Introduction

On January 5th, 2026, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced the appointment of former Canadian Deputy Prime Minister and Member of Parliament, Chrystia Freeland, as Economic Advisor to the Office of the President of Ukraine. In a post on X, Zelenskyy stated, “Ukraine needs to strengthen its internal resilience – both for the sake of Ukraine’s recovery if diplomacy delivers results as swiftly as possible, and to reinforce our defence if, because of delays by our partners, it takes longer to bring this war to an end.� In the following days, Freeland confirmed she accepted President Zelenskyy’s appointment and that she would be resigning as a Member of Parliament, taking effect as of January 9th, 2026.

Freeland’s appointment as voluntary Economic Advisor to the Office of the President of Ukraine is being made against the larger and developing backdrop of ongoing diplomatic negotiations between the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the United States (US) to come to an agreed upon pathway to peace. This negotiation process continues to be arduous for Ukraine. It also comes alongside a deepening of foreign diplomatic relations between Canada and Ukraine under the Mark Carney government; this, coming on the back of Prime Minister Carney’s historical , where he stressed the end of the rules-based international order and hinted at the decline of American hegemony – a speech that have held to ultimately represent the beginning of a multipolar era in world politics.

In the coming months, the Eastern European and Transatlantic Network (EETN) will publish a series analyzing key developments shaping the war; these include prospective pathways to peace, ongoing diplomatic negotiations and tensions, and the shifting security and economic governance landscape in Ukraine. Freeland is an integral node among an emerging and vital network aimed at supporting Ukraine and its future as the anniversary of the full-scale invasion nears and passes. This series aims to make clear that Russia is not only engaged in a war of attrition so as to try to reclaim its great power status, but that Ukraine is increasingly prepared to respond to this war of attrition with strategies and methods of asymmetric and hybrid warfare. Ukraine is prepared to make the strategic, economic, and relational moves necessary to better guarantee its future, as well as its success on the battlefield and in diplomatic negotiations.

This first brief of the series reflects on Freeland’s appointment and builds upon an argument first offered by Ukrainian scholar Valeriia Gusieva, where she suggested that cultural resilience is a foundational pillar to security. I extend her argument here by suggesting that cultural resilience and situated experience are also crucial to sustaining a coherent and effective attritional war strategy – Freeland’s appointment, in this case, should be understood light through the lens of political habituation.

Chrystia Freeland: A Ukrainian-Canadian MP and Soviet War Crimes Researcher

Chrystia Freeland was born in Peace River, Alberta in 1968 to a Ukrainian mother and Canadian father. Though she formally entered Canadian federal politics in 2013, she is perhaps most known through her association with former Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and his government. Under Trudeau, Freeland was appointed to serve as Minister of International Trade in Trudeau’s cabinet. In this position, she was a key negotiator in the hard-fought Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) (which replaced the North American Free Trade Agreement, or NAFTA, in 2020), as well as the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with the European Union (EU) that was signed in 2016.

While it is fair to assume that many Western audiences are familiar with the whiplash antics of American President Donald Trump, who often combines “,� less well known are the tensions that characterized the negotiation process of CETA. As researchers , CETA encountered historical diplomatic tensions throughout its negotiation process: “This challenge becomes evident at various stages in the trade policy process, but it is most pronounced in the ratification of bilateral agreements, which require approval in all member states.�

On paper, arriving at CETA was through the bilateral process of negotiation between Canada and the EU; in reality, however, Freeland was situated in a much more difficult negotiating position. Because the subsequent ratification of CETA would require the approval of all EU member states, such a negotiating process proved to be a lesson for both Freeland and the European Commission, who was charged with ensuring the twenty-eight member states were in alignment. Indeed, as scholar Joris Larik , the alleged crisis of CETA negotiations soon became a “cautionary tale� about the “cumbersome and vulnerable EU treaty-making procedures, where internal politics and technical legal discussions detracted from the merits (or demerits) of the actual agreement.�

This became most visible through the tensions experienced with the Wallonia Parliament in Belgium, an autonomous regional government with veto power over EU trade deals. In late 2016, the Walloon government publicly rejected CETA, in part because of their worry that the trade deal would “.� Walloon regional minister-president, Paul Magnette, told reporters the following: “I don’t consider this as a funeral, I don’t consider this as a veto without any conditions. I consider this as a request to reopen negotiations so that European leaders could hear the legitimate demands which have been forcefully expressed by an organized, transparent civil society.� As Larik however, this crisis led to “profound internal reflections on EU trade policy, causing even a shift in the EU’s practice in concluding trade agreements.

It was largely in response to these tensions and apparent deadlock within Wallonia that Freeland made the public decision to walk out on CETA negotiations with our European allies. Following her decision, Freeland with Canadian journalists candidly: “It’s become evident for me, for Canada, that the European Union isn’t capable now to have an international treaty even with a country that has very European values like Canada. And even with a country so nice, with a lot of patience like Canada.� At the time, the move was taken by some in Canadian media as an “� response; Conservative critics in the House of Commons Freeland’s walk out as a “meltdown,� alleging she required “adult supervision� – language that carried clear sexist and gendered connotations. Still others this walk out is exactly what the negotiation process needed, as it eventually led to the signing of the trade agreement.

Reflecting on her CETA negotiation experience in 2026, Freeland the following about negotiating with European allies, which is worth quoting at-length here:

“You can sort of have two kinds of negotiations. Some negotiations start with a kind of win-win premise where the two parties come together wanting a deal, wanting to be friends, seeing each other as long-term partners, and they’ll disagree about stuff, but the negotiation is really about everyone working hard together to find the best possible landing zone. I would say Canada’s negotiations with the EU about our trade deal with Europe, CETA, were conducted in that way, and they were hard, right? … Our final slightly melodramatic moments in Namur, in Wallonia, you know, proceeded by moments in Vienna, in Germany, in the European Parliament. I mean, it was a long slog and there were lots of obstacles and there was some drama, but it was clear there was goodwill on all sides.”

In this interview, Freeland goes on to characterize how Trump falls into an alternative negotiation camp compared to that which characterized CETA; she the idea that the American President abides by the logic of a zero-sum game: “…when you are dealing with a party that has that kind of a view [zero-sum game logic] and that kind of an attitude, then I think you have to be very clear in your own mind about red lines. And you have to be very prepared to say, thus far and no further, we’re not gonna capitulate our approach.�

Freeland later went on to become Canada’s Minister of Finance in 2020, where she was responsible for introducing four federal budgets, including federal aid measures related to Canada’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic. She was the first woman to serve in this role, a fact that would later be considered by the as crucial in the decay of her relationship with Trudeau prior to his own resignation in late-2025.

Beyond her political career, Freeland’s academic and journalistic works span two decades and have drawn the ire of the Kremlin. While pursuing graduate studies in Russian history and literature at Harvard, where she was responsible for documenting and translating archival and investigative materials related to the – an unmarked, mass burial site used by the NKVD (the secret police of the Soviet Union) to dispose of executed dissidents and prisoners. It remains one of the largest mass burial sites in Ukraine, even Russia’s current invasion. Her research played a decisive role in debunking the Stalin-era myth that the executions were exclusively carried out by the Nazis during World War Two. This research eventually attracted the attention of the KGB – the main security agency of the Soviet Union – who then assigned Freeland the codename “Frida,� closely surveilling and building a case against her throughout the course of her study.

As a Canadian with Ukrainian heritage, Freeland has been among the most outspoken advocates for sustained Canadian support to Ukraine. In response, she is one of thirteen Canadian officials barred from entering Russia under retaliatory sanctions imposed by Vladimir Putin himself in 2014 and has been the target of various . Freeland has also faced public attacks from American President Donald Trump, who on several occasions has described her in disparaging terms, including “,� a “,� a “,� and an overall “.� From a feminist perspective, Freeland’s experience navigating such attacks underscores her familiarity with the gendered power dynamics employed by – an experience that may indeed prove to be a strategic asset in a war whose social construction and conduct are themselves . While much of international politics Freeland nonetheless works against the masculine grain in a pursuit of fair and just agreements and futures.

Contextualizing the Habituation of Freeland and Concluding Remarks

As this series continues to examine changes within President Zelenskyy’s inner circle in response to both Ukrainian domestic pressures and Russia’s growing attritional war strategy, I suggest that Freeland’s appointment as a voluntary Economic Advisor to Ukraine signals an awareness within Ukrainian leadership and its closest allies that responding to Russia’s attritional warfare in 2026 cannot be confined to military operations alone. No longer are we in an era where hard power capabilities are the only measure of a nation’s strength; the personal and personnel also matter.

Freeland will be an important figure to watch, particularly as it relates to dialogue between Ukrainian feminists and the pro-democracy movement – not because Freeland herself has expressed a desire to pursue a feminist agenda in Ukraine’s economic reconstruction, but because her presence reflects the often-implicit reality that gendered political experience shapes how the dynamics of endurance, credibility, and trust are produced and sustained in wartime economies. In a war of attrition, where authority is continuously reaffirmed under conditions of prolonged uncertainty, reputational attack, and economic strain, such situated experience becomes strategically relevant, I suggest, as a form of habituation to sustained delegitimization.

The notion of habituation draws from a long philosophical tradition – mostly commonly, Aristotelian ethics, where habituation (hexis) was used to refer to repeated exposure and practice from durable dispositions rather than momentary or instantaneous reaction. In contemporary political thought, philosophers and scholars inspired by phenomenologists such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty have upon this idea to explain how subjects develop capacities for political action through ongoing relational strain. In feminist ethics, habituation helps to explain how – often oppressed – actors learn to endure, navigate, and act within conditions of prolonged vulnerability, scrutiny, and marginalization over time. It moves beyond experience; it is an engaged and embodied vision and practice.

In an attritional war where legitimacy is not necessarily secured through fast-paced or singular victories but continually reproduced across various political, economic, and social structures, as well as through relations of alliance management and public trust, this mode of habituation takes on strategic significance. Indeed, for President Zelenskyy, it works in his favour to cultivate and incorporate actors habituated to sustained delegitimization because it acts as a shock absorber to the , partner unreliability in a so-called newly-founded “� world, and economic fatigue increasingly characterizing this phase of the war and ongoing occupation. The hope is that these hybrid shocks are absorbed by such a habituation without suffering from significant strategic drifts that may carry over into the battlefield.

, nations and militaries perceived to possess greater status and capabilities – that is, the greater of two powers – engage in warfare by attrition. Those familiar with Russia and the former Soviet Union’s historical record of aggression, occupation, interference, and war across Eastern Europe will also recognize this mode of warfare, perhaps all too familiarly. The Baltics, the Balkans, Poland, Chechnya, Georgia – they all know this playbook. The Russian Federation continues to seek what it perceives as its rightful seat at the table of great-power politics; even those of us who reject John J. Mearsheimer’s structuralist projections onto Eastern Europe as lying within a fixed Russian “sphere of influence� cannot ignore such an imperial desire percolating within the Russian state since the unipolar moment.

In attritional war, time is a previous resource. As Sun Tzu , prolonged conflict could be of great risk to either warring side, on account of exhausting the state apparatus, undermining domestic order and morale, and eroding strategic advantage; for him, military strategy was a subtle and complex technique whose success depended on minimizing the temporal risks and costs of war. While Sun Tzu viewed attritional war as a strategic failure, the work of military theorist and general requires us to remember that wars of attrition often emerge as a political condition over time, shaped by friction, uncertainty, and an overall inability to achieve decisive political outcomes. What Ukraine demonstrates to the international community, this series aims to show, is that Russia’s apparent great power strategy grounded in attrition – like empire itself – can burn out.

It is by sources close to both Freeland and Prime Minister Carney that Freeland received Zelenskyy’s offer on December 22nd, 2025; by December 24th, she had shared with the Prime Minister her intentions to leave Canadian parliament to join the Ukrainian team. In responding to the Kremlin’s continued war of attrition, concerns beyond immediate hard power capabilities, military strategy, and command structures must be addressed. Freeland possesses a unique form of habituation to sustain delegitimation; her appointment may indeed be an important shock absorber to Russia’s ongoing disinformation campaigns, American partner unreliability, and the economic fatigue increasingly characterizing this war.

At the level of a broader wartime strategy, I suggest this capacity can also function as a form of resilience; it signals to communities, civil society, international partners, and adversaries alike that broader Ukraine’s leadership is prepared to govern through a liminal phase of uncertain futurity rather than govern toward a rapid endpoint. This is a strategy in stark contrast to Putin’s assumption that a “quick military operation� could sweep Ukraine in 2022, or that , once elected, could end the war in Ukraine in the first 24-hours of his second term. In this sense, it is important to emphasize that habituation is not merely an individual trait or disposition, but also a culturally sedimented capacity that is experienced transnationally and relationally. As Gusieva has argued, cultural resilience constitutes a foundational pillar of security; indeed, classical realist how such resilience at times is what pushes a nation beyond survival towards victory. I extend this logic here by suggesting that such cultural resilience is forged through repeated exposure to, and embeddedness within, enduring imperial projects and traditionalist military practices – in this case, namely, Russia’s ongoing attempts to reclaim imperial-great power status, legitimate its occupations, and sustain attritional warfare alongside its hybrid threats towards Europe.

In Ukraine, cultural habituation operates as resilience, but it is neither neutral nor abstract; rather, its experience is deeply racialized, ethnicized, and gendered. It is racialized and ethnicized through the persistent positioning of the nation as materially peripheral to Europe while cast as subordinate to Russia’s so-called historical sphere of influence; it is gendered through the paternalizing narratives directed at Ukraine and other Eastern European states aspiring to EU membership, as well as in the recurring trope of Ukraine as the “little brother� to a masculinized “Mother Russia.� More specifically, we see this reproduced through the hegemonically masculine practices embodied by state actors in political negotiations of economic and security matters; these behaviours continue to structure much of how political negotiation, listening, and diplomatic exchange take place. Freeland, in this respect, is a node within a broader relational structure of habituation and diplomatic practice in wartime Ukraine – one whose own political endurance aligns with, and stands to reinforce, Ukraine’s culturally embedded capacity to govern through attrition.

Please stay tuned for the next installment of this series, which will analyze Ukraine’s 2025 energy scandal and subsequent political moves undertaken President Zelenskyy following a state investigation that exposed high-level embezzlement within the nation’s energy sector.

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“The Black Sea in 2026: Strategic Maneuvers and Economic Opportunity” examines how the Black Sea has become one of the world’s most consequential geopolitical and economic corridors following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The brief analyzes the competing strategies of Russia, Türkiye, the European Union, and China, alongside the security concerns of littoral states, highlighting how control of the region shapes Ukraine’s future and broader transatlantic stability. It also outlines Canada’s growing role as a NATO partner in supporting regional security, trade resilience, and postwar reconstruction. The paper concludes with targeted policy recommendations for strengthening Canada–Ukraine cooperation and enhancing Black Sea security in a rapidly evolving strategic landscape.

To read the full policy brief prepared by Dr. Jeff Sahadeo, click the download button below.

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The South Caucasus region has historically been regarded as one of the most complex regions in the world, where geopolitical rivalries, ethnic disputes, and energy security risks collide. One of the longest-lasting conflicts in the region is the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh.

This paper aims to study the Washington Peace Declaration between Armenia and Azerbaijan and its potential impact on security and economic integration in the South Caucasus region. TRIPP and related transport initiatives could enable Armenia and Azerbaijan to serve as critical components of a strategic transit corridor linking Europe and Asia. US and EU engagement is highlighted as essential for maintaining stability and attracting investment in the region.

The post The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Geopolitical Significance of the Washington Peace Declaration for the South Caucasus appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

• Turkish goals in the Black Sea region (BSR) are to maintain stability and its own strategic positioning within the region.

• Canadian cooperation with Türkiye continues to encounter challenges due to misaligned priorities and estrangement between actors.

• Canada has an opportunity to increase presence in the BSR by cooperating on initiatives outside of hard security concerns.

Policy Recommendations

• Canada should support the initiation of additional humanitarian projects in the BSR and seek out ways to partner with Türkiye on defence technology and modernization to strengthen overall diplomatic and defence relations.

• Increasing Canada’s regional presence around the BSR through NATO initiatives could help to bolster its image as a supportive ally to Türkiye while also helping project overall Canadian security interests.

Türkiye’s Foreign Policy post 2022

Türkiye has historically played an influential role in the Black Sea Region (BSR) as NATO’s southeastern bulwark. The gives Türkiye control over the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits, the key entry point of the Black Sea. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the BSR has been under wartime conditions. Türkiye has since invoked the Convention to effectively close the straits to both NATO and Russian ships; a decision which has nonetheless sparked controversy, particularly after Türkiye . Ankara remains apprehensive towards NATO involvement in the region, and while its relationship with the West is strained, it continues to maintain relations with Russia based on shared in the .

Türkiye, unlike most NATO countries, has , and still . At the same time, Türkiye has also . Türkiye’s seemingly contradictory policies reflect its primary goal: to maintain the existing balance of power in the BSR.

Türkiye’s stance is driven by independent interests rather an alignment with the West or Russia. For Türkiye, reinforcing the status quo reaffirms their military, economic, and diplomatic power in the BSR. Türkiye prioritizes business and trade to aid its struggling economy. It has also been increasingly positioning itself ; this has informed the country’s decisions to participate in the (a humanitarian-focused mission) and engage in peacemaking talks with Russia and Ukraine. Türkiye’s commitments are strategic, wishing to avoid provocation of either side while still leveraging their influence in military, resources, and politics.

Challenges for Canada

The major challenge for Canada will be to understand how to approach collaborations with Türkiye in the BSR. Estrangement and misalignment from both parties pose potential problems. Relations only recently improved after Canada following Türkiye’s use of Canadian arms in Nagorno-Karabakh, Libya, and Syria. Türkiye, through its refusal to sanction Russia or permit NATO military presence BSR, has demonstrated that it is not willing to explicitly target Russia. This clashes with Canada’s aim to contain Russian expansionism and protect Ukraine.

Canadian-Turkish military cooperation largely operates through NATO. Both countries participate in , , , and . While NATO provides a strong foundation, direct partnerships between Canadian and Turkish armed forces are still minimal, thus heightening the chances of estrangement between both sides.

Opportunities for Canada

Despite limitations, there are still opportunities to develop Canadian-Turkish diplomatic collaboration. Focusing on economic, humanitarian, or regional development initiatives creates common ground. For example, the defence industry is an area of growing partnership. Since Canada lifted the arms embargo on Türkiye, it has become one of Canada’s . Türkiye also participates in CANSEC (Canada’s international defence technology conference), and Turkish defence firms travelled to Canada as part of a . The exercise generated technology that enhances automated systems and increases resilience to hybrid offensives. For example, the firm HAVELSAN was able to . between the two countries also provide strong opportunities for investment and technological development which can have positive effects both for defence and for the overall economies of each country.

Building regional capacity is a promising avenue for cooperation. As mentioned above, Türkiye participates in FLF battlegroups, part of NATO’s . Pursuing similar initiatives in the scope of military modernization could be successful in increasing regional capacity. Furthermore, Canada can draw upon its skills in mediation and development to encourage stable, formal BSR organizations. Both actions can increase the ability for the BSR to safeguard against further destabilization in the region, which is beneficial to Turkish interests. The MCM was able to launch successfully in large part because it was framed as a humanitarian mission. This emphasizes the importance of optics for Türkiye, and should serve as an example of how to navigate different positionalities.

For Canada, the BSR can be a new avenue of partnership, increasing overall soft power and presence. A strong BSR is essential for NATO’s objective to defend Alliance territories. It is also essential for Canada’s efforts to enhance its defence posture and bolster international stability. However, without critically engaging with Türkiye this goal will be difficult to achieve. Therefore, finding relevant but non-conventional ways to collaborate in the BSR is key. Enhancing relations also align with other moves Türkiye has been making to collaborate more closely with other NATO and EU countries which seek similar goals as Canada. With an increasing need for fortification of the BSR, Canada should take the opportunity to distinguish itself as a valuable partner.

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Executive Summary

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has had far-reaching consequences for global security, particularly for regions and areas outside the European Union (EU), such as the South Caucasus, post-Soviet Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Mongolia. Although these areas are geographically far from the conflict zone, security ripple effects have been significant, as the Russian Federation has remained historically dominant and influential in these regions. However, the war in Ukraine has raised concerns about the security challenges and terrorism threats in Central Asia and South Caucasus.

This white paper explores the strategic consequences of Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine for broader security architecture with a focus on four critical areas: the South Caucasus, Central Asia, Mongolia, and Afghanistan. It offers a regional assessment of shifting military alignments, hybrid threats, counterterrorism dynamics, and Canada’s emerging security interests in this evolving landscape.

Key Findings

· Russia’s military overstretch has significantly weakened its role as a regional security guarantor, particularly in Central Asia and the South Caucasus.

· Traditional alliances are being re-evaluated; new security actors such as Turkiye, China, and smaller Western states are filling the resulting vacuum.

· Hybrid threats are rising in formerly Russian-dominated regions, increasing instability and risk.

· The resurgence of terrorism and border insecurity in Central Asia and Afghanistan poses renewed threats to regional and global stability.

· Canada has vital strategic interests in contributing to the mitigation of these risks, leveraging its role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and longstanding regional partnerships.

· Poland and Romania, as key actors in NATO and EU strategic initiatives, offer replicable models for Canadian-supported deterrence and resilience across Eurasia.

Introduction

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has not only redefined the contemporary nature of war but exposed deep strategic vulnerabilities within Europe’s security architecture. NATO’s eastern flank was shown to be underprepared for full-scale military aggression, and debates over enlargement and deterrence capabilities have been reinvigorated. Compounding this is the growing uncertainty surrounding US foreign policy under a second Trump administration, casting doubt on the consistency and reliability of transatlantic security commitments.

These shifting dynamics raise critical questions for states on the periphery of NATO and Russia’s former sphere of influence. As they navigate the emerging multipolar order, the need for new strategic calculations, and potentially, alternative or diversified security guarantees, has become paramount.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 marked a turning point in global security relations. While much focus has remained on NATO’s eastern flank and Western Europe, the war’s ripple effects are being acutely felt across post-Soviet Eurasia. Countries that once relied on Russia for military protection are now exploring new alignments, hedging their defense dependencies, or recalibrating their neutrality.

In addition, this war has been influencing NATO’s counterterrorism strategy. The war has created new opportunities for terrorist groups to exploit and ultimately increase their influence to fill the security vacuum. Among these groups we can mention IS-K/IS-KP – Islamic State in Khorasan Province, the branch of IS – Islamic State – which has been spreading its propaganda in Western societies as well. During the war, Russia has continued to be a trusted partner for Iran, hosting members of another radical group Hamas previously in Moscow. Anti-Western propaganda is familiar for Russia as it has often blamed Western countries in facilitating the rise of terrorist organizations. For example, Maria Zabolotskaya, deputy permanent representative of Russia in United Nations (UN), has argued that emergence of IS in the Middle East and Africa can be blamed on the failed US withdrawal and intervention in Iraq and Libya. She added that the situation in Afghanistan is a vivid example of the West leveraging counterterrorism issues to serve their “selfish geopolitical interests�.

This white paper examines the impacts of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on the South Caucasus, Central Asia, Mongolia, and Afghanistan, which have been historically influenced by Russian (and Soviet) military presence, as well as political and economic interests, but are navigating an increasingly fragmented and uncertain security environment. While it is true that the war may not be immediately felt within these regions, it will still nevertheless have significant indirect implications for regional security dynamics by potentially escalating terrorism and extremism. Groups like IS, Al-Qaeda, and other Islamist militant organizations remain active not only in conflict zones, but also in launching global terror operations.

For Canadian policymakers, these developments raise key questions about strategic engagement, NATO cooperation, counterterrorism strategy, and regional stability.

Methodology

This white paper employs a qualitative research design, utilizing a combination of primary and secondary sources to investigate the multifaceted challenges faced by selected states in the context of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Primary sources include government strategy papers, defense white papers, and formal statements issued by international organizations, such as NATO and the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE). Secondary sources include academic literature, policy briefs or analyses from research institutions or think tanks as well as insights derived from expert interviews.

A case study methodology underpins the country-level analysis, enabling in-depth examination of the geopolitical and security implications for Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, and Afghanistan. This approach facilitates comparative insights regarding the regional ramifications of the war in Ukraine, particularly concerning national resilience, foreign policy realignments, and security sector responses.

Historical and Geopolitical Context

For decades following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia maintained its influence over the South Caucasus and Central Asia through a combination of hard military presence, economic dependencies, and soft power. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), bilateral military treaties, and strategic basing agreements, such as those in Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, reflected Moscow’s central role in regional security. As have argued, Russia’s approach was rooted in the belief that the Eastern European neighbourhood should remain within its exclusive sphere of influence, serving both as a security buffer and a geopolitical assertion of status. However, the war in Ukraine has fundamentally destabilized this architecture.

Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine accelerated a visible erosion of Russia’s hegemonic posture in the broader Eurasian region. Yet this war did not begin in 2022; it is the culmination of a broader imperial strategy that began with Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia and the 2014 annexation of Crimea. These earlier incursions served as testing grounds for military aggression, hybrid warfare, and the West’s tolerance for territorial revisionism.

The 2008 war in Georgia, which resulted in the occupation of 20% of Georgian territory, was met with limited international pushback and no enduring deterrent mechanisms. This failure arguably emboldened the Kremlin’s further actions in Ukraine and elsewhere, reinforcing a perception of impunity. The erosion of credible deterrence, both conventional and hybrid, has challenged the assumptions underpinning NATO’s posture in Eastern Europe.

The war in Ukraine has also tested the transatlantic relationship, revealing an over-reliance on US leadership and exposing uncertainties about the durability of Western unity, particularly in light of shifts in American administrations. The conflict has reignited debates in Europe about strategic autonomy, defense investment, and burden-sharing within NATO.

While much attention remains focused on Ukraine, the shockwaves of the war have rippled well beyond its borders. Eurasia, particularly the South Caucasus, Central Asia, Mongolia, and Afghanistan have felt the tremors. These regions, historically shaped by Russia’s military and political dominance, now face a strategic vacuum. Russia’s overextension, domestic fragility, and inability to honor security commitments have altered the geopolitical balance. The result is a complex reordering of alliances, threat perceptions, and defense strategies across a vast and vulnerable geography.

Countries like Kazakhstan, traditionally aligned with Moscow, have resisted pressure to support the Kremlin’s war aims and have actively diversified their foreign policy strategies. Some scholars identify a growing trend of “strategic hedging� among Central Asian states, an effort to reduce overdependence on Russian security while cautiously engaging other powers. Meanwhile, Armenia’s disillusionment with the CSTO following Russia’s passivity during the 2020 and 2023 Nagorno-Karabakh crises reflects a broader questioning of Moscow’s reliability.

This erosion has created space for other actors. China, once cautious in its military profile, is now establishing a more visible security footprint in Central Asia. As Raffaello Pantucci (2023) notes, Beijing has invested in border surveillance, counterterrorism cooperation, and limited joint exercises in Tajikistan

and Kyrgyzstan. These changes indicate a transition from Russian-centric security alignment to multipolar, flexible, and interest-based configurations.

NATO’s role in Eurasian security is also undergoing a significant transformation. While formal enlargement remains politically sensitive, NATO has pursued partnership formats, especially with Georgia and, increasingly, Mongolia, to build interoperability and signal political support. Michael Rühle discusses the strategic importance of “NATO’s global partnerships,â€� which allow for flexible collaboration without formal membership. Georgia’s engagement through the NATO–Georgia Substantial Package has been one of the examples of this evolving cooperation. The Alliance’s “open doorâ€� policy is also being undermined by strategic ambiguity, raising doubts among aspirant states about the credibility of Western security guarantees.

In the Georgian case, what was once a society firmly committed to Euro-Atlantic integration has, in recent years, seen a partial retrenchment. Public support for NATO remains high, but political dynamics and growing disillusionment with Western inaction in the face of Russian occupation have fueled uncertainty. This creates both risk and opportunity: risk in the form of democratic backsliding and regional instability, and opportunity for Canada and NATO allies to re-engage with clear, consistent support for democratic reform and territorial integrity.

Yet, NATO’s ability to provide credible security guarantees short of membership remains contested. highlight how ambiguity in NATO’s posture toward aspirant states undermines deterrence and opens space for adversarial manipulation. These concerns are further compounded by shifting US policies and uncertain commitment levels, especially under new administrations. For states in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, this ambiguity feeds the appeal of diversification.

focuses on the new security landscape created by Russia’s war in Ukraine to adapt the new strategy of counter-terrorism and hybrid warfare. According to a particular NATO document, three main tasks has been identified: collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security. As analyzes, this document “identifies terrorism as one of the primary asymmetric threats to the alliance, alongside hybrid warfare…�. Also, the Washington Summit Declaration of 2024 highlighted to prevent the spread of radical ideologies and adapt the counter-terrorism policy.

mentions three main challenges for security architecture: “low-level terrorism,� digital “value chain,� and proliferation of arms. He suggests that NATO’s counter-terrorism strategy should take up a practice of selective reevaluation to answer new terrorism threats. As NATO’s adaptive strategy from the 1990s to the 2000s was focused on strengthening its counter-terrorism efforts, the new security landscape is reshaping NATO’s strategy to be more focused on answering these new threats connecting to arms trafficking from conflict zones. Stockhammer includes the example of when

The literature also emphasizes the growing prevalence of hybrid threats, disinformation campaigns, and covert paramilitary activity. theorize that hegemonic decline is often accompanied by a rise in grey zone tactics, as waning powers seek to maintain influence without triggering direct confrontation. Russia’s increased use of cyber and disinformation tools in Georgia and Kazakhstan supports this thesis. Similarly, China’s security strategy in Central Asia increasingly includes digital authoritarianism, with exported surveillance technologies and cyber-cooperation compacts.

These hybrid methods are particularly concerning in contexts of weak governance and democratic fragility, where external manipulation can exploit societal divisions. Scholars like have long warned about the vulnerability of aspiring democracies on Russia’s border, and recent events in Georgia and Armenia suggest that these vulnerabilities are being actively exploited in the post-Ukraine war environment.

The South Caucasus region – including Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan – remains vulnerable to terrorism largely due to its proximity to unstable areas such as the North Caucasus, Turkiye, and Iran, as well as the movement of foreign terrorist fighters (FTF) linked to conflicts in Syria and Iraq that have involved IS and other radical Islamist groups. These conflicts have created fertile ground for radicalization that some scholars suggest may further intensify the risk of radicalization; they express concern regarding the possibility of individuals returning home and further engaging with radical ideologies among local communities. While Armenia has been less affected by Islamist movements, the instability following the Karabakh conflict may nonetheless have left fertile ground for hybrid threats to form. In addition, there are concerns about Syrian militants (mainly from groups with ties to jihadist organizations) being transported to the South Caucasus to fight alongside Azerbaijani forces, particularly since the second Nagorno-Karabakh war. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine could exacerbate the , with some potentially being diverted to the South Caucasus, either

The Pankisi Gorge region in Georgia gained notoriety in the 2000s as a site of jihadist recruitment, a refuge site for Islamic militants, and a key transit route. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Western intelligence raised alarms on presence of Al-Qaeda in the Gorge. According to various sources, Arab foreign fighters who participated in the Chechen wars also received training in the region – a practice that Russia frequently cited in its accusations of Georgia harboring terrorists and failing to control its borders. From 2014 to 2015, Georgia re-emerged in international media coverage when IS rose to power in Iraq, drawing foreign fighters from around the world – including Georgia – to the battlefields of Iraq and subsequently, Syria. According to different sources, approximately 50 to 200 fighters left Georgia to fight in the ranks of IS or other terrorist organizations. As the war in Ukraine continues, it may present Russia with yet another opportunity to accuse others of providing safe haven to foreign terrorist fighters.

Recent reflections, including by , highlight that international engagement in Afghanistan, particularly by Western powers including Canada, was compromised by flawed diplomatic design and operational fragmentation. In his assessment of the , Rahim identifies key failures such as the exclusion of the Afghan government, unrealistic timelines imposed by the United States, and a lack of impartial mediation as primary factors in the collapse of political settlement efforts. These deficiencies, compounded by internal divisions among Afghan elites, resulted in a fragile negotiating structure vulnerable to collapse under Taliban pressure. Canada’s mission, like that of its NATO allies, was constrained by unclear objectives and shifting operational mandates, a point echoed by Canadian commentators in major outlets like The Globe and Mail (2023).

The collapse of the Afghan Republic and the Taliban’s return to power has had immediate and long-term security spillovers in the region. Central Asian states are particularly concerned about cross-border terrorism, refugee surges, narcotics trafficking, and the spread of extremist ideologies. With Russia distracted and weakened by its invasion of Ukraine, and China reluctant to assume deep security commitments, the region

faces a growing vacuum of counterterrorism leadership. In this context, Rahim’s critique serves as a cautionary framework for future interventions: local legitimacy, inclusive diplomacy, and long-term strategic alignment must form the foundation of external engagement. Canada’s policy going forward should include lessons learned from Afghanistan’s collapse, as well as new mechanisms to support border-state resilience through coordinated regional intelligence, multilateral diplomacy, and support for community-level stabilization initiatives.

Afghanistan, however, presents another dimension of strategic instability. The US forces withdrawal and the Taliban’s return to power have turned the country into a potential source of terrorist activity and transnational criminal networks. Reports by the International Crisis Group and the United States Institute of Peace warn of the risks posed by IS-KP and other extremist groups to regional security, particularly in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. The new atmosphere gave more flexibility to various extremist groups to regroup or collaborate with each other. There are three main terrorist groups operating in Afghanistan now: the .

Afghanistan falling to Taliban rule has created a multitude of challenges for international relations. Despite the fact that no country or international organization formally recognizes the leadership of Taliban, some maintain diplomatic relations. Central Asian countries such as Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan continue to engage in diplomatic talks with Taliban, focusing mostly on regional economic issues. All five Central Asian states have kept embassies in Kabul despite the fallout.

As Russia focuses more on Ukraine, IS-KP has more possibility to increase its influence outside Afghanistan too. IS-KP is estimated to have about , including foreign recruits from Central Asia and Europe. IS-KP carried out its first terrorist attack at Kabul airport immediately after the US military withdrawal in 2021, signaling its intent to challenge the Taliban for control over Afghanistan. As result of the , 170 Afghans and 13 US militants were killed. And although IS has lost its territorial strongholds in Iraq and Syria, the group has nonetheless quickly shifted its strategy to forming smaller factions across various countries: “�.

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has expressed concern over the situation in Afghanistan and IS-KP since the US withdrawal in 2021. As Vladimir Voronkov, UN Under-Secretary-General mentioned, “�. In this context, some scholars consider IS-KP as the most formidable extremist group, with . It has plotted more terrorist attacks since 2021 when Taliban came to power. The reasons of the increased terrorist attacks are the tactical shift that began in 2019 and chaos and vacuum in Afghanistan. while the Taliban referred to IS-KP members as Salafis or Khawarij, or heretical extremists.

It is important to mention that IS-KP members, which became one of the main threats for the security of Afghanistan and Central Asia, who organize terrorist attacks in Afghanistan, are from Central Asian countries and mainly, Tajikistan. For example, the first terrorist attack following the onset of the Ukraine war occurred in Kabul in 2022 and was carried out by of IS. In March 2023, a Tajik militant assassinated the , , who had been a promient figure in the fight against the IS-KP network in Nangarhar. Later, in December 2023, a member from Central Asia residing in Germany . These attacks were flollowed by several terrorist attacks in Iran – killing 90 people – and Turkiye – killing one person.

This continued into 2024, where IS-KP orchestrated a series of terrorist attacks across Afghanistan. Among the most notable was an assault on , the Afghan Taliban governor of Nimroz, who narrowly escaped execution by a faction of IS-KP Tajik member. On March 21, 2024, an Uzbek national affiliated with . Following this, IS expanded its operations beyond the Khorasan region and launched several high-profile attacks. Among them was a widely publicized suicide bombing in Kerman province, Iran, during the anniversary procession of the General Qassem Soleimani’s death. According to the Iranian investigators, one of the terrorists was of who had received training instructions in Afghanistan (Table 1).

Furthermore, among those noteworthy included terrorist attacks attributed to IS-KP on March 24, 2024, which saw Tajik nationals storm and kill 145 people. Such terrorist attacks showed the tendency, that since IS-KP became active in Afghanistan, more individuals from Central Asian countries – mainly ethnic Tajiks – have been engaged in terrorist activities. This trend created the fertile ground for radicalization in Central Asia’s region that already experienced Islamic radical movements in the 1990s.

2025 was no exception to terrorist violence, as several high-profile terrorist attacks in Turkiye and Russia took place. In an effort to thwart future terrorist attacks, the Turkish government carried out a series of operations targeting IS cells across the country. More than three hundred individuals were arrested, most of them originating from Central Asia. Subsequent investigations revealed that several of the detainees were high-ranking members of the IS-KP network operating across Central Asia, Turkiye, and the Caucasus.

Due to IS-KP’s terrorist activities beyond Afghanistan’s borders, neighbouring countries – particularly in – have found it necessary to engage with the Taliban, not only to pursue counterterrorism objectives but to also advance their own economic and political interests in the region. Unlike the IS-KP, which poses a greater regional security threat, the Taliban has been viewed as a more viable partner in reshaping the regional security landscape. Central Asian countries have maintained their embassies in Kabul, signaling a pragmatic approach to diplomacy with Taliban governance. As Turgunbaeva & Ghiasi suggest, for Central Asian countries, the Taliban proves to be the better partner than IS-KP, as the latter has already attacked two Central Asian countries: Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Additionally, while China seeks stability in Afghanistan for fulfilling the interests served by the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and to prevent the spread the radical ideology, Central Asian countries also try to stabilize the region.

The persistence of Central Asian militants remains an overwhelming challenge to international security. Since 2023, the region has been a wellspring of terrorist operations organized by its nationals, whose reach has extended from Europe to the Middle East. These attacks, carried out across countries such as Iran, Russia, Afghanistan, and Turkiye, bear the unmistakable imprint of Central Asian involvement. Although, despite the troubling export of violence, the post-Soviet Central Asian states themselves have, thus far, remained largely untouched by such acts of terrorism on their own soil.

Uzbekistan was the first country to host a Taliban delegation, led by the Deputy Prime Minister Mawlawi Abdul Salam Hanafi in September 2022. In 2024 the Uzbek Prime Minister visited Kabul to discuss the trade projects. Kyrgyzstan’s relations with Afghanistan continue to be shaped in part by the presence of a strong Afghan-Kyrgyz minority in the nation. In 2021, Deputy Chairman of the Security Council Taalatbek Masadykov met with Taliban ministers to address issues important to this Afghan-Kyrgyz electorate. In September 2024, cooperation had expanded to include trade and energy infrastructure, which was soon followed by agreements in agriculture and transit.

Kazakhstan has focused its engagement with Afghanistan on economic opportunities, particularly in the chemical, mining, and metallurgical sectors. The Kazak Prime Minister led a delegation to Kabul to participate in a Kazakhstan-Afghanistan business forum, highlighting growing bilateral commercial ties.

Tajikistan, despite being the main regional opponent of the Taliban, has established trade relations with Afghanistan and signed an agreement worth $120 million USD. In addition, in 2023, Tajikistan opened five joint border markets with Afghanistan.

Turkmenistan maintains a neutral stance and primarily engages with Afghanistan through the lens of energy cooperation. Its principal interest lies in the progress of the TAPI – Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India gas pipeline. As a result, Turkmen officials’ meetings with the Taliban have mostly focused on advancing this strategic energy TAPI project.

While not a formal diplomatic move, the US has also begun to engage with the Taliban on a limited basis. On March 23, 2025, they removed three high-profile members of the Haqqani network – including Sirajuddin Haqqani, the group’s leader and the Taliban’s acting Interior Minister – from its most-wanted list. According to the Taliban, are Sirajuddin Haqqani’s brother and nephew.

The United States added the Haqqani Network as one of the deadliest groups connected to Taliban – operating in Pakistan and bordering Afghanistan – to the foreign terrorist organizations list in 2012. In doing so, they offered $5 to 10 USD reward for information leading to the capture of its leaders. However, , causing larger questions to arise regarding the future role and presence of US hegemony in the region. As scholars mention, this removal followed the Taliban’s release of US citizen George Glezmann, who had been detained in Afghanistan since 2022.

With Russia weakened and NATO’s reach limited, alternative security and development frameworks have gained prominence. The Central Asia–Caucasus–Europe (CACE) corridor, for example, envisions a strategic and economic bridge from Central Asia through the South Caucasus to Europe, bypassing Russian-controlled routes and creating new geoeconomic fault lines. Meanwhile, the , spearheaded by Poland and supported by NATO allies, connects the Adriatic, Baltic, and Black Seas in a project of economic resilience, energy diversification, and digital infrastructure.

In considering NATO members’ strategic roles, Romania has been emphasized in discussions about NATO’s deterrence on the eastern flank and the EU’s updated Black Sea Strategy (). Romania stands at the intersection of NATO’s military initiatives and the EU’s efforts to enhance connectivity, economic resilience, and maritime security in the Black Sea. Also, Poland’s assertive role in the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) highlights a regional approach to infrastructure, energy security, and defense cooperation. The 3SI provides a framework for enhanced Central European resilience in the face of growing Russian assertiveness and fluctuating US involvement in Europe.

Graham highlights Mongolia’s position as a neutral buffer balancing Russian and Chinese pressures. The Ukraine war has further encouraged Mongolia to diversify security and economic partnerships, including through engagement with Canada and other liberal democracies. Mongolia is geographically distant from Ukraine, although the war’s influence on global security dynamics may affect the region’s stability and terrorism risks. Mongolia is close to China and Russia, rendering them an indirect target for the potential exporting of radical ideologies from the extremist groups. As a neutral power between China and Russia, Mongolia may be targeted by the extremist groups allied with the Russian and Chinese state – countries which are on the same side in Ukraine war.

Mongolia recognizes the global threat that terrorism and violent extremist present to an increasingly uncertain and multipolar world. Since 2023, Mongolia has been a member of the UN Office Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) program and established the Passenger Information Unit of Mongolia. It became the fourth country to join this program and the first Asian country to establish an UNOCT unit (). According to the UN representative of Mongolia, the country is continuing to take steps to increase awareness of, and fight against, disinformation and propaganda. In 2024, Mongolia hosted the conference titled “Addressing the prevailing Digital Information Disorder: Countering the Use of the Internet by Terrorists and Extremists,� organized by OSCE Transnational Threats Department together with the National Counter-Terrorism Council of Mongolia (). In addition, the “Case for Central Asia–Caucasus Engagement� () proposes a new strategic platform to integrate diplomatic, development, and deterrence policy toward post-Soviet Eurasia. This vision aligns closely with Canada’s potential for flexible engagement and soft security.

Against this backdrop, countries are hedging their bets. While some still look to NATO as the ultimate guarantor, others have diversified their options, seeking bilateral arrangements, new regional alignments, or transactional partnerships with authoritarian powers. Strategic pluralism, rather than bloc politics, defines the new Eurasian security order.

Canadian Strategic Engagement

Poland, through its leadership in the Three Seas Initiative (3SI), represents a strategic anchor for Central and Eastern Europe in countering Russian influence and fostering Euro-Atlantic cooperation. As highlighted by , Poland has played a central role in building regional infrastructure, energy interconnectivity, and digital resilience across the 3SI member states. These efforts reduce dependency on Russian-controlled supply lines and enhance regional autonomy in the face of hybrid and conventional threats.

The 3SI complements broader NATO and EU frameworks by focusing on practical development and connectivity between the Adriatic, Baltic, and Black Seas. For countries in the South Caucasus and Central

Asia, it offers a vision of post-Soviet regionalism that emphasizes integration, resilience, and Western alignment. Integrating the Three Seas Initiative into Canadian policy considerations provides a valuable model for aligning economic development with security stabilization across the broader post-Soviet periphery.

As regional actors seek to build more autonomous strategic and economic futures, new frameworks such as the proposed Central Asia–Caucasus–Europe (CACE) corridor have gained traction. The CACE initiative, as highlighted by The National Interest (2025), envisions a geoeconomic and geopolitical link connecting Central Asia and the South Caucasus directly to Europe, bypassing traditional Russian-controlled routes. The corridor promotes diversified energy exports, secure supply chains, and multilateral infrastructure cooperation. It also reinforces the strategic importance of Georgia and Azerbaijan as transit hubs between East and West.

In this context, offers an alternative regional architecture that counters Russian and Chinese monopolies on overland infrastructure. For Canada, supporting such corridors may serve dual objectives: reducing regional dependency on adversarial actors, and facilitating sustainable development and security cooperation among emerging democracies. Integrating the CACE vision into Canadian foreign policy also complements NATO’s military posture with a civilian, development-focused track aimed at long-term stabilization.

Recent policy commentary underscores two interlinked narratives in Eurasia’s evolving security order: the significance of credible NATO-aligned deterrence models (as seen in Romania), and the consequences of softening international stances toward Russia’s occupation of Crimea. Recognizing Russia’s annexation of Crimea as legitimate would embolden other revisionist powers and fundamentally erode international legal norms regarding sovereignty. Meanwhile, Romania has demonstrated how mid-sized NATO allies can reinforce the alliance’s eastern posture through infrastructure development, multinational coordination, and hybrid threat management.

These examples illustrate the critical importance of defending international legal standards and investing in alliance readiness. Canada’s strategic outlook would benefit from incorporating these dual lessons: defending non-recognition policies in contested regions like Crimea while simultaneously learning from NATO forward-deployed frameworks in countries like Romania. Taken together, these academic and policy perspectives provide the analytical foundation for understanding Eurasia’s post-Ukraine security recalibration – and for formulating Canada’s strategic options in response.

Regional Security Implications

Across the South Caucasus, Central Asia, Mongolia, and Afghanistan, Russia’s declining influence has triggered regional realignments, new threat landscapes, and emerging opportunities for external engagement. For Canada, understanding these dynamics is critical to shaping effective policy responses.

In the South Caucasus, Armenia has grown increasingly disillusioned with Russia, particularly following Moscow’s failure to act during Azerbaijan’s 2023 offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh. Yerevan is now actively pursuing closer ties with the EU and the United States. Azerbaijan, meanwhile, has capitalized on Russia’s invasion in Ukraine to boost its military cooperation with Turkiye and Israel, positioning itself as a dominant regional power. Georgia, while maintaining its strategic commitment to NATO integratio

struggle with domestic political instability and the enduring occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Russian forces.

In Central Asia, countries like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have distanced themselves from Moscow’s geopolitical agenda. Kazakhstan notably refused to recognize Russia’s annexation of Ukrainian territories, reaffirming its commitment to territorial integrity as a core foreign policy principle. Kazakhstan has deepened defense partnerships with Turkiye, NATO, and select Western actors, while Uzbekistan – traditionally outside the CSTO – has pursued independent counterterrorism and security dialogues with the United States and China. China’s growing footprint, especially in Tajikistan, highlights Beijing’s transactional interest in border security and regime stability rather than full-spectrum defense cooperation.

At the same time, the region is facing increased pressure from transnational threats. The reassertion of Taliban control in Afghanistan and the resurgence of IS-KP have heightened fears of terrorism, arms trafficking, and extremist ideology spilling into Central Asia. Weak border management capacities and the erosion of Russia’s traditional role as a security bulwark have created a dangerous vacuum. Parallel to these trends, cyber and information warfare have intensified. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and others have been targeted by Russian disinformation campaigns aiming to undermine public trust in democratic institutions and discourage Western engagement. These hybrid threats have led to growing interest in cyber cooperation with NATO-aligned actors.

Mongolia, long maintaining a neutral foreign policy posture, is also recalibrating. Concerns about Russian unpredictability and Chinese dominance have pushed Ulaanbaatar to pursue closer security and economic ties with democratic partners, including the US, Japan, and Canada. Mongolia’s strategic location and democratic credentials position it as a valuable partner for middle-power engagement.

Afghanistan remains a critical axis of instability. The Taliban’s unchecked consolidation of power, Russia’s diminished role, and China’s limited security ambition have allowed terrorist groups such as IS-KP to flourish. Cross-border smuggling of arms and narcotics continues to destabilize the region. For bordering states like Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, this poses a direct security threat, prompting interest in greater intelligence-sharing and joint counterterrorism mechanisms.

Together, these developments suggest that Canada has an opportunity to deepen its role as a stabilizing actor. This includes advancing NATO partnerships, co-sponsoring cybersecurity and counterterrorism initiatives, and investing in diplomatic and development programs that enhance regional resilience.

Future Security Scenarios and Policy Recommendations

remains one of the most significant violations of international law in recent history. Recognizing this act, or failing to robustly oppose it, would send dangerous signals to other revisionist powers seeking to alter borders by force. As noted in the analysis by The National Interest (2024), legitimizing Russia’s control over Crimea would reward aggression and erode international norms surrounding sovereignty and territorial integrity.

For aspiring NATO-aligned nations such as Georgia and Moldova, the failure to maintain a firm stance on Crimea undermines the credibility of international deterrence. It also emboldens separatist movements supported by external powers, particularly in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria. In Central Asia,

states with Russian-speaking minorities observe the situation closely, wary of Moscow’s justifications for intervention under the pretense of “protecting compatriots.�

Canada’s unwavering support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity remains essential. Backsliding on Crimea would not only harm Kyiv’s war effort but also undermine Canadian diplomatic credibility across Eurasia. As part of NATO’s eastern flank engagement, Canadian policymakers must continue advocating for non-recognition, bolster security assistance to at-risk states, and ensure hybrid threats exploiting ambiguous status territories do not escalate into new conflicts.

Romania has emerged as a pivotal actor in NATO’s Black Sea strategy, showcasing how smaller but committed allies can meaningfully reinforce alliance posture in contested regions. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Romania rapidly expanded its defense spending, modernized its armed forces, and upgraded key infrastructure, including the Mihail Kogălniceanu Air Base — set to become one of NATO’s largest air hubs in Europe. Romania’s role is further reinforced through its leadership in regional maritime security efforts, including trilateral cooperation with Bulgaria and Turkiye to counter drifting mines in the Black Sea.

Moreover, Romania has played a critical role in supporting Ukraine’s economic resilience by facilitating the transit of over 29 million tons of Ukrainian grain through its ports, despite Russian attempts to blockade Black Sea maritime routes. It also hosts the Headquarters Multinational Corps Southeast in Sibiu, enhancing NATO’s regional command and control capacity in crisis scenarios.

Canada can view Romania as a strategic partner and operational hub within NATO’s Black Sea architecture. Joint participation in military exercises would help build interoperability with Romanian and other allied forces. Canada could contribute cyber defense expertise, helping Romania counter hybrid threats and disinformation campaigns that have intensified in the region. Infrastructure support and humanitarian collaboration could also be explored to reinforce Canada’s commitment to Eastern European security and resilience. This model of NATO-aligned deterrence in Romania can serve as a valuable reference for engaging other aspirant or front-line states, particularly Georgia and Armenia, as they navigate uncertain security environments amid a weakening Russian presence and ambiguous Western guarantees.

As Eurasian states reassess their security futures in the post-Ukraine context, two contrasting strategic directions are emerging:

Option A: NATO as a security anchor despite its limited footprint beyond Eastern Europe, some aspirant states (like Georgia) still view the alliance as the ultimate guarantor of their sovereignty and territorial integrity. For these countries, deepening interoperability with NATO standards, participating in joint exercises, and securing bilateral defense commitments from individual NATO members are seen as vital steps toward eventual membership or at least enhanced deterrence.

Option B: Strategic diversification and bilateral guarantees given uncertainties surrounding NATO’s future enlargement and potential policy shifts under a new US administration, other regional actors may opt for diversified security partnerships. This could include closer defense ties with China, or even non-aligned groupings. These actors may pursue flexible arrangements that prioritize regime security, border control, or cyber defense, rather than full-spectrum alliance integration.

Strategic Recommendations for Canada

• Expand NATO regional initiatives through technical support and military training missions.

• Deepen defense cooperation with Mongolia, Georgia, and Kazakhstan.

• Invest in regional CT capacity-building, particularly in border zones adjacent to Afghanistan.

• Contribute to hybrid threat awareness and resilience by supporting anti-disinformation programs.

• Engage multilaterally in regional defense forums, including OSCE dialogues and confidence-building platforms.

• Enhance counterterrorism cooperation with Central Asian Republics, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Mongolia

• Participate on framing the Security Policy and border control mechanisms together with Central Asian and South Caucasus countries

• Deradicalization programs – several countries in the region of Central Asia and South Caucasus have implemented de-radicalization programs to counter extremist ideologies – collaborating in adopting such programs will facilitate the process that thus far, been struggling to gain political traction.

• Advance Strategic Engagement with CACE states through:
  • Backing multilateral efforts that increase the corridor’s resilience to hybrid threats.
  • Encouraging diplomatic alignment with CACE-participating states as part of Canada’s broader Eurasia engagement strategy
  • Supporting infrastructure financing and regional governance frameworks through international institutions.
• Consider engagement with the 3SI through:
  • Investment in critical infrastructure and digital connectivity projects led by trusted allies like Poland.
  • Policy dialogue and technical assistance in the 3SI’s energy and cyber defense pillars.
  • Support for South Caucasus participation in transregional linkages with 3SI corridors, particularly through Georgia.

Conclusion

The ripple effects of Russia’s war in Ukraine extend far beyond Europe. In Eurasia, the reshuffling of defense alignments and emergence of new security actors are already reshaping the regional landscape. Canada, as a capable actor within NATO and the global security community, must engage strategically to protect its interests, support its allies, and contribute to long-term regional stability.

This white paper underscores the urgency of proactive engagement across counterterrorism and multilateral defense diplomacy. The evolving security vacuum must be addressed with foresight, allied coordination, and a renewed commitment to regional security partnerships.

Canada has both a responsibility and an opening. By advancing its contributions to NATO’s deterrence efforts, supporting resilience-focused development corridors like the Three Seas Initiative and the Central

Asia–Caucasus–Europe platform, and deepening counterterrorism cooperation with frontline states, Canada can reinforce stability and uphold democratic values in an increasingly contested region.

Table 1

The post Beyond the Battlefield: The Effects of Russia’s War in Ukraine on the Regional Security in the South Caucasus, Central Asia, Mongolia and Afghanistan appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

The Kyrgyz Republic’s under-digitised public healthcare system presents an emerging vector for foreign digital influence and strategic vulnerability. As China advances its global data ambitions through the Digital Silk Road and affiliated Health Silk Road, Beijing is positioning itself to dominate the digitisation of Kyrgyzstan’s public healthcare system by offering technologies often tied to opaque governance and hidden data extraction risks. 

The health sector, often overlooked in traditional security assessments, contains vast quantities of personal and biometric data. In the absence of competitive alternatives, Kyrgyzstan risks entrenching Chinese digital standards, undermining its data sovereignty —a crucial component of strategic autonomy —and becoming increasingly dependent on authoritarian-aligned technologies.

China’s Digital Expansion and Kyrgyzstan’s Authoritarian Drift

Once viewed as an in post-Soviet Central Asia, the Kyrgyz Republic has taken an increasingly under the regime of President Sadyr Japarov. While domestic drivers underpin this trajectory, China’s has provided essential support (for further context, see: Exporting Surveillance: China’s Authoritarian Blueprint in the Kyrgyz Republic).Ìý

, long considered apolitical and largely removed from most conversations about security and strategic autonomy, is emerging as a new frontier. As Kyrgyzstan its health sector, Beijing has developed attractive and under the banner of the . These are often deployed under non-transparent agreements that provide state-affiliated corporations access to data that can facilitate , , , and of populations. 

Biometric Data and Medical Records: An Overlooked Threat

data refers to unique physiological characteristics used to identify individuals. In the context of healthcare, this includes high-tech identifiers such as facial scans, fingerprints, and retinal patterns, as well as lower-tech data like height, weight, blood type, dental records, menstrual cycles, and handwritten signatures. While this may seem innocuous, when combined with the wider scope of , these figures become inadvertently sensitive. 

For example, menstrual cycle data can signal pregnancy, fertility patterns, and reproductive irregularities, making it highly valuable in contexts where states seek to control reproduction. In China, where population management has historically been enforced through the and, more recently, through the of Uyghur women in Xinjiang, the raises serious security and human rights concerns. 

As Chinese–Kyrgyz relations deepen, particularly through security and technological cooperation involving the increased monitoring and surveillance of Kyrgyzstan’s Uyghur population. This extension of surveillance infrastructure, combined with the digitisation of health data, risks replicating the same reproductive control measures seen in Xinjiang.

Access to a nation’s health records and biometric data also provides information about the population’s demographics, such as death rates, birth rates, and infant mortality. In addition to these historical security concerns about population demographics, this data can also current health risks and disparities, and forecast future health outcomes like disease outbreaks. The potential for misuse makes this information particularly vulnerable in insecure or foreign-controlled digital systems.

Unauthorised access to biometric and health data is a . It can enable foreign actors to monitor populations, coerce political figures, or target dissent. In authoritarian contexts, such data can be weaponised to suppress opposition and influence the behaviour of populations. , while framed as developmental aid, threaten to introduce asymmetric dependencies, data extraction risks, and strategic leverage over host governments.

Without robust safeguards or competitive alternatives, Kyrgyzstan’s adoption of foreign digital infrastructure risks eroding data sovereignty, weakening institutional independence, and embedding long-term vulnerabilities that can be exploited for geopolitical influence.

Healthcare Vulnerabilities 

Kyrgyzstan’s healthcare system, shaped by Soviet-era centralisation, has since independence through reforms and international partnerships. It now delivers both private care through clinics as well as publicly funded universal care. The public sector of healthcare remains underdeveloped and largely paper-based. Digital systems, where they exist, are fragmented, lacking both interoperability and .

This systemic weakness has real-world consequences. During a research visit to Kyrgyzstan in the summer of 2025, I sustained multiple injuries in a mountain biking accident and was treated at Bishkek’s National Hospital. While clinical care was excellent, the lack of digital infrastructure was stark: I had to photograph CT scans and X-rays with my personal smartphone and carry handwritten medical records between appointments. This informal data handling not only complicates care but also demonstrates the demand for the digitisation of Kyrgyz healthcare.

My experience is not unique. From conversations with medical professionals across Kyrgyzstan, diagnostic imaging, lab results, and patient histories are stored in siloed or offline systems with minimal security protocols. These conditions create strategic vulnerabilities, particularly as China offers digital solutions through the Health Silk Road, accompanied by opaque contracts and back-end access provisions.

Policy Recommendation

To mitigate the growing influence of Chinese digital infrastructure and strengthen Kyrgyzstan’s strategic autonomy, Canada should take a proactive role in supporting the digitisation of Kyrgyzstan’s public healthcare system. This sector, which is rich in sensitive personal and biometric data, is increasingly targeted by China through its Digital and Health Silk Road initiatives. By supporting secure, interoperable, and rights-respecting alternatives, Canada can help prevent the entrenchment of authoritarian digital norms and reduce Kyrgyzstan’s dependency on foreign-controlled platforms.

Canada is well-positioned to contribute meaningfully. With in public health, , and , Canada can offer technical support, capacity-building, and policy guidance grounded in transparency and accountability. This effort should align with ongoing multilateral initiatives, such as the , and be framed as part of a broader push to reinforce democratic digital governance in a strategically contested region.

Beyond technical assistance, this is also an opportunity for Canada to repair and reframe its relationship with Kyrgyzstan, particularly in light of the reputational damage caused by the . Supporting the digitisation of Kyrgyzstan’s healthcare system, which is a vital public service that directly affects citizens’ daily lives, would demonstrate Canada’s commitment to inclusive, rights-based development and offer a constructive step forward in strengthening bilateral cooperation. It would also allow Canada to project soft power, build goodwill, and lead by example in a region where democratic engagement is urgently needed to counterbalance rising authoritarian influence.

Conclusion

Kyrgyzstan’s underdeveloped and fragmented digital health infrastructure has created a strategic vacuum which has increasingly been filled by Chinese technologies deployed through the Health Silk Road. While these systems are marketed as development tools, they often come bundled with embedded dependencies that undermine data sovereignty and weaken institutional resilience. In an era where biometric and health data have become strategic assets, the digitisation of public services like healthcare is no longer a purely technical matter. It is now a question of national security and democratic integrity.

Amid China’s expanding digital influence and Russia’s declining regional engagement post-2022, Kyrgyzstan faces a narrowing set of choices. Without meaningful alternatives, it risks entrenching authoritarian-aligned technologies that could shape not only its healthcare system but also its political and civic landscape.

Canada has both the normative interest and the technical capacity to offer an alternative. By supporting the secure, rights-based digitisation of Kyrgyzstan’s healthcare sector, Canada can reinforce democratic digital norms, help safeguard strategic autonomy, and re-engage with a region that has seen limited Canadian involvement since 2021. Such a contribution would signal a shift toward inclusive, citizen-focused development, moving beyond a low-intensity economic relationship, towards a constructive, long-term partnership.

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Through the multi-nodal design of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Chinese state has developed a “â€� level of structural coercion in the nations of Central Asia. These function as hubs of communication within decentralised networks of information sharing and technological exchange. Such a degree of interconnection is embedded within aspects of “,â€� a concept which describes how dominant states leverage asymmetric access to global networks (such as trade, finance, or technology) to exert coercive influence over weaker states. Within the CCP’s BRI project, this dynamic enables China to entrench its strategic control while projecting stability under its own terms. The states of Central Asia (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan) are growing more susceptible to Beijing’s influence, not only due to proximity and economic dependency but also through the increasing centralisation of technology. China’s broader strategy seeks to export its model of illiberal governance and to implement security-oriented practices, including surveillance, policing, and border control, that reflect a broader process of regional securitisation. 

These efforts are tightly interwoven with economic and technological interdependence, enabling Beijing to through weaponised interdependence. This strategy is met not just with passive acquiescence but with active enthusiasm from domestic actors in the Kyrgyz Republic, where a growing appetite for authoritarian governance provides Beijing with willing partners. Kyrgyzstan’s underrepresentation in Western strategic discourse, despite its geographic proximity to Xinjiang and growing entanglement with Chinese security initiatives, makes it an essential focal point for assessing China’s regional ambitions. While conducting fieldwork in Kyrgyzstan, I encountered firsthand how securitisation and digital surveillance shape movement, access, and everyday life. These experiences inform the analytical lens of this paper and underscore the tangible impact of China’s expanding security architecture in the region. Through weaponised interdependence and a decentralised network of private and state actors, Beijing has embedded itself into the core of Central Asia’s security landscape, with the Kyrgyz Republic offering a compelling case study of how local political dynamics can both enable and amplify China’s authoritarian export model. Ultimately, China’s influence under the Belt and Road framework presents not only an economic opportunity for Central Asia, but a growing risk of entrenched authoritarian governance, regional dependency, and diminished sovereignty.

Structural Coercion Through Multi-Nodal Interdependence

The increasing complication and centralisation of technology has allowed Beijing to emerge as a global leader in the ever-changing technological sector. With this increased complexity and centralisation, Beijing has moved to implement the “� framework, which would see China become the primary global data hub. This hegemony of technology grants the CCP oversight over a wide range of data flows, including cross-border communications, financial transactions, e-commerce logistics, biometric records, and metadata. While not overtly coercive at this stage, this interdependence creates structural asymmetries that China may later exploit as leverage, a dynamic explored in subsequent sections.

Coacting with the multi-nodal structure of the BRI and the growing digitisation and technological dominance, China has established the “â€� (BRNSIS), which utilises private actors, primarily Chinese private security contractors. These actors primarily assist Chinese embassies in Central Asia with information gathering, accessible to various government institutions through a centralized database. Chinese private security contractors employed by the BRNSIS in gathering intelligence, which is stored in a centralised database accessible across Chinese government ministries, enhancing the state’s ability to coordinate regional surveillance. In addition, growing trade networks with Central Asia have also provided power asymmetries that allow for growing data gathering from individual traders acting as independent nodes. 

Targeting the Uyghur Diaspora: Exporting Securitisation

As China begins consolidating its influence in Central Asia, largely replacing Russia as the regional hegemon post-2022, the diaspora Uyghur population has fallen victim to methodologies of Beijing’s securitisation. are a Turkic Muslim ethnic group indigenous to the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in western China. Since 2017, China has faced widespread international condemnation for its of over a million Uyghurs in so-called “reeducationâ€� camps, with some governments, , labelling these policies as genocide. Many Uyghurs have fled persecution and now live in Central Asian countries, where they remain under the surveillance and coercive reach of Chinese security practices. In Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, has been sold to authoritarian regimes to identify political dissidents and protest participants. As this technology becomes increasingly centralised, Chinese intelligence services also gain , which they can use to identify individuals deemed security threats, particularly among the Uyghur diaspora in Central Asia. While Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan possess deeper bilateral relations with China in terms of security, the Kyrgyz Republic, which, along with Kazakhstan, borders the region of Xinjiang, does not possess this same set of relations. However, the Chinese and Kyrgyz states have begun with joint policing exercises directed towards anti-terrorist measures. The lack of formalised security ties suggests that China’s model of regional influence does not rely solely on official agreements. It also operates through ad hoc cooperation, technological penetration, and strategic pressure, especially in states like Kyrgyzstan, where domestic authoritarian appetites are beginning to align with Beijing’s interests.

Kyrgyzstan’s Security Alignment with Beijing Post-2016

Largely influencing this alignment of Kyrgyz domestic security with Chinese regional objectives was the 2016 Chinese embassy bombing in the Kyrgyz capital of Bishkek. In the of the attack, China began rejecting visas to Kyrgyz citizens and applied pressure to the Kyrgyz state to hold the perpetrators accountable and release the information gathered during the investigation. The State Committee on National Security (GKNB) found that it was a targeted committed by the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (), a transnational Uyghur organisation active across Central Asia.

Three years later, in 2019, a new police command centre was established in Bishkek, incorporating the same used in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. A protest, which developed into a riot, took place soon after the completion of the police command centre, fueled by Kyrgyz fears over in the nation. Public hostility toward Beijing’s influence was fueled by rising Chinese immigration into the Kyrgyz Republic and reports of in “vocational education training centresâ€� in Xinjiang. 

The SCO, RATS, and Authoritarian Learning

Within the construction of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), there is a strong focus on anti-terrorism efforts, emphasised by the pillar of the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS). Within the framework of RATS, cooperation across member states to promote is encouraged. In June 2023, Kyrgyz Interior Ministry representatives travelled to Xinjiang for demonstrations , which showcased crowd control and counterterrorism techniques. At the conclusion of the visit, representatives of both countries under which Chinese security officials “will conduct and organise training for (Kyrgyz) employees of police districts adjacent to the border.â€� As China will gain utility from increased regional cooperation and subsequent codependency, the Kyrgyz delegation, under the growing authoritarianism of the Japarov regime, into building an improved surveillance state. This reflects a domestic openness in Kyrgyzstan to adopt illiberal governance models, revealing a reciprocal dynamic where China’s export of authoritarian practices meets local political appetite, thus enhancing both states’ objectives. According to the Interior Ministry statement, had opportunities “to study new achievements in the digitalization of the Chinese police, to familiarize themselves with the work of the police using unmanned aerial vehicles, to study methods of combating religious extremism … (and) familiarization with the actions and methods and means used by the police during mass riots.â€� Chinese officials also for the Kyrgyz visitors, demonstrating “the work of a special forces detachment, as well as public order services, and their actions during riots.â€�

Interaction-2024 and Japarov’s Strategic Calculus

A recent development within RATS is “,” a joint counter-terrorism exercise between China and the states of Central Asia, which involved specialised operations intended to enhance the operational capabilities of member states. In February of 2025, Kyrgyz president Sadyr Japarov visited Beijing for a visit with Chinese president Xi Jinping. Xi Jinping emphasised the historic and geographic between China and the Kyrgyz Republic as well as the rapid growth of bilateral relations in recent years. The Chinese president added that the two sides should continue to explore new ideas, focus on cooperation, and deepen mutually beneficial cooperation. China is willing to continue to expand cooperation and enhance connectivity by continuing construction of the a railway connecting China, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. that Kyrgyzstan will continue to protect the of Chinese investors in the country.

Border Control and Securitisation

Demonstrating the expansion of connectivity is the reopening and ongoing development of the border crossing connecting the Kyrgyz settlement of Barskon, located along the south shore of Lake Issyk-Kul, to the region of Xinjiang. The Bedel Pass crossing is the third border district connecting China to Kyrgyzstan, with the other two being the in the Kyrgyz region of Naryn and the in the Osh Region. However, the entirety of the Chinese-Kyrgyz border is along the region of Xinjiang. This contributes to Beijing’s desire to police the regions as many Uyghurs flee and seek refuge in the Kyrgyz Republic, as well as of the East Turkestan Liberation Organisation (ELTO), a secessionist Uyghur organisation training in the border regions of the Kyrgyz Republic. Increased securitisation on the Kyrgyz border side has assumed Xi Jinping’s demands for Kyrgyzstan to “�. Along the entirety of the 1,063-kilometre border between China and Kyrgyzstan, a extending 50 kilometres from the de facto border has been established. To enter the Border Zone, a , which can only be obtained from Kyrgyz authorities, ensuring that only authorised individuals can enter these securitised areas.

Due to the securitisation of the Border Zone, the centralisation of technology and the ongoing digitisation of police activities, I did not travel closer than the village of Chiy-Tala in the Osh Region, located 140 kilometres from the Erkeshtam Pass border crossing.

Domestic Nationalism and Foreign Leverage

However, in the capital of Bishkek, securitisation in the historic Uyghur-run Madina Market can be observed from first-hand accounts and primary sources. During repeated visits to the market throughout my fieldwork, I consistently noted a heightened police presence, which included both uniformed and plainclothed officers. Compared to the two larger markets in the city, Osh Bazaar and Dordoi Bazaar, this visible security presence appeared disproportionate and politically charged. Conversations with Uyghur merchants revealed a sense of anxiety with several vendors speaking cautiously and avoiding political discussions. In contrast, some ethnic Kyrgyz locals I spoke with openly expressed suspicion toward the Uyghur presence in the market. These sentiments reflect how Chinese securitisation narratives, particularly the conflation of Uyghur identity with extremism, have filtered into public discourse, helping to justify increased surveillance and legitimise discriminatory practices in local contexts.

The neo-nationalist Kyrgyz grassroots movement, , has been calling for the from the Madina Market since 2015. While previously Kyrk Choro enjoyed complacency from security officials and state actors in the Kyrgyz Republic, under the populist platform of Sadyr Japarov, the group’s ideology has benefited from presidential policies such as Japarov’s , which aims to protect the “traditions and values of Kyrgyz familiesâ€� by discriminating against ethnic minorities, rolling back women’s rights, and centralising media and journalism, capturing support from nationalistic and subsequently anti-Uyghur political movements. China’s exportation of illiberal governance aligns with a growing domestic appetite for authoritarianism in Kyrgyzstan, where nationalist movements and political elites actively embrace these models to strengthen their own power. This dynamic grants Kyrgyz actors agency in shaping the country’s authoritarian trajectory, making the relationship with Beijing a mutually reinforcing process rather than a simple external imposition. Official state action reflects domestic nationalist sentiments while simultaneously satisfying China’s desires for stability and securitisation. 

In 2023, the against the founder of the Madina Market, Tursuntai Salimov and his son Ilshan. Tursuntai was also the leader of Ittipak, a Kyrgyz-Uyghur diaspora political organisation advocating for cultural preservation. In 2024, both Tursuntai and Ilshan Salimov were for the laundering of criminal proceeds in the interest of Kamchybek Asanbek’s organised crime group. 

The assets of the Salimov family, including Madina Market, were rapidly transferred to Tarim Trade, a company owned by the son of Khabibula Abdukadyr. Abdukadyr, a close ally of Japarov, had successfully built a trading monopoly which transits . Abdukadyr is also a business partner of a close friend of the president’s son, who , which are an integral part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

Conclusion: A New Security Order under Chinese Patronage

By utilising the pre-existing frameworks of the SCO, the infrastructure of the BRI, and the centralisation of technology via the Digital Silk Road, China has constructed a vast and adaptive apparatus of regional surveillance and control and a comprehensive security architecture in the form of the Belt and Road National Security Intelligence System. Through weaponised interdependence and a decentralised network of private and state actors, Beijing has embedded itself into the core of Central Asia’s security landscape. China’s broader strategy seeks to export its model of illiberal governance and practices of securitisation as a means to impose regional stability, thereby facilitating deeper economic engagement and political interaction under Beijing’s terms. Importantly, this approach resonates with domestic actors in Kyrgyzstan, where an existing appetite for illiberalism and nationalist governance provides agency to local elites, enabling them to actively participate in and shape this evolving security architecture. While framed as cooperation or development, the deeper consequence is a significant erosion of regional sovereignty and the externalisation of China’s internal securitisation model. The targeting of Uyghur diaspora communities, the co-optation of nationalist movements, and the strategic transfer of economic assets all underscore the convergence of surveillance, economic control, and authoritarian governance under Beijing’s influence.

As China supplants Russia as Central Asia’s dominant external power, its approach represents not merely a shift in regional geopolitics but a reconfiguration of sovereignty itself, one grounded in digital oversight, security codependence, and authoritarian learning. Without meaningful safeguards or regional pushback, the Belt and Road may no longer be simply a path to economic development but a conduit for asymmetrical control and systemic repression.

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In August 2025, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the United States signed a three-way agreement to end the long-standing conflict between the two nations, built upon the preliminary agreements established between Armenia and Azerbaijan in March 2025. The prospective peace deal further includes a clause for the creation of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), a transport corridor through the Zangezur region. The TRIPP establishes a 99-year partnership granting the U.S. exclusive rights to develop transportation and energy infrastructure within Armenia’s Zangezur corridor to create a new Asia-Europe transit route that bypasses Russia and Iran.

To view the whole report, download the report below.

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During his time as Iran’s President from 2021–2024, Seyed Ebrahim Raisi spearheaded a marked recalibration of Iran’s foreign policy characterized by heightened distrust and skepticism toward Europe and its efforts to play a central diplomatic role in resolving current United States (US)-Iran tensions. Diverging from the positions of the previous Rouhani presidency, Raisi’s administration viewed Europe less as an independent geopolitical actor and more as an extension of a declining US-dominated international order.  

As a result, Raisi demonstrated little willingness to engage with European powers, consistently voicing skepticism regarding their intentions and portraying them as strategically subordinate to the US (). Reflecting this shift in tone, Raisi’s addresses to the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in September 2024 repeatedly underscored the perceived decline of US hegemony, declaring that the “project to Americanize the world has failedâ€� and that the “old liberal order … has been pushed asideâ€�  (). During this speech, he urged European states to distance themselves from US expansionist policies and to honour their commitments to Iran, warning that “US unilateralism is not in the interest of anyone.â€� Although Raisi expressed conditional interest in economic cooperation with Europe, he simultaneously cautioned against what he termed as “alienâ€� interference in shaping these relations ().Ìý

Differences Between Raisi and Rouhani Administrations Regarding Relations with Europe

A key distinction between Raisi’s administration and that of Rouhani was the former’s renewed emphasis on strengthening the “resistance economyâ€� in Iran. Originally introduced by Ayatollah Khamenei but largely sidelined during Rouhani’s tenure, this strategy aimed to achieve economic self-sufficiency and neutralize the impact of foreign sanctions. Under Raisi, this strategy translated into a more deliberate policy of boosting domestic production, expanding non-oil exports, and reducing reliance on imports (Tasnim News, 2019). This focus marked a clear departure from Rouhani’s approach, which prioritized diplomacy with the West as the primary way to reduce economic isolation and improve Iran’s security. Contrarily, by publicly decoupling Iran’s economic trajectory from the success of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Raisi’s administration sought to minimize perceived external leverage over its nuclear program. This posture allowed Iran to maintain a firm stance on its demands despite European pressure, as the immediate economic necessity for a deal was downplayed domestically (Mashregh News, 2022a). Though this strategy hardened Iran’s negotiating position, it also contributed to the prolonged nature of negotiations by diminishing the perceived urgency for Iran to make a compromise ().Ìý

In parallel, the long-standing “Look Eastâ€� policy, championed by Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei, has gained unprecedented momentum during Raisi’s presidency. This doctrine was based on the belief that the current US-led international system would lose influence to an emerging global order centred around Asia. Raisi’s administrated followed this policy by strengthening Iran’s ties with its Eastern partners, particularly China and Russia, as a means to counter the diplomatic isolation and sanctions imposed by the US and Europe (; ). This strategic pivot further limited prospects for cooperation with Europe, as Tehran increasingly perceived Europe and the US as being aligned, thus leading Iran to prioritize partnerships with Asian powers over engagement with the West (; ). 

During this time, Iranian official discourse on nuclear negotiations with Europe also adopted a much more firm and critical tone. For example, Raisi openly condemned the US and the E3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (UK)) for what he described as a “very improperâ€� act of advancing a resolution at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors that was sharply critical of Iran while all sides were still engaged in negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program (). Raisi also questioned the reliability of US and European negotiators, stressing that Iran would not allow negotiations to be for negotiations’ sake and insisting that any dialogue must be results-oriented and produce tangible outcomes for Iran (; ). Central to this administration’s stance was the categorical rejection of expanding the scope of negotiations, particularly through Raisi’s assertion that – despite being a core concern for Europe – Iran’s ballistic missile program was non-negotiable (; ). 

Late 2021: Initial Stalemates in EU-Iran Nuclear Negotiations

The Raisi administration’s approach to negotiating  its nuclear program with Europe began with the seventh round of the ‘Vienna talks’ in November 2021. Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian and Iran’s chief negotiator Ali Bagheri Kani consistently emphasized two central demands during these talks: one, the complete and verifiable lifting of all sanctions imposed after the US withdrawal in 2018; and two, legally binding guarantees to prevent any future US administration from abandoning the agreement (). Additionally, Iran’s negotiating team sought assurances that sanctions relief would result in tangible and sustainable economic benefits for their country (). These demands were proposed to mitigate against the negative effects of the first JCPOA, where the absence of such guarantees led to significant economic disruption for Iran after the US’ unilateral exit in 2018. During the Vienna talks, Iran submitted two documents outlining proposals on sanctions removal and nuclear commitments, with a third document on guarantees and verification that they were abiding by the JCPOA. In presenting these proposals, Bagheri Kani asserted that Iran’s position during these talks was based on principles accepted by all parties, despite European dissatisfaction (). 

European partners, particularly the E3, reiterated their commitment to reviving the JCPOA, viewing it as the most effective means to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. However, they also expressed mounting concerns over Iran’s accelerated nuclear activities (). According to IAEA reports, these advancements undermined the non-proliferation benefits of the original deal and sharply reduced Iran’s breakout time to produce weapons-grade uranium (). Shortly after Raisi assumed office in August 2021, Iran began enriching uranium to 60% while also producing uranium metal. By the start of the November 2021 Vienna talks, Iran had accumulated 113.8 kilograms of 20% enriched uranium. Enriching to 20% completes almost all the necessary work to produce the fissile material for a bomb (), a threshold Iran surpassed with its 113.8 kilogram stockpile. While European officials acknowledged Iran’s concerns regarding sanctions relief, they viewed the demand for legally binding guarantees as particularly difficult to fulfill, especially in the context of Iran’s renewed effort to enrich its uranium (). 

2022 to Early 2023: Escalation of Tensions and Diplomatic Impasse

From 2022 to early 2023, the diplomatic climate surrounding the European Union (EU)-Iran nuclear talks deteriorated sharply; this breakdown was caused by two major events.  

The first was Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Before the invasion, Russia had played a relatively constructive role in Iran–IAEA relations. While occasionally criticizing Iran for its breaches of the nuclear accord and delays in the JCPOA negotiations, Russia largely positioned itself as a mediator between Iran and the West. However, the full-scale invasion and resulting war between Russia and Ukraine fundamentally altered this dynamic, introducing significant challenges for the already faltering nuclear negotiations between Iran and European powers (). 

Iran’s response to the war has gone beyond mere rhetorical support for Russia. Tehran has provided significant military assistance to Moscow, particularly in the form of loitering munitions such as the Shahed 131 and Shahed 136 drones, which have been widely used by Russian forces on the battlefield Ukrainian conflict (). In October 2022, reports emerged suggesting that Iran was also preparing to supply Russia with short-range ballistic missiles, thus deepening its involvement in the conflict (). Iranian officials, including Amirabdollahian, defended providing Russia with these weapons and asserted that the drones did not violate UN Security Council Resolution 2231. This Resolution, which was adopted to lift sanctions on Iran as part of the JCPOA, regulates the transfer of goods that could potentially contribute to nuclear weapon delivery systems (). Iran’s ambassador to the UN further supported this stance, arguing that these military transfers were outside the scope of the Resolution (). 

The geopolitical shift triggered by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine had a direct impact on the stalled JCPOA negotiations. As Russia grew increasingly dependent on Iran for both economic and military support, Moscow’s leverage over Tehran in the nuclear talks diminished (). This new dependence reduced Russia’s ability – and, perhaps more critically, its willingness – to mediate the nuclear discussions effectively. As the war in Ukraine continues, Russia’s stance on Iran’s nuclear ambitions has become more tolerant. In fact, Moscow now appears to view Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapon capabilities as beneficial to its own strategic interests. From Russia’s perspective, a broader confrontation between Iran and the West could serve to further complicate the West’s foreign policy focus, creating additional pressure on the liberal international order at a time of heightened geopolitical tensions (; ). 

This shift in Russia’s approach, transforming from a constructive mediator to a more disengaged partner, has further undermined European efforts to revive the nuclear deal. For European nations, Iran’s military assistance to Russia has become a significant point of contention. The EU swiftly condemned Iran’s actions to provide Russia with military drones and missiles to use in the war. In response, the E3 and other European countries imposed new rounds of sanctions targeting Iranian officials and entities for human rights abuses and military cooperation – sanctions that were separate from those tied to Iran’s nuclear program (). Tehran quickly retaliated by sanctioning European individuals and organizations, accusing them of inciting unrest and meddling in its sovereign affairs (). This cycle of punitive measures and countersanctions has further eroded trust and severely disrupted communication channels between the two sides. The introduction of these new, non-nuclear sanctions, coupled with Iran’s reciprocal measures, signaled a broader breakdown in bilateral relations, making it increasingly difficult to compartmentalize the nuclear negotiations from other contentious issues. 

The second factor contributing to the breakdown of the EU-Iran relationship during this period was the death of Masha Amini in September 2022 and the resulting political unrest in Iran. Amini died in police custody after being arrested for improperly wearing her hijab. The Iranian government’s handling of the protests criticizing the government drew strong condemnation and sanctions from European nations which, in turn, affected the prospects for the nuclear program negotiations. European governments, now reconsidering their approach to Iran, became increasingly hesitant to advance a deal with Tehran under its conservative conditions. Amirabdollahian also repeatedly denounced European statements and actions regarding the protests, accusing them of interference in Iran’s internal affairs and acting on a double standard (). This highly charged political environment further complicated any possibility of a diplomatic breakthrough on the nuclear issue, as European policy toward Iran began to increasingly incorporate conditions tied to domestic human rights concerns (; ).

Conclusion

As the Raisi administration ended in May 2024, Iran-Europe relations were left strained, and the nuclear negotiations remained at a standstill. Despite existing communication channels aimed at preventing a complete diplomatic breakdown, trust further dissolved as the talks became increasingly entangled with broader disputes over Iran’s human rights record and its military support for Russia. European frustration deepened as Iran’s nuclear program advanced through higher enrichment levels and expanded centrifuge capacity, pushing the revival of the JCPOA further out of reach and prompting consideration of alternative strategies. As a result, Raisi’s legacy has been defined by an unyielding approach that emphasized resilience and national demands over compromise. This stance, while projecting Iran as a powerful and resilient actor, nevertheless prolonging the deadlock as well as Iran’s economic and political isolation. Raisi’s successor, Masoud Pezeshkian, now has to navigate balancing Iran’s emboldened nuclear program with his political ambitions to return to a more open and constructive relationship with Europe ().Ìý

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The 2025 BRICS Summit, hosted in Rio de Janeiro by Brazil, featured noticeably more divergence in terms of political priorities when compared to last year’s Summit in Russia. This group, which began as an informal bloc of emerging economies (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), has since morphed into a politically diverse alliance of 11 countries, which have different perceptions on how to reshape the international system. Historically, Russia and China have utilized the BRICS institutions to promote an . Meanwhile, Brazil’s and India’s approach is non-aligned and focused on promoting economic cooperation with the West and other emerging economies.  

During the 2025 BRICS Summit, the parties released a that highlights these diverging priorities. The declaration outlines 126 commitments focused primarily on promoting the interests of – India and Brazil. These commitments range from . On the geopolitical side, the declaration condemns the Israeli attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities and Ukrainian attacks on Russian civil infrastructure but makes no mention of United States involvement in either conflict. Indeed, argue that the relatively more moderate agenda at this year’s Summit was an intentional effort to not antagonize Trump due to his . 

In contrast, last year’s BRICS Summit was framed by Russia as “â€� in the country, showcasing its resilience to Western sanctions and its ability . The 2024 Summit also introduced a new partnership status for members and called for de-dollarization, as well as building an alternative financial system to sanction-proof key members.  

Another notable difference is that the 2024 Summit had greater diplomatic representation than the 2025 Summit. The 2024 Summit was attended by 22 heads of state, including the newly joined members of . That Summit also included representation from . Conversely, the 2025 BRICS Summit was attended by only 11 leaders, with call in order to avoid arrest on war crime charges issued by the International Criminal Court in 2023. Xi Jinping did not attend the Summit, . The disinterest of certain BRICS leaders underscores how some may prefer to avoid the Summit if it is not used as a platform to promote anti-Western rhetoric. 

These leadership absences highlight deeper political divisions within the group, including differing views on the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East. This division was most prominent in Iran, a newly joined member, . Such breaks in unity are also present when looking at how different members view the future of BRICS. For instance, during the 2024 BRICS Summit, some members . These countries feared that the bloc was favouring the inclusion of autocracies as a way to consolidate Russian and Chinese influence over emerging economies at the expense of promoting democracy. These rifts make the ideological trajectory of the BRICS increasingly uncertain as divisions deepen between authoritarian and democratic members. 

Considering that India will host the next BRICS Summit in 2026, the bloc is likely to focus on issues related to economic cooperation rather than anti-Western rhetoric, which may lead to some greater political rifts. The coming years will reveal how the BRICS alliance will either develop a unified geopolitical identity or remain a fragmented alliance.  

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