“The Black Sea in 2026: Strategic Maneuvers and Economic Opportunity” examines how the Black Sea has become one of the world’s most consequential geopolitical and economic corridors following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The brief analyzes the competing strategies of Russia, TĂĽrkiye, the European Union, and China, alongside the security concerns of littoral states, highlighting how control of the region shapes Ukraine’s future and broader transatlantic stability. It also outlines Canada’s growing role as a NATO partner in supporting regional security, trade resilience, and postwar reconstruction. The paper concludes with targeted policy recommendations for strengthening Canada–Ukraine cooperation and enhancing Black Sea security in a rapidly evolving strategic landscape.

To read the full policy brief prepared by Dr. Jeff Sahadeo, click the download button below.

The post The Black Sea in 2026: Strategic Manoeuvres and Economic Opportunity appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

The South Caucasus region has historically been regarded as one of the most complex regions in the world, where geopolitical rivalries, ethnic disputes, and energy security risks collide. One of the longest-lasting conflicts in the region is the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh.

This paper aims to study the Washington Peace Declaration between Armenia and Azerbaijan and its potential impact on security and economic integration in the South Caucasus region. TRIPP and related transport initiatives could enable Armenia and Azerbaijan to serve as critical components of a strategic transit corridor linking Europe and Asia. US and EU engagement is highlighted as essential for maintaining stability and attracting investment in the region.

The post The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Geopolitical Significance of the Washington Peace Declaration for the South Caucasus appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

• Turkish goals in the Black Sea region (BSR) are to maintain stability and its own strategic positioning within the region.

• Canadian cooperation with TĂĽrkiye continues to encounter challenges due to misaligned priorities and estrangement between actors.

• Canada has an opportunity to increase presence in the BSR by cooperating on initiatives outside of hard security concerns.

Policy Recommendations

• Canada should support the initiation of additional humanitarian projects in the BSR and seek out ways to partner with TĂĽrkiye on defence technology and modernization to strengthen overall diplomatic and defence relations.

• Increasing Canada’s regional presence around the BSR through NATO initiatives could help to bolster its image as a supportive ally to TĂĽrkiye while also helping project overall Canadian security interests.

Türkiye’s Foreign Policy post 2022

Türkiye has historically played an influential role in the Black Sea Region (BSR) as NATO’s southeastern bulwark. The gives Türkiye control over the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits, the key entry point of the Black Sea. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the BSR has been under wartime conditions. Türkiye has since invoked the Convention to effectively close the straits to both NATO and Russian ships; a decision which has nonetheless sparked controversy, particularly after Türkiye . Ankara remains apprehensive towards NATO involvement in the region, and while its relationship with the West is strained, it continues to maintain relations with Russia based on shared in the .

Türkiye, unlike most NATO countries, has , and still . At the same time, Türkiye has also . Türkiye’s seemingly contradictory policies reflect its primary goal: to maintain the existing balance of power in the BSR.

Türkiye’s stance is driven by independent interests rather an alignment with the West or Russia. For Türkiye, reinforcing the status quo reaffirms their military, economic, and diplomatic power in the BSR. Türkiye prioritizes business and trade to aid its struggling economy. It has also been increasingly positioning itself ; this has informed the country’s decisions to participate in the (a humanitarian-focused mission) and engage in peacemaking talks with Russia and Ukraine. Türkiye’s commitments are strategic, wishing to avoid provocation of either side while still leveraging their influence in military, resources, and politics.

Challenges for Canada

The major challenge for Canada will be to understand how to approach collaborations with Türkiye in the BSR. Estrangement and misalignment from both parties pose potential problems. Relations only recently improved after Canada following Türkiye’s use of Canadian arms in Nagorno-Karabakh, Libya, and Syria. Türkiye, through its refusal to sanction Russia or permit NATO military presence BSR, has demonstrated that it is not willing to explicitly target Russia. This clashes with Canada’s aim to contain Russian expansionism and protect Ukraine.

Canadian-Turkish military cooperation largely operates through NATO. Both countries participate in , , , and . While NATO provides a strong foundation, direct partnerships between Canadian and Turkish armed forces are still minimal, thus heightening the chances of estrangement between both sides.

Opportunities for Canada

Despite limitations, there are still opportunities to develop Canadian-Turkish diplomatic collaboration. Focusing on economic, humanitarian, or regional development initiatives creates common ground. For example, the defence industry is an area of growing partnership. Since Canada lifted the arms embargo on Türkiye, it has become one of Canada’s . Türkiye also participates in CANSEC (Canada’s international defence technology conference), and Turkish defence firms travelled to Canada as part of a . The exercise generated technology that enhances automated systems and increases resilience to hybrid offensives. For example, the firm HAVELSAN was able to . between the two countries also provide strong opportunities for investment and technological development which can have positive effects both for defence and for the overall economies of each country.

Building regional capacity is a promising avenue for cooperation. As mentioned above, Türkiye participates in FLF battlegroups, part of NATO’s . Pursuing similar initiatives in the scope of military modernization could be successful in increasing regional capacity. Furthermore, Canada can draw upon its skills in mediation and development to encourage stable, formal BSR organizations. Both actions can increase the ability for the BSR to safeguard against further destabilization in the region, which is beneficial to Turkish interests. The MCM was able to launch successfully in large part because it was framed as a humanitarian mission. This emphasizes the importance of optics for Türkiye, and should serve as an example of how to navigate different positionalities.

For Canada, the BSR can be a new avenue of partnership, increasing overall soft power and presence. A strong BSR is essential for NATO’s objective to defend Alliance territories. It is also essential for Canada’s efforts to enhance its defence posture and bolster international stability. However, without critically engaging with Türkiye this goal will be difficult to achieve. Therefore, finding relevant but non-conventional ways to collaborate in the BSR is key. Enhancing relations also align with other moves Türkiye has been making to collaborate more closely with other NATO and EU countries which seek similar goals as Canada. With an increasing need for fortification of the BSR, Canada should take the opportunity to distinguish itself as a valuable partner.

The post Turkish Foreign Policy in the BSR: Opportunities and Challenges for Canada appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

Canada’s role in the Black Sea Mine Countermeasures Task Force supports regional security by helping clear naval mines and ordnance threatening vital shipping routes. Working alongside Romania, Türkiye, and Bulgaria, Canada enhances NATO interoperability and gains critical experience in multi-domain naval operations. The mission highlights Canada’s strategic interest in the Black Sea and its potential role in postwar recovery. Continued engagement could strengthen Canada’s regional presence, support allied capabilities, and advance readiness for future maritime challenges.

To view the whole report, download the report below.

The post Canada’s Role in the Black Sea: Mine Countermeasures and Beyond appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

On September 11th, Poland made headlines in its decision to close its border with Belarus over the Russian Zapad 2025 drills. The nuclear and missile drills, combined with the detection of Russian drones in Polish airspace, kept the border closed for almost two weeks, halting the critical Northern Corridor trade route between the EU and China, which had previously brought in 25 billion euros in 2024. The closure emphasizes the increasing insecurity surrounding trade since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Regional conflicts, along with logistical issues, including outdated infrastructure and corridor congestion, have amplified the need to protect or develop trade routes between China and Europe. China, as the largest exporter in the world, has been especially proactive in this space; however, looking at different trade route alternatives opens a new set of security and economic questions. This brief considers the role of the Northern Corridor as a critical point in the Chinese-European relationship, emerging alternatives, and the political implications if such alternatives are sought out by the partners.

The Northern Corridor

The border closure affected a critical point of the China-Europe Railway Express, a vital trade route for goods coming into Europe. , affecting major e-commerce companies such as Temu and Shein, who rely on smooth and rapid transitways for high-speed shipping of goods. The railway is a key part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, as well as the Northern Corridor trading route. , where they then change to a European rail gauge before continuing on with their journey.

The Northern Corridor, running through Russian and Belarusian territory, has been the primary route to export goods intercontinentally, as it remains a strong alternative to lengthy and expensive land and sea routes. However, Russian aggression and expansionism have created political, financial, and logistical difficulties. The route itself has become incredibly . Disruptions have affected the global trading economy, food supply chain, and economic health of individual countries. The damage done to the Northern Corridor has motivated China to reconsider its future trade movements and partnerships.

Emerging Alternatives

A popular alternative has been the , which would avoid Russia by going through Central Asia and into Europe via the Black Sea. However, the lack of infrastructure renders this initiative a work-in-progress. Furthermore, ongoing security issues in the Black Sea make merchant ships vulnerable to damage from mines and Russian attacks. Despite previously blocking TITR development, China has through the China Railway Container Transport Corporation. Other Central Asian and Black Sea states have also taken on However, many countries along this route are still susceptible to Russian influence and coercion, which could further stagnate development.

An even more attractive alternative for China and Russia has emerged through the Northern Sea Route (NSR). The NSR travels through the and reaches Europe through British ports. Previously unnavigable, the route is becoming a more viable option, though it also lacks substantial infrastructure. As a direct response to the closure of Poland’s borders, Chinese container line Sea Legend through the NSR on September 24th. This will test the efficacy of the journey, with the ship expected to reach Britain in 18 days. Since the route passes through Russian ports to reach Europe, it is unclear what geopolitical outcomes this will have due to the ongoing war.

What are the Political Implications of These Moves?

The development of both the TITR and NSR reflect changing geopolitical dynamics. Developing routes can be a space for new partnerships and prosperity – or problems. The TITR is a new place for modernization projects, where multiple countries can emerge as key enablers and/or investors. Countries like TĂĽrkiye, Romania, and China are all pushing to assert their positions. Shipping through the TITR is partially underway through land, rail, and sea; however, further development will be needed to establish its primacy.

The NSR emphasizes the growing geopolitical competition in the Arctic. Russian and Chinese development along this route will further secure economic interests and therefore influence within the region. For China, connections to the Arctic have critical gains as they pursue an active policy in the region, Russia has strongly supported China’s moves, and partnership in the NSR will deepen their collaboration. In the Northern Corridor, both countries used their partnership to dominate decisions around trade and development. Could the NSR be a new place to replicate this dynamic? This could have implications for the future of norms-setting and governance in the Arctic; however, it should be noted that the NSR has its own logistical handicaps, which could limit its impact.

For the time being, the Northern Corridor remains a major transitway. This means that global trade will continue to be insecure, so long as regional threats remain active. Back in Poland, the government reopened the border on September 24th for security and economic reasons. However,

The post The Future of Trade: Analyzing Critical Routes in the Current Geopolitical Landscape appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

This policy memo examines the complex and evolving security threats posed by Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) in the Black Sea region, particularly in the context of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war. This memo assesses the scale of the FTF threat across key Black Sea states, including TĂĽrkiye, Georgia, Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania, and Moldova, and outlines the multifaceted risks posed by returning or transiting fighters, including future terrorist activity, regional destabilization, and violations of international humanitarian law. In response, the memo calls for a comprehensive and cooperative regional security strategy that includes Canadian support. Recommended actions include strengthening border surveillance, enhancing intelligence-sharing mechanisms, expanding legal frameworks aligned with international human rights standards, and implementing community-based deradicalization and reintegration programs. Canadian experience in counterterrorism and human rights advocacy is positioned to facilitate regional dialogue, contribute technical expertise, and promote long-term security in this geopolitically volatile region.

To view the whole report, download the report below.

The post Foreign Fighters and Regional Security in the Black Sea Region: Policy Imperatives Amid the Russia-Ukraine War appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

The Caspian and Black Sea regions hold significant geopolitical importance for Europe’s energy security, due to their strategic location, abundant resources, and critical role as transit corridors linking energy-producing areas with consumer markets. .  The significance of these regions also extends beyond energy and trade, encompassing economic potential and a strategic role in regional stability and broader security dynamics. Given their geopolitical and geostrategic value, ensuring the security of these regions has become a priority for external actors, often from geopolitically opposing sides. The regions’ energy reserves, trade flows, and transportation infrastructure increasingly influence both regional and transregional stability and security frameworks. 

The post The Strategic Importance of the Caspian and Black Sea Regions for Europe’s Energy Security appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

This policy memo argues that Russia’s ongoing efforts to dominate the Black Sea region are not isolated historical events, but part of a broader and deliberate geopolitical strategy aimed at challenging Western influence, undermining democratic sovereignty, and reasserting imperial power. Understanding these dynamics is crucial as the region stands at the frontline of the confrontation between authoritarian resurgence and democratic resilience. By analyzing Russia’s evolving foreign policy tools – ranging from military aggression to hybrid warfare – this memo aims to show how the Black Sea has become a key battleground for the future of European and international security. 

The Context

Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, a large part of the Black Sea region was firmly embedded within its strategic orbit along the region’s coastline. Ukraine, Georgia, Bulgaria, and Romania were either under direct Soviet control or part of the Warsaw Pact, leaving TĂĽrkiye as the NATO member in the region. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the strategic landscape changed dramatically – Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova regained their independence, while Bulgaria and Romania became NATO members. This fundamentally altered the geopolitical significance of the Black Sea, opening the region up to Western integration as Russian influence waned.  

The dissolution of the Soviet Union led to a power vacuum as the post-Soviet republics of Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova forged paths to sovereignty. However, despite the birth of new regional powers that challenged Russia’s historical interests in the region, Moscow sought to develop leverage and instruments to maintain its sphere of influence. This creates a precedent for crude interference by Russia, demonstrating that its attempt to maintain a remains relevant. 

In the 1990s, Russia pursued a strategy that involved supporting in Abkhazia (Georgia), South Ossetia (Georgia), and Transnistria (Moldova), thereby attempting to weaken the fledgling states. In the 2000s, under the rule of Vladimir Putin, a more assertive and targeted approach was developed, . Examples of this more assertive approach can be seen in events such as the  

To this day, Russia’s primary motivations remain centred on obstructing the expansion of NATO and the European Union (EU), while simultaneously promoting narratives that frame Western institutions and organizations as existential threats to both the region and broader global order. Today, the Black Sea is not only a geographical crossroads but a strategic fault line between . The struggle for control over this region is no longer just about territory – it is about global ideological competition, security, and the future of Europe’s eastern flank.

Russia and the Black Sea Region: Geopolitical Situation and Strategic Interests 

The Black Sea region pits post-Soviet states against . The Kremlin’s goals within the region remain concentrated on weakening NATO unity and preventing the accession of Ukraine and Georgia to the Alliance. Accordingly, the Black Sea serves as a key platform for Moscow to consolidate its broader influence not only in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, but also across . Russia’s post-Soviet entanglements have turned the Black Sea into a militarized zone, wherein Russian warships, aircraft, and artillery systems (particularly in Crimea) are stationed. Nevertheless, Russia’s dominant position in the region remains a contentious issue due to Ukraine’s naval resistance, NATO involvement, and TĂĽrkiye’s growing regional influence. TĂĽrkiye’s strategic role in NATO has significantly increased in recent years, allowing it to play a greater role in regional security and diplomacy. When discussing TĂĽrkiye as an actor in the Black Sea region, the Montreux Convention cannot be ignored. Signed in 1936, the Montreux Convention gives TĂĽrkiye control over the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits, making it a key player in regulating military access to the Black Sea. 

From one perspective, the Montreux Convention serves as an advantage for Russia, as it restricts the permanent presence of non-Black Sea NATO fleets, which aids Russia’s dominance in the region; however, the agreement also limits Russia’s ability to freely move military vessels during conflicts. Thus, the Convention is vital for maintaining a relative balance of security in the Black Sea – hindering militarization by external powers, while giving TĂĽrkiye certain leverage during regional crises. 

Romania and Bulgaria have gained more control over their Exclusive Economic Zones within the Black Sea with both countries moving closer to NATO and the EU, further emphasizing their role in regional security. It is also noteworthy that the United States and its allies are , as reflected in calls for the development of a comprehensive Black Sea strategy. Such a strategy aims to increase coordination with NATO and the EU, deepen economic ties, and strengthen democratic principles. 

The Black Sea thus remains a region in contest. For Russia, the Black Sea represents a means of expanding geopolitical influence, projecting military power, and controlling vital energy routes, while other players in the region are actively combating Russian influence and fostering closer ties with the West. Consequently, the region is a hub of geopolitical conflict, wherein Russia’s pursuit of dominance often conflicts with the aspirations of neighbouring countries seeking independence, security, and a sovereign role on the global stage. 

Conflicts in the Region 

The Black Sea’s are key factors that underscore contemporary political tensions. By the end of the 20th century, a strong sentiment for the preservation and return of national identity emerged in post-Soviet states. , Moldova, and Ukraine have direct experience of confrontation with Russia; they have repeatedly and consistently represented the front of ideological clashes under the pretext of obtaining and maintaining independence or free political will. Memories of collective Soviet identity serve as barriers for relatively small states that wish to integrate, assimilate, and align politically with the West. , in which Russian-backed separatists opposed Georgia, serves as a clear example of Moscow’s approach towards the region. A similar scenario occurred in Moldova in 1992, which to this day remains a frozen conflict in Transnistria. 

The politics of recognizing the rights of separatists and pseudo-independence is a strategic hallmark of Moscow aimed at presenting its actions as consistent with contemporary political systems and international legal norms. From the perspective of the international community, this policy had been seen as doomed to fail. A clear example of the undermining of free and sovereign political will can be found in the (1994–1996; 1999–2009), which were motivated by a desire to maintain regional hegemony and suppress Chechen self-determination within the framework of state sovereignty. 

Rather than serving as a balancing and humanitarian force, Russia embodies a contradictory presence that undermines the very norms it claims to value and uphold. ” The annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 thus only lend further evidence to the realities of separatist recognition by Russia. These events have changed the political dynamics of not only the Black Sea region, but global perceptions of the appropriateness of state behaviour, the scope of international law, the diffusion of nuclear weapons, the importance of human rights, and overall global security. 

Hybrid Warfare

Hybrid warfare is currently one of the most relevant issues in the Black Sea region. 

Russia’s active use of this tactic is particularly noteworthy as it is a crucial tool to further the region’s destabilization and its own imperialistic ambitions. Hybrid warfare centres on the use of cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, economic pressure, and other technological means of warfare. 

Ukraine remains a key arena where Russia has employed hybrid warfare. The 2014 annexation of Crimea was not solely a military operation; it involved a coherent and deliberate dissemination of propaganda narratives and disinformation campaigns. Russia’s “little green men” – an anonymous force of soldiers in green uniforms – appeared in Crimea in 2014, representing Russian special forces. In reality, these “little green men” are only one of the many illustrative examples of hybrid warfare, part of a much . This combination of unmarked military forces alongside concerted disinformation campaigns and political manipulation continues to be among Russia’s primary approaches aimed at achieving its strategic objectives in the region by ultimately sowing confusion and uncertainty, thereby avoiding an immediate international reaction. 

Georgia and Moldova have also been targets of Russia’s hybrid tactics. After the 2008 war in Georgia, Russia actively began the so-called “creeping borderization” in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, along Georgia’s borders. This was accompanied by intense disinformation and propaganda campaigns. In Moldova, the presence of Russian troops in Transnistria continues against the backdrop of a strong disinformation narrative. In the information sphere, Russian state media and online “troll bots” are actively working to spread disinformation in the region, targeting both the local populations of Beyond military objectives, these efforts are aimed at eroding trust in Western democratic and security institutions – particularly NATO and the EU – deepening internal divisions and advancing a broad anti-Western narrative across the region.

Economic Interests 

Russia’s economic interests in the Black Sea region are closely intertwined with its . Gaining control and influence over this region would facilitate the easier distribution of exports such as . Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, Moscow’s economic leverage and instruments of influence have been strengthened, expanded, and diversified, considering the resources and potential trade opportunities available in the region.  

Russia is a major global grain exporter. Maintaining and developing this capacity is vital.  For Russia, the Black Sea region serves as a transit hub for this purpose. Novorossiysk, a city in Russia, is a clear example of how this country interprets and approaches the economic utilization of the Black Sea basin and its surrounding areas. Novorossiysk remains one of the most strategically important ports in the region. As sanctions intensified between 2014 and 2022, Russia chose to leverage this asset to maintain its trade routes by bypassing Western-controlled ports. This capability has become a tool of soft power, particularly in the Middle East, North Africa, and developing economies. Through grain diplomacy, Russia strengthens its ties with countries heavily reliant on food imports, especially during times of supply chain crises or disruptions.  

The ongoing war and Russia’s continued targeting of Ukraine’s agricultural infrastructure represent a massive blow to the Ukrainian economy. Despite Ukraine’s efforts to find new trade routes and possible leverage to work with, the mentioned phenomenon represents a complex, diverse problem by creating a significant hole in its economy and impacting global food security. While analyzing the current geopolitical landscape, tendencies, and strategies, it becomes evident that we are facing a neocolonial reality: Ukraine’s grain exports are becoming increasingly unprofitable and vulnerable, particularly in African markets. The reason is clear – Russia’s active involvement in BRICS, African summits, and bilateral forums has strengthened its economic leverage by lowering prices and positioning itself as a reliable, affordable, and powerful trade partner. We are confronted with a harsh truth: grain has become a weapon. Export markets have turned into a battlefield between Ukraine and Russia, with the region’s food economy increasingly shaped by a single, dominant political actor. Russia derives substantial strategic and economic advantages from its influence and dominance over the Black Sea region, which in turn strengthens its overall presence on global political and trade platforms. – rooted in the region’s geopolitical significance — further diversifies Moscow’s potential instruments of power.

Conclusion

The Black Sea region remains a geopolitically complex and strategically important zone, functioning as both a crossroads and a contested space for power struggles among Russia, regional actors, and Western powers such as NATO and the EU. The Black Sea’s geopolitical position is closely tied to Russian interests and motivations to control and bring the states in this area back under its sphere of influence. Despite their initiative and aspiration to embrace Western values, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine remain within a vulnerable zone – largely due to Moscow’s aggressive and coercive actions. Russia’s approach reflects a deliberate strategy to expand its sphere of influence at the expense of neighbouring countries.  

The annexation of Crimea, support for separatist movements in Georgia and Moldova, the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and many other actions are clear manifestations of imperial ambitions, demonstrating how Moscow systematically violates international law and the sovereignty of neighboring states. In addition, through intense hybrid warfare – along with disinformation, cyberattacks, economic pressure, and covert military operations – Russia actively exploits the weaknesses of smaller, democratic countries. It is equally important to recognize that the countries in the Black Sea region are by no means passive players. Ukraine is actively resisting the Russian invasion through both military and diplomatic means. Moldova and Georgia are striving to align more closely with European and Euro-Atlantic states, while NATO members such as Romania and Bulgaria are strengthening their defensive capabilities. Accordingly, regional cooperation and Western support are gradually increasing. Yet, it is still crucial to acknowledge that the threat of Russian aggression and domination remains real and persistent. The Black Sea region continues to be one of the most important transit, transport, and trade routes for a variety of international actors. The ongoing Russo-Ukraine war clearly shows that security-related challenges in the region still exist and are likely to persist in the future. This competition complicates the formation of a stable geopolitical environment under the aforementioned political landscape. Russia is not just a geopolitical competitor; it is the main source of destabilization in the Black Sea region. So long as its ambitions are based on aggression and conquest, the region will remain the frontline of authoritarian expansion. For this reason, it is essential to strengthen democratic institutions and reinforce Western partnerships in order to defuse geopolitical tensions in the region and prevent future threats as well as possible confrontations. 

The post The Geopolitical Situation and Russia’s Foreign Policy in the Black Sea Region appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

The Black Sea has long held historical importance due to various political, economic, and trade factors. For centuries, the area was disputed by the Russian and Ottoman Empires. Since the 20^th century, the region’s geopolitical landscape has grown more complex, especially because three important countries in the region – TĂĽrkiye, Bulgaria, and Romania – are North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies.  

Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine, which culminated in the full-scale invasion of 2022, has further increased the fragility and complexity of the Black Sea region. In addition to military threats, the region also faces a multitude of other security hazards such as economic, environmental and migratory concerns. Interestingly, most of these issues have direct links to Russian aggression in the region. 

It is no accident that Russia is at the centre of the majority of conflicts that have been fought in this region. In 2004, Russia did not have sufficient power to challenge Bulgaria and Romania’s NATO accession. However, when Georgia and Ukraine moved towards joining NATO following the Bucharest Summit of 2008, Russia responded with military force. In 2008, Russia invaded Georgia and occupied parts of its territory; in 2014, Russia annexed Crimea, and eight years later, launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. 

The post NATO’s Role in the Black Sea Region – Strategic Interests and Challenges appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.