â—Ź Russia has been testing and refining hybrid tactics in the Balkans since the 2010s

â—Ź Hybrid tactics prey on ethnic divisions, political instability, and encourage hostility towards the West

● Russia’s tactics have increased their soft power, making it easier for malign actors to destabilize Europe

Russia’s unconventional threats

Hybrid threats have become an increasingly pervasive aspect of the global security landscape. Since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Russian Federation has been a key instigator of hybrid attacks, launching disinformation and propaganda campaigns, offensive cyber operations, espionage, and attacks on critical infrastructure. In Ukraine, hybrid tactics act as a force multiplier for traditional combat. Such hybrid tactics seek to weaponize divisions between social groups; the government and citizens; as well as economic and structural weaknesses to undermine faith in the systems, norms, and values of Western countries. By eroding public trust and exploiting weaknesses in target countries, societies are becoming more susceptible to internal vulnerability and Russian influence.

One area that has been a target of hybrid tactics is the Western Balkans. A critical juncture between West and East, the Balkans have been an area of competing ideology and cultural influence; it is also a region with a multitude of divisions for Russia to exploit. The repeated use of threats and fanning of tensions may imply a desire to stoke regional conflict, which could divide and disorder Europe. Much of Russia’s connection to the area is rooted in , which in the worst case scenario, could invite further expansionist ambitions into the region. Russia has largely implemented hybrid warfare tactics in places where they can leverage the most historical and cultural connections: Serbia; Republika Srpska; Montenegro; and North Macedonia (Slavic population).

Proxy Political Actors

Since the 2010s, Russia has been developing and testing clear methods of direct interference in political systems. Their primary tactic is backing ultranationalist and populist political figures. This includes the VMRO-DPMNE party in North Macedonia, which is a pro-Russian right-wing party. They have amplified , including the Macedonian naming dispute regarding . In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Milorad Dodik has been a strong pro-Kremlin force in the region, advocating for the secession of Republika Srpska, the Serbian-dominated enclave in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Russia recently used the in an effort to condemn Western influence in the region. In Serbia, Kremlin-backed politicians have historically been influential. , appointed to Parliament in 2024, President Aleksander Vučić has also frequently been accused of succumbing to Russia influence, though in the Serbian-Russian bilateral relationship remain notable. Russia’s use of state proxy actors is an effective way to ensure that the developing democratic systems in these countries remain divided and fragile. These actors are effective at preventing cooperation and often incite violent and polarizing rhetoric.

Non-political proxy actors

Russia has also refined its hybrid tactics through the exploitation of religious and cultural ties. The Russian Federation has deep and historical ties with the Orthodox Church, an integral part of daily life and culture in many Balkan countries. Pro-Kremlin oligarchs provide financial support to the Church and its charitable works. In return, moves towards democracy are framed as immoral Western decadence, which destroys traditional culture. The Orthodox Church has frequently opposed sovereignty and democracy for Montenegro and Kosovo, framing it as a threat to pan-Slavic identity. This rhetoric maintains tensions around territory, making peace more fragile. Cultural associations, mainly in Serbia, serve to disseminate propaganda among everyday citizens and cement Russian opinions. . Since the group was dismantled, the fate of criminal recruiting networks remains unclear. Another famous example is the . Cultural and educational programs throughout the region promote Russian language and ideology. This primes citizens to be more susceptible to Russian narratives and propaganda, increasing the effectiveness of hybrid tactics. Russia’s actions in the Balkans demonstrates its ability to leverage indirect, soft forms of influence.

Digital Landscape

Russia has been able to effectively weaponize social media and news outlets throughout the Balkans. Primarily, these efforts are targeted towards Serbian audiences. News outlets are flooded with Russian disinformation and propaganda. . The site itself is accessible to a wide audience, filling information voids with inflammatory stories. Many popular local news outlets – not tied to Russia – often repost such information as well. Disinformation portrays the West as weak, reinvigorating controversial memories such as the 1999 NATO bombings, and overstating regional conflicts. Outlets like , , and consistently regurgitate this messaging. Russia also leverages social media platforms like Telegram to further its disinformation campaign. Rybar, a pro-Russian channel, recently posted information regarding the joint special exercise between Albania, Croatia, and Kosovo. It claimed that this was evidence of an axis being formed by the West. Dozens of local Serbian channels reposted this information, inciting panic and paranoia about ethnic tensions.

Conclusion

Russia’s moves in the Western Balkans demonstrates its intentions to destabilize Europe from multiple fronts in the east, while simultaneously waging war in Ukraine This can divide the attention and resources of European nations, which improve the success of Russia’s strategic ambitions. For years, malign influence has penetrated the region, as noted in NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept. NATO should build on their outlined commitment and empower the region to become more resilient to hybrid threats.

Policy Recommendations

â—Ź Existing institutions and developmental frameworks should be buttressed by NATO to support democracy-building in the region

â—Ź Canada should support resilience and democratic stability by developing bilateral ties via NGO, diplomatic, and economic partnerships.

â—Ź Individuals, companies, centres, and associations who undermine democracy and encourage pro-Russian beliefs should be appropriately identified and restricted.

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On November 1st, 2025, , the site of a railway canopy collapse that killed sixteen people just a year prior. Novi Sad railway station, intended to be a symbol of modernization after renovations led by , instead became a demonstration of how quickly corruption can turn deadly. Student-led protests quickly began, calling for accountability and a transparent investigation on the incident; however, as resistance and negligence continued, the movement quickly grew to a revolt against an entire system deemed corrupt. Aleksander Vučić, the president of Serbia and founder of the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), has long defined his rule in Serbia through increasing autocratization. His anti-democratic methods have incited more outrage, but also made it more difficult to realize change. What are some of the successes and challenges that have defined the movement so far? What are possible next steps?

Success through community

One of the most notable features of the protests was the ability to mobilize vast sectors of the population. Leaders like Vučić are very skilled at making citizens feel shut out from politics; the protests have reawakened a sense of agency and power among society. The students leading the protest have been able to gain the support of the , , , and . Students have made an effort to include marginalized voices, which has bridged the divide between urban-rural populations, cultural groups, and sectors. Key to the organization has been its leaderless and decentralized form. Rather than establishing any new kind of hierarchy, the protests have opted for horizontal forms of authority, which ensure all participants are equal. for debates and decisions. This has also allowed all participants to feel that they are actively involved in their own governance and society, rather than remaining disenfranchised. The tactics used by the protestors have also aided its success. Actions that are symbolic, yet peaceful and legal, have made resistance approachable. These include traffic blockades, inter-city marches, social media campaigns, and marathons to Brussels.

The protests have pushed the resignation of select key officials, including the . An investigation was opened, but the lack of progress and reality of state power of the judiciary remain an issue. Similarly, partial documents around the construction project have been released, but much information . The protesters, after much campaigning, have received official support on October 22, 2025. This could have impacts on the ability for external actors to pressure Vučić. The sustained cooperation and power of the protests remain its biggest success, demonstrating the power of the people and the ability for citizens to regain their voice.

Challenges: state pushback

Crackdowns on civil society, control over free press, patronage networks, and election interference have become characteristic of Vučić’s office, undermining Serbia’s development as well as its pathway to democracy and EU accession. This has led to many calling for a leadership change. Vučić has responded by attacking the protestors, labelling them as . Physical attacks, smear campaigns, doxxing, unlawful questioning/detainment, and the controversial continue to be ongoing threats levied against protestors. Attacks on the educational sector have also been strong, with teachers facing pay cuts and threats since the beginning of the protests. Over the summer, government response became increasingly violent, with . This has drawn international criticism and has exponentially increased the threat level for protest participants. The government has also organized , though they remain smaller than their opposition.

State pushback and unwillingness to discuss have impeded the ability of meaningful dialogue and reform to occur; however, the system was designed this way. For protestors, it is difficult to translate actions into meaningful reform through the barring of political participation in civil society. , and social-political structures are captured by the state. Additionally, the has stood out for being very reticent in their support, likely due to fears over economic uncertainty following a new government, or to their own connections to .

An additional area where more support would be instrumental relates to international and external actors. The EU’s formal resolution came after months of relative disengagement from events in Serbia. Many may view student protests as a potentially unstable bet, however there should be strong support for civil society and the principles the protestors are advocating for. For a long time, international actors who support Vučić (such as Russia and China) have been louder than those in support. Considerable political transformation must take place in order to pressure Vučić, both internally and externally.

Where to next?

Currently, the protest sits at a defining moment. The past year has seen success through mass mobilization, the resignation of key officials, and the EU’s resolution of support for the protest. However, the government remains strong, and while . This has raised the issue of how to navigate these challenges. A major debate surrounds how the students should engage in the electoral arena. A student’s list of outsider candidates is being developed, however . It is difficult to justify joining the very system seen as corrupt, and there are concerns the election will not actually reform the system, just change the face. Additionally, attempts from are a growing internal issue that risks causing further division and factionalism. It may require the protestors to set ideological lines, countering its primarily apolitical image.

The protests in Serbia demonstrate the power of collective action and citizen mobilization. Its year-long anniversary marks a crossroads where the collective needs to decide its next steps. How they choose to orient themselves could have deep implications on the success of the protests and the growing political voice of the people.

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When Albania’s Prime Minister Edi Rama joked that his new artificial intelligence (AI) “minister,” Diella (Albanian for Sun), was “pregnant with 83 children” (a metaphor for 83 digital assistants that will serve members of parliament), he turned an . The move to incorporate AI into governance itself is considered by many to be amusing, unsettling, and even revealing, as it shows how easily AI can be warped into a spectacle while subtly re-wiring how decisions about money and power are made. Diella is also the world’s first AI system formally appointed as Minister of State for Artificial Intelligence, with responsibility for.

From Virtual Assistant to Cabinet-Level Minister

as a virtual assistant on the , intended to assist Albanian citizens in accessing documents and other online public services. Nine months later, in September 2025, following a decree that authorized a virtual minister, Rama had elevated Diella to the rank of Minister of State for Artificial Intelligence, .

Such an unorthodox move has garnered plenty of international coverage, as many have framed it as both an anti-corruption experiment and a form of political branding, describing Diella as a digital assistant dressed in traditional clothing, now tasked with making public tenders free of corruption. However, some have also pointed out that procurement in Albania has long been dominated by political elites and oligarch-like figures, making .

A Spectacle?

Writer/researcher : essentially shifting political responsibility to digital actors and presenting them as being pure, incorruptible, and tireless, standing in for distrusted political elites. Perhaps accidental, this comes across as not a neutral design choice. Presenting the system as a woman in traditional costume frames digitalization as care and service rather than control, pulling on gendered stereotypes while also making it difficult to contest the new political innovation without appearing as “anti-modern” or “anti-progress.” The “” metaphor pushes this further, casting Diella as a digital mother of dozens of subordinate systems that will monitor and help with parliamentary work. It infantilizes MPs as being dependent on an algorithm, and suggests that political conflict within parliament can be processed by a neutral machine rather than by openly accountable representatives.

The move to incorporate AI into governance sits at the intersection of EU accession politics and digital dependency, as Diella is likely based on OpenAI models hosted on Microsoft Azure, which is precisely the kind of . Hypothetically speaking, if Albania were to obtain EU membership and Diella were to operate within the EU, it would be flagged as a high-risk system under the new , where stringent requirements are imposed on the usage of AI in public services and resource allocation. Such frameworks do not yet bind Albania; however, it is clearly experimenting in exactly the domain in which the Act targets, that being algorithmic governance, where constitutional accountability is thin.

Canada’s “Sovereign AI” Moment

Canada is moving quickly in a similar direction by embedding AI into state structures, but with a different approach. The announces $925.6 million over five years for “large-scale sovereign public AI infrastructure,” including a Sovereign Canadian Cloud to support research and public-sector AI use. The federal government is implementing AI and .

Canada already has a formal governance “toolkit” or framework for implementing public-sector AI. The government’s and its official guidelines require “algorithmic impact assessments,” the formal documentation of the systems used, and alternative mechanisms for performing similar functions when automated decisions may potentially affect rights and interests. Moreover, the further defines sovereignty as the ability to manage and protect government data, systems, and infrastructure independently in a globally interconnected environment.

However, Canadian experts warn that infrastructure and branding risks could outpace efforts to control them. As noted by , Canada’s dependence on American companies is one of the most significant risks and complications facing Canadian digital sovereignty, particularly given the dominance of US providers in digital and cloud services.

Put side by side, Albania and Canada reveal the same underlying question: who actually controls AI in the state, and under what rules? Diella is clearly an extreme case of AI as spectacle: an AI minister is “pregnant” with assistants, purity, and efficiency in a system still wrestling with corruption and weak checks. Whereas Canada’s “sovereign AI” push is more technocratic, but it faces its own temptation to treat big AI spending and a branded cloud as proof of control, even while key infrastructure and AI models remain under foreign corporate jurisdictions.

The core lesson for Canada is not to mock Diella, but to avoid a more subtle version of the same trap. As AI becomes more integrated into sectors that the federal government may deem appropriate, the real test will be whether such systems are contestable or even grounded in enforceable law, rather than merely marketed as innovative or sovereign, as it is easy to get caught up in the media storm and publicity such reforms seem to command. Canada’s task should be to ensure that its “sovereign AI” remains democratic, even when there is no digital “minister” on the screen.

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Bosnia and Herzegovina, more specifically the Serbian-majority region of Republika Srpska, is currently experiencing a difficult political and constitutional crisis centred around its President, Milorad Dodik, and his defiance of

On August 1, 2025, a Bosnian appeals court upheld a criminal conviction for Milorad Dodik, which includes from holding public office, as a result of his The OHR, an international organization led by High Representative Christian Schmidt, is responsible for overseeing the (Dayton Agreement), which ended the Bosnian War.

In line with election law, Bosnia’s Central Election Commission (CEC) revoked Dodik’s presidential mandate on August 6, 2025. Importantly, the OHR was not the body in charge of sentencing Dodik; the court conviction (for failing to implement OHR decisions) came first, and the CEC’s mandate came after. However, Dodik and his allies assert that the decision to remove him from politics is , and argue that the verdict is not directed against the President of Republika Srpska, but

Dodik’s defiance to this ruling is also apparent as Republika Srpska moves ahead with a referendum scheduled for October 25, 2025, which challenges Bosnia’s political institutions and the OHR’s peacekeeping role in the country. The “Do you accept the decisions of the unelected foreigner Christian Schmidt and the rulings of the unconstitutional Court of Bosnia & Herzegovina issued against the President of Republika Srpska, as well as the decision of the Central Election Commission to strip the President of Republika Srpska, Milorad Dodik, of his mandate?”

After removing Dodik from office, the CEC set an for November 23, 2025, to establish a new president for the region. After Republika Srpska lawmakers , they have now for it to go ahead as scheduled. The result therefore represents a two-headed challenge for Bosnia’s democracy: a referendum aimed at delegitimizing state decisions – despite a legal basis indicating that the – and a succession contest in which Dodik seeks to maintain control.

The situation surrounding the referendum matters for Bosnia’s security because it targets the rule-of-law guardrails of the country’s democratic infrastructure, which are designed to work across ethnic boundaries. By holding this referendum, Republika Srpska’s political authorities are effectively challenging the rules of the state and who has the power to set them. Depending on the results of this vote, Bosnia could see the emergence of parallel legal structures and an increase in friction between Such erosion could also threaten the conditions for Bosnia’s EU accession process across the “European neighbourhood” by inviting external influence and drawing more EU/NATO attention and resources due to instability in the region.

The timing of the unfolding crisis magnifies this risk. The referendum is held just before the UN Security Council is scheduled to take up the annual renewal of , a peace support mission led by the EU that is currently the only executive security presence in the country. ALTHEA is also of the Dayton Agreement. Any political crisis, politicization, or delay in renewal could weaken deterrence when core institutions are being tested. Dodik has in the past expressed the possibility of employing his connections to Russia, a UN Security Council member and , to

Dodik’s long-standing ties with Moscow consistently influence his political calculus, as evidenced by his frequent travels to Russia, as well as his regular meetings and consultations with representatives of the Russian government. For example, the and expressing its support for both Dodik and Republika Srpska, going so far as to declare that calling for Dodik’s removal from office was Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Sergey Lavrov also claimed during a speech at the UN General Assembly that for destabilizing the Balkan region by undermining peace and sovereignty. Another representative of the Russian government stated that the OHR for Bosnia and Herzegovina should be .

Taken together, the diplomatic cover and narrative framing provided by Russia on this issue give Dodik the political space needed to continue his non-compliance with the court ruling, and to ignore the EU-based conceptualizations of rule-of-law, such as respect for court decisions and OHR authority. All of these factors contribute to the

Canada has an interest in monitoring this situation, given its on European defence and security. Questions surrounding ALTHEA’s renewal and a broader breakdown of governing institutions in Bosnia serve as a challenge to the agenda that Ottawa has taken on with Brussels. Coordination with European (and American) partners on enforcement and will shape the credibility and efficacy of pressure on actors who seek to obstruct state institutions. At the same time, a crisis in the Balkans would likely divert resources and attention at a time when support for Ukraine in its continued fight against Russia remains essential.

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