Introduction

On January 5th, 2026, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced the appointment of former Canadian Deputy Prime Minister and Member of Parliament, Chrystia Freeland, as Economic Advisor to the Office of the President of Ukraine. In a post on X, Zelenskyy stated, “Ukraine needs to strengthen its internal resilience – both for the sake of Ukraine’s recovery if diplomacy delivers results as swiftly as possible, and to reinforce our defence if, because of delays by our partners, it takes longer to bring this war to an end.” In the following days, Freeland confirmed she accepted President Zelenskyy’s appointment and that she would be resigning as a Member of Parliament, taking effect as of January 9th, 2026.

Freeland’s appointment as voluntary Economic Advisor to the Office of the President of Ukraine is being made against the larger and developing backdrop of ongoing diplomatic negotiations between the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the United States (US) to come to an agreed upon pathway to peace. This negotiation process continues to be arduous for Ukraine. It also comes alongside a deepening of foreign diplomatic relations between Canada and Ukraine under the Mark Carney government; this, coming on the back of Prime Minister Carney’s historical , where he stressed the end of the rules-based international order and hinted at the decline of American hegemony – a speech that have held to ultimately represent the beginning of a multipolar era in world politics.

In the coming months, the Eastern European and Transatlantic Network (EETN) will publish a series analyzing key developments shaping the war; these include prospective pathways to peace, ongoing diplomatic negotiations and tensions, and the shifting security and economic governance landscape in Ukraine. Freeland is an integral node among an emerging and vital network aimed at supporting Ukraine and its future as the anniversary of the full-scale invasion nears and passes. This series aims to make clear that Russia is not only engaged in a war of attrition so as to try to reclaim its great power status, but that Ukraine is increasingly prepared to respond to this war of attrition with strategies and methods of asymmetric and hybrid warfare. Ukraine is prepared to make the strategic, economic, and relational moves necessary to better guarantee its future, as well as its success on the battlefield and in diplomatic negotiations.

This first brief of the series reflects on Freeland’s appointment and builds upon an argument first offered by Ukrainian scholar Valeriia Gusieva, where she suggested that cultural resilience is a foundational pillar to security. I extend her argument here by suggesting that cultural resilience and situated experience are also crucial to sustaining a coherent and effective attritional war strategy – Freeland’s appointment, in this case, should be understood light through the lens of political habituation.

Chrystia Freeland: A Ukrainian-Canadian MP and Soviet War Crimes Researcher

Chrystia Freeland was born in Peace River, Alberta in 1968 to a Ukrainian mother and Canadian father. Though she formally entered Canadian federal politics in 2013, she is perhaps most known through her association with former Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and his government. Under Trudeau, Freeland was appointed to serve as Minister of International Trade in Trudeau’s cabinet. In this position, she was a key negotiator in the hard-fought Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) (which replaced the North American Free Trade Agreement, or NAFTA, in 2020), as well as the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with the European Union (EU) that was signed in 2016.

While it is fair to assume that many Western audiences are familiar with the whiplash antics of American President Donald Trump, who often combines “,” less well known are the tensions that characterized the negotiation process of CETA. As researchers , CETA encountered historical diplomatic tensions throughout its negotiation process: “This challenge becomes evident at various stages in the trade policy process, but it is most pronounced in the ratification of bilateral agreements, which require approval in all member states.”

On paper, arriving at CETA was through the bilateral process of negotiation between Canada and the EU; in reality, however, Freeland was situated in a much more difficult negotiating position. Because the subsequent ratification of CETA would require the approval of all EU member states, such a negotiating process proved to be a lesson for both Freeland and the European Commission, who was charged with ensuring the twenty-eight member states were in alignment. Indeed, as scholar Joris Larik , the alleged crisis of CETA negotiations soon became a “cautionary tale” about the “cumbersome and vulnerable EU treaty-making procedures, where internal politics and technical legal discussions detracted from the merits (or demerits) of the actual agreement.”

This became most visible through the tensions experienced with the Wallonia Parliament in Belgium, an autonomous regional government with veto power over EU trade deals. In late 2016, the Walloon government publicly rejected CETA, in part because of their worry that the trade deal would “.” Walloon regional minister-president, Paul Magnette, told reporters the following: “I don’t consider this as a funeral, I don’t consider this as a veto without any conditions. I consider this as a request to reopen negotiations so that European leaders could hear the legitimate demands which have been forcefully expressed by an organized, transparent civil society.” As Larik however, this crisis led to “profound internal reflections on EU trade policy, causing even a shift in the EU’s practice in concluding trade agreements.

It was largely in response to these tensions and apparent deadlock within Wallonia that Freeland made the public decision to walk out on CETA negotiations with our European allies. Following her decision, Freeland with Canadian journalists candidly: “It’s become evident for me, for Canada, that the European Union isn’t capable now to have an international treaty even with a country that has very European values like Canada. And even with a country so nice, with a lot of patience like Canada.” At the time, the move was taken by some in Canadian media as an “” response; Conservative critics in the House of Commons Freeland’s walk out as a “meltdown,” alleging she required “adult supervision” – language that carried clear sexist and gendered connotations. Still others this walk out is exactly what the negotiation process needed, as it eventually led to the signing of the trade agreement.

Reflecting on her CETA negotiation experience in 2026, Freeland the following about negotiating with European allies, which is worth quoting at-length here:

“You can sort of have two kinds of negotiations. Some negotiations start with a kind of win-win premise where the two parties come together wanting a deal, wanting to be friends, seeing each other as long-term partners, and they’ll disagree about stuff, but the negotiation is really about everyone working hard together to find the best possible landing zone. I would say �䲹�Բ��岹’s negotiations with the EU about our trade deal with Europe, CETA, were conducted in that way, and they were hard, right? … Our final slightly melodramatic moments in Namur, in Wallonia, you know, proceeded by moments in Vienna, in Germany, in the European Parliament. I mean, it was a long slog and there were lots of obstacles and there was some drama, but it was clear there was goodwill on all sides.”

In this interview, Freeland goes on to characterize how Trump falls into an alternative negotiation camp compared to that which characterized CETA; she the idea that the American President abides by the logic of a zero-sum game: “…when you are dealing with a party that has that kind of a view [zero-sum game logic] and that kind of an attitude, then I think you have to be very clear in your own mind about red lines. And you have to be very prepared to say, thus far and no further, we’re not gonna capitulate our approach.”

Freeland later went on to become �䲹�Բ��岹’s Minister of Finance in 2020, where she was responsible for introducing four federal budgets, including federal aid measures related to �䲹�Բ��岹’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic. She was the first woman to serve in this role, a fact that would later be considered by the as crucial in the decay of her relationship with Trudeau prior to his own resignation in late-2025.

Beyond her political career, Freeland’s academic and journalistic works span two decades and have drawn the ire of the Kremlin. While pursuing graduate studies in Russian history and literature at Harvard, where she was responsible for documenting and translating archival and investigative materials related to the – an unmarked, mass burial site used by the NKVD (the secret police of the Soviet Union) to dispose of executed dissidents and prisoners. It remains one of the largest mass burial sites in Ukraine, even Russia’s current invasion. Her research played a decisive role in debunking the Stalin-era myth that the executions were exclusively carried out by the Nazis during World War Two. This research eventually attracted the attention of the KGB – the main security agency of the Soviet Union – who then assigned Freeland the codename “Frida,” closely surveilling and building a case against her throughout the course of her study.

As a Canadian with Ukrainian heritage, Freeland has been among the most outspoken advocates for sustained Canadian support to Ukraine. In response, she is one of thirteen Canadian officials barred from entering Russia under retaliatory sanctions imposed by Vladimir Putin himself in 2014 and has been the target of various . Freeland has also faced public attacks from American President Donald Trump, who on several occasions has described her in disparaging terms, including “,” a “,” a “,” and an overall “.” From a feminist perspective, Freeland’s experience navigating such attacks underscores her familiarity with the gendered power dynamics employed by – an experience that may indeed prove to be a strategic asset in a war whose social construction and conduct are themselves . While much of international politics Freeland nonetheless works against the masculine grain in a pursuit of fair and just agreements and futures.

Contextualizing the Habituation of Freeland and Concluding Remarks

As this series continues to examine changes within President Zelenskyy’s inner circle in response to both Ukrainian domestic pressures and Russia’s growing attritional war strategy, I suggest that Freeland’s appointment as a voluntary Economic Advisor to Ukraine signals an awareness within Ukrainian leadership and its closest allies that responding to Russia’s attritional warfare in 2026 cannot be confined to military operations alone. No longer are we in an era where hard power capabilities are the only measure of a nation’s strength; the personal and personnel also matter.

Freeland will be an important figure to watch, particularly as it relates to dialogue between Ukrainian feminists and the pro-democracy movement – not because Freeland herself has expressed a desire to pursue a feminist agenda in Ukraine’s economic reconstruction, but because her presence reflects the often-implicit reality that gendered political experience shapes how the dynamics of endurance, credibility, and trust are produced and sustained in wartime economies. In a war of attrition, where authority is continuously reaffirmed under conditions of prolonged uncertainty, reputational attack, and economic strain, such situated experience becomes strategically relevant, I suggest, as a form of habituation to sustained delegitimization.

The notion of habituation draws from a long philosophical tradition – mostly commonly, Aristotelian ethics, where habituation (hexis) was used to refer to repeated exposure and practice from durable dispositions rather than momentary or instantaneous reaction. In contemporary political thought, philosophers and scholars inspired by phenomenologists such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty have upon this idea to explain how subjects develop capacities for political action through ongoing relational strain. In feminist ethics, habituation helps to explain how – often oppressed – actors learn to endure, navigate, and act within conditions of prolonged vulnerability, scrutiny, and marginalization over time. It moves beyond experience; it is an engaged and embodied vision and practice.

In an attritional war where legitimacy is not necessarily secured through fast-paced or singular victories but continually reproduced across various political, economic, and social structures, as well as through relations of alliance management and public trust, this mode of habituation takes on strategic significance. Indeed, for President Zelenskyy, it works in his favour to cultivate and incorporate actors habituated to sustained delegitimization because it acts as a shock absorber to the , partner unreliability in a so-called newly-founded “” world, and economic fatigue increasingly characterizing this phase of the war and ongoing occupation. The hope is that these hybrid shocks are absorbed by such a habituation without suffering from significant strategic drifts that may carry over into the battlefield.

, nations and militaries perceived to possess greater status and capabilities – that is, the greater of two powers – engage in warfare by attrition. Those familiar with Russia and the former Soviet Union’s historical record of aggression, occupation, interference, and war across Eastern Europe will also recognize this mode of warfare, perhaps all too familiarly. The Baltics, the Balkans, Poland, Chechnya, Georgia – they all know this playbook. The Russian Federation continues to seek what it perceives as its rightful seat at the table of great-power politics; even those of us who reject John J. Mearsheimer’s structuralist projections onto Eastern Europe as lying within a fixed Russian “sphere of influence” cannot ignore such an imperial desire percolating within the Russian state since the unipolar moment.

In attritional war, time is a previous resource. As Sun Tzu , prolonged conflict could be of great risk to either warring side, on account of exhausting the state apparatus, undermining domestic order and morale, and eroding strategic advantage; for him, military strategy was a subtle and complex technique whose success depended on minimizing the temporal risks and costs of war. While Sun Tzu viewed attritional war as a strategic failure, the work of military theorist and general requires us to remember that wars of attrition often emerge as a political condition over time, shaped by friction, uncertainty, and an overall inability to achieve decisive political outcomes. What Ukraine demonstrates to the international community, this series aims to show, is that Russia’s apparent great power strategy grounded in attrition – like empire itself – can burn out.

It is by sources close to both Freeland and Prime Minister Carney that Freeland received Zelenskyy’s offer on December 22nd, 2025; by December 24th, she had shared with the Prime Minister her intentions to leave Canadian parliament to join the Ukrainian team. In responding to the Kremlin’s continued war of attrition, concerns beyond immediate hard power capabilities, military strategy, and command structures must be addressed. Freeland possesses a unique form of habituation to sustain delegitimation; her appointment may indeed be an important shock absorber to Russia’s ongoing disinformation campaigns, American partner unreliability, and the economic fatigue increasingly characterizing this war.

At the level of a broader wartime strategy, I suggest this capacity can also function as a form of resilience; it signals to communities, civil society, international partners, and adversaries alike that broader Ukraine’s leadership is prepared to govern through a liminal phase of uncertain futurity rather than govern toward a rapid endpoint. This is a strategy in stark contrast to Putin’s assumption that a “quick military operation” could sweep Ukraine in 2022, or that , once elected, could end the war in Ukraine in the first 24-hours of his second term. In this sense, it is important to emphasize that habituation is not merely an individual trait or disposition, but also a culturally sedimented capacity that is experienced transnationally and relationally. As Gusieva has argued, cultural resilience constitutes a foundational pillar of security; indeed, classical realist how such resilience at times is what pushes a nation beyond survival towards victory. I extend this logic here by suggesting that such cultural resilience is forged through repeated exposure to, and embeddedness within, enduring imperial projects and traditionalist military practices – in this case, namely, Russia’s ongoing attempts to reclaim imperial-great power status, legitimate its occupations, and sustain attritional warfare alongside its hybrid threats towards Europe.

In Ukraine, cultural habituation operates as resilience, but it is neither neutral nor abstract; rather, its experience is deeply racialized, ethnicized, and gendered. It is racialized and ethnicized through the persistent positioning of the nation as materially peripheral to Europe while cast as subordinate to Russia’s so-called historical sphere of influence; it is gendered through the paternalizing narratives directed at Ukraine and other Eastern European states aspiring to EU membership, as well as in the recurring trope of Ukraine as the “little brother” to a masculinized “Mother Russia.” More specifically, we see this reproduced through the hegemonically masculine practices embodied by state actors in political negotiations of economic and security matters; these behaviours continue to structure much of how political negotiation, listening, and diplomatic exchange take place. Freeland, in this respect, is a node within a broader relational structure of habituation and diplomatic practice in wartime Ukraine – one whose own political endurance aligns with, and stands to reinforce, Ukraine’s culturally embedded capacity to govern through attrition.

Please stay tuned for the next installment of this series, which will analyze Ukraine’s 2025 energy scandal and subsequent political moves undertaken President Zelenskyy following a state investigation that exposed high-level embezzlement within the nation’s energy sector.

The post Habituation in War: The Appointment of Chrystia Freeland as a Node in Ukraine’s Attritional War Strategy appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

A new partnership was announced in January 2026 between Canadian and Estonian institutions that focus on clean energy solutions. The new partnership sets out three research projects that have been set for 2026, bringing together the University of Victoria’s Accelerating Community Energy Transformation (ACET) initiative and the Estonian Islands Energy Agency (EISEA). The aim of the partnership is to co-design and develop vital research and practical models for island populations as it relates to clean and sustainable energy priorities for local communities, which can then be expanded to larger populations. As featured in a by the University of Victoria, the hope is that by “combining ACET’s research expertise with EISEA’s on-the-ground knowledge of island communities, the partnership will foster innovative clean energy solutions, enhance local capacity and create replicable approaches to community-centered energy systems on Estonian islands.” This collaboration is part of a growing trend of Canadian cooperation with the Baltics, engaging with security, social, and professional sectors. In doing so, such a partnership gives an opportunity for Canada to support Baltic defence against Russian hybrid threats by developing broader social resilience strategies and relationships.

What will the partnership look like?

. The first, on Saarema, will investigate how local organic waste can be repurposed to power the island’s heating system. On Hiiuma, the second project will track a pilot initiative on sustainable energy production, distribution, and transportation. Both will generate important lessons on developing a circular and sustainable energy economy. The third project will look broadly at the social implications of energy development, analyzing how local communities respond to new projects. This can help build fair and transparent energy planning processes.

ACET and EISEA will be blending their research and innovation skills, each bringing an important skillset. Integral to the project will be the EISEA knowledge and engagement with Estonian island communities. The to ensure accurate interpretations of local contexts. For ACET, the partnership is an opportunity to showcase Canadian research leadership and apply lessons learned in previous projects. In the past, in British Columbia to co-design energy projects, giving important insight into how to lead collaborative and sustainable research development.

Security Implications

The development of clean energy in Estonia ties directly into their security resilience. Prior to 2022, Estonia was heavily reliant on Russian gas and oil, . While Estonia has been able to find alternative sources for LNG through Latvia and Lithuania, enhancing their own energy infrastructure will be integral to national capacity and resilience.

Previously, Estonia ; however, , part of the pipeline was damaged, leading Estonia to pivot to other Baltic states. The incident was alleged to be in response to heightened tensions over Russian sanctions. This highlights the need for strengthened local and regional infrastructure to mitigate possible threats. For example, . This is a vulnerability that can be exploited if there are disruptions to critical infrastructure by malign actors.

For islands in Estonia’s Baltic Sea, this is even more vital. Estonia has thousands of islands, some of which are exceptionally vulnerable due to distance from the mainland and close proximity to Russia. Last fall, . Other incursions have occurred in Poland and Lithuania, heightening security concerns among Europeans and their allies. While Estonia is , they will also need to ward off hybrid threats such as these. This means accounting for economic, environmental, social, and other vulnerabilities outside of hard security concerns. The partnership not only addresses critical infrastructure gaps, but it is doing so in a transparent and collaborative manner with local communities. This reinforces social cohesion and self-sustainability within these smaller populations – a model that could be replicated elsewhere. Therefore, the partnership is a strong example of the comprehensive approaches NATO and its members can continue to seek out to improve its readiness and defence posture.

�䲹�Բ��岹’s approach to Baltics

This announcement is aligned with other moves Canada has recently made to deepen ties with Baltic states. Through and , Canada has bolstered its defence presence in the region. �䲹�Բ��岹’s presence in the Baltics ties into a broader national goal to be a more active global partner, particularly in the effort to improve European security. This is a noteworthy shift from the previous Trudeau government, whose values-based foreign policy at times left Canada to the periphery of important security decision-making in Europe. This recalibration signals an effort to translate normative commitments into more robust material contributions and relationships, enhancing �䲹�Բ��岹’s own strategic role within NATO while ensuring it remains reliable.

The Baltics’ proximity to Russia makes them a key target for hybrid Russian threats, emphasizing the need to improve counterresponse. Estonia in particular shares a . Estonia has already partnered with NATO to improve their defence, including on the islands of ; however, full resilience will require a comprehensive approach that also defends critical infrastructure and community interests. Here, Canada has a strong opportunity to partner with Estonian companies and research institutions to support the development of industries and technology in preparation for a more robust counterresponse to Russian hybrid pressures.

Estonia has been . This has opened the opportunity for Canadian companies to connect with Estonia on renewable energy, storage capacity, and smart technologies. In . to deploy a BWRX-300 small modular reactor, which will boost their nuclear energy capacity. The work generated by ACET-EISEA will further develop these opportunities and centre them in the community while prioritizing environmental sustainability. This is where Canada can really shine, as not only a supporter but also a promoter of key values and goals of the liberal international order.

Conclusion

Looking ahead, ACET-EISEA is set to announce more collaboration in the coming months. As the projects begin in 2026, it will be important to track progress and lessons learned. The partnership is a strong example of the kinds of multinational action that is needed to address collective security and political concerns. Drawing from this experience can give strong models for other initiatives, which can in turn strengthen the development of the Transatlantic community. In doing so, these initiatives play a significant role in reinforcing the strategic cohesion necessary among the Alliance at a time when cooperation is increasingly being tested by geopolitical tension and conflict.

The post Canadian-Estonian clean energy partnership signals deepening ties with the Baltics appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

With Hungary set to have its , Prime Minister Viktor Orbán is facing arguably the first serious challenge to his almost 16-year rule. The Respect and Freedom party – commonly referred to as the Tisza party – is led by Péter Magyar and has emerged as a viable alternative to the Orbán regime. Campaigning on an anti-corruption platform, Tisza has been able to resonate with a domestic population that is increasingly frustrated with Orban’s Fidesz party.

Internationally, Orbán has soured relations with historical allies over opposing aid to Ukraine, bouts of rising illiberalism, as well as recurring appeals to right-wing populism. Importantly, he is a figure charged with largely leading throughout Europe – a loosely coordinated but growing, transnational populist movement that combines social and cultural conservatism with anti-liberal, anti-globalist politics. Domestically, frustration within Hungary has risen over the inability to revive the economy from inflation and instability. This is reflected in the polls, where Fidesz has fallen to Tisza, 37% to 49%, respectively. The outcome of this election will have serious long-term implications on Hungary’s future political trajectory and offers the nation an opportunity to pivot away from an illiberal-populist trajectory. In turn, the election may also influence the dynamics of the European Union (EU), which has long suffered from Hungary’s divisive role as a wedge to political consensus.

Who is Tisza?

, Tisza is a centre-right party that has been growing in popularity. Tisza has focused its campaign largely on anti-corruption, promising initiatives such as strengthening judicial independence. This is a powerful message for Hungarians who have continued to face economic struggle while the ruling party has benefited from state resources.

Tisza also openly positions itself as anti-Orbán, criticizing the leader for nepotism and allegedly funding an oligarchy. They have been able to convert some loyal Fidesz supporters but much of their support stems from luring voters from various opposition bases. Magyar himself was at one point , working as public administrator. He later resigned following a scandal where Hungary’s former President, , pardoned the former the deputy director of the Kossuth Zsuzsa’s Children’s Home in Bicske, who had been . After his resignation, Magyar as corrupt and authoritarian and has since continued to consolidate opposition.

Magyar has promised to on democratic issues related to the rule of law and human rights – two points the EU has increasingly been pressing in applying political pressure to the Orbán regime. The ongoing dispute has caused vital EU assets to be frozen and being able to access them could provide a necessary economic boost; however, the two parties would still have competing interests, as . Part of their appeal has been that they are neither pro-EU or anti-EU, but rather opt to prioritize the interests of Hungary and the V4 countries (Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia). This indicates that Tisza’s approach may still be rooted in right-wing and nationalist values shared amongst their neighbours. These risks inciting further tension with the EU, who have been critical of these values on the basis that they work against collective action and Western liberal democracy.

Differing ideologies and rhetorics can continue to fracture relations between Brussels and Eastern Europe. Regarding Russia and China, Magyar seeks to establish what he calls “.” This would prioritize mutual strategic interests and values rather than personal ties. Tisza has also highlighted the need to ; however, this is unlikely to revolutionize the Hungarian-Russian relationship, as the former remains reliant on Russia’s crude oil and gas. Magyar has stated openness to renegotiating projects like the and remains wary of Chinese foreign direct investment.

How likely is a Tisza win?

While polls are indicating a strong lead, the real battleground will be during the election period. Fidesz is notorious for influencing elections by using state resources to create an uneven political playground. Orbán himself has been known to use tactics such as . In addition, opponents are strongly disadvantaged in their ability to campaign. Fidesz’s makes it easy to push smear campaigns and pro-Fidesz content, while the opposition has less platforms to use. To secure Parliament, Tisza will have to navigate a severely rigged, competitive, political environment. The challenge for the Fidesz party will be to determine how far they may interfere with elections, risking potential backlash from the population. Currently, Orbán has already launched a campaign against Tisza, .

What impact would a Tisza win have?

A change in government will improve Hungary’s domestic situation in the long-term, but in the short-term, and internationally, the results will be mixed. on corruption can help undermine the increasingly powerful oligarchy and reduce clientelism. The party has also promised to , which could improve rule of law in the country. Additionally, the possibility of EU funds can be vital for improving the economy and social infrastructure, should it be utilized effectively; however, many of these benefits will take time to materialize. Many members within Orbán’s government will still have the rest of their terms to serve. This could prevent the necessary cultural change within constitutional institutions that needs to take place for democracy to recuperate after corruption, further slowing the (re)adoption of democratic values, including proper checks and balances. Dismantling the oligarchy will also take time and consistent effort from both the top and the bottom. Therefore, while Tisza is likely to pivot away from democratic backsliding, this will be a slow process.

While Tisza aims to restore democratic values such as rule of law, voting rights, and judicial independence, it has yet to be determined if they will do the same for so-called “liberal” values. Tisza has shied away from taking a stance on controversial issues, including Hungary’s LGBTQIA+ community and migration policies. This leaves uncertainty around whether they are willing to tackle social issues.

The popularity of both Tisza and Fidesz means Parliament may be run by right-wing parties come spring. Left-wing parties such as Democratic Coalition and Mi Hazanak . Under Orbán, , supporting the formation of a coalition of socially conservative, anti-EU, populist leaders. This includes prominent figures such as in Slovakia and in the Czech Republic. This coalition includes strong and persistent Euroskeptics that have stalled key EU decisions and leveraged recurring attacks against Brussels. While a Tisza government would not eliminate opposing standpoints, pursuing institutional compromises and negotiations instead of veto politics could ease internal hostilities. However, if Tisza elects to continue strengthening the right-wing flank, right-wing populism may become even more embedded into Europe’s institutional and political infrastructure. This could exacerbate polarization and division among communities, further destabilizing Europe’s political climate at a time when the world is already increasingly experiencing shifts in polarity and great power contestation.

Conclusion

The parliamentary elections in April 2026 have opened the opportunity for a change in governance for Hungary. This has the potential to strengthen democratic institutions, rule of law, and civil freedoms; however, Tisza will have to navigate a hostile electoral environment and consolidate a base strong enough to outweigh external interference. If they win, Hungary will be at a crossroads. Their decisions on social issues, the Russia-Ukraine war, and ties with the EU will help determine the nature of Hungary’s democracy moving forward.

The post Electing a New Future: The stakes and implications of Hungary’s Parliamentary election appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

�䲹�Բ��岹’s national strategy is undergoing a fundamental transformation. Great power competition, technological change, and hybrid tactics have reshaped the nature of modern conflict, blurring the boundaries between domestic stability and external security. States today face pressure not only to deter conventional military threats but also to address challenges that primarily affect civilian societies. represents an attempt to strengthen national resilience by integrating investments in defence capacity, critical infrastructure, and domestic military industrial capability. Yet these measures unfold against a backdrop of worsening socioeconomic pressures at home, leaving the country exposed to domestic destabilization even as defence spending rises. The convergence of external threats and internal vulnerabilities reveals that national security can no longer be understood solely through the lens of military preparedness. National security today requires a hybrid-resilience approach, combining military readiness and social cohesion to address threats.

Strategic Context and Security Challenges

�䲹�Բ��岹’s outlines a strategic approach to increasing adept at dealing with amidst the . By integrating , , and , Canada is trying to become a more autonomous nation. Simultaneously, addressing Canadian domestic security necessities through investment and nation-building projects will help . With Canada joining the EU’s defence procurement initiative, , Canadian defence firms gain access to European joint procurement and finance mechanisms.

As the United States (US), �䲹�Բ��岹’s traditional security guarantor, increasingly focuses on the Indo-Pacific and signals a reduced willingness to underwrite transatlantic stability, Canada is . Yet contemporary risk environments are defined not only by but also by , including , , and . Addressing these threats requires a multidimensional security posture that integrates physical, technological, and societal components. The budget’s allocation toward , , and developing underscores a commitment to and strategic autonomy. Investments in advanced technologies such as , , and further demonstrate recognition that modern security extends beyond traditional military capability, encompassing both technological resilience and the protection of critical industrial and information networks.

However, amidst a growing “” dilemma, in which defence imperatives compete with mounting domestic socioeconomic pressures, Canadian security challenges are complex. Socioeconomic vulnerabilities, , , , and , interact with traditional and hybrid security threats, creating interdependent risks. 

CAF Readiness and Personnel Support

Critical to a hybrid-resilient approach is developing the strength and readiness of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). Addressing hard-security concerns requires not only modern capabilities but also ensuring that CAF personnel are supported, retained, and operationally effective. Retention is a significant concern, with of new members leaving service, highlighting the need for , , and an enhanced . The recent are a step in the right direction, but additional investments in housing, , and are essential. Equally important are mental-health services, which have been consistently and who face the cumulative stresses of operations, repeated deployments, and long-term service.

At the same time, �䲹�Բ��岹’s defence procurement system continues to face relating to personnel shortages and a multi-departmental model. While the Ministry of Public Services and Procurement invests in high-profile platforms such as and , – including , , and – receives insufficient attention from the federal government. The most recent audit by the (2025) found that as of March 31, 2024, many training areas had less gear than needed, while others did not have enough equipment to carry out training operations.

More transparent and accountable procurement processes are needed to ensure that frontline personnel have reliable, effective tools to perform their duties safely and efficiently. Strengthening both personnel support and procurement effectiveness not only enhances operational readiness but also integrates material and human resource stability into a broader national resilience framework, complementing community-level and social initiatives to counter hybrid threats.

Socioeconomic Pressures and Domestic Security Concerns

Although the federal budget , the and the limited attention to worsening social crises leave Canada vulnerable to further destabilisation, populism, and societal polarisation. For many young people facing , military service can appear to be one of the few . A recent analysis by highlights that �䲹�Բ��岹’s youth face some of the toughest labour-market conditions in decades, making enlistment in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) a possible remedy for the youth unemployment crisis. This pattern echoes the , which has long been criticised for disproportionately drawing in economically disadvantaged youth, effectively creating pathways into the armed forces driven less by choice and more by necessity. 

Such dynamics also raise serious domestic security concerns: far-right networks have, in documented cases, encouraged members to or sought contact with as a means of acquiring and . Compounding this trend is the in Canada- particularly common among young men- which increasingly identify as a potential gateway into broader extremist ideologies. Without sufficient attention to these online spaces, the risk posed by vulnerable youth becoming radicalised and incentivised to join the military becomes a serious concern for domestic security and the protection of liberal-democratic values.

Growing separatist movements, particularly in and , highlight regional discontent and political polarisation, which can interact with socioeconomic vulnerabilities and be exploited by both domestic and foreign actors seeking to exacerbate societal fractures. These dynamics intersect with broader socioeconomic pressures and are further amplified by hybrid threats and foreign interference, which serve to exploit domestic polarisation through strategies titled “” 
Integrating with defence and technological investments is central to a . International examples, such as , demonstrate how initiatives that strengthen , media literacy, and can meaningfully complement traditional security capabilities. For Canada, public-awareness efforts like the campaign, which brings together over fifty feminist organisations to advocate for , , and , help address the socioeconomic stresses and political grievances that make communities vulnerable to polarisation and manipulation. 

Additionally, coordinated programs commissioned by the federal government, such as the (CRF) and the (DCI), linking defence, industrial strategy, and social resilience not only enhance the country’s ability to detect, withstand, and recover from hybrid threats but also reinforce national cohesion. In this sense, investing in social stability is not an adjunct to national security but a foundational component of it: strengthening communities, reducing socioeconomic vulnerabilities, and empowering citizens collectively contribute to a more unified, resilient society capable of withstanding increasingly complex threat environments.

Towards a Hybrid-Resilient Canada

�䲹�Բ��岹’s security landscape in the twenty-first century is defined by the convergence of traditional military threats, hybrid challenges, and domestic vulnerabilities. As this analysis demonstrates, a comprehensive approach to national resilience cannot rely solely on modernising the Canadian Armed Forces or expanding technological and industrial capabilities. Socioeconomic pressures, including youth unemployment, housing insecurity, and political polarisation, interact with hybrid threats, creating opportunities for extremist mobilisation, disinformation, and foreign interference. Social spending is not a competing priority in an era of heightened geopolitical tension; it is a core element of national defence.

By investing in social programs, community resilience initiatives, and public-awareness campaigns like Demand Better, Canada addresses these underlying vulnerabilities while simultaneously strengthening civic trust, cohesion, and adaptability. When combined with targeted defence investments and technological modernisation, such measures create a multidimensional, hybrid-resilient framework capable of withstanding both internal and external pressures. Social spending and citizen support are not peripheral to national security; they are at the very heart of it. A Canada that invests in the well-being of its people is not only more equitable and inclusive but also more unified, adaptable, and resilient in the face of modern conflict.

The post From Defence to Community – Social Stability as a Pillar of National Security appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

When Albania’s Prime Minister Edi Rama joked that his new artificial intelligence (AI) “minister,” Diella (Albanian for Sun), was “pregnant with 83 children” (a metaphor for 83 digital assistants that will serve members of parliament), he turned an . The move to incorporate AI into governance itself is considered by many to be amusing, unsettling, and even revealing, as it shows how easily AI can be warped into a spectacle while subtly re-wiring how decisions about money and power are made. Diella is also the world’s first AI system formally appointed as Minister of State for Artificial Intelligence, with responsibility for.

From Virtual Assistant to Cabinet-Level Minister

as a virtual assistant on the , intended to assist Albanian citizens in accessing documents and other online public services. Nine months later, in September 2025, following a decree that authorized a virtual minister, Rama had elevated Diella to the rank of Minister of State for Artificial Intelligence, .

Such an unorthodox move has garnered plenty of international coverage, as many have framed it as both an anti-corruption experiment and a form of political branding, describing Diella as a digital assistant dressed in traditional clothing, now tasked with making public tenders free of corruption. However, some have also pointed out that procurement in Albania has long been dominated by political elites and oligarch-like figures, making .

A Spectacle?

Writer/researcher : essentially shifting political responsibility to digital actors and presenting them as being pure, incorruptible, and tireless, standing in for distrusted political elites. Perhaps accidental, this comes across as not a neutral design choice. Presenting the system as a woman in traditional costume frames digitalization as care and service rather than control, pulling on gendered stereotypes while also making it difficult to contest the new political innovation without appearing as “anti-modern” or “anti-progress.” The “” metaphor pushes this further, casting Diella as a digital mother of dozens of subordinate systems that will monitor and help with parliamentary work. It infantilizes MPs as being dependent on an algorithm, and suggests that political conflict within parliament can be processed by a neutral machine rather than by openly accountable representatives.

The move to incorporate AI into governance sits at the intersection of EU accession politics and digital dependency, as Diella is likely based on OpenAI models hosted on Microsoft Azure, which is precisely the kind of . Hypothetically speaking, if Albania were to obtain EU membership and Diella were to operate within the EU, it would be flagged as a high-risk system under the new , where stringent requirements are imposed on the usage of AI in public services and resource allocation. Such frameworks do not yet bind Albania; however, it is clearly experimenting in exactly the domain in which the Act targets, that being algorithmic governance, where constitutional accountability is thin.

Canada’s “Sovereign AI” Moment

Canada is moving quickly in a similar direction by embedding AI into state structures, but with a different approach. The announces $925.6 million over five years for “large-scale sovereign public AI infrastructure,” including a Sovereign Canadian Cloud to support research and public-sector AI use. The federal government is implementing AI and .

Canada already has a formal governance “toolkit” or framework for implementing public-sector AI. The government’s and its official guidelines require “algorithmic impact assessments,” the formal documentation of the systems used, and alternative mechanisms for performing similar functions when automated decisions may potentially affect rights and interests. Moreover, the further defines sovereignty as the ability to manage and protect government data, systems, and infrastructure independently in a globally interconnected environment.

However, Canadian experts warn that infrastructure and branding risks could outpace efforts to control them. As noted by , Canada’s dependence on American companies is one of the most significant risks and complications facing Canadian digital sovereignty, particularly given the dominance of US providers in digital and cloud services.

Put side by side, Albania and Canada reveal the same underlying question: who actually controls AI in the state, and under what rules? Diella is clearly an extreme case of AI as spectacle: an AI minister is “pregnant” with assistants, purity, and efficiency in a system still wrestling with corruption and weak checks. Whereas Canada’s “sovereign AI” push is more technocratic, but it faces its own temptation to treat big AI spending and a branded cloud as proof of control, even while key infrastructure and AI models remain under foreign corporate jurisdictions.

The core lesson for Canada is not to mock Diella, but to avoid a more subtle version of the same trap. As AI becomes more integrated into sectors that the federal government may deem appropriate, the real test will be whether such systems are contestable or even grounded in enforceable law, rather than merely marketed as innovative or sovereign, as it is easy to get caught up in the media storm and publicity such reforms seem to command. Canada’s task should be to ensure that its “sovereign AI” remains democratic, even when there is no digital “minister” on the screen.

The post Democracy Meets AI appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

On September 30, 2025, to intervene in Nexperia’s operations, a semiconductor-focused Chinese-owned company. The government had cited “” and the risk that vital technological capabilities could be shifted out of Europe, and it gave itself the power to reverse or even block decisions deemed harmful to both Dutch and European economic security.

Nexperia, as a company, is not a glamorous AI-chip producer as the media tends to focus on, but rather a supplier of “legacy” semiconductors used in both cars and other consumer electronics, which was formerly part of Philips’ semiconductor operations and was . However, . The response from Beijing was swift. In early October, China’s Commerce Ministry . It halted exports of Nexperia chips from China, turning the regulatory move into a global supply chain incident. Nexperia, for its part, warned its customers that it would no longer be able to guarantee the quality or authenticity of any chips produced in China after October 13, .

Suppliers and automakers alike suddenly discovered how exposed they were to the “boring” part of the chip world. The European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association and could force production lines to halt. The ripple effects of supply chain issues caused by the Dutch regulatory provision were felt even in North America, and had either sought other suppliers or exemptions from the control measures imposed by China.

By mid-November, after talks involving partners such as the United States, China decided to ease its export ban on Nexperia, and the , citing steps taken by Beijing to restore chip flows to Europe. The immediate crisis seems to have been managed for the time being. However, the events of the last three months have exposed apparent limitations in the resilience of Europe’s semiconductor industry.

On Paper: Ambitious. In Reality: Dependent

The is intended to double the European share of the global semiconductor market to 20% by 2030, strengthen and resilient supply chains, and minimize Europe’s dependency on foreign suppliers. However, the that this target is unlikely to be met, and that the EU market share is currently only projected to be 11.7% in 2030.

Interestingly, identified semiconductors as one of the four “critical technology areas” that require risk assessments by its member states, other critical areas included biotech, quantum, and AI technologies. However, the Nexperia case reveals that Europe’s most glaring deficiencies are not only at the bleeding edge of semiconductor design, but also that the assembly, testing, and production of older-generation chips have been, for the most part, offshored to China. This is consistent with broader statistics on digital dependence. For example, the relayed estimations that the EU relies on non-EU suppliers for more than 80% of its digital products, services, and infrastructure, and that China supplies approximately 71% of the EU’s gallium and 45% of its germanium, both of which are irreplaceable materials needed for semiconductor production. In other words, Europe is attempting to establish some degree of technological sovereignty on a foundation that is deeply entangled with Chinese output, especially in the least glamorous parts of the value chain.

Lessons

The EU now centres discussions on “” from China to manage interdependence and to diversify rather than simply sever ties with China altogether. The Nexperia case offers a sneak peek at what this could mean in practice.

First, it would require regulatory teeth, such as the willingness to use emergency security tools, including the , and EU-level export control and investment screening, to keep critical capabilities anchored in Europe when market incentives may point elsewhere. Second, it demands a redesign of the supply chain. Ensuring that 70% of a critical supplier’s output is not hostage to policy decisions made by China means not only investing in high-end chips, but also in the often-forgotten parts of the industry, such as test facilities, packaging plants, and the raw materials they rely on. The Nexperia saga serves as a great case study in the potential costs of ignoring such links. Third, de-risking not only implies reshoring but also friend-shoring. , launched in 2022, aims to make Canada a global “supplier of choice” for critical minerals and the clean technologies they enable, such as semiconductors. The recent builds upon this strategy by committing new funding to raw mineral extraction and export. Canada and the EU already have a from 2021, which commits both sides to integrating Canada-EU raw materials value chains and reducing strategic dependencies on other supplier countries. For Europe, treating that partnership more as a core pillar of its long-term semiconductor security strategy would be a meaningful act of de-risking.

The Nexperia crisis is a preview. As Europe tightens export controls and pushes its Chips Act forward, similar flashpoints are likely, mainly around similar firms and technologies. The question is whether European policymakers are prepared and willing to pay both the financial and political costs of reducing dependencies and taking proactive measures rather than simply reacting when a single chip company suddenly becomes the chokepoint of global production.

The post Chip Dependency Comes Due appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

• Turkish goals in the Black Sea region (BSR) are to maintain stability and its own strategic positioning within the region.

• Canadian cooperation with Türkiye continues to encounter challenges due to misaligned priorities and estrangement between actors.

• Canada has an opportunity to increase presence in the BSR by cooperating on initiatives outside of hard security concerns.

Policy Recommendations

• Canada should support the initiation of additional humanitarian projects in the BSR and seek out ways to partner with Türkiye on defence technology and modernization to strengthen overall diplomatic and defence relations.

• Increasing �䲹�Բ��岹’s regional presence around the BSR through NATO initiatives could help to bolster its image as a supportive ally to Türkiye while also helping project overall Canadian security interests.

Türkiye’s Foreign Policy post 2022

Türkiye has historically played an influential role in the Black Sea Region (BSR) as NATO’s southeastern bulwark. The gives Türkiye control over the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits, the key entry point of the Black Sea. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the BSR has been under wartime conditions. Türkiye has since invoked the Convention to effectively close the straits to both NATO and Russian ships; a decision which has nonetheless sparked controversy, particularly after Türkiye . Ankara remains apprehensive towards NATO involvement in the region, and while its relationship with the West is strained, it continues to maintain relations with Russia based on shared in the .

Türkiye, unlike most NATO countries, has , and still . At the same time, Türkiye has also . Türkiye’s seemingly contradictory policies reflect its primary goal: to maintain the existing balance of power in the BSR.

Türkiye’s stance is driven by independent interests rather an alignment with the West or Russia. For Türkiye, reinforcing the status quo reaffirms their military, economic, and diplomatic power in the BSR. Türkiye prioritizes business and trade to aid its struggling economy. It has also been increasingly positioning itself ; this has informed the country’s decisions to participate in the (a humanitarian-focused mission) and engage in peacemaking talks with Russia and Ukraine. Türkiye’s commitments are strategic, wishing to avoid provocation of either side while still leveraging their influence in military, resources, and politics.

Challenges for Canada

The major challenge for Canada will be to understand how to approach collaborations with Türkiye in the BSR. Estrangement and misalignment from both parties pose potential problems. Relations only recently improved after Canada following Türkiye’s use of Canadian arms in Nagorno-Karabakh, Libya, and Syria. Türkiye, through its refusal to sanction Russia or permit NATO military presence BSR, has demonstrated that it is not willing to explicitly target Russia. This clashes with �䲹�Բ��岹’s aim to contain Russian expansionism and protect Ukraine.

Canadian-Turkish military cooperation largely operates through NATO. Both countries participate in , , , and . While NATO provides a strong foundation, direct partnerships between Canadian and Turkish armed forces are still minimal, thus heightening the chances of estrangement between both sides.

Opportunities for Canada

Despite limitations, there are still opportunities to develop Canadian-Turkish diplomatic collaboration. Focusing on economic, humanitarian, or regional development initiatives creates common ground. For example, the defence industry is an area of growing partnership. Since Canada lifted the arms embargo on Türkiye, it has become one of �䲹�Բ��岹’s . Türkiye also participates in CANSEC (�䲹�Բ��岹’s international defence technology conference), and Turkish defence firms travelled to Canada as part of a . The exercise generated technology that enhances automated systems and increases resilience to hybrid offensives. For example, the firm HAVELSAN was able to . between the two countries also provide strong opportunities for investment and technological development which can have positive effects both for defence and for the overall economies of each country.

Building regional capacity is a promising avenue for cooperation. As mentioned above, Türkiye participates in FLF battlegroups, part of NATO’s . Pursuing similar initiatives in the scope of military modernization could be successful in increasing regional capacity. Furthermore, Canada can draw upon its skills in mediation and development to encourage stable, formal BSR organizations. Both actions can increase the ability for the BSR to safeguard against further destabilization in the region, which is beneficial to Turkish interests. The MCM was able to launch successfully in large part because it was framed as a humanitarian mission. This emphasizes the importance of optics for Türkiye, and should serve as an example of how to navigate different positionalities.

For Canada, the BSR can be a new avenue of partnership, increasing overall soft power and presence. A strong BSR is essential for NATO’s objective to defend Alliance territories. It is also essential for �䲹�Բ��岹’s efforts to enhance its defence posture and bolster international stability. However, without critically engaging with Türkiye this goal will be difficult to achieve. Therefore, finding relevant but non-conventional ways to collaborate in the BSR is key. Enhancing relations also align with other moves Türkiye has been making to collaborate more closely with other NATO and EU countries which seek similar goals as Canada. With an increasing need for fortification of the BSR, Canada should take the opportunity to distinguish itself as a valuable partner.

The post Turkish Foreign Policy in the BSR: Opportunities and Challenges for Canada appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

In a post on X (formerly known as Twitter), current German Chancellor Friedrich Merz stated the following: “.” Just a few short weeks later, in a posted on YouTube with Hungary’s news outlet, former German Chancellor Angela Merkel spoke about her experience in June 2021 when she and French President Emmanuel Macron had floated the idea of the EU holding direct talks with Vladimir Putin in an effort to calm re-ignited tensions with Ukraine. However, at that time, COVID-19 was given as the reason for preventing more frequent dialogue with Russia, which Merkel felt was crucial to ensuring that the be upheld.

In this new interview, Merkel revealed that it was in fact the Baltic states and Poland who were against such initiatives, and then claimed that “” Clearly, such a statement aims to manipulate memory for strategic purposes by placing significant blame on the Baltic states and Poland in the lead-up to the war, while also suggesting that Merkel herself had been serving as a peace-making actor, playing no role in empowering Russia to take such aggressive actions.

The reaction to Merkel’s comments was near instant. For example, Estonian foreign minister Margus Tsahkna responded that Merkel was “” and that instead of strongly responding to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, or its war in Georgia, . Another example of the outrage initiated by Merkel’s comments was captured by Poland’s Minister for Regional Policy, Katarzyna Pełczyńska-Nałęcz (former Polish Ambassador to Russia), who stated that being blamed for starting a war because they “.”

Why say it, and why say it there?

In short, Merkel argues about process in order to justify and defend her legacy and relations with Russia during her time as Chancellor, which focused on fostering “” – including sanctions, Minsk diplomacy, and energy interdependence as a ‘bridge’ with strategic intentions. This political approach is . Merkel’s casting of 2021 as a sort of missed off-ramp shifts focus from Berlin’s (and Merkel’s) long-term bet on engagement with Russia to an Eastern European veto that indirectly led to the war in Ukraine in the first place. Similarly, this mimics the theme that ‘,’ which politicians such as US President Donald Trump tend to employ as a discursive strategy. Legally and morally, the aggressor is Russia. What Merkel’s storytelling does is recast the focus on the intra-EU process of who blocked talks, rather than on the actor who chose invasion over dialogue. This narrative also directly undermines EU unity against Russia’s aggression, .

The venue of this interview further amplifies the political impact on EU unity. The that operates within a highly polarized media ecosystem, which placed . Additionally, alongside being the second lowest among EU member states in this index, recent reports indicate that Prime Minister Victor Orbán and his allies have consolidated control over around 80% of the press media in Hungary.The �ʲ����پ���á�� is hardly a mouthpiece for Budapest, but it is undoubtedly interesting that such an interview would come from the EU member state most often associated with strategic ambiguity in its relations with Moscow. It is worth noting, however, that during the same interview, when asked whether Orbán was a Trojan horse for Putin into the EU, Merkel simply stated that this propagated idea was “.” As placed in Hungary’s polarized media space, the Merkel clip conveys intra-EU blame, further testing cohesion by muddying the EU’s message to Moscow.

For the Baltics and Poland, the was both a threat and signal test. As the Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda warned, engaging in dialogue with Putin without tangible changes in Russian behaviour would send “” that the EU was placating Russia’s actions. Hosting summits without leverage and making agreements without cost or constraints creates an opportunity for Russia to further normalize coercion and potentially foster coalition-splitting rather than deterring it. Viewed in this light, the disapproval in 2021 from Poland and the Baltics was not obstructionism but rather a and a fear for potentially being the next target of Russia’s aggression.

An inconvenient backdrop

There is a reason Eastern Europe balks at Merkel’s ‘if only we had talked more’ sentiments. For three decades, Germany’s policy towards Russia combined binding and deterrence through sanctions and Minsk diplomacy, alongside a dense web of commercial, energy, and even security-based ties. , or the , where a German prime military contractor supplying high-end training systems to a Russian arms centre was . Only after the annexation of Crimea did Berlin entirely revoke the license. The cancellation showed that routine cooperation between Germany and Russia had been institutionalized even after Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008.

The EU’s own briefings on Nord Stream 2 noted that it , which led to debates and arguments from Poland, for example, , as well as broader concerns that Russia was using such initiatives to . Angela Merkel had reiterated to partners, and more specifically to Kyiv, that , despite being seemingly immune to the suggestion that Russia would, in fact, use energy as a tool to achieve its political interests in Europe.

Schröder, the useful contrast

Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, Merkel’s predecessor, moved straight into Russian energy after his time leading Germany, first chairing (the European-Russian pipeline company), then later joining the board of Rosneft (a state-owned Russian oil company), from which he under mounting political pressure. Additionally, Schröder had flirted with a ; however, , which was later stripped of a taxpayer-funded office by the Bundestag, prompting him to navigate the German court system to regain his office. However, the courts upheld his loss of privileges.

Merkel, by contrast, has not taken any corporate posts from Russian-based firms. However, her entanglement with Moscow is apparent through her narrative in the interview which re-allocates the burden of the war within the EU. This reframing serves two distinct purposes: The first is directly shifting any accountability for the complex situation Europe currently finds itself in with Russia, and the second, more indirectly, serves Russian hybrid tactics that seek to and as the .

What now?

Merkel’s interview works less as revisionism and more as a redistribution of memory, agency, and what she believes that EU unity should have resulted in during that time. It invites a tempting but counterfactual narrative that is ultimately counterproductive: that one more conversation might have ‘saved the day’ if only the Easterners had not blocked it. The empirical record – from Mulino to Nord Stream – suggests the opposite. That being said, diplomacy only works when backed by credible costs; absent that, it enables coercion. The lesson Europe should take is that the Baltics and Poland were cautious, given their historical understanding of Russia as a political actor, but were not outright fearful of dialogue with Moscow. If Europe shifts its focus to who blocked what talks and actions, it risks falling into the very divisions and tensions that Moscow seeks to foster.

The post Does the Mask Still Fit? Merkel’s Legacy-Protective Reframing of the Russo-Ukrainian War appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

The Moldovan electorate has once again stood up to Russia and reaffirmed their path towards the European Union. On September 28, 2025, Moldovan citizens went to the polls to vote in this year’s parliamentary election, the results of which were by the Central Electoral Commission on October 5, whose report is now before the Constitutional Court.

Since applying for and receiving EU candidate status in the immediate aftermath of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Moldovan government has abandoned its previous balancing strategy between Russia and the EU and pivoted entirely toward Europe. Now, under threat of increased and manipulation, Moldovans have voted to continue on their path towards accession to the EU in a contentious election cycle targeted with hybrid warfare. While the pro-European Part of Action and Solidarity (PAS) will remain in power, Moldova’s future membership in the EU is not yet solidified.

What happened?

Moldova’s 2025 parliamentary elections were framed as another decision point on the country’s road to joining the EU, occurring just one year after 2024’s presidential elections and referendum on updating the Constitution to permit accession, passing only by a narrow margin. While multiple entities competed for votes, the two main players in this cycle are the pro-European Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) and the Russia-aligned Patriotic Electoral Bloc (BEP), formed by the parties of Communists, Party of Socialists, and the Heart and Future of Moldova. The Heart of Moldova, along with Moldova Mare, were ultimately from participating in the election due to suspected campaign financing. Russian interference was widely anticipated and documented leading up to the election, points underscored by President Maia Sandu in an the week before the election, as she warned the electorate about security threats in Transnistria and Ukraine, as well as oligarchic capture.

Leading up to the election, observers expected a between the PAS and BEP. However, with 52.21 percent turnout, PAS scored a clear victory with over 50.2 percent of the overall vote and a mandated 55 out of 101 seats in Parliament. BEP achieved 26 seats, with the remaining 20 divided among three other parties whose share of the vote reached the required threshold. PAS will keep its definitive majority in the newly-formed government.

The outcome indicates some regional divides in the electorate. Disaggregating the domestic and diaspora votes shared by the , PAS achieved 44.13 percent of the vote compared to BEP’s 28.29 (considering only votes placed within the country). Domestically, PAS outpaced BEP in the central raions. BEP put up a stronger fight in the north and south, though not enough to sweep the areas or make up for its relatively poorer performance. Unsurprisingly, the two regions with special status and widely considered to be pro-Russian strongholds, Gagauzia and Transnistria, voted overwhelmingly for BEP as anticipated (82.35 and 51.02 percent for BEP, respectively).

Moving to the diaspora vote, PAS votes outnumbered BEP in all but three of the 41 countries with polling stations abroad: Russia, Belarus, and Bulgaria. In 36 of those countries, PAS scored a majority with over 60 percent of the vote. Diaspora votes are clearly in favour of Moldova’s European path; as in , the diaspora votes pushed the total over the 50 percent threshold towards further European integration and rejection of Russian control. All told, the votes tallied 50.20 percent of the overall vote for PAS and BEP in second place with 24.20 percent of the vote, securing the pro-Europeans their majority.

Was the election free and fair?

�����䷡’s concludes that the election was well-run and successfully administered, despite vote-buying, cyber attacks, and bomb threats. Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, Moldova on its elections and reasserted European support. However, not all parties are satisfied with the administration of the election. In the days since the election, former president and leader of the Socialists Igor Dodon has decried the results as illegitimate on his , claiming that PAS lost within the country (notably, PAS still beat Dodon’s bloc by 15 points considering only the domestic vote) and won a “dubious ‘victory’ due to the diaspora.” His comments those of Russian MFA spokesperson Maria Zakharova. Zakharova and Dodon refer to vote suppression at home and abroad, referencing the limited number of and Moldovan authorities claim that the reduced number of Russia-based polling stations is due to the credible security risk to the election. Likewise, Moldovan authorities claim polling stations for Transnistria are allocated in compliance with national legislation and demand. Given the consistent and concerted effort by Russia to interfere in Moldova’s elections, the explanation is convincing.

What’s next?

In the immediate, the domestic political context remains dynamic. The CEC’s report on the election is before the Constitutional Court, which will approve the results in the coming week. Since election day, PAS’s majority has dipped from 55 to 53 as on PAS’s list announced a plan to act in parliament as pro-Europe independents. BEP has protested outside of Parliament, and PAS has alleged that those protestors are PAS’s pre-election day about the George Simion-affiliated “Democracy at Home” Party’s suspect campaign financing and online activities has been volleyed from the CEC to the Constitutional Court to decide whether the party’s six mandated seats will be confirmed. The Heart of Moldova, excluded from the parliamentary elections, has been likewise barred from upcoming

In the longer term, the Moldovan government’s goal is to join the EU However, as Moldova makes progress in its growth plan and continues to meet targets for accession, major still exist, including the precariousness of Transnistria and instability due to continued Russian interference. Additionally, provided Moldova remains on track in its progress towards membership and continues to resist Russian control, the EU itself needs to agree to Moldova’s accession, a vote which could be derailed by naysayers. While unanimous agreement is required, there have been discussions around the use of to mitigate the risks posed by the EU’s more pugnacious members. Even if Moldova meets its end of the bargain, the EU can still deny membership.

While many breathed a sigh of relief on Monday morning at the result in favor of PAS, the outcome may also underscore the existing schism in the electorate and threats of foreign interference. For those who support Moldova’s future as a member of the EU, this is a good time for optimism but not complacency. Russia will continue its concerted attempts directly and indirectly to hold sway over Moldova’s future. Moldova’s continued sovereignty and independence rely on domestic commitment to its European path and support of the EU.

The post Has Moldova Evaded Russian Interference? appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

Bosnia and Herzegovina, more specifically the Serbian-majority region of Republika Srpska, is currently experiencing a difficult political and constitutional crisis centred around its President, Milorad Dodik, and his defiance of

On August 1, 2025, a Bosnian appeals court upheld a criminal conviction for Milorad Dodik, which includes from holding public office, as a result of his The OHR, an international organization led by High Representative Christian Schmidt, is responsible for overseeing the (Dayton Agreement), which ended the Bosnian War.

In line with election law, Bosnia’s Central Election Commission (CEC) revoked Dodik’s presidential mandate on August 6, 2025. Importantly, the OHR was not the body in charge of sentencing Dodik; the court conviction (for failing to implement OHR decisions) came first, and the CEC’s mandate came after. However, Dodik and his allies assert that the decision to remove him from politics is , and argue that the verdict is not directed against the President of Republika Srpska, but

Dodik’s defiance to this ruling is also apparent as Republika Srpska moves ahead with a referendum scheduled for October 25, 2025, which challenges Bosnia’s political institutions and the OHR’s peacekeeping role in the country. The “Do you accept the decisions of the unelected foreigner Christian Schmidt and the rulings of the unconstitutional Court of Bosnia & Herzegovina issued against the President of Republika Srpska, as well as the decision of the Central Election Commission to strip the President of Republika Srpska, Milorad Dodik, of his mandate?”

After removing Dodik from office, the CEC set an for November 23, 2025, to establish a new president for the region. After Republika Srpska lawmakers , they have now for it to go ahead as scheduled. The result therefore represents a two-headed challenge for Bosnia’s democracy: a referendum aimed at delegitimizing state decisions – despite a legal basis indicating that the – and a succession contest in which Dodik seeks to maintain control.

The situation surrounding the referendum matters for Bosnia’s security because it targets the rule-of-law guardrails of the country’s democratic infrastructure, which are designed to work across ethnic boundaries. By holding this referendum, Republika Srpska’s political authorities are effectively challenging the rules of the state and who has the power to set them. Depending on the results of this vote, Bosnia could see the emergence of parallel legal structures and an increase in friction between Such erosion could also threaten the conditions for Bosnia’s EU accession process across the “European neighbourhood” by inviting external influence and drawing more EU/NATO attention and resources due to instability in the region.

The timing of the unfolding crisis magnifies this risk. The referendum is held just before the UN Security Council is scheduled to take up the annual renewal of , a peace support mission led by the EU that is currently the only executive security presence in the country. ALTHEA is also of the Dayton Agreement. Any political crisis, politicization, or delay in renewal could weaken deterrence when core institutions are being tested. Dodik has in the past expressed the possibility of employing his connections to Russia, a UN Security Council member and , to

Dodik’s long-standing ties with Moscow consistently influence his political calculus, as evidenced by his frequent travels to Russia, as well as his regular meetings and consultations with representatives of the Russian government. For example, the and expressing its support for both Dodik and Republika Srpska, going so far as to declare that calling for Dodik’s removal from office was Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Sergey Lavrov also claimed during a speech at the UN General Assembly that for destabilizing the Balkan region by undermining peace and sovereignty. Another representative of the Russian government stated that the OHR for Bosnia and Herzegovina should be .

Taken together, the diplomatic cover and narrative framing provided by Russia on this issue give Dodik the political space needed to continue his non-compliance with the court ruling, and to ignore the EU-based conceptualizations of rule-of-law, such as respect for court decisions and OHR authority. All of these factors contribute to the

Canada has an interest in monitoring this situation, given its on European defence and security. Questions surrounding ALTHEA’s renewal and a broader breakdown of governing institutions in Bosnia serve as a challenge to the agenda that Ottawa has taken on with Brussels. Coordination with European (and American) partners on enforcement and will shape the credibility and efficacy of pressure on actors who seek to obstruct state institutions. At the same time, a crisis in the Balkans would likely divert resources and attention at a time when support for Ukraine in its continued fight against Russia remains essential.

The post Republika Srpska Referendum as Dayton Stress Test appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.