Introduction

In 2025, the United States (US)-Türkiye relationship moved beyond the traditional logic of NATO Alliance cohesion and entered a phase of strategic bargaining. Once anchored almost exclusively in NATO solidarity and Cold War–era security imperatives, bilateral ties between the nations are now being increasingly shaped by two defining and interconnected issues: Türkiye’s calibrated position on the war in Ukraine and its growing relevance in the geopolitics of rare earth elements and critical minerals.¹ These dynamics reflect a broader transformation of the international system and intra-alliance dynamics in which great power competition, fragmented supply chains, and regional autonomy are increasingly overriding ideological alignment.  

For Washington, Türkiye remains indispensable but unreliable; for Ankara, the US is a necessary but constraining partner. The challenge for both sides is how to construct a functional partnership that accommodates a divergence of alignment while still delivering strategic value. Rare earth elements and Türkiye’s role in Ukraine offer precisely such a framework: material, interest-based, and adaptable to a world defined by competition with Russia and China. 

Türkiye, Ukraine, and the Logic of Strategic AutonomyÌı

Türkiye’s response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has crystallized its broader foreign policy doctrine. Ankara condemned the invasion, supported Ukraine’s territorial integrity, supplied Kyiv with military equipment, and closed the Turkish Straits to military traffic under the Montreux Convention. At the same time, it refused to impose sanctions on Russia and preserved energy, trade, and diplomatic ties with Moscow. 

This approach is often described in Washington as “â€� but from Ankara’s perspective, it is a rational expression of strategic autonomy.&²Ô²ú²õ±è;°Õü°ù°ì¾±²â±ğ&²Ô²ú²õ±è;views the war not only as a European security crisis but also a  with direct implications for its own stability, energy security, and economic resilience. Full alignment with Western sanctions would expose Türkiye to severe economic costs, exacerbate inflation, and jeopardize energy supplies, while full alignment with Russia would undermine its role in NATO. 

Türkiye’s early mediation efforts following the invasion of Ukraine have reinforced its self-image as an indispensable intermediary between Russia and the West. Unlike most NATO Allies, Ankara retains the ability to communicate credibly with both sides. For the US, this role is double-edged: it dilutes Alliance discipline but preserves a diplomatic channel with Russia that would otherwise not exist. 

US Expectations and Limits of Alliance DisciplineÌı

Throughout the second Trump presidency, the US has viewed the war in Ukraine less as a fundamental test of the rules-based international order and more as a measure of Allied burden-sharing and loyalty to US interests. Washington’s discard of normative alignment and expectations of tangible demonstrations of support carries deep implications for Türkiye that benefits substantially from NATO security guarantees. In this context, Ankara’s refusal to impose sanctions on Russia and its continued economic engagement with Moscow are not seen as violations of shared principles, but rather as opportunistic behaviour that undermines NATO cohesion and reinforces perceptions of Allies â€˜freeloading’ off US protection. 

Yet, these expectations reflect an older model of Alliance behaviour that is increasingly difficult to sustain. In a multipolar system, medium powers like Türkiye are less willing to subordinate their interests to bloc politics. Ankara’s behaviour in Ukraine is not an anomaly but a signal of how smaller and middle powers navigate systemic competition: hedging, mediating, and extracting leverage from multiple relationships simultaneously. 

This suggests that pressuring the Turkish government into full alignment may be counterproductive. Excessive coercion risks accelerating Ankara’s drift toward alternative partnerships, while reducing US influence over Turkish strategic choices. The challenge for Washington, therefore, is not to put an end to Turkish autonomy, but to channel it toward outcomes compatible with US interests. 

Rare EarthÌıElementsÌıand the New Geopolitics of Supply ChainsÌı

In October 2025, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced that Türkiye had identified the world’s second largest reserve of rare earth elements, containing an estimated 694 million tons of mineral resources in Beylikova, located in northwestern Türkiye. The discovery includes .&²Ô²ú²õ±è;°Õü°ù°ì¾±²â±ğ&²Ô²ú²õ±è; developing rare-earth reserves in western Anatolia with the US after similar talks with China and Russia were halted amid disagreements over control; it is also engaging with  on potential cooperation. Türkiye plans on building a refinery in Beylikova, which contains ore with more than 1% rare-earth oxide by weight.  In addition, Ankara plans to apply to the Australian Institute of Geoscientists for certification under the JORC Code, which sets minimum standards for how companies publicly report exploration results and would reveal the size of deposits for potential investors. 

Ankara’s talks with Western partners come as the US and the European Union (EU) step up efforts to reduce China’s dominance in the production and processing of rare earth elements. The Turkish government has sought to balance its ties with both the West and China amid growing global trade tensions. In September 2025, Türkiye joined a  led by the US and EU aimed at diversifying critical mineral supply chains; however, it has also been offered partner-country status to the BRICS group of emerging-market powers and attracted Chinese investment in electric vehicle production. In 2026, the EU  a new agreement with US and Japan to cooperate on critical raw materials supply chains.  

It is within this context that rare earth elements and critical minerals acquire strategic significance. The global competition over rare earth elements has become a central front in US-China geopolitical rivalry. China’s dominant position across extraction, processing, and downstream manufacturing of these elements represents a structural vulnerability for the US and its partners. For Ankara, cooperation supports its goal of moving up the global value chain, reducing reliance on external suppliers, and strengthening its role in strategic industries, such as defense systems, medical technologies, and consumer electronics. For Washington, Türkiye represents a politically and geographically viable partner in efforts to diversify supply chains for key technological and defence products while reducing dependence on China without concentrating production in a limited number of partner countries. 

Diversifying supply chains is therefore a national security imperative and Türkiye is increasingly relevant for three reasons: firstly, it possesses geological potential for rare earth elements and other strategic minerals; second, it has a substantial industrial base capable of supporting processing and manufacturing; and third, its geographic position makes it a hub connecting Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. 

Linking Rare EarthÌıElementsÌıand Ukraine: Strategic ComplementarityÌı

The intersection between cooperation on rare earth elements and Türkiye’s position on Ukraine is not coincidental. Both issues raise the same underlying question: how much strategic autonomy can Türkiye exercise while remaining embedded in the Western alliance structure?  

Economic interdependence in critical sectors creates incentives for alignment that political pressure alone cannot achieve. A structured US-Türkiye partnership on rare earth exploration, processing, and technology transfer would deepen mutual dependence, making a sharp geopolitical rupture less likely. Such cooperation would strengthen Türkiye’s stake in a Western-oriented economic order, indirectly shaping its calculations on Ukraine. While it would not compel Ankara to adopt sanctions or abandon mediation, it would raise costs of drifting too far from US strategic priorities. This logic is visible in US efforts to structure critical mineral partnerships with Ukraine, suggesting that resource cooperation is emerging as a broader instrument of strategic alignment rather than a case-specific initiative. 

Russia, China, andÌıTürkiye’s Hedging StrategyÌı

Türkiye’s approach to rare earths must also be understood in the context of its broader hedging strategy vis-à-vis Russia and China. Moscow remains a key energy supplier and a critical actor in the Black Sea, while Beijing is an increasingly important trade and investment partner for Türkiye. 

China’s dominance in the rare earth industry presents Ankara with both an opportunity and a constraint. On the one hand, Chinese investment and technology are an attractive prospect for developing Türkiye’s mineral sector. On the other, excessive reliance on China would undermine Türkiye’s aspiration for strategic autonomy and expose it to geopolitical pressure from its Western partners A US-Türkiye partnership on rare earth elements offers Ankara an alternative path â€“ one that diversifies external dependencies. For Washington, engaging with Türkiye reduces the likelihood that Ankara will default to China. 

Türkiye’s value extends well beyond economics. Its control of access to the Black Sea, close proximity to Ukraine, Russia, and the Middle East, and strong military capabilities make it a cornerstone of NATO’s southern and eastern flanks. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has reinforced the strategic importance of the Black Sea as a contested space where naval power, energy routes, and regional stability intersect. Türkiye’s enforcement of the Montreux Convention has limited Russian naval reinforcement and demonstrated Ankara’s capacity to shape the operational environment without direct military confrontation. This contribution, though often overlooked, has tangible value for Ukraine, the US and other NATO Allies. Maintaining Türkiye’s integration within NATO is therefore essential, even as undercurrents persist. Cooperation on rare earth elements complements this objective by reinforcing Türkiye’s embeddedness in the Western order. 

Scenarios for the Evolution of US-Türkiye RelationsÌı

Several trajectories could shape US-Türkiye relations in the coming years. 

Scenario 1: Strategic Convergence Through Economic Anchoring 

In this scenario, the US and Türkiye deepen cooperation on rare earth elements and other critical minerals, integrating cooperation with broader collaboration in defense technologies, energy transition, and industrial policy. Deepening economic interdependence would help stabilize the bilateral relationship and provide a practical framework for managing political differences. Türkiye would continue to act as a semi-autonomous NATO Ally â€“ aligned with the US on core security interests, while retaining flexibility in its diplomatic engagement with other powers and partners. 

Scenario 2: Strategic Drift and Competitive Hedging 

If cooperation on rare earth elements fails to materialize and political tensions over Ukraine intensify, Türkiye may deepen its ties with Russia and China. In this scenario, Ankara’s mediation role loses value for Washington, and the relationship becomes increasingly transactional and distrustful. NATO cohesion weakens, and supply chain cooperation shifts elsewhere. 

Scenario 3: Managed Autonomy and Functional Partnership 

In the most realistic scenario, the US accepts Türkiye’s strategic autonomy while selectively deepening cooperation in areas of high mutual value, particularly rare earth elements and Black Sea security.&²Ô²ú²õ±è;°Õü°ù°ì¾±²â±ğ&²Ô²ú²õ±è;continues to mediate Ukraine, and Washington leverages this role pragmatically, even as political differences persist. 

Policy Options for the United States 

US policy toward Türkiye should place cooperation on rare earth elements and critical minerals at the centre of the bilateral agenda, elevating it to a strategic pillar within broader efforts to reduce supply chain dependence on China. This would require the adoption of concrete measures, including investment, technology sharing, and regulatory coordination. At the same time, Washington should continue to reassess Türkiye’s approach to Ukraine by focusing more on practical outcomes, recognizing that Ankara’s efforts and selective support for Kyiv can contribute to regional stability in ways that rigid conformity may not. Strengthening high-level institutional dialogue that links security, economic, and industrial policy would help reduce misunderstandings and prevent tensions from overshadowing the broader relationship. Finally, the US should reaffirm Türkiye’s central role within NATO while accepting that member country cohesion in a multipolar environment will inevitably involve tension and diversity in policies and approaches,  

Conclusion: From Alignment to Strategic InterdependenceÌı

The US-Türkiye relationship in 2025 highlights how NATO may increasingly be shaped by pragmatism and negotiated interests, alongside â€“ but not replaced by â€“ shared values and ideological affinity. In this context, values remain relevant but may no longer be sufficient on their own to sustain strategic partnerships. Instead, cooperation is structured through selective interdependence across security, economic, and technological domains. Türkiye’s calibrated approach to Ukraine and its growing role in rare earth elements and critical mineral supply chains should therefore be seen as interdependent strategies, offering broader theoretical insights regarding contemporary alliance patterns. 

For the US, this shift may require a recalibration of expectations. The ultimate choice is not between accepting Turkish autonomy or attempting to impose alliance discipline, but between shaping that autonomy through sustained engagement or allowing it to evolve in ways increasingly misaligned with US interests. Treating Türkiye’s behaviour as a problem of non-compliance risks overlooking the structural forces driving Ankara’s decisions. A strategy centred on pressure alone is unlikely to succeed and may intensify Türkiye’s temptations to turn toward alternative partnerships. Instead, over time, deepening interdependence could play a stabilizing role, mitigate political disputes and increase the costs of strategic divergence on both sides. 

Ultimately, in an era defined by multipolar competition and systemic rivalry, resilience will depend more on flexible, interest-based cooperation. The combination of cooperation on rare earth elements and pragmatic engagement on Ukraine offers a framework through which the US and NATO can adapt their approach to Türkiye without relinquishing core strategic objectives. By prioritizing realism, mutual benefit, and long-term interdependence, Washington can help ensure that Türkiye remains a pivotal â€” if unconventional â€” partner, capable of contributing to Western security and economic resilience in an increasingly fragmented world. 

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Key Findings

Key Takeaways 

• NATO and Western partners are widely viewed as desirable securityÌıpartnersÌıin Armenia, Estonia, Georgia, and Latvia, with the strongest support in the Baltic states and Georgia.ÌıPerceptionsÌıof NATO’s security impact are highly positive in Estonia and Latvia, andÌımost citizens support continued NATO membership. However, about one-third in each country expect toÌıreceive no externalÌıassistanceÌıor aid in theÌıfaceÌıof a securityÌıcrisis.Ìı

• In the South Caucasus, favourable views of NATO do not translate into expectations of crisis support. FewÌıidentifyÌıNATO as the main crisis responder, while self-reliance is the dominant view. In Armenia, public opinion is evenly split on alignment, with equal support for closer ties to NATO and Russia.Ìı

• Considering this,ÌıNATO should increase regular and visible reassurance in regions where it is the main defense guarantor, especially in the Baltic states, and address the concerns of those who expect toÌıbe self-reliantÌıduring crises. In the South Caucasus, NATO should manage public expectations and focus on building resilience and preparedness, given limited direct security options.Ìı

To read the full policy memo, download a PDF copy with the button below.

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KeyÌıTakeaways

• Most Armenians feel that their country isÌı“on their ownâ€�Ìıif facedÌıwithÌıa military threat,Ìıdisplaying aÌıperceptionÌıof personal safety associated with geopolitical alignment.Ìı

• With uncertainty widespread andÌıperceptionsÌıon security partnerships polarized, manyÌıin ArmeniaÌıare open to diversifying security ties.Ìı

• Considering public opinion, while NATOÌıhasÌıaÌırelatively limitedÌıset of cooperation tools, they shouldÌınonethelessÌıprioritize visibleÌıengagementÌıwith Armenia, communicate limitationsÌıof such partnershipÌıclearly,Ìıand manageÌıexpectations.ÌıSustainedÌıand predictable cooperationÌıshould be keptÌıinÌıpracticalÌırather than geopoliticalÌıterms andÌıperceptions.Ìı

ContextÌı

This policy brief examines the implications of public attitudes towards security issues in Armenia for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It assesses the prevalence of insecurity narratives among Armenians and shows how such attitudes are associated with opinions towards external security actors. Survey evidence shows that Armenia’s core security challenge is a sense of abandonment among its public. Confidence in international security institutions is weak, as nearly half of Armenians (48%) believe their country would not receive support in the event of a military conflict.  

As confidence in Armenia’s traditional security partners â€“ Russia and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) â€“ stands low,  other international actors are seen as positive contributors to Armenia’s overall security, including both NATO and China. The Armenian public’s openness toward alternative security partners and a broader reassessement of Armenia’s security architecture creates an opportunity for NATO to push for more active involvement. As available options are limited, NATO should strive for realistic, civilian-oriented cooperation based in institutional resilience, without raising expectations of formal guarantees. This increased involvement, along with sustained and visible engagement, should offer better reassurance to Armenia without otherwise escalating geopolitical tensions in the region. 

Between its independence in 1991 and the start of the second Nagorno- Karabakh War in 2020, Armenia’s security architecture was heavily . Armenian political elites leaned towards Russia due to a lack of alternative options on account of its landlocked status and persistent conflict with Azerbaijan and Türkiye, along with a limited domestic military capacity. Russia served as Armenia’s primary security guarantor through  and  membership; Western military and security engagement remained largely symbolic. Although Armenia and NATO collaborated through  and  frameworks, these initiatives focused on technical cooperation and institutional dialogue rather than substantive security guarantees. 

The  to prevent military defeat in 2020 marked a critical rupture in Armenia’s security system. The second Nagorno-Karabakh War significantly undermined public and government confidence in  and the CSTO as reliable protectors and intensified feelings that Armenia had been  by its traditional security partners. In response, the Pashinyan government increasingly sought to . This shift is visible in several developments, including the â€œ,â€� the deployment of the European Union’s (EU)  along the Armenia–Azerbaijan border, and the launch of enhanced  in January 2025.

Public Insecurity, Security Preferences, and Reported Future Vote in ArmeniaÌıÌı

A nationwide survey in Armenia, conducted by ĞÓ°ÉÔ­´´ University’s Eastern European and Transatlantic Network (EETN) in February and March 2025, shows that Armenians are almost equally split between who report to feel safe (52%) and unsafe (47%) in their daily lives. Residents of Yerevan tend to feel more unsafe (52%) compared to these in other urban (44%) and rural areas (45%). The risk of war with Azerbaijan (59%) is the major concern consistent across society. 

Perceived personal security is closely associated with positive attitudes toward Western alignment; those who feel safer are substantially more likely to support NATO and EU membership than those who do not. Among individuals who report feeling safe, 60% would vote â€œYesâ€� in a hypothetical referendum for Armenia joining NATO and 64% would do the same in a potential referendum on joining the EU. In contrast, among those who feel unsafe, only 40% would support NATO, and 36% would back EU membership, with clear majorities in this group opposing both initiatives, 56% against NATO and 64% against the EU. 

Armenians are divided across party lines in their assessment of personal safety. With a clear majority (71%) either recusing themselves from voting in parliamentary elections, intending to spoil the ballot, or not share voting preferences. Among those who would engage in elections and/or share their preferences, the majority who support the Civil Contract party (86%) feel safe, compared to 36 percent of opposition supporters that include the largely pro-Russian Armenia Alliance party. 

Many in Armenia feel that their country would be left on their own if it faces a military attack, with nearly half (48%) thinking so and only 6% being unsure about who might help. As the sense of abandonment is widespread, still, those with different perceptions of safety have distinct expectations on who might help. Those who feel unsafe are more likely to choose Russia or the CSTO (20%) as a likely ally in case Armenia faces military conflict, compared to NATO or the West (14%). Conversely, more amongst those feeling secure would expect NATO or the West to come to their aid (25%) than Russia or the CSTO (12%). In sum, perceptions of insecurity are associated with greater reliance on Russia, whereas feelings of security are more strongly linked to expectations of Western support. 

At the same time, support for diversifying security partnerships beyond existing allies is relatively broad, with 53% agreeing that searching for new defense and military ties with other countries would make Armenia safer against foreign threats. This idea is popular across the political divide, including 70% of Civil Contract supporters and 59% of opposition voters. While uncertainty is higher among those with no declared voting intentions, still, more among this group believe that diversification of defense and military ties would make Armenia more secure compared to those who disagree. 

This preference for diversification also resonates with elite threat narratives. While Armenian political parties differ in their preferred alignments â€” some favouring Russia, others emphasizing Western engagement, or expressing self-reliance â€” they somehow share a recognition that reliance on a single security partner is no longer sufficient. 

Despite widespread pessimism about Armenia’s security environment, preferences over geopolitical alignment remain divided rather than consolidated into a single dominant orientation. Equal proportions of respondents believe Armenia would be safer moving closer to NATO (36%) or Russia (36%). Furthermore, more than half of Armenians consider that having NATO troops on the ground would make Armenia safer, indicating a veiled sympathy towards the NATO Alliance. 

Overall, these patterns do not indicate a clear preference toward any single geopolitical bloc, although the Western side carries somewhat greater weight. Armenians are somewhat engaged in a survival-driven reassessment of security providers and remaining open to diversified allies clarifies this viewpoint. This creates potetial opportunities for NATO to expand its partnership with Armenia. 

Conclusions and Policy RecommendationsÌı

Given Armenia’s non-member status in NATO and the structural constraints created by Russia’s influence in the region, formal security guarantees from Western institutions are unlikely to materialize in the near future. NATO’s internal dynamics — particularly Türkiye’s membership and its close military partnership with Azerbaijan — further limit the ±·´¡°Õ°¿â€™s&²Ô²ú²õ±è;capacity to provide direct defence commitments to Armenia. 

At the same time, Armenia’s security landscape is shifting as the government seeks to diversify its external security partnerships. In practice, this has created space for forms of cooperation that do not rely on military guarantees but instead focus on civilian-oriented, visible, and predictable initiatives such as resilience building, civil emergency planning, institutional reform, and confidence-building measures. These efforts aim to address vulnerabilities rather than establish broader geopolitical alignment. 

Evidence from NATO’s engagement in partner countries illustrates the value of this approach. The substantial  has supported defence reforms, institutional coordination, and national resilience through training, interoperability programs, and civil–military cooperation. Similarly, cooperation with  has strengthened energy resilience, medical capacity, disaster response, and defence education, showing that civilian-focused partnerships can deliver sustained, practical outcomes.  

For Armenia, diversification therefore functions as a pragmatic way to expand sources of security support in the absence of formal guarantees. Within this framework, NATO could become a more constructive and realistic partner for Armenia. While direct defence commitments remain improbable, civilian-oriented initiatives offer tools to strengthen institutions and reduce security risks. This perspective underpins the policy recommendations that follow.  

1. Given the substantial support of Western-led political structures, NATO should prioritize visible engagement with Armenia. 

±·´¡°Õ°¿â€™s&²Ô²ú²õ±è;is the central framework coordinating cooperation with Armenia, bringing together planning, training, exercises, and institutional reform in a multi-year, capacity-building process. As outlined in , the  is designed to deepen cooperation in line with  and level of readiness. NATO should use this initiatives not only as a coordination tool, but as a delivery mechanism for visible, locally-implemented cooperation, particularly beyond Yerevan. By translating the framework into routine, practical engagement, NATO and Armenia can bilaterally strengthen security capacities and address perceptions of abandonment from the Armenian public. 

2. NATO should clearly communicate limitations and manage expectations about its partnership with Armenia.  

NATO already frames cooperation with Armenia as partnership-based rather than guarantee-based, but could benefit from communicating more clearly and publicly about what cooperation involves (e.g., preparedness, institutional reform, resilience) and what it does not (e.g., full membership). Additionally, engagement should be consistently framed as capacity-building rather than a security provision to avoid creating public expectations of any security guarantees. Simple cooperation roadmaps with regular milestones would strengthen predictability, credibility, and reassurance. Furthermore, this should happen in a sustained manner, emphasizing repeated training cycles, ongoing institutional support, and routine regional exercises rather than isolated events. Predictable, long-term cooperation builds trust without raising unrealistic expectations. 

3. NATO should keep cooperation with Armenia practical and not geopolitical. 

Finally, as the Armenian public remains divided in their geopolitical preferences, it is important for NATO to prevent its partnership with Armenia from expanding into questions of geopolitical alignment. Engagement should remain centred on functional areas such as crisis preparedness, emergency coordination, institutional reform, and civilian resilience rather than Western-versus-Russian narratives. Expanding direct and clear communication with the Armenian general public can further limit perceptions of forced geopolitical choice and better align external policies with insecurity-driven public concerns in Armenia. This action would strengthen Armenia’s security capacity while minimizing escalation risks and domestic polarization. 

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Prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukraine was one of the world’s largest exporters of grain, with its Black Sea ports in Odesa, Chornomorsk, and Pivdennyi serving as key stops in global shipment routes. The ongoing war has severely impeded Ukraine’s exporting capabilities, which has had critical impacts domestically and abroad. Ukraine has been able to adapt by establishing alternative shipping routes, but this has also created new potential vulnerabilities. The Port of Constanta, Romania’s Black Sea port, has emerged as a central node in stabilizing global grain supply as a result of the war. This development provides an opportunity for intraregional cooperation, as well as further EU and NATO presence through key littoral states. Understanding the geopolitical implications of shifting supply routes gives insight into a primary target for economic pressure by Russia, and how this has influenced regional development.

Securitization of Shipping Routes in the Black Sea

A key element of Russia’s war strategy in Ukraine has been to target industry and infrastructure to deplete Ukraine’s economy and overall capacity to defend itself. The Black Sea and Danube shipping routes are instrumental to this strategy. Odesa is Ukraine’s largest port on the Black Sea. Rail and road transport connect Odesa to the Danube, so goods can be shipped upstream to the rest of Europe or out to international destinations. Prior to the war, Odesa was the main hub for exports of grain, sunflower products, and oilseeds, . When shipping out of Odesa and other Black Sea ports became inviable due to Russian attacks, transport shifted to rail, truck, and barge; however, this rapid increase in land traffic quickly led to chokepoints and delays. The inability for Ukraine to export grain created shortages around the world – particularly in Africa, Asia, and – and also had a severe impact on Ukraine’s economy, . Therefore, disruptions had a huge impact on Ukraine’s economy, as well as global markets. As a result, in 2022 the was brokered to enable Ukrainian exports. A UN-brokered deal between Russia, Ukraine, and Türkiye, this Initiative established safe passages, inspections, and additional security for commercial vessels during the war. However, it only lasted a year before Russia withdrew. Since then, Russian attacks on Ukraine’s ports on both the Black Sea and the Danube have been consistent and destructive. While Ukraine has been able to partially restore grain exports since 2023, these exports still remained in 2025. Alternative shipping routes have been critical in providing an outlet for this grain, notably , transport across the Danube, and the . To support these new routes, regional partners have helped Ukraine by taking in more imports to domestic markets and by exporting more Ukrainian grain through domestic facilities. The Port of Constanta in Romania has played a central part in this shift and serves as a primary example of how the war is strengthening cooperation between Ukraine and the European Union (EU).

Port of Constanta

The Port of Constanta, located on the coast of Romania, is the EU’s largest port on the Black Sea. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion, this port has become a major grain hub with a . In 2023, as Ukrainian cereal and grain was redirected there after the war started. Bridging Europe, Asia, and Africa, this port holds significant strategic importance while also serving as . Additionally, the port’s proximity to the Danube River emphasizes its connectivity to Ukraine. Since the war, the Danube River corridor has become a vital alternative route for Ukrainian grain exports, making the Port of Constanta an essential aspect of Ukraine’s export flows. Additionally, the geopolitical importance of the Port has motivated large-scale modernization of facilities and broader infrastructural upgrades. The EU has been pivotal in funding key projects involving the Port of Constanta such as a , , and . Private companies have also contributed to ramping up operational capacity at the Port. This includes a new with specialized equipment, , and a . At this point, Russia has not launched direct attacks on Romanian port infrastructure on the Black Sea or the Danube. This is because Romania is a part of NATO, and therefore an attack risks triggering Article 5. However, fallout from attacks on their Ukrainian ports such as Izmail along the Danube affects Romanian facilities and villages by the water. Infrastructural damage affects the ability for shipments along the waterway to run smoothly. Additionally, , and a .

Geopolitical Implications

The securitization of Black Sea shipping routes have provided new geopolitical challenges while also accelerating already existing intraregional issues. The integral role exports play for the Ukrainian economy make it essential for routes to be protected to avoid further economic destabilization. Additionally, the inability for Ukraine to ship regular capacities of grain out of the Black Sea has placed additional stress on the Solidarity Lanes into neighbouring countries of Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia. This decreased capacity, in turn, has created political tensions between Ukraine and its Eastern European neighbours as , negatively affecting the livelihoods of local farmers who cannot compete with the influx of supply. As a result of this influx, the which limit trade liberalization for key products like wheat and sugar. However, Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary still maintain their , which has further increased tensions within the EU. This blockade has contributed to worsening relations between these countries and Ukraine, as well as preventing unified EU action on this issue. The destabilizing effects of Russia’s attacks on shipment routes needs to be addressed in order to ensure Ukraine does not face additional material pressures in the war. Stabilizing the region will also be integral to protecting networks such as the , which rely on the Black Sea to connect goods between Asia and Europe.

These security needs present EU littoral states a unique opportunity to establish their own presence in the region, both politically and economically. Romania has expressed strong interest in becoming a key EU representative in the region, which could be pivotal in breaking through the current disagreements. Engaging in deeper ties with other countries like Bulgaria and Georgia could also increase prosperity and development within the region. For example, Georgia and Romania recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding on a new , which can reinforce energy security that has been consistently undermined by Russian attacks. An outcome of this increased cooperation could be strengthened collaboration with the EU and NATO through these littoral states. The EU has already played a strong role as an investor and economic partner for countries like Romania and Bulgaria. NATO, through and the Mines Countermeasure exercise, improves deterrence and defence in the region. Using the EU/NATO umbrella also helps to bring in key external partners in the region. For example, engaging with Georgia on this initiative is an important opportunity to push back against Russian expansionism and influence on the other side of the Black Sea.

Conclusion

The Black Sea region acts as a crossroads between several different trade routes, making it pivotal as both an economic and military target. Russia’s actions in the region have been effective in destabilizing the Ukrainian economy and reducing the capacity of preexisting trade routes in the region. However, these challenges have been mitigated by the ability of Ukraine and its neighbours to adapt under difficult circumstances. Moving forward, further coordinated action in the region can further enhance its stability and even contribute to future prosperity. Existing pan-European and even transatlantic cooperation in the region has already provided a strong foundation to protect and support littoral partners. Leveraging these ties further provides an opportunity to counter Russian strategies and contain its expansionist ambitions.

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“The Black Sea in 2026: Strategic Maneuvers and Economic Opportunity” examines how the Black Sea has become one of the world’s most consequential geopolitical and economic corridors following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The brief analyzes the competing strategies of Russia, Türkiye, the European Union, and China, alongside the security concerns of littoral states, highlighting how control of the region shapes Ukraine’s future and broader transatlantic stability. It also outlines Canada’s growing role as a NATO partner in supporting regional security, trade resilience, and postwar reconstruction. The paper concludes with targeted policy recommendations for strengthening Canada–Ukraine cooperation and enhancing Black Sea security in a rapidly evolving strategic landscape.

To read the full policy brief prepared by Dr. Jeff Sahadeo, click the download button below.

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The South Caucasus region has historically been regarded as one of the most complex regions in the world, where geopolitical rivalries, ethnic disputes, and energy security risks collide. One of the longest-lasting conflicts in the region is the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh.

This paper aims to study the Washington Peace Declaration between Armenia and Azerbaijan and its potential impact on security and economic integration in the South Caucasus region. TRIPP and related transport initiatives could enable Armenia and Azerbaijan to serve as critical components of a strategic transit corridor linking Europe and Asia. US and EU engagement is highlighted as essential for maintaining stability and attracting investment in the region.

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• Turkish goals in the Black Sea region (BSR) are to maintain stability and its own strategic positioning within the region.

• Canadian cooperation with Türkiye continues to encounter challenges due to misaligned priorities and estrangement between actors.

• Canada has an opportunity to increase presence in the BSR by cooperating on initiatives outside of hard security concerns.

Policy Recommendations

• Canada should support the initiation of additional humanitarian projects in the BSR and seek out ways to partner with Türkiye on defence technology and modernization to strengthen overall diplomatic and defence relations.

• Increasing Canada’s regional presence around the BSR through NATO initiatives could help to bolster its image as a supportive ally to Türkiye while also helping project overall Canadian security interests.

Türkiye’s Foreign Policy post 2022

Türkiye has historically played an influential role in the Black Sea Region (BSR) as NATO’s southeastern bulwark. The gives Türkiye control over the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits, the key entry point of the Black Sea. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the BSR has been under wartime conditions. Türkiye has since invoked the Convention to effectively close the straits to both NATO and Russian ships; a decision which has nonetheless sparked controversy, particularly after Türkiye . Ankara remains apprehensive towards NATO involvement in the region, and while its relationship with the West is strained, it continues to maintain relations with Russia based on shared in the .

Türkiye, unlike most NATO countries, has , and still . At the same time, Türkiye has also . Türkiye’s seemingly contradictory policies reflect its primary goal: to maintain the existing balance of power in the BSR.

Türkiye’s stance is driven by independent interests rather an alignment with the West or Russia. For Türkiye, reinforcing the status quo reaffirms their military, economic, and diplomatic power in the BSR. Türkiye prioritizes business and trade to aid its struggling economy. It has also been increasingly positioning itself ; this has informed the country’s decisions to participate in the (a humanitarian-focused mission) and engage in peacemaking talks with Russia and Ukraine. Türkiye’s commitments are strategic, wishing to avoid provocation of either side while still leveraging their influence in military, resources, and politics.

Challenges for Canada

The major challenge for Canada will be to understand how to approach collaborations with Türkiye in the BSR. Estrangement and misalignment from both parties pose potential problems. Relations only recently improved after Canada following Türkiye’s use of Canadian arms in Nagorno-Karabakh, Libya, and Syria. Türkiye, through its refusal to sanction Russia or permit NATO military presence BSR, has demonstrated that it is not willing to explicitly target Russia. This clashes with Canada’s aim to contain Russian expansionism and protect Ukraine.

Canadian-Turkish military cooperation largely operates through NATO. Both countries participate in , , , and . While NATO provides a strong foundation, direct partnerships between Canadian and Turkish armed forces are still minimal, thus heightening the chances of estrangement between both sides.

Opportunities for Canada

Despite limitations, there are still opportunities to develop Canadian-Turkish diplomatic collaboration. Focusing on economic, humanitarian, or regional development initiatives creates common ground. For example, the defence industry is an area of growing partnership. Since Canada lifted the arms embargo on Türkiye, it has become one of Canada’s . Türkiye also participates in CANSEC (Canada’s international defence technology conference), and Turkish defence firms travelled to Canada as part of a . The exercise generated technology that enhances automated systems and increases resilience to hybrid offensives. For example, the firm HAVELSAN was able to . between the two countries also provide strong opportunities for investment and technological development which can have positive effects both for defence and for the overall economies of each country.

Building regional capacity is a promising avenue for cooperation. As mentioned above, Türkiye participates in FLF battlegroups, part of NATO’s . Pursuing similar initiatives in the scope of military modernization could be successful in increasing regional capacity. Furthermore, Canada can draw upon its skills in mediation and development to encourage stable, formal BSR organizations. Both actions can increase the ability for the BSR to safeguard against further destabilization in the region, which is beneficial to Turkish interests. The MCM was able to launch successfully in large part because it was framed as a humanitarian mission. This emphasizes the importance of optics for Türkiye, and should serve as an example of how to navigate different positionalities.

For Canada, the BSR can be a new avenue of partnership, increasing overall soft power and presence. A strong BSR is essential for NATO’s objective to defend Alliance territories. It is also essential for Canada’s efforts to enhance its defence posture and bolster international stability. However, without critically engaging with Türkiye this goal will be difficult to achieve. Therefore, finding relevant but non-conventional ways to collaborate in the BSR is key. Enhancing relations also align with other moves Türkiye has been making to collaborate more closely with other NATO and EU countries which seek similar goals as Canada. With an increasing need for fortification of the BSR, Canada should take the opportunity to distinguish itself as a valuable partner.

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Canada’s role in the Black Sea Mine Countermeasures Task Force supports regional security by helping clear naval mines and ordnance threatening vital shipping routes. Working alongside Romania, Türkiye, and Bulgaria, Canada enhances NATO interoperability and gains critical experience in multi-domain naval operations. The mission highlights Canada’s strategic interest in the Black Sea and its potential role in postwar recovery. Continued engagement could strengthen Canada’s regional presence, support allied capabilities, and advance readiness for future maritime challenges.

To view the whole report, download the report below.

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On September 11th, Poland made headlines in its decision to close its border with Belarus over the Russian Zapad 2025 drills. The nuclear and missile drills, combined with the detection of Russian drones in Polish airspace, kept the border closed for almost two weeks, halting the critical Northern Corridor trade route between the EU and China, which had previously brought in 25 billion euros in 2024. The closure emphasizes the increasing insecurity surrounding trade since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Regional conflicts, along with logistical issues, including outdated infrastructure and corridor congestion, have amplified the need to protect or develop trade routes between China and Europe. China, as the largest exporter in the world, has been especially proactive in this space; however, looking at different trade route alternatives opens a new set of security and economic questions. This brief considers the role of the Northern Corridor as a critical point in the Chinese-European relationship, emerging alternatives, and the political implications if such alternatives are sought out by the partners.

The Northern Corridor

The border closure affected a critical point of the China-Europe Railway Express, a vital trade route for goods coming into Europe. , affecting major e-commerce companies such as Temu and Shein, who rely on smooth and rapid transitways for high-speed shipping of goods. The railway is a key part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, as well as the Northern Corridor trading route. , where they then change to a European rail gauge before continuing on with their journey.

The Northern Corridor, running through Russian and Belarusian territory, has been the primary route to export goods intercontinentally, as it remains a strong alternative to lengthy and expensive land and sea routes. However, Russian aggression and expansionism have created political, financial, and logistical difficulties. The route itself has become incredibly . Disruptions have affected the global trading economy, food supply chain, and economic health of individual countries. The damage done to the Northern Corridor has motivated China to reconsider its future trade movements and partnerships.

Emerging Alternatives

A popular alternative has been the , which would avoid Russia by going through Central Asia and into Europe via the Black Sea. However, the lack of infrastructure renders this initiative a work-in-progress. Furthermore, ongoing security issues in the Black Sea make merchant ships vulnerable to damage from mines and Russian attacks. Despite previously blocking TITR development, China has through the China Railway Container Transport Corporation. Other Central Asian and Black Sea states have also taken on However, many countries along this route are still susceptible to Russian influence and coercion, which could further stagnate development.

An even more attractive alternative for China and Russia has emerged through the Northern Sea Route (NSR). The NSR travels through the and reaches Europe through British ports. Previously unnavigable, the route is becoming a more viable option, though it also lacks substantial infrastructure. As a direct response to the closure of Poland’s borders, Chinese container line Sea Legend through the NSR on September 24th. This will test the efficacy of the journey, with the ship expected to reach Britain in 18 days. Since the route passes through Russian ports to reach Europe, it is unclear what geopolitical outcomes this will have due to the ongoing war.

What are the Political Implications of These Moves?

The development of both the TITR and NSR reflect changing geopolitical dynamics. Developing routes can be a space for new partnerships and prosperity – or problems. The TITR is a new place for modernization projects, where multiple countries can emerge as key enablers and/or investors. Countries like Türkiye, Romania, and China are all pushing to assert their positions. Shipping through the TITR is partially underway through land, rail, and sea; however, further development will be needed to establish its primacy.

The NSR emphasizes the growing geopolitical competition in the Arctic. Russian and Chinese development along this route will further secure economic interests and therefore influence within the region. For China, connections to the Arctic have critical gains as they pursue an active policy in the region, Russia has strongly supported China’s moves, and partnership in the NSR will deepen their collaboration. In the Northern Corridor, both countries used their partnership to dominate decisions around trade and development. Could the NSR be a new place to replicate this dynamic? This could have implications for the future of norms-setting and governance in the Arctic; however, it should be noted that the NSR has its own logistical handicaps, which could limit its impact.

For the time being, the Northern Corridor remains a major transitway. This means that global trade will continue to be insecure, so long as regional threats remain active. Back in Poland, the government reopened the border on September 24th for security and economic reasons. However,

The post The Future of Trade: Analyzing Critical Routes in the Current Geopolitical Landscape appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

This policy memo examines the complex and evolving security threats posed by Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) in the Black Sea region, particularly in the context of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war. This memo assesses the scale of the FTF threat across key Black Sea states, including Türkiye, Georgia, Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania, and Moldova, and outlines the multifaceted risks posed by returning or transiting fighters, including future terrorist activity, regional destabilization, and violations of international humanitarian law. In response, the memo calls for a comprehensive and cooperative regional security strategy that includes Canadian support. Recommended actions include strengthening border surveillance, enhancing intelligence-sharing mechanisms, expanding legal frameworks aligned with international human rights standards, and implementing community-based deradicalization and reintegration programs. Canadian experience in counterterrorism and human rights advocacy is positioned to facilitate regional dialogue, contribute technical expertise, and promote long-term security in this geopolitically volatile region.

To view the whole report, download the report below.

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