“The Black Sea in 2026: Strategic Maneuvers and Economic Opportunity” examines how the Black Sea has become one of the world’s most consequential geopolitical and economic corridors following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The brief analyzes the competing strategies of Russia, TĂĽrkiye, the European Union, and China, alongside the security concerns of littoral states, highlighting how control of the region shapes Ukraine’s future and broader transatlantic stability. It also outlines Canada’s growing role as a NATO partner in supporting regional security, trade resilience, and postwar reconstruction. The paper concludes with targeted policy recommendations for strengthening Canada–Ukraine cooperation and enhancing Black Sea security in a rapidly evolving strategic landscape.

To read the full policy brief prepared by Dr. Jeff Sahadeo, click the download button below.

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On September 30, 2025, to intervene in Nexperia’s operations, a semiconductor-focused Chinese-owned company. The government had cited “” and the risk that vital technological capabilities could be shifted out of Europe, and it gave itself the power to reverse or even block decisions deemed harmful to both Dutch and European economic security.

Nexperia, as a company, is not a glamorous AI-chip producer as the media tends to focus on, but rather a supplier of “legacy” semiconductors used in both cars and other consumer electronics, which was formerly part of Philips’ semiconductor operations and was . However, . The response from Beijing was swift. In early October, China’s Commerce Ministry . It halted exports of Nexperia chips from China, turning the regulatory move into a global supply chain incident. Nexperia, for its part, warned its customers that it would no longer be able to guarantee the quality or authenticity of any chips produced in China after October 13, .

Suppliers and automakers alike suddenly discovered how exposed they were to the “boring” part of the chip world. The European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association and could force production lines to halt. The ripple effects of supply chain issues caused by the Dutch regulatory provision were felt even in North America, and had either sought other suppliers or exemptions from the control measures imposed by China.

By mid-November, after talks involving partners such as the United States, China decided to ease its export ban on Nexperia, and the , citing steps taken by Beijing to restore chip flows to Europe. The immediate crisis seems to have been managed for the time being. However, the events of the last three months have exposed apparent limitations in the resilience of Europe’s semiconductor industry.

On Paper: Ambitious. In Reality: Dependent

The is intended to double the European share of the global semiconductor market to 20% by 2030, strengthen and resilient supply chains, and minimize Europe’s dependency on foreign suppliers. However, the that this target is unlikely to be met, and that the EU market share is currently only projected to be 11.7% in 2030.

Interestingly, identified semiconductors as one of the four “critical technology areas” that require risk assessments by its member states, other critical areas included biotech, quantum, and AI technologies. However, the Nexperia case reveals that Europe’s most glaring deficiencies are not only at the bleeding edge of semiconductor design, but also that the assembly, testing, and production of older-generation chips have been, for the most part, offshored to China. This is consistent with broader statistics on digital dependence. For example, the relayed estimations that the EU relies on non-EU suppliers for more than 80% of its digital products, services, and infrastructure, and that China supplies approximately 71% of the EU’s gallium and 45% of its germanium, both of which are irreplaceable materials needed for semiconductor production. In other words, Europe is attempting to establish some degree of technological sovereignty on a foundation that is deeply entangled with Chinese output, especially in the least glamorous parts of the value chain.

Lessons

The EU now centres discussions on “” from China to manage interdependence and to diversify rather than simply sever ties with China altogether. The Nexperia case offers a sneak peek at what this could mean in practice.

First, it would require regulatory teeth, such as the willingness to use emergency security tools, including the , and EU-level export control and investment screening, to keep critical capabilities anchored in Europe when market incentives may point elsewhere. Second, it demands a redesign of the supply chain. Ensuring that 70% of a critical supplier’s output is not hostage to policy decisions made by China means not only investing in high-end chips, but also in the often-forgotten parts of the industry, such as test facilities, packaging plants, and the raw materials they rely on. The Nexperia saga serves as a great case study in the potential costs of ignoring such links. Third, de-risking not only implies reshoring but also friend-shoring. , launched in 2022, aims to make Canada a global “supplier of choice” for critical minerals and the clean technologies they enable, such as semiconductors. The recent builds upon this strategy by committing new funding to raw mineral extraction and export. Canada and the EU already have a from 2021, which commits both sides to integrating Canada-EU raw materials value chains and reducing strategic dependencies on other supplier countries. For Europe, treating that partnership more as a core pillar of its long-term semiconductor security strategy would be a meaningful act of de-risking.

The Nexperia crisis is a preview. As Europe tightens export controls and pushes its Chips Act forward, similar flashpoints are likely, mainly around similar firms and technologies. The question is whether European policymakers are prepared and willing to pay both the financial and political costs of reducing dependencies and taking proactive measures rather than simply reacting when a single chip company suddenly becomes the chokepoint of global production.

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The Kyrgyz Republic’s under-digitised public healthcare system presents an emerging vector for foreign digital influence and strategic vulnerability. As China advances its global data ambitions through the Digital Silk Road and affiliated Health Silk Road, Beijing is positioning itself to dominate the digitisation of Kyrgyzstan’s public healthcare system by offering technologies often tied to opaque governance and hidden data extraction risks. 

The health sector, often overlooked in traditional security assessments, contains vast quantities of personal and biometric data. In the absence of competitive alternatives, Kyrgyzstan risks entrenching Chinese digital standards, undermining its data sovereignty —a crucial component of strategic autonomy —and becoming increasingly dependent on authoritarian-aligned technologies.

China’s Digital Expansion and Kyrgyzstan’s Authoritarian Drift

Once viewed as an in post-Soviet Central Asia, the Kyrgyz Republic has taken an increasingly under the regime of President Sadyr Japarov. While domestic drivers underpin this trajectory, China’s has provided essential support (for further context, see: Exporting Surveillance: China’s Authoritarian Blueprint in the Kyrgyz Republic).Ěý

, long considered apolitical and largely removed from most conversations about security and strategic autonomy, is emerging as a new frontier. As Kyrgyzstan its health sector, Beijing has developed attractive and under the banner of the . These are often deployed under non-transparent agreements that provide state-affiliated corporations access to data that can facilitate , , , and of populations. 

Biometric Data and Medical Records: An Overlooked Threat

data refers to unique physiological characteristics used to identify individuals. In the context of healthcare, this includes high-tech identifiers such as facial scans, fingerprints, and retinal patterns, as well as lower-tech data like height, weight, blood type, dental records, menstrual cycles, and handwritten signatures. While this may seem innocuous, when combined with the wider scope of , these figures become inadvertently sensitive. 

For example, menstrual cycle data can signal pregnancy, fertility patterns, and reproductive irregularities, making it highly valuable in contexts where states seek to control reproduction. In China, where population management has historically been enforced through the and, more recently, through the of Uyghur women in Xinjiang, the raises serious security and human rights concerns. 

As Chinese–Kyrgyz relations deepen, particularly through security and technological cooperation involving the increased monitoring and surveillance of Kyrgyzstan’s Uyghur population. This extension of surveillance infrastructure, combined with the digitisation of health data, risks replicating the same reproductive control measures seen in Xinjiang.

Access to a nation’s health records and biometric data also provides information about the population’s demographics, such as death rates, birth rates, and infant mortality. In addition to these historical security concerns about population demographics, this data can also current health risks and disparities, and forecast future health outcomes like disease outbreaks. The potential for misuse makes this information particularly vulnerable in insecure or foreign-controlled digital systems.

Unauthorised access to biometric and health data is a . It can enable foreign actors to monitor populations, coerce political figures, or target dissent. In authoritarian contexts, such data can be weaponised to suppress opposition and influence the behaviour of populations. , while framed as developmental aid, threaten to introduce asymmetric dependencies, data extraction risks, and strategic leverage over host governments.

Without robust safeguards or competitive alternatives, Kyrgyzstan’s adoption of foreign digital infrastructure risks eroding data sovereignty, weakening institutional independence, and embedding long-term vulnerabilities that can be exploited for geopolitical influence.

Healthcare Vulnerabilities 

Kyrgyzstan’s healthcare system, shaped by Soviet-era centralisation, has since independence through reforms and international partnerships. It now delivers both private care through clinics as well as publicly funded universal care. The public sector of healthcare remains underdeveloped and largely paper-based. Digital systems, where they exist, are fragmented, lacking both interoperability and .

This systemic weakness has real-world consequences. During a research visit to Kyrgyzstan in the summer of 2025, I sustained multiple injuries in a mountain biking accident and was treated at Bishkek’s National Hospital. While clinical care was excellent, the lack of digital infrastructure was stark: I had to photograph CT scans and X-rays with my personal smartphone and carry handwritten medical records between appointments. This informal data handling not only complicates care but also demonstrates the demand for the digitisation of Kyrgyz healthcare.

My experience is not unique. From conversations with medical professionals across Kyrgyzstan, diagnostic imaging, lab results, and patient histories are stored in siloed or offline systems with minimal security protocols. These conditions create strategic vulnerabilities, particularly as China offers digital solutions through the Health Silk Road, accompanied by opaque contracts and back-end access provisions.

Policy Recommendation

To mitigate the growing influence of Chinese digital infrastructure and strengthen Kyrgyzstan’s strategic autonomy, Canada should take a proactive role in supporting the digitisation of Kyrgyzstan’s public healthcare system. This sector, which is rich in sensitive personal and biometric data, is increasingly targeted by China through its Digital and Health Silk Road initiatives. By supporting secure, interoperable, and rights-respecting alternatives, Canada can help prevent the entrenchment of authoritarian digital norms and reduce Kyrgyzstan’s dependency on foreign-controlled platforms.

Canada is well-positioned to contribute meaningfully. With in public health, , and , Canada can offer technical support, capacity-building, and policy guidance grounded in transparency and accountability. This effort should align with ongoing multilateral initiatives, such as the , and be framed as part of a broader push to reinforce democratic digital governance in a strategically contested region.

Beyond technical assistance, this is also an opportunity for Canada to repair and reframe its relationship with Kyrgyzstan, particularly in light of the reputational damage caused by the . Supporting the digitisation of Kyrgyzstan’s healthcare system, which is a vital public service that directly affects citizens’ daily lives, would demonstrate Canada’s commitment to inclusive, rights-based development and offer a constructive step forward in strengthening bilateral cooperation. It would also allow Canada to project soft power, build goodwill, and lead by example in a region where democratic engagement is urgently needed to counterbalance rising authoritarian influence.

Conclusion

Kyrgyzstan’s underdeveloped and fragmented digital health infrastructure has created a strategic vacuum which has increasingly been filled by Chinese technologies deployed through the Health Silk Road. While these systems are marketed as development tools, they often come bundled with embedded dependencies that undermine data sovereignty and weaken institutional resilience. In an era where biometric and health data have become strategic assets, the digitisation of public services like healthcare is no longer a purely technical matter. It is now a question of national security and democratic integrity.

Amid China’s expanding digital influence and Russia’s declining regional engagement post-2022, Kyrgyzstan faces a narrowing set of choices. Without meaningful alternatives, it risks entrenching authoritarian-aligned technologies that could shape not only its healthcare system but also its political and civic landscape.

Canada has both the normative interest and the technical capacity to offer an alternative. By supporting the secure, rights-based digitisation of Kyrgyzstan’s healthcare sector, Canada can reinforce democratic digital norms, help safeguard strategic autonomy, and re-engage with a region that has seen limited Canadian involvement since 2021. Such a contribution would signal a shift toward inclusive, citizen-focused development, moving beyond a low-intensity economic relationship, towards a constructive, long-term partnership.

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On September 11th, Poland made headlines in its decision to close its border with Belarus over the Russian Zapad 2025 drills. The nuclear and missile drills, combined with the detection of Russian drones in Polish airspace, kept the border closed for almost two weeks, halting the critical Northern Corridor trade route between the EU and China, which had previously brought in 25 billion euros in 2024. The closure emphasizes the increasing insecurity surrounding trade since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Regional conflicts, along with logistical issues, including outdated infrastructure and corridor congestion, have amplified the need to protect or develop trade routes between China and Europe. China, as the largest exporter in the world, has been especially proactive in this space; however, looking at different trade route alternatives opens a new set of security and economic questions. This brief considers the role of the Northern Corridor as a critical point in the Chinese-European relationship, emerging alternatives, and the political implications if such alternatives are sought out by the partners.

The Northern Corridor

The border closure affected a critical point of the China-Europe Railway Express, a vital trade route for goods coming into Europe. , affecting major e-commerce companies such as Temu and Shein, who rely on smooth and rapid transitways for high-speed shipping of goods. The railway is a key part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, as well as the Northern Corridor trading route. , where they then change to a European rail gauge before continuing on with their journey.

The Northern Corridor, running through Russian and Belarusian territory, has been the primary route to export goods intercontinentally, as it remains a strong alternative to lengthy and expensive land and sea routes. However, Russian aggression and expansionism have created political, financial, and logistical difficulties. The route itself has become incredibly . Disruptions have affected the global trading economy, food supply chain, and economic health of individual countries. The damage done to the Northern Corridor has motivated China to reconsider its future trade movements and partnerships.

Emerging Alternatives

A popular alternative has been the , which would avoid Russia by going through Central Asia and into Europe via the Black Sea. However, the lack of infrastructure renders this initiative a work-in-progress. Furthermore, ongoing security issues in the Black Sea make merchant ships vulnerable to damage from mines and Russian attacks. Despite previously blocking TITR development, China has through the China Railway Container Transport Corporation. Other Central Asian and Black Sea states have also taken on However, many countries along this route are still susceptible to Russian influence and coercion, which could further stagnate development.

An even more attractive alternative for China and Russia has emerged through the Northern Sea Route (NSR). The NSR travels through the and reaches Europe through British ports. Previously unnavigable, the route is becoming a more viable option, though it also lacks substantial infrastructure. As a direct response to the closure of Poland’s borders, Chinese container line Sea Legend through the NSR on September 24th. This will test the efficacy of the journey, with the ship expected to reach Britain in 18 days. Since the route passes through Russian ports to reach Europe, it is unclear what geopolitical outcomes this will have due to the ongoing war.

What are the Political Implications of These Moves?

The development of both the TITR and NSR reflect changing geopolitical dynamics. Developing routes can be a space for new partnerships and prosperity – or problems. The TITR is a new place for modernization projects, where multiple countries can emerge as key enablers and/or investors. Countries like TĂĽrkiye, Romania, and China are all pushing to assert their positions. Shipping through the TITR is partially underway through land, rail, and sea; however, further development will be needed to establish its primacy.

The NSR emphasizes the growing geopolitical competition in the Arctic. Russian and Chinese development along this route will further secure economic interests and therefore influence within the region. For China, connections to the Arctic have critical gains as they pursue an active policy in the region, Russia has strongly supported China’s moves, and partnership in the NSR will deepen their collaboration. In the Northern Corridor, both countries used their partnership to dominate decisions around trade and development. Could the NSR be a new place to replicate this dynamic? This could have implications for the future of norms-setting and governance in the Arctic; however, it should be noted that the NSR has its own logistical handicaps, which could limit its impact.

For the time being, the Northern Corridor remains a major transitway. This means that global trade will continue to be insecure, so long as regional threats remain active. Back in Poland, the government reopened the border on September 24th for security and economic reasons. However,

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Through the multi-nodal design of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Chinese state has developed a “” level of structural coercion in the nations of Central Asia. These function as hubs of communication within decentralised networks of information sharing and technological exchange. Such a degree of interconnection is embedded within aspects of “,” a concept which describes how dominant states leverage asymmetric access to global networks (such as trade, finance, or technology) to exert coercive influence over weaker states. Within the CCP’s BRI project, this dynamic enables China to entrench its strategic control while projecting stability under its own terms. The states of Central Asia (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan) are growing more susceptible to Beijing’s influence, not only due to proximity and economic dependency but also through the increasing centralisation of technology. China’s broader strategy seeks to export its model of illiberal governance and to implement security-oriented practices, including surveillance, policing, and border control, that reflect a broader process of regional securitisation. 

These efforts are tightly interwoven with economic and technological interdependence, enabling Beijing to through weaponised interdependence. This strategy is met not just with passive acquiescence but with active enthusiasm from domestic actors in the Kyrgyz Republic, where a growing appetite for authoritarian governance provides Beijing with willing partners. Kyrgyzstan’s underrepresentation in Western strategic discourse, despite its geographic proximity to Xinjiang and growing entanglement with Chinese security initiatives, makes it an essential focal point for assessing China’s regional ambitions. While conducting fieldwork in Kyrgyzstan, I encountered firsthand how securitisation and digital surveillance shape movement, access, and everyday life. These experiences inform the analytical lens of this paper and underscore the tangible impact of China’s expanding security architecture in the region. Through weaponised interdependence and a decentralised network of private and state actors, Beijing has embedded itself into the core of Central Asia’s security landscape, with the Kyrgyz Republic offering a compelling case study of how local political dynamics can both enable and amplify China’s authoritarian export model. Ultimately, China’s influence under the Belt and Road framework presents not only an economic opportunity for Central Asia, but a growing risk of entrenched authoritarian governance, regional dependency, and diminished sovereignty.

Structural Coercion Through Multi-Nodal Interdependence

The increasing complication and centralisation of technology has allowed Beijing to emerge as a global leader in the ever-changing technological sector. With this increased complexity and centralisation, Beijing has moved to implement the “” framework, which would see China become the primary global data hub. This hegemony of technology grants the CCP oversight over a wide range of data flows, including cross-border communications, financial transactions, e-commerce logistics, biometric records, and metadata. While not overtly coercive at this stage, this interdependence creates structural asymmetries that China may later exploit as leverage, a dynamic explored in subsequent sections.

Coacting with the multi-nodal structure of the BRI and the growing digitisation and technological dominance, China has established the “” (BRNSIS), which utilises private actors, primarily Chinese private security contractors. These actors primarily assist Chinese embassies in Central Asia with information gathering, accessible to various government institutions through a centralized database. Chinese private security contractors employed by the BRNSIS in gathering intelligence, which is stored in a centralised database accessible across Chinese government ministries, enhancing the state’s ability to coordinate regional surveillance. In addition, growing trade networks with Central Asia have also provided power asymmetries that allow for growing data gathering from individual traders acting as independent nodes. 

Targeting the Uyghur Diaspora: Exporting Securitisation

As China begins consolidating its influence in Central Asia, largely replacing Russia as the regional hegemon post-2022, the diaspora Uyghur population has fallen victim to methodologies of Beijing’s securitisation. are a Turkic Muslim ethnic group indigenous to the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in western China. Since 2017, China has faced widespread international condemnation for its of over a million Uyghurs in so-called “reeducation” camps, with some governments, , labelling these policies as genocide. Many Uyghurs have fled persecution and now live in Central Asian countries, where they remain under the surveillance and coercive reach of Chinese security practices. In Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, has been sold to authoritarian regimes to identify political dissidents and protest participants. As this technology becomes increasingly centralised, Chinese intelligence services also gain , which they can use to identify individuals deemed security threats, particularly among the Uyghur diaspora in Central Asia. While Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan possess deeper bilateral relations with China in terms of security, the Kyrgyz Republic, which, along with Kazakhstan, borders the region of Xinjiang, does not possess this same set of relations. However, the Chinese and Kyrgyz states have begun with joint policing exercises directed towards anti-terrorist measures. The lack of formalised security ties suggests that China’s model of regional influence does not rely solely on official agreements. It also operates through ad hoc cooperation, technological penetration, and strategic pressure, especially in states like Kyrgyzstan, where domestic authoritarian appetites are beginning to align with Beijing’s interests.

Kyrgyzstan’s Security Alignment with Beijing Post-2016

Largely influencing this alignment of Kyrgyz domestic security with Chinese regional objectives was the 2016 Chinese embassy bombing in the Kyrgyz capital of Bishkek. In the of the attack, China began rejecting visas to Kyrgyz citizens and applied pressure to the Kyrgyz state to hold the perpetrators accountable and release the information gathered during the investigation. The State Committee on National Security (GKNB) found that it was a targeted committed by the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (), a transnational Uyghur organisation active across Central Asia.

Three years later, in 2019, a new police command centre was established in Bishkek, incorporating the same used in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. A protest, which developed into a riot, took place soon after the completion of the police command centre, fueled by Kyrgyz fears over in the nation. Public hostility toward Beijing’s influence was fueled by rising Chinese immigration into the Kyrgyz Republic and reports of in “vocational education training centres” in Xinjiang. 

The SCO, RATS, and Authoritarian Learning

Within the construction of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), there is a strong focus on anti-terrorism efforts, emphasised by the pillar of the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS). Within the framework of RATS, cooperation across member states to promote is encouraged. In June 2023, Kyrgyz Interior Ministry representatives travelled to Xinjiang for demonstrations , which showcased crowd control and counterterrorism techniques. At the conclusion of the visit, representatives of both countries under which Chinese security officials “will conduct and organise training for (Kyrgyz) employees of police districts adjacent to the border.” As China will gain utility from increased regional cooperation and subsequent codependency, the Kyrgyz delegation, under the growing authoritarianism of the Japarov regime, into building an improved surveillance state. This reflects a domestic openness in Kyrgyzstan to adopt illiberal governance models, revealing a reciprocal dynamic where China’s export of authoritarian practices meets local political appetite, thus enhancing both states’ objectives. According to the Interior Ministry statement, had opportunities “to study new achievements in the digitalization of the Chinese police, to familiarize themselves with the work of the police using unmanned aerial vehicles, to study methods of combating religious extremism … (and) familiarization with the actions and methods and means used by the police during mass riots.” Chinese officials also for the Kyrgyz visitors, demonstrating “the work of a special forces detachment, as well as public order services, and their actions during riots.”

Interaction-2024 and Japarov’s Strategic Calculus

A recent development within RATS is “,” a joint counter-terrorism exercise between China and the states of Central Asia, which involved specialised operations intended to enhance the operational capabilities of member states. In February of 2025, Kyrgyz president Sadyr Japarov visited Beijing for a visit with Chinese president Xi Jinping. Xi Jinping emphasised the historic and geographic between China and the Kyrgyz Republic as well as the rapid growth of bilateral relations in recent years. The Chinese president added that the two sides should continue to explore new ideas, focus on cooperation, and deepen mutually beneficial cooperation. China is willing to continue to expand cooperation and enhance connectivity by continuing construction of the a railway connecting China, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. that Kyrgyzstan will continue to protect the of Chinese investors in the country.

Border Control and Securitisation

Demonstrating the expansion of connectivity is the reopening and ongoing development of the border crossing connecting the Kyrgyz settlement of Barskon, located along the south shore of Lake Issyk-Kul, to the region of Xinjiang. The Bedel Pass crossing is the third border district connecting China to Kyrgyzstan, with the other two being the in the Kyrgyz region of Naryn and the in the Osh Region. However, the entirety of the Chinese-Kyrgyz border is along the region of Xinjiang. This contributes to Beijing’s desire to police the regions as many Uyghurs flee and seek refuge in the Kyrgyz Republic, as well as of the East Turkestan Liberation Organisation (ELTO), a secessionist Uyghur organisation training in the border regions of the Kyrgyz Republic. Increased securitisation on the Kyrgyz border side has assumed Xi Jinping’s demands for Kyrgyzstan to “”. Along the entirety of the 1,063-kilometre border between China and Kyrgyzstan, a extending 50 kilometres from the de facto border has been established. To enter the Border Zone, a , which can only be obtained from Kyrgyz authorities, ensuring that only authorised individuals can enter these securitised areas.

Due to the securitisation of the Border Zone, the centralisation of technology and the ongoing digitisation of police activities, I did not travel closer than the village of Chiy-Tala in the Osh Region, located 140 kilometres from the Erkeshtam Pass border crossing.

Domestic Nationalism and Foreign Leverage

However, in the capital of Bishkek, securitisation in the historic Uyghur-run Madina Market can be observed from first-hand accounts and primary sources. During repeated visits to the market throughout my fieldwork, I consistently noted a heightened police presence, which included both uniformed and plainclothed officers. Compared to the two larger markets in the city, Osh Bazaar and Dordoi Bazaar, this visible security presence appeared disproportionate and politically charged. Conversations with Uyghur merchants revealed a sense of anxiety with several vendors speaking cautiously and avoiding political discussions. In contrast, some ethnic Kyrgyz locals I spoke with openly expressed suspicion toward the Uyghur presence in the market. These sentiments reflect how Chinese securitisation narratives, particularly the conflation of Uyghur identity with extremism, have filtered into public discourse, helping to justify increased surveillance and legitimise discriminatory practices in local contexts.

The neo-nationalist Kyrgyz grassroots movement, , has been calling for the from the Madina Market since 2015. While previously Kyrk Choro enjoyed complacency from security officials and state actors in the Kyrgyz Republic, under the populist platform of Sadyr Japarov, the group’s ideology has benefited from presidential policies such as Japarov’s , which aims to protect the “traditions and values of Kyrgyz families” by discriminating against ethnic minorities, rolling back women’s rights, and centralising media and journalism, capturing support from nationalistic and subsequently anti-Uyghur political movements. China’s exportation of illiberal governance aligns with a growing domestic appetite for authoritarianism in Kyrgyzstan, where nationalist movements and political elites actively embrace these models to strengthen their own power. This dynamic grants Kyrgyz actors agency in shaping the country’s authoritarian trajectory, making the relationship with Beijing a mutually reinforcing process rather than a simple external imposition. Official state action reflects domestic nationalist sentiments while simultaneously satisfying China’s desires for stability and securitisation. 

In 2023, the against the founder of the Madina Market, Tursuntai Salimov and his son Ilshan. Tursuntai was also the leader of Ittipak, a Kyrgyz-Uyghur diaspora political organisation advocating for cultural preservation. In 2024, both Tursuntai and Ilshan Salimov were for the laundering of criminal proceeds in the interest of Kamchybek Asanbek’s organised crime group. 

The assets of the Salimov family, including Madina Market, were rapidly transferred to Tarim Trade, a company owned by the son of Khabibula Abdukadyr. Abdukadyr, a close ally of Japarov, had successfully built a trading monopoly which transits . Abdukadyr is also a business partner of a close friend of the president’s son, who , which are an integral part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

Conclusion: A New Security Order under Chinese Patronage

By utilising the pre-existing frameworks of the SCO, the infrastructure of the BRI, and the centralisation of technology via the Digital Silk Road, China has constructed a vast and adaptive apparatus of regional surveillance and control and a comprehensive security architecture in the form of the Belt and Road National Security Intelligence System. Through weaponised interdependence and a decentralised network of private and state actors, Beijing has embedded itself into the core of Central Asia’s security landscape. China’s broader strategy seeks to export its model of illiberal governance and practices of securitisation as a means to impose regional stability, thereby facilitating deeper economic engagement and political interaction under Beijing’s terms. Importantly, this approach resonates with domestic actors in Kyrgyzstan, where an existing appetite for illiberalism and nationalist governance provides agency to local elites, enabling them to actively participate in and shape this evolving security architecture. While framed as cooperation or development, the deeper consequence is a significant erosion of regional sovereignty and the externalisation of China’s internal securitisation model. The targeting of Uyghur diaspora communities, the co-optation of nationalist movements, and the strategic transfer of economic assets all underscore the convergence of surveillance, economic control, and authoritarian governance under Beijing’s influence.

As China supplants Russia as Central Asia’s dominant external power, its approach represents not merely a shift in regional geopolitics but a reconfiguration of sovereignty itself, one grounded in digital oversight, security codependence, and authoritarian learning. Without meaningful safeguards or regional pushback, the Belt and Road may no longer be simply a path to economic development but a conduit for asymmetrical control and systemic repression.

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Critical minerals are pivotal for the manufacturing of defence equipment ranging from aircraft to ammunition and armour. Securing these resources is essential for minimizing defence supply chain risks and for the broader green energy transition. For NATO and Canada, defence supply chains have due to global disruptions like the COVID-19 pandemic and coercive economic tactics, particularly from . This realized vulnerability has pushed Canada, the US, and Europe to develop legislation to safeguard these critical resources, build supply chain resiliency, and protect domestic defence industry by friend-shoring with Allies. 

Strategies to Secure Critical Mineral Supply Chains 

In 2022, the Canadian government launched its $4 billion to bolster domestic industry, identifying six critical minerals as pivotal to the green energy transition. To complement this strategy, the government also laid out in Canada’s mining sector, , under the . In May 2024, the EU launched its own to secure the supply of essential critical minerals, identifying 17 strategic raw materials that are at risk of disruption and in which demand could increase exponentially.  

At the international level, the G7 published its in June 2025 to build resiliency in critical mineral supply chains and ensure that they are traded in a standards-based market. And in December 2024, NATO released its list of that are essential for manufacturing all types of defence equipment. Importantly, all 12 critical minerals identified on NATO’s list are found in Canada, with produced and refined in Canada. 

Canada’s Evolving Critical Mineral Trading Relationships 

has allowed it to become a strategic exporter of these resources to the US and European partners. During the 2025 NATO Summit, Canadian Prime Minister (PM) Mark Carney that expenditures related to critical minerals will be considered a military contribution towards reaching the NATO target of 5 percent for annual defence spending. This spending will also involve building to ensure these resources are accessible for Canada’s partners. While Canada has tremendous potential in mining reserves, numerous projects in this sector have recently struggled to become operational due to , inadequate infrastructure, and problems acquiring sufficient upfront capital and equipment; however, the Canadian Government has announced and to reduce the impact of these issues.  

The in the critical minerals trade, with sent to the US in 2023. In addition, many of the minerals mined in Canada are refined in the US, signifying that a substantial number of mining companies in Canada are dependent on a healthy US-Canada trade relationship for their own success. Thus, the impact of Trump’s tariffs has raised significant concerns about the economic and security risks of this dependency, including the effects of tariffs on the costs of such minerals and how among Allies over the long term. Chinese companies with advanced mineral processing and refining equipment and expertise could take advantage of the rising costs of these minerals by selling them at discounted prices.   

While the US will remain Canada’s top partner for trading and financing critical mineral projects into the future, Canada’s tumultuous trade relationship with the Trump administration and recent drive to diversify its trade partnerships has created opportunities to build joint supply chains with the EU. Canadian mining companies are currently able to export critical minerals to the EU under the 2017 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). This partnership further expanded in 2021 when Canada and the EU announced to integrate critical mineral supply chains. 

Although the US is also an important trading partner for for the EU, various European leaders have expressed interest in accessing Canada’s abundant mineral reserves as a way to bolster their own supply chains. Most recently, both sides have expressed the need for enhanced cooperation in this sector through the and through . With still being in the negotiation stage, EU-Canada cooperation in this area looks to have a significant opportunity for continued expansion. 

Potential Areas of Cooperation in Critical Mineral Supply-Chains for Canada 

Most recently, the European Investment Bank recently announced new funding for mineral exploration and financing of defence-critical minerals for which . However, there are still additional opportunities for Canada and the EU to build supply-chain resilience. One important area of potential collaboration is the stockpiling of critical minerals, . To assist the EU in building its stockpiles, Canada could export some of its critical minerals on the EU’s strategic raw minerals list, such as , after domestic production ramps up. 

A recent also recommends that Canada establish its own critical mineral stockpile, potentially composed . Creating these reserves in Canada could boost its credibility among NATO Allies while simultaneously contributing to NATO’s 5 percent military spending target.  

Lastly, to meet NATO’s 5 percent GDP spending target and contribute to supply chain resiliency, have noted that Canada could develop financing laws equivalent to the US’s , which could provide a signal to mining companies that the Canadian government will place a greater stake in financing new mining projects. Such a move could also to fund such resource extraction and processing projects and to encourage stockpiling.  

In conclusion, Canada’s vast critical mineral reserves have the potential to supply the growing demand from NATO Allies. However, Canada must still develop its domestic capacity and the necessary infrastructure to mine these critical minerals, as projects can take up to . Despite the unpredictability in Canada’s current trade relationship with the US, the potential environmental, economic, and security benefits of strengthening this sector domestically and building resilient supply chains will remain significant for years to come.  

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Overview: This hybrid event was held at ĐÓ°ÉÔ­´´ University aon Monday, April 7, 2025, from 4:00 pm to 5:30 pm, and co-hosted by the Eastern Europe and Transatlantic Network (EETN) and the Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence. The event featured a 50-minute lecture followed by a 40-minute Q&A discussion. Prof. Dr. Sven Biscop gave a compelling and timely lecture on the shifting realities of international politics, starting with Trump’s second presidency, followed by what it means for four key areas: Ukraine policy, European defence architecture, European decision-making, and global power politics.

Speaker: , lectures at Ghent University and leads the Europe in the World Programme at the Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations in Brussels. He is a member of the Royal Academy for Overseas Sciences of Belgium and an honorary fellow of the European Security and Defence College of the EU.

Lecture summary: After the actions taken by US President Donald Trump’s administration, Dr. Biscop emphasized that we must stop relying on incremental responses, rather than committing to preparing for worst-case scenarios and forging an independent path forward for Europe. He outlined three of his guiding principles on which decision-makers can ground their strategies going forward: Trump will continue siding with Putin; there is the possibility of a J.D Vance’s presidency following Trump; Europe will be left on its own if there is to be a conventional war with Russia. Dr. Biscop elaborated on the following four key points:

Ukraine Policy

In response to Trump’s sidelining of both Ukraine and its allies, all the while undermining NATO solidarity, Europe must take the lead in shaping Ukraine’s security and future. Dr. Biscop argued that increasing defence spending and uniting Europe will aid in securing the continent rather than retrenching within national borders.

Europe should continue the EU accession process for Ukraine, maintain its independent sanction policy, and provide military support via the “coalition of the willing.”

Establishing a reassurance force to provide a security guarantee to deter further Russian aggression, ensuring Ukraine’s future security after a potential ceasefire.

Abandoning Ukraine would risk losing Moldova, Georgia, and other strategic access to the resources of Caucasus and connection with Central Asia while allowing Russia to expand its influence in eastern Europe.

If a ceasefire is reached, confirmation through the UN Security Council would be a novel way of pressuring China while ensuring Russian compliance given it would be politically difficult to veto their own ceasefire.

European Defense and Security Architecture

The EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has fallen short due to its internal paradox – European governments do not trust a scheme for the harmonization of defence planning that does not include the US. However, it is vital that this scheme is implemented as the US may not join. Currently, without the strategic power that US provides, Europe has a sizeable force that is unable to achieve full operational coherency.

• Developing a European pillar within NATO and its defence planning process (not an EU-only pillar) ensures operational readiness without US support.
• Reaching military autonomy would require a shared investment in large-scale defence capabilities lasting at least 5 to 10 years, but planning must start now.
• The UK and France – Europe’s two nuclear powers – must be at the core, with other non-EU states like Canada, welcomed into the defence industrial framework through flexible cooperation.
• The role of the EU is to supports its member states to meet these targets by relaxing budgetary regulation, investing in the defence industry through the EU’s budget, reforming the borrowing power of member states, and facilitating coordination between member and partner states.
• Dr. Biscop emphasized the value of France’s independent nuclear arsenal, suggesting that an expanded French guarantee – co-funded by those under its protection – may be a viable path to a European nuclear backstop, while also prompting a reassessment of the UK’s American-dependent nuclear deterrent.

European Decision-Making

The European security architecture is complex and there is no single place to discuss all relevant aspects. Additionally, the current decision-making framework within the EU and NATO, which requires consensus or unanimity, is not agile enough to respond to today’s fast-moving geopolitical environment and crises. That is why an ad hoc format of the “coalition of the willing” must be implemented.

• The de facto war cabinet sits within the coalition of the willing and would include key states like France, the UK, Germany, Italy, and Poland, alongside institutional leaders.
• Non-EU countries like Canada and Turkey could be closely associated, as their involvement brings additional weight, legitimacy, military capability, and industrial mass.
• Such a coalition could eventually influence NATO’s command structure so that even if the US no longer wishes to act as the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe (SACEUR), Europeans can assume full and independent operational control.

Impact on the Great Power Politics

The world is not entering a “new” order, but rather returning to a multipolar system where great powers constantly compete, cooperate, and rival with each other, with the balance of power is consistently shifting. Furthermore, the unique post-WWII transatlantic alliance is unravelling, especially under Trump’s transactional approach, which may weaken trust and embolden adversaries.

Europe and Canada still have the resources, capabilities, and strategic options to act.

The erosion of US commitment to its allies signals that security guarantees can no longer be taken for granted, making the global environment more volatile.

The US under Trump is not replacing one alliance with another but with transactionalism.

China is neither a friend nor an enemy of Europe. There exists a plethora of issues that Europe and China can work cooperatively on, while remaining cautious and conditional in it approach.

Europe must now reinforce ties with like-minded middle powers, such as Canada and Global South countries, who share an interest in maintaining a rules-based international order and avoiding a global cold war between US and China.

The retreating of the US and its undermining of multilateral architecture raises the question of whether a multilateral system is viable without US.

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