Introduction

On January 5th, 2026, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced the appointment of former Canadian Deputy Prime Minister and Member of Parliament, Chrystia Freeland, as Economic Advisor to the Office of the President of Ukraine. In a post on X, Zelenskyy stated, “Ukraine needs to strengthen its internal resilience – both for the sake of Ukraine’s recovery if diplomacy delivers results as swiftly as possible, and to reinforce our defence if, because of delays by our partners, it takes longer to bring this war to an end.” In the following days, Freeland confirmed she accepted President Zelenskyy’s appointment and that she would be resigning as a Member of Parliament, taking effect as of January 9th, 2026.

Freeland’s appointment as voluntary Economic Advisor to the Office of the President of Ukraine is being made against the larger and developing backdrop of ongoing diplomatic negotiations between the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the United States (US) to come to an agreed upon pathway to peace. This negotiation process continues to be arduous for Ukraine. It also comes alongside a deepening of foreign diplomatic relations between Canada and Ukraine under the Mark Carney government; this, coming on the back of Prime Minister Carney’s historical , where he stressed the end of the rules-based international order and hinted at the decline of American hegemony – a speech that have held to ultimately represent the beginning of a multipolar era in world politics.

In the coming months, the Eastern European and Transatlantic Network (EETN) will publish a series analyzing key developments shaping the war; these include prospective pathways to peace, ongoing diplomatic negotiations and tensions, and the shifting security and economic governance landscape in Ukraine. Freeland is an integral node among an emerging and vital network aimed at supporting Ukraine and its future as the anniversary of the full-scale invasion nears and passes. This series aims to make clear that Russia is not only engaged in a war of attrition so as to try to reclaim its great power status, but that Ukraine is increasingly prepared to respond to this war of attrition with strategies and methods of asymmetric and hybrid warfare. Ukraine is prepared to make the strategic, economic, and relational moves necessary to better guarantee its future, as well as its success on the battlefield and in diplomatic negotiations.

This first brief of the series reflects on Freeland’s appointment and builds upon an argument first offered by Ukrainian scholar Valeriia Gusieva, where she suggested that cultural resilience is a foundational pillar to security. I extend her argument here by suggesting that cultural resilience and situated experience are also crucial to sustaining a coherent and effective attritional war strategy – Freeland’s appointment, in this case, should be understood light through the lens of political habituation.

Chrystia Freeland: A Ukrainian-Canadian MP and Soviet War Crimes Researcher

Chrystia Freeland was born in Peace River, Alberta in 1968 to a Ukrainian mother and Canadian father. Though she formally entered Canadian federal politics in 2013, she is perhaps most known through her association with former Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and his government. Under Trudeau, Freeland was appointed to serve as Minister of International Trade in Trudeau’s cabinet. In this position, she was a key negotiator in the hard-fought Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) (which replaced the North American Free Trade Agreement, or NAFTA, in 2020), as well as the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with the European Union (EU) that was signed in 2016.

While it is fair to assume that many Western audiences are familiar with the whiplash antics of American President Donald Trump, who often combines “,” less well known are the tensions that characterized the negotiation process of CETA. As researchers , CETA encountered historical diplomatic tensions throughout its negotiation process: “This challenge becomes evident at various stages in the trade policy process, but it is most pronounced in the ratification of bilateral agreements, which require approval in all member states.”

On paper, arriving at CETA was through the bilateral process of negotiation between Canada and the EU; in reality, however, Freeland was situated in a much more difficult negotiating position. Because the subsequent ratification of CETA would require the approval of all EU member states, such a negotiating process proved to be a lesson for both Freeland and the European Commission, who was charged with ensuring the twenty-eight member states were in alignment. Indeed, as scholar Joris Larik , the alleged crisis of CETA negotiations soon became a “cautionary tale” about the “cumbersome and vulnerable EU treaty-making procedures, where internal politics and technical legal discussions detracted from the merits (or demerits) of the actual agreement.”

This became most visible through the tensions experienced with the Wallonia Parliament in Belgium, an autonomous regional government with veto power over EU trade deals. In late 2016, the Walloon government publicly rejected CETA, in part because of their worry that the trade deal would “.” Walloon regional minister-president, Paul Magnette, told reporters the following: “I don’t consider this as a funeral, I don’t consider this as a veto without any conditions. I consider this as a request to reopen negotiations so that European leaders could hear the legitimate demands which have been forcefully expressed by an organized, transparent civil society.” As Larik however, this crisis led to “profound internal reflections on EU trade policy, causing even a shift in the EU’s practice in concluding trade agreements.

It was largely in response to these tensions and apparent deadlock within Wallonia that Freeland made the public decision to walk out on CETA negotiations with our European allies. Following her decision, Freeland with Canadian journalists candidly: “It’s become evident for me, for Canada, that the European Union isn’t capable now to have an international treaty even with a country that has very European values like Canada. And even with a country so nice, with a lot of patience like Canada.” At the time, the move was taken by some in Canadian media as an “” response; Conservative critics in the House of Commons Freeland’s walk out as a “meltdown,” alleging she required “adult supervision” – language that carried clear sexist and gendered connotations. Still others this walk out is exactly what the negotiation process needed, as it eventually led to the signing of the trade agreement.

Reflecting on her CETA negotiation experience in 2026, Freeland the following about negotiating with European allies, which is worth quoting at-length here:

“You can sort of have two kinds of negotiations. Some negotiations start with a kind of win-win premise where the two parties come together wanting a deal, wanting to be friends, seeing each other as long-term partners, and they’ll disagree about stuff, but the negotiation is really about everyone working hard together to find the best possible landing zone. I would say �䲹�Բ��岹’s negotiations with the EU about our trade deal with Europe, CETA, were conducted in that way, and they were hard, right? … Our final slightly melodramatic moments in Namur, in Wallonia, you know, proceeded by moments in Vienna, in Germany, in the European Parliament. I mean, it was a long slog and there were lots of obstacles and there was some drama, but it was clear there was goodwill on all sides.”

In this interview, Freeland goes on to characterize how Trump falls into an alternative negotiation camp compared to that which characterized CETA; she the idea that the American President abides by the logic of a zero-sum game: “…when you are dealing with a party that has that kind of a view [zero-sum game logic] and that kind of an attitude, then I think you have to be very clear in your own mind about red lines. And you have to be very prepared to say, thus far and no further, we’re not gonna capitulate our approach.”

Freeland later went on to become �䲹�Բ��岹’s Minister of Finance in 2020, where she was responsible for introducing four federal budgets, including federal aid measures related to �䲹�Բ��岹’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic. She was the first woman to serve in this role, a fact that would later be considered by the as crucial in the decay of her relationship with Trudeau prior to his own resignation in late-2025.

Beyond her political career, Freeland’s academic and journalistic works span two decades and have drawn the ire of the Kremlin. While pursuing graduate studies in Russian history and literature at Harvard, where she was responsible for documenting and translating archival and investigative materials related to the – an unmarked, mass burial site used by the NKVD (the secret police of the Soviet Union) to dispose of executed dissidents and prisoners. It remains one of the largest mass burial sites in Ukraine, even Russia’s current invasion. Her research played a decisive role in debunking the Stalin-era myth that the executions were exclusively carried out by the Nazis during World War Two. This research eventually attracted the attention of the KGB – the main security agency of the Soviet Union – who then assigned Freeland the codename “Frida,” closely surveilling and building a case against her throughout the course of her study.

As a Canadian with Ukrainian heritage, Freeland has been among the most outspoken advocates for sustained Canadian support to Ukraine. In response, she is one of thirteen Canadian officials barred from entering Russia under retaliatory sanctions imposed by Vladimir Putin himself in 2014 and has been the target of various . Freeland has also faced public attacks from American President Donald Trump, who on several occasions has described her in disparaging terms, including “,” a “,” a “,” and an overall “.” From a feminist perspective, Freeland’s experience navigating such attacks underscores her familiarity with the gendered power dynamics employed by – an experience that may indeed prove to be a strategic asset in a war whose social construction and conduct are themselves . While much of international politics Freeland nonetheless works against the masculine grain in a pursuit of fair and just agreements and futures.

Contextualizing the Habituation of Freeland and Concluding Remarks

As this series continues to examine changes within President Zelenskyy’s inner circle in response to both Ukrainian domestic pressures and Russia’s growing attritional war strategy, I suggest that Freeland’s appointment as a voluntary Economic Advisor to Ukraine signals an awareness within Ukrainian leadership and its closest allies that responding to Russia’s attritional warfare in 2026 cannot be confined to military operations alone. No longer are we in an era where hard power capabilities are the only measure of a nation’s strength; the personal and personnel also matter.

Freeland will be an important figure to watch, particularly as it relates to dialogue between Ukrainian feminists and the pro-democracy movement – not because Freeland herself has expressed a desire to pursue a feminist agenda in Ukraine’s economic reconstruction, but because her presence reflects the often-implicit reality that gendered political experience shapes how the dynamics of endurance, credibility, and trust are produced and sustained in wartime economies. In a war of attrition, where authority is continuously reaffirmed under conditions of prolonged uncertainty, reputational attack, and economic strain, such situated experience becomes strategically relevant, I suggest, as a form of habituation to sustained delegitimization.

The notion of habituation draws from a long philosophical tradition – mostly commonly, Aristotelian ethics, where habituation (hexis) was used to refer to repeated exposure and practice from durable dispositions rather than momentary or instantaneous reaction. In contemporary political thought, philosophers and scholars inspired by phenomenologists such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty have upon this idea to explain how subjects develop capacities for political action through ongoing relational strain. In feminist ethics, habituation helps to explain how – often oppressed – actors learn to endure, navigate, and act within conditions of prolonged vulnerability, scrutiny, and marginalization over time. It moves beyond experience; it is an engaged and embodied vision and practice.

In an attritional war where legitimacy is not necessarily secured through fast-paced or singular victories but continually reproduced across various political, economic, and social structures, as well as through relations of alliance management and public trust, this mode of habituation takes on strategic significance. Indeed, for President Zelenskyy, it works in his favour to cultivate and incorporate actors habituated to sustained delegitimization because it acts as a shock absorber to the , partner unreliability in a so-called newly-founded “” world, and economic fatigue increasingly characterizing this phase of the war and ongoing occupation. The hope is that these hybrid shocks are absorbed by such a habituation without suffering from significant strategic drifts that may carry over into the battlefield.

, nations and militaries perceived to possess greater status and capabilities – that is, the greater of two powers – engage in warfare by attrition. Those familiar with Russia and the former Soviet Union’s historical record of aggression, occupation, interference, and war across Eastern Europe will also recognize this mode of warfare, perhaps all too familiarly. The Baltics, the Balkans, Poland, Chechnya, Georgia – they all know this playbook. The Russian Federation continues to seek what it perceives as its rightful seat at the table of great-power politics; even those of us who reject John J. Mearsheimer’s structuralist projections onto Eastern Europe as lying within a fixed Russian “sphere of influence” cannot ignore such an imperial desire percolating within the Russian state since the unipolar moment.

In attritional war, time is a previous resource. As Sun Tzu , prolonged conflict could be of great risk to either warring side, on account of exhausting the state apparatus, undermining domestic order and morale, and eroding strategic advantage; for him, military strategy was a subtle and complex technique whose success depended on minimizing the temporal risks and costs of war. While Sun Tzu viewed attritional war as a strategic failure, the work of military theorist and general requires us to remember that wars of attrition often emerge as a political condition over time, shaped by friction, uncertainty, and an overall inability to achieve decisive political outcomes. What Ukraine demonstrates to the international community, this series aims to show, is that Russia’s apparent great power strategy grounded in attrition – like empire itself – can burn out.

It is by sources close to both Freeland and Prime Minister Carney that Freeland received Zelenskyy’s offer on December 22nd, 2025; by December 24th, she had shared with the Prime Minister her intentions to leave Canadian parliament to join the Ukrainian team. In responding to the Kremlin’s continued war of attrition, concerns beyond immediate hard power capabilities, military strategy, and command structures must be addressed. Freeland possesses a unique form of habituation to sustain delegitimation; her appointment may indeed be an important shock absorber to Russia’s ongoing disinformation campaigns, American partner unreliability, and the economic fatigue increasingly characterizing this war.

At the level of a broader wartime strategy, I suggest this capacity can also function as a form of resilience; it signals to communities, civil society, international partners, and adversaries alike that broader Ukraine’s leadership is prepared to govern through a liminal phase of uncertain futurity rather than govern toward a rapid endpoint. This is a strategy in stark contrast to Putin’s assumption that a “quick military operation” could sweep Ukraine in 2022, or that , once elected, could end the war in Ukraine in the first 24-hours of his second term. In this sense, it is important to emphasize that habituation is not merely an individual trait or disposition, but also a culturally sedimented capacity that is experienced transnationally and relationally. As Gusieva has argued, cultural resilience constitutes a foundational pillar of security; indeed, classical realist how such resilience at times is what pushes a nation beyond survival towards victory. I extend this logic here by suggesting that such cultural resilience is forged through repeated exposure to, and embeddedness within, enduring imperial projects and traditionalist military practices – in this case, namely, Russia’s ongoing attempts to reclaim imperial-great power status, legitimate its occupations, and sustain attritional warfare alongside its hybrid threats towards Europe.

In Ukraine, cultural habituation operates as resilience, but it is neither neutral nor abstract; rather, its experience is deeply racialized, ethnicized, and gendered. It is racialized and ethnicized through the persistent positioning of the nation as materially peripheral to Europe while cast as subordinate to Russia’s so-called historical sphere of influence; it is gendered through the paternalizing narratives directed at Ukraine and other Eastern European states aspiring to EU membership, as well as in the recurring trope of Ukraine as the “little brother” to a masculinized “Mother Russia.” More specifically, we see this reproduced through the hegemonically masculine practices embodied by state actors in political negotiations of economic and security matters; these behaviours continue to structure much of how political negotiation, listening, and diplomatic exchange take place. Freeland, in this respect, is a node within a broader relational structure of habituation and diplomatic practice in wartime Ukraine – one whose own political endurance aligns with, and stands to reinforce, Ukraine’s culturally embedded capacity to govern through attrition.

Please stay tuned for the next installment of this series, which will analyze Ukraine’s 2025 energy scandal and subsequent political moves undertaken President Zelenskyy following a state investigation that exposed high-level embezzlement within the nation’s energy sector.

The post Habituation in War: The Appointment of Chrystia Freeland as a Node in Ukraine’s Attritional War Strategy appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

�䲹�Բ��岹’s national strategy is undergoing a fundamental transformation. Great power competition, technological change, and hybrid tactics have reshaped the nature of modern conflict, blurring the boundaries between domestic stability and external security. States today face pressure not only to deter conventional military threats but also to address challenges that primarily affect civilian societies. represents an attempt to strengthen national resilience by integrating investments in defence capacity, critical infrastructure, and domestic military industrial capability. Yet these measures unfold against a backdrop of worsening socioeconomic pressures at home, leaving the country exposed to domestic destabilization even as defence spending rises. The convergence of external threats and internal vulnerabilities reveals that national security can no longer be understood solely through the lens of military preparedness. National security today requires a hybrid-resilience approach, combining military readiness and social cohesion to address threats.

Strategic Context and Security Challenges

�䲹�Բ��岹’s outlines a strategic approach to increasing adept at dealing with amidst the . By integrating , , and , Canada is trying to become a more autonomous nation. Simultaneously, addressing Canadian domestic security necessities through investment and nation-building projects will help . With Canada joining the EU’s defence procurement initiative, , Canadian defence firms gain access to European joint procurement and finance mechanisms.

As the United States (US), �䲹�Բ��岹’s traditional security guarantor, increasingly focuses on the Indo-Pacific and signals a reduced willingness to underwrite transatlantic stability, Canada is . Yet contemporary risk environments are defined not only by but also by , including , , and . Addressing these threats requires a multidimensional security posture that integrates physical, technological, and societal components. The budget’s allocation toward , , and developing underscores a commitment to and strategic autonomy. Investments in advanced technologies such as , , and further demonstrate recognition that modern security extends beyond traditional military capability, encompassing both technological resilience and the protection of critical industrial and information networks.

However, amidst a growing “” dilemma, in which defence imperatives compete with mounting domestic socioeconomic pressures, Canadian security challenges are complex. Socioeconomic vulnerabilities, , , , and , interact with traditional and hybrid security threats, creating interdependent risks. 

CAF Readiness and Personnel Support

Critical to a hybrid-resilient approach is developing the strength and readiness of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). Addressing hard-security concerns requires not only modern capabilities but also ensuring that CAF personnel are supported, retained, and operationally effective. Retention is a significant concern, with of new members leaving service, highlighting the need for , , and an enhanced . The recent are a step in the right direction, but additional investments in housing, , and are essential. Equally important are mental-health services, which have been consistently and who face the cumulative stresses of operations, repeated deployments, and long-term service.

At the same time, �䲹�Բ��岹’s defence procurement system continues to face relating to personnel shortages and a multi-departmental model. While the Ministry of Public Services and Procurement invests in high-profile platforms such as and , – including , , and – receives insufficient attention from the federal government. The most recent audit by the (2025) found that as of March 31, 2024, many training areas had less gear than needed, while others did not have enough equipment to carry out training operations.

More transparent and accountable procurement processes are needed to ensure that frontline personnel have reliable, effective tools to perform their duties safely and efficiently. Strengthening both personnel support and procurement effectiveness not only enhances operational readiness but also integrates material and human resource stability into a broader national resilience framework, complementing community-level and social initiatives to counter hybrid threats.

Socioeconomic Pressures and Domestic Security Concerns

Although the federal budget , the and the limited attention to worsening social crises leave Canada vulnerable to further destabilisation, populism, and societal polarisation. For many young people facing , military service can appear to be one of the few . A recent analysis by highlights that �䲹�Բ��岹’s youth face some of the toughest labour-market conditions in decades, making enlistment in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) a possible remedy for the youth unemployment crisis. This pattern echoes the , which has long been criticised for disproportionately drawing in economically disadvantaged youth, effectively creating pathways into the armed forces driven less by choice and more by necessity. 

Such dynamics also raise serious domestic security concerns: far-right networks have, in documented cases, encouraged members to or sought contact with as a means of acquiring and . Compounding this trend is the in Canada- particularly common among young men- which increasingly identify as a potential gateway into broader extremist ideologies. Without sufficient attention to these online spaces, the risk posed by vulnerable youth becoming radicalised and incentivised to join the military becomes a serious concern for domestic security and the protection of liberal-democratic values.

Growing separatist movements, particularly in and , highlight regional discontent and political polarisation, which can interact with socioeconomic vulnerabilities and be exploited by both domestic and foreign actors seeking to exacerbate societal fractures. These dynamics intersect with broader socioeconomic pressures and are further amplified by hybrid threats and foreign interference, which serve to exploit domestic polarisation through strategies titled “” 
Integrating with defence and technological investments is central to a . International examples, such as , demonstrate how initiatives that strengthen , media literacy, and can meaningfully complement traditional security capabilities. For Canada, public-awareness efforts like the campaign, which brings together over fifty feminist organisations to advocate for , , and , help address the socioeconomic stresses and political grievances that make communities vulnerable to polarisation and manipulation. 

Additionally, coordinated programs commissioned by the federal government, such as the (CRF) and the (DCI), linking defence, industrial strategy, and social resilience not only enhance the country’s ability to detect, withstand, and recover from hybrid threats but also reinforce national cohesion. In this sense, investing in social stability is not an adjunct to national security but a foundational component of it: strengthening communities, reducing socioeconomic vulnerabilities, and empowering citizens collectively contribute to a more unified, resilient society capable of withstanding increasingly complex threat environments.

Towards a Hybrid-Resilient Canada

�䲹�Բ��岹’s security landscape in the twenty-first century is defined by the convergence of traditional military threats, hybrid challenges, and domestic vulnerabilities. As this analysis demonstrates, a comprehensive approach to national resilience cannot rely solely on modernising the Canadian Armed Forces or expanding technological and industrial capabilities. Socioeconomic pressures, including youth unemployment, housing insecurity, and political polarisation, interact with hybrid threats, creating opportunities for extremist mobilisation, disinformation, and foreign interference. Social spending is not a competing priority in an era of heightened geopolitical tension; it is a core element of national defence.

By investing in social programs, community resilience initiatives, and public-awareness campaigns like Demand Better, Canada addresses these underlying vulnerabilities while simultaneously strengthening civic trust, cohesion, and adaptability. When combined with targeted defence investments and technological modernisation, such measures create a multidimensional, hybrid-resilient framework capable of withstanding both internal and external pressures. Social spending and citizen support are not peripheral to national security; they are at the very heart of it. A Canada that invests in the well-being of its people is not only more equitable and inclusive but also more unified, adaptable, and resilient in the face of modern conflict.

The post From Defence to Community – Social Stability as a Pillar of National Security appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

● Russia has been testing and refining hybrid tactics in the Balkans since the 2010s

● Hybrid tactics prey on ethnic divisions, political instability, and encourage hostility towards the West

● Russia’s tactics have increased their soft power, making it easier for malign actors to destabilize Europe

Russia’s unconventional threats

Hybrid threats have become an increasingly pervasive aspect of the global security landscape. Since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Russian Federation has been a key instigator of hybrid attacks, launching disinformation and propaganda campaigns, offensive cyber operations, espionage, and attacks on critical infrastructure. In Ukraine, hybrid tactics act as a force multiplier for traditional combat. Such hybrid tactics seek to weaponize divisions between social groups; the government and citizens; as well as economic and structural weaknesses to undermine faith in the systems, norms, and values of Western countries. By eroding public trust and exploiting weaknesses in target countries, societies are becoming more susceptible to internal vulnerability and Russian influence.

One area that has been a target of hybrid tactics is the Western Balkans. A critical juncture between West and East, the Balkans have been an area of competing ideology and cultural influence; it is also a region with a multitude of divisions for Russia to exploit. The repeated use of threats and fanning of tensions may imply a desire to stoke regional conflict, which could divide and disorder Europe. Much of Russia’s connection to the area is rooted in , which in the worst case scenario, could invite further expansionist ambitions into the region. Russia has largely implemented hybrid warfare tactics in places where they can leverage the most historical and cultural connections: Serbia; Republika Srpska; Montenegro; and North Macedonia (Slavic population).

Proxy Political Actors

Since the 2010s, Russia has been developing and testing clear methods of direct interference in political systems. Their primary tactic is backing ultranationalist and populist political figures. This includes the VMRO-DPMNE party in North Macedonia, which is a pro-Russian right-wing party. They have amplified , including the Macedonian naming dispute regarding . In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Milorad Dodik has been a strong pro-Kremlin force in the region, advocating for the secession of Republika Srpska, the Serbian-dominated enclave in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Russia recently used the in an effort to condemn Western influence in the region. In Serbia, Kremlin-backed politicians have historically been influential. , appointed to Parliament in 2024, President Aleksander Vučić has also frequently been accused of succumbing to Russia influence, though in the Serbian-Russian bilateral relationship remain notable. Russia’s use of state proxy actors is an effective way to ensure that the developing democratic systems in these countries remain divided and fragile. These actors are effective at preventing cooperation and often incite violent and polarizing rhetoric.

Non-political proxy actors

Russia has also refined its hybrid tactics through the exploitation of religious and cultural ties. The Russian Federation has deep and historical ties with the Orthodox Church, an integral part of daily life and culture in many Balkan countries. Pro-Kremlin oligarchs provide financial support to the Church and its charitable works. In return, moves towards democracy are framed as immoral Western decadence, which destroys traditional culture. The Orthodox Church has frequently opposed sovereignty and democracy for Montenegro and Kosovo, framing it as a threat to pan-Slavic identity. This rhetoric maintains tensions around territory, making peace more fragile. Cultural associations, mainly in Serbia, serve to disseminate propaganda among everyday citizens and cement Russian opinions. . Since the group was dismantled, the fate of criminal recruiting networks remains unclear. Another famous example is the . Cultural and educational programs throughout the region promote Russian language and ideology. This primes citizens to be more susceptible to Russian narratives and propaganda, increasing the effectiveness of hybrid tactics. Russia’s actions in the Balkans demonstrates its ability to leverage indirect, soft forms of influence.

Digital Landscape

Russia has been able to effectively weaponize social media and news outlets throughout the Balkans. Primarily, these efforts are targeted towards Serbian audiences. News outlets are flooded with Russian disinformation and propaganda. . The site itself is accessible to a wide audience, filling information voids with inflammatory stories. Many popular local news outlets – not tied to Russia – often repost such information as well. Disinformation portrays the West as weak, reinvigorating controversial memories such as the 1999 NATO bombings, and overstating regional conflicts. Outlets like , , and consistently regurgitate this messaging. Russia also leverages social media platforms like Telegram to further its disinformation campaign. Rybar, a pro-Russian channel, recently posted information regarding the joint special exercise between Albania, Croatia, and Kosovo. It claimed that this was evidence of an axis being formed by the West. Dozens of local Serbian channels reposted this information, inciting panic and paranoia about ethnic tensions.

Conclusion

Russia’s moves in the Western Balkans demonstrates its intentions to destabilize Europe from multiple fronts in the east, while simultaneously waging war in Ukraine This can divide the attention and resources of European nations, which improve the success of Russia’s strategic ambitions. For years, malign influence has penetrated the region, as noted in NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept. NATO should build on their outlined commitment and empower the region to become more resilient to hybrid threats.

Policy Recommendations

● Existing institutions and developmental frameworks should be buttressed by NATO to support democracy-building in the region

● Canada should support resilience and democratic stability by developing bilateral ties via NGO, diplomatic, and economic partnerships.

● Individuals, companies, centres, and associations who undermine democracy and encourage pro-Russian beliefs should be appropriately identified and restricted.

The post Russia’s Hybrid War in the Balkans appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

In a post on X (formerly known as Twitter), current German Chancellor Friedrich Merz stated the following: “.” Just a few short weeks later, in a posted on YouTube with Hungary’s news outlet, former German Chancellor Angela Merkel spoke about her experience in June 2021 when she and French President Emmanuel Macron had floated the idea of the EU holding direct talks with Vladimir Putin in an effort to calm re-ignited tensions with Ukraine. However, at that time, COVID-19 was given as the reason for preventing more frequent dialogue with Russia, which Merkel felt was crucial to ensuring that the be upheld.

In this new interview, Merkel revealed that it was in fact the Baltic states and Poland who were against such initiatives, and then claimed that “” Clearly, such a statement aims to manipulate memory for strategic purposes by placing significant blame on the Baltic states and Poland in the lead-up to the war, while also suggesting that Merkel herself had been serving as a peace-making actor, playing no role in empowering Russia to take such aggressive actions.

The reaction to Merkel’s comments was near instant. For example, Estonian foreign minister Margus Tsahkna responded that Merkel was “” and that instead of strongly responding to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, or its war in Georgia, . Another example of the outrage initiated by Merkel’s comments was captured by Poland’s Minister for Regional Policy, Katarzyna Pełczyńska-Nałęcz (former Polish Ambassador to Russia), who stated that being blamed for starting a war because they “.”

Why say it, and why say it there?

In short, Merkel argues about process in order to justify and defend her legacy and relations with Russia during her time as Chancellor, which focused on fostering “” – including sanctions, Minsk diplomacy, and energy interdependence as a ‘bridge’ with strategic intentions. This political approach is . Merkel’s casting of 2021 as a sort of missed off-ramp shifts focus from Berlin’s (and Merkel’s) long-term bet on engagement with Russia to an Eastern European veto that indirectly led to the war in Ukraine in the first place. Similarly, this mimics the theme that ‘,’ which politicians such as US President Donald Trump tend to employ as a discursive strategy. Legally and morally, the aggressor is Russia. What Merkel’s storytelling does is recast the focus on the intra-EU process of who blocked talks, rather than on the actor who chose invasion over dialogue. This narrative also directly undermines EU unity against Russia’s aggression, .

The venue of this interview further amplifies the political impact on EU unity. The that operates within a highly polarized media ecosystem, which placed . Additionally, alongside being the second lowest among EU member states in this index, recent reports indicate that Prime Minister Victor Orbán and his allies have consolidated control over around 80% of the press media in Hungary.The �ʲ����پ���á�� is hardly a mouthpiece for Budapest, but it is undoubtedly interesting that such an interview would come from the EU member state most often associated with strategic ambiguity in its relations with Moscow. It is worth noting, however, that during the same interview, when asked whether Orbán was a Trojan horse for Putin into the EU, Merkel simply stated that this propagated idea was “.” As placed in Hungary’s polarized media space, the Merkel clip conveys intra-EU blame, further testing cohesion by muddying the EU’s message to Moscow.

For the Baltics and Poland, the was both a threat and signal test. As the Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda warned, engaging in dialogue with Putin without tangible changes in Russian behaviour would send “” that the EU was placating Russia’s actions. Hosting summits without leverage and making agreements without cost or constraints creates an opportunity for Russia to further normalize coercion and potentially foster coalition-splitting rather than deterring it. Viewed in this light, the disapproval in 2021 from Poland and the Baltics was not obstructionism but rather a and a fear for potentially being the next target of Russia’s aggression.

An inconvenient backdrop

There is a reason Eastern Europe balks at Merkel’s ‘if only we had talked more’ sentiments. For three decades, Germany’s policy towards Russia combined binding and deterrence through sanctions and Minsk diplomacy, alongside a dense web of commercial, energy, and even security-based ties. , or the , where a German prime military contractor supplying high-end training systems to a Russian arms centre was . Only after the annexation of Crimea did Berlin entirely revoke the license. The cancellation showed that routine cooperation between Germany and Russia had been institutionalized even after Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008.

The EU’s own briefings on Nord Stream 2 noted that it , which led to debates and arguments from Poland, for example, , as well as broader concerns that Russia was using such initiatives to . Angela Merkel had reiterated to partners, and more specifically to Kyiv, that , despite being seemingly immune to the suggestion that Russia would, in fact, use energy as a tool to achieve its political interests in Europe.

Schröder, the useful contrast

Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, Merkel’s predecessor, moved straight into Russian energy after his time leading Germany, first chairing (the European-Russian pipeline company), then later joining the board of Rosneft (a state-owned Russian oil company), from which he under mounting political pressure. Additionally, Schröder had flirted with a ; however, , which was later stripped of a taxpayer-funded office by the Bundestag, prompting him to navigate the German court system to regain his office. However, the courts upheld his loss of privileges.

Merkel, by contrast, has not taken any corporate posts from Russian-based firms. However, her entanglement with Moscow is apparent through her narrative in the interview which re-allocates the burden of the war within the EU. This reframing serves two distinct purposes: The first is directly shifting any accountability for the complex situation Europe currently finds itself in with Russia, and the second, more indirectly, serves Russian hybrid tactics that seek to and as the .

What now?

Merkel’s interview works less as revisionism and more as a redistribution of memory, agency, and what she believes that EU unity should have resulted in during that time. It invites a tempting but counterfactual narrative that is ultimately counterproductive: that one more conversation might have ‘saved the day’ if only the Easterners had not blocked it. The empirical record – from Mulino to Nord Stream – suggests the opposite. That being said, diplomacy only works when backed by credible costs; absent that, it enables coercion. The lesson Europe should take is that the Baltics and Poland were cautious, given their historical understanding of Russia as a political actor, but were not outright fearful of dialogue with Moscow. If Europe shifts its focus to who blocked what talks and actions, it risks falling into the very divisions and tensions that Moscow seeks to foster.

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Executive Summary

This policy memo evaluates �䲹�Բ��岹’s current measures to combat disinformation, identifies key gaps, and proposes policy options to address such gaps by drawing upon international best practices from Finland, Ukraine, Estonia, and Germany. The analysis offers evidence-based recommendations tailored to �䲹�Բ��岹’s context, including implementing a National Media Literacy Curriculum, creating a Media Literacy Toolkit, and establishing a Centre for Strategic Communications to monitor and counter disinformation. It is also recommended that Canada invest in OSINT training for journalists and expand international collaboration with experts from Finland, Ukraine, and Estonia.

Background

presents a to �䲹�Բ��岹’s national security, public trust, and democratic integrity. State-sponsored actors, , use digital platforms to manipulate public discourse, spread false narratives, and deepen polarisation within Canadian society. Other foreign actors, including , , and , have also engaged in disinformation activities targeting Canada. �䲹�Բ��岹’s open democracy and advanced digital infrastructure make it an appealing target for these campaigns, necessitating the need for a coordinated, strategic response. Effectively addressing these challenges will require close collaboration across all levels of government, including provincial and territorial partners, given their responsibilities in education, community services, and public engagement.

To date, Canada has taken steps to address disinformation through led by Public Safety Canada, the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), the Department of National Defence (DND), and Global Affairs Canada (GAC), including the , the , and the . However, these efforts fail to address the complexity and scale of evolving disinformation tactics. To address these challenges, Canada requires a cohesive, proactive strategy that integrates these efforts while adapting best practices from international leaders such as Finland, Ukraine, Estonia, and Germany, which have developed effective, forward-looking approaches to countering disinformation through national education strategies, coordinated communications, digital literacy, and interagency cooperation.

Why Current Efforts are Insufficient

Despite these initiatives, �䲹�Բ��岹’s response to disinformation remains ;

• Educational initiatives are either absent or limited to specific schools, with no standardized or compulsory approach nationwide.
• Existing programs operate independently, across different levels of government, leading to inefficiencies and missed opportunities for collaboration.
• Canada lacks a centralized unit to monitor and respond to disinformation campaigns as they unfold, a gap exploited by foreign actors.

International Best Practices in Disinformation Response

Finland:

Finland is for its effective counter-disinformation strategies, which are grounded in a . This approach combines cross-sector collaboration, the integration of digital literacy into public education, and public trust. Finland’s whole-of-society engagement is supported by a strong tradition of media literacy and institutional transparency, resulting in a society highly resilient to disinformation.

1. Finland’s Cross-sector Collaboration: The Finnish government collaborates with private companies, civil society, academia, and media to combat disinformation. Government task forces made up of government officials, experts, and researchers .

2. Finland’s Mandatory Media Literacy in Public Education: Digital and media literacy is integral to Finland’s counter-disinformation efforts and has been made a . This education begins as early as primary school, , and continues throughout students’ academic journeys. The curriculum focuses on critical thinking, source evaluation, and recognizing media bias. Beyond schools, libraries serve as hubs for public education, offering resources and training to adults and seniors. Non-governmental organizations and local leaders also play an active role in outreach, ensuring broad accessibility to these tools and skills across the community.

Ukraine:

Ukraine in countering disinformation, particularly when sustaining information warfare from Russia. By leveraging , Ukraine empowers journalists and the public to identify and combat false narratives effectively.

1. Centre for Strategic Communications and Information Security: leads national efforts to counter disinformation and information warfare. The centre analyzes disinformation trends, crafts counter-narratives, and disseminates accurate information to combat malign propaganda, especially from Russia. Working in collaboration with government agencies, organizations, and international partners, the centre also promotes media literacy, equipping citizens with tools to recognize and resist false narratives.

2. Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) Training for Journalists: Ukraine has prioritized extensive training in . These enable professionals to verify information, analyze digital content, and expose malicious narratives effectively. Training covers the critical assessment of sources, geolocation analysis, and the authentication of multimedia content, such as images and videos. This focus has strengthened the capacity of Ukrainian media professionals to report accurately and debunk disinformation, creating further public trust in credible information sources and a more informed and resilient society.

Other International Best Practices

involves the creation of an interagency task force to combat the influence of false messaging on its democratic processes and enhance media literacy for students in high school. Germany has implemented several proactive strategies, specifically the , which both mandates social media platforms to remove illegal content such as hate speech and disinformation, ensuring accountability through penalties and transparency requirements.

Policy Recommendations for Canada

Digital and Media Literacy

1. National Media Literacy Curriculum

While curriculum development falls under provincial jurisdiction, Public Safety Canada, in coordination with Canadian Heritage and provincial partners, can support the development and implementation of a National Digital and Media Literacy Curriculum by funding awareness campaigns, developing outreach materials, and promoting shared standards for digital and media literacy education for elementary and high school students (K–12). Educating children early is essential, as young people are among the most active users of digital platforms and are frequently exposed to mis- and disinformation. Without the tools to critically evaluate online content, they are more vulnerable to manipulation, bias, and false narratives that can shape their worldview, decision-making, and trust in democratic institutions. Equipping students with the tools to critically assess the information they encounter is essential to building long-term societal resilience to disinformation. This curriculum would teach students to:

• Identify credible sources and distinguish between reliable and unreliable content.
• Verify facts and recognize manipulative narratives.
• Understand the mechanics of social media algorithms and their role in shaping information consumption, including the risks of echo chambers and bias.

Through practical exercises, such as analyzing news articles and debunking viral claims, students would gain real-world skills to combat disinformation. Teacher training and institutional support would be prioritized to ensure educators are equipped to handle evolving disinformation tactics. Provincial collaboration would facilitate the rollout of this curriculum nationwide.

2. Media Literacy National Toolkit

A Media Literacy National Toolkit could be developed to provide resources for the public. This toolkit would be accessible online and available in public libraries to ensure low-barrier access and inclusivity. Resources would include educational guides and workshops for librarians and staff to support community engagement, as well as materials to answer public inquiries and facilitate self-directed learning. The toolkit would be offered in both official languages, with accessibility features that meet the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines to ensure usability for individuals with visual, auditory, or cognitive impairments. The toolkit should also be available in Indigenous languages, such as Cree, Ojibway, Dene, Inuktitut, and Mi’kmaq, as well as other languages widely spoken across Canada, including Punjabi, Mandarin, Arabic, Tagalog, Spanish, and Ukrainian.

Including these languages from the outset would promote equitable access, strengthen public resilience, and help ensure that all Canadians are equipped with the tools needed to navigate today’s information environment. Expanding the toolkit’s reach in this way would also reduce reliance on siloed, one-time translation efforts and encourage a more integrated, inclusive approach to the Media Literacy National Toolkit. Delivery would require collaboration with provincial, territorial, and municipal partners, including library networks and community organizations, to ensure regional relevance and effective implementation.

This Canadian media literacy initiative would align with existing Canadian frameworks, such as the Digital Charter and provincial education standards. To ensure relevance, the curriculum and toolkit would include regular assessments and feedback from educators, students, and the public. Funding would be required for curriculum development, teacher training, the creation of the toolkit, and a public awareness campaign that would promote these resources, ensuring their widespread adoption and utilization.

Conclusion

While Canada has acknowledged the growing threat of disinformation, current efforts remain fragmented and inadequate to address its scale and complexity. Existing policy frameworks, awareness campaigns, and international partnerships have not yet been translated into integrated, sustained action. To strengthen national resilience, Canada must adopt a proactive, coordinated strategy grounded in international best practices. Key recommendations include implementing a National Media Literacy Curriculum, developing a Media Literacy Toolkit, and establishing a Centre for Media Integrity and Disinformation Resilience. Canada should also invest in Open-Source Intelligence training for journalists and deepen collaboration with international experts from Finland, Ukraine, Estonia, and Germany.

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Russia’s war in Ukraine has fueled political radicalization in Latvia with far-reaching implications for national security. This policy brief examines how radical attitudes and behaviours have evolved in Latvia’s society – particularly online – under the influence of Russian propaganda, disinformation, and cyber operations since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022.

 Latvia, in response to Russia’s aggression and anxiety regarding its shared border, has embarked on a set of to secure national security and decouple from the Soviet past. These consisted of extensive , humanitarian, and to Ukraine, securing the national information space and shaping historical memory. The Latvian government has taken steps to prohibit and related online sites. and symbols have been removed from public places. While these efforts were done in the name of preserving Latvian sovereignty, they also , many of whom perceived this as an attempt to rewrite history.

Thus, Latvia faces a risk of radicalization among specific segments of its population as a direct and indirect consequence of Russia’s hybrid warfare. Hybrid threats have been systematically used to deepen societal cleavages and foment extremist sentiments. The Russian-speaking community (making up slightly more than one-third of Latvia’s population) is a target of Kremlin propaganda, wherein Latvia is framed as “Russophobic”, thus allowing Russia to spread its narratives among these populations.

This trend threatens Latvia’s internal security and has an added strategic security dimension as a polarized and unstable Latvia, a key NATO member, would benefit Russia and its efforts to undermine the solidarity of the NATO Alliance.

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Introduction

On March 3^rd, 2025, the United States temporarily paused all intelligence sharing with Ukraine. This decision marked a significant shift in U.S. foreign policy and has immediate consequences for both Ukraine’s battlefield capabilities and broader NATO intelligence coordination. , which appeared to be a strategic effort by the Trump administration to pressure Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the time to . 

On March 11^th, 2025, , lifting the suspension on military aid and intelligence sharing. This came after Ukraine signalled openness to a 30-day ceasefire with Russia, pending Russian agreement, during talks in Saudi Arabia. While the ceasefire could be extended by mutual agreement, its implementation remains contingent on Russian participation. The U.S. has communicated that Russian reciprocity is essential for achieving peace, but this event demonstrates the extent to which intelligence support can be used as leverage. It further raises questions about the long-term reliability of U.S. assistance and whether similar pauses could occur in the future.   

Key Developments

The temporary interruption of U.S. intelligence sharing had a greater immediate impact on Ukraine’s operational effectiveness than the recent reduction in U.S. weapons transfers. Contrary to some assumptions, of Ukraine’s imported military equipment comes from the U.S., with now being produced domestically. While losing access to weapons flows is a challenge, losing intelligence was far more damaging. Intelligence sharing has been central to Ukraine’s ability to counter Russian numerical and logistical advantages.  

Other NATO countries possess intelligence capabilities but have traditionally relied on U.S. intelligence leadership within the alliance. The suspension may disrupt Ukraine’s long-term ability to target Russian logistics and troop movements effectively.  

The U.S. decision has among key security partners, including Five Eyes nations (Canada, UK, Australia, New Zealand) and Middle Eastern allies (Israel, Saudi Arabia), regarding both intelligence leaks and potential Russian infiltration of sensitive data. Some are reassessing intelligence-sharing agreements with the U.S.  

Implications

For Ukraine: The pause of U.S. intelligence sharing and satellite imagery Ukraine’s ability to conduct precision strikes and track Russian movements. Ukrainian forces rely heavily on , which were severely impacted by the intelligence pause. If U.S. intelligence were withdrawn again, Ukraine would struggle to maintain operational mobility, giving Russian forces an opportunity to capitalize on their numerical superiority. 

For NATO and Allies: The pause of U.S. intelligence sharing about the reliability of U.S. security commitments. U.S. SIGINT and satellite intelligence have played a dominant role in NATO operations, and their absence left Ukraine exposed. Other NATO countries have intelligence capabilities but were not positioned to fill the gap left by the U.S. The Five Eyes partners are now , wary of the possibility that the U.S. could make similar moves in the future. 

For Russia: The pause of U.S. intelligence sharing provided a , allowing its forces to operate with less risk of being targeted by Ukrainian precision strikes. Another such a pause could permit Russia to exploit the intelligence gap to increase pressure on Ukrainian defences. A further possibility is that the U.S. might eventually extend intelligence-sharing agreements to Russia, either as a negotiating tool or as part of a broader realignment.  

Conclusion

The suspension and subsequent restoration of U.S. intelligence support to Ukraine has demonstrated the fragility of Ukraine’s reliance on U.S. intelligence in the future. While intelligence sharing has resumed, this incident demonstrated that the U.S. is willing to cut off Ukraine from critical intelligence flows in pursuit of American foreign policy objectives.  

NATO allies, particularly Five Eyes members, must now work to close intelligence-sharing gaps in anticipation of future U.S. policy shifts. Ukraine must also strengthen its domestic intelligence capabilities and deepen European intelligence partnerships to reduce dependence on U.S. intelligence flows. At the same time, concerns remain about other strategic vulnerabilities. For example, there has been ongoing speculation that Elon Musk might limit Ukraine’s access to Starlink, which has been instrumental for Ukrainian military communications. Ultimately, this event has reinforced a key lesson that Ukraine and its allies must prepare for unpredictability in U.S. foreign policy.  

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By: Albina Holokhvastova

Trump’s recent shift away from supporting Ukraine has led to the country’s exclusion from the latest peace negotiations aimed at ending the war. This development shows the importance of narratives as strategic guidelines and the impact that their weaponization can have on major policy decisions. 

In today’s geopolitical landscape, narratives are not just stories; they are strategic tools that shape public opinion and guide strategic policies. Both government and non-government actors play a critical role in the development and promotion of these narratives by selectively presenting information in a way that supports their position. This is the essence of the weaponization of narratives. 

The dramatic shift in US support for Ukraine under the new Trump administration illustrates how narratives have real effects on major policy decisions. In this case, the shift from US support for Ukraine’s fight against Russian aggression to adopting a more ambiguous position on the causes of the war have led to the exclusion of Ukraine in peace talks between the US and Russia. 

In Ukraine, government officials and independent media, including The Kyiv Independent, have condemned Ukraine’s exclusion from these talks. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has warned that any pathway to peace conducted without Ukraine’s direct involvement is unacceptable, emphasizing that Ukraine must be at the forefront of any negotiations, declaring “nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine.” Without Ukraine at the negotiation table, any settlements reached could result in a disadvantageous ceasefire, leaving Ukraine vulnerable to further concessions that may compromise its national security and territorial integrity. Ukraine’s position in the war has been undercut by the United States’ narrative shift from Biden to Trump and could result in real effects on Ukrainian sovereignty and security if it does not gain a seat at the negotiating table. 

Conversely, Russian state media, particularly Russia Today (RT), has praised Trump’s narrative and has framed the talks as a diplomatic victory. The Kremlin’s own narrative portray NATO and Ukraine as the aggressors in the war, claiming that it was forced to act against this aggression in order to defend Russian minority groups in Ukraine. The exclusion of Ukraine and European NATO Allies from the peace talks, as well as Trump’s recent comments labelling Zelenskyy as a “dictator” serve to legitimize Russia’s narrative and reinforce its position by portraying Western security commitments as provocative rather than stabilizing. By lending support to Russia’s narrative, the United States could embolden Russia to continue its aggressive actions in Eastern Europe, thus bringing about new challenges for NATO in its ability to uphold European security.  

Across the NATO Alliance and in Canada in particular, various government and media outlets have raised alarms over Trump’s ambiguous stance toward Putin, warning that it undermines the cohesion of Western security policies and weakens the moral clarity needed to confront Russian aggression.  The framing of these discussions continues to evolve with broader concerns about foreign interference and disinformation. Canadian media, particularly Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, has also framed the peace talks alongside broader concerns about foreign interference and disinformation. As a result, Canada has expressed its commitment to safeguarding its information space and upholding democratic institutions. 

The US-Russia peace talks demonstrate how a weaponization of narratives can result in real changes to the outcomes of a conflict. These developments also show the importance of information warfare in modern conflict. 

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Disinformation and Media Framing of the Trump-Putin Talks and Their Impact on Ukraine appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.