After 18 months of public inquiry, the Foreign Interference Commission, commonly known as the Hogue Commission, published a report highlighting extensive patterns of foreign interference and transnational repression in Canada. The report underscored how certain ethnic communities have been actively targeted by foreign governments, including Iran, India, China, and, to a lesser extent, Russia. The Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force has highlighted the impact of transnational repression on electoral processes in Canada, notably in the case of Joe Tay, the Conservative Party candidate for Don Valley North in 2025.

Both the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) have become increasingly involved in investigating cases of transnational repression affecting ethnic communities, including the high-profile murder of Hardeep Singh Nijjar in Surrey, British Columbia, in 2023. The report further contributed to the creation of the , responsible for administering and enforcing the provisions of the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act (FITAA).

The Government of Canada identifies Iran among the state actors conducting in the country, citing assassination plots, harassment of dissidents, and digital threats. In 2026, against the backdrop of widespread domestic political protests and direct military hostilities involving the United States (US) and Israel, anticipate that pressure on diaspora communities will intensify, citing a documented pattern in which periods of domestic instability are followed by increased activity abroad. Analysts read this pattern as an attempt to mitigate internal vulnerabilities while extending diaspora coercion as a component of broader hybrid conflict with Western states.

At the margins of, and often overlooked within, discussions of transnational repression, violence and intimidation occurring within ethnic communities continue to take place in Canada and other Western countries. This form of violence remains understudied and frequently falls between the mandates of national security agencies and local law enforcement. Because this type of violence comprises transnational repression, hate crimes and incidents, and local crime, an overall understanding of the trends and comparative analysis between countries is difficult to establish.

This white paper uses open-source intelligence to document escalating patterns of physical violence, intimidation, activism, and online harassment within the Iranian diaspora following the January 2026 domestic protests and US-Israeli war against Iran which has been ongoing since February. By doing so, we further investigate Iranian diaspora fragmentation beyond the highly visible transnational repression, providing security and law enforcement agencies a better overall understanding of security dynamics in Canada. Furthermore, if experts forecast a growing threat to Iranian Canadians from the Iranian government through 2026, a more comprehensive understanding of intra-community tensions and patterns of polarization will be essential for accurately assessing risks and developing appropriate policy responses.

The Iranian Diaspora in Canada: Polarization and Fragmentation in 2026

Since January 2026, �䲹�Բ��岹’s Iranian diaspora has mobilized on a significant scale. Roughly in Ottawa on 11 January, and an estimated on 14 February. While largely peaceful, these demonstrations highlighted growing ideological friction among different groups within the diaspora. Following the beginning of American and Israeli strikes on Iran in February 2026, also known as Operation “Epic Fury,” the Iranian diaspora in Canada became increasingly polarized. On 1 March, about in Calgary to oppose the American and Israeli strikes; an hour later, . The possibility of political transition, prompted by either domestic collapse or foreign intervention, has catalyzed intra-diaspora rivalry as competing groups seek to advance distinct political outcomes.

Political disagreement within �䲹�Բ��岹’s Iranian diaspora has hardened into a question of loyalty, dividing the community over foreign military intervention, the shape of a post-Republic Iran, and who counts as a legitimate opponent of the government. Since January 2026, street-level protests have largely split along two main axes: first, between monarchist (Pahlavist) demonstrators and those displaying pro-government or non-aligned symbols; and second, within the opposition itself, spanning monarchist right-wing groups, pro-democracy advocates, ethnic minority movements, and Mojahedin-aligned groups. 

The Pahlavists are the largest group in the 2026 mobilization. They support the return of Reza Pahlavi, the exiled son of the last shah. Within the broader pro-monarchy Pahlavi movement, a hardline nationalist element has increasingly asserted itself. This wing openly endorses more aggressive foreign policy measures against Tehran, including aligned Israeli-American military action, while displaying hostility toward political rivals in and other Western countries. Pro-Pahlavi forces increasingly embrace hardline rhetoric, reflected in the chant The slogan groups leftist and Mojahed opposition movements together with the clerical establishment, portraying all three as equal targets of opposition. This extremist wing has expanded rapidly since January 2026, coordinating across social media and establishing a physical presence at demonstrations throughout Western Europe and North America. Some branches march in , which has drawn controversy. This group often aligns with right-wing movements in Europe and North America and supports the American and Israeli strikes on Iran. It also polices its own side, rejecting supporters who would accept Pahlavi’s return as a civilian political figure rather than as monarch.

The second protest group consists of a loosely affiliated pro-democracy current, including republicans, anti-war activists, and those organizing under the 2022 slogan “Woman, Life, Freedom.” The slogan became the rallying cry of the that followed the death of Mahsa Amini, a 22-year-old woman, in September 2022, three days after her arrest by Iran’s Guidance Patrol over failing to wear her hijab according to state standards. For those in this camp, the slogan expresses a demand for women’s rights and personal freedoms. While these groups differ on the governance model for a future Iran, they share a rejection of both the Islamic Republic and a restored monarchy. However, monarchist activists often collapse these internal distinctions, framing diverse critics across this spectrum as leftists or Islamic Republic sympathizers. reported in February that aides to Reza Pahlavi in the US had pushed supporters to remove references to the Woman, Life, Freedom slogan from their social media accounts on the grounds that it is associated with a leftist and feminist agenda. In a video circulated on social media of a demonstration in Vancouver in February 2026, organizers barred the slogan, while a man leading the demonstration stated through a megaphone that those chanting the slogan were connected to the reformist parties in Iran and were attempting to steal the revolution. Meanwhile, the pre-1979 Lion and Sun flag serves as a common visual thread across these protests, carried by both Pahlavists and pro-democracy activists. The emblem has in Iranian iconography and its meaning has shifted over time. Some trace it to ancient Persia and read it as a symbol of Iranian history before the arrival of Islam, while in other narratives it evolved after Islam, and particularly after the Safavids made Shi’ism the state religion in 1501, into a symbol of Iran’s , with the lion representing Ali ibn Abi Talib (the first Shia Imam). Because these layers of meaning long predate the Pahlavi dynasty, many who carry the flag see it as a symbol of historic Iran rather than as an endorsement of any particular political system, which allows groups with different visions for the country’s future to claim it.

The Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK) is the third main group opposed to the Islamic Republic. Often described as a , this group is organized as an opposition movement in long-standing mutual hostility with both the monarchists and the government in Tehran. The group carries its own version of the Lion and Sun flag, adopted by its political wing, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (), in 1993, which is distinguishable from the Pahlavist version by the absence of the crown. Although still the most organized group within the opposition diaspora, the MEK remains unpopular among Iranians because of its cult-like internal practices, its origins as an Islamist-Marxist militia, and its during the Iran-Iraq war. The group’s presence at demonstrations is treated as a provocation by monarchists and government sympathizers alike, though since January 2026 it has kept a comparatively low profile in Canadian street mobilization.

Alongside general anti-Islamic Republic forces, various nationalist and ethno-regional groups have gained prominence within the Iranian diaspora, advocating for decentralization or state fragmentation in the event of government collapse. Ethnic minority groups, including Azeri, Arab, Kurdish, and Baluch movements, are pursuing distinct national rights, with demands spanning from regional federalism to outright independence. These platform positions put them in direct conflict with the centralizing nationalism of Pahlavist monarchists, other anti-Islamic Republic nationalists, and Islamic Republic supporters. Furthermore, several of these movements maintain cross-border ties with foreign governments, including Israel and Türkiye, as well as regional armed groups, such as Iraqi Kurdish forces. Carrying their own flags and chanting their own slogans, they are often targeted by other groups in protests.

Contrasting with anti-Islamic Republic forces, pro-government elements within the diaspora consist of individuals sympathetic to Iran’s current political system. At political demonstrations, display of the Islamic Republic flag generally signals alignment with Tehran, and this group routinely clashes with opposition groups at such events. The same emblem carries a different meaning in other settings, however, since it remains the current national flag and is carried at cultural and sporting events by Iranians who hold no brief for the government, a distinction that bears directly on several of the incidents described below.

Intra-Diaspora Conflict: Escalating Violence and Tension in 2026

Heightened polarization and rising internal divisions are increasingly linked to criminal incidents within the Iranian diaspora and its political mobilization in Canada. These activities remain difficult to address through traditional judicial channels, as the high degree of polarization complicates perpetrator identification and successful prosecution.

Such polarization has escalated into intra-diaspora violence. In February 2026, Masood Masjoody, a critic of both the Islamic Republic and the exiled Pahlavi family, disappeared in British Columbia. His remains were found the following month. were charged with first-degree murder. that both accused had opposed the Iranian government and backed the monarchist movement in online posts, and that one was a defendant in a harassment suit Masjoody had filed before his death. Reuters later that Masjoody had himself belonged to the monarchist organization “Farashgard” before becoming a critic of it. In an interview in April 2025, Masjoody described being harassed for his views, saying that monarchist activists had threatened him without limits. Masjoody said that one threat specified the , and that he had submitted this material to the Supreme Court of British Columbia. Following a court appearance by the two accused, two groups of spectators and were separated by sheriffs.

Days after Masjoody disappeared, ten diaspora figures, most of them critics of the monarchist campaign or of the war, were which read, in Farsi and beneath a knife emoji, that they would soon have to find the corpses of many. The account was named for SAVAK, the pre-1979 Iranian security service, and has since been deactivated. At least two of those tagged reported the post to police and altered their routines. In July, a Greater Toronto Area resident publicly called on to add a lethal agricultural chemical to food served at a public funeral, drawing condemnation from voices in the diaspora. Although directed at events in Iran, the statement was made publicly from Canada by a resident and no public action by Canadian authorities has followed. In March, Toronto Police arrested two counter-demonstrators at the rally following a clash between pro-Islamic Republic and anti-Islamic Republic protesters. One of the accused allegedly tore an Islamic Republic flag from a participant’s back and later set one alight; his charges include public incitement of hatred. Toronto Police stated that both investigations were being At a monarchist demonstration in downtown Toronto in January, a man who had argued with participants was struck in the face and injured in the eye. Video that circulated afterwards shows a participant defending the assault on the grounds that he had insulted them. At demonstrations in Vancouver, have gathered in close proximity and entered into sustained confrontation. In June 2026, the City of Toronto had to of the World Cup match between Iran and Belgium because of public safety concerns related to the demonstrations and increased risks of confrontations between pro-Islamic Republic and anti-Islamic Republic protesters. FIFA from World Cup stadiums in May. Tensions have occasionally manifested in threats or acts of physical violence targeting pro-democracy activists, government sympathizers, and ethno-national groups such as Azerbaijani, Arab, Kurd, and Baluch representatives. Those who or repeat the expected slogan are increasingly treated not as opponents but as collaborators. Polarization within the diaspora has increased drastically in everyday life as well. A boycott campaign has circulated online naming Iranian businesses in Toronto as being affiliated with or supporting the Islamic Republic, including . Harassment between monarchist activists and their critics has also increased, and Iranian-Canadian academics and journalists in Toronto describe receiving repeated death threats, rape threats, and doxxing over the same period. On 12 April, was exchanged between the two sides at a rally in Toronto.

Parallel Dynamics in the United States and United Kingdom

These dynamics extend well beyond Canada. Over the same timeframe, comparable clashes involving the same groups have emerged across the broader West, notably in the US and the United Kingdom (UK). This widespread incidence points to a systemic, transnational pattern of diaspora fragmentation and intra-community conflict, and underlines the challenges facing law-enforcement agencies in Canada.

In the US, on 11 January, in the Westwood district of Los Angeles, California, carrying a banner that read “No Shah. No Regime. USA: Don’t Repeat 1953. No Mullah,” a message rejecting both the monarchy and the Islamic Republic. According to the , demonstrators tore the banner from the truck, smashed its windows, and assaulted the driver, who then drove through the crowd. The driver was arrested for reckless driving and later released without charge.

In March, that ^[1] In June, during Iran’s opening World Cup match in , stadium officials had to break up a fight in the stands between . Outside the stadium, videos circulated showing , as well as other people trying to enter or leave the stadium, being harassed by Pahlavi supporters for not carrying the Lion and Sun flag.

In the UK, Pahlavi supporters have targeted ethnic minority Iranians and anti-war demonstrators, treating those who oppose the American and Israeli military campaign against Iran as complicit with the Islamic Republic. In March, following an attack on a Kurdish-owned restaurant in London, , the UK correspondent for Kurdistan24, was seriously injured by a group of roughly fifteen monarchist supporters while reporting on the incident. The Metropolitan Police opened an investigation into what witnesses described as part of a wider pattern of attacks on Kurdish businesses and individuals. In April, , an Iranian demonstrating against the war outside Downing Street, was stabbed several times by a counter-protester of Iranian origin and survived. He had previously been abused in public, and other anti-war Iranians in the UK reported threats of stabbing from the monarchist side at demonstrations.

Beyond Transnational Repression: Jurisdictional Challenges

Existing scholarship on transnational repression has focused primarily on state-directed activities targeting dissidents, while paying comparatively little attention to coercive and violent dynamics occurring within diaspora communities. Transnational repression is now seen as a matter of national security in relation to foreign interference. Violence between diaspora members falls outside this scope when it is not sponsored and supported directly by foreign governments.

Intra-community violence is a more complex process involving genuine political activism as well as organized criminality and foreign interference. Political activism such as protests can turn into political intimidation and violence aimed at silencing part of ethnic communities which, in turn, leads to social polarization. Canada has seen intra-community political violence before. Examples include the confrontations at Eritrean community events in and , and the inward-directed incidents that have accompanied . In each instance, the conduct was handled as public disorder or as a matter of foreign interference rather than as diaspora politics in its own right. This threat is not specific to Canada and occurs in most Western countries.

, the RCMP is the primary agency responsible for investigating threats to national security, including foreign interference as defined under the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act. Transnational repression, including threats directed at diaspora communities, falls within this mandate. The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) and CSIS also play important roles in investigating transnational repression activities and identifying foreign operatives acting on Canadian soil.

By contrast, intimidation, violence at protests, and threats exchanged between members of diaspora communities generally fall within the jurisdiction of local law enforcement agencies. A useful parallel can be drawn with the distinction between terrorist activities, which fall under the mandate of RCMP Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams (INSETs), and hate crimes that are not linked to broader extremist ideologies or organized groups, which are typically investigated by local police services.

These manifestations of diaspora polarization are further complicated by the fact that violence occurs within a broader context of political activism directed against the government in Tehran, which Canada has long criticized on human rights grounds. Canadian policy seeks simultaneously to protect freedoms of expression and assembly at home and to sustain that criticism abroad. The Iranian case presents a distinct set of challenges compared to other cases of foreign interference in Canada, such as those involving India, because intra-community tensions are intertwined with a broader political movement that receives considerable public sympathy and support within Canadian society.

As a result, investigative attention is often directed toward transnational repression, while patterns of intra-ethnic polarization receive comparatively limited scrutiny as a distinct phenomenon. Rather than being analyzed collectively, such incidents are generally treated as discrete criminal acts perpetrated by individuals, agent provocateurs, or criminal organizations. In a July 2026 with Reuters, Reza Pahlavi attributed some of the conduct carried out in his name to plants and agitators masquerading as supporters in order to create such conflicts. Such rhetoric further blurs the line between state-sponsored foreign interference and localized diaspora violence, interweaving local, national, transnational, and geopolitical dynamics.

While intra-diaspora political polarization is well-documented, institutional blind spots regarding its intersection with state-backed foreign interference leave diaspora members acutely vulnerable. Victims often find it difficult to report these politically motivated acts, as the political and ideological nuances surrounding such incidents can complicate their interpretation by both community members and law enforcement agencies. Consequently, these incidents may be underreported or investigated as isolated criminal acts rather than as part of broader patterns of intra-ethnic polarization. In the UK, activist Ghazal Diani and was told the matter would be investigated only if something more serious occurred.

Politically motivated intimidation within these communities occupies an ambiguous legal space, straddling national security mandates, hate crime enforcement, and conventional criminal law. This jurisdictional overlap complicates local law enforcement responses and creates significant reporting barriers, hindering the systematic tracking and prosecution of intra-community violence. Furthermore, investigations related to transnational repression often require extensive international cooperation, as segments of the Iranian diaspora are active across multiple Western countries. Effective investigations also depend on access to Persian-language expertise, trusted relationships within diaspora communities, and a nuanced understanding of community dynamics. At the law enforcement level, this requires keeping pace with rapidly evolving political tensions and polarization within the diaspora, as well as broader geopolitical developments. At the national security level, a key challenge is sharing highly classified information with local law enforcement partners in ways that support investigations while protecting sensitive sources and methods. This is particularly important when distinguishing between criminal activities stemming from community polarization and actions directed or supported by a foreign state. Authorities must also recognize that investigations and interventions within diaspora communities can have unintended consequences. If not approached carefully, they may deepen existing divisions, reinforce perceptions of stigmatization, and inadvertently strengthen narratives that portray Western governments as targeting Iranian communities.

Recommendations and Implications for Canada

Violence within diaspora communities presents a significant challenge that �䲹�Բ��岹’s existing security and law-enforcement categories were not designed to capture as effectively as threats to national security. It does not neatly fit the framework of transnational repression and foreign interference, as much of the violence is neither directed nor coordinated by a foreign state. Nor is it adequately understood as conventional hate crime or violent extremism, particularly when perpetrators and victims may share the same nationality, ethnic identity, or religious affiliation. Yet the consequences of this violence are distinctly transnational and political, often intersecting with mobilization and protests against the Islamic Republic of Iran. When agencies assess these incidents only through the lens of their individual mandates, the broader pattern can remain invisible. The result is a fragmented response that risks overlooking victims, underestimating the scale of the threat, and failing to address the political and transnational dimensions of the violence.

Although it can sometimes fit within the framework of politically motivated violent extremism, intra-community violence presents distinct analytical challenges. It may be interpreted differently from forms of violent extremism occurring between distinct communities, such as the tensions and violence observed between �䲹�Բ��岹’s Palestinian and Jewish communities following October 2023. Because perpetrators and victims may share the same ethnic, religious, or national identity, the political and ideological motivations underlying the violence can be more difficult to identify and may be overlooked within existing threat-assessment frameworks. For example, has funded multiple programs to address polarization between Arab and Jewish diasporas, but very few are designed for violence inside a single community.

Prevention and enforcement efforts in diaspora communities often lack dedicated language expertise and the capacity to monitor increased activity across multiple platforms, including Telegram, Instagram, X, diaspora media, and encrypted channels. These gaps are particularly consequential during periods of heightened political mobilization, when emerging vulnerabilities and risks can develop rapidly and require early intervention. Hate-based incidents are rarely the product of a single organization or network; rather, they can emerge in protests and other political activities and involve loosely connected actors. Yet these incidents can reflect broader transnational trends, with narratives, tactics, and grievances circulating across borders and becoming mutually reinforcing. Effective prevention therefore requires heightened monitoring during periods of political mobilization, combined with stronger language and analytical capabilities to identify emerging risks upstream and distinguish isolated incidents from broader patterns of mobilization and violence. Risks often first emerge through seemingly isolated episodes of hate and intimidation online or during protests, including doxxing, sexualized threats, the circulation of target lists, and other forms of targeted harassment. A concrete public safety response should be sufficiently flexible to address a threat that does not fit neatly within existing frameworks for transnational repression, foreign interference, or countering violent extremism. It should enable authorities to monitor large-scale protests and political mobilization as well as social media where violence occurs within communities and movements, rather than primarily between them. This requires the capacity to identify early indicators of hate and escalation across multiple platforms, supported by language-specific expertise. It should also allow authorities to connect local episodes of violence to broader transnational trends without assuming that such trends reflect hierarchical command structures or formal organizational links.

Interagency Collaboration: A Coordinated Approach to Hate Incident Reporting and Threat Assessment

In an ideal scenario, dedicated task forces could be established to foster sustained collaboration among relevant agencies. A more realistic and immediately actionable approach, however, would be to strengthen information-sharing mechanisms and reinforce referral pathways between agencies. Law enforcement agencies often lack the broader visibility needed to identify trends and linkages across incidents occurring elsewhere in Canada and in other Western countries. Enhanced information sharing could help bridge this gap by connecting local, incident-level intelligence with broader assessments of emerging threats and extremist activity.

One promising model is the increasingly effective coordination between local law enforcement agencies investigating hate crimes motivated by Islamophobia, antisemitism, and racism on the one hand, and national security agencies addressing hate-based groups and far-right extremism on the other. Current efforts to address nihilistic violent extremism at the local, national, and international levels provide another useful model to adapt. Existing collaboration between agencies has long been developed to identify concrete threats to national security, requiring the involvement of INSET units in Canada, as distinct from localized crimes to be investigated and prosecuted by local law enforcement and prosecutors. These partnerships have also included intervention and prevention teams established to address vulnerabilities and risk factors associated with radicalization leading to violence.

The case of intra-diaspora violence appears more complex to address, as the national security threat environment combines far-right extremism, hate-based ideologies, foreign interference, and transnational repression. At the local level, violence and criminality can unfold across a range of settings, including large public protests, mass gatherings associated with sporting events, and Middle East-related events such as Al-Quds events or those linked to the war in Palestine. At the same time, the Criminal Code provisions on uttering threats, criminal harassment, intimidation, and public incitement of hatred cover most of the incidents documented in this paper, and the laid by Toronto Police following the Al-Quds Day rally demonstrate their applicability.

Local law enforcement should remain responsible for receiving and investigating individual hate incidents and criminal offences, while national-level agencies could provide broader threat assessments, identify cross-jurisdictional patterns, and facilitate the sharing of relevant intelligence. The RCMP plays a central role in cross-jurisdictional investigations, as well as in establishing sustained operational partnerships with other intelligence and investigative bodies, such as CSIS and CBSA, alongside broader strategic coordination by Public Safety Canada tracking these incidents. The transnational nature of the threat also requires greater coordination among Five Eyes partners, alongside carefully calibrated information-sharing arrangements with foreign governments. This is particularly important when engaging the United States, given its direct and ongoing military confrontation with Iran.

Strengthening Outreach and Trust with the Iranian Diaspora

Given that the threat environment remains fluid and is heavily influenced by geopolitical developments, interagency communication should not be treated as an ad hoc or event-driven process. Instead, it should be structured as a recurring mechanism, with regular exchanges of information and threat assessments that allow agencies to identify emerging patterns, reassess risks, and adjust their responses as circumstances evolve.

Outreach mechanisms targeting the Iranian diaspora have already been developed to address concerns related to transnational repression, but these efforts could be expanded to better capture dynamics of intra-diaspora violence. A reliable referral mechanism could enable members of the diaspora to report hate incidents at both the local and national levels, while providing law enforcement agencies with the contextual information needed to assess individual incidents within broader patterns. Such reporting mechanisms are effectively implemented for , but are ill-equipped for intra-diaspora polarization.

At the same time, the highly polarized and politically contested nature of these issues creates a risk that referral mechanisms could be exploited for partisan or strategic purposes, including through the submission of unsubstantiated or politically motivated allegations. Any such mechanism should therefore incorporate robust, evidence-based safeguards. Reports should be assessed against consistent criteria, corroborated where possible, and clearly distinguished between verified incidents, credible allegations, and unsubstantiated claims.

Implementing an incident-reporting mechanism is easier than sustaining one effectively. Its long-term success depends on local authorities earning the trust of the community, while also demonstrating the capacity to investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute reported cases. Without both community confidence and credible follow-through, reporting mechanisms risk generating limited engagement and may fail to provide the sustained information needed to identify broader patterns and trends.

Conclusion

Overall, intra-diaspora violence is not a new phenomenon. Existing interagency coordination mechanisms can address many of its manifestations effectively. The central challenge, however, is that such violence is often identified only after incidents have occurred, resulting in a predominantly reactive rather than proactive response. This report has documented recent incidents, their increasing intensity, and their transnational dimensions to raise awareness of the need for a more coordinated approach building on existing transnational repression outreach and prevention activities as well as existing mechanisms developed to address violent extremism.

In a multicultural society, the test of a security policy is whether it protects citizens from violence within their own communities as carefully as it protects them from foreign states, and whether it can do so without treating an entire community as suspect. This approach is not specific to Iranian communities. The same combination of early detection, behaviour-based intervention, and restraint is applicable wherever political conflicts abroad divide communities at home, as has occurred among Eritrean, Sikh, and other diaspora communities in Canada. A framework developed to address these challenges in the Iranian diaspora could therefore provide a broader model for identifying and mitigating community-based political violence without stigmatizing legitimate political activity.

^[1] Meaning long live the King, a slogan popular among the Pahlavists and royalists.

The post �䲹�Բ��岹’s Blind Spot: Intra-Community Violence inside �䲹�Բ��岹’s Iranian Diaspora appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

The issue

In November 2023, Latvia ratified the , a core international treaty which aims to prevent violence towards women, including domestic and sexual violence. The Istanbul Convention has since then been at the centre of a contentious political debate in Latvia, becoming a in Latvia’s cultural wars, and bringing about a clash of ideologies on gender, nationality, and constitutional issues.

The debate on the Istanbul Convention reflects a broader shift in societal values and political loyalties in Latvia. On 30 October 2025, a majority vote in the Saeima (Latvia’s parliament) to denounce the Istanbul Convention unexpectedly succeeded, as one of the partners in the ruling coalition – Union of Greens and Farmers – . The vote led to public protests: on October 29, at least 5,000 people protested outside the Saeima against Latvia’s withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention; on November 6, at least 10,000 protested at Dome Square in Riga, organizing a petition with more than 67,000 signatures. A veto by has put the issue on the back burner until after the parliamentary elections scheduled for early October 2026. Depending on the results of that election, to withdraw from the Istanbul Convention.

This policy brief aims to examine how disinformation narratives and radicalization risks emerged and evolved throughout the public debate on the Istanbul Convention in Latvia from 2023 to 2025. For each phase (the ratification phase in 2023; the withdrawal mobilization phase in 2025; and the post-decision phase in late-2025), the study reviews the 15 most popular Facebook posts and the 80 most liked comments (a total of 45 posts and 240 comments) by manually coding them for narrative type, emotional intensity, disinformation indicators, and evidence of radicalization. This methodological approach was chosen to select a representative but manageable sample of a highly visible discourse. The policy brief is structured as a three-phase analysis of the debate, followed by a synthesis of findings and concluding remarks.

Phase 1: Ratification and Immediate Online Backlash (2023)

Division and debate over the Istanbul Convention appeared immediately after the Latvian parliament voted – by incredibly slim margins – to ratify the Convention on November 30, 2023. Women’s rights organizations and liberal bloggers in Latvia saw this as proof of . On the other hand, an ardent anti-Convention movement sprang up in social networks, claiming that ratifying the Conventions was a betrayal of national interests and gender values. Furthermore, right-wing politicians publicly criticized lawmakers for violating Latvian values in support of the Convention.

The anti-Convention group was represented in public declarations by the former social welfare minister Ramona Petraviča, who argued that “.” In monitoring disinformation about the Convention, included many misconceptions about the Convention circulating in the last quarter of 2023. On Facebook and on Latvian blogging sites, rumors spread about new policies to be gay at school; about gender reassignment surgeries taking place at the age of 14 without parents’ consent for children interested in such procedures; and about . Such misinformation, usually centered around the were disseminated by right-leaning bloggers such as musician Kaspars Pudniks and author Vija Beinerte, who both claimed that ratifying the Convention would involve teaching in schools about gender transition .

Thus, the showed considerable polarization, moving away from its actual goal of combating domestic violence. Instead of focusing on the objectives of the Istanbul Convention, the online discussion turned into a moral battle between those who claimed to defend traditional gender values and those who were perceived to represent a radical liberal agenda. In this regard, the ratification of the Istanbul Convention fueled cultural conflicts online, thereby undermining positive communication and discussions on how to end domestic violence.

Phase 2: Disinformation Surge and Withdrawal Campaign (2025)

Latvia’s ratification of the Istanbul Convention remained a key issue for Latvian far-right movements thorough the post-ratification period. This opposition reached a new level in September 2025, when started a campaign advocating for the withdrawal of Latvia from the Istanbul Convention. The political movement initiated a flood of conspiratorial posts on social media platforms and messaging applications. Facebook continued to be the central platform wherein these posts were made, but heated debates also took place on Telegram and TikTok, where messaging was aimed at specific target groups. in the online disinformation campaign. His Facebook posts in 2025 clearly demonstrated the use of shifting the debate from the Convention’s legal purpose of preventing violence against women and domestic violence to alleged threats to children, the “natural family”, national sovereignty, and traditional values. A group of started a campaign advocating for the withdrawal of Latvia from the Istanbul Convention. The political movement initiated a flood of conspiratorial posts on social media platforms and messaging applications.

Šlesers has himself claimed, without any evidence in the treaty text, that the Istanbul Convention forces the on Latvia, which aims to “threaten the natural family.” This video represents another case of complex problems being reduced to ‘us vs. them’ dichotomies, fostering polarization and discord in society. According to research done by , platforms like TikTok and YouTube are flooded with memes about culture wars as well as general fear-mongering content. This finding fits with the posting trend of Šlesers and others in this group, who lashed out at progressive actors being “[]/global gangsters” – often pairing these posts with accompanying memes and manipulated photos – in addition to their specific opposition to the Convention.

For instance, Linda Liepiņa, a parliament member of the Latvia First Party who originally advocated for the ratification of the Convention in 2023, also began to criticize the Convention on Facebook and Telegram. , which was delivered in the Saeima and reached large audiences online, claiming that a “foreign ideology tries to creep into our everyday lives” and that “what’s abnormal will be declared normal.” She also argued that “.” Another MP, Mārcis Jencītis, also a member of the Latvia First Party, called the Convention a “,” a term that was subsequently .

By mid-2025, anti-Convention-related online activism increased; yet, the shift in parliamentary voting was mainly caused by political trends that developed at the time. In the period from 2023 to 2025, splits in the ruling coalition in the Saeima became more pronounced, and some MPs readjusted their stances because of pressure from conservative groups and their voters. Furthermore, the problem became more politically relevant and was recast by the opposition in terms of the issues of sovereignty and values, which resonated with the pre-election discourse.

At the same time, continuous online activism contributed to perceptions of growing popular dissent, which affected the decisions of many MPs and forced them to change their stances, especially among those whose constituencies were electorally competitive. By 2025, supporting withdrawal from the European Convention became a useful political tool to reach out to conservatives and demonstrate a distinct position,

Phase 3: President’s Intervention and Digital Aftermath (Late 2025)

The Saeima’s vote in late October to withdraw from the Convention was a shock to many Latvians and reflected and a high level of polarization in Latvian politics. The result also surprised President Edgars Rinkēvičs, who declined to sign the bill into law and instead called for a period of reflection. On the 5th and 6th of November, the Saeima agreed to postpone the decision until the next parliamentary term, that is, after the 2026 election scheduled for early October. The online reactions to these moves were mixed, with at the decision. Supporters of the Convention , with Prime Minister Evika Silina posting on her Facebook page that the decision to postpone the decision

This intervention effectively stalled Latvia’s exit from the Istanbul Convention, throwing a lifeline to supporters and provoking a new wave of hostile . Online, Rinkēvičs’ move was met with an outpouring of both relief and vitriol – reflecting entrenched polarization. On one side, women’s rights organizations and liberal civil society celebrated the veto as a courageous step against populism. Activists like Beata Jonite of the MARTA Centre – an organization that provides specialized support to victims of domestic violence and human trafficking – shared the President’s message via social media. Jonite, who had been posting on TikTok and Instagram throughout the fall to debunk myths and rally youth support, posted an emotional TikTok video thanking Rinkēvičs for “.” That video garnered tens of thousands of views and comments expressing sentiments like “Finally, sanity prevails!” and “Thank you, President!” Meanwhile, a Manabalss.lv petition urging the President to gathered over 67,000 signatures .

Based on public opinion polls on the issue, Latvian society has not been divided into two clear camps, despite the polarization that appears online. In reality, there appears to be a relatively large segment of the population that is opposed to withdrawal, a relatively small segment of the population that is in favour of withdrawal, and a large segment of the population that is undecided. carried out in May 2023 by Berg Research indicate a high level of public support for the ratification of the Convention, with 71% of the total number of respondents showing their approval in May; the results of the survey conducted in June 2023 among Latvian citizens show a similar level of support, with 73% of the total number of respondents showing their approval.

These results show that support for the Convention among the general public was relatively strong in terms of the . In contrast, the Berg Research survey conducted in October 2025 shows that there was greater division among respondents in terms of their positions but not necessarily polarization. Specifically, 49% of respondents were against withdrawing from the Convention, 31% were in favor of it, and 20% were still undecided. These results support the position of this policy brief that the rhetoric surrounding the issue has been able to produce the illusion of greater polarization compared to what public opinion figures actually show. While anti-Convention narratives had gained a lot of traction and emotional appeal online, public opinion was actually more complex and could be influenced by both political parties involved.

Emotional Sentiment and Ideological Framing in Latvia’s Istanbul Convention Debate

The force of public engagement may thus be seen as emanating from the change in the nature of the Convention, from being primarily a legal document dealing with violence against women to becoming a symbol representing a number of emotionally charged topics, including children, family, nationhood, sovereignty, and skepticism toward political elites. The shift served to increase the potency of the disinformation narrative, which was no longer tied to any deep familiarity with the text of the Convention but, instead, tapped into preexisting emotions

and value differences. Hence, the case represents one more feature of modern Latvian online political communication: the tendency for a complicated policy issue to quickly transform into a medium for simplified culture wars, where emotion and suspicion often outweigh law and facts.

According to Google Trends data, public interest in the Istanbul Convention remained relatively low from early 2023 to the point where a strong surge occurred towards the end of 2025. These findings of increased searches towards the end of 2025 do correspond with renewed political struggles and mobilization efforts in the form of mass protests and intensive debates within parliament on withdrawing from the Convention. One of the most interesting findings is how public interest is geographically distributed regarding the searches conducted, where smaller towns (Inčukalns, Lielvārde, Ozolnieki, Garkalne, and Sigulda) show the greatest levels of activity.

Figure 1. Google Trends search interest in the Istanbul Convention in Latvia, 2023- 2025.

Figure 2. Geographic distribution of Google searches related to the Istanbul Convention in Latvia.

The data indicates that online engagement has not been isolated to Riga and major cities, as rural communities are just as likely to search for this topic online.

The analysis of the discourse on the Istanbul Convention on Facebook in Latvia reveals a clear pattern of coordinated disinformation, emotionally polarized audiences, and radicalization of political discourse. The dominant discourse against the Istanbul Convention is based on three distinct narratives: (1) the notion that the Convention promotes a dangerous “gender ideology” that undermines traditional morality and family values (45% of the analyzed content); (2) the idea that the Convention is an external threat to national sovereignty and legal independence of Latvia (30%); and (3) the notion that the Convention has no practical benefits in combating violence and instead distracted from legitimate issues, such as the rights of the LGBT community (20%). The dominant disinformation in the discourse on the Istanbul Convention in Latvia was not peripheral; instead, it was central to the dominant discourse.

The persistence of disinformation, such as the trope of the ‘117 genders,’ the claim that the Convention would replace the words ‘mother’ and ‘father’ with ‘Parent 1 and 2,’ and the claim that the Convention would sexualize children, were all widespread. Not only was this this disinformation apparent in all three phases of the Convention debate, but it was also visible in the rhetoric of Latvian parliamentarians, suggesting that it had become normalized in the political discourse on the Convention.

The audience’s reactions varied depending on the narrative. The ‘gender ideology’ threat narrative elicited the highest number of ‘angry’ emoji reactions (50%). This was closely followed by the ‘sovereignty’ narrative (45%). The audience reactions to the narrative on the protection of women were different. In this case, ‘Like’ and ‘Love’ combined for 40% of the audience reactions; ‘Angry’ was seen in 15% of reactions. The ‘Laughing’ emoji reactions were higher in the case of the ‘exaggerated’ narrative (20%). These findings show that while the audience reacted with anger to the ideological threat narrative, another part of the audience reacted with mockery to the exaggerated narrative.

The analysis also shows that there are signs of discursive political radicalization. Of the approximately 30 high-engagement posts, 6-8 showed strong signs of radicalization. These included alarmist rhetoric, conspiracy theories, and delegitimization of democratic actors. Radicalization was also more evident in the comments sections of each post. In some posts, 15% to 25% of the comments contained dehumanizing metaphors, accusations of treason, or appeals for silencing or expelling political opponents. The politicians who took the side of the Convention were called “traitors,” “foreign agents”, or “corrupt pigs,” while the veto of the withdrawal decision by the President was described as “betrayal.” Some of the comments also contained appeals for “rising up”, “expelling” the supporters of the Convention, and “saving the nation.”

The radicalization of the discourse was also asymmetrical. The posts of the supporters of the Convention sometimes showed signs of frustration or irony but rarely used hostile language or rejected the idea of democratic pluralism. Arguments mostly focused on the legal content of the Convention, women’s rights, and the refutation of disinformation. However, the level of engagement of the posts was significantly lower than that of the opponents.

Conclusion

Across all three phases, the Latvia-based discussion on the Istanbul Convention illustrates the manner in which a policy debate can be transformed into a debate on cultural values via disinformation and powerful emotive appeals. Disinformation was consistently used to galvanize opposition and link the Convention to unrelated concerns, such as those surrounding children, gender ideology, and identity. As such, highly emotive and divisive messages achieved greater traction than evidence-based messages, undermining the space for constructive debate and normalizing hostile, delegitimizing rhetoric.

The case highlights the extent to which online discourse may distort the perception of public opinion. According to polls, Latvian society was not divided into two equally strong groups; instead, an active online minority shaping part of the discussion gave the impression of wider opposition. More generally, Latvia is symptomatic of a gender backlash that is taking place across Europe, including in post-Soviet and Central-Eastern countries. In this backlash, gender equality policies are presented as endangering the traditional family, children, national identity, and even state sovereignty.

In Latvia, the convention came to symbolize an ideological struggle over gender norms and social values. The debate is still ongoing, with the final resolution scheduled for sometime after the October 2026 Saeima elections. Thus, the Convention will continue to be a relevant topic on the political agenda. Without a consensus, the survival of the Istanbul Convention in Latvia will depend on the next parliamentary composition and the willingness of actors to keep spreading anti-gender narratives or return to fact-based discussions about violence prevention and victim protection.

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Executive Summary:

Russia’s war against Ukraine is also a struggle about public interpretation. NATO members have responded to Russia’s full-scale invasion through sanctions, military aid, deterrence, and diplomatic efforts. These actions depend on the public understanding that Russia is the aggressor, Ukraine is the victim of an illegal invasion, and support for Ukraine is important for European and transatlantic security. Russia’s counter-narrative seeks to weaken this consensus view by claiming that Ukraine, NATO, the US, or the West provoked the war.

Drawing on , with a Canada-focused analysis, as initially outlined at �Ӱ�ԭ�� University’s 2026 Eastern European and Transatlantic Network conference, this brief argues that trust in NATO is central to how citizens interpret responsibility for the war. Canadian public opinion remains strongly aligned with the core NATO narrative: most Canadians blame Russia, while only a small minority blame the West. Yet this minority is not randomly distributed. Canadians who do not trust NATO are significantly more likely to accept the narrative that the West provoked the war, while Canadians who trust NATO are much more likely to blame Russia.

The implication is straightforward: countering disinformation is not only about correcting false claims after they spread. It is also about sustaining public trust in the institutions whose messages compete with adversaries’ propaganda and misinformation. For Canada and its NATO Allies, trust in NATO should therefore be treated as a security resource — one that requires proactive prebunking, clearer explanations of NATO’s relevance to Canadian security, and a wider network of trusted messengers.

Introduction: The Narrative Dimension of the War in Ukraine

NATO countries responded to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 through military, economic, and diplomatic means and pressure. However, this support also sparked an ongoing discussion about how and why this war erupted. The core NATO narrative is straightforward: Russia is the aggressor, Ukraine is the victim of an unlawful and unprovoked invasion, and allied support for Ukraine is necessary for European and transatlantic security. The main Kremlin counter-narrative tells a different story: Ukraine, NATO, the United States, or “the West” provoked the war, leaving Russia no choice but to invade in order to protect its so-called historical sphere of influence.

This ongoing contest matters because it can affect whether citizens support sanctions, weapons deliveries, refugee assistance, defense spending, and long-term deterrence measures taken by their countries and NATO. If the public believes that Russia caused the war, continued support for Ukraine and NATO cohesion becomes easier to sustain. If the public believes that NATO or the West provoked the war, allied policy aimed at countering Russia can appear reckless, hypocritical, or needlessly escalatory.

Much of the discussion about Russian information operations focuses on the supply side. It aims to address threats posed by, for example, Russian propaganda, falsehoods, and electoral and other interference, across different channels and platforms. These are important. , a foreign disinformation detection institution, defines foreign information manipulation and interference as “intentional and coordinated efforts by state or non-state actors to alter information in pursuit of political, security, or other strategic objectives.” But supply alone does not explain why people in Canada and other countries believe one competing strategic narrative over another.

This brief, therefore, focuses on the demand side of strategic narrative reception. Why are some citizens more receptive to the Kremlin’s West-blame narrative while others accept the NATO narrative that Russia caused the war? Findings from suggest that people tend to rely on trust in the messenger as a shortcut to plausibility. When they trust NATO, they also tend to trust its messaging. When they distrust NATO, those same explanations are easier to dismiss as propaganda, spin, or elite messaging.

Strategic Narratives and the Credibility of the Narrator

Strategic narratives are stories that countries tell to “win the story” as they frame issues, advance their goals, and convince others of the righteousness of their actions in global affairs. Strategic narratives identify heroes and villains, assign blame, explain crises, and justify policy choices. In the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine, narratives about the origins of the war are especially important because they can and do shape policy debates. If Russia is understood as the aggressor, then sanctions, deterrence, and military assistance to Ukraine follow logically. If NATO is understood as the provocateur, then those same policies can be framed as a dangerous escalation.

Narratives succeed not only because of repetition or exposure. They also depend on the narrator’s perceived credibility. Citizens do not evaluate every claim from scratch; they use their trust in the messenger as a cognitive shortcut that, especially when multiple competing narratives are present, is more likely to lead them to accept or reject the story in question.

This is why fact-checking and rebuttals of malign information, while necessary, are not sufficient. The consensus recommendations in emphasize that corrections are most effective when they are clear, credible, and accompanied by an alternative explanation. However, both this handbook and our research suggest that to increase the likelihood that the audience accepts the debunking, the audience should hold a positive view of the messenger. When trust is low, the same corrections can be rejected as self-interested messaging. In practice, “truth” often competes with “trusted.”

The policy implication is that institutional credibility is neither a soft nor a secondary issue. It is part of democratic resilience. explicitly identifies resilience as central to its ability to deter and defend. While NATO’s deterrent posture depends on military capabilities, we should also keep in mind that the Alliance also depends on public support for the political choices that make deterrence credible. If hostile information operations can weaken trust in the institutions that explain and justify allied policy, they can complicate democratic decision-making even without changing facts on the ground.

Evidence from the Survey: Canada as a High-Trust but Still Vulnerable Case

The empirical evidence for this brief comes from the . The survey asked respondents who they believe caused the war in Ukraine and measured trust in NATO, the EU, and domestic institutions.

Figure 1: Public Trust in NATO across Alliance Countries

Canada is a useful case because public alignment with the core NATO narrative is strong overall. In the Canadian sample, approximately 84% of respondents blame Russia for the war, while only about 8% blame the West. Around 60% of reports trust NATO. This suggests that Kremin’s West-blame narrative has not received much traction in Canada.

Yet the Canadian data also show why overconfidence would be a mistake. West-blame beliefs are not evenly distributed. They are concentrated among respondents who do not trust NATO. For Canadians who trust NATO, only about 4% blame the West. Among those who do not trust NATO, the figure rises to about 15%. Similarly, about 90% of Canadians who trust NATO blame Russia, compared to about 74% among those who do not trust NATO.

Figure 2: Canadian Trust in NATO and Blame Attribution for the War in Ukraine

The full Canadian results reinforce this pattern. Controlling for socio-demographic factors, trust in NATO is strongly associated with blaming Russia for the war and strongly negatively associated with blaming the West. Other socio-demographic and attitudinal factors also matter, but the clearest and most policy-relevant pattern is the relationship between trust in NATO and blame attribution.

This does not mean that distrust in NATO automatically translates into pro-Kremlin beliefs. The relationship may run in both directions. Some citizens may distrust NATO and therefore reject NATO’s account of the war. Others may become less trusting of NATO after consuming information critical of it. Both processes could occur simultaneously. For policy purposes, however, the direction is less important than the vulnerability itself. Where trust in NATO is lower, NATO’s messages are less likely to be heard, and adversarial narratives are more likely to find receptive audiences.

Why This Matters for Canada

For Canada, the findings are directly relevant as it is an active player in Europe and, increasingly, the Arctic. Through , Canada has played a leading role in NATO’s presence in Latvia and on the Alliance’s eastern flank. �䲹�Բ��岹’s security interests extend to the Arctic, cyber defence, democratic resilience, and the protection of a rules-based order that is directly challenged by Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. In the Arctic, however, security communication must also include Inuit and other Indigenous communities as central stakeholders, since their knowledge, rights, livelihoods, and local security concerns are directly affected by how Canada defines and communicates its northern defence priorities.

Moreover, NATO can still feel abstract to many Canadians. It may appear distant, bureaucratic, European, or not sufficiently in Canada’s interests. When NATO is understood mainly as a Brussels-based security organization, it is easier for adversaries to portray it as “out-of-touch” with the average Canadian. When NATO is understood as Canadian soldiers in Latvia for the purposes of preventing a wider war, as Arctic deterrence, as cyber cooperation, and as a framework that helps prevent wider war, its relevance to Canada and Canadians is strengthened.

The challenge is not simply to tell Canadians that NATO matters; it is to show how NATO strengthens Canadian security and �䲹�Բ��岹’s international role. This is particularly important as allied governments ask the public to support higher defense spending, long-term military assistance to Ukraine, and sustained deterrence. These policies require political endurance, and political endurance depends on public trust. For example, �䲹�Բ��岹’s broader efforts against foreign information manipulation and interference could connect more directly to strategic communication about NATO. Monitoring hostile narratives, exposing coordinated manipulation, and working with platforms remain necessary. However, �䲹�Բ��岹’s counter-disinformation strategy should also focus on credibility-building to increase the likelihood that its messages will resonate better with the public. This means transparency, consistency, local relevance, and messengers who can reach audiences that may not respond to official statements.

For example, �䲹�Բ��岹’s broader efforts against could connect more directly to strategic communication about NATO. Monitoring hostile narratives, exposing coordinated manipulation, and working with platforms remain necessary. However, �䲹�Բ��岹’s counter-disinformation strategy should also focus on credibility-building to increase the likelihood that its messages will resonate better with the public. This means transparency, consistency, local relevance, and messengers who can reach audiences that may not respond to official statements.

Why Rebuttals and Takedowns Are Not Enough

Democratic governments often respond to disinformation with three main tools: exposure, removal, and correction. They identify false claims, work to take them down if possible, and post factual rebuttals. These tools are important, but they tend to be reactive. By the time a false narrative has spread widely, corrections may reach only a fraction of the original audience. Also, in instances where people do not trust the institutions or organizations taking up the correcting, attempts to take down false narratives could reinforce distrust and suspicion. Studies on and show that it helps to anticipate and address manipulation techniques before people encounter them.

It may be helpful to supplement existing debunking efforts with more prebunking, building societal resistance to misinformation, and strengthening trust in NATO and similar institutions. Experimental research by show that short interventions aimed at informing people about common manipulation tactics used by hostile actors can increase resilience to misinformation. For example, before a major NATO summit, Ukrainian aid package, or deployment decision, Canadian and allied communicators can anticipate predictable claims that NATO provoked the war, Ukraine is merely a proxy, or Canada is paying for Europe’s war. Rather than waiting for these claims to circulate, Canadian and NATO communicators could explain in advance why they are misleading and how they fit into a broader Russian narrative strategy aimed at dividing and weakening Canada and NATO. This approach should be simple and delivered by trusted voices. It should avoid overly technical language.

At the same time, NATO and Canadian institutions need to avoid communicating only during crises. Trust building takes time and patience. If the public learns about the role and benefits of NATO membership only when leaders are seeking support for a given initiative, they may view such communication with suspicion.

Policy Recommendations

1. Treat trust as an early-warning indicator

Canada already monitors foreign information manipulation and interference and conducts public opinion research on security issues. Canada and its Allies should monitor public trust in NATO and other key security institutions as part of democratic resilience planning. Public opinion polls should ask respondents whether they trust NATO, the Canadian government, and similar institutions. Declining trust should be treated as an early warning indicator that more outreach is needed to reduce susceptibility to adversarial information warfare.

2. Institutionalize prebunking before predictable narrative attacks

More attention should be paid to prebunking at moments when adversarial information warfare is likely to escalate (e.g., predictable narrative attacks). Among others, such events likely include NATO summits, defense spending announcements, Ukraine aid package announcements, troop deployments abroad, and elections in allied countries. Communicators should prepare short, accessible materials that explain both the facts and the manipulation techniques adversaries are likely to use. Such efforts should be coordinated by the Canadian government, NATO allies, and other communicators to increase narrative resilience before hostile narratives reach NATO audiences.

3. Make NATO concrete in Canadian public communication

Conduct public information campaigns aimed at explaining the benefits of NATO membership and consistently connecting them to Canadian security interests. Such a campaign could use specific examples to emphasize NATO’s relevance by highlighting its leadership in Latvia, its role in Arctic security, its cyber defense capabilities, and its efforts to prevent a wider war in Europe, among others. Such communication should also be transparent about trade-offs, given legitimate questions about rising defense spending and the implications of Canada’s growing involvement in European deterrence initiatives. Credible communication should not avoid taking on difficult questions directly — in fact, addressing them should help with building trust.

4. Expand the trusted messenger network

Canada already supports public outreach initiatives aimed at countering disinformation and promoting democratic resilience. Such work should be extended to matters surrounding NATO and its work. Since government and NATO officials may not always be the most trusted communicators, Canada should aim to work with a wide network of credible messengers, including veterans, reservists, military families, educators, local officials, Ukrainian and Eastern European diaspora communities, Indigenous and northern voices on Arctic security, and independent scholars. Using such goodwill ambassadors should help key messages reach individuals across different local and social contexts. This could be a way to reach audiences distrustful of political elites.

Conclusion: Trust as Democratic Deterrence

The full-scale invasion in Ukraine highlighted that deterrence requires military capability, political will, and social resilience. Part of Russia’s challenges to NATO is represented by its hostile information operations. Moscow does not want NATO to admire Russia – it only needs enough citizens to doubt NATO’s reliability, blame the West for the invasion of Ukraine, oppose support, or lose confidence that allied institutions are telling the truth.

The Canadian evidence presented here offers both reassurance and warning — and policy recommendations outlined here aim to strengthen �䲹�Բ��岹’s broader democratic resilience. Most Canadians blame Russia for the war, and the Kremlin’s West-blame narrative remains a minority view. But that minority is meaningfully larger among those who do not trust NATO. Increasing trust in NATO, in turn, would require ongoing attention to informational campaigns aimed at raising public understanding of why and how the Alliance matters.

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Executive Summary

Authoritarian states are increasingly using police organizations to target diaspora communities in democratic countries. This is especially evident in the misuse of Interpol’s Red Notice system to bypass extradition barriers and pursue dissidents abroad. When politically motivated notices are dispersed through Canadian policing systems, they risk compromising the integrity of international law enforcement cooperation, increasing the likelihood of refoulement which violates �䲹�Բ��岹’s legal obligations, and exacerbates a chilling effect among diaspora communities. In doing so, these notices expose the vulnerabilities in �䲹�Բ��岹’s domestic protections by allowing foreign states the ability to project coercive influence through Canadian political institutions.  

While this brief focuses on the misuse of INTERPOL mechanisms as a specific form of Transnational Repression (TR), it sits within a broader context of state-led repression ranging from the People’s Republic of China to India. It uses Tajikistan as a case study to highlight vulnerabilities in INTERPOL’s vetting process, including insufficient pre-screening and the burden placed on victims to prove their innocence. These weaknesses enable states to exploit Canadian institutions to harass and deport political refugees, a practice known as Transnational Repression (TR).  

TR has occurred in Canada, demonstrating the urgent need for a governmental response.  The focus of this policy brief is on the use of INTERPOL to target dissidents. To address these challenges, this brief proposes specific procedural enhancements to protect the asylum process and strengthen pre-existing domestic protections to protect �䲹�Բ��岹’s diaspora communities. 

To read the full policy brief, use the button below to download the full policy memo.

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Key Takeaways 

• In Estonia and Latvia, border residents, ethnic Russians, and Russian-speakers differ from the general population in their perception of security threats. They are more likely to view domestic political instability as their country’s primary security threat, rather than Russia. 

• This segment of Estonians and Latvians also tend to feel disenfranchised and helpless regarding national defence, with the majority more likely to respond that their countries are “on their own” if faced by a military threat. 

• NATO should take a regionally focused outreach, using the Russian language as a medium and utilize transparent intelligence disclosure to assure and rebuild trust among these vulnerable populations. Furthermore, using visible and well-tested approaches such as tangible first-responder training and on-the-ground capacity-building measures could help address local skepticism. 

Background 

While the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) focuses on defending the Baltics from external Russian aggression, a critical segment of the population – namely border residents, ethnic Russians, and Russian-speakers – are more concerned with internal political instability than external threats for its national security. In addition, many of these respondents express a feeling of helplessness and alienation, believing neither the West nor Russia would come to their aid should their country face a military or security threat. Thus far, NATO operations aimed at reassuring Baltic residents are not succeeding with instilling confidence in current national security frameworks. Recognizing the diversity of security beliefs with a particular regional and linguistic focus could better inform NATO strategies that address security threat responses in the Baltics, helping to reassure these skeptical and disenfranchised populations.   

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has fundamentally transformed the international security landscape, prompting NATO’s response to reassure its Baltic members that, should it face a threat, NATO will come to their defence.  NATO’s operations in Latvia and Estonia are a part of its broader efforts at deterrence and defence on its eastern flank by increasing its presence in the region, with Canada leading the Multinational Brigade in Latvia through , and the United Kingdom leading in Estonia with . Latvia and Estonia are both active participants in various NATO-accredited Centres of Excellence (COEs) that conduct collaborative research with NATO Allies to better address security threats, many by malign Russian influence through hybrid tactics. For example, the , located in Riga, Latvia, monitors and counters information-manipulation threats in real time. Russia’s information operations in these countries exploit pre-existing societal divisions among ethnic, regional, and linguistic lines, promoting extremist sentiments and skepticism against their governments and Western partners.  accuse Estonian and Latvian governments of being anti-Russian and incapable of defending their countries against any threat.   

Existing studies suggest that Russophone, ethnic Russian, and borderland populations in both Latvia and Estonia are more skeptical towards NATO and existing national security frameworks. They are found to be , and .  is found to be a salient factor, associated with decreased support for present (often liberal democratic) regimes.  In the context of the ongoing war against Ukraine, , and . Furthermore, they are.   

However, public opinion amongst these groups in Estonia and Latvia is proving to be more nuanced; many in these populations express a complex belief system surrounding national security that is . , , meaning that public opinion among Russophones in Latvia and Estonia is heterogenous. Given these insights, policy aimed at developing trust with these populations and fostering participation in national security frameworks should reflect this variety of beliefs, and address skepticism through regionally and linguistically mindful outreach initiatives.

Belief in ‘Domestic Political Instability’ as the Greatest National Security Threat

A survey conducted by the �Ӱ�ԭ�� University Eastern European and Transatlantic Network (EETN) in Latvia and Estonia between March and May 2025 indicates that while Russia and the war in Ukraine are still prevalent security threats, 26% of Latvians and 22% of Estonians perceive “domestic political instability” as the most important threat. These opinions are particularly widespread among the border-region populations, among Russian speakers, and ethnic Russians. For example, in Latgale (Latvia’s border region) 52% chose “domestic political instability” as the greatest threat; only 7% picked Russia, and 12% the war in Ukraine. Similarly, in Northeastern Estonia, an area that borders Russia, 47% consider domestic political instability as a main security threat while only 17% consider Russia as the greatest threat. In Latvia, Russian speakers were far more likely to hold this belief compared to respondents who speak the titular language; language was not a measured factor in the Estonia survey. 

These groups are all more likely than their counterparts to feel personally “unsafe,” with 51% of Latgale residents and 30% of Russian speakers in Latvia choosing “unsafe” when asked about their personal safety. In Northeastern Estonia, 31% also personally feel “unsafe.” Skeptics tend to attribute threats to personal safety on internal concerns rather than external actors. In both countries, those who share this belief have a higher likelihood to view Russia as most helpful for their national security. ​​For example, in Latvia 26% of respondents chose “domestic political instability” as the greatest threat to personal safety, and among these respondents 61% chose Russia as the most helpful external actor to Latvia in the case of a military threat- pointing to an intersection between positive perceptions of Russia and concerns over internal concerns. Similarly, for the same question in Estonia, 22% chose “domestic political instability,” and of this group 77% also picked Russia to come to their aid. 

In addition, those concerned with domestic security are more likely to be skeptical of the EU, NATO, and the West. In both countries, such respondents are least likely to choose “the West” as most helpful should they face a military threat, with only 12% in Latvia, and 18% in Estonia. Furthermore, among those who share this belief is a higher likelihood to vote “no/leave” in hypothetical referendums for the EU and NATO respectively.  

Feelings of Alienation, NATO Skepticism and Internal Instability Belief 

Among respondents who share a belief regarding domestic political instability and specifically in the Russophone, ethnic Russian, and borderland populations is a common feeling of alienation from current security mechanisms and parliamentary processes. Respondents who share this belief also often expressed disenfranchisement, believing that if their country faces a military threat that they will be helped by no one. When asked the same question, Russophones in Latvia proved that they are least likely to choose NATO and most likely to choose “Nobody will help us/we are here for ourselves”.  

Residents of Northeastern Estonia and Latgale are the least likely among Estonia’s macro-regions to choose “closer to NATO” (only 34% in Northeast Estonia and 41% in Latgale) and are most likely among all regions to pick either “closer to Russia” (22% in Northeast Estonia, 21% in Latgale) or “closer to both/neither” (31% in Northeast Estonia, 25% in Latgale). 

It seems that such skepticism towards common security architecture reflects a greater disbelief in the national political system. Although a majority of respondents who also share the belief of alienation would vote “yes/stay” in the hypothetical referendums to remain in NATO or the EU, their support is weaker than the general population. To conclude, Russophones, border-region residents, and respondents who share their “domestic political instability belief more often express feelings of alienation and disenfranchisement from political processes rather than a desire to deepen ties with Russia.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 

Feelings of skepticism, alienation, and disenfranchisement in the border regions cannot be attributed to ethnic and linguistic identification alone. Being Russian or Russophone in a border region does not inherently make someone vulnerable to Russian influence. Socioeconomic disparities in these regions paired with titular language mandates in both countries can contribute to feelings of alienation, though further research is needed in order to uncover a clearer picture of these citizens’ experiences. A more in-depth understanding will further restore agency to this population, as their beliefs are likely acquired through more complex routes than simply absorbing Kremlin media.  that Russian media did not have an independent effect on one’s willingness to defend their country and instead infers that many respondents who consume Russian media have a distrust of media in general, further highlighting a need for a more nuanced understanding of skepticism among Russophones. 

1. Further research on best practices through NATO COEs is needed to address alienation and helplessness 

NATO Allies utilize different COE’s to share best practices for countermeasures and confidence-building initiatives and to build societal resilience against malign information influence. A transnational study on best practices for building confidence among ethnic minorities would fill a sizable gap in current research and would provide a basis for which to design public outreach campaigns for populations experiencing alienation and skepticism.  In addition, further research can investigate the security perceptions and feelings of alienation in public opinion. This would provide a more accurate foundation for which to form policy on public outreach, rather than simply attributing the security concerns of Russophones to inherent Russian-tendencies that favor Kremlin-intervention. 

2. Targeted and regionally mindful outreach for key groups could have important impacts 

Further regionally-focused outreach for these specific Russophone, ethnic Russian, and borderland populations using a , with tactics such as intelligence disclosures (gathered through the , or NISRF), can effectively rebuild credibility and better reassure these populations of NATO’s defence commitments and decision-making. Furthermore, intelligence disclosures through accessible media can inform users on external security threats and potentially increase risk awareness and trust in public institutions through transparency measures.  

 Given that a significant amount of  is conducted by Russian-language media, it is tantamount to consider this population’s linguistic preference as a tool of engagement rather than a characteristic to exclude from policy measures to counteract Russian influence.  

3. Share key expertise within NATO frameworks, and make it visible to key groups 

 found that any citizen regardless of ethnicity is more open to helping in their country’s defences if they are reassured by a powerful patron, one that they have confidence in. In 2023, , sharing best practices for preparedness among first responders. Similar efforts in Latvia and Estonia could reach NATO-skeptical populations among citizens working in the public sector for emergency response. Sharing key expertise in similar sectors can potentially build trust among skeptical groups and increase NATO’s visibility among local populations, offering a firsthand account of NATO’s efforts instead of through malign narratives online.  

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Introduction

On January 5th, 2026, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced the appointment of former Canadian Deputy Prime Minister and Member of Parliament, Chrystia Freeland, as Economic Advisor to the Office of the President of Ukraine. In a post on X, Zelenskyy stated, “Ukraine needs to strengthen its internal resilience – both for the sake of Ukraine’s recovery if diplomacy delivers results as swiftly as possible, and to reinforce our defence if, because of delays by our partners, it takes longer to bring this war to an end.” In the following days, Freeland confirmed she accepted President Zelenskyy’s appointment and that she would be resigning as a Member of Parliament, taking effect as of January 9th, 2026.

Freeland’s appointment as voluntary Economic Advisor to the Office of the President of Ukraine is being made against the larger and developing backdrop of ongoing diplomatic negotiations between the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the United States (US) to come to an agreed upon pathway to peace. This negotiation process continues to be arduous for Ukraine. It also comes alongside a deepening of foreign diplomatic relations between Canada and Ukraine under the Mark Carney government; this, coming on the back of Prime Minister Carney’s historical , where he stressed the end of the rules-based international order and hinted at the decline of American hegemony – a speech that have held to ultimately represent the beginning of a multipolar era in world politics.

In the coming months, the Eastern European and Transatlantic Network (EETN) will publish a series analyzing key developments shaping the war; these include prospective pathways to peace, ongoing diplomatic negotiations and tensions, and the shifting security and economic governance landscape in Ukraine. Freeland is an integral node among an emerging and vital network aimed at supporting Ukraine and its future as the anniversary of the full-scale invasion nears and passes. This series aims to make clear that Russia is not only engaged in a war of attrition so as to try to reclaim its great power status, but that Ukraine is increasingly prepared to respond to this war of attrition with strategies and methods of asymmetric and hybrid warfare. Ukraine is prepared to make the strategic, economic, and relational moves necessary to better guarantee its future, as well as its success on the battlefield and in diplomatic negotiations.

This first brief of the series reflects on Freeland’s appointment and builds upon an argument first offered by Ukrainian scholar Valeriia Gusieva, where she suggested that cultural resilience is a foundational pillar to security. I extend her argument here by suggesting that cultural resilience and situated experience are also crucial to sustaining a coherent and effective attritional war strategy – Freeland’s appointment, in this case, should be understood light through the lens of political habituation.

Chrystia Freeland: A Ukrainian-Canadian MP and Soviet War Crimes Researcher

Chrystia Freeland was born in Peace River, Alberta in 1968 to a Ukrainian mother and Canadian father. Though she formally entered Canadian federal politics in 2013, she is perhaps most known through her association with former Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and his government. Under Trudeau, Freeland was appointed to serve as Minister of International Trade in Trudeau’s cabinet. In this position, she was a key negotiator in the hard-fought Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) (which replaced the North American Free Trade Agreement, or NAFTA, in 2020), as well as the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with the European Union (EU) that was signed in 2016.

While it is fair to assume that many Western audiences are familiar with the whiplash antics of American President Donald Trump, who often combines “,” less well known are the tensions that characterized the negotiation process of CETA. As researchers , CETA encountered historical diplomatic tensions throughout its negotiation process: “This challenge becomes evident at various stages in the trade policy process, but it is most pronounced in the ratification of bilateral agreements, which require approval in all member states.”

On paper, arriving at CETA was through the bilateral process of negotiation between Canada and the EU; in reality, however, Freeland was situated in a much more difficult negotiating position. Because the subsequent ratification of CETA would require the approval of all EU member states, such a negotiating process proved to be a lesson for both Freeland and the European Commission, who was charged with ensuring the twenty-eight member states were in alignment. Indeed, as scholar Joris Larik , the alleged crisis of CETA negotiations soon became a “cautionary tale” about the “cumbersome and vulnerable EU treaty-making procedures, where internal politics and technical legal discussions detracted from the merits (or demerits) of the actual agreement.”

This became most visible through the tensions experienced with the Wallonia Parliament in Belgium, an autonomous regional government with veto power over EU trade deals. In late 2016, the Walloon government publicly rejected CETA, in part because of their worry that the trade deal would “.” Walloon regional minister-president, Paul Magnette, told reporters the following: “I don’t consider this as a funeral, I don’t consider this as a veto without any conditions. I consider this as a request to reopen negotiations so that European leaders could hear the legitimate demands which have been forcefully expressed by an organized, transparent civil society.” As Larik however, this crisis led to “profound internal reflections on EU trade policy, causing even a shift in the EU’s practice in concluding trade agreements.

It was largely in response to these tensions and apparent deadlock within Wallonia that Freeland made the public decision to walk out on CETA negotiations with our European allies. Following her decision, Freeland with Canadian journalists candidly: “It’s become evident for me, for Canada, that the European Union isn’t capable now to have an international treaty even with a country that has very European values like Canada. And even with a country so nice, with a lot of patience like Canada.” At the time, the move was taken by some in Canadian media as an “” response; Conservative critics in the House of Commons Freeland’s walk out as a “meltdown,” alleging she required “adult supervision” – language that carried clear sexist and gendered connotations. Still others this walk out is exactly what the negotiation process needed, as it eventually led to the signing of the trade agreement.

Reflecting on her CETA negotiation experience in 2026, Freeland the following about negotiating with European allies, which is worth quoting at-length here:

“You can sort of have two kinds of negotiations. Some negotiations start with a kind of win-win premise where the two parties come together wanting a deal, wanting to be friends, seeing each other as long-term partners, and they’ll disagree about stuff, but the negotiation is really about everyone working hard together to find the best possible landing zone. I would say �䲹�Բ��岹’s negotiations with the EU about our trade deal with Europe, CETA, were conducted in that way, and they were hard, right? … Our final slightly melodramatic moments in Namur, in Wallonia, you know, proceeded by moments in Vienna, in Germany, in the European Parliament. I mean, it was a long slog and there were lots of obstacles and there was some drama, but it was clear there was goodwill on all sides.”

In this interview, Freeland goes on to characterize how Trump falls into an alternative negotiation camp compared to that which characterized CETA; she the idea that the American President abides by the logic of a zero-sum game: “…when you are dealing with a party that has that kind of a view [zero-sum game logic] and that kind of an attitude, then I think you have to be very clear in your own mind about red lines. And you have to be very prepared to say, thus far and no further, we’re not gonna capitulate our approach.”

Freeland later went on to become �䲹�Բ��岹’s Minister of Finance in 2020, where she was responsible for introducing four federal budgets, including federal aid measures related to �䲹�Բ��岹’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic. She was the first woman to serve in this role, a fact that would later be considered by the as crucial in the decay of her relationship with Trudeau prior to his own resignation in late-2025.

Beyond her political career, Freeland’s academic and journalistic works span two decades and have drawn the ire of the Kremlin. While pursuing graduate studies in Russian history and literature at Harvard, where she was responsible for documenting and translating archival and investigative materials related to the – an unmarked, mass burial site used by the NKVD (the secret police of the Soviet Union) to dispose of executed dissidents and prisoners. It remains one of the largest mass burial sites in Ukraine, even Russia’s current invasion. Her research played a decisive role in debunking the Stalin-era myth that the executions were exclusively carried out by the Nazis during World War Two. This research eventually attracted the attention of the KGB – the main security agency of the Soviet Union – who then assigned Freeland the codename “Frida,” closely surveilling and building a case against her throughout the course of her study.

As a Canadian with Ukrainian heritage, Freeland has been among the most outspoken advocates for sustained Canadian support to Ukraine. In response, she is one of thirteen Canadian officials barred from entering Russia under retaliatory sanctions imposed by Vladimir Putin himself in 2014 and has been the target of various . Freeland has also faced public attacks from American President Donald Trump, who on several occasions has described her in disparaging terms, including “,” a “,” a “,” and an overall “.” From a feminist perspective, Freeland’s experience navigating such attacks underscores her familiarity with the gendered power dynamics employed by – an experience that may indeed prove to be a strategic asset in a war whose social construction and conduct are themselves . While much of international politics Freeland nonetheless works against the masculine grain in a pursuit of fair and just agreements and futures.

Contextualizing the Habituation of Freeland and Concluding Remarks

As this series continues to examine changes within President Zelenskyy’s inner circle in response to both Ukrainian domestic pressures and Russia’s growing attritional war strategy, I suggest that Freeland’s appointment as a voluntary Economic Advisor to Ukraine signals an awareness within Ukrainian leadership and its closest allies that responding to Russia’s attritional warfare in 2026 cannot be confined to military operations alone. No longer are we in an era where hard power capabilities are the only measure of a nation’s strength; the personal and personnel also matter.

Freeland will be an important figure to watch, particularly as it relates to dialogue between Ukrainian feminists and the pro-democracy movement – not because Freeland herself has expressed a desire to pursue a feminist agenda in Ukraine’s economic reconstruction, but because her presence reflects the often-implicit reality that gendered political experience shapes how the dynamics of endurance, credibility, and trust are produced and sustained in wartime economies. In a war of attrition, where authority is continuously reaffirmed under conditions of prolonged uncertainty, reputational attack, and economic strain, such situated experience becomes strategically relevant, I suggest, as a form of habituation to sustained delegitimization.

The notion of habituation draws from a long philosophical tradition – mostly commonly, Aristotelian ethics, where habituation (hexis) was used to refer to repeated exposure and practice from durable dispositions rather than momentary or instantaneous reaction. In contemporary political thought, philosophers and scholars inspired by phenomenologists such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty have upon this idea to explain how subjects develop capacities for political action through ongoing relational strain. In feminist ethics, habituation helps to explain how – often oppressed – actors learn to endure, navigate, and act within conditions of prolonged vulnerability, scrutiny, and marginalization over time. It moves beyond experience; it is an engaged and embodied vision and practice.

In an attritional war where legitimacy is not necessarily secured through fast-paced or singular victories but continually reproduced across various political, economic, and social structures, as well as through relations of alliance management and public trust, this mode of habituation takes on strategic significance. Indeed, for President Zelenskyy, it works in his favour to cultivate and incorporate actors habituated to sustained delegitimization because it acts as a shock absorber to the , partner unreliability in a so-called newly-founded “” world, and economic fatigue increasingly characterizing this phase of the war and ongoing occupation. The hope is that these hybrid shocks are absorbed by such a habituation without suffering from significant strategic drifts that may carry over into the battlefield.

, nations and militaries perceived to possess greater status and capabilities – that is, the greater of two powers – engage in warfare by attrition. Those familiar with Russia and the former Soviet Union’s historical record of aggression, occupation, interference, and war across Eastern Europe will also recognize this mode of warfare, perhaps all too familiarly. The Baltics, the Balkans, Poland, Chechnya, Georgia – they all know this playbook. The Russian Federation continues to seek what it perceives as its rightful seat at the table of great-power politics; even those of us who reject John J. Mearsheimer’s structuralist projections onto Eastern Europe as lying within a fixed Russian “sphere of influence” cannot ignore such an imperial desire percolating within the Russian state since the unipolar moment.

In attritional war, time is a previous resource. As Sun Tzu , prolonged conflict could be of great risk to either warring side, on account of exhausting the state apparatus, undermining domestic order and morale, and eroding strategic advantage; for him, military strategy was a subtle and complex technique whose success depended on minimizing the temporal risks and costs of war. While Sun Tzu viewed attritional war as a strategic failure, the work of military theorist and general requires us to remember that wars of attrition often emerge as a political condition over time, shaped by friction, uncertainty, and an overall inability to achieve decisive political outcomes. What Ukraine demonstrates to the international community, this series aims to show, is that Russia’s apparent great power strategy grounded in attrition – like empire itself – can burn out.

It is by sources close to both Freeland and Prime Minister Carney that Freeland received Zelenskyy’s offer on December 22nd, 2025; by December 24th, she had shared with the Prime Minister her intentions to leave Canadian parliament to join the Ukrainian team. In responding to the Kremlin’s continued war of attrition, concerns beyond immediate hard power capabilities, military strategy, and command structures must be addressed. Freeland possesses a unique form of habituation to sustain delegitimation; her appointment may indeed be an important shock absorber to Russia’s ongoing disinformation campaigns, American partner unreliability, and the economic fatigue increasingly characterizing this war.

At the level of a broader wartime strategy, I suggest this capacity can also function as a form of resilience; it signals to communities, civil society, international partners, and adversaries alike that broader Ukraine’s leadership is prepared to govern through a liminal phase of uncertain futurity rather than govern toward a rapid endpoint. This is a strategy in stark contrast to Putin’s assumption that a “quick military operation” could sweep Ukraine in 2022, or that , once elected, could end the war in Ukraine in the first 24-hours of his second term. In this sense, it is important to emphasize that habituation is not merely an individual trait or disposition, but also a culturally sedimented capacity that is experienced transnationally and relationally. As Gusieva has argued, cultural resilience constitutes a foundational pillar of security; indeed, classical realist how such resilience at times is what pushes a nation beyond survival towards victory. I extend this logic here by suggesting that such cultural resilience is forged through repeated exposure to, and embeddedness within, enduring imperial projects and traditionalist military practices – in this case, namely, Russia’s ongoing attempts to reclaim imperial-great power status, legitimate its occupations, and sustain attritional warfare alongside its hybrid threats towards Europe.

In Ukraine, cultural habituation operates as resilience, but it is neither neutral nor abstract; rather, its experience is deeply racialized, ethnicized, and gendered. It is racialized and ethnicized through the persistent positioning of the nation as materially peripheral to Europe while cast as subordinate to Russia’s so-called historical sphere of influence; it is gendered through the paternalizing narratives directed at Ukraine and other Eastern European states aspiring to EU membership, as well as in the recurring trope of Ukraine as the “little brother” to a masculinized “Mother Russia.” More specifically, we see this reproduced through the hegemonically masculine practices embodied by state actors in political negotiations of economic and security matters; these behaviours continue to structure much of how political negotiation, listening, and diplomatic exchange take place. Freeland, in this respect, is a node within a broader relational structure of habituation and diplomatic practice in wartime Ukraine – one whose own political endurance aligns with, and stands to reinforce, Ukraine’s culturally embedded capacity to govern through attrition.

Please stay tuned for the next installment of this series, which will analyze Ukraine’s 2025 energy scandal and subsequent political moves undertaken President Zelenskyy following a state investigation that exposed high-level embezzlement within the nation’s energy sector.

The post Habituation in War: The Appointment of Chrystia Freeland as a Node in Ukraine’s Attritional War Strategy appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

�䲹�Բ��岹’s national strategy is undergoing a fundamental transformation. Great power competition, technological change, and hybrid tactics have reshaped the nature of modern conflict, blurring the boundaries between domestic stability and external security. States today face pressure not only to deter conventional military threats but also to address challenges that primarily affect civilian societies. represents an attempt to strengthen national resilience by integrating investments in defence capacity, critical infrastructure, and domestic military industrial capability. Yet these measures unfold against a backdrop of worsening socioeconomic pressures at home, leaving the country exposed to domestic destabilization even as defence spending rises. The convergence of external threats and internal vulnerabilities reveals that national security can no longer be understood solely through the lens of military preparedness. National security today requires a hybrid-resilience approach, combining military readiness and social cohesion to address threats.

Strategic Context and Security Challenges

�䲹�Բ��岹’s outlines a strategic approach to increasing adept at dealing with amidst the . By integrating , , and , Canada is trying to become a more autonomous nation. Simultaneously, addressing Canadian domestic security necessities through investment and nation-building projects will help . With Canada joining the EU’s defence procurement initiative, , Canadian defence firms gain access to European joint procurement and finance mechanisms.

As the United States (US), �䲹�Բ��岹’s traditional security guarantor, increasingly focuses on the Indo-Pacific and signals a reduced willingness to underwrite transatlantic stability, Canada is . Yet contemporary risk environments are defined not only by but also by , including , , and . Addressing these threats requires a multidimensional security posture that integrates physical, technological, and societal components. The budget’s allocation toward , , and developing underscores a commitment to and strategic autonomy. Investments in advanced technologies such as , , and further demonstrate recognition that modern security extends beyond traditional military capability, encompassing both technological resilience and the protection of critical industrial and information networks.

However, amidst a growing “” dilemma, in which defence imperatives compete with mounting domestic socioeconomic pressures, Canadian security challenges are complex. Socioeconomic vulnerabilities, , , , and , interact with traditional and hybrid security threats, creating interdependent risks. 

CAF Readiness and Personnel Support

Critical to a hybrid-resilient approach is developing the strength and readiness of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). Addressing hard-security concerns requires not only modern capabilities but also ensuring that CAF personnel are supported, retained, and operationally effective. Retention is a significant concern, with of new members leaving service, highlighting the need for , , and an enhanced . The recent are a step in the right direction, but additional investments in housing, , and are essential. Equally important are mental-health services, which have been consistently and who face the cumulative stresses of operations, repeated deployments, and long-term service.

At the same time, �䲹�Բ��岹’s defence procurement system continues to face relating to personnel shortages and a multi-departmental model. While the Ministry of Public Services and Procurement invests in high-profile platforms such as and , – including , , and – receives insufficient attention from the federal government. The most recent audit by the (2025) found that as of March 31, 2024, many training areas had less gear than needed, while others did not have enough equipment to carry out training operations.

More transparent and accountable procurement processes are needed to ensure that frontline personnel have reliable, effective tools to perform their duties safely and efficiently. Strengthening both personnel support and procurement effectiveness not only enhances operational readiness but also integrates material and human resource stability into a broader national resilience framework, complementing community-level and social initiatives to counter hybrid threats.

Socioeconomic Pressures and Domestic Security Concerns

Although the federal budget , the and the limited attention to worsening social crises leave Canada vulnerable to further destabilisation, populism, and societal polarisation. For many young people facing , military service can appear to be one of the few . A recent analysis by highlights that �䲹�Բ��岹’s youth face some of the toughest labour-market conditions in decades, making enlistment in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) a possible remedy for the youth unemployment crisis. This pattern echoes the , which has long been criticised for disproportionately drawing in economically disadvantaged youth, effectively creating pathways into the armed forces driven less by choice and more by necessity. 

Such dynamics also raise serious domestic security concerns: far-right networks have, in documented cases, encouraged members to or sought contact with as a means of acquiring and . Compounding this trend is the in Canada- particularly common among young men- which increasingly identify as a potential gateway into broader extremist ideologies. Without sufficient attention to these online spaces, the risk posed by vulnerable youth becoming radicalised and incentivised to join the military becomes a serious concern for domestic security and the protection of liberal-democratic values.

Growing separatist movements, particularly in and , highlight regional discontent and political polarisation, which can interact with socioeconomic vulnerabilities and be exploited by both domestic and foreign actors seeking to exacerbate societal fractures. These dynamics intersect with broader socioeconomic pressures and are further amplified by hybrid threats and foreign interference, which serve to exploit domestic polarisation through strategies titled “” 
Integrating with defence and technological investments is central to a . International examples, such as , demonstrate how initiatives that strengthen , media literacy, and can meaningfully complement traditional security capabilities. For Canada, public-awareness efforts like the campaign, which brings together over fifty feminist organisations to advocate for , , and , help address the socioeconomic stresses and political grievances that make communities vulnerable to polarisation and manipulation. 

Additionally, coordinated programs commissioned by the federal government, such as the (CRF) and the (DCI), linking defence, industrial strategy, and social resilience not only enhance the country’s ability to detect, withstand, and recover from hybrid threats but also reinforce national cohesion. In this sense, investing in social stability is not an adjunct to national security but a foundational component of it: strengthening communities, reducing socioeconomic vulnerabilities, and empowering citizens collectively contribute to a more unified, resilient society capable of withstanding increasingly complex threat environments.

Towards a Hybrid-Resilient Canada

�䲹�Բ��岹’s security landscape in the twenty-first century is defined by the convergence of traditional military threats, hybrid challenges, and domestic vulnerabilities. As this analysis demonstrates, a comprehensive approach to national resilience cannot rely solely on modernising the Canadian Armed Forces or expanding technological and industrial capabilities. Socioeconomic pressures, including youth unemployment, housing insecurity, and political polarisation, interact with hybrid threats, creating opportunities for extremist mobilisation, disinformation, and foreign interference. Social spending is not a competing priority in an era of heightened geopolitical tension; it is a core element of national defence.

By investing in social programs, community resilience initiatives, and public-awareness campaigns like Demand Better, Canada addresses these underlying vulnerabilities while simultaneously strengthening civic trust, cohesion, and adaptability. When combined with targeted defence investments and technological modernisation, such measures create a multidimensional, hybrid-resilient framework capable of withstanding both internal and external pressures. Social spending and citizen support are not peripheral to national security; they are at the very heart of it. A Canada that invests in the well-being of its people is not only more equitable and inclusive but also more unified, adaptable, and resilient in the face of modern conflict.

The post From Defence to Community – Social Stability as a Pillar of National Security appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

● Russia has been testing and refining hybrid tactics in the Balkans since the 2010s

● Hybrid tactics prey on ethnic divisions, political instability, and encourage hostility towards the West

● Russia’s tactics have increased their soft power, making it easier for malign actors to destabilize Europe

Russia’s unconventional threats

Hybrid threats have become an increasingly pervasive aspect of the global security landscape. Since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Russian Federation has been a key instigator of hybrid attacks, launching disinformation and propaganda campaigns, offensive cyber operations, espionage, and attacks on critical infrastructure. In Ukraine, hybrid tactics act as a force multiplier for traditional combat. Such hybrid tactics seek to weaponize divisions between social groups; the government and citizens; as well as economic and structural weaknesses to undermine faith in the systems, norms, and values of Western countries. By eroding public trust and exploiting weaknesses in target countries, societies are becoming more susceptible to internal vulnerability and Russian influence.

One area that has been a target of hybrid tactics is the Western Balkans. A critical juncture between West and East, the Balkans have been an area of competing ideology and cultural influence; it is also a region with a multitude of divisions for Russia to exploit. The repeated use of threats and fanning of tensions may imply a desire to stoke regional conflict, which could divide and disorder Europe. Much of Russia’s connection to the area is rooted in , which in the worst case scenario, could invite further expansionist ambitions into the region. Russia has largely implemented hybrid warfare tactics in places where they can leverage the most historical and cultural connections: Serbia; Republika Srpska; Montenegro; and North Macedonia (Slavic population).

Proxy Political Actors

Since the 2010s, Russia has been developing and testing clear methods of direct interference in political systems. Their primary tactic is backing ultranationalist and populist political figures. This includes the VMRO-DPMNE party in North Macedonia, which is a pro-Russian right-wing party. They have amplified , including the Macedonian naming dispute regarding . In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Milorad Dodik has been a strong pro-Kremlin force in the region, advocating for the secession of Republika Srpska, the Serbian-dominated enclave in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Russia recently used the in an effort to condemn Western influence in the region. In Serbia, Kremlin-backed politicians have historically been influential. , appointed to Parliament in 2024, President Aleksander Vučić has also frequently been accused of succumbing to Russia influence, though in the Serbian-Russian bilateral relationship remain notable. Russia’s use of state proxy actors is an effective way to ensure that the developing democratic systems in these countries remain divided and fragile. These actors are effective at preventing cooperation and often incite violent and polarizing rhetoric.

Non-political proxy actors

Russia has also refined its hybrid tactics through the exploitation of religious and cultural ties. The Russian Federation has deep and historical ties with the Orthodox Church, an integral part of daily life and culture in many Balkan countries. Pro-Kremlin oligarchs provide financial support to the Church and its charitable works. In return, moves towards democracy are framed as immoral Western decadence, which destroys traditional culture. The Orthodox Church has frequently opposed sovereignty and democracy for Montenegro and Kosovo, framing it as a threat to pan-Slavic identity. This rhetoric maintains tensions around territory, making peace more fragile. Cultural associations, mainly in Serbia, serve to disseminate propaganda among everyday citizens and cement Russian opinions. . Since the group was dismantled, the fate of criminal recruiting networks remains unclear. Another famous example is the . Cultural and educational programs throughout the region promote Russian language and ideology. This primes citizens to be more susceptible to Russian narratives and propaganda, increasing the effectiveness of hybrid tactics. Russia’s actions in the Balkans demonstrates its ability to leverage indirect, soft forms of influence.

Digital Landscape

Russia has been able to effectively weaponize social media and news outlets throughout the Balkans. Primarily, these efforts are targeted towards Serbian audiences. News outlets are flooded with Russian disinformation and propaganda. . The site itself is accessible to a wide audience, filling information voids with inflammatory stories. Many popular local news outlets – not tied to Russia – often repost such information as well. Disinformation portrays the West as weak, reinvigorating controversial memories such as the 1999 NATO bombings, and overstating regional conflicts. Outlets like , , and consistently regurgitate this messaging. Russia also leverages social media platforms like Telegram to further its disinformation campaign. Rybar, a pro-Russian channel, recently posted information regarding the joint special exercise between Albania, Croatia, and Kosovo. It claimed that this was evidence of an axis being formed by the West. Dozens of local Serbian channels reposted this information, inciting panic and paranoia about ethnic tensions.

Conclusion

Russia’s moves in the Western Balkans demonstrates its intentions to destabilize Europe from multiple fronts in the east, while simultaneously waging war in Ukraine This can divide the attention and resources of European nations, which improve the success of Russia’s strategic ambitions. For years, malign influence has penetrated the region, as noted in NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept. NATO should build on their outlined commitment and empower the region to become more resilient to hybrid threats.

Policy Recommendations

● Existing institutions and developmental frameworks should be buttressed by NATO to support democracy-building in the region

● Canada should support resilience and democratic stability by developing bilateral ties via NGO, diplomatic, and economic partnerships.

● Individuals, companies, centres, and associations who undermine democracy and encourage pro-Russian beliefs should be appropriately identified and restricted.

The post Russia’s Hybrid War in the Balkans appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

In a post on X (formerly known as Twitter), current German Chancellor Friedrich Merz stated the following: “.” Just a few short weeks later, in a posted on YouTube with Hungary’s news outlet, former German Chancellor Angela Merkel spoke about her experience in June 2021 when she and French President Emmanuel Macron had floated the idea of the EU holding direct talks with Vladimir Putin in an effort to calm re-ignited tensions with Ukraine. However, at that time, COVID-19 was given as the reason for preventing more frequent dialogue with Russia, which Merkel felt was crucial to ensuring that the be upheld.

In this new interview, Merkel revealed that it was in fact the Baltic states and Poland who were against such initiatives, and then claimed that “” Clearly, such a statement aims to manipulate memory for strategic purposes by placing significant blame on the Baltic states and Poland in the lead-up to the war, while also suggesting that Merkel herself had been serving as a peace-making actor, playing no role in empowering Russia to take such aggressive actions.

The reaction to Merkel’s comments was near instant. For example, Estonian foreign minister Margus Tsahkna responded that Merkel was “” and that instead of strongly responding to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, or its war in Georgia, . Another example of the outrage initiated by Merkel’s comments was captured by Poland’s Minister for Regional Policy, Katarzyna Pełczyńska-Nałęcz (former Polish Ambassador to Russia), who stated that being blamed for starting a war because they “.”

Why say it, and why say it there?

In short, Merkel argues about process in order to justify and defend her legacy and relations with Russia during her time as Chancellor, which focused on fostering “” – including sanctions, Minsk diplomacy, and energy interdependence as a ‘bridge’ with strategic intentions. This political approach is . Merkel’s casting of 2021 as a sort of missed off-ramp shifts focus from Berlin’s (and Merkel’s) long-term bet on engagement with Russia to an Eastern European veto that indirectly led to the war in Ukraine in the first place. Similarly, this mimics the theme that ‘,’ which politicians such as US President Donald Trump tend to employ as a discursive strategy. Legally and morally, the aggressor is Russia. What Merkel’s storytelling does is recast the focus on the intra-EU process of who blocked talks, rather than on the actor who chose invasion over dialogue. This narrative also directly undermines EU unity against Russia’s aggression, .

The venue of this interview further amplifies the political impact on EU unity. The that operates within a highly polarized media ecosystem, which placed . Additionally, alongside being the second lowest among EU member states in this index, recent reports indicate that Prime Minister Victor Orbán and his allies have consolidated control over around 80% of the press media in Hungary.The �ʲ����پ���á�� is hardly a mouthpiece for Budapest, but it is undoubtedly interesting that such an interview would come from the EU member state most often associated with strategic ambiguity in its relations with Moscow. It is worth noting, however, that during the same interview, when asked whether Orbán was a Trojan horse for Putin into the EU, Merkel simply stated that this propagated idea was “.” As placed in Hungary’s polarized media space, the Merkel clip conveys intra-EU blame, further testing cohesion by muddying the EU’s message to Moscow.

For the Baltics and Poland, the was both a threat and signal test. As the Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda warned, engaging in dialogue with Putin without tangible changes in Russian behaviour would send “” that the EU was placating Russia’s actions. Hosting summits without leverage and making agreements without cost or constraints creates an opportunity for Russia to further normalize coercion and potentially foster coalition-splitting rather than deterring it. Viewed in this light, the disapproval in 2021 from Poland and the Baltics was not obstructionism but rather a and a fear for potentially being the next target of Russia’s aggression.

An inconvenient backdrop

There is a reason Eastern Europe balks at Merkel’s ‘if only we had talked more’ sentiments. For three decades, Germany’s policy towards Russia combined binding and deterrence through sanctions and Minsk diplomacy, alongside a dense web of commercial, energy, and even security-based ties. , or the , where a German prime military contractor supplying high-end training systems to a Russian arms centre was . Only after the annexation of Crimea did Berlin entirely revoke the license. The cancellation showed that routine cooperation between Germany and Russia had been institutionalized even after Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008.

The EU’s own briefings on Nord Stream 2 noted that it , which led to debates and arguments from Poland, for example, , as well as broader concerns that Russia was using such initiatives to . Angela Merkel had reiterated to partners, and more specifically to Kyiv, that , despite being seemingly immune to the suggestion that Russia would, in fact, use energy as a tool to achieve its political interests in Europe.

Schröder, the useful contrast

Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, Merkel’s predecessor, moved straight into Russian energy after his time leading Germany, first chairing (the European-Russian pipeline company), then later joining the board of Rosneft (a state-owned Russian oil company), from which he under mounting political pressure. Additionally, Schröder had flirted with a ; however, , which was later stripped of a taxpayer-funded office by the Bundestag, prompting him to navigate the German court system to regain his office. However, the courts upheld his loss of privileges.

Merkel, by contrast, has not taken any corporate posts from Russian-based firms. However, her entanglement with Moscow is apparent through her narrative in the interview which re-allocates the burden of the war within the EU. This reframing serves two distinct purposes: The first is directly shifting any accountability for the complex situation Europe currently finds itself in with Russia, and the second, more indirectly, serves Russian hybrid tactics that seek to and as the .

What now?

Merkel’s interview works less as revisionism and more as a redistribution of memory, agency, and what she believes that EU unity should have resulted in during that time. It invites a tempting but counterfactual narrative that is ultimately counterproductive: that one more conversation might have ‘saved the day’ if only the Easterners had not blocked it. The empirical record – from Mulino to Nord Stream – suggests the opposite. That being said, diplomacy only works when backed by credible costs; absent that, it enables coercion. The lesson Europe should take is that the Baltics and Poland were cautious, given their historical understanding of Russia as a political actor, but were not outright fearful of dialogue with Moscow. If Europe shifts its focus to who blocked what talks and actions, it risks falling into the very divisions and tensions that Moscow seeks to foster.

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Executive Summary

This policy memo evaluates �䲹�Բ��岹’s current measures to combat disinformation, identifies key gaps, and proposes policy options to address such gaps by drawing upon international best practices from Finland, Ukraine, Estonia, and Germany. The analysis offers evidence-based recommendations tailored to �䲹�Բ��岹’s context, including implementing a National Media Literacy Curriculum, creating a Media Literacy Toolkit, and establishing a Centre for Strategic Communications to monitor and counter disinformation. It is also recommended that Canada invest in OSINT training for journalists and expand international collaboration with experts from Finland, Ukraine, and Estonia.

Background

presents a to �䲹�Բ��岹’s national security, public trust, and democratic integrity. State-sponsored actors, , use digital platforms to manipulate public discourse, spread false narratives, and deepen polarisation within Canadian society. Other foreign actors, including , , and , have also engaged in disinformation activities targeting Canada. �䲹�Բ��岹’s open democracy and advanced digital infrastructure make it an appealing target for these campaigns, necessitating the need for a coordinated, strategic response. Effectively addressing these challenges will require close collaboration across all levels of government, including provincial and territorial partners, given their responsibilities in education, community services, and public engagement.

To date, Canada has taken steps to address disinformation through led by Public Safety Canada, the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), the Department of National Defence (DND), and Global Affairs Canada (GAC), including the , the , and the . However, these efforts fail to address the complexity and scale of evolving disinformation tactics. To address these challenges, Canada requires a cohesive, proactive strategy that integrates these efforts while adapting best practices from international leaders such as Finland, Ukraine, Estonia, and Germany, which have developed effective, forward-looking approaches to countering disinformation through national education strategies, coordinated communications, digital literacy, and interagency cooperation.

Why Current Efforts are Insufficient

Despite these initiatives, �䲹�Բ��岹’s response to disinformation remains ;

• Educational initiatives are either absent or limited to specific schools, with no standardized or compulsory approach nationwide.
• Existing programs operate independently, across different levels of government, leading to inefficiencies and missed opportunities for collaboration.
• Canada lacks a centralized unit to monitor and respond to disinformation campaigns as they unfold, a gap exploited by foreign actors.

International Best Practices in Disinformation Response

Finland:

Finland is for its effective counter-disinformation strategies, which are grounded in a . This approach combines cross-sector collaboration, the integration of digital literacy into public education, and public trust. Finland’s whole-of-society engagement is supported by a strong tradition of media literacy and institutional transparency, resulting in a society highly resilient to disinformation.

1. Finland’s Cross-sector Collaboration: The Finnish government collaborates with private companies, civil society, academia, and media to combat disinformation. Government task forces made up of government officials, experts, and researchers .

2. Finland’s Mandatory Media Literacy in Public Education: Digital and media literacy is integral to Finland’s counter-disinformation efforts and has been made a . This education begins as early as primary school, , and continues throughout students’ academic journeys. The curriculum focuses on critical thinking, source evaluation, and recognizing media bias. Beyond schools, libraries serve as hubs for public education, offering resources and training to adults and seniors. Non-governmental organizations and local leaders also play an active role in outreach, ensuring broad accessibility to these tools and skills across the community.

Ukraine:

Ukraine in countering disinformation, particularly when sustaining information warfare from Russia. By leveraging , Ukraine empowers journalists and the public to identify and combat false narratives effectively.

1. Centre for Strategic Communications and Information Security: leads national efforts to counter disinformation and information warfare. The centre analyzes disinformation trends, crafts counter-narratives, and disseminates accurate information to combat malign propaganda, especially from Russia. Working in collaboration with government agencies, organizations, and international partners, the centre also promotes media literacy, equipping citizens with tools to recognize and resist false narratives.

2. Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) Training for Journalists: Ukraine has prioritized extensive training in . These enable professionals to verify information, analyze digital content, and expose malicious narratives effectively. Training covers the critical assessment of sources, geolocation analysis, and the authentication of multimedia content, such as images and videos. This focus has strengthened the capacity of Ukrainian media professionals to report accurately and debunk disinformation, creating further public trust in credible information sources and a more informed and resilient society.

Other International Best Practices

involves the creation of an interagency task force to combat the influence of false messaging on its democratic processes and enhance media literacy for students in high school. Germany has implemented several proactive strategies, specifically the , which both mandates social media platforms to remove illegal content such as hate speech and disinformation, ensuring accountability through penalties and transparency requirements.

Policy Recommendations for Canada

Digital and Media Literacy

1. National Media Literacy Curriculum

While curriculum development falls under provincial jurisdiction, Public Safety Canada, in coordination with Canadian Heritage and provincial partners, can support the development and implementation of a National Digital and Media Literacy Curriculum by funding awareness campaigns, developing outreach materials, and promoting shared standards for digital and media literacy education for elementary and high school students (K–12). Educating children early is essential, as young people are among the most active users of digital platforms and are frequently exposed to mis- and disinformation. Without the tools to critically evaluate online content, they are more vulnerable to manipulation, bias, and false narratives that can shape their worldview, decision-making, and trust in democratic institutions. Equipping students with the tools to critically assess the information they encounter is essential to building long-term societal resilience to disinformation. This curriculum would teach students to:

• Identify credible sources and distinguish between reliable and unreliable content.
• Verify facts and recognize manipulative narratives.
• Understand the mechanics of social media algorithms and their role in shaping information consumption, including the risks of echo chambers and bias.

Through practical exercises, such as analyzing news articles and debunking viral claims, students would gain real-world skills to combat disinformation. Teacher training and institutional support would be prioritized to ensure educators are equipped to handle evolving disinformation tactics. Provincial collaboration would facilitate the rollout of this curriculum nationwide.

2. Media Literacy National Toolkit

A Media Literacy National Toolkit could be developed to provide resources for the public. This toolkit would be accessible online and available in public libraries to ensure low-barrier access and inclusivity. Resources would include educational guides and workshops for librarians and staff to support community engagement, as well as materials to answer public inquiries and facilitate self-directed learning. The toolkit would be offered in both official languages, with accessibility features that meet the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines to ensure usability for individuals with visual, auditory, or cognitive impairments. The toolkit should also be available in Indigenous languages, such as Cree, Ojibway, Dene, Inuktitut, and Mi’kmaq, as well as other languages widely spoken across Canada, including Punjabi, Mandarin, Arabic, Tagalog, Spanish, and Ukrainian.

Including these languages from the outset would promote equitable access, strengthen public resilience, and help ensure that all Canadians are equipped with the tools needed to navigate today’s information environment. Expanding the toolkit’s reach in this way would also reduce reliance on siloed, one-time translation efforts and encourage a more integrated, inclusive approach to the Media Literacy National Toolkit. Delivery would require collaboration with provincial, territorial, and municipal partners, including library networks and community organizations, to ensure regional relevance and effective implementation.

This Canadian media literacy initiative would align with existing Canadian frameworks, such as the Digital Charter and provincial education standards. To ensure relevance, the curriculum and toolkit would include regular assessments and feedback from educators, students, and the public. Funding would be required for curriculum development, teacher training, the creation of the toolkit, and a public awareness campaign that would promote these resources, ensuring their widespread adoption and utilization.

Conclusion

While Canada has acknowledged the growing threat of disinformation, current efforts remain fragmented and inadequate to address its scale and complexity. Existing policy frameworks, awareness campaigns, and international partnerships have not yet been translated into integrated, sustained action. To strengthen national resilience, Canada must adopt a proactive, coordinated strategy grounded in international best practices. Key recommendations include implementing a National Media Literacy Curriculum, developing a Media Literacy Toolkit, and establishing a Centre for Media Integrity and Disinformation Resilience. Canada should also invest in Open-Source Intelligence training for journalists and deepen collaboration with international experts from Finland, Ukraine, Estonia, and Germany.

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