Following the Brexit vote in 2016 the defence relationship between the UK and the EU has since been relatively unfettered. This strength can largely be attributed to the increasing coordination through NATO institutions and the establishment of the Coalition of the Willing, creating functional cooperation without deepening policy integration between the UK and the EU. Yet this relationship has clear limits. As EU defence policy focuses inward on industry and procurement, the effects of Brexit now have immediate impacts on European capacity building.

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Introduction

On January 5th, 2026, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced the appointment of former Canadian Deputy Prime Minister and Member of Parliament, Chrystia Freeland, as Economic Advisor to the Office of the President of Ukraine. In a post on X, Zelenskyy stated, “Ukraine needs to strengthen its internal resilience – both for the sake of Ukraine’s recovery if diplomacy delivers results as swiftly as possible, and to reinforce our defence if, because of delays by our partners, it takes longer to bring this war to an end.” In the following days, Freeland confirmed she accepted President Zelenskyy’s appointment and that she would be resigning as a Member of Parliament, taking effect as of January 9th, 2026.

Freeland’s appointment as voluntary Economic Advisor to the Office of the President of Ukraine is being made against the larger and developing backdrop of ongoing diplomatic negotiations between the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the United States (US) to come to an agreed upon pathway to peace. This negotiation process continues to be arduous for Ukraine. It also comes alongside a deepening of foreign diplomatic relations between Canada and Ukraine under the Mark Carney government; this, coming on the back of Prime Minister Carney’s historical , where he stressed the end of the rules-based international order and hinted at the decline of American hegemony – a speech that have held to ultimately represent the beginning of a multipolar era in world politics.

In the coming months, the Eastern European and Transatlantic Network (EETN) will publish a series analyzing key developments shaping the war; these include prospective pathways to peace, ongoing diplomatic negotiations and tensions, and the shifting security and economic governance landscape in Ukraine. Freeland is an integral node among an emerging and vital network aimed at supporting Ukraine and its future as the anniversary of the full-scale invasion nears and passes. This series aims to make clear that Russia is not only engaged in a war of attrition so as to try to reclaim its great power status, but that Ukraine is increasingly prepared to respond to this war of attrition with strategies and methods of asymmetric and hybrid warfare. Ukraine is prepared to make the strategic, economic, and relational moves necessary to better guarantee its future, as well as its success on the battlefield and in diplomatic negotiations.

This first brief of the series reflects on Freeland’s appointment and builds upon an argument first offered by Ukrainian scholar Valeriia Gusieva, where she suggested that cultural resilience is a foundational pillar to security. I extend her argument here by suggesting that cultural resilience and situated experience are also crucial to sustaining a coherent and effective attritional war strategy – Freeland’s appointment, in this case, should be understood light through the lens of political habituation.

Chrystia Freeland: A Ukrainian-Canadian MP and Soviet War Crimes Researcher

Chrystia Freeland was born in Peace River, Alberta in 1968 to a Ukrainian mother and Canadian father. Though she formally entered Canadian federal politics in 2013, she is perhaps most known through her association with former Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and his government. Under Trudeau, Freeland was appointed to serve as Minister of International Trade in Trudeau’s cabinet. In this position, she was a key negotiator in the hard-fought Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) (which replaced the North American Free Trade Agreement, or NAFTA, in 2020), as well as the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with the European Union (EU) that was signed in 2016.

While it is fair to assume that many Western audiences are familiar with the whiplash antics of American President Donald Trump, who often combines “,” less well known are the tensions that characterized the negotiation process of CETA. As researchers , CETA encountered historical diplomatic tensions throughout its negotiation process: “This challenge becomes evident at various stages in the trade policy process, but it is most pronounced in the ratification of bilateral agreements, which require approval in all member states.”

On paper, arriving at CETA was through the bilateral process of negotiation between Canada and the EU; in reality, however, Freeland was situated in a much more difficult negotiating position. Because the subsequent ratification of CETA would require the approval of all EU member states, such a negotiating process proved to be a lesson for both Freeland and the European Commission, who was charged with ensuring the twenty-eight member states were in alignment. Indeed, as scholar Joris Larik , the alleged crisis of CETA negotiations soon became a “cautionary tale” about the “cumbersome and vulnerable EU treaty-making procedures, where internal politics and technical legal discussions detracted from the merits (or demerits) of the actual agreement.”

This became most visible through the tensions experienced with the Wallonia Parliament in Belgium, an autonomous regional government with veto power over EU trade deals. In late 2016, the Walloon government publicly rejected CETA, in part because of their worry that the trade deal would “.” Walloon regional minister-president, Paul Magnette, told reporters the following: “I don’t consider this as a funeral, I don’t consider this as a veto without any conditions. I consider this as a request to reopen negotiations so that European leaders could hear the legitimate demands which have been forcefully expressed by an organized, transparent civil society.” As Larik however, this crisis led to “profound internal reflections on EU trade policy, causing even a shift in the EU’s practice in concluding trade agreements.

It was largely in response to these tensions and apparent deadlock within Wallonia that Freeland made the public decision to walk out on CETA negotiations with our European allies. Following her decision, Freeland with Canadian journalists candidly: “It’s become evident for me, for Canada, that the European Union isn’t capable now to have an international treaty even with a country that has very European values like Canada. And even with a country so nice, with a lot of patience like Canada.” At the time, the move was taken by some in Canadian media as an “” response; Conservative critics in the House of Commons Freeland’s walk out as a “meltdown,” alleging she required “adult supervision” – language that carried clear sexist and gendered connotations. Still others this walk out is exactly what the negotiation process needed, as it eventually led to the signing of the trade agreement.

Reflecting on her CETA negotiation experience in 2026, Freeland the following about negotiating with European allies, which is worth quoting at-length here:

“You can sort of have two kinds of negotiations. Some negotiations start with a kind of win-win premise where the two parties come together wanting a deal, wanting to be friends, seeing each other as long-term partners, and they’ll disagree about stuff, but the negotiation is really about everyone working hard together to find the best possible landing zone. I would say Canada’s negotiations with the EU about our trade deal with Europe, CETA, were conducted in that way, and they were hard, right? … Our final slightly melodramatic moments in Namur, in Wallonia, you know, proceeded by moments in Vienna, in Germany, in the European Parliament. I mean, it was a long slog and there were lots of obstacles and there was some drama, but it was clear there was goodwill on all sides.”

In this interview, Freeland goes on to characterize how Trump falls into an alternative negotiation camp compared to that which characterized CETA; she the idea that the American President abides by the logic of a zero-sum game: “…when you are dealing with a party that has that kind of a view [zero-sum game logic] and that kind of an attitude, then I think you have to be very clear in your own mind about red lines. And you have to be very prepared to say, thus far and no further, we’re not gonna capitulate our approach.”

Freeland later went on to become Canada’s Minister of Finance in 2020, where she was responsible for introducing four federal budgets, including federal aid measures related to Canada’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic. She was the first woman to serve in this role, a fact that would later be considered by the as crucial in the decay of her relationship with Trudeau prior to his own resignation in late-2025.

Beyond her political career, Freeland’s academic and journalistic works span two decades and have drawn the ire of the Kremlin. While pursuing graduate studies in Russian history and literature at Harvard, where she was responsible for documenting and translating archival and investigative materials related to the – an unmarked, mass burial site used by the NKVD (the secret police of the Soviet Union) to dispose of executed dissidents and prisoners. It remains one of the largest mass burial sites in Ukraine, even Russia’s current invasion. Her research played a decisive role in debunking the Stalin-era myth that the executions were exclusively carried out by the Nazis during World War Two. This research eventually attracted the attention of the KGB – the main security agency of the Soviet Union – who then assigned Freeland the codename “Frida,” closely surveilling and building a case against her throughout the course of her study.

As a Canadian with Ukrainian heritage, Freeland has been among the most outspoken advocates for sustained Canadian support to Ukraine. In response, she is one of thirteen Canadian officials barred from entering Russia under retaliatory sanctions imposed by Vladimir Putin himself in 2014 and has been the target of various . Freeland has also faced public attacks from American President Donald Trump, who on several occasions has described her in disparaging terms, including “,” a “,” a “,” and an overall “.” From a feminist perspective, Freeland’s experience navigating such attacks underscores her familiarity with the gendered power dynamics employed by – an experience that may indeed prove to be a strategic asset in a war whose social construction and conduct are themselves . While much of international politics Freeland nonetheless works against the masculine grain in a pursuit of fair and just agreements and futures.

Contextualizing the Habituation of Freeland and Concluding Remarks

As this series continues to examine changes within President Zelenskyy’s inner circle in response to both Ukrainian domestic pressures and Russia’s growing attritional war strategy, I suggest that Freeland’s appointment as a voluntary Economic Advisor to Ukraine signals an awareness within Ukrainian leadership and its closest allies that responding to Russia’s attritional warfare in 2026 cannot be confined to military operations alone. No longer are we in an era where hard power capabilities are the only measure of a nation’s strength; the personal and personnel also matter.

Freeland will be an important figure to watch, particularly as it relates to dialogue between Ukrainian feminists and the pro-democracy movement – not because Freeland herself has expressed a desire to pursue a feminist agenda in Ukraine’s economic reconstruction, but because her presence reflects the often-implicit reality that gendered political experience shapes how the dynamics of endurance, credibility, and trust are produced and sustained in wartime economies. In a war of attrition, where authority is continuously reaffirmed under conditions of prolonged uncertainty, reputational attack, and economic strain, such situated experience becomes strategically relevant, I suggest, as a form of habituation to sustained delegitimization.

The notion of habituation draws from a long philosophical tradition – mostly commonly, Aristotelian ethics, where habituation (hexis) was used to refer to repeated exposure and practice from durable dispositions rather than momentary or instantaneous reaction. In contemporary political thought, philosophers and scholars inspired by phenomenologists such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty have upon this idea to explain how subjects develop capacities for political action through ongoing relational strain. In feminist ethics, habituation helps to explain how – often oppressed – actors learn to endure, navigate, and act within conditions of prolonged vulnerability, scrutiny, and marginalization over time. It moves beyond experience; it is an engaged and embodied vision and practice.

In an attritional war where legitimacy is not necessarily secured through fast-paced or singular victories but continually reproduced across various political, economic, and social structures, as well as through relations of alliance management and public trust, this mode of habituation takes on strategic significance. Indeed, for President Zelenskyy, it works in his favour to cultivate and incorporate actors habituated to sustained delegitimization because it acts as a shock absorber to the , partner unreliability in a so-called newly-founded “” world, and economic fatigue increasingly characterizing this phase of the war and ongoing occupation. The hope is that these hybrid shocks are absorbed by such a habituation without suffering from significant strategic drifts that may carry over into the battlefield.

, nations and militaries perceived to possess greater status and capabilities – that is, the greater of two powers – engage in warfare by attrition. Those familiar with Russia and the former Soviet Union’s historical record of aggression, occupation, interference, and war across Eastern Europe will also recognize this mode of warfare, perhaps all too familiarly. The Baltics, the Balkans, Poland, Chechnya, Georgia – they all know this playbook. The Russian Federation continues to seek what it perceives as its rightful seat at the table of great-power politics; even those of us who reject John J. Mearsheimer’s structuralist projections onto Eastern Europe as lying within a fixed Russian “sphere of influence” cannot ignore such an imperial desire percolating within the Russian state since the unipolar moment.

In attritional war, time is a previous resource. As Sun Tzu , prolonged conflict could be of great risk to either warring side, on account of exhausting the state apparatus, undermining domestic order and morale, and eroding strategic advantage; for him, military strategy was a subtle and complex technique whose success depended on minimizing the temporal risks and costs of war. While Sun Tzu viewed attritional war as a strategic failure, the work of military theorist and general requires us to remember that wars of attrition often emerge as a political condition over time, shaped by friction, uncertainty, and an overall inability to achieve decisive political outcomes. What Ukraine demonstrates to the international community, this series aims to show, is that Russia’s apparent great power strategy grounded in attrition – like empire itself – can burn out.

It is by sources close to both Freeland and Prime Minister Carney that Freeland received Zelenskyy’s offer on December 22nd, 2025; by December 24th, she had shared with the Prime Minister her intentions to leave Canadian parliament to join the Ukrainian team. In responding to the Kremlin’s continued war of attrition, concerns beyond immediate hard power capabilities, military strategy, and command structures must be addressed. Freeland possesses a unique form of habituation to sustain delegitimation; her appointment may indeed be an important shock absorber to Russia’s ongoing disinformation campaigns, American partner unreliability, and the economic fatigue increasingly characterizing this war.

At the level of a broader wartime strategy, I suggest this capacity can also function as a form of resilience; it signals to communities, civil society, international partners, and adversaries alike that broader Ukraine’s leadership is prepared to govern through a liminal phase of uncertain futurity rather than govern toward a rapid endpoint. This is a strategy in stark contrast to Putin’s assumption that a “quick military operation” could sweep Ukraine in 2022, or that , once elected, could end the war in Ukraine in the first 24-hours of his second term. In this sense, it is important to emphasize that habituation is not merely an individual trait or disposition, but also a culturally sedimented capacity that is experienced transnationally and relationally. As Gusieva has argued, cultural resilience constitutes a foundational pillar of security; indeed, classical realist how such resilience at times is what pushes a nation beyond survival towards victory. I extend this logic here by suggesting that such cultural resilience is forged through repeated exposure to, and embeddedness within, enduring imperial projects and traditionalist military practices – in this case, namely, Russia’s ongoing attempts to reclaim imperial-great power status, legitimate its occupations, and sustain attritional warfare alongside its hybrid threats towards Europe.

In Ukraine, cultural habituation operates as resilience, but it is neither neutral nor abstract; rather, its experience is deeply racialized, ethnicized, and gendered. It is racialized and ethnicized through the persistent positioning of the nation as materially peripheral to Europe while cast as subordinate to Russia’s so-called historical sphere of influence; it is gendered through the paternalizing narratives directed at Ukraine and other Eastern European states aspiring to EU membership, as well as in the recurring trope of Ukraine as the “little brother” to a masculinized “Mother Russia.” More specifically, we see this reproduced through the hegemonically masculine practices embodied by state actors in political negotiations of economic and security matters; these behaviours continue to structure much of how political negotiation, listening, and diplomatic exchange take place. Freeland, in this respect, is a node within a broader relational structure of habituation and diplomatic practice in wartime Ukraine – one whose own political endurance aligns with, and stands to reinforce, Ukraine’s culturally embedded capacity to govern through attrition.

Please stay tuned for the next installment of this series, which will analyze Ukraine’s 2025 energy scandal and subsequent political moves undertaken President Zelenskyy following a state investigation that exposed high-level embezzlement within the nation’s energy sector.

The post Habituation in War: The Appointment of Chrystia Freeland as a Node in Ukraine’s Attritional War Strategy appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

Disclaimer: This profile is based on an extended interview conducted with a serving member of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The soldier’s name and call sign are used with consent.

Dmytro, known by his nom de guerre “Student,” has spent the past three years in uniform. He joined the Armed Forces of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the first day of Russia’s full-scale invasion, answering a call to what he describes not as a sudden impulse, but as a moral certainty. Now a combat medic in the Reconnaissance Company of the 106th Separate Territorial Defence Brigade, Dmytro was just twenty-two years old when the full-scale invasion began.

When the air raid woke him up on the morning of the 24th, he already knew where he was going. His father had been helping Ukrainian soldiers since 2014, after Russia first occupied Crimea. Dima grew up inside that world: distributing bulletproof vests, learning military equipment, and often participating in training at the local polygon. Ironically, February 24 was meant to be a shooting practice day and his gear was already packed.

“I woke up to the siren and my first thought was that I already knew where to go”, he recalls.

When he arrived at the recruitment centre, there were already too many people. There was nowhere to sleep. He was issued a uniform and sent home, told to return later. That first night, nine people shared four beds, rotating sleep while others stood watch.

“I never second-guessed my choice” Dmytro says. “I knew it was my responsibility to protect my homeland, my family and my people.”

For him, civilian life was no longer an option. He explained that the existence of a frontline, where people were dying every day, made the idea of continuing life as before feel morally impossible.

“There are moments when it is objectively terrifying,” he admits. “When an enemy drone is flying nearby, I even start to believe in God.” What keeps him going after all this time is not adrenaline but as a combat medic, he sees the impact his work makes. His brigade has suffered a minimal number of casualties, something he connects directly to planning, training and logistics. He designs evacuation plans down to the smallest detail, ensures vehicles are stocked with proper medical equipment and provides extensive medical training to fellow soldiers.

“I like to achieve things,” he says. “When I see that someone comes back alive from a mission because I planned their evacuation, stocked the vehicles properly, trained the unit, that keeps me going.”

When asked about the role civic identity played in his decision, he said that civic identity is inseparable from action. He speaks less about rights and more about responsibility.

“I believe in basic values, fairness, and truth,” he explains. “If you are a man, you have to prove it through your actions. Patriotism and honour are not words.”

Loving one’s country, in his view, does not mean accepting its failures. If something is broken, whether in government, institutions, or the military, it must be changed.

“I don’t want to come back from war and see that everything stayed the same,” he says. “We need change.”

Even amid constant Russian attacks, Ukrainians continue to demonstrate a deep commitment to a pro-democracy civil society. Ukraine consciously chose a democratic path, and despite the strains of war, the country persists in building resilient institutions and reinforcing democratic governance. The summer 2025 protest emerged in response to a high-profile corruption scandal involving a close advisor to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and the resignation that followed. This protest and subsequent cabinet reshufflings highlight how public pressure and demands for accountability continue to shape political decision-making in Ukraine, even in the midst of war. These events demonstrate that Ukrainian civil society remains active and engaged, insisting on transparency and reform while the state simultaneously fights for national survival.

Dmytro’s experience on the frontlines reflects the same sense of civic responsibility. His commitment to serve, improve systems within his unit, and protect his comrades resonates with the broader determination of Ukrainians to defend not only their territory, but also the democratic values and institutions they have worked so hard to build.

Life at the Front: Environment and Morale

Life at the front is defined by simplicity and scarcity. Routine is dictated by opportunity, not preference. “If you have a chance to do your laundry, you do your laundry,” Dima says. “Because the next chance might be in a month.” Units often stay in abandoned houses. They take care of the property and of the animals left behind. Dogs and cats are fed before soldiers worry about themselves. “It’s funny sometimes,” he smiles. “We might be able to eat very little for a few days, but the pets must be taken care of.”

The army has reshaped his understanding of human nature. Age, once synonymous with authority, no longer guarantees respect. “I used to think age gives wisdom,” he reflects. “Now I know that only actions do.”

Despite constant danger, Dima does not feel that his life is on hold. He does not plan far ahead for a future after demobilization, not because he lacks hope, but because his focus is anchored firmly in the present. “My life is here,” he says. “I want to be useful to my team.”

He continues to make plans for improving systems within his unit, refining processes and improving the quality of life for his comrades. The war has made him stronger and more resilient, but it has also sharpened his understanding of what matters. He sees his family approximately thirty days a year and the distance has reordered his priorities. “Before, I avoided family time,” he admits. “Now I know my family is my home.”

Fear is constant, but it is contextualized. “You can be afraid now under a Ukrainian flag,” he says, “or later under an occupation flag, forced to fight on their side.”

When asked about the challenges soldiers face and the support available to them, Dmytro reflects on the growing emotional and psychological toll of the war. After years of continuous fighting, fatigue is setting in, and the weight of that responsibility is becoming harder to carry. While soldiers remain deeply committed to their mission, they also recognize that they deserve stronger systems of care in return, especially when it comes to mental health support. He further reflects:

“The work is difficult, and there are psychological supports offered, but we are lacking a systemic approach to mental health for both soldiers and veterans. There are simply too many people and individual support is hard to provide. It’s also not normalized to ask for help. What has helped me personally is physical activity and maintaining a good nutrition routine. We sometimes have presentations or webinars about breathing techniques or wellness tips, but there isn’t consistent one-on-one support.”

The War Beyond the Ukrainian Trench: International Support and Its Limitations

From the frontline, international support is not an abstract policy debate.

“Definitely, you can feel the support from Western countries at a systemic level, through additional education, training and supplies,” Dima says. “As a combat medic, I would not be able to do my job without Western support.” At the same time, he is acutely aware of its limits. Assistance often arrives slowly, entangled in bureaucracy, disconnected from the immediacy of frontline needs. “War is expensive,” he says. “You need a lot, in large quantities, and ideally you needed it yesterday and not in two months.” Because of these delays, individual soldiers and units frequently organize personal fundraisers to improve their chances of survival. Our past piece on Civilian Frontlines: Drones, Fundraising, and Evolving Military Policy unpack the role informal fundraising plays out on the Ukrainian battlefield.

Dima spends much of his salary ensuring his unit is properly equipped. He does not have savings for civilian life. “I spend my salary so that me and my comrades come back alive,” he says. His battalion has a CASEVAC vehicle. Many others do not. From his perspective, there is often no systemic understanding of what is urgently required on the ground.

General geopolitical narratives also shape morale. He recalls how speculation abroad about quick diplomatic solutions led some soldiers to relax, a dangerous illusion. “If you relax on the frontline, you are dead,” he says. “Or your comrade is dead. That’s the reality.”

Dima believes many countries underestimate Russia because they have never experienced its occupation or repression firsthand. “A lot of the world doesn’t understand what kind of evil Russia is,” he says. “They’ve never had direct contact with occupation.” At the same time, reliance on Western support should not replace internal responsibility. Ukraine, he argues, must continue working toward self-sufficiency. “We can’t wait for someone to come and save us,” he says. “We need education and training early, so people are ready to show their love for the country through action.”

Recruitment, Mobilization and the Weight of Reality

According to Dmytro, recruitment and mobilization remain deeply flawed. War, he argues, is often romanticized, while the reality is left unspoken. “We need a healthy approach to recruitment,” he says. “And from early on, we need to teach young people about responsibility as citizens of Ukraine.” He is blunt about demographic reality: young, healthy people are needed at the front. A fully professional contract army is a goal, but not a current reality during a full-scale invasion. “We are not close to winning this war,” he says. “The government needs to explain that protection of the homeland comes through military service.” He also points to systemic issues inside the army: recognition that does not always reflect contribution, bureaucracy that resists innovation and tensions between volunteers and career military personnel.

“The full-scale invasion showed how two different worlds met,” he explains. “Volunteers came with creativity and initiative, while career military often do everything strictly by the book. But the frontline changes fast. We need new solutions.” Many talented people from civilian fields are now in uniform, trying to improve systems while navigating internal resistance. “For volunteers, rules are sometimes more flexible,” he says. “But internal battles with bureaucracy still exist.” For him personally, financial incentives or benefits were never a consideration. “I wasn’t thinking about money when I joined,” he says. “My role is to implement changes that can save lives or health.”

Dmytro also reflected on how gender continues to shape realities on the frontline. “Throughout my service, I have seen women occupy a wide range of roles, from frontline positions to more supportive ones, and many of them demonstrate remarkable courage, strength, and resilience, often exceeding that of their male counterparts. One challenge I have observed is the assumption that the combat medic role is inherently more suitable for women because it is associated with healthcare. In reality, the position is extremely demanding. A significant part of the role involves physically evacuating wounded soldiers from frontline positions, who are often much larger in size, requiring specific physical capacities.

There are, of course, many stereotypes about women in the military, most of which are still perpetuated by older career personnel. At the same time, I have served alongside many women who are exceptionally strong and capable, while continuing to carry their femininity within an environment that remains deeply masculine and physically demanding.”

Rethinking Victory

When asked what victory means, Dima rejects the term entirely.

“We should ban the word ‘victory,’” he says. “It has a positive connotation, but what happened to us, especially to people in occupied territories, is a tragedy.” For him, the end goal is not celebration, but accountability. “The collapse of the Russian Federation would not bring back lost lives,” he says. “But at least we could say that, at a heavy price, we defeated evil.”

Narratives about victory are often amplified through social media in Ukraine and sometimes presented as morale-boosting policies by the government. However, when asked whether he feels a disconnect from civilians during short breaks in areas far from the frontlines, Dmytro is quick to acknowledge that civilians will never fully understand a soldier’s experience simply because they have never been there. It is a particular type of as Donna Haraway defines it. He says you cannot put yourself in the shoes of a soldier and that it is okay. You do not need frontline combat experience to show empathy. What Ukrainians are lacking, he believes, is basic respect for people in uniform and for soldiers.

Dmytro is clear that soldiers deserve understanding and recognition from civilians, but he is even more demanding of the government. In his view, the state owes them guarantees of a decent life after demobilization and meaningful support in return for everything they have done to preserve Ukraine’s sovereignty. He is honest about the challenges ahead, including reintegration, PTSD, and other psychological struggles, and he stresses that society should already be preparing to welcome soldiers back and help them rehabilitate. He firmly believes that as strong as Ukrainian society is, there is still a lot of work to do, starting with improving access to medical services, resources, and knowledge about what support exists.

When asked about the scariest experience he has had, Dmytro described the first time he truly felt that death was close. During a massive attack by Russian forces, he ran toward a trench and heard a mine explode right behind him. He still does not understand how he survived. That moment, he says, made him realize just how fragile life on the frontline can be. While the Ukrainian government has not officially disclosed the number of soldiers who were not as lucky as Dmytro and were killed in action, . Many Ukrainian soldiers remain in Russian captivity, a situation that requires urgent attention from the international community and sustained efforts to secure their release.

At the time of this writing, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has surpassed the length of the Soviet Union’s war against Nazi Germany. Dmytro’s story is not unique. The resilience of Ukraine rests in the hands of people like him who answered the call to serve their country, carrying not only the weight of the battlefield but the hopes of an entire nation. Their courage should serve as a reminder to us all that the values of freedom, human rights, and democracy are often inseparable from the willingness to defend them on the battlefield.

The post “I Never Gave Myself a Choice”: A Ukrainian Combat Medic on War, Responsibility and Freedom appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

A new partnership was announced in January 2026 between Canadian and Estonian institutions that focus on clean energy solutions. The new partnership sets out three research projects that have been set for 2026, bringing together the University of Victoria’s Accelerating Community Energy Transformation (ACET) initiative and the Estonian Islands Energy Agency (EISEA). The aim of the partnership is to co-design and develop vital research and practical models for island populations as it relates to clean and sustainable energy priorities for local communities, which can then be expanded to larger populations. As featured in a by the University of Victoria, the hope is that by “combining ACET’s research expertise with EISEA’s on-the-ground knowledge of island communities, the partnership will foster innovative clean energy solutions, enhance local capacity and create replicable approaches to community-centered energy systems on Estonian islands.” This collaboration is part of a growing trend of Canadian cooperation with the Baltics, engaging with security, social, and professional sectors. In doing so, such a partnership gives an opportunity for Canada to support Baltic defence against Russian hybrid threats by developing broader social resilience strategies and relationships.

What will the partnership look like?

. The first, on Saarema, will investigate how local organic waste can be repurposed to power the island’s heating system. On Hiiuma, the second project will track a pilot initiative on sustainable energy production, distribution, and transportation. Both will generate important lessons on developing a circular and sustainable energy economy. The third project will look broadly at the social implications of energy development, analyzing how local communities respond to new projects. This can help build fair and transparent energy planning processes.

ACET and EISEA will be blending their research and innovation skills, each bringing an important skillset. Integral to the project will be the EISEA knowledge and engagement with Estonian island communities. The to ensure accurate interpretations of local contexts. For ACET, the partnership is an opportunity to showcase Canadian research leadership and apply lessons learned in previous projects. In the past, in British Columbia to co-design energy projects, giving important insight into how to lead collaborative and sustainable research development.

Security Implications

The development of clean energy in Estonia ties directly into their security resilience. Prior to 2022, Estonia was heavily reliant on Russian gas and oil, . While Estonia has been able to find alternative sources for LNG through Latvia and Lithuania, enhancing their own energy infrastructure will be integral to national capacity and resilience.

Previously, Estonia ; however, , part of the pipeline was damaged, leading Estonia to pivot to other Baltic states. The incident was alleged to be in response to heightened tensions over Russian sanctions. This highlights the need for strengthened local and regional infrastructure to mitigate possible threats. For example, . This is a vulnerability that can be exploited if there are disruptions to critical infrastructure by malign actors.

For islands in Estonia’s Baltic Sea, this is even more vital. Estonia has thousands of islands, some of which are exceptionally vulnerable due to distance from the mainland and close proximity to Russia. Last fall, . Other incursions have occurred in Poland and Lithuania, heightening security concerns among Europeans and their allies. While Estonia is , they will also need to ward off hybrid threats such as these. This means accounting for economic, environmental, social, and other vulnerabilities outside of hard security concerns. The partnership not only addresses critical infrastructure gaps, but it is doing so in a transparent and collaborative manner with local communities. This reinforces social cohesion and self-sustainability within these smaller populations – a model that could be replicated elsewhere. Therefore, the partnership is a strong example of the comprehensive approaches NATO and its members can continue to seek out to improve its readiness and defence posture.

Canada’s approach to Baltics

This announcement is aligned with other moves Canada has recently made to deepen ties with Baltic states. Through and , Canada has bolstered its defence presence in the region. Canada’s presence in the Baltics ties into a broader national goal to be a more active global partner, particularly in the effort to improve European security. This is a noteworthy shift from the previous Trudeau government, whose values-based foreign policy at times left Canada to the periphery of important security decision-making in Europe. This recalibration signals an effort to translate normative commitments into more robust material contributions and relationships, enhancing Canada’s own strategic role within NATO while ensuring it remains reliable.

The Baltics’ proximity to Russia makes them a key target for hybrid Russian threats, emphasizing the need to improve counterresponse. Estonia in particular shares a . Estonia has already partnered with NATO to improve their defence, including on the islands of ; however, full resilience will require a comprehensive approach that also defends critical infrastructure and community interests. Here, Canada has a strong opportunity to partner with Estonian companies and research institutions to support the development of industries and technology in preparation for a more robust counterresponse to Russian hybrid pressures.

Estonia has been . This has opened the opportunity for Canadian companies to connect with Estonia on renewable energy, storage capacity, and smart technologies. In . to deploy a BWRX-300 small modular reactor, which will boost their nuclear energy capacity. The work generated by ACET-EISEA will further develop these opportunities and centre them in the community while prioritizing environmental sustainability. This is where Canada can really shine, as not only a supporter but also a promoter of key values and goals of the liberal international order.

Conclusion

Looking ahead, ACET-EISEA is set to announce more collaboration in the coming months. As the projects begin in 2026, it will be important to track progress and lessons learned. The partnership is a strong example of the kinds of multinational action that is needed to address collective security and political concerns. Drawing from this experience can give strong models for other initiatives, which can in turn strengthen the development of the Transatlantic community. In doing so, these initiatives play a significant role in reinforcing the strategic cohesion necessary among the Alliance at a time when cooperation is increasingly being tested by geopolitical tension and conflict.

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“The Black Sea in 2026: Strategic Maneuvers and Economic Opportunity” examines how the Black Sea has become one of the world’s most consequential geopolitical and economic corridors following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The brief analyzes the competing strategies of Russia, Türkiye, the European Union, and China, alongside the security concerns of littoral states, highlighting how control of the region shapes Ukraine’s future and broader transatlantic stability. It also outlines Canada’s growing role as a NATO partner in supporting regional security, trade resilience, and postwar reconstruction. The paper concludes with targeted policy recommendations for strengthening Canada–Ukraine cooperation and enhancing Black Sea security in a rapidly evolving strategic landscape.

To read the full policy brief prepared by Dr. Jeff Sahadeo, click the download button below.

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After a contentious summit – one that saw European Union (EU) members divided on the future of funding to Ukraine as the war nears its fourth year – the EU has created a plan to secure an . This plan depends on using cash from secured capital markets, deviating from the to use frozen Russian assets. The summit comes at a time where and . While the EU’s major goal of securing a funding package was achieved, internal fractures are increasingly felt and spreading, with the discussion inflaming verbal attacks and disagreements between Hungary, Slovakia, and other EU members.

Risky or revolutionary?

The EU’s final iteration of its funding package comes as a much safer development from the Commission’s initial Reparations Loan. That initial package would have secured funding from since the start of the full-scale invasion. Days before the summit, the EU agreed to , which primarily belong to the Russian Central Bank, held through Euroclear. The Commission maintained there was no breach of ethics on account of the agreement not affecting the Russian Central Bank’s intellectual property and Euroclear would be bound to repay it. Despite this, the plan elicited heated controversy among EU members.

Strong opposition largely stems from Euroclear and Belgium – where the financial company is based. Euroclear’s concerns pertain to the international trust in the euro and the company itself; it also expressed concern that it may be undermined by what they deemed a “.” Belgium fears Russian retaliation through international courts. The and promised if the plan were to go ahead. Retaliation from Russia could also include various hybrid strategies such as cyberattacks, sabotage of critical infrastructure, or even drone incursions. Hungary and Slovakia have also opposed the plan. The two countries have become increasingly critical of EU sanctions against Russia due to their own political and energy connections and dependencies on the country. Both nations to indefinitely freeze Russian assets, eliminating their veto power. Prime Ministers and slammed the plan on social media, implying it betrays important normative and legal architecture of the European Union.

Ultimately, the Reparations Loan in its original form was not passed, with members saying it was “too complex” and politically risky to go through with now. The primary concern was that Belgium needed . This brought mixed reactions and the guarantees could not be met. The EU’s main strategic goal to avoid escalation with Russia also made this move too risky, with the threat of financial and legal repercussions too costly.

What’s next for Ukraine?

The loan will be based on , requiring Ukraine to pay it back once they begin receiving reparations after the war has ended. The current plan eases the burden for some struggling with financing Ukraine directly, while also not affecting the obligations of countries like . This guarantee also paved the way for these countries to support the loan, making the decision smoother. The loan will be used to support Ukraine’s financial needs, particularly for investing in Ukrainian defence technology and industry. The country has identified a need for additional funding beyond its current IMF program, calling for up to .

What does this say about the EU?

One thing that has become abundantly clear during the summit is the increasing fractures between members of the European Union regarding the war in Ukraine. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and its continued influence throughout Eastern Europe is beginning to sow real discord within the EU, proving to be an increasingly complex issue as the war rolls on. Currently, the EU has made several moves that mitigate the ability for countries that sympathize with Russia to disrupt aid to Ukraine; however, the new plan also gives a noteworthy “out” to these countries by allowing them not to contribute. Disagreements over the war are also combined with strong anti-bureaucratic and anti-EU rhetoric from leaders, who operate from a populist and, at times, illiberal base of governance. The EU will need to be vigilant and cautious about the influence and relationship to Russia that current member states have. The destabilization and weakening of the EU will be strategically advantageous to Russia, divisions that have already begun to exploit.

What will be interesting to see is how funding will evolve as time goes on. The EU . Will later developments prompt this risky move? Additionally, what will the reaction of Moscow be in these current conditions? It will be important to follow developments as they relate to renewed funding, as this could (re)invigorate either party and change future strategies and funding scenarios. Whether this will result in strategic pressures with positive outcomes or a further destabilization of the European continent, has yet to be seen.

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● Russia has been testing and refining hybrid tactics in the Balkans since the 2010s

● Hybrid tactics prey on ethnic divisions, political instability, and encourage hostility towards the West

● Russia’s tactics have increased their soft power, making it easier for malign actors to destabilize Europe

Russia’s unconventional threats

Hybrid threats have become an increasingly pervasive aspect of the global security landscape. Since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Russian Federation has been a key instigator of hybrid attacks, launching disinformation and propaganda campaigns, offensive cyber operations, espionage, and attacks on critical infrastructure. In Ukraine, hybrid tactics act as a force multiplier for traditional combat. Such hybrid tactics seek to weaponize divisions between social groups; the government and citizens; as well as economic and structural weaknesses to undermine faith in the systems, norms, and values of Western countries. By eroding public trust and exploiting weaknesses in target countries, societies are becoming more susceptible to internal vulnerability and Russian influence.

One area that has been a target of hybrid tactics is the Western Balkans. A critical juncture between West and East, the Balkans have been an area of competing ideology and cultural influence; it is also a region with a multitude of divisions for Russia to exploit. The repeated use of threats and fanning of tensions may imply a desire to stoke regional conflict, which could divide and disorder Europe. Much of Russia’s connection to the area is rooted in , which in the worst case scenario, could invite further expansionist ambitions into the region. Russia has largely implemented hybrid warfare tactics in places where they can leverage the most historical and cultural connections: Serbia; Republika Srpska; Montenegro; and North Macedonia (Slavic population).

Proxy Political Actors

Since the 2010s, Russia has been developing and testing clear methods of direct interference in political systems. Their primary tactic is backing ultranationalist and populist political figures. This includes the VMRO-DPMNE party in North Macedonia, which is a pro-Russian right-wing party. They have amplified , including the Macedonian naming dispute regarding . In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Milorad Dodik has been a strong pro-Kremlin force in the region, advocating for the secession of Republika Srpska, the Serbian-dominated enclave in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Russia recently used the in an effort to condemn Western influence in the region. In Serbia, Kremlin-backed politicians have historically been influential. , appointed to Parliament in 2024, President Aleksander Vučić has also frequently been accused of succumbing to Russia influence, though in the Serbian-Russian bilateral relationship remain notable. Russia’s use of state proxy actors is an effective way to ensure that the developing democratic systems in these countries remain divided and fragile. These actors are effective at preventing cooperation and often incite violent and polarizing rhetoric.

Non-political proxy actors

Russia has also refined its hybrid tactics through the exploitation of religious and cultural ties. The Russian Federation has deep and historical ties with the Orthodox Church, an integral part of daily life and culture in many Balkan countries. Pro-Kremlin oligarchs provide financial support to the Church and its charitable works. In return, moves towards democracy are framed as immoral Western decadence, which destroys traditional culture. The Orthodox Church has frequently opposed sovereignty and democracy for Montenegro and Kosovo, framing it as a threat to pan-Slavic identity. This rhetoric maintains tensions around territory, making peace more fragile. Cultural associations, mainly in Serbia, serve to disseminate propaganda among everyday citizens and cement Russian opinions. . Since the group was dismantled, the fate of criminal recruiting networks remains unclear. Another famous example is the . Cultural and educational programs throughout the region promote Russian language and ideology. This primes citizens to be more susceptible to Russian narratives and propaganda, increasing the effectiveness of hybrid tactics. Russia’s actions in the Balkans demonstrates its ability to leverage indirect, soft forms of influence.

Digital Landscape

Russia has been able to effectively weaponize social media and news outlets throughout the Balkans. Primarily, these efforts are targeted towards Serbian audiences. News outlets are flooded with Russian disinformation and propaganda. . The site itself is accessible to a wide audience, filling information voids with inflammatory stories. Many popular local news outlets – not tied to Russia – often repost such information as well. Disinformation portrays the West as weak, reinvigorating controversial memories such as the 1999 NATO bombings, and overstating regional conflicts. Outlets like , , and consistently regurgitate this messaging. Russia also leverages social media platforms like Telegram to further its disinformation campaign. Rybar, a pro-Russian channel, recently posted information regarding the joint special exercise between Albania, Croatia, and Kosovo. It claimed that this was evidence of an axis being formed by the West. Dozens of local Serbian channels reposted this information, inciting panic and paranoia about ethnic tensions.

Conclusion

Russia’s moves in the Western Balkans demonstrates its intentions to destabilize Europe from multiple fronts in the east, while simultaneously waging war in Ukraine This can divide the attention and resources of European nations, which improve the success of Russia’s strategic ambitions. For years, malign influence has penetrated the region, as noted in NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept. NATO should build on their outlined commitment and empower the region to become more resilient to hybrid threats.

Policy Recommendations

● Existing institutions and developmental frameworks should be buttressed by NATO to support democracy-building in the region

● Canada should support resilience and democratic stability by developing bilateral ties via NGO, diplomatic, and economic partnerships.

● Individuals, companies, centres, and associations who undermine democracy and encourage pro-Russian beliefs should be appropriately identified and restricted.

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Prior to 2022, Europe’s defence posture relied heavily on NATO deterrence and the United States’ (US) security guarantee, underscoring the absence of a fully realized shared strategic vision within the European Union (EU). Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, coupled with growing , exposed the risks of this reliance and accelerated the EU’s push for greater strategic autonomy. For the first time, the EU financed the through the European Peace Facility and under the 2023–25 European Defence Industrial Programme. Defence spending soared across the continent, and what had long been an aspirational concept of strategic autonomy became an urgent necessity, even if its full realization remains a long-term project.

Yet, as Russia’s war in Ukraine exceeds its third year, the EU faces a lingering challenge: the rise of far-right governments in many of its member states. While strategic autonomy is still top of mind for EU leaders, materialized through the introduction of , several members states are increasingly pursuing nationalist defence agendas. As a result, the EU finds itself caught between advancing the architecture of collective defence while simultaneously contending with leaders who instrumentalize this same mechanism for domestic political gain. This tension has direct implications for Europe’s credibility as a security actor. It complicates efforts to align defence procurement, weakens the consistency of sanctions and aid policies, and risks eroding the transatlantic trust which Europe still depends on for deterrence.

The Far-Right Populist and Defence

The far right’s influence on European defence policy does not manifest through outright obstruction but through . Rather than rejecting Brussels’ new defence architecture, nationalist leaders have learned to operate within it, appropriating both its funding mechanism and its language to advance sovereignty-based agendas. These actors recognize that participating in EU-funded defence initiatives confers both material and symbolic rewards: access to industrial contracts, regional investment, and the legitimacy that comes from being seen as a responsible European partner. What distinguishes them is not withdrawal, but the ability to convert cooperation into a narrative of national strength. In doing so, they hollow out the collective rationale of defence integration, turning what should be a shared European project into a vehicle for domestic legitimacy.

Hungary illustrates this pattern most overtly. Under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, the Hungarian government while remaining ambivalent toward the collective logic underpinning the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In 2017, Budapest initiated the , a €13 billion modernization effort aimed at creating domestic supply chains for arms and munitions. German firms such as , establishing joint ventures that anchor Hungary’s defence industry within the European market while strengthening Orban’s narrative of rebuilding the Hungarian military. The , co-financed through EU cohesion funds and national investment subsidies, is emblematic of this dual logic: it deepens Hungary’s integration in the EU defence economy even as Orban portrays it as proof of national self-reliance.

Yet while leveraging these partnerships, Hungary remains one of the least aligned member states when it comes to the that underpin the EU’s CSDP overall goal. Budapest consistently resists the forms of coordination that give CSDP substance, shared threat assessments, deeper PESCO commitments, and capability-pooling arrangements that would bind national planning to collective European priorities. At the same time, Budapest has sought access to funding under the EU’s new support for Ammunition and Firearms Expansion loan instrument, , while opposing proposals to link disbursements to rule-of-law compliance. Orban repeatedly frames defence modernization as integral to protecting Hungary’s national identity, emphasizing that . Hungary supports EU investment when it serves its industrial base, such as the Security Action for Europe and European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement schemes, that would make these mechanisms genuinely European. Orban’s model thus envisions a Europe of self-reliant states loosely connected through markets and contracts, not through . The result is a form of instrumental integration, wherein Hungary contributes materially to Europe’s rearmament while eroding the institutional cohesion that collective security demands.

The EU’s Response

The dual challenge of Russian aggression and internal fragmentation has forced EU leaders to harden both its defence and governance instruments. The EU’s post-2022 defence agenda has expanded at a pace unseen since the bloc’s creation. The Readiness 2030 initiative, announced in 2025, seeks to mobilize over and establish new fiscal flexibility for member states to allocate up to 1.5 percent of GDP to defence without breaching budget-deficit rules. A is intended to finance joint procurement of military products, while the European Defence Industrial Strategy lays the groundwork for a with harmonized rules to enable faster and larger-scale production.

At the same time, recognizing Russia’s active hybrid warfare strategy and the role illiberal and populist actors play in it, the EU has coupled defence integration with measures to safeguard its democratic infrastructure. The now empowers Brussels to audit social-media platforms and penalize those that facilitate foreign influence operations. The EU has also invested in counter-hybrid capabilities, from cyber-resilience frameworks to a proposed along its eastern frontier, reflecting the growing convergence of internal and external security.

Conclusion – A Contested Path Forward

Europe’s defence awakening has built the structure of strategic autonomy but not its political foundation. The EU now commands funding instruments, industrial incentives, and procurement schemes approaching a true defence union, yet its legitimacy in this area still remains fragile. Without a mandate rooted in democratic accountability and public debate, these mechanisms risk becoming a technocratic enterprise that populists can exploit for their domestic gain. Leaders such as Viktor Orbán have learned to navigate this gap, appropriating the language and benefits of European rearmament to validate nationalist narratives while obstructing collective decision-making.

Yet public sentiment offers an opening. .The task for Brussels is to transform this diffuse approval into a clear mandate, linking defence to agency, accountability, and shared purpose. Strategic autonomy will only endure if it becomes political as well as industrial, anchored in legitimacy, communication, and leadership that make Europe not just rearmed, but united.

Policy Recommendations: From Technocracy to Political Cohesion

To combine Europe’s strategic autonomy and close the legitimacy gap that populist actors exploit, the EU must move beyond institutional design to political consolidation. The following measures outline how Brussels can align its defence ambitions with democratic cohesion.

Mobilize public consent through strategic communication and civic engagement – The EU should institutionalize structured citizen dialogue on security and defence, modelled on the Conference on the Future of Europe, to engage Europeans in shaping the Union’s strategic priorities.

Form a European Strategic Communication Taskforce for Defence – The EU should establish a Strategic Communication Taskforce for Defence to counter the populist narratives that reframe collective defence as a threat to sovereignty or a national achievement. Housed within the European External Action Service and building on existing StratCom capabilities, the taskforce would coordinate messaging across member states, highlight the local benefits of EU-funded defence projects, and proactively counter disinformation about European rearmament.

Strengthen role of European Defence Commissioner and unify procurement authority – The establishment of a Defence and Space Commissioner marks progress, but the portfolio currently lacks the political weight and institutional tools needed to meaningfully coordinate EU defence initatives. With responbilities dispersed between the European External Action Service, the Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space, and the European Defence Agency, strengthening the Commissioner’s mandate, particularly in unified procurement and capability planning, would reduce fragmentation and advance Europe’s strategic sovereignty.

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On November 1st, 2025, , the site of a railway canopy collapse that killed sixteen people just a year prior. Novi Sad railway station, intended to be a symbol of modernization after renovations led by , instead became a demonstration of how quickly corruption can turn deadly. Student-led protests quickly began, calling for accountability and a transparent investigation on the incident; however, as resistance and negligence continued, the movement quickly grew to a revolt against an entire system deemed corrupt. Aleksander Vučić, the president of Serbia and founder of the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), has long defined his rule in Serbia through increasing autocratization. His anti-democratic methods have incited more outrage, but also made it more difficult to realize change. What are some of the successes and challenges that have defined the movement so far? What are possible next steps?

Success through community

One of the most notable features of the protests was the ability to mobilize vast sectors of the population. Leaders like Vučić are very skilled at making citizens feel shut out from politics; the protests have reawakened a sense of agency and power among society. The students leading the protest have been able to gain the support of the , , , and . Students have made an effort to include marginalized voices, which has bridged the divide between urban-rural populations, cultural groups, and sectors. Key to the organization has been its leaderless and decentralized form. Rather than establishing any new kind of hierarchy, the protests have opted for horizontal forms of authority, which ensure all participants are equal. for debates and decisions. This has also allowed all participants to feel that they are actively involved in their own governance and society, rather than remaining disenfranchised. The tactics used by the protestors have also aided its success. Actions that are symbolic, yet peaceful and legal, have made resistance approachable. These include traffic blockades, inter-city marches, social media campaigns, and marathons to Brussels.

The protests have pushed the resignation of select key officials, including the . An investigation was opened, but the lack of progress and reality of state power of the judiciary remain an issue. Similarly, partial documents around the construction project have been released, but much information . The protesters, after much campaigning, have received official support on October 22, 2025. This could have impacts on the ability for external actors to pressure Vučić. The sustained cooperation and power of the protests remain its biggest success, demonstrating the power of the people and the ability for citizens to regain their voice.

Challenges: state pushback

Crackdowns on civil society, control over free press, patronage networks, and election interference have become characteristic of Vučić’s office, undermining Serbia’s development as well as its pathway to democracy and EU accession. This has led to many calling for a leadership change. Vučić has responded by attacking the protestors, labelling them as . Physical attacks, smear campaigns, doxxing, unlawful questioning/detainment, and the controversial continue to be ongoing threats levied against protestors. Attacks on the educational sector have also been strong, with teachers facing pay cuts and threats since the beginning of the protests. Over the summer, government response became increasingly violent, with . This has drawn international criticism and has exponentially increased the threat level for protest participants. The government has also organized , though they remain smaller than their opposition.

State pushback and unwillingness to discuss have impeded the ability of meaningful dialogue and reform to occur; however, the system was designed this way. For protestors, it is difficult to translate actions into meaningful reform through the barring of political participation in civil society. , and social-political structures are captured by the state. Additionally, the has stood out for being very reticent in their support, likely due to fears over economic uncertainty following a new government, or to their own connections to .

An additional area where more support would be instrumental relates to international and external actors. The EU’s formal resolution came after months of relative disengagement from events in Serbia. Many may view student protests as a potentially unstable bet, however there should be strong support for civil society and the principles the protestors are advocating for. For a long time, international actors who support Vučić (such as Russia and China) have been louder than those in support. Considerable political transformation must take place in order to pressure Vučić, both internally and externally.

Where to next?

Currently, the protest sits at a defining moment. The past year has seen success through mass mobilization, the resignation of key officials, and the EU’s resolution of support for the protest. However, the government remains strong, and while . This has raised the issue of how to navigate these challenges. A major debate surrounds how the students should engage in the electoral arena. A student’s list of outsider candidates is being developed, however . It is difficult to justify joining the very system seen as corrupt, and there are concerns the election will not actually reform the system, just change the face. Additionally, attempts from are a growing internal issue that risks causing further division and factionalism. It may require the protestors to set ideological lines, countering its primarily apolitical image.

The protests in Serbia demonstrate the power of collective action and citizen mobilization. Its year-long anniversary marks a crossroads where the collective needs to decide its next steps. How they choose to orient themselves could have deep implications on the success of the protests and the growing political voice of the people.

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On September 30, 2025, to intervene in Nexperia’s operations, a semiconductor-focused Chinese-owned company. The government had cited “” and the risk that vital technological capabilities could be shifted out of Europe, and it gave itself the power to reverse or even block decisions deemed harmful to both Dutch and European economic security.

Nexperia, as a company, is not a glamorous AI-chip producer as the media tends to focus on, but rather a supplier of “legacy” semiconductors used in both cars and other consumer electronics, which was formerly part of Philips’ semiconductor operations and was . However, . The response from Beijing was swift. In early October, China’s Commerce Ministry . It halted exports of Nexperia chips from China, turning the regulatory move into a global supply chain incident. Nexperia, for its part, warned its customers that it would no longer be able to guarantee the quality or authenticity of any chips produced in China after October 13, .

Suppliers and automakers alike suddenly discovered how exposed they were to the “boring” part of the chip world. The European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association and could force production lines to halt. The ripple effects of supply chain issues caused by the Dutch regulatory provision were felt even in North America, and had either sought other suppliers or exemptions from the control measures imposed by China.

By mid-November, after talks involving partners such as the United States, China decided to ease its export ban on Nexperia, and the , citing steps taken by Beijing to restore chip flows to Europe. The immediate crisis seems to have been managed for the time being. However, the events of the last three months have exposed apparent limitations in the resilience of Europe’s semiconductor industry.

On Paper: Ambitious. In Reality: Dependent

The is intended to double the European share of the global semiconductor market to 20% by 2030, strengthen and resilient supply chains, and minimize Europe’s dependency on foreign suppliers. However, the that this target is unlikely to be met, and that the EU market share is currently only projected to be 11.7% in 2030.

Interestingly, identified semiconductors as one of the four “critical technology areas” that require risk assessments by its member states, other critical areas included biotech, quantum, and AI technologies. However, the Nexperia case reveals that Europe’s most glaring deficiencies are not only at the bleeding edge of semiconductor design, but also that the assembly, testing, and production of older-generation chips have been, for the most part, offshored to China. This is consistent with broader statistics on digital dependence. For example, the relayed estimations that the EU relies on non-EU suppliers for more than 80% of its digital products, services, and infrastructure, and that China supplies approximately 71% of the EU’s gallium and 45% of its germanium, both of which are irreplaceable materials needed for semiconductor production. In other words, Europe is attempting to establish some degree of technological sovereignty on a foundation that is deeply entangled with Chinese output, especially in the least glamorous parts of the value chain.

Lessons

The EU now centres discussions on “” from China to manage interdependence and to diversify rather than simply sever ties with China altogether. The Nexperia case offers a sneak peek at what this could mean in practice.

First, it would require regulatory teeth, such as the willingness to use emergency security tools, including the , and EU-level export control and investment screening, to keep critical capabilities anchored in Europe when market incentives may point elsewhere. Second, it demands a redesign of the supply chain. Ensuring that 70% of a critical supplier’s output is not hostage to policy decisions made by China means not only investing in high-end chips, but also in the often-forgotten parts of the industry, such as test facilities, packaging plants, and the raw materials they rely on. The Nexperia saga serves as a great case study in the potential costs of ignoring such links. Third, de-risking not only implies reshoring but also friend-shoring. , launched in 2022, aims to make Canada a global “supplier of choice” for critical minerals and the clean technologies they enable, such as semiconductors. The recent builds upon this strategy by committing new funding to raw mineral extraction and export. Canada and the EU already have a from 2021, which commits both sides to integrating Canada-EU raw materials value chains and reducing strategic dependencies on other supplier countries. For Europe, treating that partnership more as a core pillar of its long-term semiconductor security strategy would be a meaningful act of de-risking.

The Nexperia crisis is a preview. As Europe tightens export controls and pushes its Chips Act forward, similar flashpoints are likely, mainly around similar firms and technologies. The question is whether European policymakers are prepared and willing to pay both the financial and political costs of reducing dependencies and taking proactive measures rather than simply reacting when a single chip company suddenly becomes the chokepoint of global production.

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