Introduction

In recent years, Europe’s geopolitical centre of gravity has shifted toward the Northeast, with the Baltic region emerging as a . As , the Organization’s member countries are increasingly focused on deterrence and defence. Traditional conceptions of deterrence are constructed around three pillars: . This memo focuses on the second “C” – credibility – by examining prospects for strengthening the resilience of NATO’s military supply chains in the Baltic region through defence industrial cooperation between the three enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) framework nations (Canada, Germany, and the United Kingdom (UK)) and the three host nations (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia). 

As a response to Russia’s military aggression and hybrid warfare against Ukraine since 2014, the 2016 NATO Warsaw summit marked a significant step towards reinforcing the security of the Baltic region. Canada, Germany, and the UK assumed leadership as framework nations for eFP battlegroups in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, respectively. While the eFP signals a strong multinational Allied presence in the Baltic states, lessons from Ukraine since 2022 inevitably raise critical questions: is NATO ready to fight for a prolonged period? And can NATO secure supply chains so that they remain close to the war fighters? 

This policy brief first analyses how resilient supply chains lay the foundation for credible long-term deterrence. Second, it examines the role and prospects of defence industrial cooperation between eFP framework nations and host nations, before finally concluding with three concrete policy recommendations.  

Why��Does��Security of Supply Matter?��

There is an old saying attributed to Dwight. E. Eisenhower that . It is also true that , as each nation brings its own peculiarities while the combined force must act as a single organization. To put this into perspective, the Canadian-led NATO Multinational Brigade in Latvia (formerly, the eFP battlegroup) is composed of 14 nations, making it NATO’s  military unit. 

Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, NATO began scaling the three eFP battlegroups in the Baltics into brigade-sized units. Germany’s 45^th Panzer brigade has been relocated to Lithuania and is expected to achieve . Canada is also considering  in Latvia.  

Regardless of how its war against Ukraine ends, Russia will remain an existential security threat to the Baltic states. To deter and, if necessary, defend against Russia in the Baltic region, NATO Allies – especially the eFP framework nations – must demonstrate both the capacity and the resolve to fight alongside the host nations for as long as it takes to defend NATO territory. This, in turn, requires a continuous and resilient flow of supplies through to the battlefield.  

While experts have called for the  to sustain operational capability in the longer term, this approach has clear limitations – most importantly because stockpiles are finite in the event of a prolonged conflict. To secure an uninterrupted supply, it is essential to develop local defence industrial capacities. 

Security of supply extends beyond the availability of raw materials and manufacturing components. Latvia’s  defines security of supply as a guarantee of access to the materiel and services required by the National Armed Forces to fulfil its tasks. This understanding emphasizes that the defence industrial base is an integral part of comprehensive defence strategy across the peace-crisis-war spectrum. It also implies that the defence industries of eFP host nations must be able to supply not only their national militaries but also Allied armed forces. However, defence industries in the Baltic states, while growing rapidly, are still relatively nascent, and there may not be sufficient latent industrial capacity to scale up production quickly in time of crisis.  

Failure to secure military supply chains would pose strategic risks that are particularly acute given the geographic characteristics of the Baltic states. A close proximity to Russia and reliance on the roughly 65km-wide  to link the region to the rest of Europe exacerbate supply vulnerabilities. To ensure that NATO forces deployed in the region can fight a prolonged war, it is necessary to establish short, resilient, and regionally-anchored military supply chains and, at the same time, to deepen defence industrial cooperation between the eFP framework nations and host nations. 

Enhancing the Enhanced Forward Presence��

The  posits that the Baltic states constitute a single area of operations. This means that regional cooperation should be understood as a key enabler of credible deterrence and effective defence. This logic applies not only to trilateral Baltic cooperation but also among all Allies deployed in the region.  

To improve coordination between the three framework nations and the three host nations, the  was launched in 2023. Although it was originally envisaged as a platform for political and strategic dialogue in areas of common interest, such as training and exercises, it also holds untapped potential to serve as a venue for industrial cooperation and joint supply chain management. 

There are already examples of bilateral cooperation in this area. Recently, the Latvian Ministry of Defence signed a  (MoU) with the Canadian Commercial Corporation – Canada’s government-to-government contracting agency –  concerning bilateral cooperation in military equipment, services, infrastructure, and industry. 

However, since the Baltics consider themselves to be a single area of operations, a broader relationship of regional cooperation between the framework and host nations is needed. Dialogue must take place at all levels – political, strategic, operational, tactical, as well as between defence industries. Regular information sharing and practical measures to harmonize defence investment and industrial policies will strengthen the security of supply and help forge new defence industrial partnerships.

What��Do Host Nations Have to Offer?��

The three host nations are  in NATO. With defence budgets reaching 5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2026, the Baltic states are actively developing local defence industrial capabilities. In recent years, . There are notable success stories, such as the production of  and subsequent expansion into assembly and maintenance of more advanced systems such as . Nevertheless, the Baltic defence industries remain primarily focused on niche technological areas and generally lack the scale to support full production cycles of heavy armaments or other advanced military systems. At the same time, their relatively small size makes Baltic defence industries flexible, innovation-oriented, and able to rapidly adapt. 

This environment creates opportunities for foreign defence companies to enter the market and address the existing gaps in cooperation with local partners. As of 2025, all three framework nations allocate at least 2% of GDP to defence and have committed to increase defence expenditure up to 5% of GDP by 2035. Consequently, there is a strong push to build homegrown . 

Recently, German defence companies have been particularly active in the Baltic states. For example,  to establish 155mm artillery ammunition production facilities. More recently, Lithuania Defense Services, a joint venture established in 2022 by Rheinmetall and KNDS Germany, announced plans to .  

 and  are also pursuing ambitious efforts to expand their defence industrial capacities. For example, a Canadian company  to establish assembly lines for its BlackWolf tactical armoured vehicles in Latvia. Of the three eFP framework nations, such partnerships are especially relevant for Canada given the geographical distance between Canada and the Baltic region. Partnering Canadian defence industry with local companies in Latvia not only facilitates access to new markets but also helps build viable defence industrial capacity in the Baltic states for warfighting purposes, especially in a prolonged conflict.  

This logic extends beyond the manufacture of original equipment to also encompass access to critical components and materials. For example, last year the Canadian company – a component that is essential for sensors and electronic systems widely used in defence technology, such as aircraft, missiles, and drones. 

The new geopolitical reality, growing defence budgets, and commitment to develop defence industrial capabilities underscore the need to coordinate defence investment and industrial policies within the 3+3 format. Such coordination would help secure military supply chains precisely where they are needed the most. This approach would align with broader NATO efforts to ramp up defence industrial capacities, such as  and .  

Conclusions and��Recommendations��

Secured supply chains through defence industrial cooperation are not just desirable; they are a strategic necessity for credible deterrence. Since its creation, , from which the defence industries of framework and host nations stand to benefit. 

To harness the potential of defence industrial cooperation within the 3+3 format, the policymakers in the three framework nations and the three host nations should consider the following actions: 

1. Expand the Scope of 3+3 Format to Include Defence Industrial Cooperation.  

The��3+3��agenda��should��be��broadened by��having��regular meetings of key��representatives��– such as��National Armaments Directors��–��from the Baltic states, Canada, Germany, and the��UK��to promote dialogue, coordinate policies,��and identify opportunities��for��defence industrial cooperation and��strengthening��security of supply��across the region.����

2. Establish an Annual 3+3 Defence Industry Forum.  

To facilitate the establishment of cross-border partnerships between defence companies, regular and open dialogue is essential. As several bilateral defence industry events already exist, a dedicated 3+3 Defence Industry Forum could be built on these foundations, providing a multilateral platform for collaboration. 

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Host nations and framework nations should invest in new production facilities and reinforce supply chains for the militaries deployed in the Baltic region. Framework nations’ defence industry national champions should take a leading role and integrate host nations’ defence industries into regional supply chains. This approach would promote transfer of knowledge and technology, as well as strengthen the overall capacity to sustain operations over a prolonged period. 

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Key Takeaways��

• �Ӱ�ԭ�� one in three residents of Estonia and Latvia say they would do nothing��in the event of��a military threat, with even lower likelihood to act among ethnic Russians.����

• Interest in��participating��through non-combat roles (e.g.,��financial contributions) is higher than in combat roles��but still does not reflect��a significant��portion��of the population��in either Latvia or Estonia.��

• NATO (and Canada) should��address��the��societal resilience��gap among local��communities.��Targeted grants for trusted local organizations, coupled with strong monitoring and evaluation, can help build social cohesion and civic preparedness across Estonia and Latvia, particularly in regions with a significant ethnic Russian population.��

Background��

Recent polling data from Estonia and Latvia suggest there is a significant gap in societal resilience among the residents of both countries. While Russia is overwhelmingly perceived as a security threat within these nations, an overall willingness to act in the event of a military threat is low. This gap is particularly pronounced along demographic lines, with lower willingness to act among ethnic Russians in Estonia and Latvia. As the Baltic states are likely targets for potential future Russian aggression, this deficit in resilience has direct implications for Canadian and NATO security commitments in the region.  

Since their post-Soviet independence, Estonia and Latvia have invested heavily in defence preparedness through joining NATO, bolstering their cyber networks, and educating their youth on mis- and disinformation. After Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, Canada joined its NATO Allies in strengthening defence structures in Eastern and Central Europe under , currently the Canadian Armed Forces’ (CAF) largest overseas mission. Recognizing the particular vulnerability of the Baltic states to Russian aggression, Canada took the initiative to lead the Multinational Battlegroup in Latvia in 2017. After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Canada committed to scaling this presence into a full . Following his election in Spring 2025, Prime Minister Mark Carney emphasized that these operations work to reinforce NATO at a time of great global instability and change. 

To meet NATO’s Article 3 , Estonia and Latvia have adopted “Total Defence” models, recognizing that societal resilience and civilian participation are just as crucial as military structures for overall defence of the country. Learning from the success of the Ukrainian Territorial Defence Forces in fighting the Russian military,  is working to promote its own reservist force through public awareness campaigns, increased daily allowances for reservists, and crisis preparedness education.  similarly promotes civil protection while identifying “political trust” and “inter-ethnic cohesion” as vital to national security. Both Baltic countries are also working to increase civil support for their law enforcement agencies, fire departments, and medical systems.  

As highlighted in the Latvian defence plan, social cohesion and confidence in state institutions and partnerships are essential for building and maintaining civil engagement in total defence. The  in Riga engages in public diplomacy, information operations, and psychological operations to align national efforts with NATO’s strategic objectives. The Latvian government has also partnered with the  – an NGO with the goal of informing the public about NATO and Latvia’s participation in it.  

Social cohesion between ethnic communities has been a focus of national and local NGOs, as Russian-speaking minorities remain less likely to trust NATO or volunteer for national defence than their neighbours. In the northeastern region of Estonia,  works mostly with Russian speakers of all ages on projects developing critical thinking and media literacy. These projects promote active citizenship and social entrepreneurship through youth work and international exchanges. VitaTiim already has international partnerships, including with the European Solidarity Corps and the US Embassy in Estonia. In Latvia, the organization  focuses on education, culture, media, and civic engagement in the Baltics and beyond, specifically striving to foster open dialogue and social inclusion for underrepresented ethnic minorities.  

Despite these institutional frameworks and nonprofit initiatives, recent polling reveals a high likelihood amongst the public to do nothing to defend Estonia and Latvia from a military threat, as well as a persistent gap in how different ethnic communities perceive national security and threats to their country. To better understand these dynamics, the following data examines security perceptions across the region. 

Survey Evidence: Societal Resilience Gaps in Estonia and Latvia��

Polling from �Ӱ�ԭ�� University’s Eastern European and Transatlantic Network (EETN) shows that,��as of Spring 2025, many people in Estonia and Latvia do not see themselves as active participants in defence during a crisis. Most significantly, about 30% of Estonians and Latvians say they are likely to do nothing��in the event of��a military threat.����

Demographic and geographic��characteristics of��this vulnerability��show a stark division:��almost half��of ethnic Russians��(46%)��residing��in Latvia and Estonia��would��do nothing��if��their��respective countries face a military threat.��Four in 10��(43%)��polled��residents��of��Latgale, a region of Latvia directly on the border with Russia��comprised��of a��large Russian-speaking minority,��say they would not act.��Half of those polled��in Northeastern Estonia��(51%), another region sharing a border with Russia��and having a similar demographic composition as Latgale, are also likely to do nothing.��

Reported willingness to participate in national defence is low. When asked whether they would join the active-duty military in the event of a military threat, only about 20% of Estonians and Latvians say they are likely to do so, and only about 30% are likely to join the military reserves or territorial forces in response to the same threat.  

While more people are willing to take up non-combat forms of national defence, still, even such likelihood is low. Estonians appear to be more likely to assist in this way than Latvians, approximately six in 10 (59%) of Estonians are likely to volunteer to contribute with physical labour, versus 44% in Latvia. �Ӱ�ԭ�� half (48%) of Estonians are likely to volunteer to contribute financially, compared to only 29% of Latvians.  

Ethnic Russians in both countries are even less likely to be active defenders in the event of a military threat. A staggering 80% of ethnic Russians in Latvia and Estonia are unlikely to join the active-duty military, military reserves, or territorial forces. In Estonia, 41% of ethnic Russians are likely to volunteer to contribute with physical labour, but this number drops significantly in Latvia, with only 29% of ethnic Russians likely to do so. Finally, only about 20% of ethnic Russians, in both Estonia and Latvia, are likely to volunteer to contribute financially.  

From a policy perspective, this polling data highlights��both��a��gap and an��opportunity. If a significant segment of the population is unlikely to��contribute to the active defence of their country, resilience-building efforts must expand beyond military��deployments. To foster the social cohesion necessary for resilience, trust��and cooperation between minority and majority communities must be bolstered. NATO and Canada can do this through collaboration with local community networks��–��such as��VitaTiim��and New East��–��that are already on the ground��in��the region.��

Conclusion��

Recent polling data from Estonia and Latvia suggests a region with a significant gap in societal resilience. While Russia is overwhelmingly perceived as a security threat, willingness to act��in the event of��a military threat is low. This gap is particularly pronounced along��demographic��lines, with lower willingness to act among��ethnic Russians. As��Estonia and Latvia��are��likely targets��for potential future Russian aggression, this deficit in resilience has direct implications for Canadian and NATO security commitments in the region. By supporting well-monitored projects with local organizations that build social cohesion and civic preparedness, Canada and NATO can help ensure Estonia and Latvia are more resilient and better prepared to withstand a military threat.����

Policy Recommendations��

1. NATO and Canada should create a dedicated societal resilience grant to support local NGOs such as VitaTiim and New East that advance social cohesion and civic preparedness. Supported projects should have bilingual messaging (in Russian and Estonian or Latvian) and may include media literacy and cyber safety training, community initiatives fostering dialogue across demographic lines, and projects that engage citizens as partners in international governance. 

The grant should emphasize collaboration between local and international organizations, promoting a shared responsibility in local, national, and international governance. Priority should go to local initiatives in regions with large Russian-speaking populations. 

2. Each NATO/Canadian-supported project should be required to include a monitoring, evaluation, and feedback plan in alignment with NATO’s . Thorough monitoring is necessary in order to accurately evaluate how effective projects are at bolstering societal resilience and civic preparedness.  

3. Canada and NATO should use existing NATO StratCom COE platforms to highlight successful partnerships in relatable ways to the Estonians and Latvians, including through multilingual media and public events. Positive views of NATO and the West expressed by individuals and organizations that already have credibility in their communities should be amplified to . 

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Key Takeaways 

• In Estonia and Latvia, border residents, ethnic Russians, and Russian-speakers differ from the general population in their perception of security threats. They are more likely to view domestic political instability as their country’s primary security threat, rather than Russia. 

• This segment of Estonians and Latvians also tend to feel disenfranchised and helpless regarding national defence, with the majority more likely to respond that their countries are “on their own” if faced by a military threat. 

• NATO should take a regionally focused outreach, using the Russian language as a medium and utilize transparent intelligence disclosure to assure and rebuild trust among these vulnerable populations. Furthermore, using visible and well-tested approaches such as tangible first-responder training and on-the-ground capacity-building measures could help address local skepticism. 

Background 

While the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) focuses on defending the Baltics from external Russian aggression, a critical segment of the population – namely border residents, ethnic Russians, and Russian-speakers – are more concerned with internal political instability than external threats for its national security. In addition, many of these respondents express a feeling of helplessness and alienation, believing neither the West nor Russia would come to their aid should their country face a military or security threat. Thus far, NATO operations aimed at reassuring Baltic residents are not succeeding with instilling confidence in current national security frameworks. Recognizing the diversity of security beliefs with a particular regional and linguistic focus could better inform NATO strategies that address security threat responses in the Baltics, helping to reassure these skeptical and disenfranchised populations.   

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has fundamentally transformed the international security landscape, prompting NATO’s response to reassure its Baltic members that, should it face a threat, NATO will come to their defence.  NATO’s operations in Latvia and Estonia are a part of its broader efforts at deterrence and defence on its eastern flank by increasing its presence in the region, with Canada leading the Multinational Brigade in Latvia through , and the United Kingdom leading in Estonia with . Latvia and Estonia are both active participants in various NATO-accredited Centres of Excellence (COEs) that conduct collaborative research with NATO Allies to better address security threats, many by malign Russian influence through hybrid tactics. For example, the , located in Riga, Latvia, monitors and counters information-manipulation threats in real time. Russia’s information operations in these countries exploit pre-existing societal divisions among ethnic, regional, and linguistic lines, promoting extremist sentiments and skepticism against their governments and Western partners.  accuse Estonian and Latvian governments of being anti-Russian and incapable of defending their countries against any threat.   

Existing studies suggest that Russophone, ethnic Russian, and borderland populations in both Latvia and Estonia are more skeptical towards NATO and existing national security frameworks. They are found to be , and .  is found to be a salient factor, associated with decreased support for present (often liberal democratic) regimes.  In the context of the ongoing war against Ukraine, , and . Furthermore, they are.   

However, public opinion amongst these groups in Estonia and Latvia is proving to be more nuanced; many in these populations express a complex belief system surrounding national security that is . , , meaning that public opinion among Russophones in Latvia and Estonia is heterogenous. Given these insights, policy aimed at developing trust with these populations and fostering participation in national security frameworks should reflect this variety of beliefs, and address skepticism through regionally and linguistically mindful outreach initiatives.

Belief in ‘Domestic Political Instability’ as the Greatest National Security Threat

A survey conducted by the �Ӱ�ԭ�� University Eastern European and Transatlantic Network (EETN) in Latvia and Estonia between March and May 2025 indicates that while Russia and the war in Ukraine are still prevalent security threats, 26% of Latvians and 22% of Estonians perceive “domestic political instability” as the most important threat. These opinions are particularly widespread among the border-region populations, among Russian speakers, and ethnic Russians. For example, in Latgale (Latvia’s border region) 52% chose “domestic political instability” as the greatest threat; only 7% picked Russia, and 12% the war in Ukraine. Similarly, in Northeastern Estonia, an area that borders Russia, 47% consider domestic political instability as a main security threat while only 17% consider Russia as the greatest threat. In Latvia, Russian speakers were far more likely to hold this belief compared to respondents who speak the titular language; language was not a measured factor in the Estonia survey. 

These groups are all more likely than their counterparts to feel personally “unsafe,” with 51% of Latgale residents and 30% of Russian speakers in Latvia choosing “unsafe” when asked about their personal safety. In Northeastern Estonia, 31% also personally feel “unsafe.” Skeptics tend to attribute threats to personal safety on internal concerns rather than external actors. In both countries, those who share this belief have a higher likelihood to view Russia as most helpful for their national security. ​​For example, in Latvia 26% of respondents chose “domestic political instability” as the greatest threat to personal safety, and among these respondents 61% chose Russia as the most helpful external actor to Latvia in the case of a military threat- pointing to an intersection between positive perceptions of Russia and concerns over internal concerns. Similarly, for the same question in Estonia, 22% chose “domestic political instability,” and of this group 77% also picked Russia to come to their aid. 

In addition, those concerned with domestic security are more likely to be skeptical of the EU, NATO, and the West. In both countries, such respondents are least likely to choose “the West” as most helpful should they face a military threat, with only 12% in Latvia, and 18% in Estonia. Furthermore, among those who share this belief is a higher likelihood to vote “no/leave” in hypothetical referendums for the EU and NATO respectively.  

Feelings of Alienation, NATO Skepticism and Internal Instability Belief 

Among respondents who share a belief regarding domestic political instability and specifically in the Russophone, ethnic Russian, and borderland populations is a common feeling of alienation from current security mechanisms and parliamentary processes. Respondents who share this belief also often expressed disenfranchisement, believing that if their country faces a military threat that they will be helped by no one. When asked the same question, Russophones in Latvia proved that they are least likely to choose NATO and most likely to choose “Nobody will help us/we are here for ourselves”.  

Residents of Northeastern Estonia and Latgale are the least likely among Estonia’s macro-regions to choose “closer to NATO” (only 34% in Northeast Estonia and 41% in Latgale) and are most likely among all regions to pick either “closer to Russia” (22% in Northeast Estonia, 21% in Latgale) or “closer to both/neither” (31% in Northeast Estonia, 25% in Latgale). 

It seems that such skepticism towards common security architecture reflects a greater disbelief in the national political system. Although a majority of respondents who also share the belief of alienation would vote “yes/stay” in the hypothetical referendums to remain in NATO or the EU, their support is weaker than the general population. To conclude, Russophones, border-region residents, and respondents who share their “domestic political instability belief more often express feelings of alienation and disenfranchisement from political processes rather than a desire to deepen ties with Russia.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 

Feelings of skepticism, alienation, and disenfranchisement in the border regions cannot be attributed to ethnic and linguistic identification alone. Being Russian or Russophone in a border region does not inherently make someone vulnerable to Russian influence. Socioeconomic disparities in these regions paired with titular language mandates in both countries can contribute to feelings of alienation, though further research is needed in order to uncover a clearer picture of these citizens’ experiences. A more in-depth understanding will further restore agency to this population, as their beliefs are likely acquired through more complex routes than simply absorbing Kremlin media.  that Russian media did not have an independent effect on one’s willingness to defend their country and instead infers that many respondents who consume Russian media have a distrust of media in general, further highlighting a need for a more nuanced understanding of skepticism among Russophones. 

1. Further research on best practices through NATO COEs is needed to address alienation and helplessness 

NATO Allies utilize different COE’s to share best practices for countermeasures and confidence-building initiatives and to build societal resilience against malign information influence. A transnational study on best practices for building confidence among ethnic minorities would fill a sizable gap in current research and would provide a basis for which to design public outreach campaigns for populations experiencing alienation and skepticism.  In addition, further research can investigate the security perceptions and feelings of alienation in public opinion. This would provide a more accurate foundation for which to form policy on public outreach, rather than simply attributing the security concerns of Russophones to inherent Russian-tendencies that favor Kremlin-intervention. 

2. Targeted and regionally mindful outreach for key groups could have important impacts 

Further regionally-focused outreach for these specific Russophone, ethnic Russian, and borderland populations using a , with tactics such as intelligence disclosures (gathered through the , or NISRF), can effectively rebuild credibility and better reassure these populations of NATO’s defence commitments and decision-making. Furthermore, intelligence disclosures through accessible media can inform users on external security threats and potentially increase risk awareness and trust in public institutions through transparency measures.  

 Given that a significant amount of  is conducted by Russian-language media, it is tantamount to consider this population’s linguistic preference as a tool of engagement rather than a characteristic to exclude from policy measures to counteract Russian influence.  

3. Share key expertise within NATO frameworks, and make it visible to key groups 

 found that any citizen regardless of ethnicity is more open to helping in their country’s defences if they are reassured by a powerful patron, one that they have confidence in. In 2023, , sharing best practices for preparedness among first responders. Similar efforts in Latvia and Estonia could reach NATO-skeptical populations among citizens working in the public sector for emergency response. Sharing key expertise in similar sectors can potentially build trust among skeptical groups and increase NATO’s visibility among local populations, offering a firsthand account of NATO’s efforts instead of through malign narratives online.  

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The current geopolitical climate has increased fears surrounding war and instability across the transatlantic. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has brought along with it a rapidly changing conventional mode of warfare to the European continent for the first time in decades, destabilizing a previous sense of peace. In addition to traditional warfighting, several malign actors – including revisionist actors such as Russia Federation and the People’s Republic of China – are increasingly using hybrid tactics in hopes of destabilizing the relationship between NATO members. Importantly, hybrid warfare includes tactics that fall short of traditional armed aggression but nonetheless have adverse effects against their target and broader citizenry, including disinformation and propaganda campaigns, offensive cyber operations, espionage, and attacks on critical infrastructure. Since 2022, numerous European states – such as Germany, Poland, France, and the Baltics – have identified an increase in hybrid attacks as a prominent part of this rapidly changing and uncertain threat landscape. Most recently, these attempts to breach NATO sovereignty and place a strain on partnerships have taken the form of cyber attacks, drone incursions, and disinformation campaigns. The rise in hybrid warfare has thus generated questions on how NATO may improve its collective responses to evolving tactics in such an uncertain international landscape. Article 5 remains a core part of the Alliance’s defensive operations but is facing questions regarding its overall effectiveness. This is largely due to the challenges created by grey-scale conflicts in establishing concrete and cohesive countermeasures. New types of war are challenging traditional conventions of collective defence, and require NATO to adapt. By analyzing the mechanisms of Article 5, it becomes evident that additional safeguards should be implemented to reinforce the power of collective defence.

Article 5 and NATO countermeasures

NATO was first formed in in the context of the Cold War. Its primary goal was to engage all Western partners in an attempt to shield them from influence of the Warsaw Pact. By declaring that an attack on one is an attack on all, Article 5 has constituted the foundation of the NATO alliance through its enshrining of the principle of collective defence. Article 5, however, does not define specifics of what constitutes an “armed attack,” nor what measures should be implemented when such an act occurs. The Article is intentionally vague in this respect, giving member states the room to maneuver and to respond on a case-by-case basis pursuant to a threat’s overall status. To trigger Article 5, a formal unanimous consensus must be reached among NATO members. Through its history, Article 5 has only been invoked once following the in New York City.

Article 4 is also an important element of collective defence, which gives members the right to call a . Article 4 was initially triggered at the outset of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 by Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. Since then, it has been triggered by and in response to Russian airspace violations[KN1]. Most recently, Romanian officials discussed using Article 4 after a Article 4 is an essential tool for countries to collaborate on defence responses, which is even more important now as threats are increasingly unconventional and unprecedented.

This escalation of hybrid warfare has challenged traditional assumptions and led to questions of what collective defence may look like in the twenty-first century. Since 2016, , including cyber attacks. At the Madrid Summit in 2022, the , formalizing their strategy against hybrid threats. The Alliance generally outlined their commitment to building resilience through preparedness, deterrence, and defence. Several coordinated initiatives, such as and counter-hybrid support teams, have strengthened collective resilience. NATO continues to also work at being a ; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents; critical infrastructure; cyber defence; energy security; and international terrorism. At a glance, this signals that NATO is adopting a multitude of policies, frameworks, and teams to address threats of hybrid attacks; however, . Article 4 consultations have helped to address airspace incursions, but a wide range of other threats have yet to be formally addressed. Article 5 has thus far not been invoked. A major problem remains, however, one which does not stem from the Treaty itself but rather countermeasures that are not cohesive or consistent enough. To improve NATO’s positioning against hybrid threats, a better framework and strategy must be adopted, which can in turn clarify the use of Article 5 in grey-scale conflict.

Next steps?

A major question surrounding Article 5 is determining how severe of an attack may call for its invocation. Would it be the cutting of a major undersea cable? A large-scale hacking incident? indicate that these threats would likely not be sufficient enough to call on collective defence. Hybrid attacks fundamentally operate below conventional thresholds on purpose. Therefore, NATO should move to assessing threats not only based on force (i.e. what hybrid tactics are equivalent to an armed attack), but rather, focus on aggregate impact on a target country. While one singular attack is unlikely to cause intensive harm, long-term campaigns are aimed at intensely eroding societal infrastructure and citizen resolve. An aggregate threat framework can provide more accurate judgements on member’s security and sovereignty.

            Another area of improvement can be further standardization of member responses based on the type of hybrid attack. Broad counter-hybrid support teams could be developed into specialized units, such as AI or cybercrime teams. Existing organizations, such as the and the , can be leveraged to develop specialized response mechanisms. Establishing cohesive procedures in response to hybrid incidents will make it easier for the Alliance to act in coordination, which is essential in deterring ongoing Russian attempts to weaken the whole of European society. This may also lead to reduced friction among between members and narrow the gap for Russia to exploit these internal vulnerabilities and tensions. Establishing improved, specialized mechanisms regarding collective defence will also help to clarify for members how to assemble if Article 5 is triggered, and to do so in a timely fashion.  Finally, an additional recommendation is to further develop a counter-hybrid warfare strategy which goes beyond defence mechanisms to engage sectors like education, transportation, and technology.

Such a counter-hybrid strategy could follow the approach, a move increasingly being embraced by many nations. The strategy could also look to establish a minimum guideline or set of requirements for member states to follow to have adequate safety net. The strategy should also target ways to improve preventative measures for member states. Integral to this will be improving intelligence-sharing and collective tracking to improve attribution. Improving attribution will help clarify who is behind such hybrid attacks. Furthermore, ensuring that countries are investing in defense or dual-use infrastructure which supports a coordinated net of European security will improve prevention.

Conclusion

NATO’s commitment to collective defense is more important than ever when addressing newly-emerging ways to fight wars in the twenty-first century. Article 5 remains a key part of this approach to security, and it should be noted its ambiguity does serve a strategic purpose. Article 4 also remains as a powerful tool for countries to leverage. However, for collective defence to be actionable in the case of grey-scale conflict, it must be supported within a strong framework that deeply engages with new offensive tactics. Without this, Article 5 can continue to be seen as vague or ineffective, which provides malign actors with more capacity to exploit vulnerabilities. These adaptations will help to improve transatlantic security from a myriad of malign actors.

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A new partnership was announced in January 2026 between Canadian and Estonian institutions that focus on clean energy solutions. The new partnership sets out three research projects that have been set for 2026, bringing together the University of Victoria’s Accelerating Community Energy Transformation (ACET) initiative and the Estonian Islands Energy Agency (EISEA). The aim of the partnership is to co-design and develop vital research and practical models for island populations as it relates to clean and sustainable energy priorities for local communities, which can then be expanded to larger populations. As featured in a by the University of Victoria, the hope is that by “combining ACET’s research expertise with EISEA’s on-the-ground knowledge of island communities, the partnership will foster innovative clean energy solutions, enhance local capacity and create replicable approaches to community-centered energy systems on Estonian islands.” This collaboration is part of a growing trend of Canadian cooperation with the Baltics, engaging with security, social, and professional sectors. In doing so, such a partnership gives an opportunity for Canada to support Baltic defence against Russian hybrid threats by developing broader social resilience strategies and relationships.

What will the partnership look like?

. The first, on Saarema, will investigate how local organic waste can be repurposed to power the island’s heating system. On Hiiuma, the second project will track a pilot initiative on sustainable energy production, distribution, and transportation. Both will generate important lessons on developing a circular and sustainable energy economy. The third project will look broadly at the social implications of energy development, analyzing how local communities respond to new projects. This can help build fair and transparent energy planning processes.

ACET and EISEA will be blending their research and innovation skills, each bringing an important skillset. Integral to the project will be the EISEA knowledge and engagement with Estonian island communities. The to ensure accurate interpretations of local contexts. For ACET, the partnership is an opportunity to showcase Canadian research leadership and apply lessons learned in previous projects. In the past, in British Columbia to co-design energy projects, giving important insight into how to lead collaborative and sustainable research development.

Security Implications

The development of clean energy in Estonia ties directly into their security resilience. Prior to 2022, Estonia was heavily reliant on Russian gas and oil, . While Estonia has been able to find alternative sources for LNG through Latvia and Lithuania, enhancing their own energy infrastructure will be integral to national capacity and resilience.

Previously, Estonia ; however, , part of the pipeline was damaged, leading Estonia to pivot to other Baltic states. The incident was alleged to be in response to heightened tensions over Russian sanctions. This highlights the need for strengthened local and regional infrastructure to mitigate possible threats. For example, . This is a vulnerability that can be exploited if there are disruptions to critical infrastructure by malign actors.

For islands in Estonia’s Baltic Sea, this is even more vital. Estonia has thousands of islands, some of which are exceptionally vulnerable due to distance from the mainland and close proximity to Russia. Last fall, . Other incursions have occurred in Poland and Lithuania, heightening security concerns among Europeans and their allies. While Estonia is , they will also need to ward off hybrid threats such as these. This means accounting for economic, environmental, social, and other vulnerabilities outside of hard security concerns. The partnership not only addresses critical infrastructure gaps, but it is doing so in a transparent and collaborative manner with local communities. This reinforces social cohesion and self-sustainability within these smaller populations – a model that could be replicated elsewhere. Therefore, the partnership is a strong example of the comprehensive approaches NATO and its members can continue to seek out to improve its readiness and defence posture.

Canada’s approach to Baltics

This announcement is aligned with other moves Canada has recently made to deepen ties with Baltic states. Through and , Canada has bolstered its defence presence in the region. Canada’s presence in the Baltics ties into a broader national goal to be a more active global partner, particularly in the effort to improve European security. This is a noteworthy shift from the previous Trudeau government, whose values-based foreign policy at times left Canada to the periphery of important security decision-making in Europe. This recalibration signals an effort to translate normative commitments into more robust material contributions and relationships, enhancing Canada’s own strategic role within NATO while ensuring it remains reliable.

The Baltics’ proximity to Russia makes them a key target for hybrid Russian threats, emphasizing the need to improve counterresponse. Estonia in particular shares a . Estonia has already partnered with NATO to improve their defence, including on the islands of ; however, full resilience will require a comprehensive approach that also defends critical infrastructure and community interests. Here, Canada has a strong opportunity to partner with Estonian companies and research institutions to support the development of industries and technology in preparation for a more robust counterresponse to Russian hybrid pressures.

Estonia has been . This has opened the opportunity for Canadian companies to connect with Estonia on renewable energy, storage capacity, and smart technologies. In . to deploy a BWRX-300 small modular reactor, which will boost their nuclear energy capacity. The work generated by ACET-EISEA will further develop these opportunities and centre them in the community while prioritizing environmental sustainability. This is where Canada can really shine, as not only a supporter but also a promoter of key values and goals of the liberal international order.

Conclusion

Looking ahead, ACET-EISEA is set to announce more collaboration in the coming months. As the projects begin in 2026, it will be important to track progress and lessons learned. The partnership is a strong example of the kinds of multinational action that is needed to address collective security and political concerns. Drawing from this experience can give strong models for other initiatives, which can in turn strengthen the development of the Transatlantic community. In doing so, these initiatives play a significant role in reinforcing the strategic cohesion necessary among the Alliance at a time when cooperation is increasingly being tested by geopolitical tension and conflict.

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In a post on X (formerly known as Twitter), current German Chancellor Friedrich Merz stated the following: “.” Just a few short weeks later, in a posted on YouTube with Hungary’s news outlet, former German Chancellor Angela Merkel spoke about her experience in June 2021 when she and French President Emmanuel Macron had floated the idea of the EU holding direct talks with Vladimir Putin in an effort to calm re-ignited tensions with Ukraine. However, at that time, COVID-19 was given as the reason for preventing more frequent dialogue with Russia, which Merkel felt was crucial to ensuring that the be upheld.

In this new interview, Merkel revealed that it was in fact the Baltic states and Poland who were against such initiatives, and then claimed that “” Clearly, such a statement aims to manipulate memory for strategic purposes by placing significant blame on the Baltic states and Poland in the lead-up to the war, while also suggesting that Merkel herself had been serving as a peace-making actor, playing no role in empowering Russia to take such aggressive actions.

The reaction to Merkel’s comments was near instant. For example, Estonian foreign minister Margus Tsahkna responded that Merkel was “” and that instead of strongly responding to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, or its war in Georgia, . Another example of the outrage initiated by Merkel’s comments was captured by Poland’s Minister for Regional Policy, Katarzyna Pełczyńska-Nałęcz (former Polish Ambassador to Russia), who stated that being blamed for starting a war because they “.”

Why say it, and why say it there?

In short, Merkel argues about process in order to justify and defend her legacy and relations with Russia during her time as Chancellor, which focused on fostering “” – including sanctions, Minsk diplomacy, and energy interdependence as a ‘bridge’ with strategic intentions. This political approach is . Merkel’s casting of 2021 as a sort of missed off-ramp shifts focus from Berlin’s (and Merkel’s) long-term bet on engagement with Russia to an Eastern European veto that indirectly led to the war in Ukraine in the first place. Similarly, this mimics the theme that ‘,’ which politicians such as US President Donald Trump tend to employ as a discursive strategy. Legally and morally, the aggressor is Russia. What Merkel’s storytelling does is recast the focus on the intra-EU process of who blocked talks, rather than on the actor who chose invasion over dialogue. This narrative also directly undermines EU unity against Russia’s aggression, .

The venue of this interview further amplifies the political impact on EU unity. The that operates within a highly polarized media ecosystem, which placed . Additionally, alongside being the second lowest among EU member states in this index, recent reports indicate that Prime Minister Victor Orbán and his allies have consolidated control over around 80% of the press media in Hungary.The �ʲ����پ���á�� is hardly a mouthpiece for Budapest, but it is undoubtedly interesting that such an interview would come from the EU member state most often associated with strategic ambiguity in its relations with Moscow. It is worth noting, however, that during the same interview, when asked whether Orbán was a Trojan horse for Putin into the EU, Merkel simply stated that this propagated idea was “.” As placed in Hungary’s polarized media space, the Merkel clip conveys intra-EU blame, further testing cohesion by muddying the EU’s message to Moscow.

For the Baltics and Poland, the was both a threat and signal test. As the Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda warned, engaging in dialogue with Putin without tangible changes in Russian behaviour would send “” that the EU was placating Russia’s actions. Hosting summits without leverage and making agreements without cost or constraints creates an opportunity for Russia to further normalize coercion and potentially foster coalition-splitting rather than deterring it. Viewed in this light, the disapproval in 2021 from Poland and the Baltics was not obstructionism but rather a and a fear for potentially being the next target of Russia’s aggression.

An inconvenient backdrop

There is a reason Eastern Europe balks at Merkel’s ‘if only we had talked more’ sentiments. For three decades, Germany’s policy towards Russia combined binding and deterrence through sanctions and Minsk diplomacy, alongside a dense web of commercial, energy, and even security-based ties. , or the , where a German prime military contractor supplying high-end training systems to a Russian arms centre was . Only after the annexation of Crimea did Berlin entirely revoke the license. The cancellation showed that routine cooperation between Germany and Russia had been institutionalized even after Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008.

The EU’s own briefings on Nord Stream 2 noted that it , which led to debates and arguments from Poland, for example, , as well as broader concerns that Russia was using such initiatives to . Angela Merkel had reiterated to partners, and more specifically to Kyiv, that , despite being seemingly immune to the suggestion that Russia would, in fact, use energy as a tool to achieve its political interests in Europe.

Schröder, the useful contrast

Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, Merkel’s predecessor, moved straight into Russian energy after his time leading Germany, first chairing (the European-Russian pipeline company), then later joining the board of Rosneft (a state-owned Russian oil company), from which he under mounting political pressure. Additionally, Schröder had flirted with a ; however, , which was later stripped of a taxpayer-funded office by the Bundestag, prompting him to navigate the German court system to regain his office. However, the courts upheld his loss of privileges.

Merkel, by contrast, has not taken any corporate posts from Russian-based firms. However, her entanglement with Moscow is apparent through her narrative in the interview which re-allocates the burden of the war within the EU. This reframing serves two distinct purposes: The first is directly shifting any accountability for the complex situation Europe currently finds itself in with Russia, and the second, more indirectly, serves Russian hybrid tactics that seek to and as the .

What now?

Merkel’s interview works less as revisionism and more as a redistribution of memory, agency, and what she believes that EU unity should have resulted in during that time. It invites a tempting but counterfactual narrative that is ultimately counterproductive: that one more conversation might have ‘saved the day’ if only the Easterners had not blocked it. The empirical record – from Mulino to Nord Stream – suggests the opposite. That being said, diplomacy only works when backed by credible costs; absent that, it enables coercion. The lesson Europe should take is that the Baltics and Poland were cautious, given their historical understanding of Russia as a political actor, but were not outright fearful of dialogue with Moscow. If Europe shifts its focus to who blocked what talks and actions, it risks falling into the very divisions and tensions that Moscow seeks to foster.

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Amidst continued uncertainty regarding Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine, Latvia and other Baltic states are considering ending their support for the Ottawa Landmine Treaty in the name of national defence. While the decision underscores Latvia’s current fears of vulnerability to Russian aggression, it also poses complex implications for NATO operational cooperation and Canada’s humanitarian commitments. This policy memo examines the implications of the Baltic states’ possible withdrawal from the Treaty on Canada’s leadership and joint NATO operations in Latvia. It offers recommendations on how Canada can retain its international legal obligations while continuing to work successfully with Latvia and the rest of NATO through joint military operations.

Russia’s Threat

Russia’s persistent aggression towards Ukraine has led many of its neighbours to reassess their national security strategies. Poland and the Baltic states have expressed rising concerns, claiming that the regional security environment has ““. Although Russia remains primarily focused on Ukraine, Western intelligence agencies have warned of its long-term plans to challenge NATO’s Eastern flank. In the next three to four years, it is theorized that Russia plans to rebuild and strengthen its military forces, leading to the large potential of an escalated attack . Due to Latvia’s proximity to Russia and location on NATO’s Eastern flank, anticipation of a future attack and motivation to test NATO’s defence readiness are . The Latvian defence intelligence community recently presented heightened warnings of Russia’s military developments and threats, such as infiltrating Latvia’s rural areas.

Treaty Details

was adopted in 1972 to ban the current and future possession, production, and transfer of anti-personnel landmines. The international agreement is currently , excluding Russia and the United States.

Latvia, Poland, Lithuania, and Estonia from the Ottawa Treaty Agreement in late March 2025, amidst rising national security concerns regarding Russian aggression. On April 16th, Latvia’s parliament (the Saeima) voted to officially withdraw from the agreement. With this vote, Latvia became to formally apply to leave the Ottawa Treaty. members of parliament voted in favour of the withdrawal, leaving fourteen against and two abstentions. Latvia set the stage for Lithuania’s parliament (the Seimas) to follow, to leave the treaty just a few weeks later on . Riigikogu, Estonia’s parliament, on June 4th, with 81 members in favour, out of 101 members. The Baltic states must inform all other treaty parties, as well as the United Nations Security Council and Secretary General, of their intentions to withdraw. The state must then wait a before the treaty ceases to apply. This period now gives the Baltic states an opportunity to address concerns with other NATO states on their plans for navigating the future of their defence against Russia.

Despite all three countries being politically aligned to support the decision, they have nonetheless faced backlash from global humanitarian organizations and humanitarian diplomatic figures. Examples include the large banner placed on Geneva’s iconic broken chair statue by the as a direct message to the Baltic states, Finland, and Poland, advocating against withdrawal discussions. Opposition has been expressed from various humanitarian organizations, including a statement by a top human rights official, Volker Türk, from the and , denouncing the decision. A key Canadian leader in diplomatic efforts to establish the Ottawa Treaty, that this move will risk long-term humanitarian consequences in the region.

Apart from a global humanitarian response, gauging local civilian perspectives on the withdrawal remains difficult. Literature or data regarding citizen opinion on the issue across all three Baltic states is scarce, making it a challenge to assess domestic support or opposition

Implications for Canada and NATO

Despite Canada’s continued commitment to the Ottawa Treaty, the potential exit of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia raises questions about the future of Canada’s operational relationship with each of these Baltic states. This question arises because the Ottawa Treaty extends beyond the possession, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines to also of any state using landmines. The Canada-Latvia relationship is especially sensitive to this change, as Lativa currently hosts approximately 1,600 members of the Canadian Armed Forces deployed under . This operation has been extended by Mark Carney for three more years.

Canada also leads a NATO brigade in Latvia made up of troops from 13 Allies. Last year, this brigade successfully conducted , which was the first major field exercise . As activity in this region grows, it is necessary to continue assessing the alignment of the Baltic states with Canada’s treaty obligations and commitments to NATO cooperation as a whole. Canadian leadership plans to expand its brigade by adding 2,200 Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) members apart of the operation .

NATO as an organization prioritizes a collective defence strategy; however, states still hold a level of sovereignty to make military-related decisions. The decision by Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia to leave the Ottawa Treaty suggests that humanitarian concerns are being sidelined in favour of state survival. Whether this shift has an effect on the level of cooperation between Canada and the Baltic states remains to be seen. In order to mitigate this potential change, this policy memo provides two recommendations for Canadian government officials to consider as they assess their relationship with their Baltic Allies.

Recommendation: Canada-Latvia Bilateral Dialogue on Operational Framework

An initial bilateral meeting between Canada and Latvia should take place focusing on creating a plan for navigating new legal circumstances as they emerge in the international security arena. Although Prime Minister Mark Carney did in late August to discuss the extension of military operations in the region, there was no public indication that the topic of landmines was discussed. It is necessary for Canada to engage with Latvian counterparts at the level of defence ministers and senior military leadership. By involving both political authority and operational expertise, both states can ensure that diplomatic commitments are aligned with on-the-ground coordination of operative measures. Assessments should be made to weigh the need for additional legal documents such as non-involvement clauses to ensure that Canada would not engage in activity that would undermine the Treaty.

During initial meetings, Canadian and Latvian officials should seek to establish an understanding of the effects that Latvia’s withdrawal may have on joint operations. A discussion around Canada’s legal obligations should be at the forefront of the discussion. Future NATO exercises and training should be reviewed, and new scenarios should be drawn, should Latvia indicate an intention to incorporate anti-personnel landmines into joint training activities.

To institutionalize this collaboration, both states should consider establishing a Canada-Latvia Operational Working Group. This group would create a permanent, ongoing cooperation between both parties, which would address legal and logistical updates as needed.

While the priority lies in communication with Latvia due to operational duties, Canada should consider exploring avenues for broader engagement with Lithuania and Estonia to strengthen diplomatic relationships in light of changing political and legal conditions.

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