Key Takeaways

• Georgia’s ruling party, Georgian Dream (GD), has recently turned to history in order to position itself as a defender of a peaceful, enduring state amid dangerous neighbours.

• GD continues to conduct a multivector foreign policy but must carefully balance relationships with Eurasian powers alongside a “European” identity favoured by its citizens.

• As long as it spurns Euro-Atlantic integration, Georgia’s security relies on its utility as a hub to evade sanctions and conduct international trade.

A Turn to Georgia’s Pre-Imperial Past

Georgia’s Prime Minister, Irakli Kobakhidze, detoured centuries into the country’s history during a briefing on international relations on August 18. Before the press, he praised the 1783 Treaty of Georgievsk, when Erekle II of the Georgian kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti accepted Russian “protection” in exchange for guarantees of sovereignty.

Kobakhidze’s unprompted defence of a treaty that foreshadowed Imperial Russia’s annexation of Georgia sparked a firestorm at home and abroad. Did this move herald a new stage – or at least a new public stage – in Russia-Georgia relations? Russian media nodded approvingly. What might this mean for Georgia’s multivector foreign policy, which has been leaning heavily towards China, Iran and Eurasia in the past years? What did it augur for tentative efforts at transatlantic détente with North America and the European Union (EU), which have been critical of Georgia’s democratic backsliding?

Any effort to attribute long-term strategy to the actions of the governing Georgian Dream (GD) party is risky, but Kobakhidze appealed to domestic and international audiences alike as he spoke about Georgia’s place in the world through its history. The diversion reveals above all the delicacy of Georgia’s security surrounded by countries currently at war (Russia, Ukraine, Iran) as well as those considering a path to peace (Armenia, Azerbaijan, ��ü���쾱���). It also accounts for the Georgian population’s ambivalent views towards Europe, Russia and Eurasian powers.

Kobakhidze presented Erekle II’s decision as a “” for Georgia. He cited Christianity and “traditional European culture” in a treaty that ostensibly allowed Georgia to avoid assimilation into Turkic or Persian worlds. He also argued Georgians that Russia – which later violated the agreement, absorbing the region in 1801 – would act in its own interests, in a briefing that presented a of international relations.

Russia’s state-run news agency, RIA Novosti, highlighted Kobakhidze’s speech with the headline: “.” Georgian opposition figures alongside Mikheil Saakashvili, the now-jailed former Prime Minister, that this “history lesson” foreshadowed a future agreement between Georgia and Russia. One that the Georgian public, still negatively inclined towards its northern neighbour (), would need to swallow for its own future survival and “civilization.”

Europe (Which Europe) or Eurasia?

Motivations behind Kobakhidze’s statements, however, appear more complicated. GD has little to gain through formalizing a relationship with Russia. Opening a discussion on the Russian-backed territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia – which together compose about 20% of Georgia’s territory – would open a large wound with unpredictable consequences. Given Russia’s unpopularity in Georgia, GD has always operated in a zone of plausible (and public) deniability of links between Moscow and Tbilisi. Sanctions-busting, however, . Georgia has followed domestic security playbooks used in Russia and Belarus, among others, from to the .

Keeping these relationships quiet also allows Georgia to continue feigning allegiance with the West even as it builds an increasingly authoritarian state, condemning “,” and . The loss, however, of their closest ally in Europe – Hungary’s Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party – complicated GD’s narrative that they would join, in essence, an Orbánified-Europe. Georgia has extended olive branches to and a high-level parliamentary delegation visited in June. As Kobakhidze’s defence of Erekle II highlights, Georgia continues to view itself as “civilizationally” European. GD leaders hold , alongside citizenship for their families. Formal agreements with Russia would threaten GD members with further sanctions () and disturb their quiet – though commonly-known within Georgia – relationship with the European powers whose liberal values they condemn in terms .

Kobakhidze’s highlighting of Erekle II’s Christian choice also serves to counterbalance its increasing Eurasian links, even as the population overwhelmingly considers itself European. Thus far in 2026, Kobakhidze has visited the Central Asian countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan; Uzbek President Shavkat Mirzoyiyev met Kobakhidze in Tbilisi in July. Georgian President Mikheil Kavelashvili also attended the funeral of Iranian leader Ayatollah Khamenei in July 2026, while on June 9 Georgia and China “upgraded” their relationship to a “.”

The Middle Corridor: Georgia’s Future?

Georgia is staking its security and prosperity on acting as a critical transport hub through the Middle Corridor (also known as the ), linking China to Europe through Central Asia and the Caucasus. Traffic through the Middle Corridor has experienced since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Central Asia’s promise to increase the corridor’s importance in the coming years. Georgia’s free trade agreements with ��ü���쾱���, the EU, and US also serve to make the country extremely attractive for Chinese enterprises. Chinese companies have already played a major role in upgrading Georgian road and rail infrastructure, while Xinjiang’s facilitates commercial exchange between Georgia and other Xinjiang-based Chinese companies.

Georgia’s ties with Iran have also deepened, though the effect of the ongoing regional war is unclear. As with Russia, Georgia has become a for Iranian companies. Russian strategic airlifters have been to Iran, even though the country has pledged to . And while relations with the US remain rocky, . Washington has noted the importance of Middle Corridor trade and in the long-stalled plan to develop the deep-sea Anaklia port on the Black Sea after a Chinese company withdrew from the project.

GD also realizes it needs to move quickly to consolidate trade as the prospective Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) could soon become a rival transitway across the Middle Corridor. With plans to take Chinese and Central Asian goods to Europe through Armenia and Azerbaijan, the TRIPP represents a threat to Georgia’s role in facilitating regional trade. However, to Georgia’s benefit, and faces staunch Iranian opposition.

How does Erekle II fit this picture? Kobakhidze wants Georgians to consider the historic King as making hard but necessary geopolitical decisions in a world of great powers. Kobakhidze, like Erekle in a way, wants to be seen as the trusted actor to deal with dangerous entities in the interests of maintaining a , which has been GD’s basic platform since 2022. GD wants to show a “civilized” European face even as it deepens dealings with Eurasian powers. This discourse also serves as a signal to Russia that Georgia is a friendly country even as it privileges maintenance of its sovereignty. GD will, in the meantime, happily use a historical debate to that has condemned this comparison through its control of an increasingly authoritarian regime. Georgians who oppose GD point to growing internal party divisions,, as evidence of a party lacking the funds to grease enough palms to tighten its rule. Such calls, however, remain based on hope more than evidence.

Policy Recommendations

• GD’s decision to support US civil aviation sanctions on Iran shows it is sensitive to Western pressure. Intensified efforts, by Europe and the US simultaneously, to identify and punish sanctions-busting by the Georgian government could loosen GD’s anti-democratic grip.

• Possible carrots for Georgia can involve support for trans-shipment through Anaklia or an expanded Poti port, with strings that would allow Georgian civil society groups to function. It is unclear, however, whether GD would make such a concession. One stick would involve efforts to shift trade to TRIPP, effectively icing Georgia out of the economic benefits of regional integration.

The post Back to the Future? Georgian Dream and Regional Security in the Caucasus appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

After 18 months of public inquiry, the Foreign Interference Commission, commonly known as the Hogue Commission, published a report highlighting extensive patterns of foreign interference and transnational repression in Canada. The report underscored how certain ethnic communities have been actively targeted by foreign governments, including Iran, India, China, and, to a lesser extent, Russia. The Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force has highlighted the impact of transnational repression on electoral processes in Canada, notably in the case of Joe Tay, the Conservative Party candidate for Don Valley North in 2025.

Both the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) have become increasingly involved in investigating cases of transnational repression affecting ethnic communities, including the high-profile murder of Hardeep Singh Nijjar in Surrey, British Columbia, in 2023. The report further contributed to the creation of the , responsible for administering and enforcing the provisions of the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act (FITAA).

The Government of Canada identifies Iran among the state actors conducting in the country, citing assassination plots, harassment of dissidents, and digital threats. In 2026, against the backdrop of widespread domestic political protests and direct military hostilities involving the United States (US) and Israel, anticipate that pressure on diaspora communities will intensify, citing a documented pattern in which periods of domestic instability are followed by increased activity abroad. Analysts read this pattern as an attempt to mitigate internal vulnerabilities while extending diaspora coercion as a component of broader hybrid conflict with Western states.

At the margins of, and often overlooked within, discussions of transnational repression, violence and intimidation occurring within ethnic communities continue to take place in Canada and other Western countries. This form of violence remains understudied and frequently falls between the mandates of national security agencies and local law enforcement. Because this type of violence comprises transnational repression, hate crimes and incidents, and local crime, an overall understanding of the trends and comparative analysis between countries is difficult to establish.

This white paper uses open-source intelligence to document escalating patterns of physical violence, intimidation, activism, and online harassment within the Iranian diaspora following the January 2026 domestic protests and US-Israeli war against Iran which has been ongoing since February. By doing so, we further investigate Iranian diaspora fragmentation beyond the highly visible transnational repression, providing security and law enforcement agencies a better overall understanding of security dynamics in Canada. Furthermore, if experts forecast a growing threat to Iranian Canadians from the Iranian government through 2026, a more comprehensive understanding of intra-community tensions and patterns of polarization will be essential for accurately assessing risks and developing appropriate policy responses.

The Iranian Diaspora in Canada: Polarization and Fragmentation in 2026

Since January 2026, Canada’s Iranian diaspora has mobilized on a significant scale. Roughly in Ottawa on 11 January, and an estimated on 14 February. While largely peaceful, these demonstrations highlighted growing ideological friction among different groups within the diaspora. Following the beginning of American and Israeli strikes on Iran in February 2026, also known as Operation “Epic Fury,” the Iranian diaspora in Canada became increasingly polarized. On 1 March, about in Calgary to oppose the American and Israeli strikes; an hour later, . The possibility of political transition, prompted by either domestic collapse or foreign intervention, has catalyzed intra-diaspora rivalry as competing groups seek to advance distinct political outcomes.

Political disagreement within Canada’s Iranian diaspora has hardened into a question of loyalty, dividing the community over foreign military intervention, the shape of a post-Republic Iran, and who counts as a legitimate opponent of the government. Since January 2026, street-level protests have largely split along two main axes: first, between monarchist (Pahlavist) demonstrators and those displaying pro-government or non-aligned symbols; and second, within the opposition itself, spanning monarchist right-wing groups, pro-democracy advocates, ethnic minority movements, and Mojahedin-aligned groups. 

The Pahlavists are the largest group in the 2026 mobilization. They support the return of Reza Pahlavi, the exiled son of the last shah. Within the broader pro-monarchy Pahlavi movement, a hardline nationalist element has increasingly asserted itself. This wing openly endorses more aggressive foreign policy measures against Tehran, including aligned Israeli-American military action, while displaying hostility toward political rivals in and other Western countries. Pro-Pahlavi forces increasingly embrace hardline rhetoric, reflected in the chant The slogan groups leftist and Mojahed opposition movements together with the clerical establishment, portraying all three as equal targets of opposition. This extremist wing has expanded rapidly since January 2026, coordinating across social media and establishing a physical presence at demonstrations throughout Western Europe and North America. Some branches march in , which has drawn controversy. This group often aligns with right-wing movements in Europe and North America and supports the American and Israeli strikes on Iran. It also polices its own side, rejecting supporters who would accept Pahlavi’s return as a civilian political figure rather than as monarch.

The second protest group consists of a loosely affiliated pro-democracy current, including republicans, anti-war activists, and those organizing under the 2022 slogan “Woman, Life, Freedom.” The slogan became the rallying cry of the that followed the death of Mahsa Amini, a 22-year-old woman, in September 2022, three days after her arrest by Iran’s Guidance Patrol over failing to wear her hijab according to state standards. For those in this camp, the slogan expresses a demand for women’s rights and personal freedoms. While these groups differ on the governance model for a future Iran, they share a rejection of both the Islamic Republic and a restored monarchy. However, monarchist activists often collapse these internal distinctions, framing diverse critics across this spectrum as leftists or Islamic Republic sympathizers. reported in February that aides to Reza Pahlavi in the US had pushed supporters to remove references to the Woman, Life, Freedom slogan from their social media accounts on the grounds that it is associated with a leftist and feminist agenda. In a video circulated on social media of a demonstration in Vancouver in February 2026, organizers barred the slogan, while a man leading the demonstration stated through a megaphone that those chanting the slogan were connected to the reformist parties in Iran and were attempting to steal the revolution. Meanwhile, the pre-1979 Lion and Sun flag serves as a common visual thread across these protests, carried by both Pahlavists and pro-democracy activists. The emblem has in Iranian iconography and its meaning has shifted over time. Some trace it to ancient Persia and read it as a symbol of Iranian history before the arrival of Islam, while in other narratives it evolved after Islam, and particularly after the Safavids made Shi’ism the state religion in 1501, into a symbol of Iran’s , with the lion representing Ali ibn Abi Talib (the first Shia Imam). Because these layers of meaning long predate the Pahlavi dynasty, many who carry the flag see it as a symbol of historic Iran rather than as an endorsement of any particular political system, which allows groups with different visions for the country’s future to claim it.

The Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK) is the third main group opposed to the Islamic Republic. Often described as a , this group is organized as an opposition movement in long-standing mutual hostility with both the monarchists and the government in Tehran. The group carries its own version of the Lion and Sun flag, adopted by its political wing, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (), in 1993, which is distinguishable from the Pahlavist version by the absence of the crown. Although still the most organized group within the opposition diaspora, the MEK remains unpopular among Iranians because of its cult-like internal practices, its origins as an Islamist-Marxist militia, and its during the Iran-Iraq war. The group’s presence at demonstrations is treated as a provocation by monarchists and government sympathizers alike, though since January 2026 it has kept a comparatively low profile in Canadian street mobilization.

Alongside general anti-Islamic Republic forces, various nationalist and ethno-regional groups have gained prominence within the Iranian diaspora, advocating for decentralization or state fragmentation in the event of government collapse. Ethnic minority groups, including Azeri, Arab, Kurdish, and Baluch movements, are pursuing distinct national rights, with demands spanning from regional federalism to outright independence. These platform positions put them in direct conflict with the centralizing nationalism of Pahlavist monarchists, other anti-Islamic Republic nationalists, and Islamic Republic supporters. Furthermore, several of these movements maintain cross-border ties with foreign governments, including Israel and ��ü���쾱���, as well as regional armed groups, such as Iraqi Kurdish forces. Carrying their own flags and chanting their own slogans, they are often targeted by other groups in protests.

Contrasting with anti-Islamic Republic forces, pro-government elements within the diaspora consist of individuals sympathetic to Iran’s current political system. At political demonstrations, display of the Islamic Republic flag generally signals alignment with Tehran, and this group routinely clashes with opposition groups at such events. The same emblem carries a different meaning in other settings, however, since it remains the current national flag and is carried at cultural and sporting events by Iranians who hold no brief for the government, a distinction that bears directly on several of the incidents described below.

Intra-Diaspora Conflict: Escalating Violence and Tension in 2026

Heightened polarization and rising internal divisions are increasingly linked to criminal incidents within the Iranian diaspora and its political mobilization in Canada. These activities remain difficult to address through traditional judicial channels, as the high degree of polarization complicates perpetrator identification and successful prosecution.

Such polarization has escalated into intra-diaspora violence. In February 2026, Masood Masjoody, a critic of both the Islamic Republic and the exiled Pahlavi family, disappeared in British Columbia. His remains were found the following month. were charged with first-degree murder. that both accused had opposed the Iranian government and backed the monarchist movement in online posts, and that one was a defendant in a harassment suit Masjoody had filed before his death. Reuters later that Masjoody had himself belonged to the monarchist organization “Farashgard” before becoming a critic of it. In an interview in April 2025, Masjoody described being harassed for his views, saying that monarchist activists had threatened him without limits. Masjoody said that one threat specified the , and that he had submitted this material to the Supreme Court of British Columbia. Following a court appearance by the two accused, two groups of spectators and were separated by sheriffs.

Days after Masjoody disappeared, ten diaspora figures, most of them critics of the monarchist campaign or of the war, were which read, in Farsi and beneath a knife emoji, that they would soon have to find the corpses of many. The account was named for SAVAK, the pre-1979 Iranian security service, and has since been deactivated. At least two of those tagged reported the post to police and altered their routines. In July, a Greater Toronto Area resident publicly called on to add a lethal agricultural chemical to food served at a public funeral, drawing condemnation from voices in the diaspora. Although directed at events in Iran, the statement was made publicly from Canada by a resident and no public action by Canadian authorities has followed. In March, Toronto Police arrested two counter-demonstrators at the rally following a clash between pro-Islamic Republic and anti-Islamic Republic protesters. One of the accused allegedly tore an Islamic Republic flag from a participant’s back and later set one alight; his charges include public incitement of hatred. Toronto Police stated that both investigations were being At a monarchist demonstration in downtown Toronto in January, a man who had argued with participants was struck in the face and injured in the eye. Video that circulated afterwards shows a participant defending the assault on the grounds that he had insulted them. At demonstrations in Vancouver, have gathered in close proximity and entered into sustained confrontation. In June 2026, the City of Toronto had to of the World Cup match between Iran and Belgium because of public safety concerns related to the demonstrations and increased risks of confrontations between pro-Islamic Republic and anti-Islamic Republic protesters. FIFA from World Cup stadiums in May. Tensions have occasionally manifested in threats or acts of physical violence targeting pro-democracy activists, government sympathizers, and ethno-national groups such as Azerbaijani, Arab, Kurd, and Baluch representatives. Those who or repeat the expected slogan are increasingly treated not as opponents but as collaborators. Polarization within the diaspora has increased drastically in everyday life as well. A boycott campaign has circulated online naming Iranian businesses in Toronto as being affiliated with or supporting the Islamic Republic, including . Harassment between monarchist activists and their critics has also increased, and Iranian-Canadian academics and journalists in Toronto describe receiving repeated death threats, rape threats, and doxxing over the same period. On 12 April, was exchanged between the two sides at a rally in Toronto.

Parallel Dynamics in the United States and United Kingdom

These dynamics extend well beyond Canada. Over the same timeframe, comparable clashes involving the same groups have emerged across the broader West, notably in the US and the United Kingdom (UK). This widespread incidence points to a systemic, transnational pattern of diaspora fragmentation and intra-community conflict, and underlines the challenges facing law-enforcement agencies in Canada.

In the US, on 11 January, in the Westwood district of Los Angeles, California, carrying a banner that read “No Shah. No Regime. USA: Don’t Repeat 1953. No Mullah,” a message rejecting both the monarchy and the Islamic Republic. According to the , demonstrators tore the banner from the truck, smashed its windows, and assaulted the driver, who then drove through the crowd. The driver was arrested for reckless driving and later released without charge.

In March, that ^[1] In June, during Iran’s opening World Cup match in , stadium officials had to break up a fight in the stands between . Outside the stadium, videos circulated showing , as well as other people trying to enter or leave the stadium, being harassed by Pahlavi supporters for not carrying the Lion and Sun flag.

In the UK, Pahlavi supporters have targeted ethnic minority Iranians and anti-war demonstrators, treating those who oppose the American and Israeli military campaign against Iran as complicit with the Islamic Republic. In March, following an attack on a Kurdish-owned restaurant in London, , the UK correspondent for Kurdistan24, was seriously injured by a group of roughly fifteen monarchist supporters while reporting on the incident. The Metropolitan Police opened an investigation into what witnesses described as part of a wider pattern of attacks on Kurdish businesses and individuals. In April, , an Iranian demonstrating against the war outside Downing Street, was stabbed several times by a counter-protester of Iranian origin and survived. He had previously been abused in public, and other anti-war Iranians in the UK reported threats of stabbing from the monarchist side at demonstrations.

Beyond Transnational Repression: Jurisdictional Challenges

Existing scholarship on transnational repression has focused primarily on state-directed activities targeting dissidents, while paying comparatively little attention to coercive and violent dynamics occurring within diaspora communities. Transnational repression is now seen as a matter of national security in relation to foreign interference. Violence between diaspora members falls outside this scope when it is not sponsored and supported directly by foreign governments.

Intra-community violence is a more complex process involving genuine political activism as well as organized criminality and foreign interference. Political activism such as protests can turn into political intimidation and violence aimed at silencing part of ethnic communities which, in turn, leads to social polarization. Canada has seen intra-community political violence before. Examples include the confrontations at Eritrean community events in and , and the inward-directed incidents that have accompanied . In each instance, the conduct was handled as public disorder or as a matter of foreign interference rather than as diaspora politics in its own right. This threat is not specific to Canada and occurs in most Western countries.

, the RCMP is the primary agency responsible for investigating threats to national security, including foreign interference as defined under the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act. Transnational repression, including threats directed at diaspora communities, falls within this mandate. The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) and CSIS also play important roles in investigating transnational repression activities and identifying foreign operatives acting on Canadian soil.

By contrast, intimidation, violence at protests, and threats exchanged between members of diaspora communities generally fall within the jurisdiction of local law enforcement agencies. A useful parallel can be drawn with the distinction between terrorist activities, which fall under the mandate of RCMP Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams (INSETs), and hate crimes that are not linked to broader extremist ideologies or organized groups, which are typically investigated by local police services.

These manifestations of diaspora polarization are further complicated by the fact that violence occurs within a broader context of political activism directed against the government in Tehran, which Canada has long criticized on human rights grounds. Canadian policy seeks simultaneously to protect freedoms of expression and assembly at home and to sustain that criticism abroad. The Iranian case presents a distinct set of challenges compared to other cases of foreign interference in Canada, such as those involving India, because intra-community tensions are intertwined with a broader political movement that receives considerable public sympathy and support within Canadian society.

As a result, investigative attention is often directed toward transnational repression, while patterns of intra-ethnic polarization receive comparatively limited scrutiny as a distinct phenomenon. Rather than being analyzed collectively, such incidents are generally treated as discrete criminal acts perpetrated by individuals, agent provocateurs, or criminal organizations. In a July 2026 with Reuters, Reza Pahlavi attributed some of the conduct carried out in his name to plants and agitators masquerading as supporters in order to create such conflicts. Such rhetoric further blurs the line between state-sponsored foreign interference and localized diaspora violence, interweaving local, national, transnational, and geopolitical dynamics.

While intra-diaspora political polarization is well-documented, institutional blind spots regarding its intersection with state-backed foreign interference leave diaspora members acutely vulnerable. Victims often find it difficult to report these politically motivated acts, as the political and ideological nuances surrounding such incidents can complicate their interpretation by both community members and law enforcement agencies. Consequently, these incidents may be underreported or investigated as isolated criminal acts rather than as part of broader patterns of intra-ethnic polarization. In the UK, activist Ghazal Diani and was told the matter would be investigated only if something more serious occurred.

Politically motivated intimidation within these communities occupies an ambiguous legal space, straddling national security mandates, hate crime enforcement, and conventional criminal law. This jurisdictional overlap complicates local law enforcement responses and creates significant reporting barriers, hindering the systematic tracking and prosecution of intra-community violence. Furthermore, investigations related to transnational repression often require extensive international cooperation, as segments of the Iranian diaspora are active across multiple Western countries. Effective investigations also depend on access to Persian-language expertise, trusted relationships within diaspora communities, and a nuanced understanding of community dynamics. At the law enforcement level, this requires keeping pace with rapidly evolving political tensions and polarization within the diaspora, as well as broader geopolitical developments. At the national security level, a key challenge is sharing highly classified information with local law enforcement partners in ways that support investigations while protecting sensitive sources and methods. This is particularly important when distinguishing between criminal activities stemming from community polarization and actions directed or supported by a foreign state. Authorities must also recognize that investigations and interventions within diaspora communities can have unintended consequences. If not approached carefully, they may deepen existing divisions, reinforce perceptions of stigmatization, and inadvertently strengthen narratives that portray Western governments as targeting Iranian communities.

Recommendations and Implications for Canada

Violence within diaspora communities presents a significant challenge that Canada’s existing security and law-enforcement categories were not designed to capture as effectively as threats to national security. It does not neatly fit the framework of transnational repression and foreign interference, as much of the violence is neither directed nor coordinated by a foreign state. Nor is it adequately understood as conventional hate crime or violent extremism, particularly when perpetrators and victims may share the same nationality, ethnic identity, or religious affiliation. Yet the consequences of this violence are distinctly transnational and political, often intersecting with mobilization and protests against the Islamic Republic of Iran. When agencies assess these incidents only through the lens of their individual mandates, the broader pattern can remain invisible. The result is a fragmented response that risks overlooking victims, underestimating the scale of the threat, and failing to address the political and transnational dimensions of the violence.

Although it can sometimes fit within the framework of politically motivated violent extremism, intra-community violence presents distinct analytical challenges. It may be interpreted differently from forms of violent extremism occurring between distinct communities, such as the tensions and violence observed between Canada’s Palestinian and Jewish communities following October 2023. Because perpetrators and victims may share the same ethnic, religious, or national identity, the political and ideological motivations underlying the violence can be more difficult to identify and may be overlooked within existing threat-assessment frameworks. For example, has funded multiple programs to address polarization between Arab and Jewish diasporas, but very few are designed for violence inside a single community.

Prevention and enforcement efforts in diaspora communities often lack dedicated language expertise and the capacity to monitor increased activity across multiple platforms, including Telegram, Instagram, X, diaspora media, and encrypted channels. These gaps are particularly consequential during periods of heightened political mobilization, when emerging vulnerabilities and risks can develop rapidly and require early intervention. Hate-based incidents are rarely the product of a single organization or network; rather, they can emerge in protests and other political activities and involve loosely connected actors. Yet these incidents can reflect broader transnational trends, with narratives, tactics, and grievances circulating across borders and becoming mutually reinforcing. Effective prevention therefore requires heightened monitoring during periods of political mobilization, combined with stronger language and analytical capabilities to identify emerging risks upstream and distinguish isolated incidents from broader patterns of mobilization and violence. Risks often first emerge through seemingly isolated episodes of hate and intimidation online or during protests, including doxxing, sexualized threats, the circulation of target lists, and other forms of targeted harassment. A concrete public safety response should be sufficiently flexible to address a threat that does not fit neatly within existing frameworks for transnational repression, foreign interference, or countering violent extremism. It should enable authorities to monitor large-scale protests and political mobilization as well as social media where violence occurs within communities and movements, rather than primarily between them. This requires the capacity to identify early indicators of hate and escalation across multiple platforms, supported by language-specific expertise. It should also allow authorities to connect local episodes of violence to broader transnational trends without assuming that such trends reflect hierarchical command structures or formal organizational links.

Interagency Collaboration: A Coordinated Approach to Hate Incident Reporting and Threat Assessment

In an ideal scenario, dedicated task forces could be established to foster sustained collaboration among relevant agencies. A more realistic and immediately actionable approach, however, would be to strengthen information-sharing mechanisms and reinforce referral pathways between agencies. Law enforcement agencies often lack the broader visibility needed to identify trends and linkages across incidents occurring elsewhere in Canada and in other Western countries. Enhanced information sharing could help bridge this gap by connecting local, incident-level intelligence with broader assessments of emerging threats and extremist activity.

One promising model is the increasingly effective coordination between local law enforcement agencies investigating hate crimes motivated by Islamophobia, antisemitism, and racism on the one hand, and national security agencies addressing hate-based groups and far-right extremism on the other. Current efforts to address nihilistic violent extremism at the local, national, and international levels provide another useful model to adapt. Existing collaboration between agencies has long been developed to identify concrete threats to national security, requiring the involvement of INSET units in Canada, as distinct from localized crimes to be investigated and prosecuted by local law enforcement and prosecutors. These partnerships have also included intervention and prevention teams established to address vulnerabilities and risk factors associated with radicalization leading to violence.

The case of intra-diaspora violence appears more complex to address, as the national security threat environment combines far-right extremism, hate-based ideologies, foreign interference, and transnational repression. At the local level, violence and criminality can unfold across a range of settings, including large public protests, mass gatherings associated with sporting events, and Middle East-related events such as Al-Quds events or those linked to the war in Palestine. At the same time, the Criminal Code provisions on uttering threats, criminal harassment, intimidation, and public incitement of hatred cover most of the incidents documented in this paper, and the laid by Toronto Police following the Al-Quds Day rally demonstrate their applicability.

Local law enforcement should remain responsible for receiving and investigating individual hate incidents and criminal offences, while national-level agencies could provide broader threat assessments, identify cross-jurisdictional patterns, and facilitate the sharing of relevant intelligence. The RCMP plays a central role in cross-jurisdictional investigations, as well as in establishing sustained operational partnerships with other intelligence and investigative bodies, such as CSIS and CBSA, alongside broader strategic coordination by Public Safety Canada tracking these incidents. The transnational nature of the threat also requires greater coordination among Five Eyes partners, alongside carefully calibrated information-sharing arrangements with foreign governments. This is particularly important when engaging the United States, given its direct and ongoing military confrontation with Iran.

Strengthening Outreach and Trust with the Iranian Diaspora

Given that the threat environment remains fluid and is heavily influenced by geopolitical developments, interagency communication should not be treated as an ad hoc or event-driven process. Instead, it should be structured as a recurring mechanism, with regular exchanges of information and threat assessments that allow agencies to identify emerging patterns, reassess risks, and adjust their responses as circumstances evolve.

Outreach mechanisms targeting the Iranian diaspora have already been developed to address concerns related to transnational repression, but these efforts could be expanded to better capture dynamics of intra-diaspora violence. A reliable referral mechanism could enable members of the diaspora to report hate incidents at both the local and national levels, while providing law enforcement agencies with the contextual information needed to assess individual incidents within broader patterns. Such reporting mechanisms are effectively implemented for , but are ill-equipped for intra-diaspora polarization.

At the same time, the highly polarized and politically contested nature of these issues creates a risk that referral mechanisms could be exploited for partisan or strategic purposes, including through the submission of unsubstantiated or politically motivated allegations. Any such mechanism should therefore incorporate robust, evidence-based safeguards. Reports should be assessed against consistent criteria, corroborated where possible, and clearly distinguished between verified incidents, credible allegations, and unsubstantiated claims.

Implementing an incident-reporting mechanism is easier than sustaining one effectively. Its long-term success depends on local authorities earning the trust of the community, while also demonstrating the capacity to investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute reported cases. Without both community confidence and credible follow-through, reporting mechanisms risk generating limited engagement and may fail to provide the sustained information needed to identify broader patterns and trends.

Conclusion

Overall, intra-diaspora violence is not a new phenomenon. Existing interagency coordination mechanisms can address many of its manifestations effectively. The central challenge, however, is that such violence is often identified only after incidents have occurred, resulting in a predominantly reactive rather than proactive response. This report has documented recent incidents, their increasing intensity, and their transnational dimensions to raise awareness of the need for a more coordinated approach building on existing transnational repression outreach and prevention activities as well as existing mechanisms developed to address violent extremism.

In a multicultural society, the test of a security policy is whether it protects citizens from violence within their own communities as carefully as it protects them from foreign states, and whether it can do so without treating an entire community as suspect. This approach is not specific to Iranian communities. The same combination of early detection, behaviour-based intervention, and restraint is applicable wherever political conflicts abroad divide communities at home, as has occurred among Eritrean, Sikh, and other diaspora communities in Canada. A framework developed to address these challenges in the Iranian diaspora could therefore provide a broader model for identifying and mitigating community-based political violence without stigmatizing legitimate political activity.

^[1] Meaning long live the King, a slogan popular among the Pahlavists and royalists.

The post Canada’s Blind Spot: Intra-Community Violence inside Canada’s Iranian Diaspora appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

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• Most Armenians feel that their country is��“on their own”��if faced��with��a military threat,��displaying a��perception��of personal safety associated with geopolitical alignment.��

• With uncertainty widespread and��perceptions��on security partnerships polarized, many��in Armenia��are open to diversifying security ties.��

• Considering public opinion, while NATO��has��a��relatively limited��set of cooperation tools, they should��nonetheless��prioritize visible��engagement��with Armenia, communicate limitations��of such partnership��clearly,��and manage��expectations.��Sustained��and predictable cooperation��should be kept��in��practical��rather than geopolitical��terms and��perceptions.��

Context��

This policy brief examines the implications of public attitudes towards security issues in Armenia for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It assesses the prevalence of insecurity narratives among Armenians and shows how such attitudes are associated with opinions towards external security actors. Survey evidence shows that Armenia’s core security challenge is a sense of abandonment among its public. Confidence in international security institutions is weak, as nearly half of Armenians (48%) believe their country would not receive support in the event of a military conflict.  

As confidence in Armenia’s traditional security partners – Russia and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) – stands low,  other international actors are seen as positive contributors to Armenia’s overall security, including both NATO and China. The Armenian public’s openness toward alternative security partners and a broader reassessement of Armenia’s security architecture creates an opportunity for NATO to push for more active involvement. As available options are limited, NATO should strive for realistic, civilian-oriented cooperation based in institutional resilience, without raising expectations of formal guarantees. This increased involvement, along with sustained and visible engagement, should offer better reassurance to Armenia without otherwise escalating geopolitical tensions in the region. 

Between its independence in 1991 and the start of the second Nagorno- Karabakh War in 2020, Armenia’s security architecture was heavily . Armenian political elites leaned towards Russia due to a lack of alternative options on account of its landlocked status and persistent conflict with Azerbaijan and ��ü���쾱���, along with a limited domestic military capacity. Russia served as Armenia’s primary security guarantor through  and  membership; Western military and security engagement remained largely symbolic. Although Armenia and NATO collaborated through  and  frameworks, these initiatives focused on technical cooperation and institutional dialogue rather than substantive security guarantees. 

The  to prevent military defeat in 2020 marked a critical rupture in Armenia’s security system. The second Nagorno-Karabakh War significantly undermined public and government confidence in  and the CSTO as reliable protectors and intensified feelings that Armenia had been  by its traditional security partners. In response, the Pashinyan government increasingly sought to . This shift is visible in several developments, including the “,” the deployment of the European Union’s (EU)  along the Armenia–Azerbaijan border, and the launch of enhanced  in January 2025.

Public Insecurity, Security Preferences, and Reported Future Vote in Armenia����

A nationwide survey in Armenia, conducted by �Ӱ�ԭ�� University’s Eastern European and Transatlantic Network (EETN) in February and March 2025, shows that Armenians are almost equally split between who report to feel safe (52%) and unsafe (47%) in their daily lives. Residents of Yerevan tend to feel more unsafe (52%) compared to these in other urban (44%) and rural areas (45%). The risk of war with Azerbaijan (59%) is the major concern consistent across society. 

Perceived personal security is closely associated with positive attitudes toward Western alignment; those who feel safer are substantially more likely to support NATO and EU membership than those who do not. Among individuals who report feeling safe, 60% would vote “Yes” in a hypothetical referendum for Armenia joining NATO and 64% would do the same in a potential referendum on joining the EU. In contrast, among those who feel unsafe, only 40% would support NATO, and 36% would back EU membership, with clear majorities in this group opposing both initiatives, 56% against NATO and 64% against the EU. 

Armenians are divided across party lines in their assessment of personal safety. With a clear majority (71%) either recusing themselves from voting in parliamentary elections, intending to spoil the ballot, or not share voting preferences. Among those who would engage in elections and/or share their preferences, the majority who support the Civil Contract party (86%) feel safe, compared to 36 percent of opposition supporters that include the largely pro-Russian Armenia Alliance party. 

Many in Armenia feel that their country would be left on their own if it faces a military attack, with nearly half (48%) thinking so and only 6% being unsure about who might help. As the sense of abandonment is widespread, still, those with different perceptions of safety have distinct expectations on who might help. Those who feel unsafe are more likely to choose Russia or the CSTO (20%) as a likely ally in case Armenia faces military conflict, compared to NATO or the West (14%). Conversely, more amongst those feeling secure would expect NATO or the West to come to their aid (25%) than Russia or the CSTO (12%). In sum, perceptions of insecurity are associated with greater reliance on Russia, whereas feelings of security are more strongly linked to expectations of Western support. 

At the same time, support for diversifying security partnerships beyond existing allies is relatively broad, with 53% agreeing that searching for new defense and military ties with other countries would make Armenia safer against foreign threats. This idea is popular across the political divide, including 70% of Civil Contract supporters and 59% of opposition voters. While uncertainty is higher among those with no declared voting intentions, still, more among this group believe that diversification of defense and military ties would make Armenia more secure compared to those who disagree. 

This preference for diversification also resonates with elite threat narratives. While Armenian political parties differ in their preferred alignments — some favouring Russia, others emphasizing Western engagement, or expressing self-reliance — they somehow share a recognition that reliance on a single security partner is no longer sufficient. 

Despite widespread pessimism about Armenia’s security environment, preferences over geopolitical alignment remain divided rather than consolidated into a single dominant orientation. Equal proportions of respondents believe Armenia would be safer moving closer to NATO (36%) or Russia (36%). Furthermore, more than half of Armenians consider that having NATO troops on the ground would make Armenia safer, indicating a veiled sympathy towards the NATO Alliance. 

Overall, these patterns do not indicate a clear preference toward any single geopolitical bloc, although the Western side carries somewhat greater weight. Armenians are somewhat engaged in a survival-driven reassessment of security providers and remaining open to diversified allies clarifies this viewpoint. This creates potetial opportunities for NATO to expand its partnership with Armenia. 

Conclusions and Policy Recommendations��

Given Armenia’s non-member status in NATO and the structural constraints created by Russia’s influence in the region, formal security guarantees from Western institutions are unlikely to materialize in the near future. NATO’s internal dynamics — particularly ��ü���쾱���’s membership and its close military partnership with Azerbaijan — further limit the �����հ�’s&�Բ�����;capacity to provide direct defence commitments to Armenia. 

At the same time, Armenia’s security landscape is shifting as the government seeks to diversify its external security partnerships. In practice, this has created space for forms of cooperation that do not rely on military guarantees but instead focus on civilian-oriented, visible, and predictable initiatives such as resilience building, civil emergency planning, institutional reform, and confidence-building measures. These efforts aim to address vulnerabilities rather than establish broader geopolitical alignment. 

Evidence from NATO’s engagement in partner countries illustrates the value of this approach. The substantial  has supported defence reforms, institutional coordination, and national resilience through training, interoperability programs, and civil–military cooperation. Similarly, cooperation with  has strengthened energy resilience, medical capacity, disaster response, and defence education, showing that civilian-focused partnerships can deliver sustained, practical outcomes.  

For Armenia, diversification therefore functions as a pragmatic way to expand sources of security support in the absence of formal guarantees. Within this framework, NATO could become a more constructive and realistic partner for Armenia. While direct defence commitments remain improbable, civilian-oriented initiatives offer tools to strengthen institutions and reduce security risks. This perspective underpins the policy recommendations that follow.  

1. Given the substantial support of Western-led political structures, NATO should prioritize visible engagement with Armenia. 

�����հ�’s&�Բ�����;is the central framework coordinating cooperation with Armenia, bringing together planning, training, exercises, and institutional reform in a multi-year, capacity-building process. As outlined in , the  is designed to deepen cooperation in line with  and level of readiness. NATO should use this initiatives not only as a coordination tool, but as a delivery mechanism for visible, locally-implemented cooperation, particularly beyond Yerevan. By translating the framework into routine, practical engagement, NATO and Armenia can bilaterally strengthen security capacities and address perceptions of abandonment from the Armenian public. 

2. NATO should clearly communicate limitations and manage expectations about its partnership with Armenia.  

NATO already frames cooperation with Armenia as partnership-based rather than guarantee-based, but could benefit from communicating more clearly and publicly about what cooperation involves (e.g., preparedness, institutional reform, resilience) and what it does not (e.g., full membership). Additionally, engagement should be consistently framed as capacity-building rather than a security provision to avoid creating public expectations of any security guarantees. Simple cooperation roadmaps with regular milestones would strengthen predictability, credibility, and reassurance. Furthermore, this should happen in a sustained manner, emphasizing repeated training cycles, ongoing institutional support, and routine regional exercises rather than isolated events. Predictable, long-term cooperation builds trust without raising unrealistic expectations. 

3. NATO should keep cooperation with Armenia practical and not geopolitical. 

Finally, as the Armenian public remains divided in their geopolitical preferences, it is important for NATO to prevent its partnership with Armenia from expanding into questions of geopolitical alignment. Engagement should remain centred on functional areas such as crisis preparedness, emergency coordination, institutional reform, and civilian resilience rather than Western-versus-Russian narratives. Expanding direct and clear communication with the Armenian general public can further limit perceptions of forced geopolitical choice and better align external policies with insecurity-driven public concerns in Armenia. This action would strengthen Armenia’s security capacity while minimizing escalation risks and domestic polarization. 

The post Armenian Public Opinion And Opportunities For Greater NATO Engagement appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

Since the onset of the joint United States–Israeli military campaign against Iran in February 2026, developments in the Middle East have emerged as a primary driver of global strategic assessments. The conflict is simultaneously generating significant secondary effects in the South Caucasus, reshaping regional alignments and the relationship between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

By assessing Iran’s relationships with Armenia and Azerbaijan, its core strategic interests in the South Caucasus, and its operational partnership with Moscow, this policy memo examines how the ongoing war against Iran, combined with the August 2025 Washington Accords, has disrupted Tehran’s long-standing hedging strategy and could undermine its regional influence.

To illustrate this shift, the memo first analyzes Iran’s traditional foreign policy toward Armenia and Azerbaijan and how the Washington Accords have diminished Iran’s geoeconomic role as a buffer between Armenia and Azerbaijan, thereby constraining its ability to exert leverage over both states. It further evaluates how the agreement heightens Iran’s strategic vulnerabilities in the face of growing Turkish, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and U.S. presence in the region, and highlights the increasingly divergent interests and approaches of Moscow and Tehran in shaping the future of the South Caucasus.

Engaging with the outcomes of the United States–Israeli military campaign against Iran, the policy memo concludes by analyzing Tehran’s shifting strategic posture in the South Caucasus. This assessment is situated within the context of Iran’s amicable yet strategically incongruent relationship with Moscow, as well as its intensifying competition with ��ü���쾱��� for regional influence.

Iran’s Core Interests in the South Caucasus: Economic Pragmatism over Ideology

Iran views the South Caucasus as part of its immediate rather than a distant foreign region. While Tehran has historical and cultural ties with the region, its policy toward the area has been driven primarily by geopolitical stability, border security, and connectivity considerations rather than ideological or religious affinity. Although Tehran formally maintained neutrality during the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict, in practice it pursued a balancing strategy aimed at preventing regional dominance by any single actor. Much like Russia’s approach in the region, the protracted Nagorno-Karabakh conflict generated a degree of political instability that enabled Tehran and Moscow to preserve their influence over both Armenia and Azerbaijan, while simultaneously constraining ��ü���쾱���’s ability to expand its regional presence. Iran’s strategy has also emphasized the importance of preventing alterations to internationally recognized borders and safeguarding its access to European markets.

In the aftermath of Armenia’s military defeats in 2020 and 2023, and amid Moscow’s failure to uphold its perceived security commitments under the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) framework and its peacekeeping mandate, Iran increasingly came to be portrayed as one of Armenia’s most reliable regional partners. Iran–Armenia post-Soviet relations have been stable and cooperative. Since Armenia’s independence, Iran has consistently maintained , supporting Armenia, both state and people, during regional crises and serving as a key transit partner. In the aftermath of the Turkish–Azerbaijani blockade of the 1990s, Iran has functioned as a critical terrestrial access route and economic partner. The two countries are also involved in many trade and energy partnerships and collaborate in the transit of goods between Europe and Asia.

While both nations share a foundational identity as Shia-majority states, the bilateral relationship between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Republic of Azerbaijan has been characterized by persistent strategic friction since 1991. Central to Tehran’s security concerns is Baku’s deepening military-industrial and energy partnership with Israel, which, alongside Azerbaijan’s “one nation, two states” alliance with ��ü���쾱���, is viewed by Iranian policymakers as a coordinated effort to contain Iranian regional influence.

This tension is further exacerbated by the geopolitical implications of the Zangezur Corridor. From Tehran’s perspective, any Azerbaijani effort to establish a sovereign land link through southern Armenia constitutes a “red line,” as it threatens to sever Iran’s critical northern transit link to Europe and the Caucasus. Despite these structural rivalries, the relationship maintains a degree of pragmatic stability. Both states remain tethered by mutual economic interests, specifically their shared roles in the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (Middle Corridor) and Baku’s continued reliance on Iranian territory for transit to its Nakhchivan exclave.

Iran’s regional approach has been shaped less by the Muslim–Christian divide or ideological concerns and more by practical and security concerns over Turkish influence, Israeli presence near its borders, transit routes affecting its access to Eurasia, and the potential domestic repercussions among its own Azeri population. Iran views the Caucasus as its “historic security margin” and its immediate security and economic environment.

The 2025 Washington Agreement and its Initial Implementation Framework

In August 2025, Armenia and Azerbaijan signed the Washington Accords under the mediation of the President of the United States, launching the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) and establishing a 99-year economic partnership between the United States and Armenia. The Washington Accords create opportunities for significant shifts in regional transit dynamics, including the movement of goods, energy infrastructure, and the broader interconnection between Asia and Europe. These developments have implications for the roles traditionally played by Russia, Iran, Central Asia, and the South Caucasus in Eurasian transport and trade networks. It reduces Central Asian countries’ dependency on Chinese and Russian infrastructures as well as bypassing Iran’s role in the Middle Corridor.

, the United States and Armenia signed the providing exclusive rights to develop the transit infrastructure. The framework excludes extraterritorial rights to American entities preserving Armenia’s sovereignty including the border management aspect of the transit corridor. In this partnership, the TRIPP Development Company, a joint venture with Armenia mostly controlled by Washington, provides a monopoly in the development business surrounding the route and its infrastructure. The agreement seeks to develop the Syunik region as a hub of economic activity and local development, with the objective of enhancing transit and connectivity between Asia and Europe, connecting Azerbaijan with its autonomous region of Nakhichevan. More broadly, the TRIPP becomes a competitive alternative to the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars (BTK) railroad and future alternative pipeline to Europe, competing with Baku–Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline by securing European access to Central Asian hydrocarbons.

In the energy domain, the normalization process between Armenia and Azerbaijan reshapes the region’s broader transit and supply landscape. Most notably, Armenia could become significantly less dependent on Russian and Iran natural gas, thereby opening possibilities for access to Central Asian hydrocarbons and, potentially, to Azerbaijani energy sources. Turkmen and Azerbaijani gas competes with Iran’s gas output, offering a cheaper and potentially more politically reliable alternative for European countries. launched the construction of energy infrastructure, including a new transit powerline to export to Europe through ��ü���쾱���.

The Accord has inaugurated a new phase of cooperation between the former belligerents, notably facilitating the renewed transit of goods between the two states. This includes the movement of hydrocarbons originating in Azerbaijan as well as grain exports from Russia and various Central Asian countries. The emerging prospects for a peace accord between Armenia and Azerbaijan have broadened the diplomatic space for both states, transforming their engagement into a more intricate and multidimensional interaction. Furthermore, the effectively eliminates Moscow’s role as established in the November 2020 agreement, which delegated some administrative control over border management to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB).

Although the Washington Accords do not provide any security guarantees from the United States or include enforcement mechanisms directed toward Azerbaijan, Armenia leaders hope that increased American investment would encourage a more active role by Washington and put an end to Baku’s strategy of outbidding Yerevan in their bilateral relationship.

Overall, the TRIPP represents, for Armenia, an additional step toward the West, thereby weakening Moscow’s influence in the South Caucasus, while also providing an opportunity to normalize relations with Ankara and Baku. For Azerbaijan, the Washington Accords consolidate its military victory, while re-establishing direct access to Nakhchivan and stimulating its transit-based economy. Furthermore, the TRIPP reduces Baku’s dependency and uncertainties link to its main transit route to Europe going through Georgia.

Iran’s Strategic Approach in the South Caucasus after the Washington Accords

Much of the and commentary has framed recent developments as a geostrategic, zero‑sum contest in which the United States and ��ü���쾱��� have successfully marginalized both Iran and Russia from regional influence. While geostrategic and security considerations remain central, it is necessary to look beyond great power and regional competition to understand how Iran and Russia are recalibrating their relationships with Armenia and Azerbaijan and assessing areas of mutual convergence to avoid strategic marginalization.

Following the Washington Declaration and TRIPP announcement, the Iran official diplomatic position was articulated by in a telephone conversation with his Armenian counterpart. While welcoming peace efforts and regional connectivity, Araghchi specified Iran’s red lines: there must be no extraterritorial corridor or special status undermining Armenian sovereign control, and no changes that alter regional geopolitics or disadvantage Iran’s strategic access. He further emphasized full respect for borders, territorial integrity, and national jurisdiction, and stressed that connectivity must not isolate Iran from established or alternative transit routes.

However, an examination of various members of the Foreign Policy establishment could shed light on various aspects of Iran’s understanding of this situation. On 9 August 2025, , former Minister of Foreign Affairs and a senior advisor to the former Supreme Leader of Iran, framed the TRIPP as a rebranding of the Zangezur corridor concept. He said that the implementation of this project would restrict Iran’s transport routes in the north and northwest to (only) ��ü���쾱���, and that Iran will confront this move ‘whether with Russia or without it.’ He likened NATO’s presence along this route to a ‘viper’ that wants to lie down between Iran and Russia and warned that Iran will not allow this alliance to approach its northern borders. The former himself in a meeting with Prime Minister Pashinyan, in July 2024, had mentioned that Iran recognizes that the Zangezur Corridor is against Armenia’s interests and stands in this position.

Other Iranian officials however, adopted a more moderate position and sought further clarification as the details, terms, and conditions of the TRIPP are not clear yet. In a meeting with Armenia’s National Security Council Secretary, the former head of Iran’s Strategic Council on Foreign Relations, , welcomed Armenia–Azerbaijan connectivity but requested clarification regarding the governing legal and security framework of the route, particularly any external involvement. The Armenian side emphasized that border control and security would remain under Armenian authority. This exchange illustrates Tehran’s core concern: not connectivity itself, but the jurisdictional and security regime under which it would operate.

Noting the travel of , to Israel, Iran observes a ‘deviation’ from historical relationships. Kostanyan is closely involved in the implementation of the TRIPP initiative. The trip may therefore be understood not only as a diplomatic engagement but also as part of Armenia’s efforts to advance the corridor and related regional connectivity arrangements. From the Iranian perspective, Armenia has not sufficiently taken Tehran’s ‘concerns’ into account while proceeding with the project, which gives the visit broader regional significance beyond bilateral diplomacy. Current uncertainties and tensions are therefore portrayed not as a structural rivalry but as a recent policy shift by Armenia toward Western initiatives, which Tehran views as inconsistent with the traditionally predictable relationship.

Although these responses appear to represent hard-line and moderate positions, they in fact reflect Iranian concerns articulated at two different levels of policy. Velayati’s warning conveys the strategic perception of the corridor as a geopolitical and security challenge that could alter regional balances and introduce external influence near Iran’s borders. Kharrazi’s more measured statements address the operational level, focusing on the legal and jurisdictional arrangements governing the route and the necessity of preserving Armenian sovereignty and local border control. Taken together, they are complementary rather than contradictory: the first signals Iran’s red lines in terms of regional balance of power, while the second defines the specific conditions under which connectivity could be tolerated. This dual messaging suggests that Tehran’s opposition is directed not at transport connectivity itself, but at any arrangement that diminishes Iran’s strategic position or creates a non-sovereign security regime along its northwestern frontier.

Drawing on Russia’s conduct in cases such as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the Syrian Civil War, Iranian assessments of Moscow’s position on the TRIPP are broadly consistent with longer-standing perceptions of Russia across Iran’s political spectrum. These range from proponents of deeper strategic alignment with Russia, to more skeptical voices that view reliance on Moscow as a strategic liability, such as those featured in Etemad and Shargh newspapers. Between these poles, a significant group of policymakers and experts adopts a position of cautious realism, advocating sustained engagement with Russia while maintaining a clear political safety margin featured in Donya-e-Eqtesad newspaper. Notably, across these perspectives there is a shared underlying assumption: Russia is not regarded as a fully predictable or reliably-aligned partner.

The Erosion of Iran’s Transit Hub Centrality

Iran’s policy toward the South Caucasus cannot be understood without reference to its broader economic strategy. In recent years, Tehran has increasingly framed its foreign policy around geo-economics rather than solely sanctions resistance and relief. A strategic guidance issued by the and the (June 2024) explicitly direct the government to activate Iran’s ‘geopolitical advantages’ by transforming the country into a regional hub for trade, transport, and energy through regulatory reforms and infrastructure development.

The Development Plan intends to institutionalize this objective. It mandates the creation of a Regional Energy Trade Steering Committee, chaired by the President and composed of the Ministers of Oil, Foreign Affairs, and Energy, with parliamentary participation. The Committee is responsible for designing Iran’s regional energy diplomacy roadmap and approving export, import, swap, transit, and electricity exchange arrangements. These measures show that Iran is indeed attempting to convert geography into economic resilience: transit fees, energy swaps, and logistics services are intended to compensate for sanctions-related restrictions on direct trade and investment.

A central quantitative target of the Development Plan is to increase annual transit cargo volume from approximately 16 million tons at the beginning of the Plan to 40 million tons by its conclusion. The South Caucasus plays a crucial role in achieving this goal because it constitutes Iran’s shortest overland connection to Eurasian markets. The Iran-Armenia border effectively blocks a continuous ��ü���쾱���-Azerbaijan land corridor, thereby preserving ��ü���쾱���’s dependence on Iranian transit routes toward Azerbaijan and Central Asia.

Iran participates in wider regional energy arrangements, including gas swap agreements with Turkmenistan and ��ü���쾱���. These arrangements allow Tehran to earn transit revenue, estimated at roughly $1–1.5 billion annually, while maintaining relevance in regional energy distribution networks. It also conducts gas and electricity swaps with Azerbaijan to supply the Nakhchivan exclave. Additionally, it serves as a trucking corridor between ��ü���쾱��� and Central Asia, currently of Turkish trucks annually.

However, emerging infrastructure projects threaten to erode this position. The , operational since March 2025, already reduces Nakhchivan’s dependence on Iranian gas swaps. If an additional pipeline link across southern Armenia were completed, Azerbaijan would obtain a direct energy connection to its exclave, while . With the TRIPP, Turkmenistan’s and Azerbaijan’s natural gas exports directly compete with Iran’s output by providing Armenia with flexibility and lower‑cost alternatives.

More broadly, the proposed TRIPP corridor could connect ��ü���쾱��� to Central Asia via Azerbaijan and the Caspian basin, thereby rendering the second route of the Middle Corridor practically feasible as a bypass to Iranian transit routes connecting China and Central Asia to Europe. Furthermore, the TRIPP would strengthen the Middle Corridor and its overreliance on .

For Tehran, the issue is not merely symbolic. Such routes would divert trucking flows, logistics investment, and energy transit away from Iran, potentially reducing transit income by a significant margin and weakening incentives for infrastructure development. estimate potential losses reaching up to 2.6 billion dollars annually over time when indirect effects on logistics, investment, and associated services are considered.

Even more important than immediate revenue is what Iranian policymakers call ‘.’ Iran seeks to preserve independent land access to the Caucasus and Europe that does not depend exclusively on Turkish–Azerbaijani territory. The South Caucasus therefore functions not only as an economic opportunity but as a strategic economic lifeline. Any corridor that structurally marginalizes Iranian transit routes is perceived in Tehran not as a normal infrastructure project but as a long-term reduction of Iran’s geopolitical and economic leverage.

A Trojan Horse on Iran’s Doorstep: After ��ü���쾱��� and Israel, now NATO and the USA

Tehran’s security concerns centre on preserving the sovereignty structure along its northwestern frontier. Iranian officials emphasize the maintenance of internationally recognized borders and oppose any extraterritorial or internationally supervised transit arrangements in the Syunik province. In Iranian strategic perception, a transport corridor is not merely an infrastructure project but a potential : if administered or monitored by external actors, it could facilitate intelligence collection, surveillance, and the institutionalization of foreign, especially American and Israeli, presence near sensitive Iranian regions. The Washington Accords remain vague regarding which actors will be responsible for providing daily security along the TRIPP corridor, even though Armenia is formally recognized as retaining sovereignty over its territory. This ambiguity leaves open the possibility that could assume a role in protecting the route. Consequently, Iran’s opposition is directed less at connectivity itself than at any arrangement that alters jurisdictional control or introduces external security actors along its immediate border.

The intensity of Velayati’s remarks is best understood by factoring in the role of the U.S. in this initiative. According to , a former Iranian diplomat, in Iranian foreign policy thinking, where some officials regard antagonism with the U.S. as structural, any development in which Washington emerges as the agent of regional normalization would be viewed negatively. He therefore situates the corridor within Iran’s long-standing confrontation with the U.S., arguing that it would elevate Washington’s position as a political arbiter in the South Caucasus while creating a connectivity framework from which all regional actors – ��ü���쾱���, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Western partners – would benefit, except Iran. In this interpretation, the corridor itself is not the principal concern; rather, the accompanying political arrangements could institutionalize U.S. influence and leave Iran structurally excluded from emerging regional trade and security networks. Velayati’s rhetoric thus reflects a broader fear of geopolitical marginalization under a U.S.-backed regional order.

��ü���쾱���’s Pan‑Turkic Orientation and Its Strategic Implications for Iran

Iran opposes any extraterritorial corridor arrangements that would create a continuous ��ü���쾱���- Azerbaijan land connection and facilitate the Middle Corridor linking ��ü���쾱���, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia. Iranian assess that such a route would shift the regional balance in favor of ��ü���쾱���, structurally reduce Iran’s role in east–west connectivity, and diminish Tehran’s leverage in Eurasian trade and energy networks. Following the recent wars between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the Washington Accord, ��ü���쾱��� appears a step closer toward its regional ambitions focused on pan-Turkism ranging from Anatolia to Central Asia.

Tehran interprets the TRIPP as a rebranded Zangezur Corridor that constitutes a that could undermine Iran’s geoeconomic relevance in the transit between Asia and Europe by reducing dependency of regional actors on Iranian transit routes.

Within Iranian strategic discourse, the project is also interpreted as part of a broader geopolitical realignment across Eurasia. Iranian officials and senior advisers have argued that a continuous transport axis from Anatolia to Central Asia would expand Turkish political and economic influence, weaken Iran’s geoeconomic centrality, and potentially enable a wider external security presence in the South Caucasus. From Tehran’s perspective, the concern is less ideological than structural: a functioning Middle Corridor could bypass Iranian territory while embedding new political, military, and intelligence partnerships near Iran’s northwestern frontier.

At the same time, Iran appears to have avoided the worst‑case scenario that had emerged following the one‑day 2023 conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia and the subsequent escalation in Azerbaijani rhetoric, particularly the invocation of the ‘Western Azerbaijan’ concept.3 Likewise, Baku’s promotion of a ‘special corridor’— envisioned within the broader Zangezur Corridor framework and implying strong Azerbaijani–Turkish control — had raised significant concerns in Tehran regarding potential geopolitical and territorial encroachments. It would have materially shifted regional power toward the Turkish bloc and most likely completely exclude Iran from connectivity, linking Europe to Asia.

Between Alignment and Competition: Russia and Iran’s South Caucasus Strategy

In the South Caucasus, Russian and Iranian foreign policies converge in their shared willingness to counter Western influence and to constrain Ankara’s expanding regional role. This alignment is also reflected in their cooperation within the International North–South Transport Corridor, which both states have leveraged to mitigate the impact of Western sanctions. However, the North–South Transport Corridor remains inefficient and weakened by the prospects of the TRIPP and future Azerbaijan and Armenia collaboration.

At the same time, Moscow and Tehran continue to pursue distinct regional and geopolitical objectives aimed at advancing their own interests and influence in the South Caucasus rather than form a cohesive strategic approach as a functional partnership. The Washington Accords highlight these underlying frictions, particularly in revealing the absence of a coordinated Russian–Iranian position toward the TRIPP. The corridor itself is part of a wider geopolitical contest over connectivity, influence, and control in the South Caucasus, where transport routes translate directly into political and economic leverage.

Just like Iran, Moscow has voiced general concerns and skepticism regarding the TRIPP, its implementation, and its impact on the region. to the Washington Declaration reflects this partial but imperfect convergence. The Russian Foreign Ministry responded cautiously, emphasizing regional stability and existing agreements while avoiding direct confrontation with the initiative. Moscow has been careful not to antagonize Washington or to openly criticize American President Donald Trump, while underscoring its indispensable role in ensuring the success of the TRIPP.

Iranian commentary, however, interpreted this as an ambiguous position and expressed dissatisfaction that Moscow did not oppose the project more explicitly. The observes that Russia is transitioning from dominant security hegemon in the Caucasus to a constrained, reactive actor that seeks to manage decline through selective cooperation and behind-the-scenes leverage. From Tehran’s perspective, Russia is expected to resist new mediation formats that elevate Western involvement in the South Caucasus; Moscow’s restrained response therefore raised concerns in Iran about the reliability of Russian support. The episode illustrates that, although Iran and Russia share reservations about a U.S.-centred regional framework, their threat perceptions and priorities are not identical, and cooperation between them remains situational rather than fully coordinated.

In this context, Iran finds areas of partial convergence with Russia’s policy in the South Caucasus. Both states regard the proposed corridor with caution, as it could enable a new connectivity and mediation architecture in the region that would diminish their influence while expanding the presence of external actors — primarily ��ü���쾱��� and the United States, but potentially China as well. Although their motivations differ, the project is perceived in both capitals as contributing to a regional order in which Western-backed arrangements gain prominence at the expense of Iranian and Russian leverage and the increasing influence of NATO countries in the South Caucasus. Furthermore, it weakens existing regional frameworks involving Russia, Iran, and ��ü���쾱���, such as the and the . Additionally, Armenia’s shift toward Western influence is perceived by both countries as a growing risk to their regional interests.

For Tehran, the primary concerns relate to border security and the risk of exclusion from emerging regional transit networks. For Moscow, the issue is more closely tied to the erosion of its longstanding role as the principal security arbiter in the South Caucasus and, more broadly, to the setbacks confronting its neoimperial ambitions in the region weakened by Russia’s war against Ukraine.

While Russia and Iran share a primary interest in resisting the growing presence of NATO and Western influence in the South Caucasus, persistent divergences have prevented them from coordinating an effective strategic approach. Even prior to the TRIPP initiative, certain analysts, such as , Iran’s former ambassador to Baku, had warned over Russia’s ambiguous position on Zangezur corridor. Iranian analysts often describe Russia’s position as ambiguous and more flexible than Tehran’s, particularly on ‘who manages’ an eventual arrangement. They believe that Russia’s position on the Zangezur corridor reflects a broader pattern in its relationship with Iran: it is not a truly strategic partnership but rather a transactional one driven by shifting interests. In this context, the implicit message for Iran is to exercise caution. Russia may not be a reliable partner and could instrumentalize Iran’s position to advance its own regional objectives. For example, in 2026, Moscow sought to renew its influence in the South Caucasus by seeking to fix its relationship with , as well as influencing the democratic process in and the election of a pro-Russian government.

The February 2026 War and Its Implications

On 28 February 2026, the United States and Israel launched joint military operations against Iran, targeting its nuclear and missile capabilities with broader regime-change ambitions. While military objectives appear achievable in the short term, the political outcome remains deeply uncertain. The South Caucasus has thus far remained largely insulated from the conflict, despite Azerbaijan’s ties to Israel and limited Iranian strikes on and alleged supported by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps targeting the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline. Iran’s posture toward ��ü���쾱��� and the broader region remains ambiguous mainly due to precarious geopolitical positions and its internal turmoil. , however, despite certain immediate challenges such as increased energy prices, sees opportunities in consolidating its status as a regional energy hub and crossroads.

Russia’s response to the war has been evaluated as insufficient – even unacceptable – by . He attributes this restraint to Russia’s self-interest, particularly economic gains and strategic distractions linked to Ukraine. His assessment implies that despite rhetoric of strategic partnership, Russia behaves as a pragmatic actor that supports Iran only when it aligns with its own interests, raising serious doubts about its reliability in moments of crisis. At the same time, Russia appears to be playing a low-profile but consequential role by supplying Tehran with on U.S. military targets, as well as with operational lessons derived from the war in Ukraine, particularly regarding the employment of unmanned aerial systems and electronic warfare capabilities. This collaboration represents a full circle, following Iran’s transfer of Shahed drones to Russia at the outset of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Tehran not only provided the drones themselves but also offered technical support and assistance that enabled Moscow to establish its own production line for the Geran-2, the Russian version of the Shahed drone.

Regardless of the outcomes of the 2026 military campaign or the prospect of regime change in Iran, Tehran’s geostrategic competition with ��ü���쾱��� over Eurasian transit routes is likely to remain a powerful geographic and economic force shaping the South Caucasus. ��ü���쾱���’s ambition to establish a pan-Turkic corridor linking Anatolia to Central Asia via the Caspian Sea — while bypassing Iranian territory — poses a sustained threat to Iran’s transit revenues and strategic depth, irrespective of the composition of the governing regime in Tehran.

Even in the event of regime collapse and its replacement by a government aligned with U.S. and broader Western preferences, or a significantly weakened state deprived of key military instruments for projecting influence in the South Caucasus, competition between Iran and ��ü���쾱��� over Eurasian transit corridors is likely to persist. This rivalry predates the establishment of the Islamic Republic and would almost certainly outlast it. No Iranian government will find Turkish dominance of the Eurasian corridor to be in Iran’s national interest. This is a structural feature of the regional balance of power rather than an ideological preference.

While the nature of the governing regime in Tehran may shape the extent and modalities of Iran’s participation in the TRIPP, it is unlikely to fundamentally alter the underlying structural competition with ��ü���쾱��� and the lack of a common strategic approach with Russia. A more democratic Iranian government could, in fact, pursue a more proactive integration into the TRIPP-linked infrastructure, potentially positioning Iran as a critical southern corridor connecting Eurasian transit networks to the Persian Gulf. A pro-Western Iran, freed from sanctions and able to attract Western investment, may prove a more effective competitor to Turkish corridor dominance than the Islamic Republic was – because it can engage international financial systems and offer regional partners a credible alternative. Along this line, some within the Iranian government have already highlighted a potential role for Iran in the TRIPP, particularly by linking the proposed railway to a broader North–South axis that would connect Iran to the project.

Overall, the most likely scenario is a weakened Iran embroiled in prolonged transition and domestic challenges, where the outcomes of the 2026 war and the popular mobilization against the regime forces the Islamic Republic into a posture of survival and tactical concession, producing a prolonged period of U.S.-Iran negotiations. Although the TRIPP constitutes a secondary concern relative to regime survival, particularly in a context of elite fragmentation and competition over residual state assets, including security forces, revenue streams, and territorial authority, it nevertheless reflects deeper structural dynamics. Specifically, regional competition with ��ü���쾱��� is likely to remain a defining feature of Iran’s strategic environment.

Overall, Iran’s capacity to oppose the TRIPP would be significantly diminished in a context of internal fragmentation, where the central government struggles to maintain a coherent and strategic policy orientation. As domestic contestation over authority, resources, and coercive instruments intensifies, Tehran is unlikely to either mount an effective opposition to the TRIPP or engage with it in a consistent and constructive manner. This erosion of state capacity would, in turn, weaken Iran’s position along its northern frontier with Armenia, potentially transforming the Syunik region into both an economic and security vulnerability.

For ��ü���쾱���, the 2026 war could constitute a strategic window of opportunity to consolidate its influence in the South Caucasus. With Iran internally weakened and Russia preoccupied with the war in Ukraine, Ankara face fewer constraints in advancing the Middle Corridor pan-Turkic connectivity agenda. In such a scenario, both Armenia and Azerbaijan may increasingly view ��ü���쾱��� as a reliable regional partner, particularly if Ankara’s initiatives are reinforced by support from the United States and the Trump administration and by broader Western engagement. At the same time, the weakening of Iran could result on unintended consequences, such as the renewal of at Turkish borders.

Conclusion

The renewed U.S. engagement in the South Caucasus catalyzed by the Washington Accords and the TRIPP constitutes a strategic advantage for ��ü���쾱��� and Azerbaijan. It helps remove existing to the project’s implementation and circumvents longstanding opposition, particularly from Iran and Russia. For Armenia, the TRIPP represents a rare opportunity to stimulate economic development, consolidate its strategic reorientation toward the West, and rebalance its negotiating position vis-à-vis Baku, while simultaneously benefiting from the expanding trade and connectivity generated by the Middle Corridor.

By reconfiguring regional connectivity, the United States seeks to weaken both Iranian and Russian influence in the South Caucasus. Within this new strategic environment, any Iranian effort to obstruct the corridor in practice would no longer confront Azerbaijan or ��ü���쾱��� alone, but rather the United States itself. Such opposition would also risk damaging Iran’s relationship with Yerevan and undermine its access to the North–South Corridor, thereby weakening Iran’s broader connectivity to Europe.

Although Iran and Russia share certain tactical positions, most notably their skepticism toward externally driven regional initiatives such as the TRIPP, their strategic interests diverge. Russia’s posture remains pragmatic and situational, shaped by its wider global priorities and flexibility in regional bargaining. Iranian officials, by contrast, increasingly perceive the TRIPP as a direct geopolitical threat, one that could marginalize Iran economically and strategically within emerging Eurasian trade networks.

Overall, the Washington Accords have the potential to reshape the geostrategic and geoeconomic landscape of the South Caucasus and to challenge Iran’s traditional regional foreign policy. However, the realization of these outcomes will depend on the successful implementation of an ambitious infrastructure agenda requiring sustained Western engagement, as well as the finalization of a durable peace settlement between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

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Introduction

On January 5th, 2026, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced the appointment of former Canadian Deputy Prime Minister and Member of Parliament, Chrystia Freeland, as Economic Advisor to the Office of the President of Ukraine. In a post on X, Zelenskyy stated, “Ukraine needs to strengthen its internal resilience – both for the sake of Ukraine’s recovery if diplomacy delivers results as swiftly as possible, and to reinforce our defence if, because of delays by our partners, it takes longer to bring this war to an end.” In the following days, Freeland confirmed she accepted President Zelenskyy’s appointment and that she would be resigning as a Member of Parliament, taking effect as of January 9th, 2026.

Freeland’s appointment as voluntary Economic Advisor to the Office of the President of Ukraine is being made against the larger and developing backdrop of ongoing diplomatic negotiations between the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the United States (US) to come to an agreed upon pathway to peace. This negotiation process continues to be arduous for Ukraine. It also comes alongside a deepening of foreign diplomatic relations between Canada and Ukraine under the Mark Carney government; this, coming on the back of Prime Minister Carney’s historical , where he stressed the end of the rules-based international order and hinted at the decline of American hegemony – a speech that have held to ultimately represent the beginning of a multipolar era in world politics.

In the coming months, the Eastern European and Transatlantic Network (EETN) will publish a series analyzing key developments shaping the war; these include prospective pathways to peace, ongoing diplomatic negotiations and tensions, and the shifting security and economic governance landscape in Ukraine. Freeland is an integral node among an emerging and vital network aimed at supporting Ukraine and its future as the anniversary of the full-scale invasion nears and passes. This series aims to make clear that Russia is not only engaged in a war of attrition so as to try to reclaim its great power status, but that Ukraine is increasingly prepared to respond to this war of attrition with strategies and methods of asymmetric and hybrid warfare. Ukraine is prepared to make the strategic, economic, and relational moves necessary to better guarantee its future, as well as its success on the battlefield and in diplomatic negotiations.

This first brief of the series reflects on Freeland’s appointment and builds upon an argument first offered by Ukrainian scholar Valeriia Gusieva, where she suggested that cultural resilience is a foundational pillar to security. I extend her argument here by suggesting that cultural resilience and situated experience are also crucial to sustaining a coherent and effective attritional war strategy – Freeland’s appointment, in this case, should be understood light through the lens of political habituation.

Chrystia Freeland: A Ukrainian-Canadian MP and Soviet War Crimes Researcher

Chrystia Freeland was born in Peace River, Alberta in 1968 to a Ukrainian mother and Canadian father. Though she formally entered Canadian federal politics in 2013, she is perhaps most known through her association with former Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and his government. Under Trudeau, Freeland was appointed to serve as Minister of International Trade in Trudeau’s cabinet. In this position, she was a key negotiator in the hard-fought Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) (which replaced the North American Free Trade Agreement, or NAFTA, in 2020), as well as the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with the European Union (EU) that was signed in 2016.

While it is fair to assume that many Western audiences are familiar with the whiplash antics of American President Donald Trump, who often combines “,” less well known are the tensions that characterized the negotiation process of CETA. As researchers , CETA encountered historical diplomatic tensions throughout its negotiation process: “This challenge becomes evident at various stages in the trade policy process, but it is most pronounced in the ratification of bilateral agreements, which require approval in all member states.”

On paper, arriving at CETA was through the bilateral process of negotiation between Canada and the EU; in reality, however, Freeland was situated in a much more difficult negotiating position. Because the subsequent ratification of CETA would require the approval of all EU member states, such a negotiating process proved to be a lesson for both Freeland and the European Commission, who was charged with ensuring the twenty-eight member states were in alignment. Indeed, as scholar Joris Larik , the alleged crisis of CETA negotiations soon became a “cautionary tale” about the “cumbersome and vulnerable EU treaty-making procedures, where internal politics and technical legal discussions detracted from the merits (or demerits) of the actual agreement.”

This became most visible through the tensions experienced with the Wallonia Parliament in Belgium, an autonomous regional government with veto power over EU trade deals. In late 2016, the Walloon government publicly rejected CETA, in part because of their worry that the trade deal would “.” Walloon regional minister-president, Paul Magnette, told reporters the following: “I don’t consider this as a funeral, I don’t consider this as a veto without any conditions. I consider this as a request to reopen negotiations so that European leaders could hear the legitimate demands which have been forcefully expressed by an organized, transparent civil society.” As Larik however, this crisis led to “profound internal reflections on EU trade policy, causing even a shift in the EU’s practice in concluding trade agreements.

It was largely in response to these tensions and apparent deadlock within Wallonia that Freeland made the public decision to walk out on CETA negotiations with our European allies. Following her decision, Freeland with Canadian journalists candidly: “It’s become evident for me, for Canada, that the European Union isn’t capable now to have an international treaty even with a country that has very European values like Canada. And even with a country so nice, with a lot of patience like Canada.” At the time, the move was taken by some in Canadian media as an “” response; Conservative critics in the House of Commons Freeland’s walk out as a “meltdown,” alleging she required “adult supervision” – language that carried clear sexist and gendered connotations. Still others this walk out is exactly what the negotiation process needed, as it eventually led to the signing of the trade agreement.

Reflecting on her CETA negotiation experience in 2026, Freeland the following about negotiating with European allies, which is worth quoting at-length here:

“You can sort of have two kinds of negotiations. Some negotiations start with a kind of win-win premise where the two parties come together wanting a deal, wanting to be friends, seeing each other as long-term partners, and they’ll disagree about stuff, but the negotiation is really about everyone working hard together to find the best possible landing zone. I would say Canada’s negotiations with the EU about our trade deal with Europe, CETA, were conducted in that way, and they were hard, right? … Our final slightly melodramatic moments in Namur, in Wallonia, you know, proceeded by moments in Vienna, in Germany, in the European Parliament. I mean, it was a long slog and there were lots of obstacles and there was some drama, but it was clear there was goodwill on all sides.”

In this interview, Freeland goes on to characterize how Trump falls into an alternative negotiation camp compared to that which characterized CETA; she the idea that the American President abides by the logic of a zero-sum game: “…when you are dealing with a party that has that kind of a view [zero-sum game logic] and that kind of an attitude, then I think you have to be very clear in your own mind about red lines. And you have to be very prepared to say, thus far and no further, we’re not gonna capitulate our approach.”

Freeland later went on to become Canada’s Minister of Finance in 2020, where she was responsible for introducing four federal budgets, including federal aid measures related to Canada’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic. She was the first woman to serve in this role, a fact that would later be considered by the as crucial in the decay of her relationship with Trudeau prior to his own resignation in late-2025.

Beyond her political career, Freeland’s academic and journalistic works span two decades and have drawn the ire of the Kremlin. While pursuing graduate studies in Russian history and literature at Harvard, where she was responsible for documenting and translating archival and investigative materials related to the – an unmarked, mass burial site used by the NKVD (the secret police of the Soviet Union) to dispose of executed dissidents and prisoners. It remains one of the largest mass burial sites in Ukraine, even Russia’s current invasion. Her research played a decisive role in debunking the Stalin-era myth that the executions were exclusively carried out by the Nazis during World War Two. This research eventually attracted the attention of the KGB – the main security agency of the Soviet Union – who then assigned Freeland the codename “Frida,” closely surveilling and building a case against her throughout the course of her study.

As a Canadian with Ukrainian heritage, Freeland has been among the most outspoken advocates for sustained Canadian support to Ukraine. In response, she is one of thirteen Canadian officials barred from entering Russia under retaliatory sanctions imposed by Vladimir Putin himself in 2014 and has been the target of various . Freeland has also faced public attacks from American President Donald Trump, who on several occasions has described her in disparaging terms, including “,” a “,” a “,” and an overall “.” From a feminist perspective, Freeland’s experience navigating such attacks underscores her familiarity with the gendered power dynamics employed by – an experience that may indeed prove to be a strategic asset in a war whose social construction and conduct are themselves . While much of international politics Freeland nonetheless works against the masculine grain in a pursuit of fair and just agreements and futures.

Contextualizing the Habituation of Freeland and Concluding Remarks

As this series continues to examine changes within President Zelenskyy’s inner circle in response to both Ukrainian domestic pressures and Russia’s growing attritional war strategy, I suggest that Freeland’s appointment as a voluntary Economic Advisor to Ukraine signals an awareness within Ukrainian leadership and its closest allies that responding to Russia’s attritional warfare in 2026 cannot be confined to military operations alone. No longer are we in an era where hard power capabilities are the only measure of a nation’s strength; the personal and personnel also matter.

Freeland will be an important figure to watch, particularly as it relates to dialogue between Ukrainian feminists and the pro-democracy movement – not because Freeland herself has expressed a desire to pursue a feminist agenda in Ukraine’s economic reconstruction, but because her presence reflects the often-implicit reality that gendered political experience shapes how the dynamics of endurance, credibility, and trust are produced and sustained in wartime economies. In a war of attrition, where authority is continuously reaffirmed under conditions of prolonged uncertainty, reputational attack, and economic strain, such situated experience becomes strategically relevant, I suggest, as a form of habituation to sustained delegitimization.

The notion of habituation draws from a long philosophical tradition – mostly commonly, Aristotelian ethics, where habituation (hexis) was used to refer to repeated exposure and practice from durable dispositions rather than momentary or instantaneous reaction. In contemporary political thought, philosophers and scholars inspired by phenomenologists such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty have upon this idea to explain how subjects develop capacities for political action through ongoing relational strain. In feminist ethics, habituation helps to explain how – often oppressed – actors learn to endure, navigate, and act within conditions of prolonged vulnerability, scrutiny, and marginalization over time. It moves beyond experience; it is an engaged and embodied vision and practice.

In an attritional war where legitimacy is not necessarily secured through fast-paced or singular victories but continually reproduced across various political, economic, and social structures, as well as through relations of alliance management and public trust, this mode of habituation takes on strategic significance. Indeed, for President Zelenskyy, it works in his favour to cultivate and incorporate actors habituated to sustained delegitimization because it acts as a shock absorber to the , partner unreliability in a so-called newly-founded “” world, and economic fatigue increasingly characterizing this phase of the war and ongoing occupation. The hope is that these hybrid shocks are absorbed by such a habituation without suffering from significant strategic drifts that may carry over into the battlefield.

, nations and militaries perceived to possess greater status and capabilities – that is, the greater of two powers – engage in warfare by attrition. Those familiar with Russia and the former Soviet Union’s historical record of aggression, occupation, interference, and war across Eastern Europe will also recognize this mode of warfare, perhaps all too familiarly. The Baltics, the Balkans, Poland, Chechnya, Georgia – they all know this playbook. The Russian Federation continues to seek what it perceives as its rightful seat at the table of great-power politics; even those of us who reject John J. Mearsheimer’s structuralist projections onto Eastern Europe as lying within a fixed Russian “sphere of influence” cannot ignore such an imperial desire percolating within the Russian state since the unipolar moment.

In attritional war, time is a previous resource. As Sun Tzu , prolonged conflict could be of great risk to either warring side, on account of exhausting the state apparatus, undermining domestic order and morale, and eroding strategic advantage; for him, military strategy was a subtle and complex technique whose success depended on minimizing the temporal risks and costs of war. While Sun Tzu viewed attritional war as a strategic failure, the work of military theorist and general requires us to remember that wars of attrition often emerge as a political condition over time, shaped by friction, uncertainty, and an overall inability to achieve decisive political outcomes. What Ukraine demonstrates to the international community, this series aims to show, is that Russia’s apparent great power strategy grounded in attrition – like empire itself – can burn out.

It is by sources close to both Freeland and Prime Minister Carney that Freeland received Zelenskyy’s offer on December 22nd, 2025; by December 24th, she had shared with the Prime Minister her intentions to leave Canadian parliament to join the Ukrainian team. In responding to the Kremlin’s continued war of attrition, concerns beyond immediate hard power capabilities, military strategy, and command structures must be addressed. Freeland possesses a unique form of habituation to sustain delegitimation; her appointment may indeed be an important shock absorber to Russia’s ongoing disinformation campaigns, American partner unreliability, and the economic fatigue increasingly characterizing this war.

At the level of a broader wartime strategy, I suggest this capacity can also function as a form of resilience; it signals to communities, civil society, international partners, and adversaries alike that broader Ukraine’s leadership is prepared to govern through a liminal phase of uncertain futurity rather than govern toward a rapid endpoint. This is a strategy in stark contrast to Putin’s assumption that a “quick military operation” could sweep Ukraine in 2022, or that , once elected, could end the war in Ukraine in the first 24-hours of his second term. In this sense, it is important to emphasize that habituation is not merely an individual trait or disposition, but also a culturally sedimented capacity that is experienced transnationally and relationally. As Gusieva has argued, cultural resilience constitutes a foundational pillar of security; indeed, classical realist how such resilience at times is what pushes a nation beyond survival towards victory. I extend this logic here by suggesting that such cultural resilience is forged through repeated exposure to, and embeddedness within, enduring imperial projects and traditionalist military practices – in this case, namely, Russia’s ongoing attempts to reclaim imperial-great power status, legitimate its occupations, and sustain attritional warfare alongside its hybrid threats towards Europe.

In Ukraine, cultural habituation operates as resilience, but it is neither neutral nor abstract; rather, its experience is deeply racialized, ethnicized, and gendered. It is racialized and ethnicized through the persistent positioning of the nation as materially peripheral to Europe while cast as subordinate to Russia’s so-called historical sphere of influence; it is gendered through the paternalizing narratives directed at Ukraine and other Eastern European states aspiring to EU membership, as well as in the recurring trope of Ukraine as the “little brother” to a masculinized “Mother Russia.” More specifically, we see this reproduced through the hegemonically masculine practices embodied by state actors in political negotiations of economic and security matters; these behaviours continue to structure much of how political negotiation, listening, and diplomatic exchange take place. Freeland, in this respect, is a node within a broader relational structure of habituation and diplomatic practice in wartime Ukraine – one whose own political endurance aligns with, and stands to reinforce, Ukraine’s culturally embedded capacity to govern through attrition.

Please stay tuned for the next installment of this series, which will analyze Ukraine’s 2025 energy scandal and subsequent political moves undertaken President Zelenskyy following a state investigation that exposed high-level embezzlement within the nation’s energy sector.

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“The Black Sea in 2026: Strategic Maneuvers and Economic Opportunity” examines how the Black Sea has become one of the world’s most consequential geopolitical and economic corridors following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The brief analyzes the competing strategies of Russia, ��ü���쾱���, the European Union, and China, alongside the security concerns of littoral states, highlighting how control of the region shapes Ukraine’s future and broader transatlantic stability. It also outlines Canada’s growing role as a NATO partner in supporting regional security, trade resilience, and postwar reconstruction. The paper concludes with targeted policy recommendations for strengthening Canada–Ukraine cooperation and enhancing Black Sea security in a rapidly evolving strategic landscape.

To read the full policy brief prepared by Dr. Jeff Sahadeo, click the download button below.

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The South Caucasus region has historically been regarded as one of the most complex regions in the world, where geopolitical rivalries, ethnic disputes, and energy security risks collide. One of the longest-lasting conflicts in the region is the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh.

This paper aims to study the Washington Peace Declaration between Armenia and Azerbaijan and its potential impact on security and economic integration in the South Caucasus region. TRIPP and related transport initiatives could enable Armenia and Azerbaijan to serve as critical components of a strategic transit corridor linking Europe and Asia. US and EU engagement is highlighted as essential for maintaining stability and attracting investment in the region.

The post The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Geopolitical Significance of the Washington Peace Declaration for the South Caucasus appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

• Turkish goals in the Black Sea region (BSR) are to maintain stability and its own strategic positioning within the region.

• Canadian cooperation with ��ü���쾱��� continues to encounter challenges due to misaligned priorities and estrangement between actors.

• Canada has an opportunity to increase presence in the BSR by cooperating on initiatives outside of hard security concerns.

Policy Recommendations

• Canada should support the initiation of additional humanitarian projects in the BSR and seek out ways to partner with ��ü���쾱��� on defence technology and modernization to strengthen overall diplomatic and defence relations.

• Increasing Canada’s regional presence around the BSR through NATO initiatives could help to bolster its image as a supportive ally to ��ü���쾱��� while also helping project overall Canadian security interests.

��ü���쾱���’s Foreign Policy post 2022

��ü���쾱��� has historically played an influential role in the Black Sea Region (BSR) as NATO’s southeastern bulwark. The gives ��ü���쾱��� control over the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits, the key entry point of the Black Sea. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the BSR has been under wartime conditions. ��ü���쾱��� has since invoked the Convention to effectively close the straits to both NATO and Russian ships; a decision which has nonetheless sparked controversy, particularly after ��ü���쾱��� . Ankara remains apprehensive towards NATO involvement in the region, and while its relationship with the West is strained, it continues to maintain relations with Russia based on shared in the .

��ü���쾱���, unlike most NATO countries, has , and still . At the same time, ��ü���쾱��� has also . ��ü���쾱���’s seemingly contradictory policies reflect its primary goal: to maintain the existing balance of power in the BSR.

��ü���쾱���’s stance is driven by independent interests rather an alignment with the West or Russia. For ��ü���쾱���, reinforcing the status quo reaffirms their military, economic, and diplomatic power in the BSR. ��ü���쾱��� prioritizes business and trade to aid its struggling economy. It has also been increasingly positioning itself ; this has informed the country’s decisions to participate in the (a humanitarian-focused mission) and engage in peacemaking talks with Russia and Ukraine. ��ü���쾱���’s commitments are strategic, wishing to avoid provocation of either side while still leveraging their influence in military, resources, and politics.

Challenges for Canada

The major challenge for Canada will be to understand how to approach collaborations with ��ü���쾱��� in the BSR. Estrangement and misalignment from both parties pose potential problems. Relations only recently improved after Canada following ��ü���쾱���’s use of Canadian arms in Nagorno-Karabakh, Libya, and Syria. ��ü���쾱���, through its refusal to sanction Russia or permit NATO military presence BSR, has demonstrated that it is not willing to explicitly target Russia. This clashes with Canada’s aim to contain Russian expansionism and protect Ukraine.

Canadian-Turkish military cooperation largely operates through NATO. Both countries participate in , , , and . While NATO provides a strong foundation, direct partnerships between Canadian and Turkish armed forces are still minimal, thus heightening the chances of estrangement between both sides.

Opportunities for Canada

Despite limitations, there are still opportunities to develop Canadian-Turkish diplomatic collaboration. Focusing on economic, humanitarian, or regional development initiatives creates common ground. For example, the defence industry is an area of growing partnership. Since Canada lifted the arms embargo on ��ü���쾱���, it has become one of Canada’s . ��ü���쾱��� also participates in CANSEC (Canada’s international defence technology conference), and Turkish defence firms travelled to Canada as part of a . The exercise generated technology that enhances automated systems and increases resilience to hybrid offensives. For example, the firm HAVELSAN was able to . between the two countries also provide strong opportunities for investment and technological development which can have positive effects both for defence and for the overall economies of each country.

Building regional capacity is a promising avenue for cooperation. As mentioned above, ��ü���쾱��� participates in FLF battlegroups, part of NATO’s . Pursuing similar initiatives in the scope of military modernization could be successful in increasing regional capacity. Furthermore, Canada can draw upon its skills in mediation and development to encourage stable, formal BSR organizations. Both actions can increase the ability for the BSR to safeguard against further destabilization in the region, which is beneficial to Turkish interests. The MCM was able to launch successfully in large part because it was framed as a humanitarian mission. This emphasizes the importance of optics for ��ü���쾱���, and should serve as an example of how to navigate different positionalities.

For Canada, the BSR can be a new avenue of partnership, increasing overall soft power and presence. A strong BSR is essential for NATO’s objective to defend Alliance territories. It is also essential for Canada’s efforts to enhance its defence posture and bolster international stability. However, without critically engaging with ��ü���쾱��� this goal will be difficult to achieve. Therefore, finding relevant but non-conventional ways to collaborate in the BSR is key. Enhancing relations also align with other moves ��ü���쾱��� has been making to collaborate more closely with other NATO and EU countries which seek similar goals as Canada. With an increasing need for fortification of the BSR, Canada should take the opportunity to distinguish itself as a valuable partner.

The post Turkish Foreign Policy in the BSR: Opportunities and Challenges for Canada appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

Executive Summary

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has had far-reaching consequences for global security, particularly for regions and areas outside the European Union (EU), such as the South Caucasus, post-Soviet Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Mongolia. Although these areas are geographically far from the conflict zone, security ripple effects have been significant, as the Russian Federation has remained historically dominant and influential in these regions. However, the war in Ukraine has raised concerns about the security challenges and terrorism threats in Central Asia and South Caucasus.

This white paper explores the strategic consequences of Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine for broader security architecture with a focus on four critical areas: the South Caucasus, Central Asia, Mongolia, and Afghanistan. It offers a regional assessment of shifting military alignments, hybrid threats, counterterrorism dynamics, and Canada’s emerging security interests in this evolving landscape.

Key Findings

· Russia’s military overstretch has significantly weakened its role as a regional security guarantor, particularly in Central Asia and the South Caucasus.

· Traditional alliances are being re-evaluated; new security actors such as Turkiye, China, and smaller Western states are filling the resulting vacuum.

· Hybrid threats are rising in formerly Russian-dominated regions, increasing instability and risk.

· The resurgence of terrorism and border insecurity in Central Asia and Afghanistan poses renewed threats to regional and global stability.

· Canada has vital strategic interests in contributing to the mitigation of these risks, leveraging its role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and longstanding regional partnerships.

· Poland and Romania, as key actors in NATO and EU strategic initiatives, offer replicable models for Canadian-supported deterrence and resilience across Eurasia.

Introduction

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has not only redefined the contemporary nature of war but exposed deep strategic vulnerabilities within Europe’s security architecture. NATO’s eastern flank was shown to be underprepared for full-scale military aggression, and debates over enlargement and deterrence capabilities have been reinvigorated. Compounding this is the growing uncertainty surrounding US foreign policy under a second Trump administration, casting doubt on the consistency and reliability of transatlantic security commitments.

These shifting dynamics raise critical questions for states on the periphery of NATO and Russia’s former sphere of influence. As they navigate the emerging multipolar order, the need for new strategic calculations, and potentially, alternative or diversified security guarantees, has become paramount.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 marked a turning point in global security relations. While much focus has remained on NATO’s eastern flank and Western Europe, the war’s ripple effects are being acutely felt across post-Soviet Eurasia. Countries that once relied on Russia for military protection are now exploring new alignments, hedging their defense dependencies, or recalibrating their neutrality.

In addition, this war has been influencing NATO’s counterterrorism strategy. The war has created new opportunities for terrorist groups to exploit and ultimately increase their influence to fill the security vacuum. Among these groups we can mention IS-K/IS-KP – Islamic State in Khorasan Province, the branch of IS – Islamic State – which has been spreading its propaganda in Western societies as well. During the war, Russia has continued to be a trusted partner for Iran, hosting members of another radical group Hamas previously in Moscow. Anti-Western propaganda is familiar for Russia as it has often blamed Western countries in facilitating the rise of terrorist organizations. For example, Maria Zabolotskaya, deputy permanent representative of Russia in United Nations (UN), has argued that emergence of IS in the Middle East and Africa can be blamed on the failed US withdrawal and intervention in Iraq and Libya. She added that the situation in Afghanistan is a vivid example of the West leveraging counterterrorism issues to serve their “selfish geopolitical interests”.

This white paper examines the impacts of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on the South Caucasus, Central Asia, Mongolia, and Afghanistan, which have been historically influenced by Russian (and Soviet) military presence, as well as political and economic interests, but are navigating an increasingly fragmented and uncertain security environment. While it is true that the war may not be immediately felt within these regions, it will still nevertheless have significant indirect implications for regional security dynamics by potentially escalating terrorism and extremism. Groups like IS, Al-Qaeda, and other Islamist militant organizations remain active not only in conflict zones, but also in launching global terror operations.

For Canadian policymakers, these developments raise key questions about strategic engagement, NATO cooperation, counterterrorism strategy, and regional stability.

Methodology

This white paper employs a qualitative research design, utilizing a combination of primary and secondary sources to investigate the multifaceted challenges faced by selected states in the context of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Primary sources include government strategy papers, defense white papers, and formal statements issued by international organizations, such as NATO and the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE). Secondary sources include academic literature, policy briefs or analyses from research institutions or think tanks as well as insights derived from expert interviews.

A case study methodology underpins the country-level analysis, enabling in-depth examination of the geopolitical and security implications for Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, and Afghanistan. This approach facilitates comparative insights regarding the regional ramifications of the war in Ukraine, particularly concerning national resilience, foreign policy realignments, and security sector responses.

Historical and Geopolitical Context

For decades following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia maintained its influence over the South Caucasus and Central Asia through a combination of hard military presence, economic dependencies, and soft power. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), bilateral military treaties, and strategic basing agreements, such as those in Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, reflected Moscow’s central role in regional security. As have argued, Russia’s approach was rooted in the belief that the Eastern European neighbourhood should remain within its exclusive sphere of influence, serving both as a security buffer and a geopolitical assertion of status. However, the war in Ukraine has fundamentally destabilized this architecture.

Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine accelerated a visible erosion of Russia’s hegemonic posture in the broader Eurasian region. Yet this war did not begin in 2022; it is the culmination of a broader imperial strategy that began with Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia and the 2014 annexation of Crimea. These earlier incursions served as testing grounds for military aggression, hybrid warfare, and the West’s tolerance for territorial revisionism.

The 2008 war in Georgia, which resulted in the occupation of 20% of Georgian territory, was met with limited international pushback and no enduring deterrent mechanisms. This failure arguably emboldened the Kremlin’s further actions in Ukraine and elsewhere, reinforcing a perception of impunity. The erosion of credible deterrence, both conventional and hybrid, has challenged the assumptions underpinning NATO’s posture in Eastern Europe.

The war in Ukraine has also tested the transatlantic relationship, revealing an over-reliance on US leadership and exposing uncertainties about the durability of Western unity, particularly in light of shifts in American administrations. The conflict has reignited debates in Europe about strategic autonomy, defense investment, and burden-sharing within NATO.

While much attention remains focused on Ukraine, the shockwaves of the war have rippled well beyond its borders. Eurasia, particularly the South Caucasus, Central Asia, Mongolia, and Afghanistan have felt the tremors. These regions, historically shaped by Russia’s military and political dominance, now face a strategic vacuum. Russia’s overextension, domestic fragility, and inability to honor security commitments have altered the geopolitical balance. The result is a complex reordering of alliances, threat perceptions, and defense strategies across a vast and vulnerable geography.

Countries like Kazakhstan, traditionally aligned with Moscow, have resisted pressure to support the Kremlin’s war aims and have actively diversified their foreign policy strategies. Some scholars identify a growing trend of “strategic hedging” among Central Asian states, an effort to reduce overdependence on Russian security while cautiously engaging other powers. Meanwhile, Armenia’s disillusionment with the CSTO following Russia’s passivity during the 2020 and 2023 Nagorno-Karabakh crises reflects a broader questioning of Moscow’s reliability.

This erosion has created space for other actors. China, once cautious in its military profile, is now establishing a more visible security footprint in Central Asia. As Raffaello Pantucci (2023) notes, Beijing has invested in border surveillance, counterterrorism cooperation, and limited joint exercises in Tajikistan

and Kyrgyzstan. These changes indicate a transition from Russian-centric security alignment to multipolar, flexible, and interest-based configurations.

NATO’s role in Eurasian security is also undergoing a significant transformation. While formal enlargement remains politically sensitive, NATO has pursued partnership formats, especially with Georgia and, increasingly, Mongolia, to build interoperability and signal political support. Michael Rühle discusses the strategic importance of “NATO’s global partnerships,” which allow for flexible collaboration without formal membership. Georgia’s engagement through the NATO–Georgia Substantial Package has been one of the examples of this evolving cooperation. The Alliance’s “open door” policy is also being undermined by strategic ambiguity, raising doubts among aspirant states about the credibility of Western security guarantees.

In the Georgian case, what was once a society firmly committed to Euro-Atlantic integration has, in recent years, seen a partial retrenchment. Public support for NATO remains high, but political dynamics and growing disillusionment with Western inaction in the face of Russian occupation have fueled uncertainty. This creates both risk and opportunity: risk in the form of democratic backsliding and regional instability, and opportunity for Canada and NATO allies to re-engage with clear, consistent support for democratic reform and territorial integrity.

Yet, NATO’s ability to provide credible security guarantees short of membership remains contested. highlight how ambiguity in NATO’s posture toward aspirant states undermines deterrence and opens space for adversarial manipulation. These concerns are further compounded by shifting US policies and uncertain commitment levels, especially under new administrations. For states in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, this ambiguity feeds the appeal of diversification.

focuses on the new security landscape created by Russia’s war in Ukraine to adapt the new strategy of counter-terrorism and hybrid warfare. According to a particular NATO document, three main tasks has been identified: collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security. As analyzes, this document “identifies terrorism as one of the primary asymmetric threats to the alliance, alongside hybrid warfare…”. Also, the Washington Summit Declaration of 2024 highlighted to prevent the spread of radical ideologies and adapt the counter-terrorism policy.

mentions three main challenges for security architecture: “low-level terrorism,” digital “value chain,” and proliferation of arms. He suggests that NATO’s counter-terrorism strategy should take up a practice of selective reevaluation to answer new terrorism threats. As NATO’s adaptive strategy from the 1990s to the 2000s was focused on strengthening its counter-terrorism efforts, the new security landscape is reshaping NATO’s strategy to be more focused on answering these new threats connecting to arms trafficking from conflict zones. Stockhammer includes the example of when

The literature also emphasizes the growing prevalence of hybrid threats, disinformation campaigns, and covert paramilitary activity. theorize that hegemonic decline is often accompanied by a rise in grey zone tactics, as waning powers seek to maintain influence without triggering direct confrontation. Russia’s increased use of cyber and disinformation tools in Georgia and Kazakhstan supports this thesis. Similarly, China’s security strategy in Central Asia increasingly includes digital authoritarianism, with exported surveillance technologies and cyber-cooperation compacts.

These hybrid methods are particularly concerning in contexts of weak governance and democratic fragility, where external manipulation can exploit societal divisions. Scholars like have long warned about the vulnerability of aspiring democracies on Russia’s border, and recent events in Georgia and Armenia suggest that these vulnerabilities are being actively exploited in the post-Ukraine war environment.

The South Caucasus region – including Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan – remains vulnerable to terrorism largely due to its proximity to unstable areas such as the North Caucasus, Turkiye, and Iran, as well as the movement of foreign terrorist fighters (FTF) linked to conflicts in Syria and Iraq that have involved IS and other radical Islamist groups. These conflicts have created fertile ground for radicalization that some scholars suggest may further intensify the risk of radicalization; they express concern regarding the possibility of individuals returning home and further engaging with radical ideologies among local communities. While Armenia has been less affected by Islamist movements, the instability following the Karabakh conflict may nonetheless have left fertile ground for hybrid threats to form. In addition, there are concerns about Syrian militants (mainly from groups with ties to jihadist organizations) being transported to the South Caucasus to fight alongside Azerbaijani forces, particularly since the second Nagorno-Karabakh war. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine could exacerbate the , with some potentially being diverted to the South Caucasus, either

The Pankisi Gorge region in Georgia gained notoriety in the 2000s as a site of jihadist recruitment, a refuge site for Islamic militants, and a key transit route. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Western intelligence raised alarms on presence of Al-Qaeda in the Gorge. According to various sources, Arab foreign fighters who participated in the Chechen wars also received training in the region – a practice that Russia frequently cited in its accusations of Georgia harboring terrorists and failing to control its borders. From 2014 to 2015, Georgia re-emerged in international media coverage when IS rose to power in Iraq, drawing foreign fighters from around the world – including Georgia – to the battlefields of Iraq and subsequently, Syria. According to different sources, approximately 50 to 200 fighters left Georgia to fight in the ranks of IS or other terrorist organizations. As the war in Ukraine continues, it may present Russia with yet another opportunity to accuse others of providing safe haven to foreign terrorist fighters.

Recent reflections, including by , highlight that international engagement in Afghanistan, particularly by Western powers including Canada, was compromised by flawed diplomatic design and operational fragmentation. In his assessment of the , Rahim identifies key failures such as the exclusion of the Afghan government, unrealistic timelines imposed by the United States, and a lack of impartial mediation as primary factors in the collapse of political settlement efforts. These deficiencies, compounded by internal divisions among Afghan elites, resulted in a fragile negotiating structure vulnerable to collapse under Taliban pressure. Canada’s mission, like that of its NATO allies, was constrained by unclear objectives and shifting operational mandates, a point echoed by Canadian commentators in major outlets like The Globe and Mail (2023).

The collapse of the Afghan Republic and the Taliban’s return to power has had immediate and long-term security spillovers in the region. Central Asian states are particularly concerned about cross-border terrorism, refugee surges, narcotics trafficking, and the spread of extremist ideologies. With Russia distracted and weakened by its invasion of Ukraine, and China reluctant to assume deep security commitments, the region

faces a growing vacuum of counterterrorism leadership. In this context, Rahim’s critique serves as a cautionary framework for future interventions: local legitimacy, inclusive diplomacy, and long-term strategic alignment must form the foundation of external engagement. Canada’s policy going forward should include lessons learned from Afghanistan’s collapse, as well as new mechanisms to support border-state resilience through coordinated regional intelligence, multilateral diplomacy, and support for community-level stabilization initiatives.

Afghanistan, however, presents another dimension of strategic instability. The US forces withdrawal and the Taliban’s return to power have turned the country into a potential source of terrorist activity and transnational criminal networks. Reports by the International Crisis Group and the United States Institute of Peace warn of the risks posed by IS-KP and other extremist groups to regional security, particularly in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. The new atmosphere gave more flexibility to various extremist groups to regroup or collaborate with each other. There are three main terrorist groups operating in Afghanistan now: the .

Afghanistan falling to Taliban rule has created a multitude of challenges for international relations. Despite the fact that no country or international organization formally recognizes the leadership of Taliban, some maintain diplomatic relations. Central Asian countries such as Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan continue to engage in diplomatic talks with Taliban, focusing mostly on regional economic issues. All five Central Asian states have kept embassies in Kabul despite the fallout.

As Russia focuses more on Ukraine, IS-KP has more possibility to increase its influence outside Afghanistan too. IS-KP is estimated to have about , including foreign recruits from Central Asia and Europe. IS-KP carried out its first terrorist attack at Kabul airport immediately after the US military withdrawal in 2021, signaling its intent to challenge the Taliban for control over Afghanistan. As result of the , 170 Afghans and 13 US militants were killed. And although IS has lost its territorial strongholds in Iraq and Syria, the group has nonetheless quickly shifted its strategy to forming smaller factions across various countries: “”.

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has expressed concern over the situation in Afghanistan and IS-KP since the US withdrawal in 2021. As Vladimir Voronkov, UN Under-Secretary-General mentioned, “”. In this context, some scholars consider IS-KP as the most formidable extremist group, with . It has plotted more terrorist attacks since 2021 when Taliban came to power. The reasons of the increased terrorist attacks are the tactical shift that began in 2019 and chaos and vacuum in Afghanistan. while the Taliban referred to IS-KP members as Salafis or Khawarij, or heretical extremists.

It is important to mention that IS-KP members, which became one of the main threats for the security of Afghanistan and Central Asia, who organize terrorist attacks in Afghanistan, are from Central Asian countries and mainly, Tajikistan. For example, the first terrorist attack following the onset of the Ukraine war occurred in Kabul in 2022 and was carried out by of IS. In March 2023, a Tajik militant assassinated the , , who had been a promient figure in the fight against the IS-KP network in Nangarhar. Later, in December 2023, a member from Central Asia residing in Germany . These attacks were flollowed by several terrorist attacks in Iran – killing 90 people – and Turkiye – killing one person.

This continued into 2024, where IS-KP orchestrated a series of terrorist attacks across Afghanistan. Among the most notable was an assault on , the Afghan Taliban governor of Nimroz, who narrowly escaped execution by a faction of IS-KP Tajik member. On March 21, 2024, an Uzbek national affiliated with . Following this, IS expanded its operations beyond the Khorasan region and launched several high-profile attacks. Among them was a widely publicized suicide bombing in Kerman province, Iran, during the anniversary procession of the General Qassem Soleimani’s death. According to the Iranian investigators, one of the terrorists was of who had received training instructions in Afghanistan (Table 1).

Furthermore, among those noteworthy included terrorist attacks attributed to IS-KP on March 24, 2024, which saw Tajik nationals storm and kill 145 people. Such terrorist attacks showed the tendency, that since IS-KP became active in Afghanistan, more individuals from Central Asian countries – mainly ethnic Tajiks – have been engaged in terrorist activities. This trend created the fertile ground for radicalization in Central Asia’s region that already experienced Islamic radical movements in the 1990s.

2025 was no exception to terrorist violence, as several high-profile terrorist attacks in Turkiye and Russia took place. In an effort to thwart future terrorist attacks, the Turkish government carried out a series of operations targeting IS cells across the country. More than three hundred individuals were arrested, most of them originating from Central Asia. Subsequent investigations revealed that several of the detainees were high-ranking members of the IS-KP network operating across Central Asia, Turkiye, and the Caucasus.

Due to IS-KP’s terrorist activities beyond Afghanistan’s borders, neighbouring countries – particularly in – have found it necessary to engage with the Taliban, not only to pursue counterterrorism objectives but to also advance their own economic and political interests in the region. Unlike the IS-KP, which poses a greater regional security threat, the Taliban has been viewed as a more viable partner in reshaping the regional security landscape. Central Asian countries have maintained their embassies in Kabul, signaling a pragmatic approach to diplomacy with Taliban governance. As Turgunbaeva & Ghiasi suggest, for Central Asian countries, the Taliban proves to be the better partner than IS-KP, as the latter has already attacked two Central Asian countries: Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Additionally, while China seeks stability in Afghanistan for fulfilling the interests served by the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and to prevent the spread the radical ideology, Central Asian countries also try to stabilize the region.

The persistence of Central Asian militants remains an overwhelming challenge to international security. Since 2023, the region has been a wellspring of terrorist operations organized by its nationals, whose reach has extended from Europe to the Middle East. These attacks, carried out across countries such as Iran, Russia, Afghanistan, and Turkiye, bear the unmistakable imprint of Central Asian involvement. Although, despite the troubling export of violence, the post-Soviet Central Asian states themselves have, thus far, remained largely untouched by such acts of terrorism on their own soil.

Uzbekistan was the first country to host a Taliban delegation, led by the Deputy Prime Minister Mawlawi Abdul Salam Hanafi in September 2022. In 2024 the Uzbek Prime Minister visited Kabul to discuss the trade projects. Kyrgyzstan’s relations with Afghanistan continue to be shaped in part by the presence of a strong Afghan-Kyrgyz minority in the nation. In 2021, Deputy Chairman of the Security Council Taalatbek Masadykov met with Taliban ministers to address issues important to this Afghan-Kyrgyz electorate. In September 2024, cooperation had expanded to include trade and energy infrastructure, which was soon followed by agreements in agriculture and transit.

Kazakhstan has focused its engagement with Afghanistan on economic opportunities, particularly in the chemical, mining, and metallurgical sectors. The Kazak Prime Minister led a delegation to Kabul to participate in a Kazakhstan-Afghanistan business forum, highlighting growing bilateral commercial ties.

Tajikistan, despite being the main regional opponent of the Taliban, has established trade relations with Afghanistan and signed an agreement worth $120 million USD. In addition, in 2023, Tajikistan opened five joint border markets with Afghanistan.

Turkmenistan maintains a neutral stance and primarily engages with Afghanistan through the lens of energy cooperation. Its principal interest lies in the progress of the TAPI – Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India gas pipeline. As a result, Turkmen officials’ meetings with the Taliban have mostly focused on advancing this strategic energy TAPI project.

While not a formal diplomatic move, the US has also begun to engage with the Taliban on a limited basis. On March 23, 2025, they removed three high-profile members of the Haqqani network – including Sirajuddin Haqqani, the group’s leader and the Taliban’s acting Interior Minister – from its most-wanted list. According to the Taliban, are Sirajuddin Haqqani’s brother and nephew.

The United States added the Haqqani Network as one of the deadliest groups connected to Taliban – operating in Pakistan and bordering Afghanistan – to the foreign terrorist organizations list in 2012. In doing so, they offered $5 to 10 USD reward for information leading to the capture of its leaders. However, , causing larger questions to arise regarding the future role and presence of US hegemony in the region. As scholars mention, this removal followed the Taliban’s release of US citizen George Glezmann, who had been detained in Afghanistan since 2022.

With Russia weakened and NATO’s reach limited, alternative security and development frameworks have gained prominence. The Central Asia–Caucasus–Europe (CACE) corridor, for example, envisions a strategic and economic bridge from Central Asia through the South Caucasus to Europe, bypassing Russian-controlled routes and creating new geoeconomic fault lines. Meanwhile, the , spearheaded by Poland and supported by NATO allies, connects the Adriatic, Baltic, and Black Seas in a project of economic resilience, energy diversification, and digital infrastructure.

In considering NATO members’ strategic roles, Romania has been emphasized in discussions about NATO’s deterrence on the eastern flank and the EU’s updated Black Sea Strategy (). Romania stands at the intersection of NATO’s military initiatives and the EU’s efforts to enhance connectivity, economic resilience, and maritime security in the Black Sea. Also, Poland’s assertive role in the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) highlights a regional approach to infrastructure, energy security, and defense cooperation. The 3SI provides a framework for enhanced Central European resilience in the face of growing Russian assertiveness and fluctuating US involvement in Europe.

Graham highlights Mongolia’s position as a neutral buffer balancing Russian and Chinese pressures. The Ukraine war has further encouraged Mongolia to diversify security and economic partnerships, including through engagement with Canada and other liberal democracies. Mongolia is geographically distant from Ukraine, although the war’s influence on global security dynamics may affect the region’s stability and terrorism risks. Mongolia is close to China and Russia, rendering them an indirect target for the potential exporting of radical ideologies from the extremist groups. As a neutral power between China and Russia, Mongolia may be targeted by the extremist groups allied with the Russian and Chinese state – countries which are on the same side in Ukraine war.

Mongolia recognizes the global threat that terrorism and violent extremist present to an increasingly uncertain and multipolar world. Since 2023, Mongolia has been a member of the UN Office Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) program and established the Passenger Information Unit of Mongolia. It became the fourth country to join this program and the first Asian country to establish an UNOCT unit (). According to the UN representative of Mongolia, the country is continuing to take steps to increase awareness of, and fight against, disinformation and propaganda. In 2024, Mongolia hosted the conference titled “Addressing the prevailing Digital Information Disorder: Countering the Use of the Internet by Terrorists and Extremists,” organized by OSCE Transnational Threats Department together with the National Counter-Terrorism Council of Mongolia (). In addition, the “Case for Central Asia–Caucasus Engagement” () proposes a new strategic platform to integrate diplomatic, development, and deterrence policy toward post-Soviet Eurasia. This vision aligns closely with Canada’s potential for flexible engagement and soft security.

Against this backdrop, countries are hedging their bets. While some still look to NATO as the ultimate guarantor, others have diversified their options, seeking bilateral arrangements, new regional alignments, or transactional partnerships with authoritarian powers. Strategic pluralism, rather than bloc politics, defines the new Eurasian security order.

Canadian Strategic Engagement

Poland, through its leadership in the Three Seas Initiative (3SI), represents a strategic anchor for Central and Eastern Europe in countering Russian influence and fostering Euro-Atlantic cooperation. As highlighted by , Poland has played a central role in building regional infrastructure, energy interconnectivity, and digital resilience across the 3SI member states. These efforts reduce dependency on Russian-controlled supply lines and enhance regional autonomy in the face of hybrid and conventional threats.

The 3SI complements broader NATO and EU frameworks by focusing on practical development and connectivity between the Adriatic, Baltic, and Black Seas. For countries in the South Caucasus and Central

Asia, it offers a vision of post-Soviet regionalism that emphasizes integration, resilience, and Western alignment. Integrating the Three Seas Initiative into Canadian policy considerations provides a valuable model for aligning economic development with security stabilization across the broader post-Soviet periphery.

As regional actors seek to build more autonomous strategic and economic futures, new frameworks such as the proposed Central Asia–Caucasus–Europe (CACE) corridor have gained traction. The CACE initiative, as highlighted by The National Interest (2025), envisions a geoeconomic and geopolitical link connecting Central Asia and the South Caucasus directly to Europe, bypassing traditional Russian-controlled routes. The corridor promotes diversified energy exports, secure supply chains, and multilateral infrastructure cooperation. It also reinforces the strategic importance of Georgia and Azerbaijan as transit hubs between East and West.

In this context, offers an alternative regional architecture that counters Russian and Chinese monopolies on overland infrastructure. For Canada, supporting such corridors may serve dual objectives: reducing regional dependency on adversarial actors, and facilitating sustainable development and security cooperation among emerging democracies. Integrating the CACE vision into Canadian foreign policy also complements NATO’s military posture with a civilian, development-focused track aimed at long-term stabilization.

Recent policy commentary underscores two interlinked narratives in Eurasia’s evolving security order: the significance of credible NATO-aligned deterrence models (as seen in Romania), and the consequences of softening international stances toward Russia’s occupation of Crimea. Recognizing Russia’s annexation of Crimea as legitimate would embolden other revisionist powers and fundamentally erode international legal norms regarding sovereignty. Meanwhile, Romania has demonstrated how mid-sized NATO allies can reinforce the alliance’s eastern posture through infrastructure development, multinational coordination, and hybrid threat management.

These examples illustrate the critical importance of defending international legal standards and investing in alliance readiness. Canada’s strategic outlook would benefit from incorporating these dual lessons: defending non-recognition policies in contested regions like Crimea while simultaneously learning from NATO forward-deployed frameworks in countries like Romania. Taken together, these academic and policy perspectives provide the analytical foundation for understanding Eurasia’s post-Ukraine security recalibration – and for formulating Canada’s strategic options in response.

Regional Security Implications

Across the South Caucasus, Central Asia, Mongolia, and Afghanistan, Russia’s declining influence has triggered regional realignments, new threat landscapes, and emerging opportunities for external engagement. For Canada, understanding these dynamics is critical to shaping effective policy responses.

In the South Caucasus, Armenia has grown increasingly disillusioned with Russia, particularly following Moscow’s failure to act during Azerbaijan’s 2023 offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh. Yerevan is now actively pursuing closer ties with the EU and the United States. Azerbaijan, meanwhile, has capitalized on Russia’s invasion in Ukraine to boost its military cooperation with Turkiye and Israel, positioning itself as a dominant regional power. Georgia, while maintaining its strategic commitment to NATO integratio

struggle with domestic political instability and the enduring occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Russian forces.

In Central Asia, countries like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have distanced themselves from Moscow’s geopolitical agenda. Kazakhstan notably refused to recognize Russia’s annexation of Ukrainian territories, reaffirming its commitment to territorial integrity as a core foreign policy principle. Kazakhstan has deepened defense partnerships with Turkiye, NATO, and select Western actors, while Uzbekistan – traditionally outside the CSTO – has pursued independent counterterrorism and security dialogues with the United States and China. China’s growing footprint, especially in Tajikistan, highlights Beijing’s transactional interest in border security and regime stability rather than full-spectrum defense cooperation.

At the same time, the region is facing increased pressure from transnational threats. The reassertion of Taliban control in Afghanistan and the resurgence of IS-KP have heightened fears of terrorism, arms trafficking, and extremist ideology spilling into Central Asia. Weak border management capacities and the erosion of Russia’s traditional role as a security bulwark have created a dangerous vacuum. Parallel to these trends, cyber and information warfare have intensified. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and others have been targeted by Russian disinformation campaigns aiming to undermine public trust in democratic institutions and discourage Western engagement. These hybrid threats have led to growing interest in cyber cooperation with NATO-aligned actors.

Mongolia, long maintaining a neutral foreign policy posture, is also recalibrating. Concerns about Russian unpredictability and Chinese dominance have pushed Ulaanbaatar to pursue closer security and economic ties with democratic partners, including the US, Japan, and Canada. Mongolia’s strategic location and democratic credentials position it as a valuable partner for middle-power engagement.

Afghanistan remains a critical axis of instability. The Taliban’s unchecked consolidation of power, Russia’s diminished role, and China’s limited security ambition have allowed terrorist groups such as IS-KP to flourish. Cross-border smuggling of arms and narcotics continues to destabilize the region. For bordering states like Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, this poses a direct security threat, prompting interest in greater intelligence-sharing and joint counterterrorism mechanisms.

Together, these developments suggest that Canada has an opportunity to deepen its role as a stabilizing actor. This includes advancing NATO partnerships, co-sponsoring cybersecurity and counterterrorism initiatives, and investing in diplomatic and development programs that enhance regional resilience.

Future Security Scenarios and Policy Recommendations

remains one of the most significant violations of international law in recent history. Recognizing this act, or failing to robustly oppose it, would send dangerous signals to other revisionist powers seeking to alter borders by force. As noted in the analysis by The National Interest (2024), legitimizing Russia’s control over Crimea would reward aggression and erode international norms surrounding sovereignty and territorial integrity.

For aspiring NATO-aligned nations such as Georgia and Moldova, the failure to maintain a firm stance on Crimea undermines the credibility of international deterrence. It also emboldens separatist movements supported by external powers, particularly in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria. In Central Asia,

states with Russian-speaking minorities observe the situation closely, wary of Moscow’s justifications for intervention under the pretense of “protecting compatriots.”

Canada’s unwavering support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity remains essential. Backsliding on Crimea would not only harm Kyiv’s war effort but also undermine Canadian diplomatic credibility across Eurasia. As part of NATO’s eastern flank engagement, Canadian policymakers must continue advocating for non-recognition, bolster security assistance to at-risk states, and ensure hybrid threats exploiting ambiguous status territories do not escalate into new conflicts.

Romania has emerged as a pivotal actor in NATO’s Black Sea strategy, showcasing how smaller but committed allies can meaningfully reinforce alliance posture in contested regions. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Romania rapidly expanded its defense spending, modernized its armed forces, and upgraded key infrastructure, including the Mihail Kogălniceanu Air Base — set to become one of NATO’s largest air hubs in Europe. Romania’s role is further reinforced through its leadership in regional maritime security efforts, including trilateral cooperation with Bulgaria and Turkiye to counter drifting mines in the Black Sea.

Moreover, Romania has played a critical role in supporting Ukraine’s economic resilience by facilitating the transit of over 29 million tons of Ukrainian grain through its ports, despite Russian attempts to blockade Black Sea maritime routes. It also hosts the Headquarters Multinational Corps Southeast in Sibiu, enhancing NATO’s regional command and control capacity in crisis scenarios.

Canada can view Romania as a strategic partner and operational hub within NATO’s Black Sea architecture. Joint participation in military exercises would help build interoperability with Romanian and other allied forces. Canada could contribute cyber defense expertise, helping Romania counter hybrid threats and disinformation campaigns that have intensified in the region. Infrastructure support and humanitarian collaboration could also be explored to reinforce Canada’s commitment to Eastern European security and resilience. This model of NATO-aligned deterrence in Romania can serve as a valuable reference for engaging other aspirant or front-line states, particularly Georgia and Armenia, as they navigate uncertain security environments amid a weakening Russian presence and ambiguous Western guarantees.

As Eurasian states reassess their security futures in the post-Ukraine context, two contrasting strategic directions are emerging:

Option A: NATO as a security anchor despite its limited footprint beyond Eastern Europe, some aspirant states (like Georgia) still view the alliance as the ultimate guarantor of their sovereignty and territorial integrity. For these countries, deepening interoperability with NATO standards, participating in joint exercises, and securing bilateral defense commitments from individual NATO members are seen as vital steps toward eventual membership or at least enhanced deterrence.

Option B: Strategic diversification and bilateral guarantees given uncertainties surrounding NATO’s future enlargement and potential policy shifts under a new US administration, other regional actors may opt for diversified security partnerships. This could include closer defense ties with China, or even non-aligned groupings. These actors may pursue flexible arrangements that prioritize regime security, border control, or cyber defense, rather than full-spectrum alliance integration.

Strategic Recommendations for Canada

• Expand NATO regional initiatives through technical support and military training missions.

• Deepen defense cooperation with Mongolia, Georgia, and Kazakhstan.

• Invest in regional CT capacity-building, particularly in border zones adjacent to Afghanistan.

• Contribute to hybrid threat awareness and resilience by supporting anti-disinformation programs.

• Engage multilaterally in regional defense forums, including OSCE dialogues and confidence-building platforms.

• Enhance counterterrorism cooperation with Central Asian Republics, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Mongolia

• Participate on framing the Security Policy and border control mechanisms together with Central Asian and South Caucasus countries

• Deradicalization programs – several countries in the region of Central Asia and South Caucasus have implemented de-radicalization programs to counter extremist ideologies – collaborating in adopting such programs will facilitate the process that thus far, been struggling to gain political traction.

• Advance Strategic Engagement with CACE states through:
  • Backing multilateral efforts that increase the corridor’s resilience to hybrid threats.
  • Encouraging diplomatic alignment with CACE-participating states as part of Canada’s broader Eurasia engagement strategy
  • Supporting infrastructure financing and regional governance frameworks through international institutions.
• Consider engagement with the 3SI through:
  • Investment in critical infrastructure and digital connectivity projects led by trusted allies like Poland.
  • Policy dialogue and technical assistance in the 3SI’s energy and cyber defense pillars.
  • Support for South Caucasus participation in transregional linkages with 3SI corridors, particularly through Georgia.

Conclusion

The ripple effects of Russia’s war in Ukraine extend far beyond Europe. In Eurasia, the reshuffling of defense alignments and emergence of new security actors are already reshaping the regional landscape. Canada, as a capable actor within NATO and the global security community, must engage strategically to protect its interests, support its allies, and contribute to long-term regional stability.

This white paper underscores the urgency of proactive engagement across counterterrorism and multilateral defense diplomacy. The evolving security vacuum must be addressed with foresight, allied coordination, and a renewed commitment to regional security partnerships.

Canada has both a responsibility and an opening. By advancing its contributions to NATO’s deterrence efforts, supporting resilience-focused development corridors like the Three Seas Initiative and the Central

Asia–Caucasus–Europe platform, and deepening counterterrorism cooperation with frontline states, Canada can reinforce stability and uphold democratic values in an increasingly contested region.

Table 1

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The Kyrgyz Republic’s under-digitised public healthcare system presents an emerging vector for foreign digital influence and strategic vulnerability. As China advances its global data ambitions through the Digital Silk Road and affiliated Health Silk Road, Beijing is positioning itself to dominate the digitisation of Kyrgyzstan’s public healthcare system by offering technologies often tied to opaque governance and hidden data extraction risks.��

The health sector, often overlooked in traditional security assessments, contains vast quantities of personal and biometric data. In the absence of competitive alternatives, Kyrgyzstan risks entrenching Chinese digital standards, undermining its data sovereignty —a crucial component of strategic autonomy —and becoming increasingly dependent on authoritarian-aligned technologies.

China’s Digital Expansion and Kyrgyzstan’s Authoritarian Drift

Once viewed as an in post-Soviet Central Asia, the Kyrgyz Republic has taken an increasingly under the regime of President Sadyr Japarov. While domestic drivers underpin this trajectory, China’s has provided essential support (for further context, see: Exporting Surveillance: China’s Authoritarian Blueprint in the Kyrgyz Republic).��

, long considered apolitical and largely removed from most conversations about security and strategic autonomy, is emerging as a new frontier. As Kyrgyzstan its health sector, Beijing has developed attractive and under the banner of the . These are often deployed under non-transparent agreements that provide state-affiliated corporations access to data that can facilitate , , , and of populations.��

Biometric Data and Medical Records: An Overlooked Threat

data refers to unique physiological characteristics used to identify individuals. In the context of healthcare, this includes high-tech identifiers such as facial scans, fingerprints, and retinal patterns, as well as lower-tech data like height, weight, blood type, dental records, menstrual cycles, and handwritten signatures. While this may seem innocuous, when combined with the wider scope of , these figures become inadvertently sensitive.��

For example, menstrual cycle data can signal pregnancy, fertility patterns, and reproductive irregularities, making it highly valuable in contexts where states seek to control reproduction. In China, where population management has historically been enforced through the and, more recently, through the of Uyghur women in Xinjiang, the raises serious security and human rights concerns.��

As Chinese–Kyrgyz relations deepen, particularly through security and technological cooperation involving the increased monitoring and surveillance of Kyrgyzstan’s Uyghur population. This extension of surveillance infrastructure, combined with the digitisation of health data, risks replicating the same reproductive control measures seen in Xinjiang.

Access to a nation’s health records and biometric data also provides information about the population’s demographics, such as death rates, birth rates, and infant mortality. In addition to these historical security concerns about population demographics, this data can also current health risks and disparities, and forecast future health outcomes like disease outbreaks. The potential for misuse makes this information particularly vulnerable in insecure or foreign-controlled digital systems.

Unauthorised access to biometric and health data is a . It can enable foreign actors to monitor populations, coerce political figures, or target dissent. In authoritarian contexts, such data can be weaponised to suppress opposition and influence the behaviour of populations. , while framed as developmental aid, threaten to introduce asymmetric dependencies, data extraction risks, and strategic leverage over host governments.

Without robust safeguards or competitive alternatives, Kyrgyzstan’s adoption of foreign digital infrastructure risks eroding data sovereignty, weakening institutional independence, and embedding long-term vulnerabilities that can be exploited for geopolitical influence.

Healthcare Vulnerabilities��

Kyrgyzstan’s healthcare system, shaped by Soviet-era centralisation, has since independence through reforms and international partnerships. It now delivers both private care through clinics as well as publicly funded universal care. The public sector of healthcare remains underdeveloped and largely paper-based. Digital systems, where they exist, are fragmented, lacking both interoperability and .

This systemic weakness has real-world consequences. During a research visit to Kyrgyzstan in the summer of 2025, I sustained multiple injuries in a mountain biking accident and was treated at Bishkek’s National Hospital. While clinical care was excellent, the lack of digital infrastructure was stark: I had to photograph CT scans and X-rays with my personal smartphone and carry handwritten medical records between appointments. This informal data handling not only complicates care but also demonstrates the demand for the digitisation of Kyrgyz healthcare.

My experience is not unique. From conversations with medical professionals across Kyrgyzstan, diagnostic imaging, lab results, and patient histories are stored in siloed or offline systems with minimal security protocols. These conditions create strategic vulnerabilities, particularly as China offers digital solutions through the Health Silk Road, accompanied by opaque contracts and back-end access provisions.

Policy Recommendation

To mitigate the growing influence of Chinese digital infrastructure and strengthen Kyrgyzstan’s strategic autonomy, Canada should take a proactive role in supporting the digitisation of Kyrgyzstan’s public healthcare system. This sector, which is rich in sensitive personal and biometric data, is increasingly targeted by China through its Digital and Health Silk Road initiatives. By supporting secure, interoperable, and rights-respecting alternatives, Canada can help prevent the entrenchment of authoritarian digital norms and reduce Kyrgyzstan’s dependency on foreign-controlled platforms.

Canada is well-positioned to contribute meaningfully. With in public health, , and , Canada can offer technical support, capacity-building, and policy guidance grounded in transparency and accountability. This effort should align with ongoing multilateral initiatives, such as the , and be framed as part of a broader push to reinforce democratic digital governance in a strategically contested region.

Beyond technical assistance, this is also an opportunity for Canada to repair and reframe its relationship with Kyrgyzstan, particularly in light of the reputational damage caused by the . Supporting the digitisation of Kyrgyzstan’s healthcare system, which is a vital public service that directly affects citizens’ daily lives, would demonstrate Canada’s commitment to inclusive, rights-based development and offer a constructive step forward in strengthening bilateral cooperation. It would also allow Canada to project soft power, build goodwill, and lead by example in a region where democratic engagement is urgently needed to counterbalance rising authoritarian influence.

Conclusion

Kyrgyzstan’s underdeveloped and fragmented digital health infrastructure has created a strategic vacuum which has increasingly been filled by Chinese technologies deployed through the Health Silk Road. While these systems are marketed as development tools, they often come bundled with embedded dependencies that undermine data sovereignty and weaken institutional resilience. In an era where biometric and health data have become strategic assets, the digitisation of public services like healthcare is no longer a purely technical matter. It is now a question of national security and democratic integrity.

Amid China’s expanding digital influence and Russia’s declining regional engagement post-2022, Kyrgyzstan faces a narrowing set of choices. Without meaningful alternatives, it risks entrenching authoritarian-aligned technologies that could shape not only its healthcare system but also its political and civic landscape.

Canada has both the normative interest and the technical capacity to offer an alternative. By supporting the secure, rights-based digitisation of Kyrgyzstan’s healthcare sector, Canada can reinforce democratic digital norms, help safeguard strategic autonomy, and re-engage with a region that has seen limited Canadian involvement since 2021. Such a contribution would signal a shift toward inclusive, citizen-focused development, moving beyond a low-intensity economic relationship, towards a constructive, long-term partnership.

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