russian society as a whole to be a threat nor an actor to be punished.  

1. European post-war strategic communication planning should aim for long-term deterrence over rapid or even gradual normalization.  

Europe needs to base their post-war planning on the assumption that enemization in Russia will persist after the end of active hostilities in Ukraine and that it will affect Russian foreign and domestic political agendas. Although the EU has already invested substantial resources in becoming more independent from Russian energy and raw materials, as well as in its military industrial complex, such planning also requires a well-planned discursive strategy of communicating with not only the Russian regime or state elites, but Russian society as a whole. Expectations that Russia will become more pacifist and less prone to use militant instruments due to its losses in Ukraine appear to be wishful thinking, so it is essential to embrace the opposite possibility to manage the security effects of this enemization. 

2. Utilize discursive restraint in official communication.  

European officials should avoid using rhetorical frames in public speeches and documents that portray Russia as a civilizational enemy or a permanently hostile society. This, however, by no means implies that the official rhetoric needs to be softened towards the Russian government ā€“ the condemnation of Russian aggression is necessary and justified. Discursive restraint, suggested here as the policy instrument, should be understood not as conciliation but rather as a tool to limit the discursive reproduction of enemization.  

3. Clearly differentiate between the Russian regime and the population.  

Although the issue of moral responsibility of the society in an authoritarian regime for the crimes committed throughout the war is a subject of academic and political debates, avoiding the narrative of collective responsibility may be beneficial, specifically in this case of mitigating the risks of enemization for European security. Messaging that brings together the regime and the population contributes to the regimeā€™s claim that it represents the nation as a whole and validates narratives of collective punishment and guilt. This in turn leads to consolidation of the Russian public around their leaders or, at the very least, around the narratives framing Europe as a threat and enemy to Russians.  

The post Enemy Politics in Russia: A Long-Term Security Risk for Europe appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

Key TakeawaysĢż

• ŠÓ°ÉŌ­““ one in three residents of Estonia and Latvia say they would do nothingĢżin the event ofĢża military threat, with even lower likelihood to act among ethnic Russians.ĢżĢż

• Interest inĢżparticipatingĢżthrough non-combat roles (e.g.,Ģżfinancial contributions) is higher than in combat rolesĢżbut still does not reflectĢża significantĢżportionĢżof the populationĢżin either Latvia or Estonia.Ģż

• NATO (and Canada) shouldĢżaddressĢżtheĢżsocietal resilienceĢżgap among localĢżcommunities.ĢżTargeted grants for trusted local organizations, coupled with strong monitoring and evaluation, can help build social cohesion and civic preparedness across Estonia and Latvia, particularly in regions with a significant ethnic Russian population.Ģż

BackgroundĢż

Recent polling data from Estonia and Latvia suggest there is a significant gap in societal resilience among the residents of both countries. While Russia is overwhelmingly perceived as a security threat within these nations, an overall willingness to act in the event of a military threat is low. This gap is particularly pronounced along demographic lines, with lower willingness to act among ethnic Russians in Estonia and Latvia. As the Baltic states are likely targets for potential future Russian aggression, this deficit in resilience has direct implications for Canadian and NATO security commitments in the region.ā€Æ 

Since their post-Soviet independence, Estonia and Latvia have invested heavily in defence preparedness through joining NATO, bolstering their cyber networks, and educating their youth on mis- and disinformation. After Russiaā€™s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, Canada joined its NATO Allies in strengthening defence structures in Eastern and Central Europe under , currently the Canadian Armed Forcesā€™ (CAF) largest overseas mission. Recognizing the particular vulnerability of the Baltic states to Russian aggression, Canada took the initiative to lead the Multinational Battlegroup in Latvia in 2017. After Russiaā€™s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Canada committed to scaling this presence into a full . Following his election in Spring 2025, Prime Minister Mark Carney emphasized that these operations work to reinforce NATO at a time of great global instability and change. 

To meet NATOā€™s Article 3 , Estonia and Latvia have adopted ā€œTotal Defenceā€ models, recognizing that societal resilience and civilian participation are just as crucial as military structures for overall defence of the country. Learning from the success of the Ukrainian Territorial Defence Forces in fighting the Russian military,  is working to promote its own reservist force through public awareness campaigns, increased daily allowances for reservists, and crisis preparedness education.  similarly promotes civil protection while identifying ā€œpolitical trustā€ and ā€œinter-ethnic cohesionā€ as vital to national security. Both Baltic countries are also working to increase civil support for their law enforcement agencies, fire departments, and medical systems.  

As highlighted in the Latvian defence plan, social cohesion and confidence in state institutions and partnerships are essential for building and maintaining civil engagement in total defence.ā€ÆThe  in Riga engages in public diplomacy, information operations, and psychological operations to align national efforts with NATOā€™s strategic objectives. The Latvian government has also partnered with the  ā€“ an NGO with the goal of informing the public about NATO and Latviaā€™s participation in it.  

Social cohesion between ethnic communities has been a focus of national and local NGOs, as Russian-speaking minorities remain less likely to trust NATO or volunteer for national defence than their neighbours. In the northeastern region of Estonia,  works mostly with Russian speakers of all ages on projects developing critical thinking and media literacy. These projects promote active citizenship and social entrepreneurship through youth work and international exchanges. VitaTiim already has international partnerships, including with the European Solidarity Corps and the US Embassy in Estonia. In Latvia, the organization  focuses on education, culture, media, and civic engagement in the Baltics and beyond, specifically striving to foster open dialogue and social inclusion for underrepresented ethnic minorities.  

Despite these institutional frameworks and nonprofit initiatives, recent polling reveals a high likelihood amongst the public to do nothing to defend Estonia and Latvia from a military threat, as well as a persistent gap in how different ethnic communities perceive national security and threats to their country. To better understand these dynamics, the following data examines security perceptions across the region. 

Survey Evidence: Societal Resilience Gaps in Estonia and LatviaĢż

Polling from ŠÓ°ÉŌ­““ Universityā€™s Eastern European and Transatlantic Network (EETN) shows that,Ģżas of Spring 2025, many people in Estonia and Latvia do not see themselves as active participants in defence during a crisis. Most significantly, about 30% of Estonians and Latvians say they are likely to do nothingĢżin the event ofĢża military threat.ĢżĢż

Demographic and geographicĢżcharacteristics ofĢżthis vulnerabilityĢżshow a stark division:Ģżalmost halfĢżof ethnic RussiansĢż(46%)ĢżresidingĢżin Latvia and EstoniaĢżwouldĢżdo nothingĢżifĢżtheirĢżrespective countries face a military threat.ĢżFour in 10Ģż(43%)ĢżpolledĢżresidentsĢżofĢżLatgale, a region of Latvia directly on the border with RussiaĢżcomprisedĢżof aĢżlarge Russian-speaking minority,Ģżsay they would not act.ĢżHalf of those polledĢżin Northeastern EstoniaĢż(51%), another region sharing a border with RussiaĢżand having a similar demographic composition as Latgale, are also likely to do nothing.Ģż

Reported willingness to participate in national defence is low. When asked whether they would join the active-duty military in the event of a military threat, only about 20% of Estonians and Latvians say they are likely to do so, and only about 30% are likely to join the military reserves or territorial forces in response to the same threat.  

While more people are willing to take up non-combat forms of national defence, still, even such likelihood is low. Estonians appear to be more likely to assist in this way than Latvians, approximately six in 10 (59%) of Estonians are likely to volunteer to contribute with physical labour, versus 44% in Latvia. ŠÓ°ÉŌ­““ half (48%) of Estonians are likely to volunteer to contribute financially, compared to only 29% of Latvians.  

Ethnic Russians in both countries are even less likely to be active defenders in the event of a military threat. A staggering 80% of ethnic Russians in Latvia and Estonia are unlikely to join the active-duty military, military reserves, or territorial forces. In Estonia, 41% of ethnic Russians are likely to volunteer to contribute with physical labour, but this number drops significantly in Latvia, with only 29% of ethnic Russians likely to do so. Finally, only about 20% of ethnic Russians, in both Estonia and Latvia, are likely to volunteer to contribute financially.  

From a policy perspective, this polling data highlightsĢżbothĢżaĢżgap and anĢżopportunity. If a significant segment of the population is unlikely toĢżcontribute to the active defence of their country, resilience-building efforts must expand beyond militaryĢżdeployments. To foster the social cohesion necessary for resilience, trustĢżand cooperation between minority and majority communities must be bolstered. NATO and Canada can do this through collaboration with local community networksĢżā€“Ģżsuch asĢżVitaTiimĢżand New EastĢżā€“Ģżthat are already on the groundĢżinĢżthe region.Ģż

ConclusionĢż

Recent polling data from Estonia and Latvia suggests a region with a significant gap in societal resilience. While Russia is overwhelmingly perceived as a security threat, willingness to actĢżin the event ofĢża military threat is low. This gap is particularly pronounced alongĢżdemographicĢżlines, with lower willingness to act amongĢżethnic Russians. AsĢżEstonia and LatviaĢżareĢżlikely targetsĢżfor potential future Russian aggression, this deficit in resilience has direct implications for Canadian and NATO security commitments in the region.ā€ÆBy supporting well-monitored projects with local organizations that build social cohesion and civic preparedness, Canada and NATO can help ensure Estonia and Latvia are more resilient and better prepared to withstand a military threat.ĢżĢż

Policy RecommendationsĢż

1. NATO and Canada should create a dedicated societal resilience grant to support local NGOs such as VitaTiim and New East that advance social cohesion and civic preparedness. Supported projects should have bilingual messaging (in Russian and Estonian or Latvian) and may include media literacy and cyber safety training, community initiatives fostering dialogue across demographic lines, and projects that engage citizens as partners in international governance. 

The grant should emphasize collaboration between local and international organizations, promoting a shared responsibility in local, national, and international governance. Priority should go to local initiatives in regions with large Russian-speaking populations. 

2. Each NATO/Canadian-supported project should be required to include a monitoring, evaluation, and feedback plan in alignment with NATOā€™s . Thorough monitoring is necessary in order to accurately evaluate how effective projects are at bolstering societal resilience and civic preparedness.  

3. Canada and NATO should use existing NATO StratCom COE platforms to highlight successful partnerships in relatable ways to the Estonians and Latvians, including through multilingual media and public events. Positive views of NATO and the West expressed by individuals and organizations that already have credibility in their communities should be amplified to . 

The post Willing to do Nothing: Addressing the Societal Resilience Gap in Estonia and Latvia appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

Key Takeaways 

• In Estonia and Latvia, border residents, ethnic Russians, and Russian-speakers differ from the general population in their perception of security threats. They are more likely to view domestic political instability as their countryā€™s primary security threat, rather than Russia. 

• This segment of Estonians and Latvians also tend to feel disenfranchised and helpless regarding national defence, with the majority more likely to respond that their countries are ā€œon their ownā€ if faced by a military threat. 

• NATO should take a regionally focused outreach, using the Russian language as a medium and utilize transparent intelligence disclosure to assure and rebuild trust among these vulnerable populations. Furthermore, using visible and well-tested approaches such as tangible first-responder training and on-the-ground capacity-building measures could help address local skepticism. 

Background 

While the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) focuses on defending the Baltics from external Russian aggression, a critical segment of the population ā€“ namely border residents, ethnic Russians, and Russian-speakers ā€“ are more concerned with internal political instability than external threats for its national security. In addition, many of these respondents express a feeling of helplessness and alienation, believing neither the West nor Russia would come to their aid should their country face a military or security threat. Thus far, NATO operations aimed at reassuring Baltic residents are not succeeding with instilling confidence in current national security frameworks. Recognizing the diversity of security beliefs with a particular regional and linguistic focus could better inform NATO strategies that address security threat responses in the Baltics, helping to reassure these skeptical and disenfranchised populations.   

Russiaā€™s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has fundamentally transformed the international security landscape, prompting NATOā€™s response to reassure its Baltic members that, should it face a threat, NATO will come to their defence.  NATOā€™s operations in Latvia and Estonia are a part of its broader efforts at deterrence and defence on its eastern flank by increasing its presence in the region, with Canada leading the Multinational Brigade in Latvia through , and the United Kingdom leading in Estonia with . Latvia and Estonia are both active participants in various NATO-accredited Centres of Excellence (COEs) that conduct collaborative research with NATO Allies to better address security threats, many by malign Russian influence through hybrid tactics. For example, the , located in Riga, Latvia, monitors and counters information-manipulation threats in real time. Russiaā€™s information operations in these countries exploit pre-existing societal divisions among ethnic, regional, and linguistic lines, promoting extremist sentiments and skepticism against their governments and Western partners.  accuse Estonian and Latvian governments of being anti-Russian and incapable of defending their countries against any threat.   

Existing studies suggest that Russophone, ethnic Russian, and borderland populations in both Latvia and Estonia are more skeptical towards NATO and existing national security frameworks. They are found to be , and .  is found to be a salient factor, associated with decreased support for present (often liberal democratic) regimes.  In the context of the ongoing war against Ukraine, , and . Furthermore, they are.   

However, public opinion amongst these groups in Estonia and Latvia is proving to be more nuanced; many in these populations express a complex belief system surrounding national security that is . , , meaning that public opinion among Russophones in Latvia and Estonia is heterogenous. Given these insights, policy aimed at developing trust with these populations and fostering participation in national security frameworks should reflect this variety of beliefs, and address skepticism through regionally and linguistically mindful outreach initiatives.

Belief in ā€˜Domestic Political Instabilityā€™ as the Greatest National Security Threat

A survey conducted by the ŠÓ°ÉŌ­““ University Eastern European and Transatlantic Network (EETN) in Latvia and Estonia between March and May 2025 indicates that while Russia and the war in Ukraine are still prevalent security threats, 26% of Latvians and 22% of Estonians perceive ā€œdomestic political instabilityā€ as the most important threat. These opinions are particularly widespread among the border-region populations, among Russian speakers, and ethnic Russians. For example, in Latgale (Latviaā€™s border region) 52% chose ā€œdomestic political instabilityā€ as the greatest threat; only 7% picked Russia, and 12% the war in Ukraine. Similarly, in Northeastern Estonia, an area that borders Russia, 47% consider domestic political instability as a main security threat while only 17% consider Russia as the greatest threat. In Latvia, Russian speakers were far more likely to hold this belief compared to respondents who speak the titular language; language was not a measured factor in the Estonia survey. 

These groups are all more likely than their counterparts to feel personally ā€œunsafe,ā€ with 51% of Latgale residents and 30% of Russian speakers in Latvia choosing ā€œunsafeā€ when asked about their personal safety. In Northeastern Estonia, 31% also personally feel ā€œunsafe.ā€ Skeptics tend to attribute threats to personal safety on internal concerns rather than external actors. In both countries, those who share this belief have a higher likelihood to view Russia as most helpful for their national security. ā€‹ā€‹For example, in Latvia 26% of respondents chose ā€œdomestic political instabilityā€ as the greatest threat to personal safety, and among these respondents 61% chose Russia as the most helpful external actor to Latvia in the case of a military threat- pointing to an intersection between positive perceptions of Russia and concerns over internal concerns. Similarly, for the same question in Estonia, 22% chose ā€œdomestic political instability,ā€ and of this group 77% also picked Russia to come to their aid. 

In addition, those concerned with domestic security are more likely to be skeptical of the EU, NATO, and the West. In both countries, such respondents are least likely to choose ā€œthe Westā€ as most helpful should they face a military threat, with only 12% in Latvia, and 18% in Estonia. Furthermore, among those who share this belief is a higher likelihood to vote ā€œno/leaveā€ in hypothetical referendums for the EU and NATO respectively.  

Feelings of Alienation, NATO Skepticism and Internal Instability Belief 

Among respondents who share a belief regarding domestic political instability and specifically in the Russophone, ethnic Russian, and borderland populations is a common feeling of alienation from current security mechanisms and parliamentary processes. Respondents who share this belief also often expressed disenfranchisement, believing that if their country faces a military threat that they will be helped by no one. When asked the same question, Russophones in Latvia proved that they are least likely to choose NATO and most likely to choose ā€œNobody will help us/we are here for ourselvesā€.  

Residents of Northeastern Estonia and Latgale are the least likely among Estoniaā€™s macro-regions to choose ā€œcloser to NATOā€ (only 34% in Northeast Estonia and 41% in Latgale) and are most likely among all regions to pick either ā€œcloser to Russiaā€ (22% in Northeast Estonia, 21% in Latgale) or ā€œcloser to both/neitherā€ (31% in Northeast Estonia, 25% in Latgale). 

It seems that such skepticism towards common security architecture reflects a greater disbelief in the national political system. Although a majority of respondents who also share the belief of alienation would vote ā€œyes/stayā€ in the hypothetical referendums to remain in NATO or the EU, their support is weaker than the general population. To conclude, Russophones, border-region residents, and respondents who share their “domestic political instability belief more often express feelings of alienation and disenfranchisement from political processes rather than a desire to deepen ties with Russia.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 

Feelings of skepticism, alienation, and disenfranchisement in the border regions cannot be attributed to ethnic and linguistic identification alone. Being Russian or Russophone in a border region does not inherently make someone vulnerable to Russian influence. Socioeconomic disparities in these regions paired with titular language mandates in both countries can contribute to feelings of alienation, though further research is needed in order to uncover a clearer picture of these citizensā€™ experiences. A more in-depth understanding will further restore agency to this population, as their beliefs are likely acquired through more complex routes than simply absorbing Kremlin media.  that Russian media did not have an independent effect on oneā€™s willingness to defend their country and instead infers that many respondents who consume Russian media have a distrust of media in general, further highlighting a need for a more nuanced understanding of skepticism among Russophones. 

1. Further research on best practices through NATO COEs is needed to address alienation and helplessness 

NATO Allies utilize different COEā€™s to share best practices for countermeasures and confidence-building initiatives and to build societal resilience against malign information influence. A transnational study on best practices for building confidence among ethnic minorities would fill a sizable gap in current research and would provide a basis for which to design public outreach campaigns for populations experiencing alienation and skepticism.  In addition, further research can investigate the security perceptions and feelings of alienation in public opinion. This would provide a more accurate foundation for which to form policy on public outreach, rather than simply attributing the security concerns of Russophones to inherent Russian-tendencies that favor Kremlin-intervention. 

2. Targeted and regionally mindful outreach for key groups could have important impacts 

Further regionally-focused outreach for these specific Russophone, ethnic Russian, and borderland populations using a , with tactics such as intelligence disclosures (gathered through the , or NISRF), can effectively rebuild credibility and better reassure these populations of NATOā€™s defence commitments and decision-making. Furthermore, intelligence disclosures through accessible media can inform users on external security threats and potentially increase risk awareness and trust in public institutions through transparency measures.  

 Given that a significant amount of  is conducted by Russian-language media, it is tantamount to consider this populationā€™s linguistic preference as a tool of engagement rather than a characteristic to exclude from policy measures to counteract Russian influence.  

3. Share key expertise within NATO frameworks, and make it visible to key groups 

 found that any citizen regardless of ethnicity is more open to helping in their countryā€™s defences if they are reassured by a powerful patron, one that they have confidence in. In 2023, , sharing best practices for preparedness among first responders. Similar efforts in Latvia and Estonia could reach NATO-skeptical populations among citizens working in the public sector for emergency response. Sharing key expertise in similar sectors can potentially build trust among skeptical groups and increase NATOā€™s visibility among local populations, offering a firsthand account of NATOā€™s efforts instead of through malign narratives online.  

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Executive Summary  

Transatlantic relations are currently facing growing uncertainty due to significant strategic divergences in the fields of trade, security, technology, and global governance. From the trade tariff disputes to President of the United States (US) Donald Trumpā€™s territorial claims on Greenland, ties between the European Union (EU) and the US are under growing stress. This tension has heavy repercussions on the EU and its member states. Fears about an effective transatlantic decoupling have reenergized calls for the EU to acquire a capacity to act on its own. In this context, Canada can play a decisive role. Stronger EU-Canada cooperation could provide an answer to this new strategic anxiety. It would also allow to reduce dependency on the US and help develop both Canadian and European strategic autonomy.  

Changing Transatlantic Relations: An Opening for Deeper Canada-EU Ties 

While the first Trump administration tested traditional transatlantic relations, Trumpā€™s second term has marked a significant recalibration of US foreign policy that has fundamentally challenged the core values that have underpinned this relationship for the last 80 years. From recurring trade tariff disputes to territorial claims over Greenland, Trumpā€™s actions have often questioned ā€“ and even opposed ā€“ the USā€™s role as the principal guarantor of transatlantic stability and security. His administration has delegitimized multilateralism in favour of a ā€œselective engagementā€ strategy with individual US partners. The recent US , released in November 2025, formalized this major shift in American foreign policy. This new strategy reorders global priorities, reframes NATO Alliesā€™ roles, and seeks stability in Europe to allow Washington to redirect its focus and resources to the Indo-Pacific and the Western Hemisphere. At the same time, it adopts  toward the EU, portraying it as a source of instability and accusing it of undermining political liberty, sovereignty, and social cohesion. 

These dynamics raise fundamental questions about the stability, predictability, and future shape of the transatlantic relationship. For the EU, the implications are immediate: increased strategic risk, reduced certainties, and stronger pressure to develop autonomous capabilities and diversified partnerships. 

Why Canada Matters to the EU (and why the EU Matters to Canada) 

In this rapidly-changing international environment marked by geopolitical fragmentation, erratic US behaviour, and Russiaā€™s ongoing war against Ukraine, the EU must meet three conditions in order to become a more credible and decisive actor at the global level: one, it must sway sufficient economic power; two, it must demonstrate political will to act cohesively both amongst its member states and with its international partners; and three, it must be perceived as a legitimate and credible entity by other . 

To achieve these conditions, the EU needs to strengthen its ties with like-minded democracies, such as . Among them, Canada appears as an especially natural and highly compatible partner for the EU. Throughout the last 50 years, Canada and the EU have built an exemplary partnership based on shared democratic values and worldview. But in todayā€™s challenging global landscape, the EU and Canada stand together more firmly than ever as stable and trusted partners. And while the  and  serve as the foundation of the contemporary EU-Canada relationship, increased cooperation to both reinforce current areas of coopetition ā€“ such as security and defence ā€“ as well as joint ventures in new sectors ā€“ including the digital domain ā€“ will play key roles in the near future.

Security and Defence Cooperation Between Canada and the EU: A Win-Win Opportunity 

Canadaā€™s contribution to European security and defence policy is hardly new: Ottawa has been a valued contributor to EU-led security and defence efforts for over a decade. It was the first country to establish a Security and Defence Dialogue with the EU in 2015; it participates in  and has contributed to . 

However, at the 20^th EUā€“Canada Summit in Brussels last June, AntĆ³nio Costa, President of the European Council, Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, and Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada, together pledged to further strengthen their bilateral cooperation. Both sides committed to an ambitious and comprehensive partnership, the new , aimed at deepening cooperation across key areas such as trade, security, energy and other critical sectors. 

As part of their re-energized relationship, the EU High Representative of Foreign Affairs, Kaja Kallas, the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Anita Anand, and the Canadian Minister of Defense, David J. McGuinty, also signed the , which provides a framework for cooperation on cyber defence, hybrid threats, space security, maritime issues, crisis response and assistance to partners, such as Ukraine. This agreement also includes provisions for joint research in emerging technologies, which can help position both Canada and the EU as global leaders in these fields.  

This new agreement importantly lays the groundwork for increased defence procurement collaboration, primarily related to the EUā€™s . It also opened the door for   ā€“ a new European loan instrument for joint procurement ā€“ and for an administrative arrangement between Canada and the European Defence Agency, the body that supports cooperative European  and provides a forum for European ministries of defence to coordinate their policies. As a result of this increased cooperation, both Brussels and Ottawa have made tangible steps to diversify their defence partnership and become less reliant and vulnerable to Washingtonā€™s shifting moods on collective security. Similarly, this new agreement enhances the resiliency of the European pillar within NATO, without either undermining the NATO Alliance or trying to substitute it. 

New Areas of Cooperation in the Digital Domain 

As part of their cooperative efforts, the Canadian Minister of Artificial Intelligence and Digital Innovation, Evan Solomon, and the Executive Vice-President of the European Commission for Technological Sovereignty, Security and Democracy, Henna Virkkunen, have also agreed to strengthen cooperation in the . On 8 December 2025, the first meeting of the EU-Canada Digital Partnership Council took place in Montreal, Quebec. The  made at the conclusion of that meeting showed that both sides recognized the importance that digital partnership plays in advancing bilateral efforts to boost competitiveness, innovation, and economic resilience. This meeting also resulted in Canada and the EU  This meeting also resulted in Canada and the , one on cooperation on artificial intelligence, and another on digital credentials, digital identity wallets, and trust services. This new partnership will guide collaboration on AI governance, quantum technologies, cybersecurity, and digital standards. The  of this partnership is to build digital systems that are secure, transparent, and centred on public trust.

Conclusion

The ongoing reconfiguration of US foreign policy and the end of predictable transatlantic relations have led the EU and its member states to reconsider their strategic goals and explore alternative strategies to promote their own interests and societal well-being. In this context, cooperation with Canada would be a win-win opportunity, allowing both sides to reduce dependencies on the US and bolster collective defence capabilities without undermining NATO. Strengthening the EU-Canada relationship could also help show other countries that ā€“ā€Æin an era of re-emerging great power rivalry ā€“ there is still an opportunity for states to create and benefit from collective partnerships. 

Policy Recommendations  

In order to make the EU-Canada cooperation effective and concrete, both sides should consider the following policy recommendations: 

• Take an active approach to , including encouragement of domestic defence industries to actively utilize this instrument to gain increased access to external markets. 

• Encourage all EU member states to ratify CETA, as only 17 member states have ratified the agreement thus far. Finalizing the ratification of CETA would ensure stability and continuity for the agreement and would signal increased confidence in the overall Canada-EU trade relationship going forward.  

• Strengthen efforts aimed at enhancing their bilateral , to advance and diversify trade, promote economic security and resilience, and create investment opportunities. 

• Increase cooperation in the extraction and trading of . Deepening ties in this area could help reduce dependencies on unreliable partners while strengthening internal supply chains.  

• Improve cooperation on  while at the same time continue working together in order to balance innovation with ethical considerations and standards. This includes joint investments on AI-driven sustainability solutions, the adoption of accountability measures for violators of AI regulations, and the enforcement of policies that support both technological advancement and societal well-being. 

• Utilize the strong EU-Canada relationship as a stepping stone to reinforce multilateral partnerships with like-minded democratic partners, such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, and Taiwan. 

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The current geopolitical climate has increased fears surrounding war and instability across the transatlantic. Russiaā€™s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has brought along with it a rapidly changing conventional mode of warfare to the European continent for the first time in decades, destabilizing a previous sense of peace. In addition to traditional warfighting, several malign actors ā€“ including revisionist actors such as Russia Federation and the Peopleā€™s Republic of China ā€“ are increasingly using hybrid tactics in hopes of destabilizing the relationship between NATO members. Importantly, hybrid warfare includes tactics that fall short of traditional armed aggression but nonetheless have adverse effects against their target and broader citizenry, including disinformation and propaganda campaigns, offensive cyber operations, espionage, and attacks on critical infrastructure. Since 2022, numerous European states ā€“ such as Germany, Poland, France, and the Baltics ā€“ have identified an increase in hybrid attacks as a prominent part of this rapidly changing and uncertain threat landscape. Most recently, these attempts to breach NATO sovereignty and place a strain on partnerships have taken the form of cyber attacks, drone incursions, and disinformation campaigns. The rise in hybrid warfare has thus generated questions on how NATO may improve its collective responses to evolving tactics in such an uncertain international landscape. Article 5 remains a core part of the Allianceā€™s defensive operations but is facing questions regarding its overall effectiveness. This is largely due to the challenges created by grey-scale conflicts in establishing concrete and cohesive countermeasures. New types of war are challenging traditional conventions of collective defence, and require NATO to adapt. By analyzing the mechanisms of Article 5, it becomes evident that additional safeguards should be implemented to reinforce the power of collective defence.

Article 5 and NATO countermeasures

NATO was first formed in in the context of the Cold War. Its primary goal was to engage all Western partners in an attempt to shield them from influence of the Warsaw Pact. By declaring that an attack on one is an attack on all, Article 5 has constituted the foundation of the NATO alliance through its enshrining of the principle of collective defence. Article 5, however, does not define specifics of what constitutes an ā€œarmed attack,ā€ nor what measures should be implemented when such an act occurs. The Article is intentionally vague in this respect, giving member states the room to maneuver and to respond on a case-by-case basis pursuant to a threatā€™s overall status. To trigger Article 5, a formal unanimous consensus must be reached among NATO members. Through its history, Article 5 has only been invoked once following the in New York City.

Article 4 is also an important element of collective defence, which gives members the right to call a . Article 4 was initially triggered at the outset of Russiaā€™s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 by Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. Since then, it has been triggered by and in response to Russian airspace violations[KN1]. Most recently, Romanian officials discussed using Article 4 after a Article 4 is an essential tool for countries to collaborate on defence responses, which is even more important now as threats are increasingly unconventional and unprecedented.

This escalation of hybrid warfare has challenged traditional assumptions and led to questions of what collective defence may look like in the twenty-first century. Since 2016, , including cyber attacks. At the Madrid Summit in 2022, the , formalizing their strategy against hybrid threats. The Alliance generally outlined their commitment to building resilience through preparedness, deterrence, and defence. Several coordinated initiatives, such as and counter-hybrid support teams, have strengthened collective resilience. NATO continues to also work at being a ; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents; critical infrastructure; cyber defence; energy security; and international terrorism. At a glance, this signals that NATO is adopting a multitude of policies, frameworks, and teams to address threats of hybrid attacks; however, . Article 4 consultations have helped to address airspace incursions, but a wide range of other threats have yet to be formally addressed. Article 5 has thus far not been invoked. A major problem remains, however, one which does not stem from the Treaty itself but rather countermeasures that are not cohesive or consistent enough. To improve NATOā€™s positioning against hybrid threats, a better framework and strategy must be adopted, which can in turn clarify the use of Article 5 in grey-scale conflict.

Next steps?

A major question surrounding Article 5 is determining how severe of an attack may call for its invocation. Would it be the cutting of a major undersea cable? A large-scale hacking incident? indicate that these threats would likely not be sufficient enough to call on collective defence. Hybrid attacks fundamentally operate below conventional thresholds on purpose. Therefore, NATO should move to assessing threats not only based on force (i.e. what hybrid tactics are equivalent to an armed attack), but rather, focus on aggregate impact on a target country. While one singular attack is unlikely to cause intensive harm, long-term campaigns are aimed at intensely eroding societal infrastructure and citizen resolve. An aggregate threat framework can provide more accurate judgements on memberā€™s security and sovereignty.

            Another area of improvement can be further standardization of member responses based on the type of hybrid attack. Broad counter-hybrid support teams could be developed into specialized units, such as AI or cybercrime teams. Existing organizations, such as the and the , can be leveraged to develop specialized response mechanisms. Establishing cohesive procedures in response to hybrid incidents will make it easier for the Alliance to act in coordination, which is essential in deterring ongoing Russian attempts to weaken the whole of European society. This may also lead to reduced friction among between members and narrow the gap for Russia to exploit these internal vulnerabilities and tensions. Establishing improved, specialized mechanisms regarding collective defence will also help to clarify for members how to assemble if Article 5 is triggered, and to do so in a timely fashion.  Finally, an additional recommendation is to further develop a counter-hybrid warfare strategy which goes beyond defence mechanisms to engage sectors like education, transportation, and technology.

Such a counter-hybrid strategy could follow the approach, a move increasingly being embraced by many nations. The strategy could also look to establish a minimum guideline or set of requirements for member states to follow to have adequate safety net. The strategy should also target ways to improve preventative measures for member states. Integral to this will be improving intelligence-sharing and collective tracking to improve attribution. Improving attribution will help clarify who is behind such hybrid attacks. Furthermore, ensuring that countries are investing in defense or dual-use infrastructure which supports a coordinated net of European security will improve prevention.

Conclusion

NATOā€™s commitment to collective defense is more important than ever when addressing newly-emerging ways to fight wars in the twenty-first century. Article 5 remains a key part of this approach to security, and it should be noted its ambiguity does serve a strategic purpose. Article 4 also remains as a powerful tool for countries to leverage. However, for collective defence to be actionable in the case of grey-scale conflict, it must be supported within a strong framework that deeply engages with new offensive tactics. Without this, Article 5 can continue to be seen as vague or ineffective, which provides malign actors with more capacity to exploit vulnerabilities. These adaptations will help to improve transatlantic security from a myriad of malign actors.

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Since the onset of the joint United Statesā€“Israeli military campaign against Iran in February 2026, developments in the Middle East have emerged as a primary driver of global strategic assessments. The conflict is simultaneously generating significant secondary effects in the South Caucasus, reshaping regional alignments and the relationship between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

By assessing Iranā€™s relationships with Armenia and Azerbaijan, its core strategic interests in the South Caucasus, and its operational partnership with Moscow, this policy memo examines how the ongoing war against Iran, combined with the August 2025 Washington Accords, has disrupted Tehranā€™s long-standing hedging strategy and could undermine its regional influence.

To illustrate this shift, the memo first analyzes Iranā€™s traditional foreign policy toward Armenia and Azerbaijan and how the Washington Accords have diminished Iranā€™s geoeconomic role as a buffer between Armenia and Azerbaijan, thereby constraining its ability to exert leverage over both states. It further evaluates how the agreement heightens Iranā€™s strategic vulnerabilities in the face of growing Turkish, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and U.S. presence in the region, and highlights the increasingly divergent interests and approaches of Moscow and Tehran in shaping the future of the South Caucasus.

Engaging with the outcomes of the United Statesā€“Israeli military campaign against Iran, the policy memo concludes by analyzing Tehranā€™s shifting strategic posture in the South Caucasus. This assessment is situated within the context of Iranā€™s amicable yet strategically incongruent relationship with Moscow, as well as its intensifying competition with °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š for regional influence.

Iranā€™s Core Interests in the South Caucasus: Economic Pragmatism over Ideology

Iran views the South Caucasus as part of its immediate rather than a distant foreign region. While Tehran has historical and cultural ties with the region, its policy toward the area has been driven primarily by geopolitical stability, border security, and connectivity considerations rather than ideological or religious affinity. Although Tehran formally maintained neutrality during the Armeniaā€“Azerbaijan conflict, in practice it pursued a balancing strategy aimed at preventing regional dominance by any single actor. Much like Russiaā€™s approach in the region, the protracted Nagorno-Karabakh conflict generated a degree of political instability that enabled Tehran and Moscow to preserve their influence over both Armenia and Azerbaijan, while simultaneously constraining °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±šā€™s ability to expand its regional presence. Iranā€™s strategy has also emphasized the importance of preventing alterations to internationally recognized borders and safeguarding its access to European markets.

In the aftermath of Armeniaā€™s military defeats in 2020 and 2023, and amid Moscowā€™s failure to uphold its perceived security commitments under the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) framework and its peacekeeping mandate, Iran increasingly came to be portrayed as one of Armeniaā€™s most reliable regional partners. Iranā€“Armenia post-Soviet relations have been stable and cooperative. Since Armeniaā€™s independence, Iran has consistently maintained , supporting Armenia, both state and people, during regional crises and serving as a key transit partner. In the aftermath of the Turkishā€“Azerbaijani blockade of the 1990s, Iran has functioned as a critical terrestrial access route and economic partner. The two countries are also involved in many trade and energy partnerships and collaborate in the transit of goods between Europe and Asia.

While both nations share a foundational identity as Shia-majority states, the bilateral relationship between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Republic of Azerbaijan has been characterized by persistent strategic friction since 1991. Central to Tehranā€™s security concerns is Bakuā€™s deepening military-industrial and energy partnership with Israel, which, alongside Azerbaijan’s “one nation, two states” alliance with °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š, is viewed by Iranian policymakers as a coordinated effort to contain Iranian regional influence.

This tension is further exacerbated by the geopolitical implications of the Zangezur Corridor. From Tehran’s perspective, any Azerbaijani effort to establish a sovereign land link through southern Armenia constitutes a “red line,” as it threatens to sever Iranā€™s critical northern transit link to Europe and the Caucasus. Despite these structural rivalries, the relationship maintains a degree of pragmatic stability. Both states remain tethered by mutual economic interests, specifically their shared roles in the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (Middle Corridor) and Bakuā€™s continued reliance on Iranian territory for transit to its Nakhchivan exclave.

Iranā€™s regional approach has been shaped less by the Muslimā€“Christian divide or ideological concerns and more by practical and security concerns over Turkish influence, Israeli presence near its borders, transit routes affecting its access to Eurasia, and the potential domestic repercussions among its own Azeri population. Iran views the Caucasus as its ā€œhistoric security marginā€ and its immediate security and economic environment.

The 2025 Washington Agreement and its Initial Implementation Framework

In August 2025, Armenia and Azerbaijan signed the Washington Accords under the mediation of the President of the United States, launching the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) and establishing a 99-year economic partnership between the United States and Armenia. The Washington Accords create opportunities for significant shifts in regional transit dynamics, including the movement of goods, energy infrastructure, and the broader interconnection between Asia and Europe. These developments have implications for the roles traditionally played by Russia, Iran, Central Asia, and the South Caucasus in Eurasian transport and trade networks. It reduces Central Asian countriesā€™ dependency on Chinese and Russian infrastructures as well as bypassing Iranā€™s role in the Middle Corridor.

, the United States and Armenia signed the providing exclusive rights to develop the transit infrastructure. The framework excludes extraterritorial rights to American entities preserving Armeniaā€™s sovereignty including the border management aspect of the transit corridor. In this partnership, the TRIPP Development Company, a joint venture with Armenia mostly controlled by Washington, provides a monopoly in the development business surrounding the route and its infrastructure. The agreement seeks to develop the Syunik region as a hub of economic activity and local development, with the objective of enhancing transit and connectivity between Asia and Europe, connecting Azerbaijan with its autonomous region of Nakhichevan. More broadly, the TRIPP becomes a competitive alternative to the Bakuā€“Tbilisiā€“Kars (BTK) railroad and future alternative pipeline to Europe, competing with Bakuā€“Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline by securing European access to Central Asian hydrocarbons.

In the energy domain, the normalization process between Armenia and Azerbaijan reshapes the regionā€™s broader transit and supply landscape. Most notably, Armenia could become significantly less dependent on Russian and Iran natural gas, thereby opening possibilities for access to Central Asian hydrocarbons and, potentially, to Azerbaijani energy sources. Turkmen and Azerbaijani gas competes with Iranā€™s gas output, offering a cheaper and potentially more politically reliable alternative for European countries. launched the construction of energy infrastructure, including a new transit powerline to export to Europe through °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š.

The Accord has inaugurated a new phase of cooperation between the former belligerents, notably facilitating the renewed transit of goods between the two states. This includes the movement of hydrocarbons originating in Azerbaijan as well as grain exports from Russia and various Central Asian countries. The emerging prospects for a peace accord between Armenia and Azerbaijan have broadened the diplomatic space for both states, transforming their engagement into a more intricate and multidimensional interaction. Furthermore, the effectively eliminates Moscowā€™s role as established in the November 2020 agreement, which delegated some administrative control over border management to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB).

Although the Washington Accords do not provide any security guarantees from the United States or include enforcement mechanisms directed toward Azerbaijan, Armenia leaders hope that increased American investment would encourage a more active role by Washington and put an end to Bakuā€™s strategy of outbidding Yerevan in their bilateral relationship.

Overall, the TRIPP represents, for Armenia, an additional step toward the West, thereby weakening Moscowā€™s influence in the South Caucasus, while also providing an opportunity to normalize relations with Ankara and Baku. For Azerbaijan, the Washington Accords consolidate its military victory, while re-establishing direct access to Nakhchivan and stimulating its transit-based economy. Furthermore, the TRIPP reduces Bakuā€™s dependency and uncertainties link to its main transit route to Europe going through Georgia.

Iranā€™s Strategic Approach in the South Caucasus after the Washington Accords

Much of the and commentary has framed recent developments as a geostrategic, zeroā€‘sum contest in which the United States and °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š have successfully marginalized both Iran and Russia from regional influence. While geostrategic and security considerations remain central, it is necessary to look beyond great power and regional competition to understand how Iran and Russia are recalibrating their relationships with Armenia and Azerbaijan and assessing areas of mutual convergence to avoid strategic marginalization.

Following the Washington Declaration and TRIPP announcement, the Iran official diplomatic position was articulated by in a telephone conversation with his Armenian counterpart. While welcoming peace efforts and regional connectivity, Araghchi specified Iranā€™s red lines: there must be no extraterritorial corridor or special status undermining Armenian sovereign control, and no changes that alter regional geopolitics or disadvantage Iranā€™s strategic access. He further emphasized full respect for borders, territorial integrity, and national jurisdiction, and stressed that connectivity must not isolate Iran from established or alternative transit routes.

However, an examination of various members of the Foreign Policy establishment could shed light on various aspects of Iranā€™s understanding of this situation. On 9 August 2025, , former Minister of Foreign Affairs and a senior advisor to the former Supreme Leader of Iran, framed the TRIPP as a rebranding of the Zangezur corridor concept. He said that the implementation of this project would restrict Iranā€™s transport routes in the north and northwest to (only) °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š, and that Iran will confront this move ā€˜whether with Russia or without it.ā€™ He likened NATOā€™s presence along this route to a ā€˜viperā€™ that wants to lie down between Iran and Russia and warned that Iran will not allow this alliance to approach its northern borders. The former himself in a meeting with Prime Minister Pashinyan, in July 2024, had mentioned that Iran recognizes that the Zangezur Corridor is against Armeniaā€™s interests and stands in this position.

Other Iranian officials however, adopted a more moderate position and sought further clarification as the details, terms, and conditions of the TRIPP are not clear yet. In a meeting with Armeniaā€™s National Security Council Secretary, the former head of Iranā€™s Strategic Council on Foreign Relations, , welcomed Armeniaā€“Azerbaijan connectivity but requested clarification regarding the governing legal and security framework of the route, particularly any external involvement. The Armenian side emphasized that border control and security would remain under Armenian authority. This exchange illustrates Tehranā€™s core concern: not connectivity itself, but the jurisdictional and security regime under which it would operate.

Noting the travel of , to Israel, Iran observes a ā€˜deviationā€™ from historical relationships. Kostanyan is closely involved in the implementation of the TRIPP initiative. The trip may therefore be understood not only as a diplomatic engagement but also as part of Armeniaā€™s efforts to advance the corridor and related regional connectivity arrangements. From the Iranian perspective, Armenia has not sufficiently taken Tehranā€™s ā€˜concernsā€™ into account while proceeding with the project, which gives the visit broader regional significance beyond bilateral diplomacy. Current uncertainties and tensions are therefore portrayed not as a structural rivalry but as a recent policy shift by Armenia toward Western initiatives, which Tehran views as inconsistent with the traditionally predictable relationship.

Although these responses appear to represent hard-line and moderate positions, they in fact reflect Iranian concerns articulated at two different levels of policy. Velayatiā€™s warning conveys the strategic perception of the corridor as a geopolitical and security challenge that could alter regional balances and introduce external influence near Iranā€™s borders. Kharraziā€™s more measured statements address the operational level, focusing on the legal and jurisdictional arrangements governing the route and the necessity of preserving Armenian sovereignty and local border control. Taken together, they are complementary rather than contradictory: the first signals Iranā€™s red lines in terms of regional balance of power, while the second defines the specific conditions under which connectivity could be tolerated. This dual messaging suggests that Tehranā€™s opposition is directed not at transport connectivity itself, but at any arrangement that diminishes Iranā€™s strategic position or creates a non-sovereign security regime along its northwestern frontier.

Drawing on Russiaā€™s conduct in cases such as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the Syrian Civil War, Iranian assessments of Moscowā€™s position on the TRIPP are broadly consistent with longer-standing perceptions of Russia across Iranā€™s political spectrum. These range from proponents of deeper strategic alignment with Russia, to more skeptical voices that view reliance on Moscow as a strategic liability, such as those featured in Etemad and Shargh newspapers. Between these poles, a significant group of policymakers and experts adopts a position of cautious realism, advocating sustained engagement with Russia while maintaining a clear political safety margin featured in Donya-e-Eqtesad newspaper. Notably, across these perspectives there is a shared underlying assumption: Russia is not regarded as a fully predictable or reliably-aligned partner.

The Erosion of Iranā€™s Transit Hub Centrality

Iranā€™s policy toward the South Caucasus cannot be understood without reference to its broader economic strategy. In recent years, Tehran has increasingly framed its foreign policy around geo-economics rather than solely sanctions resistance and relief. A strategic guidance issued by the and the (June 2024) explicitly direct the government to activate Iranā€™s ā€˜geopolitical advantagesā€™ by transforming the country into a regional hub for trade, transport, and energy through regulatory reforms and infrastructure development.

The Development Plan intends to institutionalize this objective. It mandates the creation of a Regional Energy Trade Steering Committee, chaired by the President and composed of the Ministers of Oil, Foreign Affairs, and Energy, with parliamentary participation. The Committee is responsible for designing Iranā€™s regional energy diplomacy roadmap and approving export, import, swap, transit, and electricity exchange arrangements. These measures show that Iran is indeed attempting to convert geography into economic resilience: transit fees, energy swaps, and logistics services are intended to compensate for sanctions-related restrictions on direct trade and investment.

A central quantitative target of the Development Plan is to increase annual transit cargo volume from approximately 16 million tons at the beginning of the Plan to 40 million tons by its conclusion. The South Caucasus plays a crucial role in achieving this goal because it constitutes Iranā€™s shortest overland connection to Eurasian markets. The Iran-Armenia border effectively blocks a continuous °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š-Azerbaijan land corridor, thereby preserving °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±šā€™s dependence on Iranian transit routes toward Azerbaijan and Central Asia.

Iran participates in wider regional energy arrangements, including gas swap agreements with Turkmenistan and °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š. These arrangements allow Tehran to earn transit revenue, estimated at roughly $1ā€“1.5 billion annually, while maintaining relevance in regional energy distribution networks. It also conducts gas and electricity swaps with Azerbaijan to supply the Nakhchivan exclave. Additionally, it serves as a trucking corridor between °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š and Central Asia, currently of Turkish trucks annually.

However, emerging infrastructure projects threaten to erode this position. The , operational since March 2025, already reduces Nakhchivanā€™s dependence on Iranian gas swaps. If an additional pipeline link across southern Armenia were completed, Azerbaijan would obtain a direct energy connection to its exclave, while . With the TRIPP, Turkmenistanā€™s and Azerbaijanā€™s natural gas exports directly compete with Iranā€™s output by providing Armenia with flexibility and lowerā€‘cost alternatives.

More broadly, the proposed TRIPP corridor could connect °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š to Central Asia via Azerbaijan and the Caspian basin, thereby rendering the second route of the Middle Corridor practically feasible as a bypass to Iranian transit routes connecting China and Central Asia to Europe. Furthermore, the TRIPP would strengthen the Middle Corridor and its overreliance on .

For Tehran, the issue is not merely symbolic. Such routes would divert trucking flows, logistics investment, and energy transit away from Iran, potentially reducing transit income by a significant margin and weakening incentives for infrastructure development. estimate potential losses reaching up to 2.6 billion dollars annually over time when indirect effects on logistics, investment, and associated services are considered.

Even more important than immediate revenue is what Iranian policymakers call ā€˜.ā€™ Iran seeks to preserve independent land access to the Caucasus and Europe that does not depend exclusively on Turkishā€“Azerbaijani territory. The South Caucasus therefore functions not only as an economic opportunity but as a strategic economic lifeline. Any corridor that structurally marginalizes Iranian transit routes is perceived in Tehran not as a normal infrastructure project but as a long-term reduction of Iranā€™s geopolitical and economic leverage.

A Trojan Horse on Iranā€™s Doorstep: After °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š and Israel, now NATO and the USA

Tehranā€™s security concerns centre on preserving the sovereignty structure along its northwestern frontier. Iranian officials emphasize the maintenance of internationally recognized borders and oppose any extraterritorial or internationally supervised transit arrangements in the Syunik province. In Iranian strategic perception, a transport corridor is not merely an infrastructure project but a potential : if administered or monitored by external actors, it could facilitate intelligence collection, surveillance, and the institutionalization of foreign, especially American and Israeli, presence near sensitive Iranian regions. The Washington Accords remain vague regarding which actors will be responsible for providing daily security along the TRIPP corridor, even though Armenia is formally recognized as retaining sovereignty over its territory. This ambiguity leaves open the possibility that could assume a role in protecting the route. Consequently, Iranā€™s opposition is directed less at connectivity itself than at any arrangement that alters jurisdictional control or introduces external security actors along its immediate border.

The intensity of Velayatiā€™s remarks is best understood by factoring in the role of the U.S. in this initiative. According to , a former Iranian diplomat, in Iranian foreign policy thinking, where some officials regard antagonism with the U.S. as structural, any development in which Washington emerges as the agent of regional normalization would be viewed negatively. He therefore situates the corridor within Iranā€™s long-standing confrontation with the U.S., arguing that it would elevate Washingtonā€™s position as a political arbiter in the South Caucasus while creating a connectivity framework from which all regional actors – °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Western partners – would benefit, except Iran. In this interpretation, the corridor itself is not the principal concern; rather, the accompanying political arrangements could institutionalize U.S. influence and leave Iran structurally excluded from emerging regional trade and security networks. Velayatiā€™s rhetoric thus reflects a broader fear of geopolitical marginalization under a U.S.-backed regional order.

°ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±šā€™s Panā€‘Turkic Orientation and Its Strategic Implications for Iran

Iran opposes any extraterritorial corridor arrangements that would create a continuous °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š- Azerbaijan land connection and facilitate the Middle Corridor linking °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia. Iranian assess that such a route would shift the regional balance in favor of °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š, structurally reduce Iranā€™s role in eastā€“west connectivity, and diminish Tehranā€™s leverage in Eurasian trade and energy networks. Following the recent wars between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the Washington Accord, °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š appears a step closer toward its regional ambitions focused on pan-Turkism ranging from Anatolia to Central Asia.

Tehran interprets the TRIPP as a rebranded Zangezur Corridor that constitutes a that could undermine Iranā€™s geoeconomic relevance in the transit between Asia and Europe by reducing dependency of regional actors on Iranian transit routes.

Within Iranian strategic discourse, the project is also interpreted as part of a broader geopolitical realignment across Eurasia. Iranian officials and senior advisers have argued that a continuous transport axis from Anatolia to Central Asia would expand Turkish political and economic influence, weaken Iranā€™s geoeconomic centrality, and potentially enable a wider external security presence in the South Caucasus. From Tehranā€™s perspective, the concern is less ideological than structural: a functioning Middle Corridor could bypass Iranian territory while embedding new political, military, and intelligence partnerships near Iranā€™s northwestern frontier.

At the same time, Iran appears to have avoided the worstā€‘case scenario that had emerged following the oneā€‘day 2023 conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia and the subsequent escalation in Azerbaijani rhetoric, particularly the invocation of the ā€˜Western Azerbaijanā€™ concept.3 Likewise, Bakuā€™s promotion of a ā€˜special corridorā€™ā€” envisioned within the broader Zangezur Corridor framework and implying strong Azerbaijaniā€“Turkish control ā€” had raised significant concerns in Tehran regarding potential geopolitical and territorial encroachments. It would have materially shifted regional power toward the Turkish bloc and most likely completely exclude Iran from connectivity, linking Europe to Asia.

Between Alignment and Competition: Russia and Iranā€™s South Caucasus Strategy

In the South Caucasus, Russian and Iranian foreign policies converge in their shared willingness to counter Western influence and to constrain Ankaraā€™s expanding regional role. This alignment is also reflected in their cooperation within the International Northā€“South Transport Corridor, which both states have leveraged to mitigate the impact of Western sanctions. However, the Northā€“South Transport Corridor remains inefficient and weakened by the prospects of the TRIPP and future Azerbaijan and Armenia collaboration.

At the same time, Moscow and Tehran continue to pursue distinct regional and geopolitical objectives aimed at advancing their own interests and influence in the South Caucasus rather than form a cohesive strategic approach as a functional partnership. The Washington Accords highlight these underlying frictions, particularly in revealing the absence of a coordinated Russianā€“Iranian position toward the TRIPP. The corridor itself is part of a wider geopolitical contest over connectivity, influence, and control in the South Caucasus, where transport routes translate directly into political and economic leverage.

Just like Iran, Moscow has voiced general concerns and skepticism regarding the TRIPP, its implementation, and its impact on the region. to the Washington Declaration reflects this partial but imperfect convergence. The Russian Foreign Ministry responded cautiously, emphasizing regional stability and existing agreements while avoiding direct confrontation with the initiative. Moscow has been careful not to antagonize Washington or to openly criticize American President Donald Trump, while underscoring its indispensable role in ensuring the success of the TRIPP.

Iranian commentary, however, interpreted this as an ambiguous position and expressed dissatisfaction that Moscow did not oppose the project more explicitly. The observes that Russia is transitioning from dominant security hegemon in the Caucasus to a constrained, reactive actor that seeks to manage decline through selective cooperation and behind-the-scenes leverage. From Tehranā€™s perspective, Russia is expected to resist new mediation formats that elevate Western involvement in the South Caucasus; Moscowā€™s restrained response therefore raised concerns in Iran about the reliability of Russian support. The episode illustrates that, although Iran and Russia share reservations about a U.S.-centred regional framework, their threat perceptions and priorities are not identical, and cooperation between them remains situational rather than fully coordinated.

In this context, Iran finds areas of partial convergence with Russiaā€™s policy in the South Caucasus. Both states regard the proposed corridor with caution, as it could enable a new connectivity and mediation architecture in the region that would diminish their influence while expanding the presence of external actors ā€” primarily °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š and the United States, but potentially China as well. Although their motivations differ, the project is perceived in both capitals as contributing to a regional order in which Western-backed arrangements gain prominence at the expense of Iranian and Russian leverage and the increasing influence of NATO countries in the South Caucasus. Furthermore, it weakens existing regional frameworks involving Russia, Iran, and °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š, such as the and the . Additionally, Armeniaā€™s shift toward Western influence is perceived by both countries as a growing risk to their regional interests.

For Tehran, the primary concerns relate to border security and the risk of exclusion from emerging regional transit networks. For Moscow, the issue is more closely tied to the erosion of its longstanding role as the principal security arbiter in the South Caucasus and, more broadly, to the setbacks confronting its neoimperial ambitions in the region weakened by Russiaā€™s war against Ukraine.

While Russia and Iran share a primary interest in resisting the growing presence of NATO and Western influence in the South Caucasus, persistent divergences have prevented them from coordinating an effective strategic approach. Even prior to the TRIPP initiative, certain analysts, such as , Iranā€™s former ambassador to Baku, had warned over Russiaā€™s ambiguous position on Zangezur corridor. Iranian analysts often describe Russiaā€™s position as ambiguous and more flexible than Tehranā€™s, particularly on ā€˜who managesā€™ an eventual arrangement. They believe that Russiaā€™s position on the Zangezur corridor reflects a broader pattern in its relationship with Iran: it is not a truly strategic partnership but rather a transactional one driven by shifting interests. In this context, the implicit message for Iran is to exercise caution. Russia may not be a reliable partner and could instrumentalize Iranā€™s position to advance its own regional objectives. For example, in 2026, Moscow sought to renew its influence in the South Caucasus by seeking to fix its relationship with , as well as influencing the democratic process in and the election of a pro-Russian government.

The February 2026 War and Its Implications

On 28 February 2026, the United States and Israel launched joint military operations against Iran, targeting its nuclear and missile capabilities with broader regime-change ambitions. While military objectives appear achievable in the short term, the political outcome remains deeply uncertain. The South Caucasus has thus far remained largely insulated from the conflict, despite Azerbaijan’s ties to Israel and limited Iranian strikes on and alleged supported by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps targeting the Bakuā€“Tbilisiā€“Ceyhan pipeline. Iran’s posture toward °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š and the broader region remains ambiguous mainly due to precarious geopolitical positions and its internal turmoil. , however, despite certain immediate challenges such as increased energy prices, sees opportunities in consolidating its status as a regional energy hub and crossroads.

Russiaā€™s response to the war has been evaluated as insufficient ā€“ even unacceptable ā€“ by . He attributes this restraint to Russiaā€™s self-interest, particularly economic gains and strategic distractions linked to Ukraine. His assessment implies that despite rhetoric of strategic partnership, Russia behaves as a pragmatic actor that supports Iran only when it aligns with its own interests, raising serious doubts about its reliability in moments of crisis. At the same time, Russia appears to be playing a low-profile but consequential role by supplying Tehran with on U.S. military targets, as well as with operational lessons derived from the war in Ukraine, particularly regarding the employment of unmanned aerial systems and electronic warfare capabilities. This collaboration represents a full circle, following Iranā€™s transfer of Shahed drones to Russia at the outset of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Tehran not only provided the drones themselves but also offered technical support and assistance that enabled Moscow to establish its own production line for the Geran-2, the Russian version of the Shahed drone.

Regardless of the outcomes of the 2026 military campaign or the prospect of regime change in Iran, Tehranā€™s geostrategic competition with °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š over Eurasian transit routes is likely to remain a powerful geographic and economic force shaping the South Caucasus. °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±šā€™s ambition to establish a pan-Turkic corridor linking Anatolia to Central Asia via the Caspian Sea ā€” while bypassing Iranian territory ā€” poses a sustained threat to Iranā€™s transit revenues and strategic depth, irrespective of the composition of the governing regime in Tehran.

Even in the event of regime collapse and its replacement by a government aligned with U.S. and broader Western preferences, or a significantly weakened state deprived of key military instruments for projecting influence in the South Caucasus, competition between Iran and °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š over Eurasian transit corridors is likely to persist. This rivalry predates the establishment of the Islamic Republic and would almost certainly outlast it. No Iranian government will find Turkish dominance of the Eurasian corridor to be in Iran’s national interest. This is a structural feature of the regional balance of power rather than an ideological preference.

While the nature of the governing regime in Tehran may shape the extent and modalities of Iranā€™s participation in the TRIPP, it is unlikely to fundamentally alter the underlying structural competition with °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š and the lack of a common strategic approach with Russia. A more democratic Iranian government could, in fact, pursue a more proactive integration into the TRIPP-linked infrastructure, potentially positioning Iran as a critical southern corridor connecting Eurasian transit networks to the Persian Gulf. A pro-Western Iran, freed from sanctions and able to attract Western investment, may prove a more effective competitor to Turkish corridor dominance than the Islamic Republic was ā€“ because it can engage international financial systems and offer regional partners a credible alternative. Along this line, some within the Iranian government have already highlighted a potential role for Iran in the TRIPP, particularly by linking the proposed railway to a broader Northā€“South axis that would connect Iran to the project.

Overall, the most likely scenario is a weakened Iran embroiled in prolonged transition and domestic challenges, where the outcomes of the 2026 war and the popular mobilization against the regime forces the Islamic Republic into a posture of survival and tactical concession, producing a prolonged period of U.S.-Iran negotiations. Although the TRIPP constitutes a secondary concern relative to regime survival, particularly in a context of elite fragmentation and competition over residual state assets, including security forces, revenue streams, and territorial authority, it nevertheless reflects deeper structural dynamics. Specifically, regional competition with °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š is likely to remain a defining feature of Iranā€™s strategic environment.

Overall, Iranā€™s capacity to oppose the TRIPP would be significantly diminished in a context of internal fragmentation, where the central government struggles to maintain a coherent and strategic policy orientation. As domestic contestation over authority, resources, and coercive instruments intensifies, Tehran is unlikely to either mount an effective opposition to the TRIPP or engage with it in a consistent and constructive manner. This erosion of state capacity would, in turn, weaken Iranā€™s position along its northern frontier with Armenia, potentially transforming the Syunik region into both an economic and security vulnerability.

For °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š, the 2026 war could constitute a strategic window of opportunity to consolidate its influence in the South Caucasus. With Iran internally weakened and Russia preoccupied with the war in Ukraine, Ankara face fewer constraints in advancing the Middle Corridor pan-Turkic connectivity agenda. In such a scenario, both Armenia and Azerbaijan may increasingly view °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š as a reliable regional partner, particularly if Ankaraā€™s initiatives are reinforced by support from the United States and the Trump administration and by broader Western engagement. At the same time, the weakening of Iran could result on unintended consequences, such as the renewal of at Turkish borders.

Conclusion

The renewed U.S. engagement in the South Caucasus catalyzed by the Washington Accords and the TRIPP constitutes a strategic advantage for °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š and Azerbaijan. It helps remove existing to the projectā€™s implementation and circumvents longstanding opposition, particularly from Iran and Russia. For Armenia, the TRIPP represents a rare opportunity to stimulate economic development, consolidate its strategic reorientation toward the West, and rebalance its negotiating position vis-Ć -vis Baku, while simultaneously benefiting from the expanding trade and connectivity generated by the Middle Corridor.

By reconfiguring regional connectivity, the United States seeks to weaken both Iranian and Russian influence in the South Caucasus. Within this new strategic environment, any Iranian effort to obstruct the corridor in practice would no longer confront Azerbaijan or °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š alone, but rather the United States itself. Such opposition would also risk damaging Iranā€™s relationship with Yerevan and undermine its access to the Northā€“South Corridor, thereby weakening Iranā€™s broader connectivity to Europe.

Although Iran and Russia share certain tactical positions, most notably their skepticism toward externally driven regional initiatives such as the TRIPP, their strategic interests diverge. Russiaā€™s posture remains pragmatic and situational, shaped by its wider global priorities and flexibility in regional bargaining. Iranian officials, by contrast, increasingly perceive the TRIPP as a direct geopolitical threat, one that could marginalize Iran economically and strategically within emerging Eurasian trade networks.

Overall, the Washington Accords have the potential to reshape the geostrategic and geoeconomic landscape of the South Caucasus and to challenge Iranā€™s traditional regional foreign policy. However, the realization of these outcomes will depend on the successful implementation of an ambitious infrastructure agenda requiring sustained Western engagement, as well as the finalization of a durable peace settlement between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

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