Executive Summary:

Russia’s war against Ukraine is also a struggle about public interpretation. NATO members have responded to Russia’s full-scale invasion through sanctions, military aid, deterrence, and diplomatic efforts. These actions depend on the public understanding that Russia is the aggressor, Ukraine is the victim of an illegal invasion, and support for Ukraine is important for European and transatlantic security. Russia’s counter-narrative seeks to weaken this consensus view by claiming that Ukraine, NATO, the US, or the West provoked the war.

Drawing on , with a Canada-focused analysis, as initially outlined at ĐÓ°ÉÔ­´´ University’s 2026 Eastern European and Transatlantic Network conference, this brief argues that trust in NATO is central to how citizens interpret responsibility for the war. Canadian public opinion remains strongly aligned with the core NATO narrative: most Canadians blame Russia, while only a small minority blame the West. Yet this minority is not randomly distributed. Canadians who do not trust NATO are significantly more likely to accept the narrative that the West provoked the war, while Canadians who trust NATO are much more likely to blame Russia.

The implication is straightforward: countering disinformation is not only about correcting false claims after they spread. It is also about sustaining public trust in the institutions whose messages compete with adversaries’ propaganda and misinformation. For Canada and its NATO Allies, trust in NATO should therefore be treated as a security resource — one that requires proactive prebunking, clearer explanations of NATO’s relevance to Canadian security, and a wider network of trusted messengers.

Introduction: The Narrative Dimension of the War in Ukraine

NATO countries responded to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 through military, economic, and diplomatic means and pressure. However, this support also sparked an ongoing discussion about how and why this war erupted. The core NATO narrative is straightforward: Russia is the aggressor, Ukraine is the victim of an unlawful and unprovoked invasion, and allied support for Ukraine is necessary for European and transatlantic security. The main Kremlin counter-narrative tells a different story: Ukraine, NATO, the United States, or “the West” provoked the war, leaving Russia no choice but to invade in order to protect its so-called historical sphere of influence.

This ongoing contest matters because it can affect whether citizens support sanctions, weapons deliveries, refugee assistance, defense spending, and long-term deterrence measures taken by their countries and NATO. If the public believes that Russia caused the war, continued support for Ukraine and NATO cohesion becomes easier to sustain. If the public believes that NATO or the West provoked the war, allied policy aimed at countering Russia can appear reckless, hypocritical, or needlessly escalatory.

Much of the discussion about Russian information operations focuses on the supply side. It aims to address threats posed by, for example, Russian propaganda, falsehoods, and electoral and other interference, across different channels and platforms. These are important. , a foreign disinformation detection institution, defines foreign information manipulation and interference as “intentional and coordinated efforts by state or non-state actors to alter information in pursuit of political, security, or other strategic objectives.” But supply alone does not explain why people in Canada and other countries believe one competing strategic narrative over another.

This brief, therefore, focuses on the demand side of strategic narrative reception. Why are some citizens more receptive to the Kremlin’s West-blame narrative while others accept the NATO narrative that Russia caused the war? Findings from suggest that people tend to rely on trust in the messenger as a shortcut to plausibility. When they trust NATO, they also tend to trust its messaging. When they distrust NATO, those same explanations are easier to dismiss as propaganda, spin, or elite messaging.

Strategic Narratives and the Credibility of the Narrator

Strategic narratives are stories that countries tell to “win the story” as they frame issues, advance their goals, and convince others of the righteousness of their actions in global affairs. Strategic narratives identify heroes and villains, assign blame, explain crises, and justify policy choices. In the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine, narratives about the origins of the war are especially important because they can and do shape policy debates. If Russia is understood as the aggressor, then sanctions, deterrence, and military assistance to Ukraine follow logically. If NATO is understood as the provocateur, then those same policies can be framed as a dangerous escalation.

Narratives succeed not only because of repetition or exposure. They also depend on the narrator’s perceived credibility. Citizens do not evaluate every claim from scratch; they use their trust in the messenger as a cognitive shortcut that, especially when multiple competing narratives are present, is more likely to lead them to accept or reject the story in question.

This is why fact-checking and rebuttals of malign information, while necessary, are not sufficient. The consensus recommendations in emphasize that corrections are most effective when they are clear, credible, and accompanied by an alternative explanation. However, both this handbook and our research suggest that to increase the likelihood that the audience accepts the debunking, the audience should hold a positive view of the messenger. When trust is low, the same corrections can be rejected as self-interested messaging. In practice, “truth” often competes with “trusted.”

The policy implication is that institutional credibility is neither a soft nor a secondary issue. It is part of democratic resilience. explicitly identifies resilience as central to its ability to deter and defend. While NATO’s deterrent posture depends on military capabilities, we should also keep in mind that the Alliance also depends on public support for the political choices that make deterrence credible. If hostile information operations can weaken trust in the institutions that explain and justify allied policy, they can complicate democratic decision-making even without changing facts on the ground.

Evidence from the Survey: Canada as a High-Trust but Still Vulnerable Case

The empirical evidence for this brief comes from the . The survey asked respondents who they believe caused the war in Ukraine and measured trust in NATO, the EU, and domestic institutions.

Figure 1: Public Trust in NATO across Alliance Countries

Canada is a useful case because public alignment with the core NATO narrative is strong overall. In the Canadian sample, approximately 84% of respondents blame Russia for the war, while only about 8% blame the West. Around 60% of reports trust NATO. This suggests that Kremin’s West-blame narrative has not received much traction in Canada.

Yet the Canadian data also show why overconfidence would be a mistake. West-blame beliefs are not evenly distributed. They are concentrated among respondents who do not trust NATO. For Canadians who trust NATO, only about 4% blame the West. Among those who do not trust NATO, the figure rises to about 15%. Similarly, about 90% of Canadians who trust NATO blame Russia, compared to about 74% among those who do not trust NATO.

Figure 2: Canadian Trust in NATO and Blame Attribution for the War in Ukraine

The full Canadian results reinforce this pattern. Controlling for socio-demographic factors, trust in NATO is strongly associated with blaming Russia for the war and strongly negatively associated with blaming the West. Other socio-demographic and attitudinal factors also matter, but the clearest and most policy-relevant pattern is the relationship between trust in NATO and blame attribution.

This does not mean that distrust in NATO automatically translates into pro-Kremlin beliefs. The relationship may run in both directions. Some citizens may distrust NATO and therefore reject NATO’s account of the war. Others may become less trusting of NATO after consuming information critical of it. Both processes could occur simultaneously. For policy purposes, however, the direction is less important than the vulnerability itself. Where trust in NATO is lower, NATO’s messages are less likely to be heard, and adversarial narratives are more likely to find receptive audiences.

Why This Matters for Canada

For Canada, the findings are directly relevant as it is an active player in Europe and, increasingly, the Arctic. Through , Canada has played a leading role in NATO’s presence in Latvia and on the Alliance’s eastern flank. °ä˛ą˛Ô˛ą»ĺ˛ąâ€™s security interests extend to the Arctic, cyber defence, democratic resilience, and the protection of a rules-based order that is directly challenged by Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. In the Arctic, however, security communication must also include Inuit and other Indigenous communities as central stakeholders, since their knowledge, rights, livelihoods, and local security concerns are directly affected by how Canada defines and communicates its northern defence priorities.

Moreover, NATO can still feel abstract to many Canadians. It may appear distant, bureaucratic, European, or not sufficiently in Canada’s interests. When NATO is understood mainly as a Brussels-based security organization, it is easier for adversaries to portray it as “out-of-touch” with the average Canadian. When NATO is understood as Canadian soldiers in Latvia for the purposes of preventing a wider war, as Arctic deterrence, as cyber cooperation, and as a framework that helps prevent wider war, its relevance to Canada and Canadians is strengthened.

The challenge is not simply to tell Canadians that NATO matters; it is to show how NATO strengthens Canadian security and °ä˛ą˛Ô˛ą»ĺ˛ąâ€™s international role. This is particularly important as allied governments ask the public to support higher defense spending, long-term military assistance to Ukraine, and sustained deterrence. These policies require political endurance, and political endurance depends on public trust. For example, °ä˛ą˛Ô˛ą»ĺ˛ąâ€™s broader efforts against foreign information manipulation and interference could connect more directly to strategic communication about NATO. Monitoring hostile narratives, exposing coordinated manipulation, and working with platforms remain necessary. However, °ä˛ą˛Ô˛ą»ĺ˛ąâ€™s counter-disinformation strategy should also focus on credibility-building to increase the likelihood that its messages will resonate better with the public. This means transparency, consistency, local relevance, and messengers who can reach audiences that may not respond to official statements.

For example, °ä˛ą˛Ô˛ą»ĺ˛ąâ€™s broader efforts against could connect more directly to strategic communication about NATO. Monitoring hostile narratives, exposing coordinated manipulation, and working with platforms remain necessary. However, °ä˛ą˛Ô˛ą»ĺ˛ąâ€™s counter-disinformation strategy should also focus on credibility-building to increase the likelihood that its messages will resonate better with the public. This means transparency, consistency, local relevance, and messengers who can reach audiences that may not respond to official statements.

Why Rebuttals and Takedowns Are Not Enough

Democratic governments often respond to disinformation with three main tools: exposure, removal, and correction. They identify false claims, work to take them down if possible, and post factual rebuttals. These tools are important, but they tend to be reactive. By the time a false narrative has spread widely, corrections may reach only a fraction of the original audience. Also, in instances where people do not trust the institutions or organizations taking up the correcting, attempts to take down false narratives could reinforce distrust and suspicion. Studies on and show that it helps to anticipate and address manipulation techniques before people encounter them.

It may be helpful to supplement existing debunking efforts with more prebunking, building societal resistance to misinformation, and strengthening trust in NATO and similar institutions. Experimental research by show that short interventions aimed at informing people about common manipulation tactics used by hostile actors can increase resilience to misinformation. For example, before a major NATO summit, Ukrainian aid package, or deployment decision, Canadian and allied communicators can anticipate predictable claims that NATO provoked the war, Ukraine is merely a proxy, or Canada is paying for Europe’s war. Rather than waiting for these claims to circulate, Canadian and NATO communicators could explain in advance why they are misleading and how they fit into a broader Russian narrative strategy aimed at dividing and weakening Canada and NATO. This approach should be simple and delivered by trusted voices. It should avoid overly technical language.

At the same time, NATO and Canadian institutions need to avoid communicating only during crises. Trust building takes time and patience. If the public learns about the role and benefits of NATO membership only when leaders are seeking support for a given initiative, they may view such communication with suspicion.

Policy Recommendations

1. Treat trust as an early-warning indicator

Canada already monitors foreign information manipulation and interference and conducts public opinion research on security issues. Canada and its Allies should monitor public trust in NATO and other key security institutions as part of democratic resilience planning. Public opinion polls should ask respondents whether they trust NATO, the Canadian government, and similar institutions. Declining trust should be treated as an early warning indicator that more outreach is needed to reduce susceptibility to adversarial information warfare.

2. Institutionalize prebunking before predictable narrative attacks

More attention should be paid to prebunking at moments when adversarial information warfare is likely to escalate (e.g., predictable narrative attacks). Among others, such events likely include NATO summits, defense spending announcements, Ukraine aid package announcements, troop deployments abroad, and elections in allied countries. Communicators should prepare short, accessible materials that explain both the facts and the manipulation techniques adversaries are likely to use. Such efforts should be coordinated by the Canadian government, NATO allies, and other communicators to increase narrative resilience before hostile narratives reach NATO audiences.

3. Make NATO concrete in Canadian public communication

Conduct public information campaigns aimed at explaining the benefits of NATO membership and consistently connecting them to Canadian security interests. Such a campaign could use specific examples to emphasize NATO’s relevance by highlighting its leadership in Latvia, its role in Arctic security, its cyber defense capabilities, and its efforts to prevent a wider war in Europe, among others. Such communication should also be transparent about trade-offs, given legitimate questions about rising defense spending and the implications of Canada’s growing involvement in European deterrence initiatives. Credible communication should not avoid taking on difficult questions directly — in fact, addressing them should help with building trust.

4. Expand the trusted messenger network

Canada already supports public outreach initiatives aimed at countering disinformation and promoting democratic resilience. Such work should be extended to matters surrounding NATO and its work. Since government and NATO officials may not always be the most trusted communicators, Canada should aim to work with a wide network of credible messengers, including veterans, reservists, military families, educators, local officials, Ukrainian and Eastern European diaspora communities, Indigenous and northern voices on Arctic security, and independent scholars. Using such goodwill ambassadors should help key messages reach individuals across different local and social contexts. This could be a way to reach audiences distrustful of political elites.

Conclusion: Trust as Democratic Deterrence

The full-scale invasion in Ukraine highlighted that deterrence requires military capability, political will, and social resilience. Part of Russia’s challenges to NATO is represented by its hostile information operations. Moscow does not want NATO to admire Russia – it only needs enough citizens to doubt NATO’s reliability, blame the West for the invasion of Ukraine, oppose support, or lose confidence that allied institutions are telling the truth.

The Canadian evidence presented here offers both reassurance and warning — and policy recommendations outlined here aim to strengthen °ä˛ą˛Ô˛ą»ĺ˛ąâ€™s broader democratic resilience. Most Canadians blame Russia for the war, and the Kremlin’s West-blame narrative remains a minority view. But that minority is meaningfully larger among those who do not trust NATO. Increasing trust in NATO, in turn, would require ongoing attention to informational campaigns aimed at raising public understanding of why and how the Alliance matters.

The post Canada and Allies Cannot Win the Information War if Their Populations Do Not Trust NATO appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

Introduction

In recent years, Europe’s geopolitical centre of gravity has shifted toward the Northeast, with the Baltic region emerging as a . As , the Organization’s member countries are increasingly focused on deterrence and defence. Traditional conceptions of deterrence are constructed around three pillars: . This memo focuses on the second “C” â€“ credibility â€“ by examining prospects for strengthening the resilience of NATO’s military supply chains in the Baltic region through defence industrial cooperation between the three enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) framework nations (Canada, Germany, and the United Kingdom (UK)) and the three host nations (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia). 

As a response to Russia’s military aggression and hybrid warfare against Ukraine since 2014, the 2016 NATO Warsaw summit marked a significant step towards reinforcing the security of the Baltic region. Canada, Germany, and the UK assumed leadership as framework nations for eFP battlegroups in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, respectively. While the eFP signals a strong multinational Allied presence in the Baltic states, lessons from Ukraine since 2022 inevitably raise critical questions: is NATO ready to fight for a prolonged period? And can NATO secure supply chains so that they remain close to the war fighters? 

This policy brief first analyses how resilient supply chains lay the foundation for credible long-term deterrence. Second, it examines the role and prospects of defence industrial cooperation between eFP framework nations and host nations, before finally concluding with three concrete policy recommendations.  

WhyĚýDoesĚýSecurity of Supply Matter?Ěý

There is an old saying attributed to Dwight. E. Eisenhower that . It is also true that , as each nation brings its own peculiarities while the combined force must act as a single organization. To put this into perspective, the Canadian-led NATO Multinational Brigade in Latvia (formerly, the eFP battlegroup) is composed of 14 nations, making it NATO’s  military unit. 

Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, NATO began scaling the three eFP battlegroups in the Baltics into brigade-sized units. Germany’s 45^th Panzer brigade has been relocated to Lithuania and is expected to achieve . Canada is also considering  in Latvia.  

Regardless of how its war against Ukraine ends, Russia will remain an existential security threat to the Baltic states. To deter and, if necessary, defend against Russia in the Baltic region, NATO Allies â€“ especially the eFP framework nations â€“ must demonstrate both the capacity and the resolve to fight alongside the host nations for as long as it takes to defend NATO territory. This, in turn, requires a continuous and resilient flow of supplies through to the battlefield.  

While experts have called for the  to sustain operational capability in the longer term, this approach has clear limitations – most importantly because stockpiles are finite in the event of a prolonged conflict. To secure an uninterrupted supply, it is essential to develop local defence industrial capacities. 

Security of supply extends beyond the availability of raw materials and manufacturing components. Latvia’s  defines security of supply as a guarantee of access to the materiel and services required by the National Armed Forces to fulfil its tasks. This understanding emphasizes that the defence industrial base is an integral part of comprehensive defence strategy across the peace-crisis-war spectrum. It also implies that the defence industries of eFP host nations must be able to supply not only their national militaries but also Allied armed forces. However, defence industries in the Baltic states, while growing rapidly, are still relatively nascent, and there may not be sufficient latent industrial capacity to scale up production quickly in time of crisis.  

Failure to secure military supply chains would pose strategic risks that are particularly acute given the geographic characteristics of the Baltic states. A close proximity to Russia and reliance on the roughly 65km-wide  to link the region to the rest of Europe exacerbate supply vulnerabilities. To ensure that NATO forces deployed in the region can fight a prolonged war, it is necessary to establish short, resilient, and regionally-anchored military supply chains and, at the same time, to deepen defence industrial cooperation between the eFP framework nations and host nations. 

Enhancing the Enhanced Forward PresenceĚý

The  posits that the Baltic states constitute a single area of operations. This means that regional cooperation should be understood as a key enabler of credible deterrence and effective defence. This logic applies not only to trilateral Baltic cooperation but also among all Allies deployed in the region.  

To improve coordination between the three framework nations and the three host nations, the  was launched in 2023. Although it was originally envisaged as a platform for political and strategic dialogue in areas of common interest, such as training and exercises, it also holds untapped potential to serve as a venue for industrial cooperation and joint supply chain management. 

There are already examples of bilateral cooperation in this area. Recently, the Latvian Ministry of Defence signed a  (MoU) with the Canadian Commercial Corporation â€“ °ä˛ą˛Ô˛ą»ĺ˛ąâ€™s government-to-government contracting agency –  concerning bilateral cooperation in military equipment, services, infrastructure, and industry. 

However, since the Baltics consider themselves to be a single area of operations, a broader relationship of regional cooperation between the framework and host nations is needed. Dialogue must take place at all levels – political, strategic, operational, tactical, as well as between defence industries. Regular information sharing and practical measures to harmonize defence investment and industrial policies will strengthen the security of supply and help forge new defence industrial partnerships.

WhatĚýDo Host Nations Have to Offer?Ěý

The three host nations are  in NATO. With defence budgets reaching 5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2026, the Baltic states are actively developing local defence industrial capabilities. In recent years, . There are notable success stories, such as the production of  and subsequent expansion into assembly and maintenance of more advanced systems such as . Nevertheless, the Baltic defence industries remain primarily focused on niche technological areas and generally lack the scale to support full production cycles of heavy armaments or other advanced military systems. At the same time, their relatively small size makes Baltic defence industries flexible, innovation-oriented, and able to rapidly adapt. 

This environment creates opportunities for foreign defence companies to enter the market and address the existing gaps in cooperation with local partners. As of 2025, all three framework nations allocate at least 2% of GDP to defence and have committed to increase defence expenditure up to 5% of GDP by 2035. Consequently, there is a strong push to build homegrown . 

Recently, German defence companies have been particularly active in the Baltic states. For example,  to establish 155mm artillery ammunition production facilities. More recently, Lithuania Defense Services, a joint venture established in 2022 by Rheinmetall and KNDS Germany, announced plans to .  

 and  are also pursuing ambitious efforts to expand their defence industrial capacities. For example, a Canadian company  to establish assembly lines for its BlackWolf tactical armoured vehicles in Latvia. Of the three eFP framework nations, such partnerships are especially relevant for Canada given the geographical distance between Canada and the Baltic region. Partnering Canadian defence industry with local companies in Latvia not only facilitates access to new markets but also helps build viable defence industrial capacity in the Baltic states for warfighting purposes, especially in a prolonged conflict.  

This logic extends beyond the manufacture of original equipment to also encompass access to critical components and materials. For example, last year the Canadian company â€“ a component that is essential for sensors and electronic systems widely used in defence technology, such as aircraft, missiles, and drones. 

The new geopolitical reality, growing defence budgets, and commitment to develop defence industrial capabilities underscore the need to coordinate defence investment and industrial policies within the 3+3 format. Such coordination would help secure military supply chains precisely where they are needed the most. This approach would align with broader NATO efforts to ramp up defence industrial capacities, such as  and .  

Conclusions andĚýRecommendationsĚý

Secured supply chains through defence industrial cooperation are not just desirable; they are a strategic necessity for credible deterrence. Since its creation, , from which the defence industries of framework and host nations stand to benefit. 

To harness the potential of defence industrial cooperation within the 3+3 format, the policymakers in the three framework nations and the three host nations should consider the following actions: 

1. Expand the Scope of 3+3 Format to Include Defence Industrial Cooperation.  

TheĚý3+3ĚýagendaĚýshouldĚýbeĚýbroadened byĚýhavingĚýregular meetings of keyĚýrepresentativesĚý– such asĚýNational Armaments DirectorsĚý–Ěýfrom the Baltic states, Canada, Germany, and theĚýUKĚýto promote dialogue, coordinate policies,Ěýand identify opportunitiesĚýforĚýdefence industrial cooperation andĚýstrengtheningĚýsecurity of supplyĚýacross the region.ĚýĚý

2. Establish an Annual 3+3 Defence Industry Forum.  

To facilitate the establishment of cross-border partnerships between defence companies, regular and open dialogue is essential. As several bilateral defence industry events already exist, a dedicated 3+3 Defence Industry Forum could be built on these foundations, providing a multilateral platform for collaboration. 

3. D±đ±ą±đ±ô´Ç±č&˛Ô˛ú˛ő±č;¸é±đ˛µľ±´Ç˛Ô˛ą±ô±ô˛â&˛Ô˛ú˛ő±č;´ˇ˛Ôł¦łó´Ç°ů±đ»ĺ&˛Ô˛ú˛ő±č;±Ę°ů´Ç»ĺłÜł¦łŮľ±´Ç˛Ô&˛Ô˛ú˛ő±č;°ä˛ą±č˛ął¦ľ±łŮľ±±đ˛ő.   

Host nations and framework nations should invest in new production facilities and reinforce supply chains for the militaries deployed in the Baltic region. Framework nations’ defence industry national champions should take a leading role and integrate host nations’ defence industries into regional supply chains. This approach would promote transfer of knowledge and technology, as well as strengthen the overall capacity to sustain operations over a prolonged period. 

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Key TakeawaysĚý

• ĐÓ°ÉÔ­´´ one in three residents of Estonia and Latvia say they would do nothingĚýin the event ofĚýa military threat, with even lower likelihood to act among ethnic Russians.ĚýĚý

• Interest inĚýparticipatingĚýthrough non-combat roles (e.g.,Ěýfinancial contributions) is higher than in combat rolesĚýbut still does not reflectĚýa significantĚýportionĚýof the populationĚýin either Latvia or Estonia.Ěý

• NATO (and Canada) shouldĚýaddressĚýtheĚýsocietal resilienceĚýgap among localĚýcommunities.ĚýTargeted grants for trusted local organizations, coupled with strong monitoring and evaluation, can help build social cohesion and civic preparedness across Estonia and Latvia, particularly in regions with a significant ethnic Russian population.Ěý

BackgroundĚý

Recent polling data from Estonia and Latvia suggest there is a significant gap in societal resilience among the residents of both countries. While Russia is overwhelmingly perceived as a security threat within these nations, an overall willingness to act in the event of a military threat is low. This gap is particularly pronounced along demographic lines, with lower willingness to act among ethnic Russians in Estonia and Latvia. As the Baltic states are likely targets for potential future Russian aggression, this deficit in resilience has direct implications for Canadian and NATO security commitments in the region.  

Since their post-Soviet independence, Estonia and Latvia have invested heavily in defence preparedness through joining NATO, bolstering their cyber networks, and educating their youth on mis- and disinformation. After Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, Canada joined its NATO Allies in strengthening defence structures in Eastern and Central Europe under , currently the Canadian Armed Forces’ (CAF) largest overseas mission. Recognizing the particular vulnerability of the Baltic states to Russian aggression, Canada took the initiative to lead the Multinational Battlegroup in Latvia in 2017. After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Canada committed to scaling this presence into a full . Following his election in Spring 2025, Prime Minister Mark Carney emphasized that these operations work to reinforce NATO at a time of great global instability and change. 

To meet NATO’s Article 3 , Estonia and Latvia have adopted â€śTotal Defence” models, recognizing that societal resilience and civilian participation are just as crucial as military structures for overall defence of the country. Learning from the success of the Ukrainian Territorial Defence Forces in fighting the Russian military,  is working to promote its own reservist force through public awareness campaigns, increased daily allowances for reservists, and crisis preparedness education.  similarly promotes civil protection while identifying â€śpolitical trust” and â€śinter-ethnic cohesion” as vital to national security. Both Baltic countries are also working to increase civil support for their law enforcement agencies, fire departments, and medical systems.  

As highlighted in the Latvian defence plan, social cohesion and confidence in state institutions and partnerships are essential for building and maintaining civil engagement in total defence. The  in Riga engages in public diplomacy, information operations, and psychological operations to align national efforts with NATO’s strategic objectives. The Latvian government has also partnered with the  â€“ an NGO with the goal of informing the public about NATO and Latvia’s participation in it.  

Social cohesion between ethnic communities has been a focus of national and local NGOs, as Russian-speaking minorities remain less likely to trust NATO or volunteer for national defence than their neighbours. In the northeastern region of Estonia,  works mostly with Russian speakers of all ages on projects developing critical thinking and media literacy. These projects promote active citizenship and social entrepreneurship through youth work and international exchanges. VitaTiim already has international partnerships, including with the European Solidarity Corps and the US Embassy in Estonia. In Latvia, the organization  focuses on education, culture, media, and civic engagement in the Baltics and beyond, specifically striving to foster open dialogue and social inclusion for underrepresented ethnic minorities.  

Despite these institutional frameworks and nonprofit initiatives, recent polling reveals a high likelihood amongst the public to do nothing to defend Estonia and Latvia from a military threat, as well as a persistent gap in how different ethnic communities perceive national security and threats to their country. To better understand these dynamics, the following data examines security perceptions across the region. 

Survey Evidence: Societal Resilience Gaps in Estonia and LatviaĚý

Polling from ĐÓ°ÉÔ­´´ University’s Eastern European and Transatlantic Network (EETN) shows that,Ěýas of Spring 2025, many people in Estonia and Latvia do not see themselves as active participants in defence during a crisis. Most significantly, about 30% of Estonians and Latvians say they are likely to do nothingĚýin the event ofĚýa military threat.ĚýĚý

Demographic and geographicĚýcharacteristics ofĚýthis vulnerabilityĚýshow a stark division:Ěýalmost halfĚýof ethnic RussiansĚý(46%)ĚýresidingĚýin Latvia and EstoniaĚýwouldĚýdo nothingĚýifĚýtheirĚýrespective countries face a military threat.ĚýFour in 10Ěý(43%)ĚýpolledĚýresidentsĚýofĚýLatgale, a region of Latvia directly on the border with RussiaĚýcomprisedĚýof aĚýlarge Russian-speaking minority,Ěýsay they would not act.ĚýHalf of those polledĚýin Northeastern EstoniaĚý(51%), another region sharing a border with RussiaĚýand having a similar demographic composition as Latgale, are also likely to do nothing.Ěý

Reported willingness to participate in national defence is low. When asked whether they would join the active-duty military in the event of a military threat, only about 20% of Estonians and Latvians say they are likely to do so, and only about 30% are likely to join the military reserves or territorial forces in response to the same threat.  

While more people are willing to take up non-combat forms of national defence, still, even such likelihood is low. Estonians appear to be more likely to assist in this way than Latvians, approximately six in 10 (59%) of Estonians are likely to volunteer to contribute with physical labour, versus 44% in Latvia. ĐÓ°ÉÔ­´´ half (48%) of Estonians are likely to volunteer to contribute financially, compared to only 29% of Latvians.  

Ethnic Russians in both countries are even less likely to be active defenders in the event of a military threat. A staggering 80% of ethnic Russians in Latvia and Estonia are unlikely to join the active-duty military, military reserves, or territorial forces. In Estonia, 41% of ethnic Russians are likely to volunteer to contribute with physical labour, but this number drops significantly in Latvia, with only 29% of ethnic Russians likely to do so. Finally, only about 20% of ethnic Russians, in both Estonia and Latvia, are likely to volunteer to contribute financially.  

From a policy perspective, this polling data highlightsĚýbothĚýaĚýgap and anĚýopportunity. If a significant segment of the population is unlikely toĚýcontribute to the active defence of their country, resilience-building efforts must expand beyond militaryĚýdeployments. To foster the social cohesion necessary for resilience, trustĚýand cooperation between minority and majority communities must be bolstered. NATO and Canada can do this through collaboration with local community networksĚý–Ěýsuch asĚýVitaTiimĚýand New EastĚý–Ěýthat are already on the groundĚýinĚýthe region.Ěý

ConclusionĚý

Recent polling data from Estonia and Latvia suggests a region with a significant gap in societal resilience. While Russia is overwhelmingly perceived as a security threat, willingness to actĚýin the event ofĚýa military threat is low. This gap is particularly pronounced alongĚýdemographicĚýlines, with lower willingness to act amongĚýethnic Russians. AsĚýEstonia and LatviaĚýareĚýlikely targetsĚýfor potential future Russian aggression, this deficit in resilience has direct implications for Canadian and NATO security commitments in the region. By supporting well-monitored projects with local organizations that build social cohesion and civic preparedness, Canada and NATO can help ensure Estonia and Latvia are more resilient and better prepared to withstand a military threat.ĚýĚý

Policy RecommendationsĚý

1. NATO and Canada should create a dedicated societal resilience grant to support local NGOs such as VitaTiim and New East that advance social cohesion and civic preparedness. Supported projects should have bilingual messaging (in Russian and Estonian or Latvian) and may include media literacy and cyber safety training, community initiatives fostering dialogue across demographic lines, and projects that engage citizens as partners in international governance. 

The grant should emphasize collaboration between local and international organizations, promoting a shared responsibility in local, national, and international governance. Priority should go to local initiatives in regions with large Russian-speaking populations. 

2. Each NATO/Canadian-supported project should be required to include a monitoring, evaluation, and feedback plan in alignment with NATO’s . Thorough monitoring is necessary in order to accurately evaluate how effective projects are at bolstering societal resilience and civic preparedness.  

3. Canada and NATO should use existing NATO StratCom COE platforms to highlight successful partnerships in relatable ways to the Estonians and Latvians, including through multilingual media and public events. Positive views of NATO and the West expressed by individuals and organizations that already have credibility in their communities should be amplified to . 

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Executive Summary  

Transatlantic relations are currently facing growing uncertainty due to significant strategic divergences in the fields of trade, security, technology, and global governance. From the trade tariff disputes to President of the United States (US) Donald Trump’s territorial claims on Greenland, ties between the European Union (EU) and the US are under growing stress. This tension has heavy repercussions on the EU and its member states. Fears about an effective transatlantic decoupling have reenergized calls for the EU to acquire a capacity to act on its own. In this context, Canada can play a decisive role. Stronger EU-Canada cooperation could provide an answer to this new strategic anxiety. It would also allow to reduce dependency on the US and help develop both Canadian and European strategic autonomy.  

Changing Transatlantic Relations: An Opening for Deeper Canada-EU Ties 

While the first Trump administration tested traditional transatlantic relations, Trump’s second term has marked a significant recalibration of US foreign policy that has fundamentally challenged the core values that have underpinned this relationship for the last 80 years. From recurring trade tariff disputes to territorial claims over Greenland, Trump’s actions have often questioned â€“ and even opposed â€“ the US’s role as the principal guarantor of transatlantic stability and security. His administration has delegitimized multilateralism in favour of a “selective engagement” strategy with individual US partners. The recent US , released in November 2025, formalized this major shift in American foreign policy. This new strategy reorders global priorities, reframes NATO Allies’ roles, and seeks stability in Europe to allow Washington to redirect its focus and resources to the Indo-Pacific and the Western Hemisphere. At the same time, it adopts  toward the EU, portraying it as a source of instability and accusing it of undermining political liberty, sovereignty, and social cohesion. 

These dynamics raise fundamental questions about the stability, predictability, and future shape of the transatlantic relationship. For the EU, the implications are immediate: increased strategic risk, reduced certainties, and stronger pressure to develop autonomous capabilities and diversified partnerships. 

Why Canada Matters to the EU (and why the EU Matters to Canada) 

In this rapidly-changing international environment marked by geopolitical fragmentation, erratic US behaviour, and Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine, the EU must meet three conditions in order to become a more credible and decisive actor at the global level: one, it must sway sufficient economic power; two, it must demonstrate political will to act cohesively both amongst its member states and with its international partners; and three, it must be perceived as a legitimate and credible entity by other . 

To achieve these conditions, the EU needs to strengthen its ties with like-minded democracies, such as . Among them, Canada appears as an especially natural and highly compatible partner for the EU. Throughout the last 50 years, Canada and the EU have built an exemplary partnership based on shared democratic values and worldview. But in today’s challenging global landscape, the EU and Canada stand together more firmly than ever as stable and trusted partners. And while the  and  serve as the foundation of the contemporary EU-Canada relationship, increased cooperation to both reinforce current areas of coopetition – such as security and defence â€“ as well as joint ventures in new sectors â€“ including the digital domain – will play key roles in the near future.

Security and Defence Cooperation Between Canada and the EU: A Win-Win Opportunity 

°ä˛ą˛Ô˛ą»ĺ˛ąâ€™s contribution to European security and defence policy is hardly new: Ottawa has been a valued contributor to EU-led security and defence efforts for over a decade. It was the first country to establish a Security and Defence Dialogue with the EU in 2015; it participates in  and has contributed to . 

However, at the 20^th EU–Canada Summit in Brussels last June, AntĂłnio Costa, President of the European Council, Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, and Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada, together pledged to further strengthen their bilateral cooperation. Both sides committed to an ambitious and comprehensive partnership, the new , aimed at deepening cooperation across key areas such as trade, security, energy and other critical sectors. 

As part of their re-energized relationship, the EU High Representative of Foreign Affairs, Kaja Kallas, the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Anita Anand, and the Canadian Minister of Defense, David J. McGuinty, also signed the , which provides a framework for cooperation on cyber defence, hybrid threats, space security, maritime issues, crisis response and assistance to partners, such as Ukraine. This agreement also includes provisions for joint research in emerging technologies, which can help position both Canada and the EU as global leaders in these fields.  

This new agreement importantly lays the groundwork for increased defence procurement collaboration, primarily related to the EU’s . It also opened the door for   â€“ a new European loan instrument for joint procurement – and for an administrative arrangement between Canada and the European Defence Agency, the body that supports cooperative European  and provides a forum for European ministries of defence to coordinate their policies. As a result of this increased cooperation, both Brussels and Ottawa have made tangible steps to diversify their defence partnership and become less reliant and vulnerable to Washington’s shifting moods on collective security. Similarly, this new agreement enhances the resiliency of the European pillar within NATO, without either undermining the NATO Alliance or trying to substitute it. 

New Areas of Cooperation in the Digital Domain 

As part of their cooperative efforts, the Canadian Minister of Artificial Intelligence and Digital Innovation, Evan Solomon, and the Executive Vice-President of the European Commission for Technological Sovereignty, Security and Democracy, Henna Virkkunen, have also agreed to strengthen cooperation in the . On 8 December 2025, the first meeting of the EU-Canada Digital Partnership Council took place in Montreal, Quebec. The  made at the conclusion of that meeting showed that both sides recognized the importance that digital partnership plays in advancing bilateral efforts to boost competitiveness, innovation, and economic resilience. This meeting also resulted in Canada and the EU  This meeting also resulted in Canada and the , one on cooperation on artificial intelligence, and another on digital credentials, digital identity wallets, and trust services. This new partnership will guide collaboration on AI governance, quantum technologies, cybersecurity, and digital standards. The  of this partnership is to build digital systems that are secure, transparent, and centred on public trust.

Conclusion

The ongoing reconfiguration of US foreign policy and the end of predictable transatlantic relations have led the EU and its member states to reconsider their strategic goals and explore alternative strategies to promote their own interests and societal well-being. In this context, cooperation with Canada would be a win-win opportunity, allowing both sides to reduce dependencies on the US and bolster collective defence capabilities without undermining NATO. Strengthening the EU-Canada relationship could also help show other countries that â€“ in an era of re-emerging great power rivalry â€“ there is still an opportunity for states to create and benefit from collective partnerships. 

Policy Recommendations  

In order to make the EU-Canada cooperation effective and concrete, both sides should consider the following policy recommendations: 

• Take an active approach to , including encouragement of domestic defence industries to actively utilize this instrument to gain increased access to external markets. 

• Encourage all EU member states to ratify CETA, as only 17 member states have ratified the agreement thus far. Finalizing the ratification of CETA would ensure stability and continuity for the agreement and would signal increased confidence in the overall Canada-EU trade relationship going forward.  

• Strengthen efforts aimed at enhancing their bilateral , to advance and diversify trade, promote economic security and resilience, and create investment opportunities. 

• Increase cooperation in the extraction and trading of . Deepening ties in this area could help reduce dependencies on unreliable partners while strengthening internal supply chains.  

• Improve cooperation on  while at the same time continue working together in order to balance innovation with ethical considerations and standards. This includes joint investments on AI-driven sustainability solutions, the adoption of accountability measures for violators of AI regulations, and the enforcement of policies that support both technological advancement and societal well-being. 

• Utilize the strong EU-Canada relationship as a stepping stone to reinforce multilateral partnerships with like-minded democratic partners, such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, and Taiwan. 

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Summary

· Increasing hybrid activities in the international system expose °ä˛ą˛Ô˛ą»ĺ˛ąâ€™s vulnerabilities in federal response, coordination, and cohesion in relation to evolving security threats and targets in the 21st century.

· Norway’s Total Defence model demonstrates how incorporating a “whole-of-society” approach can enhance resilience against hybrid threats.

· Canada should implement elements from the Norwegian model during a period of heightened hybrid operations.

Increase in Hybrid Activities

Hybrid threats have expanded since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Advancements in technology, drones and artificial intelligence (AI) have created cheaper alternatives for weakening and destabilising opponents without declaring war. These activities—with Russia as a main perpetrator— include espionage, cyberattacks, critical infrastructure sabotage, disinformation campaigns, and covert operations aimed at undermining democratic institutions and creating intrastate division. NATO member states, including , have each experienced drone incursions, cyber disruptions, and other hybrid operations linked to Russia that target critical infrastructure and European civil society more broadly.

Within this hybrid threat environment, . As its polar ice melts , states are “”; the economic frontier in particular holds . As such, the Arctic has become a key region in the security space due to its economic and security value; it is in °ä˛ą˛Ô˛ą»ĺ˛ąâ€™s national interest to continue securing its Northern territories, safeguard its economic interests and relationships in this region, and overall strengthen societal resilience, as these factors remain paramount to combatting hybrid threats.

°ä˛ą˛Ô˛ą»ĺ˛ąâ€™s National Security Strategy

Canada has technically not released a . The four defence policies it has released following the initial framework outline the distribution of military resources and emphasize the geopolitical importance of the Arctic. National security strategies outline the principles and priorities that guide governments in developing and implement security policy, and while Canada has released a , it merely mentions .

This stands in contrast to the Norway, which released its first . Norway’s National Security Strategy emphasises a “whole-of-society” approach; it highlights the increasing role of hybrid tactics and prioritises societal resilience as a tool to reduce vulnerabilities, as discussed below. Furthermore, there are plans to , to meet the demands and changing international conditions. By drawing on the cohesive and coordinated Norwegian model, Canada could model its own security policy measures and responses in a way that increases societal resilience while defending against hybrid threats. It presents an opportunity for collaboration in a region increasingly being characterized as important yet vulnerable with trusted allies, thereby also serving as a coordinated response across two key Arctic states.

Infrastructure Gaps

A key source of strength and vulnerability in Canada is its vast geography and regional differences, particularly as it relates to critical infrastructure capability. The Arctic holds forty percent of °ä˛ą˛Ô˛ą»ĺ˛ąâ€™s landmass but hosts less than . Infrastructure in the Canadian Arctic is lacking and is . With °ä˛ą˛Ô˛ą»ĺ˛ąâ€™s historical neglect of the Arctic and its , adversaries have begun to aimed at targeting public trust and democratic institutions. These efforts jeopardise national security and the resilience of communities across Canada; however, the Canadian government also has the opportunity to further expand its coordination with Indigenous communities.

The Canadian Rangers are a key example of Indigenous knowledge in action in the Arctic; As mentioned in other analyses conducted by EETN, the Rangers . Continuing to utilise and expand relationships related to their knowledge as Indigenous to Turtle Island will assist in many different facets. The expansion of relationships also creates an important opportunity to reconcile and develop a renewed sense of collaboration rather than one of dependency and colonial hierarchy. This process will assist in increasing resilience across communities while building sustainably, and work to break down information siloes while developing a holistic, “whole-of-society” security model.

Institutional Coordination

The current Norwegian strategy, which integrates civilian and military components under a single framework, is a whole-of-society approach. A key pillar in their strategy is the concept of “Total Defence”; that is, “.” With a Total Defence model, Norway places resilience in the hands of the Norwegian collective, rather than one single entity, to address 21st-century threats. In 2021, the government formalised collaboration and involvement with the private sector, . This led to greater information sharing and increased dialogue, laying a foundation for better coordination.

The current Canadian model demonstrates an overarching lack of coordination, as the responsibility to respond to hybrid threats implicates a network of federal agencies, including . While each agency’s mandate targets a specific area of °ä˛ą˛Ô˛ą»ĺ˛ąâ€™s security, overarching coordination between the network remains limited and complex.

The 2025 Auditor General Report on Cyber Security of Government Network and Systems stated that while agencies have the tools to respond to cyber-attacks, there are still major gaps and vulnerabilities that remain. Recent cyber-attacks against Global Affairs Canada (GAC) and Financial Transactions and Report Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC) demonstrated issues in information sharing and coordination. As a result of incomplete procedures and protocols, it took .

This lack of coordination across government agencies has resulted in information siloes, which have subsequently led to . This translates to public-private cooperation as information-sharing remains voluntary, with ; nonetheless, the federal government has struggled to maintain consistency in information-sharing, leading to coverage gaps in Canadian hybrid response models. In contrast, the Norwegian model has which predominately focus on national cyber security, national intelligence, and joint cyber coordination. . Norway has developed a system which utilises the Joint Coordination Centres to clearly define roles, and ensures that institutional siloes are minimized, as each Centre has a clear mandate of membership and information sharing, which must be further addressed in the Canadian context.

Conclusion

Canadian exposure to hybrid threats is increasing. There remains a lack of coordination in how Canada aims to address and respond to such threats, leaving the country vulnerable to the actions undertaken by adversaries by virtue of relying on outdated frameworks of national security. The Norwegians’ Total Defence model demonstrates that while a whole-of-society approach is challenging; proper coordination, ongoing communication, and public-private partnerships are key to building longstanding societal and national resilience. By taking the steps to update our national security strategy, improving interagency coordination, and minimising gaps in Northern community infrastructure, Canada could better address and be proactive in responding to the hybrid threats of the 21st century.

Policy Recommendations

· Redevelop and update a National Security Strategy featuring a National Hybrid Resilience Framework.

· Continue partnering with Inuit, Indigenous, and Northern communities to close infrastructure gaps; look for new opportunities to build security relationships with Indigenous communities in Canada and across the Northern European continent.

· Develop a working group built of regionally-balanced, public-private stakeholders for information-sharing and threat management.

· Conduct intersecting reviews of the CSIS Act and the RCMP Act to minimise institutional silos that prevent effective and coordinated response management to hybrid threats.

The post Strengthening °ä˛ą˛Ô˛ą»ĺ˛ąâ€™s Hybrid Resilience:
Lessons Learned from Norway appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

Following the Brexit vote in 2016 the defence relationship between the UK and the EU has since been relatively unfettered. This strength can largely be attributed to the increasing coordination through NATO institutions and the establishment of the Coalition of the Willing, creating functional cooperation without deepening policy integration between the UK and the EU. Yet this relationship has clear limits. As EU defence policy focuses inward on industry and procurement, the effects of Brexit now have immediate impacts on European capacity building.

To read the full policy brief, click the download button below.

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Traditionally, strategic stability was commonly understood to be when no major power perceived an incentive to initiate a first nuclear strike. Historically, during the Cold War, this condition rested on mutual vulnerability and was achieved through arms control and measure. However, this framework is being reshaped by the advent of digital capabilities.

Unlike the relatively static assumptions of mutual vulnerability in Cold War–era stability models, the digital era introduces fluid and adaptive threat environments, compresses decision-making time, and reduces predictability.

To read the full policy brief and the implications for Canadian strategic stability, our national strategic autonomy, and potential contributions to our alliance partners, click the Download button below.

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After a contentious summit – one that saw European Union (EU) members divided on the future of funding to Ukraine as the war nears its fourth year – the EU has created a plan to secure an . This plan depends on using cash from secured capital markets, deviating from the to use frozen Russian assets. The summit comes at a time where and . While the EU’s major goal of securing a funding package was achieved, internal fractures are increasingly felt and spreading, with the discussion inflaming verbal attacks and disagreements between Hungary, Slovakia, and other EU members.

Risky or revolutionary?

The EU’s final iteration of its funding package comes as a much safer development from the Commission’s initial Reparations Loan. That initial package would have secured funding from since the start of the full-scale invasion. Days before the summit, the EU agreed to , which primarily belong to the Russian Central Bank, held through Euroclear. The Commission maintained there was no breach of ethics on account of the agreement not affecting the Russian Central Bank’s intellectual property and Euroclear would be bound to repay it. Despite this, the plan elicited heated controversy among EU members.

Strong opposition largely stems from Euroclear and Belgium – where the financial company is based. Euroclear’s concerns pertain to the international trust in the euro and the company itself; it also expressed concern that it may be undermined by what they deemed a “.” Belgium fears Russian retaliation through international courts. The and promised if the plan were to go ahead. Retaliation from Russia could also include various hybrid strategies such as cyberattacks, sabotage of critical infrastructure, or even drone incursions. Hungary and Slovakia have also opposed the plan. The two countries have become increasingly critical of EU sanctions against Russia due to their own political and energy connections and dependencies on the country. Both nations to indefinitely freeze Russian assets, eliminating their veto power. Prime Ministers and slammed the plan on social media, implying it betrays important normative and legal architecture of the European Union.

Ultimately, the Reparations Loan in its original form was not passed, with members saying it was “too complex” and politically risky to go through with now. The primary concern was that Belgium needed . This brought mixed reactions and the guarantees could not be met. The EU’s main strategic goal to avoid escalation with Russia also made this move too risky, with the threat of financial and legal repercussions too costly.

What’s next for Ukraine?

The loan will be based on , requiring Ukraine to pay it back once they begin receiving reparations after the war has ended. The current plan eases the burden for some struggling with financing Ukraine directly, while also not affecting the obligations of countries like . This guarantee also paved the way for these countries to support the loan, making the decision smoother. The loan will be used to support Ukraine’s financial needs, particularly for investing in Ukrainian defence technology and industry. The country has identified a need for additional funding beyond its current IMF program, calling for up to .

What does this say about the EU?

One thing that has become abundantly clear during the summit is the increasing fractures between members of the European Union regarding the war in Ukraine. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and its continued influence throughout Eastern Europe is beginning to sow real discord within the EU, proving to be an increasingly complex issue as the war rolls on. Currently, the EU has made several moves that mitigate the ability for countries that sympathize with Russia to disrupt aid to Ukraine; however, the new plan also gives a noteworthy “out” to these countries by allowing them not to contribute. Disagreements over the war are also combined with strong anti-bureaucratic and anti-EU rhetoric from leaders, who operate from a populist and, at times, illiberal base of governance. The EU will need to be vigilant and cautious about the influence and relationship to Russia that current member states have. The destabilization and weakening of the EU will be strategically advantageous to Russia, divisions that have already begun to exploit.

What will be interesting to see is how funding will evolve as time goes on. The EU . Will later developments prompt this risky move? Additionally, what will the reaction of Moscow be in these current conditions? It will be important to follow developments as they relate to renewed funding, as this could (re)invigorate either party and change future strategies and funding scenarios. Whether this will result in strategic pressures with positive outcomes or a further destabilization of the European continent, has yet to be seen.

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°ä˛ą˛Ô˛ą»ĺ˛ąâ€™s national strategy is undergoing a fundamental transformation. Great power competition, technological change, and hybrid tactics have reshaped the nature of modern conflict, blurring the boundaries between domestic stability and external security. States today face pressure not only to deter conventional military threats but also to address challenges that primarily affect civilian societies. represents an attempt to strengthen national resilience by integrating investments in defence capacity, critical infrastructure, and domestic military industrial capability. Yet these measures unfold against a backdrop of worsening socioeconomic pressures at home, leaving the country exposed to domestic destabilization even as defence spending rises. The convergence of external threats and internal vulnerabilities reveals that national security can no longer be understood solely through the lens of military preparedness. National security today requires a hybrid-resilience approach, combining military readiness and social cohesion to address threats.

Strategic Context and Security Challenges

°ä˛ą˛Ô˛ą»ĺ˛ąâ€™s outlines a strategic approach to increasing adept at dealing with amidst the . By integrating , , and , Canada is trying to become a more autonomous nation. Simultaneously, addressing Canadian domestic security necessities through investment and nation-building projects will help . With Canada joining the EU’s defence procurement initiative, , Canadian defence firms gain access to European joint procurement and finance mechanisms.

As the United States (US), °ä˛ą˛Ô˛ą»ĺ˛ąâ€™s traditional security guarantor, increasingly focuses on the Indo-Pacific and signals a reduced willingness to underwrite transatlantic stability, Canada is . Yet contemporary risk environments are defined not only by but also by , including , , and . Addressing these threats requires a multidimensional security posture that integrates physical, technological, and societal components. The budget’s allocation toward , , and developing underscores a commitment to and strategic autonomy. Investments in advanced technologies such as , , and further demonstrate recognition that modern security extends beyond traditional military capability, encompassing both technological resilience and the protection of critical industrial and information networks.

However, amidst a growing “” dilemma, in which defence imperatives compete with mounting domestic socioeconomic pressures, Canadian security challenges are complex. Socioeconomic vulnerabilities, , , , and , interact with traditional and hybrid security threats, creating interdependent risks.Ěý

CAF Readiness and Personnel Support

Critical to a hybrid-resilient approach is developing the strength and readiness of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). Addressing hard-security concerns requires not only modern capabilities but also ensuring that CAF personnel are supported, retained, and operationally effective. Retention is a significant concern, with of new members leaving service, highlighting the need for , , and an enhanced . The recent are a step in the right direction, but additional investments in housing, , and are essential. Equally important are mental-health services, which have been consistently and who face the cumulative stresses of operations, repeated deployments, and long-term service.

At the same time, °ä˛ą˛Ô˛ą»ĺ˛ąâ€™s defence procurement system continues to face relating to personnel shortages and a multi-departmental model. While the Ministry of Public Services and Procurement invests in high-profile platforms such as and , – including , , and – receives insufficient attention from the federal government. The most recent audit by the (2025) found that as of March 31, 2024, many training areas had less gear than needed, while others did not have enough equipment to carry out training operations.

More transparent and accountable procurement processes are needed to ensure that frontline personnel have reliable, effective tools to perform their duties safely and efficiently. Strengthening both personnel support and procurement effectiveness not only enhances operational readiness but also integrates material and human resource stability into a broader national resilience framework, complementing community-level and social initiatives to counter hybrid threats.

Socioeconomic Pressures and Domestic Security Concerns

Although the federal budget , the and the limited attention to worsening social crises leave Canada vulnerable to further destabilisation, populism, and societal polarisation. For many young people facing , military service can appear to be one of the few . A recent analysis by highlights that °ä˛ą˛Ô˛ą»ĺ˛ąâ€™s youth face some of the toughest labour-market conditions in decades, making enlistment in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) a possible remedy for the youth unemployment crisis. This pattern echoes the , which has long been criticised for disproportionately drawing in economically disadvantaged youth, effectively creating pathways into the armed forces driven less by choice and more by necessity.Ěý

Such dynamics also raise serious domestic security concerns: far-right networks have, in documented cases, encouraged members to or sought contact with as a means of acquiring and . Compounding this trend is the in Canada- particularly common among young men- which increasingly identify as a potential gateway into broader extremist ideologies. Without sufficient attention to these online spaces, the risk posed by vulnerable youth becoming radicalised and incentivised to join the military becomes a serious concern for domestic security and the protection of liberal-democratic values.

Growing separatist movements, particularly in and , highlight regional discontent and political polarisation, which can interact with socioeconomic vulnerabilities and be exploited by both domestic and foreign actors seeking to exacerbate societal fractures. These dynamics intersect with broader socioeconomic pressures and are further amplified by hybrid threats and foreign interference, which serve to exploit domestic polarisation through strategies titled “”Ěý
Integrating with defence and technological investments is central to a . International examples, such as , demonstrate how initiatives that strengthen , media literacy, and can meaningfully complement traditional security capabilities. For Canada, public-awareness efforts like the campaign, which brings together over fifty feminist organisations to advocate for , , and , help address the socioeconomic stresses and political grievances that make communities vulnerable to polarisation and manipulation.Ěý

Additionally, coordinated programs commissioned by the federal government, such as the (CRF) and the (DCI), linking defence, industrial strategy, and social resilience not only enhance the country’s ability to detect, withstand, and recover from hybrid threats but also reinforce national cohesion. In this sense, investing in social stability is not an adjunct to national security but a foundational component of it: strengthening communities, reducing socioeconomic vulnerabilities, and empowering citizens collectively contribute to a more unified, resilient society capable of withstanding increasingly complex threat environments.

Towards a Hybrid-Resilient Canada

°ä˛ą˛Ô˛ą»ĺ˛ąâ€™s security landscape in the twenty-first century is defined by the convergence of traditional military threats, hybrid challenges, and domestic vulnerabilities. As this analysis demonstrates, a comprehensive approach to national resilience cannot rely solely on modernising the Canadian Armed Forces or expanding technological and industrial capabilities. Socioeconomic pressures, including youth unemployment, housing insecurity, and political polarisation, interact with hybrid threats, creating opportunities for extremist mobilisation, disinformation, and foreign interference. Social spending is not a competing priority in an era of heightened geopolitical tension; it is a core element of national defence.

By investing in social programs, community resilience initiatives, and public-awareness campaigns like Demand Better, Canada addresses these underlying vulnerabilities while simultaneously strengthening civic trust, cohesion, and adaptability. When combined with targeted defence investments and technological modernisation, such measures create a multidimensional, hybrid-resilient framework capable of withstanding both internal and external pressures. Social spending and citizen support are not peripheral to national security; they are at the very heart of it. A Canada that invests in the well-being of its people is not only more equitable and inclusive but also more unified, adaptable, and resilient in the face of modern conflict.

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Prior to 2022, Europe’s defence posture relied heavily on NATO deterrence and the United States’ (US) security guarantee, underscoring the absence of a fully realized shared strategic vision within the European Union (EU). Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, coupled with growing , exposed the risks of this reliance and accelerated the EU’s push for greater strategic autonomy. For the first time, the EU financed the through the European Peace Facility and under the 2023–25 European Defence Industrial Programme. Defence spending soared across the continent, and what had long been an aspirational concept of strategic autonomy became an urgent necessity, even if its full realization remains a long-term project.

Yet, as Russia’s war in Ukraine exceeds its third year, the EU faces a lingering challenge: the rise of far-right governments in many of its member states. While strategic autonomy is still top of mind for EU leaders, materialized through the introduction of , several members states are increasingly pursuing nationalist defence agendas. As a result, the EU finds itself caught between advancing the architecture of collective defence while simultaneously contending with leaders who instrumentalize this same mechanism for domestic political gain. This tension has direct implications for Europe’s credibility as a security actor. It complicates efforts to align defence procurement, weakens the consistency of sanctions and aid policies, and risks eroding the transatlantic trust which Europe still depends on for deterrence.

The Far-Right Populist and Defence

The far right’s influence on European defence policy does not manifest through outright obstruction but through . Rather than rejecting Brussels’ new defence architecture, nationalist leaders have learned to operate within it, appropriating both its funding mechanism and its language to advance sovereignty-based agendas. These actors recognize that participating in EU-funded defence initiatives confers both material and symbolic rewards: access to industrial contracts, regional investment, and the legitimacy that comes from being seen as a responsible European partner. What distinguishes them is not withdrawal, but the ability to convert cooperation into a narrative of national strength. In doing so, they hollow out the collective rationale of defence integration, turning what should be a shared European project into a vehicle for domestic legitimacy.

Hungary illustrates this pattern most overtly. Under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, the Hungarian government while remaining ambivalent toward the collective logic underpinning the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In 2017, Budapest initiated the , a €13 billion modernization effort aimed at creating domestic supply chains for arms and munitions. German firms such as , establishing joint ventures that anchor Hungary’s defence industry within the European market while strengthening Orban’s narrative of rebuilding the Hungarian military. The , co-financed through EU cohesion funds and national investment subsidies, is emblematic of this dual logic: it deepens Hungary’s integration in the EU defence economy even as Orban portrays it as proof of national self-reliance.

Yet while leveraging these partnerships, Hungary remains one of the least aligned member states when it comes to the that underpin the EU’s CSDP overall goal. Budapest consistently resists the forms of coordination that give CSDP substance, shared threat assessments, deeper PESCO commitments, and capability-pooling arrangements that would bind national planning to collective European priorities. At the same time, Budapest has sought access to funding under the EU’s new support for Ammunition and Firearms Expansion loan instrument, , while opposing proposals to link disbursements to rule-of-law compliance. Orban repeatedly frames defence modernization as integral to protecting Hungary’s national identity, emphasizing that . Hungary supports EU investment when it serves its industrial base, such as the Security Action for Europe and European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement schemes, that would make these mechanisms genuinely European. Orban’s model thus envisions a Europe of self-reliant states loosely connected through markets and contracts, not through . The result is a form of instrumental integration, wherein Hungary contributes materially to Europe’s rearmament while eroding the institutional cohesion that collective security demands.

The EU’s Response

The dual challenge of Russian aggression and internal fragmentation has forced EU leaders to harden both its defence and governance instruments. The EU’s post-2022 defence agenda has expanded at a pace unseen since the bloc’s creation. The Readiness 2030 initiative, announced in 2025, seeks to mobilize over and establish new fiscal flexibility for member states to allocate up to 1.5 percent of GDP to defence without breaching budget-deficit rules. A is intended to finance joint procurement of military products, while the European Defence Industrial Strategy lays the groundwork for a with harmonized rules to enable faster and larger-scale production.

At the same time, recognizing Russia’s active hybrid warfare strategy and the role illiberal and populist actors play in it, the EU has coupled defence integration with measures to safeguard its democratic infrastructure. The now empowers Brussels to audit social-media platforms and penalize those that facilitate foreign influence operations. The EU has also invested in counter-hybrid capabilities, from cyber-resilience frameworks to a proposed along its eastern frontier, reflecting the growing convergence of internal and external security.

Conclusion – A Contested Path Forward

Europe’s defence awakening has built the structure of strategic autonomy but not its political foundation. The EU now commands funding instruments, industrial incentives, and procurement schemes approaching a true defence union, yet its legitimacy in this area still remains fragile. Without a mandate rooted in democratic accountability and public debate, these mechanisms risk becoming a technocratic enterprise that populists can exploit for their domestic gain. Leaders such as Viktor Orbán have learned to navigate this gap, appropriating the language and benefits of European rearmament to validate nationalist narratives while obstructing collective decision-making.

Yet public sentiment offers an opening. .The task for Brussels is to transform this diffuse approval into a clear mandate, linking defence to agency, accountability, and shared purpose. Strategic autonomy will only endure if it becomes political as well as industrial, anchored in legitimacy, communication, and leadership that make Europe not just rearmed, but united.

Policy Recommendations: From Technocracy to Political Cohesion

To combine Europe’s strategic autonomy and close the legitimacy gap that populist actors exploit, the EU must move beyond institutional design to political consolidation. The following measures outline how Brussels can align its defence ambitions with democratic cohesion.

Mobilize public consent through strategic communication and civic engagement – The EU should institutionalize structured citizen dialogue on security and defence, modelled on the Conference on the Future of Europe, to engage Europeans in shaping the Union’s strategic priorities.

Form a European Strategic Communication Taskforce for Defence – The EU should establish a Strategic Communication Taskforce for Defence to counter the populist narratives that reframe collective defence as a threat to sovereignty or a national achievement. Housed within the European External Action Service and building on existing StratCom capabilities, the taskforce would coordinate messaging across member states, highlight the local benefits of EU-funded defence projects, and proactively counter disinformation about European rearmament.

Strengthen role of European Defence Commissioner and unify procurement authority – The establishment of a Defence and Space Commissioner marks progress, but the portfolio currently lacks the political weight and institutional tools needed to meaningfully coordinate EU defence initatives. With responbilities dispersed between the European External Action Service, the Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space, and the European Defence Agency, strengthening the Commissioner’s mandate, particularly in unified procurement and capability planning, would reduce fragmentation and advance Europe’s strategic sovereignty.

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