As Canada looks to build a renewed vision of sovereignty and economic independence – divorced from the influence, reliance, and hegemony of the United States (US) – the nation is increasingly seeking foreign capital to develop an economically viable Canada for tomorrow. The urgent need to develop a sovereign wealth fund – the – is the structural result of the . In a bid to attract capital and develop the Canada Strong Fund while facing a , Prime Minister Mark Carney is hosting the in Toronto, Ontario, from September 14-15, 2026. 

Attending the summit will be the world’s leading investors who have been invited to identify opportunities for investment in Canada. The government’s ambition is to catalyse $1 trillion in total investment across Canada over the next five years, supported by approximately $280 billion in federal capital investments and incentives. The summit is being in partnership with the federal government, the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board (CPP Investments), and the Public Sector Pension Investment Board (PSP Investments). It will build upon Canada’s economic developments of the , as the government seeks to diversify Canada’s economic relationships, attract foreign capital, and reduce the country’s historical dependence on the US. Yet this drive for investment raises two important questions: how prepared is Canada to protect the infrastructure and strategic assets that this investment will create, expand, and place under private ownership? And does Canada have the institutional guardrails to responsibly place constraints upon private entities?

The Question of Investment and Strategic Infrastructure

The question of foreign investment in strategic infrastructure and resources is particularly relevant given the Carney government’s growing interest in private investment in Canadian transportation infrastructure. The explicitly announced that the government would , alongside measures intended to attract . The same budget also identifies continued engagement with investors to increase private investment in .

The rationale for investment in this infrastructure is straightforward. Airports and ports are essential to Canada’s economic growth and trade diversification. . At the same time, airports facilitate the movement of high-value cargo and connect Canadian communities both domestically and to . These are attractive opportunities for private investment that will generate revenue for Canada, enabling the modernisation and development of this infrastructure, boosting trade efficiency, without increasing public debt.

In Canada, there are and . These airports and ports, managed by private not-for-profit local authorities, and . These are not merely economic assets; they sustain the livelihoods of approximately half a million Canadians while serving as critical infrastructure and strategic nodes of sovereignty. They facilitate the movement of people, goods, energy, information, and, when necessary, military and emergency resources. Their worth extends beyond their commercial value and contributes to the public good of Canadian society.

Canada’s move towards the privatisation of transportation infrastructure does not make it the first state to do so – that position would belong to the . In 1987, the United Kingdom’s Conservative government’s privatisation of airports successfully generated revenue for a while simultaneously offloading the cost of airport upgrades from the state onto private firms. However, private ownership quickly poorer working conditions and lower pay for the thousands of employees.

In Canada in 2026, a similar pattern risks manifesting itself again: the auctioning off of infrastructure that provides a public service may occur at a discount price – much to the chagrin of private investors – while costs for services charged by these private entities may be able to escalate with no public accountability. Without state oversight, it may be more than solely price gouging that harms Canadians, but service interruption. If, through a callous calculation, a foreign-owned private entity decides to reduce service or even close an airport to maximise profits, this would be a corporate decision without government input or public accountability.

While the federal government may not be focused on the impact that privatisation could have upon the everyday lives of ordinary Canadians, the broader geopolitical realities of 2026 – characterised by a return to and , alongside a decline of American hegemony – make for a compelling case for the federal government to reconsider. The more Canada relies upon private and foreign capital to operate and develop these assets, the more important it becomes that the government establishes who is responsible for their security when a threat emerges. The core question to ask of the federal government is whether Canada’s security architecture and institutional capacity can keep pace with growing technological complexity and the change of ownership created by private investment.

This inquiry strikes at a weakness in Canadian governance: institutions are organised around jurisdictional responsibilities while the infrastructure and threats they must protect operate across those jurisdictions. Threats to critical infrastructure do not fit neatly within the pre-existing institutional mandates of the confederation. Radio-frequency interference, jamming, cyberattacks, hostile drones, physical intrusion, and other forms of disruption involve responsibilities spanning across institutional bodies such as (ISED), the (RCMP), the (DND), , and .

When a Threat Emerges, Who Responds?

Consider a hypothetical incident at a Canadian airport or marine port. A drone is detected approaching the facility, but its purpose is initially unknown. It may be a negligent operator, indicate criminal activity, surveillance of the facility, or something more nefarious. The distinction matters, but in the first few minutes, authorities may not have enough information to know what they are facing. The immediate problem is determining who has the authority and capability to respond while the nature of the threat is still being established.

This is particularly apparent as counter-drone systems rely upon radio-frequency interference or jamming. , and it states that the use of jammers is prohibited unless a ministerial exemption applies. Such exemptions have been granted to the , , and the . The result is a critical distinction between possessing counter-drone capability and possessing the authority to use it in a particular circumstance.

This critical distinction becomes more consequential when the infrastructure itself is privately operated. An airport or port operator may be the first to detect an intrusion and may have sophisticated security personnel and detection systems, but it does not possess the jurisdictional authority exercised by Canada’s institutional and legal bodies. Provincial or municipal police may be positioned to respond to an immediate criminal threat, but federal authorities possess jurisdiction over aviation, spectrum management, national security, and defence. The institution with the most appropriate capability may therefore not be the institution that can immediately employ it. But the first few minutes of a security incident have no respect for time nor institutional boundaries. A threat does not wait for federal, provincial, municipal, and private actors to determine whose mandate applies.

As Canada attracts private and foreign investment for critical infrastructure projects and investment, if a threat consequently emerges in the privately-owned scenario, this begs the question of who possesses both the authority and the capability to act immediately. If the answer depends upon transferring responsibility between multiple institutions before an effective response can begin, then the vulnerability is institutional. The challenge is to proactively determine who is responsible for detecting the threat, assessing it, who has authority to intervene, who possesses the necessary capability, and who assumes command. As strategic infrastructure becomes increasingly privately operated, these questions cannot be left unresolved.

Inconvenient Timing: Canada’s Policing Transition

Institutional fragmentation is becoming more consequential as Canada approaches a broader transition in the organisation of policing itself. identifies the modernisation of federal policing as an ongoing priority. At the same time, the federal government is preparing for the , which expire in . This approaching deadline is particularly important as policing responsibilities are already . and maintain their own provincial police services, while Canada’s eight other provinces and three territories contract out police services to the RCMP; but in recent years, the mandate of the RCMP is changing. In the city of Surrey, British Columbia, a has recently concluded.

Alberta provides perhaps the clearest example of where this trend could lead: the province has continued to consider the establishment of an , and the . These developments raise a question extending beyond ordinary policing, located at the core of Canadian federalism and problematising the privatisation of critical infrastructure: as provinces increasingly seek greater sovereignty and enhanced control over policing, who is ultimately responsible for protecting infrastructure that is provincially located, nationally significant, but privately owned?

Crucially, Alberta is home to infrastructure whose significance extends beyond provincial boundaries, particularly in the energy sector. If policing authority becomes increasingly provincial while infrastructure is increasingly privatized, responsibility for its protection becomes convoluted. This is further complicated by in greater provincial autonomy and potential separation, which could create additional uncertainty around the long-term governance of nationally significant infrastructure. At the same time, Alberta’s energy resources – identified as for the upcoming Canada Investment Summit –  and make the province particularly attractive to foreign private investment. While such investment can generate significant economic value, foreign ownership of strategically important energy and infrastructure assets can also create new dependencies and avenues for .

Alberta therefore provides a useful stress test for Canada’s emerging investment model: what happens when nationally significant infrastructure is provincially located, privately owned, attractive to foreign capital, and situated within a province increasingly questioning its relationship with Ottawa?

Invest if You Must, But Know Who Protects It

This highlights a tension at the heart of Canada’s investment strategy. The government is asking foreign and private investors to place capital into infrastructure that Canada considers essential to its economic sovereignty, while the frameworks governing the protection of that infrastructure remain unevenly distributed. Canada should therefore treat security governance as an essential component of its investment strategy rather than as a separate policy concern. Before encouraging significant private or foreign investment in airports, ports, telecommunications networks, energy infrastructure, critical-mineral supply chains, and other strategically important assets, Ottawa should ensure that there are clear lines of responsibility for their protection, establish mechanisms for interagency coordination, and clearly define the responsibilities of respective authorities for responding to emerging threats.

The renegotiation of the Police Service Agreements ahead of their 2032 expiry provides an opportunity to address this problem at the federal level. Ottawa and the provinces should clarify how provincial, municipal, and federal policing authorities will coordinate when locally situated infrastructure has national-security implications. Canada cannot build economic sovereignty merely by diversifying who provides capital. It must ensure that the infrastructure built with that capital remains secure, resilient, and subject to a clear Canadian security architecture. Canada should therefore enter this new era of investment with a simple principle: before deciding who will own or finance strategic infrastructure, Canada must know who will be responsible for protecting it.

But the question of who protects infrastructure is only one part of the larger challenge. Canada must also ask who operates it, who maintains it, who regulates it, who works within it, and who ensures that essential services continue when normal systems are disrupted. A resilient nation cannot rely upon conventional security capabilities while allowing the social and institutional foundations of resilience to erode.

Economic sovereignty requires investment. Conventional security requires protection. But national resilience requires both to be built alongside the public goods and institutions that allow Canadian society to withstand disruption.

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Executive Summary

Canada’s Arctic sovereignty depends on digital infrastructure governed outside its jurisdiction. Critical communications rely on foreign-owned satellite networks, exposing Canadian data and essential services to external legal regimes and geopolitical risk. The European Union faces similar vulnerabilities, creating a shared strategic challenge. Rather than pursuing separate solutions, Canada and the EU can leverage existing frameworks—including the Digital Partnership Council, the Security and Defence Partnership, SAFE, and CETA—to jointly invest in secure communications infrastructure, satellite capabilities, research and development, and regulatory coordination. By treating digital infrastructure as a collective security capability, both partners can strengthen Arctic resilience, reduce dependence on external actors, and enhance their ability to respond to emerging geopolitical threats.

Introduction

What exactly does Canadian sovereignty mean when a medical alert sent from an Indigenous community in Nunavut through a US ground station before reaching its destined Canadian community? In the digital age, all communications rely on transnational digital infrastructure , exposing both Canada and the EU to foreign surveillance, political coercion, service disruptions, and the weaponisation of critical digital infrastructure. Dependence on American digital infrastructure creates a strategic vulnerability: no state can claim if one cannot control its data. 

These strategic have become increasingly apparent as the Arctic emerges as a strategic theatre of geopolitical competition. While dependence on American digital infrastructure has historically been tolerated by both Canada and the EU, this dependency is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain. Russia’s of the High North and China’s growing in Arctic infrastructure demonstrate that the Arctic can no longer be treated as a stable environment. Simultaneously, security dynamics are shifting within NATO, originating from the erratic posturing of American President Donald Trump and his repeated calls for greater control over . Demanding as well that Canada strengthen its Arctic . This behaviour highlights the growing uncertainty surrounding Arctic governance and security. 

In this increasingly contested environment, reliance on foreign-controlled digital infrastructure represents a strategic vulnerability. The widespread ongoing through the , alongside the disruption of Venezuelan during the 2026 US operation targeting President Nicolás Maduro’s government, illustrates that communications networks can become instruments of geopolitical coercion and strategic leverage. Rather than pursuing parallel solutions, Canada and the EU are better positioned to address these challenges together. Existing frameworks such as the already provide mechanisms for joint investment, industrial cooperation, research and development, and regulatory coordination of critical digital infrastructure. Collectively, these initiatives can transform digital infrastructure from a source of strategic vulnerability into an instrument of deterrence by increasing the resilience, redundancy, and interoperability of allied communications networks.

Nunavut: A Case Study in Digital Dependence

Nunavut concentrates these vulnerabilities into a poignant case study. Its remote yet increasingly strategic geography makes satellite connectivity essential as remain limited for many of these predominantly Indigenous communities. has captured this market and has across the territory, becoming the connectivity provider for northern Indigenous communities and Canadians. This is reflected by Canada ranking among the world’s highest users of Starlink in . While this expansion has improved connectivity in underserved regions, it also creates strategic vulnerabilities. Starlink’s owner, Elon Musk, has demonstrated how privately controlled communications infrastructure can become entangled with geopolitical decision-making, most notably through the . Furthermore, reliance on places Nunavut’s communications within scope of American intelligence authorities through FISA Section 702, . The growing influence of private technology companies over critical infrastructure presents a broader sovereignty challenge, particularly amid increasing uncertainty surrounding US Arctic policy and the role of non-state actors in geopolitical affairs.

Beyond the security implications of foreign-controlled infrastructure, Nunavut’s connectivity challenges reveal both a market failure and a broader governance gap. Private interests have not accounted for the national security, sovereignty, and governance risks created by dependence on externally controlled infrastructure. This in turn represents a failure of governance. Canada has not established sufficient requirements or incentives for to extend reliable, secure connectivity to northern communities or to ensure that critical infrastructure serving the Arctic aligns with national security objectives. This failure largely stems from Canadian federalism and the constitutional , as responsibility for digital connectivity is interprovincial and therefore mandated to the federal government; however, provinces and territories retain significant responsibilities for service delivery, consumer protection, and privacy-related issues. This division creates a regulatory gap in which no single level of government is fully responsible for ensuring that northern communities receive connectivity that meets both public service needs and national security objectives. The result is a communications environment in which foreign providers have filled gaps left by domestic infrastructure investment, creating dependence on externally controlled networks. Consequently, . For residents of Nunavut, this is not an occasional anomaly, but the everyday reality of staying connected in the federation. 

This governance gap has consequences beyond service delivery and economic development; in the Arctic, digital connectivity is increasingly a component of national security. Arctic communications underpin search and rescue operations, NORAD surveillance, environmental monitoring, and critical infrastructure management across the region. An outage, interference event, or politically motivated disruption could isolate communities, degrade Canadian operational capacity, and compromise situational awareness in a strategically sensitive domain.

Building Collective Arctic Digital Capability

The vulnerabilities exposed in the Nunavut case demonstrate that Arctic security increasingly depends on resilient digital infrastructure and shared technological capabilities. Ensuring Arctic sovereignty therefore requires more than territorial presence; it requires the ability to observe, communicate, and coordinate across an increasingly contested region. No single state possesses all the infrastructure, financial resources, or technological capacity required to secure the Arctic digital environment alone.

Canada and the EU possess complementary capabilities that can strengthen collective Arctic resilience. Canada’s Constellation Mission (RCM) already provides across the Arctic. If integrated with European satellite systems such as and , these capabilities become significantly more powerful, enabling of the region. This cooperation would reduce reliance on unreliable external providers while strengthening allied capacity to respond to emerging threats. This, in turn, could also positively contribute to future NATO preparedness 

Existing Canada–EU frameworks provide the foundation to transform this shared capability into sustained cooperation. (SAFE) initiative provides access to up to €150 billion in competitively priced loans for defence capability investment. This aligns Canadian and EU defence priorities and creates new export opportunities for Canadian defence firms. The (SDP) formalised cooperation on defence planning, intelligence exchange, and emerging technologies. In of the Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), regulatory pathways are established for joint standards development, shared cybersecurity practices, and the integration of cross‑border digital services.

Beyond improving connectivity and interoperability, collective digital capability strengthens deterrence. A diversified Canada–EU digital ecosystem reduces the ability of any single state, corporation, or legal regime to exert political leverage over Arctic communications. By distributing critical infrastructure across trusted partners, Canada and the European Union increase the resilience of essential services while raising the costs of coercion, disruption, or interference. In the digital age, deterrence depends not only on military capability, but also on the resilience and redundancy of the networks that underpin national security.

Recommendations

1. Establish a Canada–EU Arctic Satellite Connectivity Partnership

Canada and the EU should develop an integrated satellite communications framework linking Canadian capabilities, including RADARSAT and Telesat’s low-Earth-orbit (LEO) systems, with European initiatives such as Copernicus and ±õ¸é±õ³§Â². Pooling resources would distribute development costs, expand northern coverage, and create a more resilient and interoperable communications architecture for Arctic communities, defence operations, and environmental monitoring.

2. Expand Trusted Telecommunications Competition in Canada

Canada should create a regulatory environment that allows trusted European telecommunications companies to operate more easily within the Canadian market. Greater competition would reduce reliance on a small number of dominant providers, incentivise investment in underserved northern regions, and encourage the development of resilient connectivity solutions for Indigenous communities. Expanding trusted foreign participation would complement domestic investment while reducing dependence on any single external provider.

3. Complete Ratification of CETA

Canada and the European Union should prioritise full ratification of CETA. Although provisionally applied, CETA has only been ratified by 17 EU member states, limiting the agreement’s full potential. Complete ratification would provide greater legal certainty, expand opportunities for cross-border procurement and investment, and establish a stronger foundation for long-term industrial, technological, and digital infrastructure cooperation.

4. Create a Joint Canada–EU Research and Development Fund for Arctic Technologies

Emerging technologies—including inter-satellite laser communications, secure LEO networks, and space-based edge computing—require sustained investment beyond the capacity of individual states. Canada and the EU should pool funding through mechanisms such as the EU’s Security Action for Europe (SAFE) initiative, CETA procurement mechanisms, and European Investment Bank programs to support collaborative research and development. Joint investment would create economies of scale, strengthen allied technological competitiveness, and accelerate innovation in northern connectivity.

5. Develop Shared Regulatory and Security Standards for Digital Infrastructure

Canada and the EU should establish coordinated standards for satellite communications, cybersecurity, and emerging technologies to strengthen the resilience of critical infrastructure. Drawing on Canada’s Digital Sovereignty Framework and European data protection principles, including lessons from , both partners should create joint assessment mechanisms for communications infrastructure procurement to mitigate risks from foreign interference. As LEO satellite systems become increasingly essential to civilian and defence operations, coordinated standards will be necessary to address cybersecurity threats, orbital congestion, and geopolitical competition.

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Since its establishment in 1949, the foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany was grounded in the concept of Zivilmacht (civilian power), a model based on the renunciation of military force, multilateral cooperation, and economic diplomacy. However, the Russian Federation’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 acted as a significant catalyst for change in Germany’s foreign policy and broader geopolitical positioning. Following these shifts in the European strategic environment, then-Chancellor Olaf Scholz proclaimed Zeitenwende (a turning point in history) had arrived, which would redefine Germany’s security policy through increased defence spending and a more prominent place in international affairs. The electoral victory of Friedrich Merz as current Chancellor has ultimately shifted Germany’s international role to a more assertive and openly strategic posture, distancing itself from the civilian power model of the past.

This essay examines Germany’s evolution from a culture of military restraint toward one of new strategic posturing, analyzing whether this transformation represents a definitive abandonment of its identity as a civilian power in favour of a return to a modern form Machtpolitik (power politics). Through an examination of the historical trajectory from the Cold War to the chancellorship of Friedrich Merz starting in 2025, this essay suggests that Germany is not reverting to aggressive militarism but is instead adopting a form of defensive and integrated Machtpolitik, necessary to ensure security within the Euro-Atlantic order.

The Erosion of the Civilian Power Paradigm

For over seven decades, the Federal Republic of Germany defined its national identity through the lens of a (civilian power). Emerging from the ruins of 1945, it anchored itself in the West under Konrad Adenauer’s policy of (western integration), replacing traditional power politics with a culture of military restraint, multilateralism, and rejection of nuclear arms. This identity consolidated during the Cold War through and the diplomatic success of Willy Brandt’s (eastern policy), which favoured economic interdependence and dialogue over the use of military force. Even after reunification in 1990, Germany struggled to move beyond this posture, exposing a lasting tension between its expanding economic influence and its unwillingness to deploy its military – an approach that NATO Allies frequently criticized as “.�

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 shattered these certainties. Then-Chancellor Olaf Scholz proclaimed a Zeitenwende had taken place, and promising a massive investment in defence through a . However, the Scholz era (2021–2025) was marked by a profound gap between rhetoric and reality. Hampered by bureaucratic bottlenecks, internal coalition disputes, and a lingering culture of pacifism, the implementation of the Zeitenwende proved difficult. Scholz’s reluctance to supply ‘offensive’ weapons – – combined with concerns about Germany’s actual capacity to increase defence spending levels, caused political inconsistency and eroded trust in his leadership at home and abroad. Consequently, the collapse of the Scholz’s governing coalition in late 2024, , paved the way for a more radical transformation under Friedrich Merz.

The Merz Chancellorship: Enforcing Zeitenwende 2.0

The election of Friedrich Merz as Chancellor in February 2025 marked the definitive end of Germany’s post-war strategic ambiguity. Merz’s rise to power envisioned a “,â€� a strategy that aimed to translate the previous government’s hesitant rhetoric into concrete, assertive action. Under Merz’s leadership, Germany has accelerated its transition from a reluctant partner to a burgeoning military leader in Europe, driven by the dual pressures of Russian aggression and uncertainty in the transatlantic security relationship following the second election of Donald Trump to the Presidency of the United States (US).

Unconditional Support for Ukraine and Strategic Assertiveness

The most immediate shift under Chancellor Merz has been the abandonment of self-imposed “red linesâ€� regarding the war in Ukraine. In stark contrast to Scholz’s , Merz’s government adopted a stance of support with “,â€� strengthening Germany’s role as the leading military supporter of Kyiv in Europe. Crucially, the Merz administration on German-supplied weaponry, allowing Ukraine to strike military targets within Russian territory – a decision that signalled a clear break from the fear of escalation that characterized Scholz’s government. This policy is supported by Germany’s continued commitment to , separate from domestic defence spending, although the level of assistance remains . By framing Ukraine’s defence as essential to preserving the European security order, Friedrich Merz has effectively normalized the use of military force as a legitimate and necessary instrument of Germany’s foreign policy.

In line with this strategic imperative, the Merz government has extended its commitment beyond military assistance, actively seeking to reshape Europe’s broader geopolitical frameworks. To shield Eastern Europe from shifting transatlantic dynamics, Merz has recently proposed supporting Ukraine to become an “� within the EU. This proposal would see Ukraine attend high-level EU meetings as an observer without voting rights, effectively allowing it to gain access to EU decision-making forums while it progresses through the legal and administrative work of becoming a full EU member state.

Rearmament and the “Kriegstüchtigkeit” of the Bundeswehr

Domestically, the Merz chancellorship has been defined by an unprecedented drive for rearmament, aiming to transform the Bundeswehr into “.� Following the , Germany committed to significant new spending targets: 3.5% of GDP by 2029, rising to 5% by 2035. To finance the increase defence spending, the German government pushed through a controversial reform of the constitutional debt brake, .

This financial commitment has been matched by structural reforms aimed at achieving Kriegstüchtigkeit (war readiness). The adoption of the designates Germany as the central logistical hub for NATO in Europe, preparing the nation to serve as the transit corridor and operational base for Allied troops in the event of a large-scale conflict with Russia. This shift acknowledges that Germany is no longer just a security contributor, but a frontline state exposed to hybrid threats, requiring full coordination between military forces and civilian infrastructure.

The Return of Conscription and Societal Friction

Perhaps the most socially divisive aspect of Merz’s security overhaul has been the move to address the personnel crisis within the armed forces. In late 2025, the government passed the with the ambition of reaching 260,000 active personnel by the 2030s. This legislation relies on a hybrid model: while initially prioritizing voluntary service with financial incentives, it also established the legal framework for a “� (Bedarfsabhängige Dienstpflicht) that can be activated if volunteer targets are not met.

The potential reintroduction of conscription, which had been abolished in 2011, has sparked significant . Younger generations view the move as a regression to militarism, highlighting a disconnect between the government’s strategic objectives and the pacifist undercurrents of German civil society. The friction reveals that while the German political elite have embraced a harsher security and foreign policy, under a modern form of defensive and integrated Machtpolitik, the societal transition away from the civilian power identity remains incomplete and contested.

European Autonomy and the “Atomic Zeitenwende�

The geopolitical context of Merz’s chancellorship is heavily influenced by second Trump administration in the US. In the wake of President Trump’s “� foreign policy strategy, Merz has pushed for more and an urgent strengthening of German defence. This has led to a breaking of the ultimate German taboo: the nuclear question.

While explicitly ruling out the acquisition of a nuclear arsenal, the Merz government is pursuing an “� through an integration strategy. Germany has deepened cooperation with Europe’s two nuclear powers, France and the United Kingdom (UK), within the framework of the – an informal trilateral forum originally established in 2003 to coordinate diplomatic efforts over Iran’s nuclear program. Despite Brexit complicating its institutional dimension, the E3 has evolved into a broader platform for strategic coordination, . Through initiatives such as the – and in the context of strengthened Franco-British nuclear cooperation through the – Germany is seeking to link European security more closely to Franco-British nuclear deterrents. These developments mark a deep cultural shift: nuclear deterrence is no longer discarded but instead embraced as a necessary component of European defence, with Germany acting as a key political facilitator of this shared capability.

Theoretical Analysis: A Return to Machtpolitik? Neoclassical realist approach

The radical transformation of German security policy under Friedrich Merz raises a fundamental question: has Germany abandoned its identity as a Zivilmacht in favour of a return to Machtpolitik? The evidence suggests that while the civilian power model in its idealistic and pacifist form has largely faded, Germany is not returning to the aggressive, unilateral power politics of the pre-1945 era. Instead, it is adopting a defensive and integrated Machtpolitik.

The theory of helps explain why Germany could no longer remain a civilian power after 2022 while also highlighting the variables that have complicated this transformation. External pressures, such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine, altered the distribution of power and threat perception in Europe, compelling the German government to embark on a Zeitenwende to adapt its material capabilities. Yet the theory recognizes that systemic imperatives are filtered through domestic variables. Perceptions of policy-makers, institutional constraints such as the debt brake, and a society shaped by pacifist norms have all slowed decision-making and implementation of reforms, reflecting what Hanns W. Maull defined as , or, a “lack of realism� or “oblivion of power.�

Under these conditions, Germany’s rearmament is not simply about accumulating hard power, but instead about responding to a shifting geopolitical environment in an integrated and defensive manner. Integration () occurs through NATO and EU institutions, allowing Berlin to exercise influence and maximize security without alarming Allies. The defensive dimension () focuses on denying Russian victory and protecting the status quo rather than redrawing Europe’s borders. This approach illustrates a neoclassical realist compromise: Germany adapts to systemic requirements while being constrained and shaped by internal political and societal factors, explaining why its strategic transformation has been slow and deliberate.

Overcoming Machtvergessenheit

As argued by , Germany is in the process of overcoming its “forgetting of power.� For decades, the Federal Republic of Germany operated under the illusion that European economic interdependence and normative power projection were sufficient to secure its interests – characteristically liberal ideals. The Merz era reflects a growing recognition that civilian power may require the support of military strength to remain credible.

The Merz government has realized that to preserve the liberal international order – a core objective of the Zivilmacht concept – it must employ the tools of Machtpolitik. Thus, the dichotomy traditionally rendered between the two ontologies is false. Germany is not choosing power over law; rather, it frames the strengthening of its military as part of a broader effort to provide security for Europe and the liberal international order. Its refusal to pursue an independent nuclear arsenal while simultaneously seeking deeper integration into Allied nuclear frameworks demonstrates this nuanced position. Initiatives such as the establishment of a high-level , or the debate at this year’s Munich Security Conference on to safeguard Europe’s future, demonstrate that Germany remains firmly anchored in the institutions that have shaped its identity since its founding. At the same time, Germany is discussing options with European partners to develop a deterrence posture that is autonomous, independent, and credible.

Recent diplomatic developments strongly illustrate this assertive and autonomous stance. On the diplomatic front, Friedrich Merz has cast aside any lingering hesitation, explicitly accusing the Trump administration of allowing itself to be during the course of the ongoing US-Iran conflict. This position reflects a pragmatic call for European self-reliance in response to unpredictable US diplomacy, rather than an open challenge to the NATO Alliance.

Conclusion

The chancellorship of Friedrich Merz has placed the Federal Republic of Germany on a decisive path towards a difficult, yet necessary, transformation. The hesitation and ambiguity that defined the Scholz era and the Zeitenwende 1.0 have been replaced by a strategic clarity that acknowledges the harsh realities of the current security environment.

By challenging fiscal constraints with the €500 billion fund, addressing societal taboos with the reintroduction of conscription, and engaging with previously avoided strategic debates, Germany has fundamentally redefined its role. It has transitioned from a reluctant partner, long constrained by neglect of military power and capability development, to an emerging pillar of European stability, actively shaping defence initiatives and security cooperation.

However, this transition carries significant perils. Societal backlash against conscription and concerns over Germany’s military buildup underscore the fragility of both internal and external support. The success of a defensive, integrated Machtpolitik depends not only on the . Furthermore, fears of a potential authoritarian turn – partly driven by rising domestic support for the – continues to create anxieties among the Allies.

Ultimately, Germany has not yet returned to the aggressive nationalism of its past. Instead, it is slowly becoming a “normal� geopolitical power by acknowledging that, in a multipolar world, abstaining from projections of power may undermine chances for survival.

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Executive Summary:

Russia’s war against Ukraine is also a struggle about public interpretation. NATO members have responded to Russia’s full-scale invasion through sanctions, military aid, deterrence, and diplomatic efforts. These actions depend on the public understanding that Russia is the aggressor, Ukraine is the victim of an illegal invasion, and support for Ukraine is important for European and transatlantic security. Russia’s counter-narrative seeks to weaken this consensus view by claiming that Ukraine, NATO, the US, or the West provoked the war.

Drawing on , with a Canada-focused analysis, as initially outlined at ĞÓ°ÉÔ­´´ University’s 2026 Eastern European and Transatlantic Network conference, this brief argues that trust in NATO is central to how citizens interpret responsibility for the war. Canadian public opinion remains strongly aligned with the core NATO narrative: most Canadians blame Russia, while only a small minority blame the West. Yet this minority is not randomly distributed. Canadians who do not trust NATO are significantly more likely to accept the narrative that the West provoked the war, while Canadians who trust NATO are much more likely to blame Russia.

The implication is straightforward: countering disinformation is not only about correcting false claims after they spread. It is also about sustaining public trust in the institutions whose messages compete with adversaries’ propaganda and misinformation. For Canada and its NATO Allies, trust in NATO should therefore be treated as a security resource — one that requires proactive prebunking, clearer explanations of NATO’s relevance to Canadian security, and a wider network of trusted messengers.

Introduction: The Narrative Dimension of the War in Ukraine

NATO countries responded to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 through military, economic, and diplomatic means and pressure. However, this support also sparked an ongoing discussion about how and why this war erupted. The core NATO narrative is straightforward: Russia is the aggressor, Ukraine is the victim of an unlawful and unprovoked invasion, and allied support for Ukraine is necessary for European and transatlantic security. The main Kremlin counter-narrative tells a different story: Ukraine, NATO, the United States, or “the West� provoked the war, leaving Russia no choice but to invade in order to protect its so-called historical sphere of influence.

This ongoing contest matters because it can affect whether citizens support sanctions, weapons deliveries, refugee assistance, defense spending, and long-term deterrence measures taken by their countries and NATO. If the public believes that Russia caused the war, continued support for Ukraine and NATO cohesion becomes easier to sustain. If the public believes that NATO or the West provoked the war, allied policy aimed at countering Russia can appear reckless, hypocritical, or needlessly escalatory.

Much of the discussion about Russian information operations focuses on the supply side. It aims to address threats posed by, for example, Russian propaganda, falsehoods, and electoral and other interference, across different channels and platforms. These are important. , a foreign disinformation detection institution, defines foreign information manipulation and interference as “intentional and coordinated efforts by state or non-state actors to alter information in pursuit of political, security, or other strategic objectives.� But supply alone does not explain why people in Canada and other countries believe one competing strategic narrative over another.

This brief, therefore, focuses on the demand side of strategic narrative reception. Why are some citizens more receptive to the Kremlin’s West-blame narrative while others accept the NATO narrative that Russia caused the war? Findings from suggest that people tend to rely on trust in the messenger as a shortcut to plausibility. When they trust NATO, they also tend to trust its messaging. When they distrust NATO, those same explanations are easier to dismiss as propaganda, spin, or elite messaging.

Strategic Narratives and the Credibility of the Narrator

Strategic narratives are stories that countries tell to “win the story� as they frame issues, advance their goals, and convince others of the righteousness of their actions in global affairs. Strategic narratives identify heroes and villains, assign blame, explain crises, and justify policy choices. In the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine, narratives about the origins of the war are especially important because they can and do shape policy debates. If Russia is understood as the aggressor, then sanctions, deterrence, and military assistance to Ukraine follow logically. If NATO is understood as the provocateur, then those same policies can be framed as a dangerous escalation.

Narratives succeed not only because of repetition or exposure. They also depend on the narrator’s perceived credibility. Citizens do not evaluate every claim from scratch; they use their trust in the messenger as a cognitive shortcut that, especially when multiple competing narratives are present, is more likely to lead them to accept or reject the story in question.

This is why fact-checking and rebuttals of malign information, while necessary, are not sufficient. The consensus recommendations in emphasize that corrections are most effective when they are clear, credible, and accompanied by an alternative explanation. However, both this handbook and our research suggest that to increase the likelihood that the audience accepts the debunking, the audience should hold a positive view of the messenger. When trust is low, the same corrections can be rejected as self-interested messaging. In practice, “truth� often competes with “trusted.�

The policy implication is that institutional credibility is neither a soft nor a secondary issue. It is part of democratic resilience. explicitly identifies resilience as central to its ability to deter and defend. While NATO’s deterrent posture depends on military capabilities, we should also keep in mind that the Alliance also depends on public support for the political choices that make deterrence credible. If hostile information operations can weaken trust in the institutions that explain and justify allied policy, they can complicate democratic decision-making even without changing facts on the ground.

Evidence from the Survey: Canada as a High-Trust but Still Vulnerable Case

The empirical evidence for this brief comes from the . The survey asked respondents who they believe caused the war in Ukraine and measured trust in NATO, the EU, and domestic institutions.

Figure 1: Public Trust in NATO across Alliance Countries

Canada is a useful case because public alignment with the core NATO narrative is strong overall. In the Canadian sample, approximately 84% of respondents blame Russia for the war, while only about 8% blame the West. Around 60% of reports trust NATO. This suggests that Kremin’s West-blame narrative has not received much traction in Canada.

Yet the Canadian data also show why overconfidence would be a mistake. West-blame beliefs are not evenly distributed. They are concentrated among respondents who do not trust NATO. For Canadians who trust NATO, only about 4% blame the West. Among those who do not trust NATO, the figure rises to about 15%. Similarly, about 90% of Canadians who trust NATO blame Russia, compared to about 74% among those who do not trust NATO.

Figure 2: Canadian Trust in NATO and Blame Attribution for the War in Ukraine

The full Canadian results reinforce this pattern. Controlling for socio-demographic factors, trust in NATO is strongly associated with blaming Russia for the war and strongly negatively associated with blaming the West. Other socio-demographic and attitudinal factors also matter, but the clearest and most policy-relevant pattern is the relationship between trust in NATO and blame attribution.

This does not mean that distrust in NATO automatically translates into pro-Kremlin beliefs. The relationship may run in both directions. Some citizens may distrust NATO and therefore reject NATO’s account of the war. Others may become less trusting of NATO after consuming information critical of it. Both processes could occur simultaneously. For policy purposes, however, the direction is less important than the vulnerability itself. Where trust in NATO is lower, NATO’s messages are less likely to be heard, and adversarial narratives are more likely to find receptive audiences.

Why This Matters for Canada

For Canada, the findings are directly relevant as it is an active player in Europe and, increasingly, the Arctic. Through , Canada has played a leading role in NATO’s presence in Latvia and on the Alliance’s eastern flank. Canada’s security interests extend to the Arctic, cyber defence, democratic resilience, and the protection of a rules-based order that is directly challenged by Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. In the Arctic, however, security communication must also include Inuit and other Indigenous communities as central stakeholders, since their knowledge, rights, livelihoods, and local security concerns are directly affected by how Canada defines and communicates its northern defence priorities.

Moreover, NATO can still feel abstract to many Canadians. It may appear distant, bureaucratic, European, or not sufficiently in Canada’s interests. When NATO is understood mainly as a Brussels-based security organization, it is easier for adversaries to portray it as “out-of-touchâ€� with the average Canadian. When NATO is understood as Canadian soldiers in Latvia for the purposes of preventing a wider war, as Arctic deterrence, as cyber cooperation, and as a framework that helps prevent wider war, its relevance to Canada and Canadians is strengthened.

The challenge is not simply to tell Canadians that NATO matters; it is to show how NATO strengthens Canadian security and Canada’s international role. This is particularly important as allied governments ask the public to support higher defense spending, long-term military assistance to Ukraine, and sustained deterrence. These policies require political endurance, and political endurance depends on public trust. For example, Canada’s broader efforts against foreign information manipulation and interference could connect more directly to strategic communication about NATO. Monitoring hostile narratives, exposing coordinated manipulation, and working with platforms remain necessary. However, Canada’s counter-disinformation strategy should also focus on credibility-building to increase the likelihood that its messages will resonate better with the public. This means transparency, consistency, local relevance, and messengers who can reach audiences that may not respond to official statements.

For example, Canada’s broader efforts against could connect more directly to strategic communication about NATO. Monitoring hostile narratives, exposing coordinated manipulation, and working with platforms remain necessary. However, Canada’s counter-disinformation strategy should also focus on credibility-building to increase the likelihood that its messages will resonate better with the public. This means transparency, consistency, local relevance, and messengers who can reach audiences that may not respond to official statements.

Why Rebuttals and Takedowns Are Not Enough

Democratic governments often respond to disinformation with three main tools: exposure, removal, and correction. They identify false claims, work to take them down if possible, and post factual rebuttals. These tools are important, but they tend to be reactive. By the time a false narrative has spread widely, corrections may reach only a fraction of the original audience. Also, in instances where people do not trust the institutions or organizations taking up the correcting, attempts to take down false narratives could reinforce distrust and suspicion. Studies on and show that it helps to anticipate and address manipulation techniques before people encounter them.

It may be helpful to supplement existing debunking efforts with more prebunking, building societal resistance to misinformation, and strengthening trust in NATO and similar institutions. Experimental research by show that short interventions aimed at informing people about common manipulation tactics used by hostile actors can increase resilience to misinformation. For example, before a major NATO summit, Ukrainian aid package, or deployment decision, Canadian and allied communicators can anticipate predictable claims that NATO provoked the war, Ukraine is merely a proxy, or Canada is paying for Europe’s war. Rather than waiting for these claims to circulate, Canadian and NATO communicators could explain in advance why they are misleading and how they fit into a broader Russian narrative strategy aimed at dividing and weakening Canada and NATO. This approach should be simple and delivered by trusted voices. It should avoid overly technical language.

At the same time, NATO and Canadian institutions need to avoid communicating only during crises. Trust building takes time and patience. If the public learns about the role and benefits of NATO membership only when leaders are seeking support for a given initiative, they may view such communication with suspicion.

Policy Recommendations

1. Treat trust as an early-warning indicator

Canada already monitors foreign information manipulation and interference and conducts public opinion research on security issues. Canada and its Allies should monitor public trust in NATO and other key security institutions as part of democratic resilience planning. Public opinion polls should ask respondents whether they trust NATO, the Canadian government, and similar institutions. Declining trust should be treated as an early warning indicator that more outreach is needed to reduce susceptibility to adversarial information warfare.

2. Institutionalize prebunking before predictable narrative attacks

More attention should be paid to prebunking at moments when adversarial information warfare is likely to escalate (e.g., predictable narrative attacks). Among others, such events likely include NATO summits, defense spending announcements, Ukraine aid package announcements, troop deployments abroad, and elections in allied countries. Communicators should prepare short, accessible materials that explain both the facts and the manipulation techniques adversaries are likely to use. Such efforts should be coordinated by the Canadian government, NATO allies, and other communicators to increase narrative resilience before hostile narratives reach NATO audiences.

3. Make NATO concrete in Canadian public communication

Conduct public information campaigns aimed at explaining the benefits of NATO membership and consistently connecting them to Canadian security interests. Such a campaign could use specific examples to emphasize NATO’s relevance by highlighting its leadership in Latvia, its role in Arctic security, its cyber defense capabilities, and its efforts to prevent a wider war in Europe, among others. Such communication should also be transparent about trade-offs, given legitimate questions about rising defense spending and the implications of Canada’s growing involvement in European deterrence initiatives. Credible communication should not avoid taking on difficult questions directly — in fact, addressing them should help with building trust.

4. Expand the trusted messenger network

Canada already supports public outreach initiatives aimed at countering disinformation and promoting democratic resilience. Such work should be extended to matters surrounding NATO and its work. Since government and NATO officials may not always be the most trusted communicators, Canada should aim to work with a wide network of credible messengers, including veterans, reservists, military families, educators, local officials, Ukrainian and Eastern European diaspora communities, Indigenous and northern voices on Arctic security, and independent scholars. Using such goodwill ambassadors should help key messages reach individuals across different local and social contexts. This could be a way to reach audiences distrustful of political elites.

Conclusion: Trust as Democratic Deterrence

The full-scale invasion in Ukraine highlighted that deterrence requires military capability, political will, and social resilience. Part of Russia’s challenges to NATO is represented by its hostile information operations. Moscow does not want NATO to admire Russia – it only needs enough citizens to doubt NATO’s reliability, blame the West for the invasion of Ukraine, oppose support, or lose confidence that allied institutions are telling the truth.

The Canadian evidence presented here offers both reassurance and warning — and policy recommendations outlined here aim to strengthen Canada’s broader democratic resilience. Most Canadians blame Russia for the war, and the Kremlin’s West-blame narrative remains a minority view. But that minority is meaningfully larger among those who do not trust NATO. Increasing trust in NATO, in turn, would require ongoing attention to informational campaigns aimed at raising public understanding of why and how the Alliance matters.

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Introduction

In recent years, Europe’s geopolitical centre of gravity has shifted toward the Northeast, with the Baltic region emerging as a . As , the Organization’s member countries are increasingly focused on deterrence and defence. Traditional conceptions of deterrence are constructed around three pillars: . This memo focuses on the second “Câ€� â€“ credibility â€“ by examining prospects for strengthening the resilience of NATO’s military supply chains in the Baltic region through defence industrial cooperation between the three enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) framework nations (Canada, Germany, and the United Kingdom (UK)) and the three host nations (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia). 

As a response to Russia’s military aggression and hybrid warfare against Ukraine since 2014, the 2016 NATO Warsaw summit marked a significant step towards reinforcing the security of the Baltic region. Canada, Germany, and the UK assumed leadership as framework nations for eFP battlegroups in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, respectively. While the eFP signals a strong multinational Allied presence in the Baltic states, lessons from Ukraine since 2022 inevitably raise critical questions: is NATO ready to fight for a prolonged period? And can NATO secure supply chains so that they remain close to the war fighters? 

This policy brief first analyses how resilient supply chains lay the foundation for credible long-term deterrence. Second, it examines the role and prospects of defence industrial cooperation between eFP framework nations and host nations, before finally concluding with three concrete policy recommendations.  

WhyÌıDoesÌıSecurity of Supply Matter?Ìı

There is an old saying attributed to Dwight. E. Eisenhower that . It is also true that , as each nation brings its own peculiarities while the combined force must act as a single organization. To put this into perspective, the Canadian-led NATO Multinational Brigade in Latvia (formerly, the eFP battlegroup) is composed of 14 nations, making it NATO’s  military unit. 

Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, NATO began scaling the three eFP battlegroups in the Baltics into brigade-sized units. Germany’s 45^th Panzer brigade has been relocated to Lithuania and is expected to achieve . Canada is also considering  in Latvia.  

Regardless of how its war against Ukraine ends, Russia will remain an existential security threat to the Baltic states. To deter and, if necessary, defend against Russia in the Baltic region, NATO Allies â€“ especially the eFP framework nations â€“ must demonstrate both the capacity and the resolve to fight alongside the host nations for as long as it takes to defend NATO territory. This, in turn, requires a continuous and resilient flow of supplies through to the battlefield.  

While experts have called for the  to sustain operational capability in the longer term, this approach has clear limitations – most importantly because stockpiles are finite in the event of a prolonged conflict. To secure an uninterrupted supply, it is essential to develop local defence industrial capacities. 

Security of supply extends beyond the availability of raw materials and manufacturing components. Latvia’s  defines security of supply as a guarantee of access to the materiel and services required by the National Armed Forces to fulfil its tasks. This understanding emphasizes that the defence industrial base is an integral part of comprehensive defence strategy across the peace-crisis-war spectrum. It also implies that the defence industries of eFP host nations must be able to supply not only their national militaries but also Allied armed forces. However, defence industries in the Baltic states, while growing rapidly, are still relatively nascent, and there may not be sufficient latent industrial capacity to scale up production quickly in time of crisis.  

Failure to secure military supply chains would pose strategic risks that are particularly acute given the geographic characteristics of the Baltic states. A close proximity to Russia and reliance on the roughly 65km-wide  to link the region to the rest of Europe exacerbate supply vulnerabilities. To ensure that NATO forces deployed in the region can fight a prolonged war, it is necessary to establish short, resilient, and regionally-anchored military supply chains and, at the same time, to deepen defence industrial cooperation between the eFP framework nations and host nations. 

Enhancing the Enhanced Forward PresenceÌı

The  posits that the Baltic states constitute a single area of operations. This means that regional cooperation should be understood as a key enabler of credible deterrence and effective defence. This logic applies not only to trilateral Baltic cooperation but also among all Allies deployed in the region.  

To improve coordination between the three framework nations and the three host nations, the  was launched in 2023. Although it was originally envisaged as a platform for political and strategic dialogue in areas of common interest, such as training and exercises, it also holds untapped potential to serve as a venue for industrial cooperation and joint supply chain management. 

There are already examples of bilateral cooperation in this area. Recently, the Latvian Ministry of Defence signed a  (MoU) with the Canadian Commercial Corporation â€“ Canada’s government-to-government contracting agency –  concerning bilateral cooperation in military equipment, services, infrastructure, and industry. 

However, since the Baltics consider themselves to be a single area of operations, a broader relationship of regional cooperation between the framework and host nations is needed. Dialogue must take place at all levels – political, strategic, operational, tactical, as well as between defence industries. Regular information sharing and practical measures to harmonize defence investment and industrial policies will strengthen the security of supply and help forge new defence industrial partnerships.

WhatÌıDo Host Nations Have to Offer?Ìı

The three host nations are  in NATO. With defence budgets reaching 5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2026, the Baltic states are actively developing local defence industrial capabilities. In recent years, . There are notable success stories, such as the production of  and subsequent expansion into assembly and maintenance of more advanced systems such as . Nevertheless, the Baltic defence industries remain primarily focused on niche technological areas and generally lack the scale to support full production cycles of heavy armaments or other advanced military systems. At the same time, their relatively small size makes Baltic defence industries flexible, innovation-oriented, and able to rapidly adapt. 

This environment creates opportunities for foreign defence companies to enter the market and address the existing gaps in cooperation with local partners. As of 2025, all three framework nations allocate at least 2% of GDP to defence and have committed to increase defence expenditure up to 5% of GDP by 2035. Consequently, there is a strong push to build homegrown . 

Recently, German defence companies have been particularly active in the Baltic states. For example,  to establish 155mm artillery ammunition production facilities. More recently, Lithuania Defense Services, a joint venture established in 2022 by Rheinmetall and KNDS Germany, announced plans to .  

 and  are also pursuing ambitious efforts to expand their defence industrial capacities. For example, a Canadian company  to establish assembly lines for its BlackWolf tactical armoured vehicles in Latvia. Of the three eFP framework nations, such partnerships are especially relevant for Canada given the geographical distance between Canada and the Baltic region. Partnering Canadian defence industry with local companies in Latvia not only facilitates access to new markets but also helps build viable defence industrial capacity in the Baltic states for warfighting purposes, especially in a prolonged conflict.  

This logic extends beyond the manufacture of original equipment to also encompass access to critical components and materials. For example, last year the Canadian company â€“ a component that is essential for sensors and electronic systems widely used in defence technology, such as aircraft, missiles, and drones. 

The new geopolitical reality, growing defence budgets, and commitment to develop defence industrial capabilities underscore the need to coordinate defence investment and industrial policies within the 3+3 format. Such coordination would help secure military supply chains precisely where they are needed the most. This approach would align with broader NATO efforts to ramp up defence industrial capacities, such as  and .  

Conclusions andÌıRecommendationsÌı

Secured supply chains through defence industrial cooperation are not just desirable; they are a strategic necessity for credible deterrence. Since its creation, , from which the defence industries of framework and host nations stand to benefit. 

To harness the potential of defence industrial cooperation within the 3+3 format, the policymakers in the three framework nations and the three host nations should consider the following actions: 

1. Expand the Scope of 3+3 Format to Include Defence Industrial Cooperation.  

TheÌı3+3ÌıagendaÌıshouldÌıbeÌıbroadened byÌıhavingÌıregular meetings of keyÌırepresentativesÌı– such asÌıNational Armaments DirectorsÌı–Ìıfrom the Baltic states, Canada, Germany, and theÌıUKÌıto promote dialogue, coordinate policies,Ìıand identify opportunitiesÌıforÌıdefence industrial cooperation andÌıstrengtheningÌısecurity of supplyÌıacross the region.ÌıÌı

2. Establish an Annual 3+3 Defence Industry Forum.  

To facilitate the establishment of cross-border partnerships between defence companies, regular and open dialogue is essential. As several bilateral defence industry events already exist, a dedicated 3+3 Defence Industry Forum could be built on these foundations, providing a multilateral platform for collaboration. 

3. D±ğ±¹±ğ±ô´Ç±è&²Ô²ú²õ±è;¸é±ğ²µ¾±´Ç²Ô²¹±ô±ô²â&²Ô²ú²õ±è;´¡²Ô³¦³ó´Ç°ù±ğ»å&²Ô²ú²õ±è;±Ê°ù´Ç»å³Ü³¦³Ù¾±´Ç²Ô&²Ô²ú²õ±è;°ä²¹±è²¹³¦¾±³Ù¾±±ğ²õ.   

Host nations and framework nations should invest in new production facilities and reinforce supply chains for the militaries deployed in the Baltic region. Framework nations’ defence industry national champions should take a leading role and integrate host nations’ defence industries into regional supply chains. This approach would promote transfer of knowledge and technology, as well as strengthen the overall capacity to sustain operations over a prolonged period. 

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Key TakeawaysÌı

• ĞÓ°ÉÔ­´´ one in three residents of Estonia and Latvia say they would do nothingÌıin the event ofÌıa military threat, with even lower likelihood to act among ethnic Russians.ÌıÌı

• Interest inÌıparticipatingÌıthrough non-combat roles (e.g.,Ìıfinancial contributions) is higher than in combat rolesÌıbut still does not reflectÌıa significantÌıportionÌıof the populationÌıin either Latvia or Estonia.Ìı

• NATO (and Canada) shouldÌıaddressÌıtheÌısocietal resilienceÌıgap among localÌıcommunities.ÌıTargeted grants for trusted local organizations, coupled with strong monitoring and evaluation, can help build social cohesion and civic preparedness across Estonia and Latvia, particularly in regions with a significant ethnic Russian population.Ìı

BackgroundÌı

Recent polling data from Estonia and Latvia suggest there is a significant gap in societal resilience among the residents of both countries. While Russia is overwhelmingly perceived as a security threat within these nations, an overall willingness to act in the event of a military threat is low. This gap is particularly pronounced along demographic lines, with lower willingness to act among ethnic Russians in Estonia and Latvia. As the Baltic states are likely targets for potential future Russian aggression, this deficit in resilience has direct implications for Canadian and NATO security commitments in the region.  

Since their post-Soviet independence, Estonia and Latvia have invested heavily in defence preparedness through joining NATO, bolstering their cyber networks, and educating their youth on mis- and disinformation. After Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, Canada joined its NATO Allies in strengthening defence structures in Eastern and Central Europe under , currently the Canadian Armed Forces’ (CAF) largest overseas mission. Recognizing the particular vulnerability of the Baltic states to Russian aggression, Canada took the initiative to lead the Multinational Battlegroup in Latvia in 2017. After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Canada committed to scaling this presence into a full . Following his election in Spring 2025, Prime Minister Mark Carney emphasized that these operations work to reinforce NATO at a time of great global instability and change. 

To meet NATO’s Article 3 , Estonia and Latvia have adopted â€œTotal Defenceâ€� models, recognizing that societal resilience and civilian participation are just as crucial as military structures for overall defence of the country. Learning from the success of the Ukrainian Territorial Defence Forces in fighting the Russian military,  is working to promote its own reservist force through public awareness campaigns, increased daily allowances for reservists, and crisis preparedness education.  similarly promotes civil protection while identifying â€œpolitical trustâ€� and â€œinter-ethnic cohesionâ€� as vital to national security. Both Baltic countries are also working to increase civil support for their law enforcement agencies, fire departments, and medical systems.  

As highlighted in the Latvian defence plan, social cohesion and confidence in state institutions and partnerships are essential for building and maintaining civil engagement in total defence. The  in Riga engages in public diplomacy, information operations, and psychological operations to align national efforts with NATO’s strategic objectives. The Latvian government has also partnered with the  â€“ an NGO with the goal of informing the public about NATO and Latvia’s participation in it.  

Social cohesion between ethnic communities has been a focus of national and local NGOs, as Russian-speaking minorities remain less likely to trust NATO or volunteer for national defence than their neighbours. In the northeastern region of Estonia,  works mostly with Russian speakers of all ages on projects developing critical thinking and media literacy. These projects promote active citizenship and social entrepreneurship through youth work and international exchanges. VitaTiim already has international partnerships, including with the European Solidarity Corps and the US Embassy in Estonia. In Latvia, the organization  focuses on education, culture, media, and civic engagement in the Baltics and beyond, specifically striving to foster open dialogue and social inclusion for underrepresented ethnic minorities.  

Despite these institutional frameworks and nonprofit initiatives, recent polling reveals a high likelihood amongst the public to do nothing to defend Estonia and Latvia from a military threat, as well as a persistent gap in how different ethnic communities perceive national security and threats to their country. To better understand these dynamics, the following data examines security perceptions across the region. 

Survey Evidence: Societal Resilience Gaps in Estonia and LatviaÌı

Polling from ĞÓ°ÉÔ­´´ University’s Eastern European and Transatlantic Network (EETN) shows that,Ìıas of Spring 2025, many people in Estonia and Latvia do not see themselves as active participants in defence during a crisis. Most significantly, about 30% of Estonians and Latvians say they are likely to do nothingÌıin the event ofÌıa military threat.ÌıÌı

Demographic and geographicÌıcharacteristics ofÌıthis vulnerabilityÌıshow a stark division:Ìıalmost halfÌıof ethnic RussiansÌı(46%)ÌıresidingÌıin Latvia and EstoniaÌıwouldÌıdo nothingÌıifÌıtheirÌırespective countries face a military threat.ÌıFour in 10Ìı(43%)ÌıpolledÌıresidentsÌıofÌıLatgale, a region of Latvia directly on the border with RussiaÌıcomprisedÌıof aÌılarge Russian-speaking minority,Ìısay they would not act.ÌıHalf of those polledÌıin Northeastern EstoniaÌı(51%), another region sharing a border with RussiaÌıand having a similar demographic composition as Latgale, are also likely to do nothing.Ìı

Reported willingness to participate in national defence is low. When asked whether they would join the active-duty military in the event of a military threat, only about 20% of Estonians and Latvians say they are likely to do so, and only about 30% are likely to join the military reserves or territorial forces in response to the same threat.  

While more people are willing to take up non-combat forms of national defence, still, even such likelihood is low. Estonians appear to be more likely to assist in this way than Latvians, approximately six in 10 (59%) of Estonians are likely to volunteer to contribute with physical labour, versus 44% in Latvia. ĞÓ°ÉÔ­´´ half (48%) of Estonians are likely to volunteer to contribute financially, compared to only 29% of Latvians.  

Ethnic Russians in both countries are even less likely to be active defenders in the event of a military threat. A staggering 80% of ethnic Russians in Latvia and Estonia are unlikely to join the active-duty military, military reserves, or territorial forces. In Estonia, 41% of ethnic Russians are likely to volunteer to contribute with physical labour, but this number drops significantly in Latvia, with only 29% of ethnic Russians likely to do so. Finally, only about 20% of ethnic Russians, in both Estonia and Latvia, are likely to volunteer to contribute financially.  

From a policy perspective, this polling data highlightsÌıbothÌıaÌıgap and anÌıopportunity. If a significant segment of the population is unlikely toÌıcontribute to the active defence of their country, resilience-building efforts must expand beyond militaryÌıdeployments. To foster the social cohesion necessary for resilience, trustÌıand cooperation between minority and majority communities must be bolstered. NATO and Canada can do this through collaboration with local community networksÌı–Ìısuch asÌıVitaTiimÌıand New EastÌı–Ìıthat are already on the groundÌıinÌıthe region.Ìı

ConclusionÌı

Recent polling data from Estonia and Latvia suggests a region with a significant gap in societal resilience. While Russia is overwhelmingly perceived as a security threat, willingness to actÌıin the event ofÌıa military threat is low. This gap is particularly pronounced alongÌıdemographicÌılines, with lower willingness to act amongÌıethnic Russians. AsÌıEstonia and LatviaÌıareÌılikely targetsÌıfor potential future Russian aggression, this deficit in resilience has direct implications for Canadian and NATO security commitments in the region. By supporting well-monitored projects with local organizations that build social cohesion and civic preparedness, Canada and NATO can help ensure Estonia and Latvia are more resilient and better prepared to withstand a military threat.ÌıÌı

Policy RecommendationsÌı

1. NATO and Canada should create a dedicated societal resilience grant to support local NGOs such as VitaTiim and New East that advance social cohesion and civic preparedness. Supported projects should have bilingual messaging (in Russian and Estonian or Latvian) and may include media literacy and cyber safety training, community initiatives fostering dialogue across demographic lines, and projects that engage citizens as partners in international governance. 

The grant should emphasize collaboration between local and international organizations, promoting a shared responsibility in local, national, and international governance. Priority should go to local initiatives in regions with large Russian-speaking populations. 

2. Each NATO/Canadian-supported project should be required to include a monitoring, evaluation, and feedback plan in alignment with NATO’s . Thorough monitoring is necessary in order to accurately evaluate how effective projects are at bolstering societal resilience and civic preparedness.  

3. Canada and NATO should use existing NATO StratCom COE platforms to highlight successful partnerships in relatable ways to the Estonians and Latvians, including through multilingual media and public events. Positive views of NATO and the West expressed by individuals and organizations that already have credibility in their communities should be amplified to . 

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Executive Summary  

Transatlantic relations are currently facing growing uncertainty due to significant strategic divergences in the fields of trade, security, technology, and global governance. From the trade tariff disputes to President of the United States (US) Donald Trump’s territorial claims on Greenland, ties between the European Union (EU) and the US are under growing stress. This tension has heavy repercussions on the EU and its member states. Fears about an effective transatlantic decoupling have reenergized calls for the EU to acquire a capacity to act on its own. In this context, Canada can play a decisive role. Stronger EU-Canada cooperation could provide an answer to this new strategic anxiety. It would also allow to reduce dependency on the US and help develop both Canadian and European strategic autonomy.  

Changing Transatlantic Relations: An Opening for Deeper Canada-EU Ties 

While the first Trump administration tested traditional transatlantic relations, Trump’s second term has marked a significant recalibration of US foreign policy that has fundamentally challenged the core values that have underpinned this relationship for the last 80 years. From recurring trade tariff disputes to territorial claims over Greenland, Trump’s actions have often questioned â€“ and even opposed â€“ the US’s role as the principal guarantor of transatlantic stability and security. His administration has delegitimized multilateralism in favour of a “selective engagementâ€� strategy with individual US partners. The recent US , released in November 2025, formalized this major shift in American foreign policy. This new strategy reorders global priorities, reframes NATO Allies’ roles, and seeks stability in Europe to allow Washington to redirect its focus and resources to the Indo-Pacific and the Western Hemisphere. At the same time, it adopts  toward the EU, portraying it as a source of instability and accusing it of undermining political liberty, sovereignty, and social cohesion. 

These dynamics raise fundamental questions about the stability, predictability, and future shape of the transatlantic relationship. For the EU, the implications are immediate: increased strategic risk, reduced certainties, and stronger pressure to develop autonomous capabilities and diversified partnerships. 

Why Canada Matters to the EU (and why the EU Matters to Canada) 

In this rapidly-changing international environment marked by geopolitical fragmentation, erratic US behaviour, and Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine, the EU must meet three conditions in order to become a more credible and decisive actor at the global level: one, it must sway sufficient economic power; two, it must demonstrate political will to act cohesively both amongst its member states and with its international partners; and three, it must be perceived as a legitimate and credible entity by other . 

To achieve these conditions, the EU needs to strengthen its ties with like-minded democracies, such as . Among them, Canada appears as an especially natural and highly compatible partner for the EU. Throughout the last 50 years, Canada and the EU have built an exemplary partnership based on shared democratic values and worldview. But in today’s challenging global landscape, the EU and Canada stand together more firmly than ever as stable and trusted partners. And while the  and  serve as the foundation of the contemporary EU-Canada relationship, increased cooperation to both reinforce current areas of coopetition – such as security and defence â€“ as well as joint ventures in new sectors â€“ including the digital domain – will play key roles in the near future.

Security and Defence Cooperation Between Canada and the EU: A Win-Win Opportunity 

Canada’s contribution to European security and defence policy is hardly new: Ottawa has been a valued contributor to EU-led security and defence efforts for over a decade. It was the first country to establish a Security and Defence Dialogue with the EU in 2015; it participates in  and has contributed to . 

However, at the 20^th EU–Canada Summit in Brussels last June, António Costa, President of the European Council, Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, and Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada, together pledged to further strengthen their bilateral cooperation. Both sides committed to an ambitious and comprehensive partnership, the new , aimed at deepening cooperation across key areas such as trade, security, energy and other critical sectors. 

As part of their re-energized relationship, the EU High Representative of Foreign Affairs, Kaja Kallas, the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Anita Anand, and the Canadian Minister of Defense, David J. McGuinty, also signed the , which provides a framework for cooperation on cyber defence, hybrid threats, space security, maritime issues, crisis response and assistance to partners, such as Ukraine. This agreement also includes provisions for joint research in emerging technologies, which can help position both Canada and the EU as global leaders in these fields.  

This new agreement importantly lays the groundwork for increased defence procurement collaboration, primarily related to the EU’s . It also opened the door for   â€“ a new European loan instrument for joint procurement – and for an administrative arrangement between Canada and the European Defence Agency, the body that supports cooperative European  and provides a forum for European ministries of defence to coordinate their policies. As a result of this increased cooperation, both Brussels and Ottawa have made tangible steps to diversify their defence partnership and become less reliant and vulnerable to Washington’s shifting moods on collective security. Similarly, this new agreement enhances the resiliency of the European pillar within NATO, without either undermining the NATO Alliance or trying to substitute it. 

New Areas of Cooperation in the Digital Domain 

As part of their cooperative efforts, the Canadian Minister of Artificial Intelligence and Digital Innovation, Evan Solomon, and the Executive Vice-President of the European Commission for Technological Sovereignty, Security and Democracy, Henna Virkkunen, have also agreed to strengthen cooperation in the . On 8 December 2025, the first meeting of the EU-Canada Digital Partnership Council took place in Montreal, Quebec. The  made at the conclusion of that meeting showed that both sides recognized the importance that digital partnership plays in advancing bilateral efforts to boost competitiveness, innovation, and economic resilience. This meeting also resulted in Canada and the EU  This meeting also resulted in Canada and the , one on cooperation on artificial intelligence, and another on digital credentials, digital identity wallets, and trust services. This new partnership will guide collaboration on AI governance, quantum technologies, cybersecurity, and digital standards. The  of this partnership is to build digital systems that are secure, transparent, and centred on public trust.

Conclusion

The ongoing reconfiguration of US foreign policy and the end of predictable transatlantic relations have led the EU and its member states to reconsider their strategic goals and explore alternative strategies to promote their own interests and societal well-being. In this context, cooperation with Canada would be a win-win opportunity, allowing both sides to reduce dependencies on the US and bolster collective defence capabilities without undermining NATO. Strengthening the EU-Canada relationship could also help show other countries that â€“ in an era of re-emerging great power rivalry â€“ there is still an opportunity for states to create and benefit from collective partnerships. 

Policy Recommendations  

In order to make the EU-Canada cooperation effective and concrete, both sides should consider the following policy recommendations: 

• Take an active approach to , including encouragement of domestic defence industries to actively utilize this instrument to gain increased access to external markets. 

• Encourage all EU member states to ratify CETA, as only 17 member states have ratified the agreement thus far. Finalizing the ratification of CETA would ensure stability and continuity for the agreement and would signal increased confidence in the overall Canada-EU trade relationship going forward.  

• Strengthen efforts aimed at enhancing their bilateral , to advance and diversify trade, promote economic security and resilience, and create investment opportunities. 

• Increase cooperation in the extraction and trading of . Deepening ties in this area could help reduce dependencies on unreliable partners while strengthening internal supply chains.  

• Improve cooperation on  while at the same time continue working together in order to balance innovation with ethical considerations and standards. This includes joint investments on AI-driven sustainability solutions, the adoption of accountability measures for violators of AI regulations, and the enforcement of policies that support both technological advancement and societal well-being. 

• Utilize the strong EU-Canada relationship as a stepping stone to reinforce multilateral partnerships with like-minded democratic partners, such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, and Taiwan. 

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Summary

· Increasing hybrid activities in the international system expose Canada’s vulnerabilities in federal response, coordination, and cohesion in relation to evolving security threats and targets in the 21st century.

· Norway’s Total Defence model demonstrates how incorporating a “whole-of-society� approach can enhance resilience against hybrid threats.

· Canada should implement elements from the Norwegian model during a period of heightened hybrid operations.

Increase in Hybrid Activities

Hybrid threats have expanded since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Advancements in technology, drones and artificial intelligence (AI) have created cheaper alternatives for weakening and destabilising opponents without declaring war. These activities—with Russia as a main perpetrator— include espionage, cyberattacks, critical infrastructure sabotage, disinformation campaigns, and covert operations aimed at undermining democratic institutions and creating intrastate division. NATO member states, including , have each experienced drone incursions, cyber disruptions, and other hybrid operations linked to Russia that target critical infrastructure and European civil society more broadly.

Within this hybrid threat environment, . As its polar ice melts , states are “�; the economic frontier in particular holds . As such, the Arctic has become a key region in the security space due to its economic and security value; it is in Canada’s national interest to continue securing its Northern territories, safeguard its economic interests and relationships in this region, and overall strengthen societal resilience, as these factors remain paramount to combatting hybrid threats.

Canada’s National Security Strategy

Canada has technically not released a . The four defence policies it has released following the initial framework outline the distribution of military resources and emphasize the geopolitical importance of the Arctic. National security strategies outline the principles and priorities that guide governments in developing and implement security policy, and while Canada has released a , it merely mentions .

This stands in contrast to the Norway, which released its first . Norway’s National Security Strategy emphasises a “whole-of-society� approach; it highlights the increasing role of hybrid tactics and prioritises societal resilience as a tool to reduce vulnerabilities, as discussed below. Furthermore, there are plans to , to meet the demands and changing international conditions. By drawing on the cohesive and coordinated Norwegian model, Canada could model its own security policy measures and responses in a way that increases societal resilience while defending against hybrid threats. It presents an opportunity for collaboration in a region increasingly being characterized as important yet vulnerable with trusted allies, thereby also serving as a coordinated response across two key Arctic states.

Infrastructure Gaps

A key source of strength and vulnerability in Canada is its vast geography and regional differences, particularly as it relates to critical infrastructure capability. The Arctic holds forty percent of Canada’s landmass but hosts less than . Infrastructure in the Canadian Arctic is lacking and is . With Canada’s historical neglect of the Arctic and its , adversaries have begun to aimed at targeting public trust and democratic institutions. These efforts jeopardise national security and the resilience of communities across Canada; however, the Canadian government also has the opportunity to further expand its coordination with Indigenous communities.

The Canadian Rangers are a key example of Indigenous knowledge in action in the Arctic; As mentioned in other analyses conducted by EETN, the Rangers . Continuing to utilise and expand relationships related to their knowledge as Indigenous to Turtle Island will assist in many different facets. The expansion of relationships also creates an important opportunity to reconcile and develop a renewed sense of collaboration rather than one of dependency and colonial hierarchy. This process will assist in increasing resilience across communities while building sustainably, and work to break down information siloes while developing a holistic, “whole-of-society� security model.

Institutional Coordination

The current Norwegian strategy, which integrates civilian and military components under a single framework, is a whole-of-society approach. A key pillar in their strategy is the concept of “Total Defence�; that is, “.� With a Total Defence model, Norway places resilience in the hands of the Norwegian collective, rather than one single entity, to address 21st-century threats. In 2021, the government formalised collaboration and involvement with the private sector, . This led to greater information sharing and increased dialogue, laying a foundation for better coordination.

The current Canadian model demonstrates an overarching lack of coordination, as the responsibility to respond to hybrid threats implicates a network of federal agencies, including . While each agency’s mandate targets a specific area of Canada’s security, overarching coordination between the network remains limited and complex.

The 2025 Auditor General Report on Cyber Security of Government Network and Systems stated that while agencies have the tools to respond to cyber-attacks, there are still major gaps and vulnerabilities that remain. Recent cyber-attacks against Global Affairs Canada (GAC) and Financial Transactions and Report Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC) demonstrated issues in information sharing and coordination. As a result of incomplete procedures and protocols, it took .

This lack of coordination across government agencies has resulted in information siloes, which have subsequently led to . This translates to public-private cooperation as information-sharing remains voluntary, with ; nonetheless, the federal government has struggled to maintain consistency in information-sharing, leading to coverage gaps in Canadian hybrid response models. In contrast, the Norwegian model has which predominately focus on national cyber security, national intelligence, and joint cyber coordination. . Norway has developed a system which utilises the Joint Coordination Centres to clearly define roles, and ensures that institutional siloes are minimized, as each Centre has a clear mandate of membership and information sharing, which must be further addressed in the Canadian context.

Conclusion

Canadian exposure to hybrid threats is increasing. There remains a lack of coordination in how Canada aims to address and respond to such threats, leaving the country vulnerable to the actions undertaken by adversaries by virtue of relying on outdated frameworks of national security. The Norwegians’ Total Defence model demonstrates that while a whole-of-society approach is challenging; proper coordination, ongoing communication, and public-private partnerships are key to building longstanding societal and national resilience. By taking the steps to update our national security strategy, improving interagency coordination, and minimising gaps in Northern community infrastructure, Canada could better address and be proactive in responding to the hybrid threats of the 21st century.

Policy Recommendations

· Redevelop and update a National Security Strategy featuring a National Hybrid Resilience Framework.

· Continue partnering with Inuit, Indigenous, and Northern communities to close infrastructure gaps; look for new opportunities to build security relationships with Indigenous communities in Canada and across the Northern European continent.

· Develop a working group built of regionally-balanced, public-private stakeholders for information-sharing and threat management.

· Conduct intersecting reviews of the CSIS Act and the RCMP Act to minimise institutional silos that prevent effective and coordinated response management to hybrid threats.

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Lessons Learned from Norway appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

Following the Brexit vote in 2016 the defence relationship between the UK and the EU has since been relatively unfettered. This strength can largely be attributed to the increasing coordination through NATO institutions and the establishment of the Coalition of the Willing, creating functional cooperation without deepening policy integration between the UK and the EU. Yet this relationship has clear limits. As EU defence policy focuses inward on industry and procurement, the effects of Brexit now have immediate impacts on European capacity building.

To read the full policy brief, click the download button below.

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Traditionally, strategic stability was commonly understood to be when no major power perceived an incentive to initiate a first nuclear strike. Historically, during the Cold War, this condition rested on mutual vulnerability and was achieved through arms control and measure. However, this framework is being reshaped by the advent of digital capabilities.

Unlike the relatively static assumptions of mutual vulnerability in Cold War–era stability models, the digital era introduces fluid and adaptive threat environments, compresses decision-making time, and reduces predictability.

To read the full policy brief and the implications for Canadian strategic stability, our national strategic autonomy, and potential contributions to our alliance partners, click the Download button below.

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