Since its establishment in 1949, the foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany was grounded in the concept of Zivilmacht (civilian power), a model based on the renunciation of military force, multilateral cooperation, and economic diplomacy. However, the Russian Federation’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 acted as a significant catalyst for change in Germany’s foreign policy and broader geopolitical positioning. Following these shifts in the European strategic environment, then-Chancellor Olaf Scholz proclaimed Zeitenwende (a turning point in history) had arrived, which would redefine Germany’s security policy through increased defence spending and a more prominent place in international affairs. The electoral victory of Friedrich Merz as current Chancellor has ultimately shifted Germany’s international role to a more assertive and openly strategic posture, distancing itself from the civilian power model of the past.

This essay examines Germany’s evolution from a culture of military restraint toward one of new strategic posturing, analyzing whether this transformation represents a definitive abandonment of its identity as a civilian power in favour of a return to a modern form Machtpolitik (power politics). Through an examination of the historical trajectory from the Cold War to the chancellorship of Friedrich Merz starting in 2025, this essay suggests that Germany is not reverting to aggressive militarism but is instead adopting a form of defensive and integrated Machtpolitik, necessary to ensure security within the Euro-Atlantic order.

The Erosion of the Civilian Power Paradigm

For over seven decades, the Federal Republic of Germany defined its national identity through the lens of a (civilian power). Emerging from the ruins of 1945, it anchored itself in the West under Konrad Adenauer’s policy of (western integration), replacing traditional power politics with a culture of military restraint, multilateralism, and rejection of nuclear arms. This identity consolidated during the Cold War through and the diplomatic success of Willy Brandt’s (eastern policy), which favoured economic interdependence and dialogue over the use of military force. Even after reunification in 1990, Germany struggled to move beyond this posture, exposing a lasting tension between its expanding economic influence and its unwillingness to deploy its military – an approach that NATO Allies frequently criticized as “.”

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 shattered these certainties. Then-Chancellor Olaf Scholz proclaimed a Zeitenwende had taken place, and promising a massive investment in defence through a . However, the Scholz era (2021–2025) was marked by a profound gap between rhetoric and reality. Hampered by bureaucratic bottlenecks, internal coalition disputes, and a lingering culture of pacifism, the implementation of the Zeitenwende proved difficult. Scholz’s reluctance to supply ‘offensive’ weapons – – combined with concerns about Germany’s actual capacity to increase defence spending levels, caused political inconsistency and eroded trust in his leadership at home and abroad. Consequently, the collapse of the Scholz’s governing coalition in late 2024, , paved the way for a more radical transformation under Friedrich Merz.

The Merz Chancellorship: Enforcing Zeitenwende 2.0

The election of Friedrich Merz as Chancellor in February 2025 marked the definitive end of Germany’s post-war strategic ambiguity. Merz’s rise to power envisioned a “,” a strategy that aimed to translate the previous government’s hesitant rhetoric into concrete, assertive action. Under Merz’s leadership, Germany has accelerated its transition from a reluctant partner to a burgeoning military leader in Europe, driven by the dual pressures of Russian aggression and uncertainty in the transatlantic security relationship following the second election of Donald Trump to the Presidency of the United States (US).

Unconditional Support for Ukraine and Strategic Assertiveness

The most immediate shift under Chancellor Merz has been the abandonment of self-imposed “red lines” regarding the war in Ukraine. In stark contrast to Scholz’s , Merz’s government adopted a stance of support with “,” strengthening Germany’s role as the leading military supporter of Kyiv in Europe. Crucially, the Merz administration on German-supplied weaponry, allowing Ukraine to strike military targets within Russian territory – a decision that signalled a clear break from the fear of escalation that characterized Scholz’s government. This policy is supported by Germany’s continued commitment to , separate from domestic defence spending, although the level of assistance remains . By framing Ukraine’s defence as essential to preserving the European security order, Friedrich Merz has effectively normalized the use of military force as a legitimate and necessary instrument of Germany’s foreign policy.

In line with this strategic imperative, the Merz government has extended its commitment beyond military assistance, actively seeking to reshape Europe’s broader geopolitical frameworks. To shield Eastern Europe from shifting transatlantic dynamics, Merz has recently proposed supporting Ukraine to become an “” within the EU. This proposal would see Ukraine attend high-level EU meetings as an observer without voting rights, effectively allowing it to gain access to EU decision-making forums while it progresses through the legal and administrative work of becoming a full EU member state.

Rearmament and the “Kriegstüchtigkeit” of the Bundeswehr

Domestically, the Merz chancellorship has been defined by an unprecedented drive for rearmament, aiming to transform the Bundeswehr into “.” Following the , Germany committed to significant new spending targets: 3.5% of GDP by 2029, rising to 5% by 2035. To finance the increase defence spending, the German government pushed through a controversial reform of the constitutional debt brake, .

This financial commitment has been matched by structural reforms aimed at achieving Kriegstüchtigkeit (war readiness). The adoption of the designates Germany as the central logistical hub for NATO in Europe, preparing the nation to serve as the transit corridor and operational base for Allied troops in the event of a large-scale conflict with Russia. This shift acknowledges that Germany is no longer just a security contributor, but a frontline state exposed to hybrid threats, requiring full coordination between military forces and civilian infrastructure.

The Return of Conscription and Societal Friction

Perhaps the most socially divisive aspect of Merz’s security overhaul has been the move to address the personnel crisis within the armed forces. In late 2025, the government passed the with the ambition of reaching 260,000 active personnel by the 2030s. This legislation relies on a hybrid model: while initially prioritizing voluntary service with financial incentives, it also established the legal framework for a “” (Bedarfsabhängige Dienstpflicht) that can be activated if volunteer targets are not met.

The potential reintroduction of conscription, which had been abolished in 2011, has sparked significant . Younger generations view the move as a regression to militarism, highlighting a disconnect between the government’s strategic objectives and the pacifist undercurrents of German civil society. The friction reveals that while the German political elite have embraced a harsher security and foreign policy, under a modern form of defensive and integrated Machtpolitik, the societal transition away from the civilian power identity remains incomplete and contested.

European Autonomy and the “Atomic Zeitenwende”

The geopolitical context of Merz’s chancellorship is heavily influenced by second Trump administration in the US. In the wake of President Trump’s “” foreign policy strategy, Merz has pushed for more and an urgent strengthening of German defence. This has led to a breaking of the ultimate German taboo: the nuclear question.

While explicitly ruling out the acquisition of a nuclear arsenal, the Merz government is pursuing an “” through an integration strategy. Germany has deepened cooperation with Europe’s two nuclear powers, France and the United Kingdom (UK), within the framework of the – an informal trilateral forum originally established in 2003 to coordinate diplomatic efforts over Iran’s nuclear program. Despite Brexit complicating its institutional dimension, the E3 has evolved into a broader platform for strategic coordination, . Through initiatives such as the – and in the context of strengthened Franco-British nuclear cooperation through the – Germany is seeking to link European security more closely to Franco-British nuclear deterrents. These developments mark a deep cultural shift: nuclear deterrence is no longer discarded but instead embraced as a necessary component of European defence, with Germany acting as a key political facilitator of this shared capability.

Theoretical Analysis: A Return to Machtpolitik? Neoclassical realist approach

The radical transformation of German security policy under Friedrich Merz raises a fundamental question: has Germany abandoned its identity as a Zivilmacht in favour of a return to Machtpolitik? The evidence suggests that while the civilian power model in its idealistic and pacifist form has largely faded, Germany is not returning to the aggressive, unilateral power politics of the pre-1945 era. Instead, it is adopting a defensive and integrated Machtpolitik.

The theory of helps explain why Germany could no longer remain a civilian power after 2022 while also highlighting the variables that have complicated this transformation. External pressures, such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine, altered the distribution of power and threat perception in Europe, compelling the German government to embark on a Zeitenwende to adapt its material capabilities. Yet the theory recognizes that systemic imperatives are filtered through domestic variables. Perceptions of policy-makers, institutional constraints such as the debt brake, and a society shaped by pacifist norms have all slowed decision-making and implementation of reforms, reflecting what Hanns W. Maull defined as , or, a “lack of realism” or “oblivion of power.”

Under these conditions, Germany’s rearmament is not simply about accumulating hard power, but instead about responding to a shifting geopolitical environment in an integrated and defensive manner. Integration () occurs through NATO and EU institutions, allowing Berlin to exercise influence and maximize security without alarming Allies. The defensive dimension () focuses on denying Russian victory and protecting the status quo rather than redrawing Europe’s borders. This approach illustrates a neoclassical realist compromise: Germany adapts to systemic requirements while being constrained and shaped by internal political and societal factors, explaining why its strategic transformation has been slow and deliberate.

Overcoming Machtvergessenheit

As argued by , Germany is in the process of overcoming its “forgetting of power.” For decades, the Federal Republic of Germany operated under the illusion that European economic interdependence and normative power projection were sufficient to secure its interests – characteristically liberal ideals. The Merz era reflects a growing recognition that civilian power may require the support of military strength to remain credible.

The Merz government has realized that to preserve the liberal international order – a core objective of the Zivilmacht concept – it must employ the tools of Machtpolitik. Thus, the dichotomy traditionally rendered between the two ontologies is false. Germany is not choosing power over law; rather, it frames the strengthening of its military as part of a broader effort to provide security for Europe and the liberal international order. Its refusal to pursue an independent nuclear arsenal while simultaneously seeking deeper integration into Allied nuclear frameworks demonstrates this nuanced position. Initiatives such as the establishment of a high-level , or the debate at this year’s Munich Security Conference on to safeguard Europe’s future, demonstrate that Germany remains firmly anchored in the institutions that have shaped its identity since its founding. At the same time, Germany is discussing options with European partners to develop a deterrence posture that is autonomous, independent, and credible.

Recent diplomatic developments strongly illustrate this assertive and autonomous stance. On the diplomatic front, Friedrich Merz has cast aside any lingering hesitation, explicitly accusing the Trump administration of allowing itself to be during the course of the ongoing US-Iran conflict. This position reflects a pragmatic call for European self-reliance in response to unpredictable US diplomacy, rather than an open challenge to the NATO Alliance.

Conclusion

The chancellorship of Friedrich Merz has placed the Federal Republic of Germany on a decisive path towards a difficult, yet necessary, transformation. The hesitation and ambiguity that defined the Scholz era and the Zeitenwende 1.0 have been replaced by a strategic clarity that acknowledges the harsh realities of the current security environment.

By challenging fiscal constraints with the €500 billion fund, addressing societal taboos with the reintroduction of conscription, and engaging with previously avoided strategic debates, Germany has fundamentally redefined its role. It has transitioned from a reluctant partner, long constrained by neglect of military power and capability development, to an emerging pillar of European stability, actively shaping defence initiatives and security cooperation.

However, this transition carries significant perils. Societal backlash against conscription and concerns over Germany’s military buildup underscore the fragility of both internal and external support. The success of a defensive, integrated Machtpolitik depends not only on the . Furthermore, fears of a potential authoritarian turn – partly driven by rising domestic support for the – continues to create anxieties among the Allies.

Ultimately, Germany has not yet returned to the aggressive nationalism of its past. Instead, it is slowly becoming a “normal” geopolitical power by acknowledging that, in a multipolar world, abstaining from projections of power may undermine chances for survival.

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Over the past two decades, nuclear weapons have returned to the centre of European security as a result of consistent and compounding changes to global geopolitics. For most of the post-Cold War era, weapons of mass destruction appeared to have lost salience as the disappearance of bipolar confrontation, the expansion of cooperative security frameworks, and the consolidation of arms control regimes fostered the belief that large-scale interstate conflict in Europe was a phenomenon of the past. However, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the collapse of arms control frameworks and agreements, and growing uncertainty surrounding the durability of security guarantees from the United States (US) have altered these assumptions, forcing a reassessment of the role of nuclear deterrence in Europe. Nuclear weapons have now regained centrality in European security as instruments of coercion, signalling, and strategic reassurance.

These dynamics have rekindled a nuclear debate in a number of European states, including the United Kingdom (UK) and France – Western Europe’s only two nuclear powers – who came together in July 2025 to sign the Northwood Declaration. This Declaration represents a significant political step for European nuclear security as, for the first time, both French and British governments publicly recognize that their independent nuclear forces must be thought of as a nuclear tandem in upholding the security of Europe. The political significance of this Declaration is much greater than its technical content and raises the following questions: does Northwood Declaration represent a strategic turning point in Franco-British nuclear cooperation in the context of perceived US disengagement from Europe and renewed Russian assertiveness? Can this renewed commitment to cooperation bridge the UK and France’s historically distinct strategic traditions regarding nuclear weapons?

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Nuclear relations between the UK and France have always been shaped by a triangulated great power partnership that necessarily involved the US. The UK’s nuclear program was deeply embedded in Anglo-American cooperation from the Second World War onward. The 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement institutionalized this relationship, giving the UK access to American technology, materials, and missile systems. The credibility of the British deterrent therefore rested not only on national capability but also on continued US support.

France followed the opposite path. Excluded from early nuclear cooperation and sceptical of extended deterrence, Paris developed its force de frappe as an explicit sovereign instrument. The French nuclear doctrine emphasized national decision-making, freedom of action, and the political symbolism of independence. Deterrence was not merely military protection; it was a guarantee of strategic autonomy.

These divergent trajectories repeatedly complicated bilateral cooperation between France and the UK. During the Cold War, the UK could not easily share nuclear information without American approval while France refused to subordinate its deterrent to any external framework, including NATO. Even moments of diplomatic convergence produced mostly rhetorical statements rather than operational coordination.

After 1991, the issue temporarily lost urgency. Arms control agreements, reduced geopolitical tensions, and the shift toward crisis management operations moved nuclear questions into the background. Franco-British defence cooperation deepened through initiatives such as the Saint-Malo Declaration (1998) and later the Lancaster House Treaties (2010), though these agreements focused largely on conventional capabilities and technical collaboration. Nuclear policy remained politically sensitive and largely separate from coordinated strategic planning.

The��Return of��Nuclear��Politics in Europe��

The strategic environment, already undergoing gradual change, shifted dramatically after 2014. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of armed conflict in Donbas marked the return of conventional warfare in Europe. More importantly,  While these signals remained largely indirect at the time, they reintroduced the nuclear dimension into European security. Since 2022, Russian rhetoric has become far more overt, . 

At the same time, the institutional foundations of nuclear stability weakened. The  (8 May 2018), the  (2 August 2019), the  (5 February 2026), and the broader erosion of arms control norms removed many stabilizing constraints inherited from the Cold War. These developments coincided with a gradual reorientation of US strategy toward the Indo-Pacific. . Although Washington did not disengage from NATO, successive administrations placed growing emphasis on burden-sharing and regional prioritization, encouraging European Allies to assume greater responsibility for their own security.  

For European states, the combination of Russian coercion and America’s shifting security priorities created a dilemma. NATO’s deterrence remained credible, yet its perceived unconditionality weakened. European security increasingly depended on whether Europeans could carry a larger share of the burden of deterrence in a crisis directly affecting the continent, rather than relying exclusively on automatic US escalation. In this context, nuclear discourse has regained political salience for European NATO Allies. The issue is no longer deterrence itself, but who will be responsible for making deterrence credible in a crisis directly affecting Europe. 

The Northwood Declaration��

The 2025 Northwood Declaration must be understood in the context of this shifting dynamic. This Declaration does not create a joint Franco-British nuclear force; however, its significance lies in its political message that British and French nuclear deterrents can be coordinated and jointly considered in the management of European security. 

The creation of the UK-France Nuclear Steering Group through this Declaration introduces a permanent mechanism for political consultation across nuclear policy, capabilities, and operations. However, national decision-making authority remains unaffected and both France and the UK retain explicit sovereignty over their nuclear arsenals. This step represents an important qualitative change.  Nuclear policy itself remained politically insulated. Northwood, by contrast, brings nuclear cooperation into the political sphere. For the first time, . 

The Declaration also restates the long-standing formulation that the vital interests of one country cannot be threatened without affecting those of the other, a wording that originates from the . In the contemporary context, this relational language carries broader implications than in the 1990s, as it signals a shared willingness to extend nuclear deterrence across Europe. 

Reconciling��Atlanticism��and��Autonomy��

Does this development have broader implications for transatlantic security? Does it reconcile the United Kingdom’s US-integrated deterrent posture with France’s doctrine of independent nuclear decision-making? The answer is both yes and no. The UK has not abandoned its reliance on the US. . Participation in NATO nuclear planning and the acquisition of dual-capable aircraft further reinforce transatlantic integration. France, on the other hand, has not diluted its doctrine of independence. It remains outside NATO’s nuclear planning structures and continues to emphasize sovereign decision-making, as   

The Northwood Declaration therefore does not produce doctrinal convergence. Instead, it provides functional political alignment. Both states retain their respective strategic identities while deepening political cooperation in response to a shared perception of risk. The significance of this shift lies precisely in its pragmatism. Rather than forcing institutional integration – which would be politically unacceptable to both sides – the declaration creates a cooperative interface. The UK derives credibility from its integration with NATO and its nuclear relationship with the US, whereas France derives that same credibility from autonomous national decision-making. The political coordination provided by the Northwood Declaration therefore does not merge the two deterrents but instead creates parallel centres of nuclear decision-making aligned in a common strategic posture, complicating an adversary’s assessment of escalation. 

In effect, coordination substitutes for doctrinal reconciliation. The Declaration does not remove the structural tension between NATO dependence and strategic autonomy; it manages this tension by transforming it into coordinated political signalling. 

Implications for European��Deterrence��

The Northwood Declaration importantly does not create a European nuclear deterrent. No extended guarantee is offered, no shared command established. Hence, US extended deterrence and NATO remain central for many European states. However, the Declaration does still alter the strategic landscape in Europe.  

By coordinating their deterrents politically, the UK and France introduce a European layer of nuclear signalling within the transatlantic system. This European layer operates through identifiable mechanisms. For European NATO Allies, the public coordination of the two nuclear powers signals that deterrence credibility does not depend exclusively on immediate US escalation. For a potential adversary, the existence of two politically aligned but nationally independent nuclear decision-makers introduces uncertainty about escalation thresholds and responses. At the same time, the political burden of deterrence is no longer borne solely by Washington, as London and Paris visibly assume a larger role in strategic signalling and crisis management. 

The result is best understood as a hedge. It is designed to supplement American guarantees rather than replace them. In a crisis, adversaries must consider not only NATO and the US, but also the combined political stance of Europe’s two nuclear powers. Over time, this may influence how deterrence is discussed within Europe. While not establishing a European nuclear force, the Northwood Declaration makes European nuclear responsibility a legitimate topic of policy rather than a theoretical debate.  

The Northwood Declaration fits within a broader pattern in which nuclear deterrence is no longer confined to NATO’s internal mechanisms. In this sense, the Declaration may represent a catalyst for deeper dialogue and coordination between European nuclear and non-nuclear actors. An early indication of this dynamic emerged with the  through which the UK and the Federal Republic of Germany agreed to pursue deep exchanges on deterrence, nuclear issues and arms control, as well as a permanent dialogue on defence matters, while also envisaging intensified trilateral cooperation with France. Furthermore, . 

More recently, this broader trend has been further reinforced by the French President’s proposal of a  which envisages deeper forms of political and strategic coordination between France and a group of willing European partners, including both nuclear and non-nuclear states. While stopping short of creating a European nuclear deterrent, . 

Limits and��Constraints��

Despite its significance, the Declaration faces important limitations. Structural asymmetries remain profound. The US still possesses nuclear capabilities vastly exceeding those of either France or the UK, but the relevant comparison is broader:  and . 

A further limitation concerns the autonomy of the British deterrent. Although the UK retains sovereign political control over its nuclear forces, it also remains deeply intertwined with the US through the Mutual Defence Agreement, , and broader technological cooperation. This creates structural limits on how far the UK can engage in deeper nuclear cooperation with its European nuclear and non-nuclear partners and how far the British nuclear deterrent can be Europeanized. However, the novelty concerning the French doctrine of “advanced deterrence” could be seen as another step towards a more extended deterrence. 

Divergent defence-industrial partnerships also complicate long-term convergence. France’s cooperation with Germany contrasts with Britain’s global partnerships such as the . Regional priorities differ as well. The UK has increasingly oriented its security policy toward Northern Europe, most notably through its leadership of the , a regional military framework bringing together Nordic and Baltic states for rapid crisis response and defence cooperation. 

For these reasons, the Northwood Declaration should not be interpreted as the beginning of a fully integrated European nuclear structure. Its strength lies in political signalling rather than institutional transformation. 

Conclusion��

The Northwood Declaration��represents��a strategic turning point in Franco-British nuclear cooperation, but in a specific and carefully bounded sense. It does not dismantle the structural differences between British Atlanticism and French strategic autonomy. Rather, it lays the foundations for��these two systems��to��operate��together. By publicly acknowledging coordination and institutionalizing consultation, the Declaration moves cooperation from symbolic reassurance to structured political practice. The UK continues to rely on the US; France continues to emphasize autonomy. Yet both��the UK and France��recognize that, in this current era of intense geopolitical tension, the credibility of European deterrence increasingly depends on��their��political leadership. The Northwood Declaration is a strong signal that they are willing to assume that role together.��

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Introduction

Since the 1970s, the European Economic Community (EEC)/European Union (EU) has sought to play a complementary role to the United States (US) in the pursuit of security and stability in the Middle East. This has occurred mostly through soft security measures: diplomacy; economic and financial aid to Palestinians; civilian missions focused on stability; and dialogue with Arab states. In this regard, it is worth mentioning the Euro-Arab Dialogue: a political and economic cooperation framework launched in 1974 between the EEC and the Arab League to strengthen the relationship between the parties after the Yom Kippur War and oil crisis. However, despite these efforts, the limits of the EU’s unique institutional set-up have prevented it from playing a major role in regional affairs. The ongoing war in the Gaza Strip between Israel and Hamas has highlighted the limits of the EU’s diplomatic action. In the meantime, President Donald Trump’s Peace Plan for Gaza has re-energized, once again, the role of the , prompting some to draw historical parallels to earlier US-brokered efforts – from Camp David to the failed Oslo Accords. What role could the EU play in the American plan? How can its involvement be decisive to achieve a just and lasting peace in the region?

Context

The 2006 electoral victory of Hamas in the Gaza Strip led to a severe escalation with Israel. With Hamas taking over the territory from the Fatah-controlled Palestinian Authority (PA), Israel considered the Palestinian military group a security threat, as it refused to recognize the Jewish state, renounce violence, or accept previous peace agreements brokered by the PA and Israel. Hamas’ accession to power in 2006 constituted a critical historical juncture that transformed governance in Gaza and its overall relationship with Israel. This shift was accompanied by the return of a range of familiar political practices – including diplomatic negotiations, economic sanctions, and ongoing military engagement – that continue to define this governance period.

In the meantime, two other factors made the relationship between the parties more strained. On the one hand, on November 29, 2012, the , which upgraded Palestine from a “non-member observer entity” to a “non-member observer State.” This historic vote granted Palestine implicit recognition of statehood and was seen as a move to revive the two-state solution, a move strongly opposed by the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. On the other hand, the US-brokered Abraham Accords were signed in 2020, aiming to normalize diplomatic, economic, and security relations between Israel and several Arab nations (including the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan). Palestinians overwhelmingly opposed the Abraham Accords, perceiving the agreements as an abandonment of the long-standing consensus among Arab states that negotiations with Israel were contingent on ending occupation.

On October 7, 2023, Hamas initiated an attack on Israel. . The Israeli response was a full-scale military invasion of the Gaza Strip which, by December 2025, has killed 71,266 Palestinians, left most schools and hospitals in ruins, and caused long-term damage to the local society and economy.

The EU’s response to Gaza was characterized by contradictions and divisions between its member states. Some countries such as Czech Republic, Austria, Hungary, Italy, and Germany, stood with Israel, backing its military campaign and avoiding criticism of Netanyahu’s regime. Other governments, such as Belgium, Spain, France and Ireland – while strongly condemning Hamas – called for a ceasefire and criticized Israel for violating international humanitarian law. These differing positions prevented the EU from having a coordinated stance at the UN when voting on a on December 12, 2023, which called for a humanitarian ceasefire.

Divergencies appeared not only between member states but also across EU institutions. While European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen showed a stronger emphasis on Israel’s right to defence, the European Council issued a more cautious joint statement aimed at highlighting the EU as a unified voice. The statement took a more neutral tone than President von der Leyen, emphasizing both Israel’s right to defence as well as the crucial need for humanitarian aid, civilian protection, and adherence to international law. A third voice, EU’s foreign policy chief Josep Borrell, was more critical of Israel, . The inertia resulting from lack of consensus among member states and across institutions severely undermines the EU’s position as mediator, letting the Americans play a leading role once again.

On September 29, 2025, President Trump announced his plan to “end the Gaza war” and address the broader Middle Eastern crisis. The so-called was negotiated with the consultation of Arab states, namely Egypt, Qatar and Türkiye. The EU played no formal role in the negotiations; it made no proposals of its own, despite being both a major donor to Palestine and an important partner of Israel.

Endorsed by UN Security Council , Trump’s plan includes the deployment of an International Stabilization Force (ISF) in Gaza, a multinational military body that will ensure the demilitarization and security of the Gaza Strip; and the creation of a Board of Peace (BoP), a committee led by Trump that will oversee the political transition in Gaza until a reformed Palestinian Authority can take over governance in 2027. Formally launched at the 56th World Economic Forum in January 2026, the BoP claims its main purpose is the promotion of peacekeeping all around the world, not only in Gaza. Countries wishing to participate in the BoP are required to contribute US$1 billion to the organization to renew their membership, and Trump, as its chairman, is not subject to term limits, holding the sole authority to nominate his successor.

to ending the war in Gaza; however, many EU member states have expressed concern over the possibility of the BoP overshadowing the role of the UN. Currently, Bulgaria and Hungary are the only two EU countries to have joined the initiative. France, Spain, Poland, and Germany declined to participate, while Italy, Romania, Greece and Cyprus joined as observers. The EU Commission also decided to join as an observer, sending the Commissioner for the Mediterranean, Dubravka Šuica, to Washington, DC, to attend the inaugural meeting of the BoP on February 19, 2026. In a sign of continued disunity, , calling it a “mistake”, as the EU supports a two-state solution and “cannot participate” in any body that excludes the Palestinian National Authority.

Problems

Even if Trump’s plan represents an important step towards a peace deal, it contains critical aspects which might hinder its implementation. The current plan effectively grants Israel a veto power over peace, as its military redeployments are conditioned on Hamas’ demilitarization and reform of the PA. At the same time, Israel is not required to make any formal commitments towards halting settlement expansion in the West Bank or respecting the autonomy of a Palestinian state. On this issue Israel’s stance is clear: Netanyahu declared that , as it is an “existential threat to Israel.” Therefore, there is a real risk that, without guarantees for the Palestinian people and a plan to address occupation, Trump’s plan may fail or lead to an unjust and unstable peace agreement that steamrolls Palestinian rights and territories recognized by international law.

On the other hand, Trump’s peace plan has confirmed that the US continues to play a . However, some , such as Francesca Albanese, Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian Occupied Territory, criticized the plan. UN Special Adviser on Sustainability, Jeffrey Sachs, labelled the US proposal as “.” According to them, Trump is behaving in Gaza like a 19th-century colonial broker, placing himself at the helm of the BoP to oversee a foreign territory’s governance, with the overall aim of advancing US interests in the region. The Middle East has figured prominently in the first and second Trump administrations’ foreign policy. President Trump’s main goal is to broker agreements between Israel and other Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, to . This attitude could prove counterproductive and place EU interests at risk.

Strategic Outlook and Policy Recommendations

A more active role of the EU in the region is necessary to guarantee success and counter risks of instability, which may have severe implications for European security, including energy supply limitations, new security threats, and an increase of migration and refugee flows. It is in the EU’s interest to enhance its influence in the region. What practical steps should the EU take to avoid marginalization and make a meaningful contribution to peace?

1. The EU should consider holding an enhanced observer status at the BoP as a necessary counterweight to US and Israeli pressures and hegemony in decision-making. Of course, the EU has to maintain a steadfast commitment to strengthening and reforming the UN, confirming it as the core of a rules-based international order and multilateralism. However, enhanced observer status at the BoP could allow the EU to monitor negotiations and participate in debates specifically devoted to making interventions, peace proposals, and amendments. The presence of the EU, with its traditional concern for Palestinian issues, could ensure meaningful Palestinian involvement. This is fundamental to legitimate the transitory governance of the Gaza Strip and preserve Palestinian decision-making power. A more active EU at BoP could also contribute to reforming the PA.

The divergences between member states and across EU institutions negatively impact the EU’s international role. Therefore, the EU should take a cohesive stance on its participation at the BoP, bearing in mind some key arguments. Firstly, “” provides direct insight into how decisions are implemented, serving as a channel for influence. The EU is the largest donor to Palestinian recovery and its involvement in the BoP could help the EU shape outcomes rather than merely fund them, aligning its significant financial contributions with the necessary humanitarian, governance, and security strands of the peace plan. Moreover, “” is vital for influencing the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2803.

2. The EU should be part of the International Security Force. Together with The European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) Rafah Mission and EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS), involvement in the ISF could contribute to the maintenance of the ceasefire. Participation in the ISF could enhance European influence on Israel, for example, by convincing the Israeli government to review its settlement policy and improve living conditions for the Palestinians.

3. The EU should use economic and financial tools to enhance its political influence. On the Palestinian side, the European Commission recently . On the Israeli side, the EU should overcome its reluctances and suspend the EU-Israel Association Agreement if the Israeli government continues to violate human rights in Gaza, as required by Article 2 of the Agreement. The suspension of this Agreement could influence Israel to respect the , following preliminary rulings about a “plausible” genocide occurring in Gaza. The EU could link Israeli participation in EU funding programs, such as Horizon Europe, to the full withdrawal from Gaza, the end of settlements in the West Bank, and apartheid policy against Palestinians.

4. The EU should invest in the implementation of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), an economic initiative designed to enhance connectivity and integration between Asia, the Middle East, and Europe, based on three pillars: energy, transportation, and digital connectivity. IMEC should be a core interest for Europeans, as it , increasing political and economic ties between participating counties. Moreover, it could enhance the EU’s political influence in the area, counterbalancing China and the US. The implementation of some projects as part of the IMEC – such as the EastMed Gas Pipeline – could make the EU a relevant player in terms of future economic cooperation projects, allowing it to increase its weight in the Middle East peace process.

The EU could influence, for example, the implementation of the so-called “Green Blue Deal” between Jordan and Israel, which provides for the supply of water from Israel in exchange for Jordanian supplies of solar power. The Gaza war stopped the project, but the ceasefire created hope that it may be relaunched in such a way that the Gaza Strip and the West Bank can also benefit from it.

Conclusion

While the US commitment has been the sine qua non for a ceasefire in Gaza, the EU holds key cards to ensure the successful implementation of Trump’s peace plan. With its traditional regional approach, a more active observer role of the EU in the BoP and its participation in the ISF could balance American – and Israeli – influence and ensure a more equitable peace solution. In doing so, it may also help ensure that Palestinian rights recognized by international law are considered against the backdrop of ongoing ceasefire and conflict negotiations. In addition, the use of economic leverage as well as the implementation of the IMEC corridor could enhance the EU political weight in the area, preventing the dawn of a new era of regional instability and insecurity with direct impact on Europe itself.

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Introduction

��For the first time since 1972,��when��SALT I negotiations yielded the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the Interim Agreement on offensive arms, the strategic relationship between Washington and Moscow is entirely unconstrained by a legal framework.��.��As the current normative vacuum is unprecedented in the modern era, the��North Atlantic Treaty��Organization��(NATO)��Alliance faces��a new ‘strategic trilemma’:��the simultaneous and often contradictory imperatives��of maintaining credible extended deterrence;��enhancing conventional defence against hybrid and missile threats;��and reconstructing a confidence-building, risk-reduction framework to prevent accidental escalation. The central policy problem is that the traditional tools of strategic stability��– quantitative and qualitative ceilings, inspections, and transparency��–��have been discarded in favour of vertical��nuclear��proliferation. NATO must navigate an environment where��the absence of constraints increases the risk of miscalculations, potentially leading to an unmanaged arms race that reduces the security��for all��NATO Allies.����

Context: The Long Transition and the Paradox of the New START��

The��international��arms control regime, which persisted through various systemic shifts from 1972 until 2026, has finally fractured. However, a rigorous assessment��of its lifespan��suggests that the final pillar of this regime,��the New START,��was already flawed.����This omission allowed Moscow to channel its modernization efforts toward lethal, MIRV-capable systems,��while remaining formally��compliant to��the treaty limit of 1,550 warheads.��,��Moscow’s Strategic��Rocket��Forces (RVSN) and the missile industry exploited this normative��‘shield’��to initiate a massive��‘re-MIRVing’��process. This modernization was driven by a����within the Russian military-industrial complex. By focusing on systems that exploited New START’s qualitative loopholes, institutional actors, such as the��, secured long-term funding and development pathways for a new generation of delivery vehicles. This momentum��facilitated��the emergence of a direct nexus between treaty-compliant modernization and the later deployment of advanced long-range capabilities on the Ukrainian battlefield.��

The Strategic Trilemma between Extended Deterrence and the ‘Upload’ Disparity��

The end of New START has transformed the re-MIRVing process into a catalyst for a new arms race. In this new unconstrained environment, the US possesses a significant technical advantage. . If the US opts to utilize its technological edge, it would effectively out-deploy Moscow, potentially doubling its arsenal to levels above the failed treaty’s limits.  In response, Moscow may prioritize asymmetrical offset centred on long-range theatre strike capabilities. This likely reaction is deeply rooted in the bureaucratic momentum of Russian military-industrial complex, favouring dual capable systems that operate in regulatory grey zones.   

Defence, Resilience, and the Hypersonic Decision Gap

��Unlike traditional��ICBMs, which allow for a 25-plus minutes warning window, a hypersonic system launched from central Europe can reach critical command nodes in Moscow in less than 10 minutes. This����in decision time undermines de-escalatory signalling and places����on the adversary’s early warning systems, potentially triggering automated ‘launch on warning’ responses. Even a conventional strike on communications, command-and-control (C3) centres would be strategically relevant. Therefore,��the deployment of such systems in substantial numbers would create a ‘launch-on-warning’ incentive for Moscow, further destabilizing the offensive-defensive��balance and increasing the risk of automated nuclear response.����

Managing Uncertainty��in a Multipolar System��

Emerging from a Cold War environment coalesced around a bipolar international power-distribution, traditional arms control has proven ill-suited for the asymmetrical, multipolar international disorder of the last two decades.  In a world without inspections, stability depends on predictability. To achieve this goal, the international community must work to prevent accidental escalation through transparency and launch notifications. The reconstruction of a stabilizing framework is currently stymied by two primary structural hurdles: Russia’s current lack of trustworthiness and China’s strategic intentions.  

The main obstacle to reopening dialogue with Russia is the paradox of negotiating limits on the same systems being employed in the current war in Ukraine. It would be politically fraught for the US to engage in fresh negotiations, while Russia utilizes these assets as tool of active coercion and battlefield destruction. . This move puts Washington in an uneasy negotiating position, forcing it to negotiate over assets that France and the United Kingdom (UK) consider non-negotiable. This is hardly a novel tactic:  Putin’s proposal risks to exacerbate infra-systemic fault lines, foster suspects of decoupling, and ‘fears of abandonment’ between the US and its European Allies. Simultaneously, China’s strategic stalling (and its own ambitions to increase its arsenal) prevents the necessary transition toward a trilateral framework. By hiding behind the rhetoric of minimal deterrence, Beijing refuses to accept any oversight while rapidly expanding its nuclear and conventional inventory.  

While the American and Russian nuclear stockpiles greatly exceed those of all other nuclear-weapon states, the strategic equation has irrevocably shifted from a bipolar to a multipolar calculus through China’s ambitions to drastically increase its own arsenal.  These missiles provide Beijing with a high-precision, non-nuclear capability to hold regional strategic assets in the mire, including forward air bases, carrier strike groups, and command-and-control (C2) nodes.  This scenario of ‘conventional entanglement’ complicates the global force posture of NATO’s primary security provider, the US.   

Technological Acceleration: The AI-Hypersonic Nexus��

The ‘Strategic Trilemma’ is further complicated by the integration of����and launch-control systems. As the����through the deployment of Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs), the decision-making window for political leaders has shrunk from thirty minutes to mere seconds.��.��However, the ‘black-box’ nature of neural network-based AI introduces unprecedented��. Because these models recognize patterns in ways that are non-replicable and often incomprehensible to human operators, they are prone to hallucinations or false positives – interpreting unusual atmospheric phenomena or cyber-spoofing as an incoming strike. In a strategic environment dominated by fast-flying systems like the��Dark Eagle��or��Oreshnik, the reliance on AI-driven recommendations could lead to a ‘compressed escalation’ where a machine��initiates��a retaliatory strike before human deliberation even occurs. This technological entanglement��necessitates��that any future��arms��control negotiations must deal not only with warheads and delivery systems, but also with the algorithms governing their employment.����

The Shift towards Integrated Deterrence��

In response to this acceleration, NATO has transitioned toward a posture of integrated deterrence. With the expiration of New START in sight, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) moved to solidify the Alliance’s defensive architecture.  This strategic shift was codified on February 12, 2026, when several NATO Allies launched  to develop next-generation sensors designated to counter ballistic and hypersonic threats (like the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS)). These initiatives, alongside a new  for drone-based deep precision strike capability, signal a move away from static, treaty-based stability, toward a dynamic denial posture. Furthermore, the  reinforces this approach by emphasizing trans-regional deterrence, acknowledging that while NATO remains a regional alliance, its security is inextricably tied to the ‘two-peer’ challenge.  

Policy Recommendations:����

1. Rediscover a dual approach: Combine military modernization with a standing��negotiating��offer��to both Russia and��China��on Strategic Stability Dialogue,��which would��likely benefit��NATO��Alliance cohesion by reassuring the most risk-adverse NATO��member��states.����

2. Prioritize Qualitative Limits: Advocate for a Multilateral MIRV-freeze to mitigate first-strike incentives and neutralize the advantage of rapid uploading.����In the post-START environment, the primary risk is no longer aggregate warheads counts, but the rapid surge��in��capacity,��afforded by US upload potential and Russia’s modernization of MIRV-capable systems.��A ‘freeze’ approach would be aimed at neutralizing the perceived advantages of rapid arsenal expansion, signalling a commitment to strategic sufficiency rather than the��reckless��pursuit of superiority.����

3. Establish��‘Cold War��Plus’��Communication Channels: Strengthen secure, real-time links between military headquarters to manage crisis in an era of hypersonic weapons.��NATO should strengthen secure, real-time links between military headquarters – specifically��the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)��and the Russian Ministry of Defence – to manage crisis in an era defined by HGVs. These channels must be hardened against cyber-interferences and electronic warfare to ensure they��remain��viable��during high-intensity grey zone friction or hybrid confrontations.����

4. Manage AI Integration in Command and Control:��Establish��‘human-in-the-loop’ standards between launch commands and early warning systems to��prevent��AI��systems��from triggering accidental escalation during high-speed hypersonic encounters.��While AI may become indispensable for processing massive data streams from next-generation��sensors like the HBTSS, it must never��possess��the autonomous authority to��initiate��a response. Hence, the��NATO��Alliance should champion an international protocol that mandates��a ‘’ for human commanders, even in high-speed hypersonic confrontations.��

5. Define a Clear Doctrine for Conventional Hypersonic: Clarify that systems like��Dark Eagle��are for��,��while acknowledging that����remains��inherently destabilizing.��NATO should explicitly disavow ‘decapitation’ or strategic nuclear roles for these assets to reduce the risk of Russia misperceiving conventional precision strikes as existential threats to its��C2��architecture.��

6. Strengthen Hybrid Resilience: Protect undersea and digital infrastructure as a core��component��of strategic stability to prevent��hybrid,��non-kinetic bypassing of deterrence.��By neutralizing low-cost, high-impact hybrid threats, the��NATO��Alliance prevents adversaries from bypassing deterrence thresholds��and undermining stability at the lowest level of the escalation ladder. This approach ensures that the emerging new capabilities in air, missile, and drone-defence would not be��compromised��by asymmetric disruption aimed at eroding domestic resilience and political will during a crisis.����

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Introduction

In recent years, Europe’s geopolitical centre of gravity has shifted toward the Northeast, with the Baltic region emerging as a . As , the Organization’s member countries are increasingly focused on deterrence and defence. Traditional conceptions of deterrence are constructed around three pillars: . This memo focuses on the second “C” – credibility – by examining prospects for strengthening the resilience of NATO’s military supply chains in the Baltic region through defence industrial cooperation between the three enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) framework nations (Canada, Germany, and the United Kingdom (UK)) and the three host nations (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia). 

As a response to Russia’s military aggression and hybrid warfare against Ukraine since 2014, the 2016 NATO Warsaw summit marked a significant step towards reinforcing the security of the Baltic region. Canada, Germany, and the UK assumed leadership as framework nations for eFP battlegroups in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, respectively. While the eFP signals a strong multinational Allied presence in the Baltic states, lessons from Ukraine since 2022 inevitably raise critical questions: is NATO ready to fight for a prolonged period? And can NATO secure supply chains so that they remain close to the war fighters? 

This policy brief first analyses how resilient supply chains lay the foundation for credible long-term deterrence. Second, it examines the role and prospects of defence industrial cooperation between eFP framework nations and host nations, before finally concluding with three concrete policy recommendations.  

Why��Does��Security of Supply Matter?��

There is an old saying attributed to Dwight. E. Eisenhower that . It is also true that , as each nation brings its own peculiarities while the combined force must act as a single organization. To put this into perspective, the Canadian-led NATO Multinational Brigade in Latvia (formerly, the eFP battlegroup) is composed of 14 nations, making it NATO’s  military unit. 

Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, NATO began scaling the three eFP battlegroups in the Baltics into brigade-sized units. Germany’s 45^th Panzer brigade has been relocated to Lithuania and is expected to achieve . Canada is also considering  in Latvia.  

Regardless of how its war against Ukraine ends, Russia will remain an existential security threat to the Baltic states. To deter and, if necessary, defend against Russia in the Baltic region, NATO Allies – especially the eFP framework nations – must demonstrate both the capacity and the resolve to fight alongside the host nations for as long as it takes to defend NATO territory. This, in turn, requires a continuous and resilient flow of supplies through to the battlefield.  

While experts have called for the  to sustain operational capability in the longer term, this approach has clear limitations – most importantly because stockpiles are finite in the event of a prolonged conflict. To secure an uninterrupted supply, it is essential to develop local defence industrial capacities. 

Security of supply extends beyond the availability of raw materials and manufacturing components. Latvia’s  defines security of supply as a guarantee of access to the materiel and services required by the National Armed Forces to fulfil its tasks. This understanding emphasizes that the defence industrial base is an integral part of comprehensive defence strategy across the peace-crisis-war spectrum. It also implies that the defence industries of eFP host nations must be able to supply not only their national militaries but also Allied armed forces. However, defence industries in the Baltic states, while growing rapidly, are still relatively nascent, and there may not be sufficient latent industrial capacity to scale up production quickly in time of crisis.  

Failure to secure military supply chains would pose strategic risks that are particularly acute given the geographic characteristics of the Baltic states. A close proximity to Russia and reliance on the roughly 65km-wide  to link the region to the rest of Europe exacerbate supply vulnerabilities. To ensure that NATO forces deployed in the region can fight a prolonged war, it is necessary to establish short, resilient, and regionally-anchored military supply chains and, at the same time, to deepen defence industrial cooperation between the eFP framework nations and host nations. 

Enhancing the Enhanced Forward Presence��

The  posits that the Baltic states constitute a single area of operations. This means that regional cooperation should be understood as a key enabler of credible deterrence and effective defence. This logic applies not only to trilateral Baltic cooperation but also among all Allies deployed in the region.  

To improve coordination between the three framework nations and the three host nations, the  was launched in 2023. Although it was originally envisaged as a platform for political and strategic dialogue in areas of common interest, such as training and exercises, it also holds untapped potential to serve as a venue for industrial cooperation and joint supply chain management. 

There are already examples of bilateral cooperation in this area. Recently, the Latvian Ministry of Defence signed a  (MoU) with the Canadian Commercial Corporation – Canada’s government-to-government contracting agency –  concerning bilateral cooperation in military equipment, services, infrastructure, and industry. 

However, since the Baltics consider themselves to be a single area of operations, a broader relationship of regional cooperation between the framework and host nations is needed. Dialogue must take place at all levels – political, strategic, operational, tactical, as well as between defence industries. Regular information sharing and practical measures to harmonize defence investment and industrial policies will strengthen the security of supply and help forge new defence industrial partnerships.

What��Do Host Nations Have to Offer?��

The three host nations are  in NATO. With defence budgets reaching 5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2026, the Baltic states are actively developing local defence industrial capabilities. In recent years, . There are notable success stories, such as the production of  and subsequent expansion into assembly and maintenance of more advanced systems such as . Nevertheless, the Baltic defence industries remain primarily focused on niche technological areas and generally lack the scale to support full production cycles of heavy armaments or other advanced military systems. At the same time, their relatively small size makes Baltic defence industries flexible, innovation-oriented, and able to rapidly adapt. 

This environment creates opportunities for foreign defence companies to enter the market and address the existing gaps in cooperation with local partners. As of 2025, all three framework nations allocate at least 2% of GDP to defence and have committed to increase defence expenditure up to 5% of GDP by 2035. Consequently, there is a strong push to build homegrown . 

Recently, German defence companies have been particularly active in the Baltic states. For example,  to establish 155mm artillery ammunition production facilities. More recently, Lithuania Defense Services, a joint venture established in 2022 by Rheinmetall and KNDS Germany, announced plans to .  

 and  are also pursuing ambitious efforts to expand their defence industrial capacities. For example, a Canadian company  to establish assembly lines for its BlackWolf tactical armoured vehicles in Latvia. Of the three eFP framework nations, such partnerships are especially relevant for Canada given the geographical distance between Canada and the Baltic region. Partnering Canadian defence industry with local companies in Latvia not only facilitates access to new markets but also helps build viable defence industrial capacity in the Baltic states for warfighting purposes, especially in a prolonged conflict.  

This logic extends beyond the manufacture of original equipment to also encompass access to critical components and materials. For example, last year the Canadian company – a component that is essential for sensors and electronic systems widely used in defence technology, such as aircraft, missiles, and drones. 

The new geopolitical reality, growing defence budgets, and commitment to develop defence industrial capabilities underscore the need to coordinate defence investment and industrial policies within the 3+3 format. Such coordination would help secure military supply chains precisely where they are needed the most. This approach would align with broader NATO efforts to ramp up defence industrial capacities, such as  and .  

Conclusions and��Recommendations��

Secured supply chains through defence industrial cooperation are not just desirable; they are a strategic necessity for credible deterrence. Since its creation, , from which the defence industries of framework and host nations stand to benefit. 

To harness the potential of defence industrial cooperation within the 3+3 format, the policymakers in the three framework nations and the three host nations should consider the following actions: 

1. Expand the Scope of 3+3 Format to Include Defence Industrial Cooperation.  

The��3+3��agenda��should��be��broadened by��having��regular meetings of key��representatives��– such as��National Armaments Directors��–��from the Baltic states, Canada, Germany, and the��UK��to promote dialogue, coordinate policies,��and identify opportunities��for��defence industrial cooperation and��strengthening��security of supply��across the region.����

2. Establish an Annual 3+3 Defence Industry Forum.  

To facilitate the establishment of cross-border partnerships between defence companies, regular and open dialogue is essential. As several bilateral defence industry events already exist, a dedicated 3+3 Defence Industry Forum could be built on these foundations, providing a multilateral platform for collaboration. 

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Host nations and framework nations should invest in new production facilities and reinforce supply chains for the militaries deployed in the Baltic region. Framework nations’ defence industry national champions should take a leading role and integrate host nations’ defence industries into regional supply chains. This approach would promote transfer of knowledge and technology, as well as strengthen the overall capacity to sustain operations over a prolonged period. 

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Executive Summary

Authoritarian states are increasingly using police organizations to target diaspora communities in democratic countries. This is especially evident in the misuse of Interpol’s Red Notice system to bypass extradition barriers and pursue dissidents abroad. When politically motivated notices are dispersed through Canadian policing systems, they risk compromising the integrity of international law enforcement cooperation, increasing the likelihood of refoulement which violates Canada’s legal obligations, and exacerbates a chilling effect among diaspora communities. In doing so, these notices expose the vulnerabilities in Canada’s domestic protections by allowing foreign states the ability to project coercive influence through Canadian political institutions.  

While this brief focuses on the misuse of INTERPOL mechanisms as a specific form of Transnational Repression (TR), it sits within a broader context of state-led repression ranging from the People’s Republic of China to India. It uses Tajikistan as a case study to highlight vulnerabilities in INTERPOL’s vetting process, including insufficient pre-screening and the burden placed on victims to prove their innocence. These weaknesses enable states to exploit Canadian institutions to harass and deport political refugees, a practice known as Transnational Repression (TR).  

TR has occurred in Canada, demonstrating the urgent need for a governmental response.  The focus of this policy brief is on the use of INTERPOL to target dissidents. To address these challenges, this brief proposes specific procedural enhancements to protect the asylum process and strengthen pre-existing domestic protections to protect Canada’s diaspora communities. 

To read the full policy brief, use the button below to download the full policy memo.

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Introduction

Recent think tank and policy discussions��about��the��Russian��Federation��have primarily focused on three issues: the prospects of a peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine;��developments on the battlefield;��and the limits of Russia’s resilience to Western economic sanctions (). While these questions are undoubtedly central��to the ongoing war, they risk obscuring a critical dimension of European security��–��that is, the future of enemy politics, or��“enemization,”��in��post-war Russia.��

In this policy brief, enemization refers to the systematic construction and reproduction of internal and external enemy images by political elites and state-controlled media, framing so-called “enemies” as existential threats to national survival, identity, and sovereignty. Enemization serves crucial political functions such as legitimizing authoritarian governance, mobilizing public support for repressive and confrontational domestic and foreign policies (; ). While enemization has radicalized during the war against Ukraine, it reflects a broader and longer-standing pattern in Russian politics. Even if the war ends, enemization is likely to remain one of the central organizing frameworks shaping how Russian political discourse interprets international relations, if an authoritarian regime continues. In this case, the European Union (EU) is likely to continue being framed as an adversary, limiting prospects for stable post-war engagement across Eurasia and sustaining long-term security risks.  

Therefore, understanding how enemization functions, why it persists, and how it shapes Russia’s postwar behaviour is essential for developing realistic and effective EU policy responses. Even though enemization also occurs in other countries of various political systems, the case of Russia – as a neighbouring country that has demonstrated willingness to use force – plays substantial relevance for European security. This policy brief examines the persistence of enemization in Russia and evaluates its implications for European security and long-term post-war engagement, arguing that under conditions of continued authoritarian rule, enemy narratives are likely to remain a durable feature of Russian politics regardless of war outcomes or leadership configurations.

Continuity and��Escalation of��Enemization��in Russia��

Enemization in Russia has been a recurring feature of Russian public discourse since at least the 1990s, when political, social, and economic instability revived threat and enemy perceptions, conspiracy theories, and nostalgia for “glorious past” and a strong state (Gudkov 2005¹; ). The Chechen wars and terrorist attacks further reinforced enemy framing, while trust in military and security institutions, including the presidency, grew stronger (Gudkov 2005). Under Putin, negative mobilization of the population around the ideas of enemies, threats, and other symbolic constituents of the besieged fortress narrative has become a core component of regime communication and governance (; ).  

Enemization dynamics are visible in concrete rhetorical and legislative practices. Russian propaganda, following a long-established Soviet mechanism of using references to Nazis or Fascists to delegitimize political opponents (), routinely frames Ukraine as a “Nazi regime” (), or Western values as aimed to destroy Russian culture, while domestic opposition and various social minorities are labelled as foreign agents, traitors, or extremists. Legislative measures continue to limit human rights and freedoms of these alleged enemies (), while intensifying public glorification of wartime sacrifices and spreading binary logic of enmity into education and other spheres of social life.  

The full-scale invasion of Ukraine represents the culmination of the enemization in Russian public discourse. To justify aggressive foreign policies and domestic repressions against its own citizens, the Russian regime has strengthened and radicalized its propaganda of enmity. Russian social surveys results, although requiring cautious interpretation, consistently demonstrate a widespread public endorsement, usually between 70 and 80% of respondents, of enemy images portraying Russia as a besieged fortress surrounded by hostile actors (). These enemy images are reflected in official state communications and state media framing of Ukraine as a “Nazi regime”; the West as seeking Russia’s collapse; and active narration of foreign agents and traitors among domestic political opposition and other social groups such as religious and sexual minorities. Such narratives reinforce the perception of existential threats to the Russian worldview – also commonly referred to as Ruskiy Mir – and legitimize aggressive foreign policies and repressions at home.  

Although questions remain as to what extent Russian elites genuinely believe in these enemy narratives or opportunistically instrumentalize them, public opinion data shows widespread support of enemy perceptions with official messaging (). Even if the Russian regime adopts less confrontational rhetoric, the institutionalization and long-term reproduction of enemy narratives across political discourse, media, and education may suggest that such perceptions will persist at least for a certain period. This persistence reflects not an inherent social disposition, but rather the cumulative effect of sustained propaganda of enmity which resonates, among other things, with certain popular – though not uniform – perceptions, biases, opinions, and worldviews present within a society (). For Europe, this means that rhetorical moderation alone should not be read as evidence of rapid de-escalation, since the drivers reproducing enemy narratives may remain in place after the formal conclusion of the war. 

The��Drivers of��Post-War��Enemization��in Russia��

Enemization in Russia should not be understood as a temporary wartime social and political mobilization tool, but as a longstanding political instrument and condition. First, a substantial and meaningful reversal of enemy narratives would require a major disruption of the Russian political and informational environment that sustains it. Second, enemization in wartime Russia predates the war and has become institutionalized in Russian politics throughout history. The routinized enemy narratives tend to be self-reinforcing, shaping public expectations and interpretations even after the immediate conditions that intensified them have changed. Finally, enemization is closely linked to a broader narrative of confrontation with the West, within which the war against Ukraine is framed as a separate episode in a bigger geopolitical struggle (); a particular possible scenario if Putin remains in power. Thus, even if hostilities end, the drivers that reinforce enemization are likely to persist, allowing enemy narratives remain in place and manifest.  

Although military outcomes of the war against Ukraine remain obscure, they will likely shape the tone and targets of Russian enemization in distinct ways while keeping the underlying logic intact. Russian authorities will likely declare any war outcomes as victorious, and such declarations will reinforce enemization by legitimizing the use of military force as an effective foreign policy instrument, and the use of repression as an effective domestic policy instrument (); both are based on the perception of enemies and threats. If the war ends in a prolonged stalemate without clear successes and lines drawn, the Kremlin could credibly sell narratives to the population; enemization may shift from triumphalist to resentful tones, picturing Russia as constrained or undermined by hostile external and internal forces which prevented the country from achieving a complete victory. Finally, possible military defeat could intensify revanchist narratives and scapegoating directed at already constructed enemies. Thus, across these outcomes, enemization is likely to be adapted and reformulated but not abandoned. 

One may hope that substantial regime change may positively affect enemization by beginning its partial or even full demobilization. This unlikely possibility requires us to look deeper into the phenomenon. While political leadership in autocratic Russia shapes policy choices, enemization also draws on pre-existing historical perceptions and biases in parts of society; rather than inventing enemies from scratch, Russian propaganda amplifies and rearticulates such narratives by promoting the most useful ones in a given political context (Gudkov 2005). These enemy narratives are embedded in state institutions, public expectations about politics, security, and national identity. As a result, Russian political elites operate within pre-determined moral boundaries that constrain the range of discursive options, including how enemies are defined, justified, and, if needed, de-enemized (). Even in the event of elite change, successor elites would likely be motivated to maintain at least elements of familiar narratives of enemization to avoid accusations of weakness, betrayal, and capitulation, especially from those we define as ultra-patriotic and nationalist radicals. In turn, to secure some stability amidst the leadership’s change, the new elites may find it easier to reproduce familiar enemy constructs, instead of dismantling them altogether, as historical experience in post-Soviet Russia in the 1990s suggests.   

To conclude, post-war Russia is likely to remain dependent on enemization as a policy instrument across a range of plausible war outcomes. While the specific targets and intensity of enemization may shift, the institutional framework that supports them will likely persist. Even a regime change would not automatically disband enemy narratives as the new elites may face strong incentive to continue employing in some way such enemy rhetoric to secure their own power. That is why Europe should prepare for a strong possibility to deal with Russia, in which enemization remains politically usable even if its form evolves over time.

Policy��Implications and��Recommendations for Europe��

As demonstrated above, enemization depends on propaganda’s resonance with pre-existing social and historical biases and perceptions. State messages about a hostile West or treacherous domestic political opposition draw much of its legitimacy from this resonance. Accordingly, it is unlikely that certain changes in European policies or rhetoric would suffice to transform elite threat messaging. Despite contemporary censorship conditions in Russia, however, European actions remain visible and preferable to at least some segments of Russian society. Therefore, Europe should prioritize reaching Russian society directly through its policies to mitigate enemization narratives. Even though Europe cannot directly dismantle enemization narratives within Russia, EU policies could influence the credibility and resonance of such narratives while showing that it does not consider Russian society as a whole to be a threat nor an actor to be punished.  

1. European post-war strategic communication planning should aim for long-term deterrence over rapid or even gradual normalization.  

Europe needs to base their post-war planning on the assumption that enemization in Russia will persist after the end of active hostilities in Ukraine and that it will affect Russian foreign and domestic political agendas. Although the EU has already invested substantial resources in becoming more independent from Russian energy and raw materials, as well as in its military industrial complex, such planning also requires a well-planned discursive strategy of communicating with not only the Russian regime or state elites, but Russian society as a whole. Expectations that Russia will become more pacifist and less prone to use militant instruments due to its losses in Ukraine appear to be wishful thinking, so it is essential to embrace the opposite possibility to manage the security effects of this enemization. 

2. Utilize discursive restraint in official communication.  

European officials should avoid using rhetorical frames in public speeches and documents that portray Russia as a civilizational enemy or a permanently hostile society. This, however, by no means implies that the official rhetoric needs to be softened towards the Russian government – the condemnation of Russian aggression is necessary and justified. Discursive restraint, suggested here as the policy instrument, should be understood not as conciliation but rather as a tool to limit the discursive reproduction of enemization.  

3. Clearly differentiate between the Russian regime and the population.  

Although the issue of moral responsibility of the society in an authoritarian regime for the crimes committed throughout the war is a subject of academic and political debates, avoiding the narrative of collective responsibility may be beneficial, specifically in this case of mitigating the risks of enemization for European security. Messaging that brings together the regime and the population contributes to the regime’s claim that it represents the nation as a whole and validates narratives of collective punishment and guilt. This in turn leads to consolidation of the Russian public around their leaders or, at the very least, around the narratives framing Europe as a threat and enemy to Russians.  

The post Enemy Politics in Russia: A Long-Term Security Risk for Europe appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

Key Takeaways��

• �Ӱ�ԭ�� one in three residents of Estonia and Latvia say they would do nothing��in the event of��a military threat, with even lower likelihood to act among ethnic Russians.����

• Interest in��participating��through non-combat roles (e.g.,��financial contributions) is higher than in combat roles��but still does not reflect��a significant��portion��of the population��in either Latvia or Estonia.��

• NATO (and Canada) should��address��the��societal resilience��gap among local��communities.��Targeted grants for trusted local organizations, coupled with strong monitoring and evaluation, can help build social cohesion and civic preparedness across Estonia and Latvia, particularly in regions with a significant ethnic Russian population.��

Background��

Recent polling data from Estonia and Latvia suggest there is a significant gap in societal resilience among the residents of both countries. While Russia is overwhelmingly perceived as a security threat within these nations, an overall willingness to act in the event of a military threat is low. This gap is particularly pronounced along demographic lines, with lower willingness to act among ethnic Russians in Estonia and Latvia. As the Baltic states are likely targets for potential future Russian aggression, this deficit in resilience has direct implications for Canadian and NATO security commitments in the region.  

Since their post-Soviet independence, Estonia and Latvia have invested heavily in defence preparedness through joining NATO, bolstering their cyber networks, and educating their youth on mis- and disinformation. After Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, Canada joined its NATO Allies in strengthening defence structures in Eastern and Central Europe under , currently the Canadian Armed Forces’ (CAF) largest overseas mission. Recognizing the particular vulnerability of the Baltic states to Russian aggression, Canada took the initiative to lead the Multinational Battlegroup in Latvia in 2017. After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Canada committed to scaling this presence into a full . Following his election in Spring 2025, Prime Minister Mark Carney emphasized that these operations work to reinforce NATO at a time of great global instability and change. 

To meet NATO’s Article 3 , Estonia and Latvia have adopted “Total Defence” models, recognizing that societal resilience and civilian participation are just as crucial as military structures for overall defence of the country. Learning from the success of the Ukrainian Territorial Defence Forces in fighting the Russian military,  is working to promote its own reservist force through public awareness campaigns, increased daily allowances for reservists, and crisis preparedness education.  similarly promotes civil protection while identifying “political trust” and “inter-ethnic cohesion” as vital to national security. Both Baltic countries are also working to increase civil support for their law enforcement agencies, fire departments, and medical systems.  

As highlighted in the Latvian defence plan, social cohesion and confidence in state institutions and partnerships are essential for building and maintaining civil engagement in total defence. The  in Riga engages in public diplomacy, information operations, and psychological operations to align national efforts with NATO’s strategic objectives. The Latvian government has also partnered with the  – an NGO with the goal of informing the public about NATO and Latvia’s participation in it.  

Social cohesion between ethnic communities has been a focus of national and local NGOs, as Russian-speaking minorities remain less likely to trust NATO or volunteer for national defence than their neighbours. In the northeastern region of Estonia,  works mostly with Russian speakers of all ages on projects developing critical thinking and media literacy. These projects promote active citizenship and social entrepreneurship through youth work and international exchanges. VitaTiim already has international partnerships, including with the European Solidarity Corps and the US Embassy in Estonia. In Latvia, the organization  focuses on education, culture, media, and civic engagement in the Baltics and beyond, specifically striving to foster open dialogue and social inclusion for underrepresented ethnic minorities.  

Despite these institutional frameworks and nonprofit initiatives, recent polling reveals a high likelihood amongst the public to do nothing to defend Estonia and Latvia from a military threat, as well as a persistent gap in how different ethnic communities perceive national security and threats to their country. To better understand these dynamics, the following data examines security perceptions across the region. 

Survey Evidence: Societal Resilience Gaps in Estonia and Latvia��

Polling from �Ӱ�ԭ�� University’s Eastern European and Transatlantic Network (EETN) shows that,��as of Spring 2025, many people in Estonia and Latvia do not see themselves as active participants in defence during a crisis. Most significantly, about 30% of Estonians and Latvians say they are likely to do nothing��in the event of��a military threat.����

Demographic and geographic��characteristics of��this vulnerability��show a stark division:��almost half��of ethnic Russians��(46%)��residing��in Latvia and Estonia��would��do nothing��if��their��respective countries face a military threat.��Four in 10��(43%)��polled��residents��of��Latgale, a region of Latvia directly on the border with Russia��comprised��of a��large Russian-speaking minority,��say they would not act.��Half of those polled��in Northeastern Estonia��(51%), another region sharing a border with Russia��and having a similar demographic composition as Latgale, are also likely to do nothing.��

Reported willingness to participate in national defence is low. When asked whether they would join the active-duty military in the event of a military threat, only about 20% of Estonians and Latvians say they are likely to do so, and only about 30% are likely to join the military reserves or territorial forces in response to the same threat.  

While more people are willing to take up non-combat forms of national defence, still, even such likelihood is low. Estonians appear to be more likely to assist in this way than Latvians, approximately six in 10 (59%) of Estonians are likely to volunteer to contribute with physical labour, versus 44% in Latvia. �Ӱ�ԭ�� half (48%) of Estonians are likely to volunteer to contribute financially, compared to only 29% of Latvians.  

Ethnic Russians in both countries are even less likely to be active defenders in the event of a military threat. A staggering 80% of ethnic Russians in Latvia and Estonia are unlikely to join the active-duty military, military reserves, or territorial forces. In Estonia, 41% of ethnic Russians are likely to volunteer to contribute with physical labour, but this number drops significantly in Latvia, with only 29% of ethnic Russians likely to do so. Finally, only about 20% of ethnic Russians, in both Estonia and Latvia, are likely to volunteer to contribute financially.  

From a policy perspective, this polling data highlights��both��a��gap and an��opportunity. If a significant segment of the population is unlikely to��contribute to the active defence of their country, resilience-building efforts must expand beyond military��deployments. To foster the social cohesion necessary for resilience, trust��and cooperation between minority and majority communities must be bolstered. NATO and Canada can do this through collaboration with local community networks��–��such as��VitaTiim��and New East��–��that are already on the ground��in��the region.��

Conclusion��

Recent polling data from Estonia and Latvia suggests a region with a significant gap in societal resilience. While Russia is overwhelmingly perceived as a security threat, willingness to act��in the event of��a military threat is low. This gap is particularly pronounced along��demographic��lines, with lower willingness to act among��ethnic Russians. As��Estonia and Latvia��are��likely targets��for potential future Russian aggression, this deficit in resilience has direct implications for Canadian and NATO security commitments in the region. By supporting well-monitored projects with local organizations that build social cohesion and civic preparedness, Canada and NATO can help ensure Estonia and Latvia are more resilient and better prepared to withstand a military threat.����

Policy Recommendations��

1. NATO and Canada should create a dedicated societal resilience grant to support local NGOs such as VitaTiim and New East that advance social cohesion and civic preparedness. Supported projects should have bilingual messaging (in Russian and Estonian or Latvian) and may include media literacy and cyber safety training, community initiatives fostering dialogue across demographic lines, and projects that engage citizens as partners in international governance. 

The grant should emphasize collaboration between local and international organizations, promoting a shared responsibility in local, national, and international governance. Priority should go to local initiatives in regions with large Russian-speaking populations. 

2. Each NATO/Canadian-supported project should be required to include a monitoring, evaluation, and feedback plan in alignment with NATO’s . Thorough monitoring is necessary in order to accurately evaluate how effective projects are at bolstering societal resilience and civic preparedness.  

3. Canada and NATO should use existing NATO StratCom COE platforms to highlight successful partnerships in relatable ways to the Estonians and Latvians, including through multilingual media and public events. Positive views of NATO and the West expressed by individuals and organizations that already have credibility in their communities should be amplified to . 

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Key Takeaways 

• In Estonia and Latvia, border residents, ethnic Russians, and Russian-speakers differ from the general population in their perception of security threats. They are more likely to view domestic political instability as their country’s primary security threat, rather than Russia. 

• This segment of Estonians and Latvians also tend to feel disenfranchised and helpless regarding national defence, with the majority more likely to respond that their countries are “on their own” if faced by a military threat. 

• NATO should take a regionally focused outreach, using the Russian language as a medium and utilize transparent intelligence disclosure to assure and rebuild trust among these vulnerable populations. Furthermore, using visible and well-tested approaches such as tangible first-responder training and on-the-ground capacity-building measures could help address local skepticism. 

Background 

While the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) focuses on defending the Baltics from external Russian aggression, a critical segment of the population – namely border residents, ethnic Russians, and Russian-speakers – are more concerned with internal political instability than external threats for its national security. In addition, many of these respondents express a feeling of helplessness and alienation, believing neither the West nor Russia would come to their aid should their country face a military or security threat. Thus far, NATO operations aimed at reassuring Baltic residents are not succeeding with instilling confidence in current national security frameworks. Recognizing the diversity of security beliefs with a particular regional and linguistic focus could better inform NATO strategies that address security threat responses in the Baltics, helping to reassure these skeptical and disenfranchised populations.   

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has fundamentally transformed the international security landscape, prompting NATO’s response to reassure its Baltic members that, should it face a threat, NATO will come to their defence.  NATO’s operations in Latvia and Estonia are a part of its broader efforts at deterrence and defence on its eastern flank by increasing its presence in the region, with Canada leading the Multinational Brigade in Latvia through , and the United Kingdom leading in Estonia with . Latvia and Estonia are both active participants in various NATO-accredited Centres of Excellence (COEs) that conduct collaborative research with NATO Allies to better address security threats, many by malign Russian influence through hybrid tactics. For example, the , located in Riga, Latvia, monitors and counters information-manipulation threats in real time. Russia’s information operations in these countries exploit pre-existing societal divisions among ethnic, regional, and linguistic lines, promoting extremist sentiments and skepticism against their governments and Western partners.  accuse Estonian and Latvian governments of being anti-Russian and incapable of defending their countries against any threat.   

Existing studies suggest that Russophone, ethnic Russian, and borderland populations in both Latvia and Estonia are more skeptical towards NATO and existing national security frameworks. They are found to be , and .  is found to be a salient factor, associated with decreased support for present (often liberal democratic) regimes.  In the context of the ongoing war against Ukraine, , and . Furthermore, they are.   

However, public opinion amongst these groups in Estonia and Latvia is proving to be more nuanced; many in these populations express a complex belief system surrounding national security that is . , , meaning that public opinion among Russophones in Latvia and Estonia is heterogenous. Given these insights, policy aimed at developing trust with these populations and fostering participation in national security frameworks should reflect this variety of beliefs, and address skepticism through regionally and linguistically mindful outreach initiatives.

Belief in ‘Domestic Political Instability’ as the Greatest National Security Threat

A survey conducted by the �Ӱ�ԭ�� University Eastern European and Transatlantic Network (EETN) in Latvia and Estonia between March and May 2025 indicates that while Russia and the war in Ukraine are still prevalent security threats, 26% of Latvians and 22% of Estonians perceive “domestic political instability” as the most important threat. These opinions are particularly widespread among the border-region populations, among Russian speakers, and ethnic Russians. For example, in Latgale (Latvia’s border region) 52% chose “domestic political instability” as the greatest threat; only 7% picked Russia, and 12% the war in Ukraine. Similarly, in Northeastern Estonia, an area that borders Russia, 47% consider domestic political instability as a main security threat while only 17% consider Russia as the greatest threat. In Latvia, Russian speakers were far more likely to hold this belief compared to respondents who speak the titular language; language was not a measured factor in the Estonia survey. 

These groups are all more likely than their counterparts to feel personally “unsafe,” with 51% of Latgale residents and 30% of Russian speakers in Latvia choosing “unsafe” when asked about their personal safety. In Northeastern Estonia, 31% also personally feel “unsafe.” Skeptics tend to attribute threats to personal safety on internal concerns rather than external actors. In both countries, those who share this belief have a higher likelihood to view Russia as most helpful for their national security. ​​For example, in Latvia 26% of respondents chose “domestic political instability” as the greatest threat to personal safety, and among these respondents 61% chose Russia as the most helpful external actor to Latvia in the case of a military threat- pointing to an intersection between positive perceptions of Russia and concerns over internal concerns. Similarly, for the same question in Estonia, 22% chose “domestic political instability,” and of this group 77% also picked Russia to come to their aid. 

In addition, those concerned with domestic security are more likely to be skeptical of the EU, NATO, and the West. In both countries, such respondents are least likely to choose “the West” as most helpful should they face a military threat, with only 12% in Latvia, and 18% in Estonia. Furthermore, among those who share this belief is a higher likelihood to vote “no/leave” in hypothetical referendums for the EU and NATO respectively.  

Feelings of Alienation, NATO Skepticism and Internal Instability Belief 

Among respondents who share a belief regarding domestic political instability and specifically in the Russophone, ethnic Russian, and borderland populations is a common feeling of alienation from current security mechanisms and parliamentary processes. Respondents who share this belief also often expressed disenfranchisement, believing that if their country faces a military threat that they will be helped by no one. When asked the same question, Russophones in Latvia proved that they are least likely to choose NATO and most likely to choose “Nobody will help us/we are here for ourselves”.  

Residents of Northeastern Estonia and Latgale are the least likely among Estonia’s macro-regions to choose “closer to NATO” (only 34% in Northeast Estonia and 41% in Latgale) and are most likely among all regions to pick either “closer to Russia” (22% in Northeast Estonia, 21% in Latgale) or “closer to both/neither” (31% in Northeast Estonia, 25% in Latgale). 

It seems that such skepticism towards common security architecture reflects a greater disbelief in the national political system. Although a majority of respondents who also share the belief of alienation would vote “yes/stay” in the hypothetical referendums to remain in NATO or the EU, their support is weaker than the general population. To conclude, Russophones, border-region residents, and respondents who share their “domestic political instability belief more often express feelings of alienation and disenfranchisement from political processes rather than a desire to deepen ties with Russia.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 

Feelings of skepticism, alienation, and disenfranchisement in the border regions cannot be attributed to ethnic and linguistic identification alone. Being Russian or Russophone in a border region does not inherently make someone vulnerable to Russian influence. Socioeconomic disparities in these regions paired with titular language mandates in both countries can contribute to feelings of alienation, though further research is needed in order to uncover a clearer picture of these citizens’ experiences. A more in-depth understanding will further restore agency to this population, as their beliefs are likely acquired through more complex routes than simply absorbing Kremlin media.  that Russian media did not have an independent effect on one’s willingness to defend their country and instead infers that many respondents who consume Russian media have a distrust of media in general, further highlighting a need for a more nuanced understanding of skepticism among Russophones. 

1. Further research on best practices through NATO COEs is needed to address alienation and helplessness 

NATO Allies utilize different COE’s to share best practices for countermeasures and confidence-building initiatives and to build societal resilience against malign information influence. A transnational study on best practices for building confidence among ethnic minorities would fill a sizable gap in current research and would provide a basis for which to design public outreach campaigns for populations experiencing alienation and skepticism.  In addition, further research can investigate the security perceptions and feelings of alienation in public opinion. This would provide a more accurate foundation for which to form policy on public outreach, rather than simply attributing the security concerns of Russophones to inherent Russian-tendencies that favor Kremlin-intervention. 

2. Targeted and regionally mindful outreach for key groups could have important impacts 

Further regionally-focused outreach for these specific Russophone, ethnic Russian, and borderland populations using a , with tactics such as intelligence disclosures (gathered through the , or NISRF), can effectively rebuild credibility and better reassure these populations of NATO’s defence commitments and decision-making. Furthermore, intelligence disclosures through accessible media can inform users on external security threats and potentially increase risk awareness and trust in public institutions through transparency measures.  

 Given that a significant amount of  is conducted by Russian-language media, it is tantamount to consider this population’s linguistic preference as a tool of engagement rather than a characteristic to exclude from policy measures to counteract Russian influence.  

3. Share key expertise within NATO frameworks, and make it visible to key groups 

 found that any citizen regardless of ethnicity is more open to helping in their country’s defences if they are reassured by a powerful patron, one that they have confidence in. In 2023, , sharing best practices for preparedness among first responders. Similar efforts in Latvia and Estonia could reach NATO-skeptical populations among citizens working in the public sector for emergency response. Sharing key expertise in similar sectors can potentially build trust among skeptical groups and increase NATO’s visibility among local populations, offering a firsthand account of NATO’s efforts instead of through malign narratives online.  

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Executive Summary  

Transatlantic relations are currently facing growing uncertainty due to significant strategic divergences in the fields of trade, security, technology, and global governance. From the trade tariff disputes to President of the United States (US) Donald Trump’s territorial claims on Greenland, ties between the European Union (EU) and the US are under growing stress. This tension has heavy repercussions on the EU and its member states. Fears about an effective transatlantic decoupling have reenergized calls for the EU to acquire a capacity to act on its own. In this context, Canada can play a decisive role. Stronger EU-Canada cooperation could provide an answer to this new strategic anxiety. It would also allow to reduce dependency on the US and help develop both Canadian and European strategic autonomy.  

Changing Transatlantic Relations: An Opening for Deeper Canada-EU Ties 

While the first Trump administration tested traditional transatlantic relations, Trump’s second term has marked a significant recalibration of US foreign policy that has fundamentally challenged the core values that have underpinned this relationship for the last 80 years. From recurring trade tariff disputes to territorial claims over Greenland, Trump’s actions have often questioned – and even opposed – the US’s role as the principal guarantor of transatlantic stability and security. His administration has delegitimized multilateralism in favour of a “selective engagement” strategy with individual US partners. The recent US , released in November 2025, formalized this major shift in American foreign policy. This new strategy reorders global priorities, reframes NATO Allies’ roles, and seeks stability in Europe to allow Washington to redirect its focus and resources to the Indo-Pacific and the Western Hemisphere. At the same time, it adopts  toward the EU, portraying it as a source of instability and accusing it of undermining political liberty, sovereignty, and social cohesion. 

These dynamics raise fundamental questions about the stability, predictability, and future shape of the transatlantic relationship. For the EU, the implications are immediate: increased strategic risk, reduced certainties, and stronger pressure to develop autonomous capabilities and diversified partnerships. 

Why Canada Matters to the EU (and why the EU Matters to Canada) 

In this rapidly-changing international environment marked by geopolitical fragmentation, erratic US behaviour, and Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine, the EU must meet three conditions in order to become a more credible and decisive actor at the global level: one, it must sway sufficient economic power; two, it must demonstrate political will to act cohesively both amongst its member states and with its international partners; and three, it must be perceived as a legitimate and credible entity by other . 

To achieve these conditions, the EU needs to strengthen its ties with like-minded democracies, such as . Among them, Canada appears as an especially natural and highly compatible partner for the EU. Throughout the last 50 years, Canada and the EU have built an exemplary partnership based on shared democratic values and worldview. But in today’s challenging global landscape, the EU and Canada stand together more firmly than ever as stable and trusted partners. And while the  and  serve as the foundation of the contemporary EU-Canada relationship, increased cooperation to both reinforce current areas of coopetition – such as security and defence – as well as joint ventures in new sectors – including the digital domain – will play key roles in the near future.

Security and Defence Cooperation Between Canada and the EU: A Win-Win Opportunity 

Canada’s contribution to European security and defence policy is hardly new: Ottawa has been a valued contributor to EU-led security and defence efforts for over a decade. It was the first country to establish a Security and Defence Dialogue with the EU in 2015; it participates in  and has contributed to . 

However, at the 20^th EU–Canada Summit in Brussels last June, António Costa, President of the European Council, Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, and Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada, together pledged to further strengthen their bilateral cooperation. Both sides committed to an ambitious and comprehensive partnership, the new , aimed at deepening cooperation across key areas such as trade, security, energy and other critical sectors. 

As part of their re-energized relationship, the EU High Representative of Foreign Affairs, Kaja Kallas, the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Anita Anand, and the Canadian Minister of Defense, David J. McGuinty, also signed the , which provides a framework for cooperation on cyber defence, hybrid threats, space security, maritime issues, crisis response and assistance to partners, such as Ukraine. This agreement also includes provisions for joint research in emerging technologies, which can help position both Canada and the EU as global leaders in these fields.  

This new agreement importantly lays the groundwork for increased defence procurement collaboration, primarily related to the EU’s . It also opened the door for   – a new European loan instrument for joint procurement – and for an administrative arrangement between Canada and the European Defence Agency, the body that supports cooperative European  and provides a forum for European ministries of defence to coordinate their policies. As a result of this increased cooperation, both Brussels and Ottawa have made tangible steps to diversify their defence partnership and become less reliant and vulnerable to Washington’s shifting moods on collective security. Similarly, this new agreement enhances the resiliency of the European pillar within NATO, without either undermining the NATO Alliance or trying to substitute it. 

New Areas of Cooperation in the Digital Domain 

As part of their cooperative efforts, the Canadian Minister of Artificial Intelligence and Digital Innovation, Evan Solomon, and the Executive Vice-President of the European Commission for Technological Sovereignty, Security and Democracy, Henna Virkkunen, have also agreed to strengthen cooperation in the . On 8 December 2025, the first meeting of the EU-Canada Digital Partnership Council took place in Montreal, Quebec. The  made at the conclusion of that meeting showed that both sides recognized the importance that digital partnership plays in advancing bilateral efforts to boost competitiveness, innovation, and economic resilience. This meeting also resulted in Canada and the EU  This meeting also resulted in Canada and the , one on cooperation on artificial intelligence, and another on digital credentials, digital identity wallets, and trust services. This new partnership will guide collaboration on AI governance, quantum technologies, cybersecurity, and digital standards. The  of this partnership is to build digital systems that are secure, transparent, and centred on public trust.

Conclusion

The ongoing reconfiguration of US foreign policy and the end of predictable transatlantic relations have led the EU and its member states to reconsider their strategic goals and explore alternative strategies to promote their own interests and societal well-being. In this context, cooperation with Canada would be a win-win opportunity, allowing both sides to reduce dependencies on the US and bolster collective defence capabilities without undermining NATO. Strengthening the EU-Canada relationship could also help show other countries that – in an era of re-emerging great power rivalry – there is still an opportunity for states to create and benefit from collective partnerships. 

Policy Recommendations  

In order to make the EU-Canada cooperation effective and concrete, both sides should consider the following policy recommendations: 

• Take an active approach to , including encouragement of domestic defence industries to actively utilize this instrument to gain increased access to external markets. 

• Encourage all EU member states to ratify CETA, as only 17 member states have ratified the agreement thus far. Finalizing the ratification of CETA would ensure stability and continuity for the agreement and would signal increased confidence in the overall Canada-EU trade relationship going forward.  

• Strengthen efforts aimed at enhancing their bilateral , to advance and diversify trade, promote economic security and resilience, and create investment opportunities. 

• Increase cooperation in the extraction and trading of . Deepening ties in this area could help reduce dependencies on unreliable partners while strengthening internal supply chains.  

• Improve cooperation on  while at the same time continue working together in order to balance innovation with ethical considerations and standards. This includes joint investments on AI-driven sustainability solutions, the adoption of accountability measures for violators of AI regulations, and the enforcement of policies that support both technological advancement and societal well-being. 

• Utilize the strong EU-Canada relationship as a stepping stone to reinforce multilateral partnerships with like-minded democratic partners, such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, and Taiwan. 

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