Following the Brexit vote in 2016 the defence relationship between the UK and the EU has since been relatively unfettered. This strength can largely be attributed to the increasing coordination through NATO institutions and the establishment of the Coalition of the Willing, creating functional cooperation without deepening policy integration between the UK and the EU. Yet this relationship has clear limits. As EU defence policy focuses inward on industry and procurement, the effects of Brexit now have immediate impacts on European capacity building.

To read the full policy brief, click the download button below.

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Traditionally, strategic stability was commonly understood to be when no major power perceived an incentive to initiate a first nuclear strike. Historically, during the Cold War, this condition rested on mutual vulnerability and was achieved through arms control and measure. However, this framework is being reshaped by the advent of digital capabilities.

Unlike the relatively static assumptions of mutual vulnerability in Cold War–era stability models, the digital era introduces fluid and adaptive threat environments, compresses decision-making time, and reduces predictability.

To read the full policy brief and the implications for Canadian strategic stability, our national strategic autonomy, and potential contributions to our alliance partners, click the Download button below.

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After a contentious summit – one that saw European Union (EU) members divided on the future of funding to Ukraine as the war nears its fourth year – the EU has created a plan to secure an . This plan depends on using cash from secured capital markets, deviating from the to use frozen Russian assets. The summit comes at a time where and . While the EU’s major goal of securing a funding package was achieved, internal fractures are increasingly felt and spreading, with the discussion inflaming verbal attacks and disagreements between Hungary, Slovakia, and other EU members.

Risky or revolutionary?

The EU’s final iteration of its funding package comes as a much safer development from the Commission’s initial Reparations Loan. That initial package would have secured funding from since the start of the full-scale invasion. Days before the summit, the EU agreed to , which primarily belong to the Russian Central Bank, held through Euroclear. The Commission maintained there was no breach of ethics on account of the agreement not affecting the Russian Central Bank’s intellectual property and Euroclear would be bound to repay it. Despite this, the plan elicited heated controversy among EU members.

Strong opposition largely stems from Euroclear and Belgium – where the financial company is based. Euroclear’s concerns pertain to the international trust in the euro and the company itself; it also expressed concern that it may be undermined by what they deemed a “.” Belgium fears Russian retaliation through international courts. The and promised if the plan were to go ahead. Retaliation from Russia could also include various hybrid strategies such as cyberattacks, sabotage of critical infrastructure, or even drone incursions. Hungary and Slovakia have also opposed the plan. The two countries have become increasingly critical of EU sanctions against Russia due to their own political and energy connections and dependencies on the country. Both nations to indefinitely freeze Russian assets, eliminating their veto power. Prime Ministers and slammed the plan on social media, implying it betrays important normative and legal architecture of the European Union.

Ultimately, the Reparations Loan in its original form was not passed, with members saying it was “too complex” and politically risky to go through with now. The primary concern was that Belgium needed . This brought mixed reactions and the guarantees could not be met. The EU’s main strategic goal to avoid escalation with Russia also made this move too risky, with the threat of financial and legal repercussions too costly.

What’s next for Ukraine?

The loan will be based on , requiring Ukraine to pay it back once they begin receiving reparations after the war has ended. The current plan eases the burden for some struggling with financing Ukraine directly, while also not affecting the obligations of countries like . This guarantee also paved the way for these countries to support the loan, making the decision smoother. The loan will be used to support Ukraine’s financial needs, particularly for investing in Ukrainian defence technology and industry. The country has identified a need for additional funding beyond its current IMF program, calling for up to .

What does this say about the EU?

One thing that has become abundantly clear during the summit is the increasing fractures between members of the European Union regarding the war in Ukraine. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and its continued influence throughout Eastern Europe is beginning to sow real discord within the EU, proving to be an increasingly complex issue as the war rolls on. Currently, the EU has made several moves that mitigate the ability for countries that sympathize with Russia to disrupt aid to Ukraine; however, the new plan also gives a noteworthy “out” to these countries by allowing them not to contribute. Disagreements over the war are also combined with strong anti-bureaucratic and anti-EU rhetoric from leaders, who operate from a populist and, at times, illiberal base of governance. The EU will need to be vigilant and cautious about the influence and relationship to Russia that current member states have. The destabilization and weakening of the EU will be strategically advantageous to Russia, divisions that have already begun to exploit.

What will be interesting to see is how funding will evolve as time goes on. The EU . Will later developments prompt this risky move? Additionally, what will the reaction of Moscow be in these current conditions? It will be important to follow developments as they relate to renewed funding, as this could (re)invigorate either party and change future strategies and funding scenarios. Whether this will result in strategic pressures with positive outcomes or a further destabilization of the European continent, has yet to be seen.

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�䲹�Բ��岹’s national strategy is undergoing a fundamental transformation. Great power competition, technological change, and hybrid tactics have reshaped the nature of modern conflict, blurring the boundaries between domestic stability and external security. States today face pressure not only to deter conventional military threats but also to address challenges that primarily affect civilian societies. represents an attempt to strengthen national resilience by integrating investments in defence capacity, critical infrastructure, and domestic military industrial capability. Yet these measures unfold against a backdrop of worsening socioeconomic pressures at home, leaving the country exposed to domestic destabilization even as defence spending rises. The convergence of external threats and internal vulnerabilities reveals that national security can no longer be understood solely through the lens of military preparedness. National security today requires a hybrid-resilience approach, combining military readiness and social cohesion to address threats.

Strategic Context and Security Challenges

�䲹�Բ��岹’s outlines a strategic approach to increasing adept at dealing with amidst the . By integrating , , and , Canada is trying to become a more autonomous nation. Simultaneously, addressing Canadian domestic security necessities through investment and nation-building projects will help . With Canada joining the EU’s defence procurement initiative, , Canadian defence firms gain access to European joint procurement and finance mechanisms.

As the United States (US), �䲹�Բ��岹’s traditional security guarantor, increasingly focuses on the Indo-Pacific and signals a reduced willingness to underwrite transatlantic stability, Canada is . Yet contemporary risk environments are defined not only by but also by , including , , and . Addressing these threats requires a multidimensional security posture that integrates physical, technological, and societal components. The budget’s allocation toward , , and developing underscores a commitment to and strategic autonomy. Investments in advanced technologies such as , , and further demonstrate recognition that modern security extends beyond traditional military capability, encompassing both technological resilience and the protection of critical industrial and information networks.

However, amidst a growing “” dilemma, in which defence imperatives compete with mounting domestic socioeconomic pressures, Canadian security challenges are complex. Socioeconomic vulnerabilities, , , , and , interact with traditional and hybrid security threats, creating interdependent risks. 

CAF Readiness and Personnel Support

Critical to a hybrid-resilient approach is developing the strength and readiness of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). Addressing hard-security concerns requires not only modern capabilities but also ensuring that CAF personnel are supported, retained, and operationally effective. Retention is a significant concern, with of new members leaving service, highlighting the need for , , and an enhanced . The recent are a step in the right direction, but additional investments in housing, , and are essential. Equally important are mental-health services, which have been consistently and who face the cumulative stresses of operations, repeated deployments, and long-term service.

At the same time, �䲹�Բ��岹’s defence procurement system continues to face relating to personnel shortages and a multi-departmental model. While the Ministry of Public Services and Procurement invests in high-profile platforms such as and , – including , , and – receives insufficient attention from the federal government. The most recent audit by the (2025) found that as of March 31, 2024, many training areas had less gear than needed, while others did not have enough equipment to carry out training operations.

More transparent and accountable procurement processes are needed to ensure that frontline personnel have reliable, effective tools to perform their duties safely and efficiently. Strengthening both personnel support and procurement effectiveness not only enhances operational readiness but also integrates material and human resource stability into a broader national resilience framework, complementing community-level and social initiatives to counter hybrid threats.

Socioeconomic Pressures and Domestic Security Concerns

Although the federal budget , the and the limited attention to worsening social crises leave Canada vulnerable to further destabilisation, populism, and societal polarisation. For many young people facing , military service can appear to be one of the few . A recent analysis by highlights that �䲹�Բ��岹’s youth face some of the toughest labour-market conditions in decades, making enlistment in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) a possible remedy for the youth unemployment crisis. This pattern echoes the , which has long been criticised for disproportionately drawing in economically disadvantaged youth, effectively creating pathways into the armed forces driven less by choice and more by necessity. 

Such dynamics also raise serious domestic security concerns: far-right networks have, in documented cases, encouraged members to or sought contact with as a means of acquiring and . Compounding this trend is the in Canada- particularly common among young men- which increasingly identify as a potential gateway into broader extremist ideologies. Without sufficient attention to these online spaces, the risk posed by vulnerable youth becoming radicalised and incentivised to join the military becomes a serious concern for domestic security and the protection of liberal-democratic values.

Growing separatist movements, particularly in and , highlight regional discontent and political polarisation, which can interact with socioeconomic vulnerabilities and be exploited by both domestic and foreign actors seeking to exacerbate societal fractures. These dynamics intersect with broader socioeconomic pressures and are further amplified by hybrid threats and foreign interference, which serve to exploit domestic polarisation through strategies titled “” 
Integrating with defence and technological investments is central to a . International examples, such as , demonstrate how initiatives that strengthen , media literacy, and can meaningfully complement traditional security capabilities. For Canada, public-awareness efforts like the campaign, which brings together over fifty feminist organisations to advocate for , , and , help address the socioeconomic stresses and political grievances that make communities vulnerable to polarisation and manipulation. 

Additionally, coordinated programs commissioned by the federal government, such as the (CRF) and the (DCI), linking defence, industrial strategy, and social resilience not only enhance the country’s ability to detect, withstand, and recover from hybrid threats but also reinforce national cohesion. In this sense, investing in social stability is not an adjunct to national security but a foundational component of it: strengthening communities, reducing socioeconomic vulnerabilities, and empowering citizens collectively contribute to a more unified, resilient society capable of withstanding increasingly complex threat environments.

Towards a Hybrid-Resilient Canada

�䲹�Բ��岹’s security landscape in the twenty-first century is defined by the convergence of traditional military threats, hybrid challenges, and domestic vulnerabilities. As this analysis demonstrates, a comprehensive approach to national resilience cannot rely solely on modernising the Canadian Armed Forces or expanding technological and industrial capabilities. Socioeconomic pressures, including youth unemployment, housing insecurity, and political polarisation, interact with hybrid threats, creating opportunities for extremist mobilisation, disinformation, and foreign interference. Social spending is not a competing priority in an era of heightened geopolitical tension; it is a core element of national defence.

By investing in social programs, community resilience initiatives, and public-awareness campaigns like Demand Better, Canada addresses these underlying vulnerabilities while simultaneously strengthening civic trust, cohesion, and adaptability. When combined with targeted defence investments and technological modernisation, such measures create a multidimensional, hybrid-resilient framework capable of withstanding both internal and external pressures. Social spending and citizen support are not peripheral to national security; they are at the very heart of it. A Canada that invests in the well-being of its people is not only more equitable and inclusive but also more unified, adaptable, and resilient in the face of modern conflict.

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Prior to 2022, Europe’s defence posture relied heavily on NATO deterrence and the United States’ (US) security guarantee, underscoring the absence of a fully realized shared strategic vision within the European Union (EU). Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, coupled with growing , exposed the risks of this reliance and accelerated the EU’s push for greater strategic autonomy. For the first time, the EU financed the through the European Peace Facility and under the 2023–25 European Defence Industrial Programme. Defence spending soared across the continent, and what had long been an aspirational concept of strategic autonomy became an urgent necessity, even if its full realization remains a long-term project.

Yet, as Russia’s war in Ukraine exceeds its third year, the EU faces a lingering challenge: the rise of far-right governments in many of its member states. While strategic autonomy is still top of mind for EU leaders, materialized through the introduction of , several members states are increasingly pursuing nationalist defence agendas. As a result, the EU finds itself caught between advancing the architecture of collective defence while simultaneously contending with leaders who instrumentalize this same mechanism for domestic political gain. This tension has direct implications for Europe’s credibility as a security actor. It complicates efforts to align defence procurement, weakens the consistency of sanctions and aid policies, and risks eroding the transatlantic trust which Europe still depends on for deterrence.

The Far-Right Populist and Defence

The far right’s influence on European defence policy does not manifest through outright obstruction but through . Rather than rejecting Brussels’ new defence architecture, nationalist leaders have learned to operate within it, appropriating both its funding mechanism and its language to advance sovereignty-based agendas. These actors recognize that participating in EU-funded defence initiatives confers both material and symbolic rewards: access to industrial contracts, regional investment, and the legitimacy that comes from being seen as a responsible European partner. What distinguishes them is not withdrawal, but the ability to convert cooperation into a narrative of national strength. In doing so, they hollow out the collective rationale of defence integration, turning what should be a shared European project into a vehicle for domestic legitimacy.

Hungary illustrates this pattern most overtly. Under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, the Hungarian government while remaining ambivalent toward the collective logic underpinning the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In 2017, Budapest initiated the , a €13 billion modernization effort aimed at creating domestic supply chains for arms and munitions. German firms such as , establishing joint ventures that anchor Hungary’s defence industry within the European market while strengthening Orban’s narrative of rebuilding the Hungarian military. The , co-financed through EU cohesion funds and national investment subsidies, is emblematic of this dual logic: it deepens Hungary’s integration in the EU defence economy even as Orban portrays it as proof of national self-reliance.

Yet while leveraging these partnerships, Hungary remains one of the least aligned member states when it comes to the that underpin the EU’s CSDP overall goal. Budapest consistently resists the forms of coordination that give CSDP substance, shared threat assessments, deeper PESCO commitments, and capability-pooling arrangements that would bind national planning to collective European priorities. At the same time, Budapest has sought access to funding under the EU’s new support for Ammunition and Firearms Expansion loan instrument, , while opposing proposals to link disbursements to rule-of-law compliance. Orban repeatedly frames defence modernization as integral to protecting Hungary’s national identity, emphasizing that . Hungary supports EU investment when it serves its industrial base, such as the Security Action for Europe and European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement schemes, that would make these mechanisms genuinely European. Orban’s model thus envisions a Europe of self-reliant states loosely connected through markets and contracts, not through . The result is a form of instrumental integration, wherein Hungary contributes materially to Europe’s rearmament while eroding the institutional cohesion that collective security demands.

The EU’s Response

The dual challenge of Russian aggression and internal fragmentation has forced EU leaders to harden both its defence and governance instruments. The EU’s post-2022 defence agenda has expanded at a pace unseen since the bloc’s creation. The Readiness 2030 initiative, announced in 2025, seeks to mobilize over and establish new fiscal flexibility for member states to allocate up to 1.5 percent of GDP to defence without breaching budget-deficit rules. A is intended to finance joint procurement of military products, while the European Defence Industrial Strategy lays the groundwork for a with harmonized rules to enable faster and larger-scale production.

At the same time, recognizing Russia’s active hybrid warfare strategy and the role illiberal and populist actors play in it, the EU has coupled defence integration with measures to safeguard its democratic infrastructure. The now empowers Brussels to audit social-media platforms and penalize those that facilitate foreign influence operations. The EU has also invested in counter-hybrid capabilities, from cyber-resilience frameworks to a proposed along its eastern frontier, reflecting the growing convergence of internal and external security.

Conclusion – A Contested Path Forward

Europe’s defence awakening has built the structure of strategic autonomy but not its political foundation. The EU now commands funding instruments, industrial incentives, and procurement schemes approaching a true defence union, yet its legitimacy in this area still remains fragile. Without a mandate rooted in democratic accountability and public debate, these mechanisms risk becoming a technocratic enterprise that populists can exploit for their domestic gain. Leaders such as Viktor Orbán have learned to navigate this gap, appropriating the language and benefits of European rearmament to validate nationalist narratives while obstructing collective decision-making.

Yet public sentiment offers an opening. .The task for Brussels is to transform this diffuse approval into a clear mandate, linking defence to agency, accountability, and shared purpose. Strategic autonomy will only endure if it becomes political as well as industrial, anchored in legitimacy, communication, and leadership that make Europe not just rearmed, but united.

Policy Recommendations: From Technocracy to Political Cohesion

To combine Europe’s strategic autonomy and close the legitimacy gap that populist actors exploit, the EU must move beyond institutional design to political consolidation. The following measures outline how Brussels can align its defence ambitions with democratic cohesion.

Mobilize public consent through strategic communication and civic engagement – The EU should institutionalize structured citizen dialogue on security and defence, modelled on the Conference on the Future of Europe, to engage Europeans in shaping the Union’s strategic priorities.

Form a European Strategic Communication Taskforce for Defence – The EU should establish a Strategic Communication Taskforce for Defence to counter the populist narratives that reframe collective defence as a threat to sovereignty or a national achievement. Housed within the European External Action Service and building on existing StratCom capabilities, the taskforce would coordinate messaging across member states, highlight the local benefits of EU-funded defence projects, and proactively counter disinformation about European rearmament.

Strengthen role of European Defence Commissioner and unify procurement authority – The establishment of a Defence and Space Commissioner marks progress, but the portfolio currently lacks the political weight and institutional tools needed to meaningfully coordinate EU defence initatives. With responbilities dispersed between the European External Action Service, the Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space, and the European Defence Agency, strengthening the Commissioner’s mandate, particularly in unified procurement and capability planning, would reduce fragmentation and advance Europe’s strategic sovereignty.

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�䲹�Բ��岹’s history of nation-building has often unfolded at the intersection of infrastructure development and perceived security threats. From the transcontinental railway conceived in part to secure the young Dominion against American encroachment, to Cold War northern radar lines and continental defence networks, major national projects have frequently been justified not only as economic necessities but as strategic imperatives. As the elevates defence priorities and strategic infrastructure, particularly in the Arctic and across continental supply chains, it raises a familiar question and uncomfortable idea: does Canada only undertake ambitious infrastructure development when compelled by external threats? By revisiting the historical relationship between security threats and national project building, this article considers what this pattern reveals about �䲹�Բ��岹’s political past and the lessons it offers for contemporary policy and transatlantic comparative studies.

The Coastal Axis: CPR and Early Infrastructure

The Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) stands as a foundational example of this logic. Conceived amid and the risk that an unsettled West could drift economically and politically toward the United States (US), the CPR functioned as a strategic bulwark that anchored Canadian sovereignty across the continent. By enabling settlement, troop movement, and the extension of federal authority into the Prairies, most notably during the 1885 , the railway served not only as an economic artery but also as a mechanism for internal security and territorial consolidation. At the same time, it linked Canada more tightly to the British Empire’s , simultaneously reinforcing imperial strategy and the emerging Canadian . 
Much like the CPR, the Trans-Canada Highway and other Cold War-era infrastructure projects reveal continuity in �䲹�Բ��岹’s security-driven nation-building logic. Beyond facilitating civilian mobility and economic integration, the and northern air routes allowed for the rapid deployment of troops and equipment in response to potential Soviet threats and domestic emergencies. Similarly, the (DEW) Line established early-warning capabilities across the Arctic, asserting Canadian sovereignty in the North while contributing to continental defence under (North American Aerospace Defence Command). 
In both eras, the federal government prioritised projects that reinforced territorial integrity and strategic control over those motivated purely by domestic economic or social needs, demonstrating a persistent Canadian pattern: transformative infrastructure tends to be realised most decisively when framed as essential to national security.
These security-driven infrastructure projects also entrenched �䲹�Բ��岹’s strategic integration with the United States, marking a gradual. As the two countries emerged as close allies through the First and Second World Wars, Canadian security concerns shifted toward fortifying the North American continent, exporting its security logic into a shared framework institutionalised through NORAD. Cold War-era highways, ports, and northern transport corridors not only enhanced continental security but also. By embedding Canadian development within a North American strategic orbit, these projects created enduring dependencies, rendering �䲹�Բ��岹’s capacity to transport resources and sustain its economy increasingly contingent on US logistical systems and policy priorities.
This historical pattern offers a critical lens for interpreting the 2025 federal budget, which continues to and , while recalibrating American dependence. Through , , and , the government is reorienting Canada away from exclusive US dependence while maintaining continental interoperability. Central to this objective is the creation of the , which seeks to streamline approvals, coordinate federal oversight, and accelerate nationally controlled infrastructure and resource projects, thereby “untangling” �䲹�Բ��岹’s development pathways from excessive external dependency. At the same time, this recalibration foregrounds persistent questions about , underpinned by , and , regarding the and Arctic.

Analysis: Security, Trade, and Governance

Between 1885 and 1945, Canadian nation-building and infrastructure development followed a deliberate, security and export-driven logic. the sparsely settled Prairies to eastern markets while eastern manufacturing hubs processed raw materials for export to Britain and eventually the United States, reflecting the . Infrastructure projects were often , punctuated by accelerated development during the First and Second World Wars. in the Prairies were integral to this strategy, as European settlers were encouraged westward to solidify sovereignty and develop agricultural production, often displacing Indigenous communities. Across this period, infrastructure and population policies were from nation-building objectives, in which strategic, economic, and territorial imperatives drove the scope and pace of �䲹�Բ��岹’s development.
The 1970s illustrated the vulnerability inherent in �䲹�Բ��岹’s US-oriented economic integration. on key Canadian exports, including lumber, steel, and agricultural products, exposed the risks of over-reliance on a single partner. In response, Canada pursued “”, diversifying trade by building stronger ties with the European Economic Community (EEC), expanding exports, and investing in diplomatic and industrial capacity abroad. This episode illustrates a recurring tension in Canadian planning: infrastructure and resource networks often bind the country to dominant powers, but trade and security shocks push the government to seek alternative markets and greater autonomy, a tension that remains relevant when evaluating the 2025 budget and the conflation between nation-building and infrastructure projects, especially in the context of the current Canada-US relationship.

The Axial Shift: Arctic Expansion and Contemporary Policy

The 2025 federal budget continues this historical logic. The government is investing $1 billion over four years in an , supporting dual-use transport projects (airports, seaports, and all-season roads) that serve both civilian communities and the Canadian Armed Forces. A backed by $6.6 billion over five years aims to strengthen domestic defence manufacturing and reduce reliance on external suppliers. Investments in and reflect lessons from past vulnerabilities, seeking to ensure Canada can reach non-US markets while maintaining continental security. At the same time, hiring new Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) officers and deploying modern surveillance technology highlights an emphasis on border integrity, sovereignty, and alignment with .
However, these initiatives, in particular those related to transport infrastructure, carry serious trade-offs, particularly for �䲹�Բ��岹’s northern Indigenous populations. Historically neglected communities have endured profound infrastructure deficits. This includes a lack of reliable , , , and access to , contributing to devastating outcomes such as and other . Framing new infrastructure and connectivity projects primarily in terms of security and critical mineral extraction risks repeating patterns of utilitarian development: resources and logistics are prioritised for national and global strategic benefit, rather than meeting long-standing basic needs of Canadian citizens. 
Unlike provinces, whose powers are constitutionally entrenched, �䲹�Բ��岹’s northern territories derive their authority from federal statute, meaning their . The territory of Nunavut is a prime example of this, as its government operates with delegated authority, meaning Ottawa . While comprehensive land claim and self-government agreements, such as the and the , grant significant rights to Indigenous communities, these protections are rather than inherent under the Constitution. This distinction has important implications: Arctic projects framed primarily as security measures may proceed under federal authority, potentially overriding community priorities and reproducing historical patterns of federal control over resource frontiers.
Beyond Indigenous concerns, prioritising defence and security-linked infrastructure risks diverting funds from other social programs, and environmental : Arctic roads, ports, and extraction-linked infrastructure can accelerate , threaten , and . Enhanced border security and may further reinforce dependence on the United States, limiting true strategic autonomy. These tensions echo historical patterns: Canadian infrastructure, trade, and settlement have long sought to balance sovereignty, economic resilience, and security imperatives, often at the expense of social equity and environmental sustainability.

The Future of Security-Focused Nation-Building

�䲹�Բ��岹’s nation-building trajectory, from the CPR to Cold War highways, the DEW Line, and today’s Arctic investments, reveals a persistent intertwining of infrastructure, security, and sovereignty. The 2025 federal budget continues this logic, funnelling resources into projects meant to bolster resilience, protect supply chains, and advance �䲹�Բ��岹’s position within an increasingly competitive international landscape. Yet, as history consistently demonstrates, these initiatives carry significant trade-offs. Communities long excluded from meaningful infrastructure and basic services risk being once again overlooked as national strategy takes precedence. Through this historical lens, it becomes clear that �䲹�Բ��岹’s contemporary approach to nation-building remains a delicate balancing act: enhancing sovereignty and strategic autonomy while avoiding the reproduction of long-standing inequities in regions most affected by federal intervention.
Meeting these challenges will require embedding strategic ambition within governance practices that prioritise transparency, accountability, and genuine partnership. Sustaining good-faith relationships with Indigenous nations, particularly those in the North who bear the immediate consequences of security-framed development, is essential if Canada is to move beyond utilitarian conceptions of the Arctic. While recent developments, such as and , signal federal recognition of Indigenous self-determination, these statutory frameworks remain and , unlike constitutionally entrenched rights. Consequently, Indigenous control over northern resources and infrastructure is not fully secure, leaving communities potentially exposed to decisions driven by national or continental strategic priorities. Extending reconciliation into international circumpolar relations, such as structured nation-to-nation dialogue between Inuit and Sámi communities, would further demonstrate a commitment to Indigenous leadership in shaping the region’s future as Canada deepens strategic and security relationships with Arctic states such as , , and . By grounding national security policy in inclusive, community-informed frameworks, Canada can pursue the infrastructure and defence capabilities required for an uncertain geopolitical era while avoiding the reproduction of historical exclusions and marginalisation that have long defined national development.

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Event Details

The event NATO at a Crossroads: Present Challenges and Future Trajectories was held on Friday November 7 to examine various challenges and demands NATO is currently facing due to an increasingly multipolar and conflictual world. The emergence of new hostile actors, hybrid threats, and attacks on the neoliberal order places an additional need for NATO to be adaptive and resilient.

As an influential member in NATO, �䲹�Բ��岹’s defence strategy is taking a noteworthy shift in light of a rapidly changing international environment. Prime Minister Mark Carney’s budget – referred to as Canada Strong – plans to invest an estimated , aimed at strengthening the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) while reaffirming its role in multinational organizations and NATO exercises. With this rapidly evolving domestic and international contexts in mind, EETN’s conference brought together an array of academics and political practitioners to discuss ongoing developments with the Alliance, its current status, as well as critical next steps to ensure a stable future.

Panel One: Academic Institutions

Our first panel convened scholars and researchers from diverse disciplinary backgrounds to reflect on NATO’s future, as well as the evolving landscape of Canadian defence and security. Speakers addressed persistent gaps in �䲹�Բ��岹’s defence posturing; they went on to highlight the need for more transparency and open communication with the public on national security priorities. They also examined how external actors– including the United States (US) and key European Allies – shape NATO’s strategic direction and, in turn, �䲹�Բ��岹’s position within the Alliance.

Speaker One: Dr. Christian Leuprecht (Professor, Royal Military College and Queen’s University)

Dr. Leuprecht’s presentation looked at the grand strategy of the US to reflect on how this has influenced NATO to previously change its approaches to global security, as well as how Canada should organize its own strategy. Dr. Leuprecht remarked on how despite the current unreliability of the US Administration, we should not be excessively concerned for the future of the Alliance. He highlighted that the grand strategy of the US has shifted historically and unpredictably since 2000. In 2007, its pivot towards Asia and the Indo-Pacific reflected a similar systemic shift; this being said, its land mission in Europe remains a priority requiring continued collaboration.

While the US may not be able to support Europe in the same way it has historically as a result of ongoing domestic economic struggles, it will remain essential for additional actors to supplant resources to boost European defence. Dr. Leuprecht identified that a major issue for Canada continues to be its lack of engagement and depth to its international partnerships. For example, Canada continues to struggle to establish deep and effective ties with the European Parliament. Dr. Leuprecht advised that it is a necessity for Canada to partner with fellow middle powers to reaffirm its international role and relevance. This includes countries in the Black Sea region, as well as the Weimar triangle – regions that remain critical threat vectors in the war with Russia and integral to maintaining peace in Europe. Therefore, Canada should look to give more to these partners and deepen bonds. When it comes to increasing defence spending, he states we need to clearly identify what we need to buy, how it is bought, and how it is paid for.

Additionally, considering when to focus on defence investment versus procurement remains a critical question. Overall, if Canada hopes to improve its ability to support its partners as well as cement its role in the international order, such domestic considerations, external pressures, and ongoing shifts need to be made transparent and clear.

Speaker Two: Dr. Benjamin Zyla (Professor, University of Ottawa)

Dr. Zyla’s presentation focused on four key themes: ongoing debates surrounding how much defence spending is “enough”; the diminishing coherence and contested meaning of “the West”; the importance of avoiding excessive pessimism when assessing global security trends; and the effects of no living memory of great war in Canada. On the question of minimum spending, Dr. Zyla noted this was a question of reduced importance; instead, policymakers need to identify where the maximum lies, what the money is spent on, and how this balances against sectors being cut. Money allocated to defence often does not get completely spent in a fiscal year, raising questions about internal logistics. Additionally, the grand story of why Canada needs additional defence spending is missing, making it difficult to convince the public that such spending is necessary. This disconnect can cause further friction between citizens and the government.

In response to the decline and diminished coherence of the West – a trend targeted and exploited by Russian actors – Dr. Zyla noted how much of this decline comes from within. The erosion of democratic norms within the transatlantic community, he highlights, has contributed to such a decline in status, enabling interference and external attacks by foreign actors. The solution to this normative decline must come from within the transatlantic community itself, and more importantly, it is vital Canadians remain optimistic. The current international system provides many opportunities for middle powers to work together, including in instances of mediation, niche diplomacy, and multilateral cooperation.

Finally, Dr. Zyla suggested that Canadian decision-makers must contend with the fact that the current generation has no living memory of great war. This has a significant impact on the ways threats are framed in society, the way civil society perceives such frames, as well as the government’s ability to respond through defence spending. A major takeaway from his presentation is that improving �䲹�Բ��岹’s defence is not about obvious concrete actions, but the subtler ones which work to legitimate and support �䲹�Բ��岹’s national and international ambitions.

Speaker Three: Dr. Anne Fitz-Gerald (Professor and Director of Balsillie School of International Affairs)

Dr. Fitz-Gerald focused her presentation on the importance of considering data and technology in future defence planning. She suggests these dimensions of war have changed in recent years, requiring new approaches to address cognitive and data-driven tactics. Power has become increasingly vested in who owns the most intellectual property (IP) and who controls data, having ramifications for a nation’s sovereignty.

Dr. Fitz-Gerald suggests this new technological environment continues to be a major weak point for Canada, who has not built up the skills, products, and resources to excel in this industry. Civil and government workers do not have the tools to navigate this intangible world, both in policy and in threat responses. Decisions on deployment and sunsetting of legacy systems, along with innovation towards future ones, will have to be made. She presents Canada as an excellent candidate to become a specialist within this new context if the appropriate steps are taken.

A key component to this strategy is the Arctic, as reflected in Carney’s budget, which has the ideal environmental conditions to store, process, and receive data. Developing data centers in northern climates would also provide Canada with a stake in setting the rules of the technological game. Canada can use this to advocate for safe and responsible use of technology, reinforcing liberal values. Canada requires value-added products and services to prosper, which would create a technical specialist role, create passive income through IP, and create opportunities for collaboration with international partners. Otherwise, Canada may continue to face a drain on talent and patents, remaining ill-equipped to handle the new emerging frontiers of security.

Speaker Four: Dr. Luca Ratti (Professor, University of Rome III)

Dr. Ratti outlined the various historical crossroads that NATO has faced and advocated for its ability to resurrect itself. NATO’s history of adaptation makes it well-equipped to be able to handle various challenges and structural changes, suggesting that there should be a more positive outlook on the future of the Alliance. He noted how the crossroads today look different than before; there will certainly be setbacks, but the need to pivot is not a new experience.

Dr. Ratti went on to outline four major dynamics for the current resurrection of NATO: the revival of American leadership; the need for Europe to back up its defence promises with concrete action; the consolidation of the Nordic and Eastern flanks; and the consolidation of NATO’s values. The first two points both create an opportunity for transformation within European members, where countries can begin to strengthen their commitments and capabilities. This will create a stronger NATO, and in doing so, a stronger Europe. The final two points emphasize the need for geographic and ideological consolidation; the two newest members, Sweden and Finland, demonstrate good progress in consolidating flanks closest to Russia, leaving hope for the future. Finally, the neoliberal values of NATO need to be reaffirmed and fully committed too. The fractures between neoliberalism versus more traditional conservative ideologies have caused internal conflict, polarization, and an overall lack of cohesion, leaving NATO vulnerable.

Speaker Five: Dr. David Sichinava (Adjunct Research Professor, �Ӱ�ԭ�� University)

Dr. Sichinava presented the results of his survey research conducted in Estonia, Latvia, Armenia, and Georgia. The goal of the study was to track the perception of public and security issues in the Baltics and South Caucasus. Conducted via interviews, the result provided interesting information regarding perceived threats, sentiments regarding allies, as well as challenges perceived by citizens. His study measured many different questions, however a few key ones stood out.

Regarding the perception of the biggest threat to their country, publics in Estonia, Latvia, and Georgia all ranked Russia as the first; Armenia ranked Azerbaijan as its leading concern. Political instability was the second biggest threat to all. The impact of actors like Russia, China, and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) were mixed, but generally skewed negatively (especially in Baltic states). Alternatively, Western organizations were seen more positively, though with mixed answers in the South Caucasus. Publics in the Baltics voiced strong support for the West, stating they believed the West would come to their aid in the case of an attack. Other countries however, still charged themselves with their own protection and survival. The impact of Canada was seen positively in the Baltics and inconclusive elsewhere.

Important conclusions drawn from the study include notes reflecting on the positive perceptions towards NATO and the European Union (EU) continuing to be common, even in the South Caucasus, where much uncertainty and distrust remains. This means there is still space for organizations that promote neoliberal values to connect with the population and mitigate autocratic influence. Additionally, in the South Caucasus, an area especially vulnerable to malign influence, there is a strong awareness and readiness to mobilize against threatening actors.

Speaker Six: Dr. Mihai Sebe (Lecturer, University of Bucharest and Head of the European Affairs Department; European Institute of Romania)

The final speaker of the panel discussed the importance of the Black Sea in the shifting geopolitical context, advocating for NATO to pay more attention to this region. The Black Sea region (BSR) is both a critical target for Russian threats, and a vital part of international trade with Europe. Dr. Sebe suggested that Romania as an important emerging actor in this region, highlighting its strategic geography and ongoing security initiatives. Critical to Romania’s strategy to defend the Black Sea is the Danube River, an important trade route that connects to the Balkans and beyond, which Dr. Sebe argued must be better utilized.

Looking to the future, the rebuilding of Ukraine will involve these trade routes, further underscoring its importance. Productive involvement from the BSR necessitates better and deeper cooperation with Türkiye, an area of opportunity.

A key part of Russia’s actions in the BSR is the development of hybrid tactics, which NATO needs to improve its responses to. Dr. Sebe pointed to the increasing automation of warfare, which has several important security implications, including the need for improved general regulation of technology, especially in domains of artificial intelligence (AI). In conclusion, the Eastern flank and BSR continue to experience rapid developments; NATO must be prepared to support and respond to these challenges.

Panel Two: Policymakers and Practitioners

Our second panel brought together four practitioners from the fields of defence, foreign policy, and diplomacy. Their discussions largely concentrated on the concrete steps already being taken to bolster NATO’s defence capabilities, as well as the strategic initiatives shaping the Alliance’s future trajectory.

Speaker One: H.E. Witold Dzielski (Ambassador, Embassy of Poland)

Witold Dzielski, Abassador to the Embassy of Poland, took the time to discuss the commitments that Poland has made towards NATO spending, bolstering the Eastern flank, as well as improvements that can be made to the strategic defence of Europe. As one of the top spenders in NATO, Poland has invested a greal deal in procurement, providing a robust defence framework. Dzielski also highlighted the extensive defence partnership that exist between Poland and Canada. The two have a long history of joint military cooperation and training bilaterally, as well as through NATO exercises. He noted how Canada recognizes the significant contributions of Poland in supporting Ukrainian refugees at the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion, as well as Ukrainian resilience and defence capabilities overall. For Canada, deepening its ties with Poland is an important strategic move. This is reflected through the recent announcement from Prime Minister Mark Carney and Prime Minister Donald Tusk that they will continue to enhance interoperability and collaboration. This will be an important move in reaffirming Canadian partnerships to cement its role in defending European security.

Speaker Two: Eric Laporte (Executive Director, Defence and Security Relations Division, Global Affairs)

Eric Laporte focused on discussing how the framework of decision-making and strategy-setting have changed. He suggests that we are witnessing a reversion back to “classical” geopolitical norms and dynamics, in which power politics, balancing behaviour, and strategic interdependence are growing increasing important, accompanied by renewed concerns over absolute gains. There is also a renewed focus on deterrence as countries seek to contain various malign actors.

For Canada, key questions on sovereignty have emerged: what is sovereign capability? And what does it look like in a Canadian context? Important to agenda-setting will be determining what Canada needs in order to reinforce its independent capabilities, and how this will be acquired. Laporte also emphasized that the way hard power is implemented has changed, influencing the direction of spending.

Laporte ended with a reflection on how NATO is being enhanced through transformation, as the Alliance adapts itself to respond to a new reality. He outlines some key developments from Canada that should boost innovation in defence technology. First, a new climate change centre in Quebec that addresses the unique security risks that are emerging as a result of climate change; and second, the NATO Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) has opened its North American Regional Office in Halifax, Nova Scotia. These recent events indicate important ways that Canada is contributing to NATO’s ongoing transformation.

Speaker Three: Kerry-Lynn Nankivell (Director, NATO and Europe, ADM(Pol) Department of National Defence)

Nankivell discussed the importance of policy alignment between Canada, NATO, the Department of National Defence (DND), and Global Affairs Canada (GAC). She identified a high level of alignment with NATO through the replication of key bureaucratic structures in �䲹�Բ��岹’s defence policymaking. She also emphasized that DND and GAC work closely together to ensure objectives and procedures are closely aligned, creating a robust policy framework for Canada. Canada is responding to not only Russia, but also the threat of Russia with others. This creates a need for a comprehensive defence plan between Canada and others in the international community.

Nankivell identified several challenges that need to be resolved, including responsible spending, which is an area of increasing concern and responsibility. She also identifies challenges around innovation and increasing the amount of available personnel for the CAF. She generally had a positive assessment towards the steps that Canada is making, and will be making, to ensure it establishes a productive role on the global stage.

Speaker Four: BGen Scott McKenzie (Director General, Canadian Joint Operations Command)

Scott McKenzie provided a presentation as a security practitioner on �䲹�Բ��岹’s ability to support NATO readiness. Canadian presence in Latvia has been a key part of this support, which has brought lessons and growth. The importance of pre-positioning was emphasized, where Canada participates in collective actions so that it can mobilize as fast as possible if a real threat occurs. Canada is increasingly participating in decision-making, rehearsals, plans, and drills which contributes to its role in NATO.

Since 2022, with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, NATO has been rapidly evolving and mobilizing, which Canada must ensure it keeps up with. McKenzie establishes that the fundamental problem facing NATO in regards to European security is its ability to demonstrate a sustained capacity to combat Russian threats over a long duration. The key to warding off Russia will be to demonstrate strength, which requires intense amounts of consolidation and cooperation. Consolidation remains an integral problem, as NATO countries still struggle to integrate forces on tactical and strategic levels. Countries also need to work on standardizing systems and equipment between each other to improve interoperability. Infrastructure also needs to be improved (ports, hospitals, borders, etc.) to enable rapid mobilization. This requires cooperation between militaries, governments, and private industries. Therefore, McKenzie advocates that overcoming logistical problems such as these are key to improving the effectiveness and success of NATO forces.

The post Event Report
NATO at a Crossroads: Present Challenges and Future Trajectories appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

The return of war to Europe with Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has caused many North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members to re-evaluate and reflect upon their own practices of state sovereignty, defence, and foreign policy. Canada is no different in this regard; Russia’s invasion has indeed highlighted many vulnerabilities in �䲹�Բ��岹’s defence and security architecture, both pertaining to its NATO commitments in Europe and its ongoing presence in Arctic diplomacy. Projecting an image of Canada as a strong Ally associated with Europe has become a top priority for Prime Minister Mark Carney, particularly following the alienating comments and actions of United States (US) President Donald Trump. Canadian self-sufficiency, and security integration with Europe apart from the US, is vital in this changing geopolitical landscape. At the same time, asserting Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic is becoming incredibly important with the increased presence of Russian, Chinese, and American vessels.

As the severity of the security challenges that Canada faces become more apparent, so have the many institutional problems plaguing the Canadian military. �䲹�Բ��岹’s military is , is on a progressively unreliable US, and is subject to ongoing cultural reform attempts addressing . In finding solutions for �䲹�Բ��岹’s military problems, Canada should lean on and work with its European Allies – particularly those who share Arctic territory. Sustained Russian aggression and pressure from the US have made security self-sufficiency a high priority issue in Europe. Across Europe there has been a related for policies of mandatory national service, reflecting a change in security culture that, as an Ally, Canada will need to adapt to. For Canada to take itself seriously – and be taken seriously on the world stage – as an Arctic nation and a strong NATO Ally, it needs to make significant societal changes regarding the nature of national security.

This policy brief highlights how a system of national service inspired by the Scandinavian models could have the potential to both invigorate �䲹�Բ��岹’s military culture and redefine Canadians’ relationship with national defence. By shifting the understanding of national service away from traditional conflict-oriented military roles and towards a more varied and selective system, Canada could better address its vulnerabilities and strengthen its reputation both domestically and abroad. A shifting of focus of national service away from enforced combat-oriented roles, informed by the Scandinavian example, will also address a cultural scepticism of conscription that remains prevalent throughout Canada. The ongoing and contentious debates among other Canadian allies over alternative national service options highlight the challenging reality of political and cultural responses to such policies among civil society. In considering different models from which to take inspiration for such a system, the selective compulsory national service seen in Norway and Sweden stands out as the most applicable model for the Canadian context.

Models of National Service

While there are currently nine NATO members that enforce a system of mandatory national service, the examples of Nordic countries, encompassing Finland, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark (excluding the demilitarized Iceland), are particularly attractive to Canadian and due to similar liberal democratic political values, Arctic security concerns, and NATO membership. In fact, the Nordics represent : mandatory service, lottery-driven service, and selective compulsory service.

Mandatory service is seen in Finland as well as other NATO members such as Estonia, Greece, and Türkiye. This system of conscription – in which every male citizen is required to serve in some capacity – would be untenable in a Canadian context. For instance, Finland has a small population of approximately 5.5 million, and a much longer and more conflict-ridden relationship with its dominant neighbour, the Russian Federation. �䲹�Բ��岹’s geographic insulation, and its larger and more dispersed population of approximately 40 million, makes such a comprehensive conscription system considerably less attractive and less digestible practically or politically.

In Denmark, Latvia, and Lithuania, after mandatory written and health examinations citizens are subject to a lottery-driven conscription. Most position are filled by volunteers, so conscription is heavily limited. In the past decade, nearly of those undertaking military service in Denmark were volunteers. Conscripts are otherwise placed in the service of the Emergency Management Agency. However, there are two major reasons why this lottery-based system would be ill-advised for Canada. First, its random selection bears resemblance to the historic system used in the United States during the Vietnam War, which, as discussed below, carries a great degree of cultural influence. This would run the risk of stoking widespread negative reaction merely by association with the hegemonic military and cultural legacy and memory of the US (discussed further below). Secondly, the system of random selection designed primarily to boost the number of military recruits perpetuates an assumption of traditional conflict. It therefore distracts from the need to redefine defence responsibilities of the citizenry to include more than narrow militarised considerations. It may also inhibit the ability to reframe service as a means of providing training opportunities.

Norway and Sweden share a similar system of selective compulsory service, with Sweden taking influence from the pioneering Norwegian model. Norway, while nominally extending mandatory service to all citizens, has a highly competitive system that utilizes mental and physical assessments to select candidates. Sweden’s system of “” extends to all Swedish citizens (even abroad) and foreign residents of Sweden. It includes three types of duties: military service, civilian service, and general service obligations in the event of war. In both Norway and Sweden, conscription is determined by a set of questionnaires given to all 18-year-olds. In 2024, civilian service was enacted for the first time since the Cold War ended, incorporating training in emergency services for conscripts identifying as conscientious objectors. While similar in principle to Norway’s system, Sweden differs in its inclusion of mandatory civil service. Reintroduced in 2017, Swedish compulsory civil service provides training in emergency health and energy services.

The variations seen in Sweden and Norway thus serve as more applicable examples for Canadian consideration. While these Scandinavian countries have much smaller land masses and population sizes than Canada, their limited styles of conscription would fit within the Canadian context, particularly with an expanded acceptance of immediate security priorities. The Norway-Sweden system has been taken up by other Allies as a model already – namely Germany. Like Canada, Germany is a federal state, with a healthy amount of (which it abandoned in 2011) and a population much larger than the Scandinavian countries. In , the German cabinet passed a draft bill introducing a national service system that took direct inspiration from the Swedish example, with the major difference being that the new system would be voluntary (for now). Once implemented, the system will have all Germans turning 18 sent a questionnaire asking about their physical fitness and if they are interested in volunteering for the military. While the future success of the German policy is unclear, the adoption of a modified Norway-Sweden model of national service shows the system’s potential flexibility to meet the unique requirements of a particular country. It may also serve as an example on adapting the system to the context of a larger and more diverse state.

Contentious and Ongoing Debates amongst �䲹�Բ��岹’s Allies

In assessing the applicability of Scandinavian models of national service in addressing �䲹�Բ��岹’s military needs, the consideration of alternative models provides useful context. Mandatory national service options have already been debated by some of �䲹�Բ��岹’s closest Allies.

During the 2024 United Kingdom (UK) general election, the incumbent Conservative government a form of mandatory military or civilian service for all 18-year-olds. Denounced by critics as a misguided electioneering stunt, the proposal came from then-Prime Minister Rishi Sunak without the knowledge of some of his cabinet ministers. The announcement from an historically unpopular government, directly preceding an embarrassing election loss, made a out of national service in the UK. However, in June 2025 the Labour government that succeeded Sunak endorsed the consideration of a system of voluntary ‘military gap years’ for young people based on a model offered by the Australian Defence Force.

A similar attempt at volunteer national service is seen in France’s Service National Universel (). Targeted towards French citizens aged 15-17, SNU was explicitly designed as a method of civic education. The to include mandatory participation has been discussed since its creation in 2019. However, the feasibility of national service, personally championed by President Emmanuel Macron, is heavily debated even as a voluntary program. In , the French Senate voted to slash the SNU budget against Macron’s pleadings.

As these examples illustrate, issues of practical implementation can be of immense importance in the ensuing debate over national service models. Framing and messaging of national service in these debates is also critical. Communicating a logical reason for national service can be disrupted if the messaging is incompatible with the political and cultural realities of the country. A practical policy debate is hindered by the assumption of national service as an ad hoc response to military conflict threatening national existence. Under this assumption, any attempt to explore national service in a security context that is not characterised by imminant invasion is plagued by denunciation as an impractical infringement on civil liberties, as happened in the UK. However, the attempt to bypass controversy by framing national service as primarily a tool of civic education presents the issue of lacking urgency and thus decreasing the sense of priority, as has been seen in France and Australia. It is therefore important to reframe the debate to highlight the security rationale for national service that poses immediate threat without necessarily aligning a relation to combat.

Application to Canada – Immediate Threats and Challenges

A New Security Context: European Projection and Self-Sufficiency

Canada can no longer rely on the myth of its removal from immediate territorial threats. It is no longer, as once famously quipped, “a fire-proof house far from inflammable materials.” The idea that national service is only relevant in the immediate preparation for a war threatening the integrity of national territory is nullified by the existence of numerous present security threats, both stemming from environmental and geopolitical challenges. In the international political context of President Trump questioning Canadian security, �䲹�Բ��岹’s ability to project the image of a strong, independent military actor are vital for ensuring that it can secure its own borders. The Scandinavian models of self-sufficiency through mandatory national service can be used to address several of �䲹�Բ��岹’s immediate security challenges.

The Arctic

National service applied to the assertion of Arctic sovereignty may have the benefit of strengthening cultural awareness of �䲹�Բ��岹’s Arctic identity. It may also strengthen Canadian ties with its Nordic Allies through a shared approach to security, while lessening dependence on the US. Recent to strengthen Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic include $420 million to expand military operations in the region. Canada may also take note of Denmark’s recent actions. After President Trump made several threatening remarks about his desire for an American acquisition of Greenland, the Danish government made moves to increase its presence in the autonomous territory. admitting women into mandatory national service, increasing the period of service from 4 to 11 months, and raising the number of recruits from approximately 5,000 to 7,500 by 2033. Rather than a traditional military role, the possibilities for Arctic service could include community support, healthcare, and infrastructural maintenance roles.

Environmental Crises

With the increase of environmental crises, most visible through the in the number of wildfires across Canada every summer, there is a need to expand national security to address natural disasters. Aiding in environmental catastrophes such as wildfires, floods, or earthquakes has the potential to be a major focus of a civilian national service option in Canada. As an immediate security issue, such environmental crises may serve as a viable justification for national service in public opinion. There is precedent for conscription to fight wildfires in Canada. Under British Columbia’s (2004), the Crown has the power to “order a person who is 19 years of age or older to assist in fire control”. A Swedish-style compulsory civil service model, which provides to conscripts, would have potential applications in preparing individuals to assist during environmental crisis events, whether through fighting fires or aiding infrastructural maintenance or emergency response.

Military Culture

Cultural problems have plagued �䲹�Բ��岹’s military for years, with criticisms coming from both the and . While the Conservative party calls for the return of pride in the military, the Liberal government has spoken out about the need to address cultural issues of misogyny, racism, and political extremism. Either way, the political milieu has resulted in a drastic decrease in recruitment. The to both men and women in Norway (2013), Sweden (2017), and Denmark (2025) has triggered important cultural discussions in facilitating gender parity. In Denmark, the has been presented as a way to trigger the military to practically address documented problems of sexual harassment, assault, and discrimination against women while strengthening its capabilities and purpose. The pioneering move by Norway in instituting gender equality in conscription was as having triggered significant changes in many areas, including “leadership and organizational culture”. The policy was designed to increase the number of women in the military and remove the assumption that men have a higher suitability for military responsibilities. By providing a sense of duty, purpose, and responsibility, national service can provide a culture of confidence and equality to combat the presence of discriminatory behaviour in the military.

Assessment

The Scandinavian approach to national service is not solely associated with the immediate preparation for defensive war. It carries an encompassing view of national security that focuses on the prevention of conflict and the facilitation of citizen engagement and responsibility. The aggressive rhetoric from President Trump, the war in Ukraine, and the increasingly destructive environmental crises have been cited as reasons to consider the Nordic style of conscription by political commentators in both and publications. This conversation is important in reframing the general association of conscription with the immediate onset of nation-threatening conflict. Canada faces a variety of immediate and projected threats that can be addressed by a rationalized, skills-oriented, and limited system of national service as seen in Norway and Sweden. The Norway-Sweden model facilitates choice and conscientious objection while encouraging the responsibility of citizens to protect their country. However, the prospect of implementing a system of national service in Canada would require taking into account the variabilities of diverse political responses that could be expected to such a proposal.

Reframing Security and Addressing Potential Opposition

There are some notable political and cultural differences that would make a Canadian adoption of Scandinavian conscription policies a challenge. Some that the likelihood of Canadian implementation of mandatory national service policy remains low, both due to projected issues related to public opinion and constitutional challenges. A potential court challenge regarding civil liberties under could be a barrier to any national service legislation not related to an imminent threat to Canadian sovereignty. While the notwithstanding clause of the Charter could be used by parliament to advance a policy of national service against such challenges, such a move would inevitably prove . The current Liberal government’s desire to use of the notwithstanding clause makes any potential use against a civil liberties challenge unlikely. Additionally, public opinion challenges may stem from historic cultural influences related to the US, where there is a strong distrust of conscription associated with the experiences of the Vietnam War in the 1960s-70s. The legacy of �䲹�Բ��岹’s willingness to harbour over draft-age American men and women during the Vietnam War lends some credence to a potential distaste for mandatory service. While opposition to national service along libertarian lines has been , �䲹�Բ��岹’s own historical experience with anti-conscription riots in Quebec during the First World War serves as a more significant cultural influence. In modern circumstances, however, such concerns can be addressed by adapting a new conception of what mandatory national service entails, as inspired by the Norway-Sweden example.

The emphasis on a broad definition of security to encompass climate crisis preparedness, Arctic sovereignty, and other civil duties can serve to adapt the public assumption of the meaning of national service. An noted that, while mandatory service in the military remains a contentious issue among respondents – with 44% opposing and 43% supporting – other alternative service options were much more popular. Public health support service saw 74% support, while environmental support saw 73% support. The general sympathy towards national civilian service and the relative distaste for military service is in line with the historic association of military conscription with involuntary participation in far-flung conflict overseas (such as perceptions that imperialism was the motivating factor behind the First World War, or likewise the imperialist imagery associated with the Vietnam War by so-called ‘’).

In addition, national service can be highlighted as an important opportunity for investment in developing and applying the skills of young Canadians. The aforementioned poll by the recorded the popularity of this aspect of national service, showing that 82% of respondents thought mandatory civilian service would improve the personal development of young adults. The mandatory questionnaire system used in the Norway-Sweden model can be used to gauge skills, aptitude, and interest in order to provide training where needed and encourage healthy competition for placements. Such a policy could be incorporated into an expansion of existing components of the Canadian Armed Forces, such as the Canadian Rangers. As explored by Valeriia Gusieva, the Rangers already represent a bridge between Canadian defence priorities in the Arctic and the utilisation of unique cultural knowledge found among Indigenous communities. There is great potential in the Canadian Rangers as a way to align the development of �䲹�Բ��岹’s human potential with the assertion of its sovereignty and security.

There may be an inclination to avoid public stigma against conscription by implementing a voluntary national service system, which would align Canada with France, as well as the current debates in Germany and the UK. Such an option would be less effective in addressing Canadian defence needs or in advancing an association between Canadians and national security than the selective compulsory system seen in Norway and Sweden. The Norway-Sweden model, though officially mandatory, provides a level of flexibility that facilitates an essentially voluntary system which nonetheless communicates the imperative need for security awareness and preparedness. The voluntary system in France exists instead as a compromise paired with an official desire for expansion to compulsory service. As such, they remain vulnerable to the changing whims of the legislature. The mandatory nature of national service, paired with an allowance for effective decision-making on the part of those compelled to fill in the assessment questionnaire, is necessary in order to align the redefined security focus and cultural reforms with an appreciation of the longstanding traditions associated with the Canadian military.

Therefore, the implementation of national service in Canada, in aid of fulfilling its international obligations, NATO Alliance pressures, and strategic vulnerabilities, would be best aligned with a system inspired by the Norway-Sweden model. In redefining the popular image of national security to include the immediate yet non-conflict-oriented threats of climate disasters and Arctic sovereignty assertion, national service can be disassociated from traditional military conflict and instead integrated into the public image of civic responsibility.

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Critical minerals are pivotal for the manufacturing of defence equipment ranging from aircraft to ammunition and armour. Securing these resources is essential for minimizing defence supply chain risks and for the broader green energy transition. For NATO and Canada, defence supply chains have due to global disruptions like the COVID-19 pandemic and coercive economic tactics, particularly from . This realized vulnerability has pushed Canada, the US, and Europe to develop legislation to safeguard these critical resources, build supply chain resiliency, and protect domestic defence industry by friend-shoring with Allies. 

Strategies to Secure Critical Mineral Supply Chains 

In 2022, the Canadian government launched its $4 billion to bolster domestic industry, identifying six critical minerals as pivotal to the green energy transition. To complement this strategy, the government also laid out in �䲹�Բ��岹’s mining sector, , under the . In May 2024, the EU launched its own to secure the supply of essential critical minerals, identifying 17 strategic raw materials that are at risk of disruption and in which demand could increase exponentially.  

At the international level, the G7 published its in June 2025 to build resiliency in critical mineral supply chains and ensure that they are traded in a standards-based market. And in December 2024, NATO released its list of that are essential for manufacturing all types of defence equipment. Importantly, all 12 critical minerals identified on NATO’s list are found in Canada, with produced and refined in Canada. 

�䲹�Բ��岹’s Evolving Critical Mineral Trading Relationships 

has allowed it to become a strategic exporter of these resources to the US and European partners. During the 2025 NATO Summit, Canadian Prime Minister (PM) Mark Carney that expenditures related to critical minerals will be considered a military contribution towards reaching the NATO target of 5 percent for annual defence spending. This spending will also involve building to ensure these resources are accessible for �䲹�Բ��岹’s partners. While Canada has tremendous potential in mining reserves, numerous projects in this sector have recently struggled to become operational due to , inadequate infrastructure, and problems acquiring sufficient upfront capital and equipment; however, the Canadian Government has announced and to reduce the impact of these issues.  

The in the critical minerals trade, with sent to the US in 2023. In addition, many of the minerals mined in Canada are refined in the US, signifying that a substantial number of mining companies in Canada are dependent on a healthy US-Canada trade relationship for their own success. Thus, the impact of Trump’s tariffs has raised significant concerns about the economic and security risks of this dependency, including the effects of tariffs on the costs of such minerals and how among Allies over the long term. Chinese companies with advanced mineral processing and refining equipment and expertise could take advantage of the rising costs of these minerals by selling them at discounted prices.   

While the US will remain �䲹�Բ��岹’s top partner for trading and financing critical mineral projects into the future, �䲹�Բ��岹’s tumultuous trade relationship with the Trump administration and recent drive to diversify its trade partnerships has created opportunities to build joint supply chains with the EU. Canadian mining companies are currently able to export critical minerals to the EU under the 2017 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). This partnership further expanded in 2021 when Canada and the EU announced to integrate critical mineral supply chains. 

Although the US is also an important trading partner for for the EU, various European leaders have expressed interest in accessing �䲹�Բ��岹’s abundant mineral reserves as a way to bolster their own supply chains. Most recently, both sides have expressed the need for enhanced cooperation in this sector through the and through . With still being in the negotiation stage, EU-Canada cooperation in this area looks to have a significant opportunity for continued expansion. 

Potential Areas of Cooperation in Critical Mineral Supply-Chains for Canada 

Most recently, the European Investment Bank recently announced new funding for mineral exploration and financing of defence-critical minerals for which . However, there are still additional opportunities for Canada and the EU to build supply-chain resilience. One important area of potential collaboration is the stockpiling of critical minerals, . To assist the EU in building its stockpiles, Canada could export some of its critical minerals on the EU’s strategic raw minerals list, such as , after domestic production ramps up. 

A recent also recommends that Canada establish its own critical mineral stockpile, potentially composed . Creating these reserves in Canada could boost its credibility among NATO Allies while simultaneously contributing to NATO’s 5 percent military spending target.  

Lastly, to meet NATO’s 5 percent GDP spending target and contribute to supply chain resiliency, have noted that Canada could develop financing laws equivalent to the US’s , which could provide a signal to mining companies that the Canadian government will place a greater stake in financing new mining projects. Such a move could also to fund such resource extraction and processing projects and to encourage stockpiling.  

In conclusion, �䲹�Բ��岹’s vast critical mineral reserves have the potential to supply the growing demand from NATO Allies. However, Canada must still develop its domestic capacity and the necessary infrastructure to mine these critical minerals, as projects can take up to . Despite the unpredictability in �䲹�Բ��岹’s current trade relationship with the US, the potential environmental, economic, and security benefits of strengthening this sector domestically and building resilient supply chains will remain significant for years to come.  

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It was during the first days of Russia’s full-scale invasion that Ukrainians were initially given only a few days to survive; the Russian Army was perceived to have a significant advantage in both military personnel and weaponry. Ukrainian civilians nonetheless mobilized quickly in response to support the sovereignty effort – be it through joining the front lines via voluntary military service or through the organization of humanitarian aid and fundraisers for military equipment. These grassroots initiatives have become a critical area where Ukrainians continue to succeed and make a tangible difference in the broader war effort. Ukraine has not only challenged the military might of one of the world’s largest armies but has also transformed modern warfare as we know it through innovative tactics, most notably, the increased and creative use of drones.  

It is alongside these technological advancements in drone technology and warfare that Ukraine has also pioneered a new form of media warfare, wherein press officers from different battalions as well as social media managers from Ukrainian and international charities leverage creative campaigning strategies and real-time battlefield footage to engage a global audience. By making military operations visible online, Ukrainian soldiers have brought the harsh realities of war into the public eye. This transparency, combined with the widespread organization of grassroots fundraisers, has empowered civilians and foreign supporters to actively participate in the war effort, while also ensuring that more distant audiences do not lose sight of what Ukraine is fighting for. Such civic engagement challenges the traditional notion that serving in wartime is limited to frontline military service, highlighting new ways that ordinary people contribute to national defence. The following piece will examine how grassroots fundraising campaigns, innovative drone warfare, and media strategies have enabled ordinary Ukrainians, and their global supporters, to play a vital role in the resistance from Russian expansion. It will also explore how this widespread civic engagement is reshaping traditional ideas of military service and influencing Ukrainian military policy, offering lessons for other countries on mobilizing civilian participation in modern warfare. 

Fundraising Campaigns  

While there are many organizations supporting Ukraine’s war effort, some of the most prominent include Come Back Alive, the Prytula Foundation, Hospitallers, Sternenko’s community, and United24 – a government-led fundraising and media platform. Simultaneously, many battalions have their own affiliated foundations dedicated to fundraising efforts. The civilian volunteer movement in Ukraine has existed since 2014, when Russia first launched its invasion of Ukrainian territory. However, the scale of this movement has increased drastically since 2022. While some foundations focus on providing humanitarian relief, medical aid, and support for , many are dedicated to increasing military capacity by procuring and purchasing defense equipment in collaboration with various government departments, as well as by providing direct support to battalions. 

One notable example is the . Since the start of the full-scale invasion, the team has worked in direct coordination with soldiers on the ground. This began early on, when soldiers quickly recognized during the full-scale invasion the revolutionary use of kamikaze drones on the battlefield and began fundraising to supply battalions directly. Even before the foundation was formally established, they had already delivered over 145,000 FPV drones to the army, along with many other supplies, including vehicles, Mavic drones, radios, Starlink terminals, sea drones, and long-range drones. Earlier this year, the community was officially registered as a foundation in order to streamline internal processes and increase its capacity to support the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU). The foundation posts daily drone supply reports, providing video and photo proof of deliveries to battalions. As a fundraising tactic, they often share footage of drones being used effectively on the battlefield, including targeting and eliminating enemy troops.  

A key figure behind this initiative is Serhii Sternenko, a Kyiv-based Ukrainian activist known both for his military fundraising and for publicly raising concerns about Ukrainian military leadership. He often acts as a liaison, bringing soldiers’ concerns directly to high-ranking military officials. Due to his activism, Sternenko has been a repeated target of Russian-orchestrated assassination attempts, the most recent being in May 2025. To support the fundraising campaign “Rusoriz,” which focuses on drone procurement, Sternenko hosts livestreams every Sunday, inviting popular Ukrainian activists, politicians, and soldiers. On average, these streams raise on average about 1,000,000 UAH (approximately 33,500 CAD). In addition, during the stream Sternenko also runs knife giveaways to engage supporters. One of the speculations about why Sternenko chose to give away knives is linked to an attempted assassination in 2018. Sternenko managed to disarm his attacker and used the knife in an act of self-defence. Since then, he has often showcased his extensive knife collection and has collaborated with various battalions to create exclusive engravings, increasing their value in order to raise more funds for the AFU. Another fundraising strategy used by the foundation has included a merchandise campaign featuring T-shirts and other items, with a portion of the sales going to support the war effort. The most popular designs include, “Our Russophobia is not enough,” a slogan often repeated by Sternenko on his social media profiles and during YouTube streams.  

The idea of selling merchandise to support the Ukrainian Army quickly gained popularity among Ukrainian businesses of all kinds. For example, the Ukrainian bank PUMB launched a social initiative called “We Are of One Blood,” which offers Ukraine-themed hoodies, T-shirts, and jewelry collections. The project raises funds to support blood donation initiatives, as well as funds to support the purchase hemostatic supplies and tactical medical gear for Ukrainian soldiers. Half of the cost of each purchase is donated by the bank to the non-profit organizations DonorUA, Blood Agents, and Hospitallers. In addition, the initiative supports Ukrainian manufacturers and promotes local art.  

While there are organizations raising funds on a large scale, many Ukrainians are launching grassroots campaigns to support their loved ones who have joined the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Since the start of the full-scale invasion, Ukrainians have been actively mobilizing, with large portions of the population donating regularly. However, as the war enters its third year, the geopolitical situation – marked by increasing global instability and shifting dynamics in the Trump administration – has started to impact national morale and well-being. The increasing normalization (and even valorization) of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s presence on the global stage reflects a troubling shift in the international order for Ukrainians. Despite Russia’s clear pursuit of imperial ambitions, Putin is nonetheless being tolerated – if not welcomed – within certain arenas of international politics and security that have long been associated with great power status. Such normalization signals a form of “norm diffusion” (; , whereby authoritarian governance and revisionist practices are tolerated as legitimate forms of state behaviour, particularly amidst raising global instability and the erosion of the liberal international order as we know it. For Ukrainians on the ground, this widening window of tolerance to Russian claims of great power status not only compounds upon the Ukrainian struggle for sovereignty, but also underscores the structural challenge of resisting an international political environment that is increasingly shaped by the practices and discourses of authoritarian leaders.    

Despite these challenges, numerous successful individual campaigns have evolved into grassroots movements. This paper suggests that such a momentum created by these grassroots actors can be systematized into a broader strategy to strengthen Ukraine’s military capacity and deepen civilian engagement in national resilience efforts. One such example is a movement launched to support the Azov Regiment, known as “T����DZ�����” or “Azov’s Rear People.” The core idea behind this campaign is to mobilize many individuals to collectively raise large sums through smaller, manageable contributions. In 2023, the Ukrainian bank Monobank saw a surge in popularity for its “Jar” feature (Banka). Originally designed to help users set aside money for planned purchases, the feature became a powerful fundraising tool thanks to its simplicity and flexibility. Monobank enhanced the user experience by enabling top-ups via Apple Pay, Google Pay, and other banks’ cards without fees, and by assigning a unique card number to each Jar. The service now includes raffles for donors, smartphone widgets, social media templates, and IBAN details to facilitate sharing and engagement.  

In May 2024, Monobank introduced a new feature called “Friendly Collections.” This allows multiple people to fundraise toward a common goal by dividing the total amount among themselves into separate Jars. Unlike informal methods, this official feature reduces micromanagement, as organizers no longer have to spend as much time tracking who has transferred which share. The “Azov’s Rear People” movement leverages the Jar feature to break down large fundraising targets into smaller goals that ordinary Ukrainians can reach within their personal circles and communities. To date, they have collectively raised over 220 million UAH (approximately 7.7 million CAD), demonstrating the remarkable effectiveness of this decentralized, people-powered fundraising model.  

Redefining “Service” in Wartime & Lessons for the World 

The traditional notion of service during wartime tends to focus on military enlistment or government-led mobilization efforts, as well as various humanitarian initiatives targeting civilian evacuation and the relocation of internally displaced persons (). However, Ukrainians today are demonstrating another form of direct engagement and participation with the battlefront: through grassroots fundraising efforts for military equipment, technical gear, medical supplies, vehicles, and drones. Donation culture is becoming the norm among Ukrainians, with media strategies and social media campaigns playing a central role in civic engagement. These tools are increasingly used to raise funds aimed at boosting military capacity. A major challenge in Ukraine’s defence efforts continues to be personnel shortages. With a significantly smaller population than Russia, Ukraine naturally has a more limited mobilization pool. One of our previous analyses explores the challenges surrounding mobilization, which is available here: /eetn/2025/new-recruitment-initiatives-face-backlash-amid-ukraines-war-effort 

While many civilians are contributing large sums of money to support the AFU, ethical questions persist around whether it is appropriate to “buy” one’s way out of mobilization. For instance, Lieutenant Colonel Kyrylo Veres, Commander of the 20th Separate Unmanned Systems Regiment “K-2,” in a recent interview on the tangible value provided by such financial contributions. He noted that a significant percentage of drones used by his soldiers come from volunteers rather than through official government supply chains. Veres emphasized that, in some cases, it may be more effective for individuals, such as business owners, to remain in their civilian roles, continuing to fund and supply drones and other military systems, rather than being drafted to serve on the front lines. At the same time, he expressed frustration with those who make minimal financial contributions and claim they are fighting on the “economic frontline,” especially as his unit continues to face a persistent shortage of personnel for military operations.  

The Kyiv Independent that in 2024 alone, individual volunteers and fundraisers raised nearly $1 billion to support the Armed Forces of Ukraine, highlighting a powerful culture of giving. This grassroots movement often taps into creativity and humor to engage the public. To explore the donation culture in Ukraine and the role creativity plays in successful fundraising, please consider watching this example from Kyiv Independent:

The success of Ukrainian fundraising campaigns often lies in their ability to bypass complex bureaucratic processes, allowing aid to reach the front lines almost immediately – a critical factor during wartime to ensure soldiers are properly equipped. This success also reflects shared between the AFU and Ukrainian civilians, tied together through a strong sense of belonging, shared purpose, and a commitment to participate in the war effort and the defeat of Russian forces (). The transparency of these campaigns works to reinforce public confidence.; indeed, many average Ukrainians believe their donations are being used as intended, thanks to clear reporting, proper documentation, and even photos and videos from soldiers expressing their gratitude. While grassroots fundraising cannot match the scale of government aid or international military support, it plays a vital role in rapid procurement and targeted delivery of equipment. , rooted in civilian empowerment and  ongoing, intersubjective engagement between the AFU and Ukrainians, offers a potential blueprint for other countries, including Canada, to enhance public participation in national defence or crisis response. 

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