Key Findings

Key Takeaways 

• NATO and Western partners are widely viewed as desirable securityĢżpartnersĢżin Armenia, Estonia, Georgia, and Latvia, with the strongest support in the Baltic states and Georgia.ĢżPerceptionsĢżof NATOā€™s security impact are highly positive in Estonia and Latvia, andĢżmost citizens support continued NATO membership. However, about one-third in each country expect toĢżreceive no externalĢżassistanceĢżor aid in theĢżfaceĢżof a securityĢżcrisis.Ģż

• In the South Caucasus, favourable views of NATO do not translate into expectations of crisis support. FewĢżidentifyĢżNATO as the main crisis responder, while self-reliance is the dominant view. In Armenia, public opinion is evenly split on alignment, with equal support for closer ties to NATO and Russia.Ģż

• Considering this,ĢżNATO should increase regular and visible reassurance in regions where it is the main defense guarantor, especially in the Baltic states, and address the concerns of those who expect toĢżbe self-reliantĢżduring crises. In the South Caucasus, NATO should manage public expectations and focus on building resilience and preparedness, given limited direct security options.Ģż

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• Most Armenians feel that their country isĢżā€œon their ownā€Ģżif facedĢżwithĢża military threat,Ģżdisplaying aĢżperceptionĢżof personal safety associated with geopolitical alignment.Ģż

• With uncertainty widespread andĢżperceptionsĢżon security partnerships polarized, manyĢżin ArmeniaĢżare open to diversifying security ties.Ģż

• Considering public opinion, while NATOĢżhasĢżaĢżrelatively limitedĢżset of cooperation tools, they shouldĢżnonethelessĢżprioritize visibleĢżengagementĢżwith Armenia, communicate limitationsĢżof such partnershipĢżclearly,Ģżand manageĢżexpectations.ĢżSustainedĢżand predictable cooperationĢżshould be keptĢżinĢżpracticalĢżrather than geopoliticalĢżterms andĢżperceptions.Ģż

ContextĢż

This policy brief examines the implications of public attitudes towards security issues in Armenia for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It assesses the prevalence of insecurity narratives among Armenians and shows how such attitudes are associated with opinions towards external security actors. Survey evidence shows that Armenia’s core security challenge is a sense of abandonment among its public. Confidence in international security institutions is weak, as nearly half of Armenians (48%) believe their country would not receive support in the event of a military conflict.  

As confidence in Armeniaā€™s traditional security partners ā€“ Russia and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) ā€“ stands low,  other international actors are seen as positive contributors to Armeniaā€™s overall security, including both NATO and China. The Armenian publicā€™s openness toward alternative security partners and a broader reassessement of Armeniaā€™s security architecture creates an opportunity for NATO to push for more active involvement. As available options are limited, NATO should strive for realistic, civilian-oriented cooperation based in institutional resilience, without raising expectations of formal guarantees. This increased involvement, along with sustained and visible engagement, should offer better reassurance to Armenia without otherwise escalating geopolitical tensions in the region. 

Between its independence in 1991 and the start of the second Nagorno- Karabakh War in 2020, Armeniaā€™s security architecture was heavily . Armenian political elites leaned towards Russia due to a lack of alternative options on account of its landlocked status and persistent conflict with Azerbaijan and °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š, along with a limited domestic military capacity. Russia served as Armeniaā€™s primary security guarantor through  and  membership; Western military and security engagement remained largely symbolic. Although Armenia and NATO collaborated through  and  frameworks, these initiatives focused on technical cooperation and institutional dialogue rather than substantive security guarantees. 

The  to prevent military defeat in 2020 marked a critical rupture in Armeniaā€™s security system. The second Nagorno-Karabakh War significantly undermined public and government confidence in  and the CSTO as reliable protectors and intensified feelings that Armenia had been  by its traditional security partners. In response, the Pashinyan government increasingly sought to . This shift is visible in several developments, including the ā€œ,ā€ the deployment of the European Unionā€™s (EU)  along the Armeniaā€“Azerbaijan border, and the launch of enhanced  in January 2025.

Public Insecurity, Security Preferences, and Reported Future Vote in ArmeniaĢżĢż

A nationwide survey in Armenia, conducted by ŠÓ°ÉŌ­““ Universityā€™s Eastern European and Transatlantic Network (EETN) in February and March 2025, shows that Armenians are almost equally split between who report to feel safe (52%) and unsafe (47%) in their daily lives. Residents of Yerevan tend to feel more unsafe (52%) compared to these in other urban (44%) and rural areas (45%). The risk of war with Azerbaijan (59%) is the major concern consistent across society. 

Perceived personal security is closely associated with positive attitudes toward Western alignment; those who feel safer are substantially more likely to support NATO and EU membership than those who do not. Among individuals who report feeling safe, 60% would vote ā€œYesā€ in a hypothetical referendum for Armenia joining NATO and 64% would do the same in a potential referendum on joining the EU. In contrast, among those who feel unsafe, only 40% would support NATO, and 36% would back EU membership, with clear majorities in this group opposing both initiatives, 56% against NATO and 64% against the EU. 

Armenians are divided across party lines in their assessment of personal safety. With a clear majority (71%) either recusing themselves from voting in parliamentary elections, intending to spoil the ballot, or not share voting preferences. Among those who would engage in elections and/or share their preferences, the majority who support the Civil Contract party (86%) feel safe, compared to 36 percent of opposition supporters that include the largely pro-Russian Armenia Alliance party. 

Many in Armenia feel that their country would be left on their own if it faces a military attack, with nearly half (48%) thinking so and only 6% being unsure about who might help. As the sense of abandonment is widespread, still, those with different perceptions of safety have distinct expectations on who might help. Those who feel unsafe are more likely to choose Russia or the CSTO (20%) as a likely ally in case Armenia faces military conflict, compared to NATO or the West (14%). Conversely, more amongst those feeling secure would expect NATO or the West to come to their aid (25%) than Russia or the CSTO (12%). In sum, perceptions of insecurity are associated with greater reliance on Russia, whereas feelings of security are more strongly linked to expectations of Western support. 

At the same time, support for diversifying security partnerships beyond existing allies is relatively broad, with 53% agreeing that searching for new defense and military ties with other countries would make Armenia safer against foreign threats. This idea is popular across the political divide, including 70% of Civil Contract supporters and 59% of opposition voters. While uncertainty is higher among those with no declared voting intentions, still, more among this group believe that diversification of defense and military ties would make Armenia more secure compared to those who disagree. 

This preference for diversification also resonates with elite threat narratives. While Armenian political parties differ in their preferred alignments ā€” some favouring Russia, others emphasizing Western engagement, or expressing self-reliance ā€” they somehow share a recognition that reliance on a single security partner is no longer sufficient. 

Despite widespread pessimism about Armeniaā€™s security environment, preferences over geopolitical alignment remain divided rather than consolidated into a single dominant orientation. Equal proportions of respondents believe Armenia would be safer moving closer to NATO (36%) or Russia (36%). Furthermore, more than half of Armenians consider that having NATO troops on the ground would make Armenia safer, indicating a veiled sympathy towards the NATO Alliance. 

Overall, these patterns do not indicate a clear preference toward any single geopolitical bloc, although the Western side carries somewhat greater weight. Armenians are somewhat engaged in a survival-driven reassessment of security providers and remaining open to diversified allies clarifies this viewpoint. This creates potetial opportunities for NATO to expand its partnership with Armenia. 

Conclusions and Policy RecommendationsĢż

Given Armeniaā€™s non-member status in NATO and the structural constraints created by Russiaā€™s influence in the region, formal security guarantees from Western institutions are unlikely to materialize in the near future. NATOā€™s internal dynamics ā€” particularly °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±šā€™s membership and its close military partnership with Azerbaijan ā€” further limit the ±·“”°Õ°æā€™s&²Ō²ś²õ±č;capacity to provide direct defence commitments to Armenia. 

At the same time, Armeniaā€™s security landscape is shifting as the government seeks to diversify its external security partnerships. In practice, this has created space for forms of cooperation that do not rely on military guarantees but instead focus on civilian-oriented, visible, and predictable initiatives such as resilience building, civil emergency planning, institutional reform, and confidence-building measures. These efforts aim to address vulnerabilities rather than establish broader geopolitical alignment. 

Evidence from NATOā€™s engagement in partner countries illustrates the value of this approach. The substantial  has supported defence reforms, institutional coordination, and national resilience through training, interoperability programs, and civilā€“military cooperation. Similarly, cooperation with  has strengthened energy resilience, medical capacity, disaster response, and defence education, showing that civilian-focused partnerships can deliver sustained, practical outcomes.  

For Armenia, diversification therefore functions as a pragmatic way to expand sources of security support in the absence of formal guarantees. Within this framework, NATO could become a more constructive and realistic partner for Armenia. While direct defence commitments remain improbable, civilian-oriented initiatives offer tools to strengthen institutions and reduce security risks. This perspective underpins the policy recommendations that follow.  

1. Given the substantial support of Western-led political structures, NATO should prioritize visible engagement with Armenia. 

±·“”°Õ°æā€™s&²Ō²ś²õ±č;is the central framework coordinating cooperation with Armenia, bringing together planning, training, exercises, and institutional reform in a multi-year, capacity-building process. As outlined in , the  is designed to deepen cooperation in line with  and level of readiness. NATO should use this initiatives not only as a coordination tool, but as a delivery mechanism for visible, locally-implemented cooperation, particularly beyond Yerevan. By translating the framework into routine, practical engagement, NATO and Armenia can bilaterally strengthen security capacities and address perceptions of abandonment from the Armenian public. 

2. NATO should clearly communicate limitations and manage expectations about its partnership with Armenia.  

NATO already frames cooperation with Armenia as partnership-based rather than guarantee-based, but could benefit from communicating more clearly and publicly about what cooperation involves (e.g., preparedness, institutional reform, resilience) and what it does not (e.g., full membership). Additionally, engagement should be consistently framed as capacity-building rather than a security provision to avoid creating public expectations of any security guarantees. Simple cooperation roadmaps with regular milestones would strengthen predictability, credibility, and reassurance. Furthermore, this should happen in a sustained manner, emphasizing repeated training cycles, ongoing institutional support, and routine regional exercises rather than isolated events. Predictable, long-term cooperation builds trust without raising unrealistic expectations. 

3. NATO should keep cooperation with Armenia practical and not geopolitical. 

Finally, as the Armenian public remains divided in their geopolitical preferences, it is important for NATO to prevent its partnership with Armenia from expanding into questions of geopolitical alignment. Engagement should remain centred on functional areas such as crisis preparedness, emergency coordination, institutional reform, and civilian resilience rather than Western-versus-Russian narratives. Expanding direct and clear communication with the Armenian general public can further limit perceptions of forced geopolitical choice and better align external policies with insecurity-driven public concerns in Armenia. This action would strengthen Armeniaā€™s security capacity while minimizing escalation risks and domestic polarization. 

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Since the onset of the joint United Statesā€“Israeli military campaign against Iran in February 2026, developments in the Middle East have emerged as a primary driver of global strategic assessments. The conflict is simultaneously generating significant secondary effects in the South Caucasus, reshaping regional alignments and the relationship between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

By assessing Iranā€™s relationships with Armenia and Azerbaijan, its core strategic interests in the South Caucasus, and its operational partnership with Moscow, this policy memo examines how the ongoing war against Iran, combined with the August 2025 Washington Accords, has disrupted Tehranā€™s long-standing hedging strategy and could undermine its regional influence.

To illustrate this shift, the memo first analyzes Iranā€™s traditional foreign policy toward Armenia and Azerbaijan and how the Washington Accords have diminished Iranā€™s geoeconomic role as a buffer between Armenia and Azerbaijan, thereby constraining its ability to exert leverage over both states. It further evaluates how the agreement heightens Iranā€™s strategic vulnerabilities in the face of growing Turkish, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and U.S. presence in the region, and highlights the increasingly divergent interests and approaches of Moscow and Tehran in shaping the future of the South Caucasus.

Engaging with the outcomes of the United Statesā€“Israeli military campaign against Iran, the policy memo concludes by analyzing Tehranā€™s shifting strategic posture in the South Caucasus. This assessment is situated within the context of Iranā€™s amicable yet strategically incongruent relationship with Moscow, as well as its intensifying competition with °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š for regional influence.

Iranā€™s Core Interests in the South Caucasus: Economic Pragmatism over Ideology

Iran views the South Caucasus as part of its immediate rather than a distant foreign region. While Tehran has historical and cultural ties with the region, its policy toward the area has been driven primarily by geopolitical stability, border security, and connectivity considerations rather than ideological or religious affinity. Although Tehran formally maintained neutrality during the Armeniaā€“Azerbaijan conflict, in practice it pursued a balancing strategy aimed at preventing regional dominance by any single actor. Much like Russiaā€™s approach in the region, the protracted Nagorno-Karabakh conflict generated a degree of political instability that enabled Tehran and Moscow to preserve their influence over both Armenia and Azerbaijan, while simultaneously constraining °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±šā€™s ability to expand its regional presence. Iranā€™s strategy has also emphasized the importance of preventing alterations to internationally recognized borders and safeguarding its access to European markets.

In the aftermath of Armeniaā€™s military defeats in 2020 and 2023, and amid Moscowā€™s failure to uphold its perceived security commitments under the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) framework and its peacekeeping mandate, Iran increasingly came to be portrayed as one of Armeniaā€™s most reliable regional partners. Iranā€“Armenia post-Soviet relations have been stable and cooperative. Since Armeniaā€™s independence, Iran has consistently maintained , supporting Armenia, both state and people, during regional crises and serving as a key transit partner. In the aftermath of the Turkishā€“Azerbaijani blockade of the 1990s, Iran has functioned as a critical terrestrial access route and economic partner. The two countries are also involved in many trade and energy partnerships and collaborate in the transit of goods between Europe and Asia.

While both nations share a foundational identity as Shia-majority states, the bilateral relationship between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Republic of Azerbaijan has been characterized by persistent strategic friction since 1991. Central to Tehranā€™s security concerns is Bakuā€™s deepening military-industrial and energy partnership with Israel, which, alongside Azerbaijan’s “one nation, two states” alliance with °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š, is viewed by Iranian policymakers as a coordinated effort to contain Iranian regional influence.

This tension is further exacerbated by the geopolitical implications of the Zangezur Corridor. From Tehran’s perspective, any Azerbaijani effort to establish a sovereign land link through southern Armenia constitutes a “red line,” as it threatens to sever Iranā€™s critical northern transit link to Europe and the Caucasus. Despite these structural rivalries, the relationship maintains a degree of pragmatic stability. Both states remain tethered by mutual economic interests, specifically their shared roles in the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (Middle Corridor) and Bakuā€™s continued reliance on Iranian territory for transit to its Nakhchivan exclave.

Iranā€™s regional approach has been shaped less by the Muslimā€“Christian divide or ideological concerns and more by practical and security concerns over Turkish influence, Israeli presence near its borders, transit routes affecting its access to Eurasia, and the potential domestic repercussions among its own Azeri population. Iran views the Caucasus as its ā€œhistoric security marginā€ and its immediate security and economic environment.

The 2025 Washington Agreement and its Initial Implementation Framework

In August 2025, Armenia and Azerbaijan signed the Washington Accords under the mediation of the President of the United States, launching the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) and establishing a 99-year economic partnership between the United States and Armenia. The Washington Accords create opportunities for significant shifts in regional transit dynamics, including the movement of goods, energy infrastructure, and the broader interconnection between Asia and Europe. These developments have implications for the roles traditionally played by Russia, Iran, Central Asia, and the South Caucasus in Eurasian transport and trade networks. It reduces Central Asian countriesā€™ dependency on Chinese and Russian infrastructures as well as bypassing Iranā€™s role in the Middle Corridor.

, the United States and Armenia signed the providing exclusive rights to develop the transit infrastructure. The framework excludes extraterritorial rights to American entities preserving Armeniaā€™s sovereignty including the border management aspect of the transit corridor. In this partnership, the TRIPP Development Company, a joint venture with Armenia mostly controlled by Washington, provides a monopoly in the development business surrounding the route and its infrastructure. The agreement seeks to develop the Syunik region as a hub of economic activity and local development, with the objective of enhancing transit and connectivity between Asia and Europe, connecting Azerbaijan with its autonomous region of Nakhichevan. More broadly, the TRIPP becomes a competitive alternative to the Bakuā€“Tbilisiā€“Kars (BTK) railroad and future alternative pipeline to Europe, competing with Bakuā€“Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline by securing European access to Central Asian hydrocarbons.

In the energy domain, the normalization process between Armenia and Azerbaijan reshapes the regionā€™s broader transit and supply landscape. Most notably, Armenia could become significantly less dependent on Russian and Iran natural gas, thereby opening possibilities for access to Central Asian hydrocarbons and, potentially, to Azerbaijani energy sources. Turkmen and Azerbaijani gas competes with Iranā€™s gas output, offering a cheaper and potentially more politically reliable alternative for European countries. launched the construction of energy infrastructure, including a new transit powerline to export to Europe through °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š.

The Accord has inaugurated a new phase of cooperation between the former belligerents, notably facilitating the renewed transit of goods between the two states. This includes the movement of hydrocarbons originating in Azerbaijan as well as grain exports from Russia and various Central Asian countries. The emerging prospects for a peace accord between Armenia and Azerbaijan have broadened the diplomatic space for both states, transforming their engagement into a more intricate and multidimensional interaction. Furthermore, the effectively eliminates Moscowā€™s role as established in the November 2020 agreement, which delegated some administrative control over border management to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB).

Although the Washington Accords do not provide any security guarantees from the United States or include enforcement mechanisms directed toward Azerbaijan, Armenia leaders hope that increased American investment would encourage a more active role by Washington and put an end to Bakuā€™s strategy of outbidding Yerevan in their bilateral relationship.

Overall, the TRIPP represents, for Armenia, an additional step toward the West, thereby weakening Moscowā€™s influence in the South Caucasus, while also providing an opportunity to normalize relations with Ankara and Baku. For Azerbaijan, the Washington Accords consolidate its military victory, while re-establishing direct access to Nakhchivan and stimulating its transit-based economy. Furthermore, the TRIPP reduces Bakuā€™s dependency and uncertainties link to its main transit route to Europe going through Georgia.

Iranā€™s Strategic Approach in the South Caucasus after the Washington Accords

Much of the and commentary has framed recent developments as a geostrategic, zeroā€‘sum contest in which the United States and °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š have successfully marginalized both Iran and Russia from regional influence. While geostrategic and security considerations remain central, it is necessary to look beyond great power and regional competition to understand how Iran and Russia are recalibrating their relationships with Armenia and Azerbaijan and assessing areas of mutual convergence to avoid strategic marginalization.

Following the Washington Declaration and TRIPP announcement, the Iran official diplomatic position was articulated by in a telephone conversation with his Armenian counterpart. While welcoming peace efforts and regional connectivity, Araghchi specified Iranā€™s red lines: there must be no extraterritorial corridor or special status undermining Armenian sovereign control, and no changes that alter regional geopolitics or disadvantage Iranā€™s strategic access. He further emphasized full respect for borders, territorial integrity, and national jurisdiction, and stressed that connectivity must not isolate Iran from established or alternative transit routes.

However, an examination of various members of the Foreign Policy establishment could shed light on various aspects of Iranā€™s understanding of this situation. On 9 August 2025, , former Minister of Foreign Affairs and a senior advisor to the former Supreme Leader of Iran, framed the TRIPP as a rebranding of the Zangezur corridor concept. He said that the implementation of this project would restrict Iranā€™s transport routes in the north and northwest to (only) °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š, and that Iran will confront this move ā€˜whether with Russia or without it.ā€™ He likened NATOā€™s presence along this route to a ā€˜viperā€™ that wants to lie down between Iran and Russia and warned that Iran will not allow this alliance to approach its northern borders. The former himself in a meeting with Prime Minister Pashinyan, in July 2024, had mentioned that Iran recognizes that the Zangezur Corridor is against Armeniaā€™s interests and stands in this position.

Other Iranian officials however, adopted a more moderate position and sought further clarification as the details, terms, and conditions of the TRIPP are not clear yet. In a meeting with Armeniaā€™s National Security Council Secretary, the former head of Iranā€™s Strategic Council on Foreign Relations, , welcomed Armeniaā€“Azerbaijan connectivity but requested clarification regarding the governing legal and security framework of the route, particularly any external involvement. The Armenian side emphasized that border control and security would remain under Armenian authority. This exchange illustrates Tehranā€™s core concern: not connectivity itself, but the jurisdictional and security regime under which it would operate.

Noting the travel of , to Israel, Iran observes a ā€˜deviationā€™ from historical relationships. Kostanyan is closely involved in the implementation of the TRIPP initiative. The trip may therefore be understood not only as a diplomatic engagement but also as part of Armeniaā€™s efforts to advance the corridor and related regional connectivity arrangements. From the Iranian perspective, Armenia has not sufficiently taken Tehranā€™s ā€˜concernsā€™ into account while proceeding with the project, which gives the visit broader regional significance beyond bilateral diplomacy. Current uncertainties and tensions are therefore portrayed not as a structural rivalry but as a recent policy shift by Armenia toward Western initiatives, which Tehran views as inconsistent with the traditionally predictable relationship.

Although these responses appear to represent hard-line and moderate positions, they in fact reflect Iranian concerns articulated at two different levels of policy. Velayatiā€™s warning conveys the strategic perception of the corridor as a geopolitical and security challenge that could alter regional balances and introduce external influence near Iranā€™s borders. Kharraziā€™s more measured statements address the operational level, focusing on the legal and jurisdictional arrangements governing the route and the necessity of preserving Armenian sovereignty and local border control. Taken together, they are complementary rather than contradictory: the first signals Iranā€™s red lines in terms of regional balance of power, while the second defines the specific conditions under which connectivity could be tolerated. This dual messaging suggests that Tehranā€™s opposition is directed not at transport connectivity itself, but at any arrangement that diminishes Iranā€™s strategic position or creates a non-sovereign security regime along its northwestern frontier.

Drawing on Russiaā€™s conduct in cases such as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the Syrian Civil War, Iranian assessments of Moscowā€™s position on the TRIPP are broadly consistent with longer-standing perceptions of Russia across Iranā€™s political spectrum. These range from proponents of deeper strategic alignment with Russia, to more skeptical voices that view reliance on Moscow as a strategic liability, such as those featured in Etemad and Shargh newspapers. Between these poles, a significant group of policymakers and experts adopts a position of cautious realism, advocating sustained engagement with Russia while maintaining a clear political safety margin featured in Donya-e-Eqtesad newspaper. Notably, across these perspectives there is a shared underlying assumption: Russia is not regarded as a fully predictable or reliably-aligned partner.

The Erosion of Iranā€™s Transit Hub Centrality

Iranā€™s policy toward the South Caucasus cannot be understood without reference to its broader economic strategy. In recent years, Tehran has increasingly framed its foreign policy around geo-economics rather than solely sanctions resistance and relief. A strategic guidance issued by the and the (June 2024) explicitly direct the government to activate Iranā€™s ā€˜geopolitical advantagesā€™ by transforming the country into a regional hub for trade, transport, and energy through regulatory reforms and infrastructure development.

The Development Plan intends to institutionalize this objective. It mandates the creation of a Regional Energy Trade Steering Committee, chaired by the President and composed of the Ministers of Oil, Foreign Affairs, and Energy, with parliamentary participation. The Committee is responsible for designing Iranā€™s regional energy diplomacy roadmap and approving export, import, swap, transit, and electricity exchange arrangements. These measures show that Iran is indeed attempting to convert geography into economic resilience: transit fees, energy swaps, and logistics services are intended to compensate for sanctions-related restrictions on direct trade and investment.

A central quantitative target of the Development Plan is to increase annual transit cargo volume from approximately 16 million tons at the beginning of the Plan to 40 million tons by its conclusion. The South Caucasus plays a crucial role in achieving this goal because it constitutes Iranā€™s shortest overland connection to Eurasian markets. The Iran-Armenia border effectively blocks a continuous °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š-Azerbaijan land corridor, thereby preserving °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±šā€™s dependence on Iranian transit routes toward Azerbaijan and Central Asia.

Iran participates in wider regional energy arrangements, including gas swap agreements with Turkmenistan and °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š. These arrangements allow Tehran to earn transit revenue, estimated at roughly $1ā€“1.5 billion annually, while maintaining relevance in regional energy distribution networks. It also conducts gas and electricity swaps with Azerbaijan to supply the Nakhchivan exclave. Additionally, it serves as a trucking corridor between °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š and Central Asia, currently of Turkish trucks annually.

However, emerging infrastructure projects threaten to erode this position. The , operational since March 2025, already reduces Nakhchivanā€™s dependence on Iranian gas swaps. If an additional pipeline link across southern Armenia were completed, Azerbaijan would obtain a direct energy connection to its exclave, while . With the TRIPP, Turkmenistanā€™s and Azerbaijanā€™s natural gas exports directly compete with Iranā€™s output by providing Armenia with flexibility and lowerā€‘cost alternatives.

More broadly, the proposed TRIPP corridor could connect °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š to Central Asia via Azerbaijan and the Caspian basin, thereby rendering the second route of the Middle Corridor practically feasible as a bypass to Iranian transit routes connecting China and Central Asia to Europe. Furthermore, the TRIPP would strengthen the Middle Corridor and its overreliance on .

For Tehran, the issue is not merely symbolic. Such routes would divert trucking flows, logistics investment, and energy transit away from Iran, potentially reducing transit income by a significant margin and weakening incentives for infrastructure development. estimate potential losses reaching up to 2.6 billion dollars annually over time when indirect effects on logistics, investment, and associated services are considered.

Even more important than immediate revenue is what Iranian policymakers call ā€˜.ā€™ Iran seeks to preserve independent land access to the Caucasus and Europe that does not depend exclusively on Turkishā€“Azerbaijani territory. The South Caucasus therefore functions not only as an economic opportunity but as a strategic economic lifeline. Any corridor that structurally marginalizes Iranian transit routes is perceived in Tehran not as a normal infrastructure project but as a long-term reduction of Iranā€™s geopolitical and economic leverage.

A Trojan Horse on Iranā€™s Doorstep: After °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š and Israel, now NATO and the USA

Tehranā€™s security concerns centre on preserving the sovereignty structure along its northwestern frontier. Iranian officials emphasize the maintenance of internationally recognized borders and oppose any extraterritorial or internationally supervised transit arrangements in the Syunik province. In Iranian strategic perception, a transport corridor is not merely an infrastructure project but a potential : if administered or monitored by external actors, it could facilitate intelligence collection, surveillance, and the institutionalization of foreign, especially American and Israeli, presence near sensitive Iranian regions. The Washington Accords remain vague regarding which actors will be responsible for providing daily security along the TRIPP corridor, even though Armenia is formally recognized as retaining sovereignty over its territory. This ambiguity leaves open the possibility that could assume a role in protecting the route. Consequently, Iranā€™s opposition is directed less at connectivity itself than at any arrangement that alters jurisdictional control or introduces external security actors along its immediate border.

The intensity of Velayatiā€™s remarks is best understood by factoring in the role of the U.S. in this initiative. According to , a former Iranian diplomat, in Iranian foreign policy thinking, where some officials regard antagonism with the U.S. as structural, any development in which Washington emerges as the agent of regional normalization would be viewed negatively. He therefore situates the corridor within Iranā€™s long-standing confrontation with the U.S., arguing that it would elevate Washingtonā€™s position as a political arbiter in the South Caucasus while creating a connectivity framework from which all regional actors – °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Western partners – would benefit, except Iran. In this interpretation, the corridor itself is not the principal concern; rather, the accompanying political arrangements could institutionalize U.S. influence and leave Iran structurally excluded from emerging regional trade and security networks. Velayatiā€™s rhetoric thus reflects a broader fear of geopolitical marginalization under a U.S.-backed regional order.

°ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±šā€™s Panā€‘Turkic Orientation and Its Strategic Implications for Iran

Iran opposes any extraterritorial corridor arrangements that would create a continuous °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š- Azerbaijan land connection and facilitate the Middle Corridor linking °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia. Iranian assess that such a route would shift the regional balance in favor of °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š, structurally reduce Iranā€™s role in eastā€“west connectivity, and diminish Tehranā€™s leverage in Eurasian trade and energy networks. Following the recent wars between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the Washington Accord, °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š appears a step closer toward its regional ambitions focused on pan-Turkism ranging from Anatolia to Central Asia.

Tehran interprets the TRIPP as a rebranded Zangezur Corridor that constitutes a that could undermine Iranā€™s geoeconomic relevance in the transit between Asia and Europe by reducing dependency of regional actors on Iranian transit routes.

Within Iranian strategic discourse, the project is also interpreted as part of a broader geopolitical realignment across Eurasia. Iranian officials and senior advisers have argued that a continuous transport axis from Anatolia to Central Asia would expand Turkish political and economic influence, weaken Iranā€™s geoeconomic centrality, and potentially enable a wider external security presence in the South Caucasus. From Tehranā€™s perspective, the concern is less ideological than structural: a functioning Middle Corridor could bypass Iranian territory while embedding new political, military, and intelligence partnerships near Iranā€™s northwestern frontier.

At the same time, Iran appears to have avoided the worstā€‘case scenario that had emerged following the oneā€‘day 2023 conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia and the subsequent escalation in Azerbaijani rhetoric, particularly the invocation of the ā€˜Western Azerbaijanā€™ concept.3 Likewise, Bakuā€™s promotion of a ā€˜special corridorā€™ā€” envisioned within the broader Zangezur Corridor framework and implying strong Azerbaijaniā€“Turkish control ā€” had raised significant concerns in Tehran regarding potential geopolitical and territorial encroachments. It would have materially shifted regional power toward the Turkish bloc and most likely completely exclude Iran from connectivity, linking Europe to Asia.

Between Alignment and Competition: Russia and Iranā€™s South Caucasus Strategy

In the South Caucasus, Russian and Iranian foreign policies converge in their shared willingness to counter Western influence and to constrain Ankaraā€™s expanding regional role. This alignment is also reflected in their cooperation within the International Northā€“South Transport Corridor, which both states have leveraged to mitigate the impact of Western sanctions. However, the Northā€“South Transport Corridor remains inefficient and weakened by the prospects of the TRIPP and future Azerbaijan and Armenia collaboration.

At the same time, Moscow and Tehran continue to pursue distinct regional and geopolitical objectives aimed at advancing their own interests and influence in the South Caucasus rather than form a cohesive strategic approach as a functional partnership. The Washington Accords highlight these underlying frictions, particularly in revealing the absence of a coordinated Russianā€“Iranian position toward the TRIPP. The corridor itself is part of a wider geopolitical contest over connectivity, influence, and control in the South Caucasus, where transport routes translate directly into political and economic leverage.

Just like Iran, Moscow has voiced general concerns and skepticism regarding the TRIPP, its implementation, and its impact on the region. to the Washington Declaration reflects this partial but imperfect convergence. The Russian Foreign Ministry responded cautiously, emphasizing regional stability and existing agreements while avoiding direct confrontation with the initiative. Moscow has been careful not to antagonize Washington or to openly criticize American President Donald Trump, while underscoring its indispensable role in ensuring the success of the TRIPP.

Iranian commentary, however, interpreted this as an ambiguous position and expressed dissatisfaction that Moscow did not oppose the project more explicitly. The observes that Russia is transitioning from dominant security hegemon in the Caucasus to a constrained, reactive actor that seeks to manage decline through selective cooperation and behind-the-scenes leverage. From Tehranā€™s perspective, Russia is expected to resist new mediation formats that elevate Western involvement in the South Caucasus; Moscowā€™s restrained response therefore raised concerns in Iran about the reliability of Russian support. The episode illustrates that, although Iran and Russia share reservations about a U.S.-centred regional framework, their threat perceptions and priorities are not identical, and cooperation between them remains situational rather than fully coordinated.

In this context, Iran finds areas of partial convergence with Russiaā€™s policy in the South Caucasus. Both states regard the proposed corridor with caution, as it could enable a new connectivity and mediation architecture in the region that would diminish their influence while expanding the presence of external actors ā€” primarily °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š and the United States, but potentially China as well. Although their motivations differ, the project is perceived in both capitals as contributing to a regional order in which Western-backed arrangements gain prominence at the expense of Iranian and Russian leverage and the increasing influence of NATO countries in the South Caucasus. Furthermore, it weakens existing regional frameworks involving Russia, Iran, and °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š, such as the and the . Additionally, Armeniaā€™s shift toward Western influence is perceived by both countries as a growing risk to their regional interests.

For Tehran, the primary concerns relate to border security and the risk of exclusion from emerging regional transit networks. For Moscow, the issue is more closely tied to the erosion of its longstanding role as the principal security arbiter in the South Caucasus and, more broadly, to the setbacks confronting its neoimperial ambitions in the region weakened by Russiaā€™s war against Ukraine.

While Russia and Iran share a primary interest in resisting the growing presence of NATO and Western influence in the South Caucasus, persistent divergences have prevented them from coordinating an effective strategic approach. Even prior to the TRIPP initiative, certain analysts, such as , Iranā€™s former ambassador to Baku, had warned over Russiaā€™s ambiguous position on Zangezur corridor. Iranian analysts often describe Russiaā€™s position as ambiguous and more flexible than Tehranā€™s, particularly on ā€˜who managesā€™ an eventual arrangement. They believe that Russiaā€™s position on the Zangezur corridor reflects a broader pattern in its relationship with Iran: it is not a truly strategic partnership but rather a transactional one driven by shifting interests. In this context, the implicit message for Iran is to exercise caution. Russia may not be a reliable partner and could instrumentalize Iranā€™s position to advance its own regional objectives. For example, in 2026, Moscow sought to renew its influence in the South Caucasus by seeking to fix its relationship with , as well as influencing the democratic process in and the election of a pro-Russian government.

The February 2026 War and Its Implications

On 28 February 2026, the United States and Israel launched joint military operations against Iran, targeting its nuclear and missile capabilities with broader regime-change ambitions. While military objectives appear achievable in the short term, the political outcome remains deeply uncertain. The South Caucasus has thus far remained largely insulated from the conflict, despite Azerbaijan’s ties to Israel and limited Iranian strikes on and alleged supported by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps targeting the Bakuā€“Tbilisiā€“Ceyhan pipeline. Iran’s posture toward °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š and the broader region remains ambiguous mainly due to precarious geopolitical positions and its internal turmoil. , however, despite certain immediate challenges such as increased energy prices, sees opportunities in consolidating its status as a regional energy hub and crossroads.

Russiaā€™s response to the war has been evaluated as insufficient ā€“ even unacceptable ā€“ by . He attributes this restraint to Russiaā€™s self-interest, particularly economic gains and strategic distractions linked to Ukraine. His assessment implies that despite rhetoric of strategic partnership, Russia behaves as a pragmatic actor that supports Iran only when it aligns with its own interests, raising serious doubts about its reliability in moments of crisis. At the same time, Russia appears to be playing a low-profile but consequential role by supplying Tehran with on U.S. military targets, as well as with operational lessons derived from the war in Ukraine, particularly regarding the employment of unmanned aerial systems and electronic warfare capabilities. This collaboration represents a full circle, following Iranā€™s transfer of Shahed drones to Russia at the outset of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Tehran not only provided the drones themselves but also offered technical support and assistance that enabled Moscow to establish its own production line for the Geran-2, the Russian version of the Shahed drone.

Regardless of the outcomes of the 2026 military campaign or the prospect of regime change in Iran, Tehranā€™s geostrategic competition with °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š over Eurasian transit routes is likely to remain a powerful geographic and economic force shaping the South Caucasus. °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±šā€™s ambition to establish a pan-Turkic corridor linking Anatolia to Central Asia via the Caspian Sea ā€” while bypassing Iranian territory ā€” poses a sustained threat to Iranā€™s transit revenues and strategic depth, irrespective of the composition of the governing regime in Tehran.

Even in the event of regime collapse and its replacement by a government aligned with U.S. and broader Western preferences, or a significantly weakened state deprived of key military instruments for projecting influence in the South Caucasus, competition between Iran and °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š over Eurasian transit corridors is likely to persist. This rivalry predates the establishment of the Islamic Republic and would almost certainly outlast it. No Iranian government will find Turkish dominance of the Eurasian corridor to be in Iran’s national interest. This is a structural feature of the regional balance of power rather than an ideological preference.

While the nature of the governing regime in Tehran may shape the extent and modalities of Iranā€™s participation in the TRIPP, it is unlikely to fundamentally alter the underlying structural competition with °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š and the lack of a common strategic approach with Russia. A more democratic Iranian government could, in fact, pursue a more proactive integration into the TRIPP-linked infrastructure, potentially positioning Iran as a critical southern corridor connecting Eurasian transit networks to the Persian Gulf. A pro-Western Iran, freed from sanctions and able to attract Western investment, may prove a more effective competitor to Turkish corridor dominance than the Islamic Republic was ā€“ because it can engage international financial systems and offer regional partners a credible alternative. Along this line, some within the Iranian government have already highlighted a potential role for Iran in the TRIPP, particularly by linking the proposed railway to a broader Northā€“South axis that would connect Iran to the project.

Overall, the most likely scenario is a weakened Iran embroiled in prolonged transition and domestic challenges, where the outcomes of the 2026 war and the popular mobilization against the regime forces the Islamic Republic into a posture of survival and tactical concession, producing a prolonged period of U.S.-Iran negotiations. Although the TRIPP constitutes a secondary concern relative to regime survival, particularly in a context of elite fragmentation and competition over residual state assets, including security forces, revenue streams, and territorial authority, it nevertheless reflects deeper structural dynamics. Specifically, regional competition with °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š is likely to remain a defining feature of Iranā€™s strategic environment.

Overall, Iranā€™s capacity to oppose the TRIPP would be significantly diminished in a context of internal fragmentation, where the central government struggles to maintain a coherent and strategic policy orientation. As domestic contestation over authority, resources, and coercive instruments intensifies, Tehran is unlikely to either mount an effective opposition to the TRIPP or engage with it in a consistent and constructive manner. This erosion of state capacity would, in turn, weaken Iranā€™s position along its northern frontier with Armenia, potentially transforming the Syunik region into both an economic and security vulnerability.

For °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š, the 2026 war could constitute a strategic window of opportunity to consolidate its influence in the South Caucasus. With Iran internally weakened and Russia preoccupied with the war in Ukraine, Ankara face fewer constraints in advancing the Middle Corridor pan-Turkic connectivity agenda. In such a scenario, both Armenia and Azerbaijan may increasingly view °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š as a reliable regional partner, particularly if Ankaraā€™s initiatives are reinforced by support from the United States and the Trump administration and by broader Western engagement. At the same time, the weakening of Iran could result on unintended consequences, such as the renewal of at Turkish borders.

Conclusion

The renewed U.S. engagement in the South Caucasus catalyzed by the Washington Accords and the TRIPP constitutes a strategic advantage for °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š and Azerbaijan. It helps remove existing to the projectā€™s implementation and circumvents longstanding opposition, particularly from Iran and Russia. For Armenia, the TRIPP represents a rare opportunity to stimulate economic development, consolidate its strategic reorientation toward the West, and rebalance its negotiating position vis-Ć -vis Baku, while simultaneously benefiting from the expanding trade and connectivity generated by the Middle Corridor.

By reconfiguring regional connectivity, the United States seeks to weaken both Iranian and Russian influence in the South Caucasus. Within this new strategic environment, any Iranian effort to obstruct the corridor in practice would no longer confront Azerbaijan or °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š alone, but rather the United States itself. Such opposition would also risk damaging Iranā€™s relationship with Yerevan and undermine its access to the Northā€“South Corridor, thereby weakening Iranā€™s broader connectivity to Europe.

Although Iran and Russia share certain tactical positions, most notably their skepticism toward externally driven regional initiatives such as the TRIPP, their strategic interests diverge. Russiaā€™s posture remains pragmatic and situational, shaped by its wider global priorities and flexibility in regional bargaining. Iranian officials, by contrast, increasingly perceive the TRIPP as a direct geopolitical threat, one that could marginalize Iran economically and strategically within emerging Eurasian trade networks.

Overall, the Washington Accords have the potential to reshape the geostrategic and geoeconomic landscape of the South Caucasus and to challenge Iranā€™s traditional regional foreign policy. However, the realization of these outcomes will depend on the successful implementation of an ambitious infrastructure agenda requiring sustained Western engagement, as well as the finalization of a durable peace settlement between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The post Iranā€™s Strategic Recalibration in the South Caucasus after the 2025 Washington Agreement and the 2026 Israeli American Intervention appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

The South Caucasus region has historically been regarded as one of the most complex regions in the world, where geopolitical rivalries, ethnic disputes, and energy security risks collide. One of the longest-lasting conflicts in the region is the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh.

This paper aims to study the Washington Peace Declaration between Armenia and Azerbaijan and its potential impact on security and economic integration in the South Caucasus region. TRIPP and related transport initiatives could enable Armenia and Azerbaijan to serve as critical components of a strategic transit corridor linking Europe and Asia. US and EU engagement is highlighted as essential for maintaining stability and attracting investment in the region.

The post The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Geopolitical Significance of the Washington Peace Declaration for the South Caucasus appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

A Changing Landscape for Armeniaā€“Russia Relations: A Colonial Legacy argues that Armeniaā€™s long-standing reliance on Russiaā€”rooted in imperial rule, Soviet governance, and post-1991 security dependencyā€”has produced a deeply asymmetrical, quasi-colonial relationship that continues to shape contemporary politics. The piece highlights how Russiaā€™s role in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, its use of ā€œfrozen conflictsā€ as leverage, and the economic and migratory ties binding Armenians to Russian structures have reinforced this dependency even as Armenia seeks greater sovereignty after the 2018 Velvet Revolution. Russiaā€™s inconsistent support during crises, particularly the 2020 and 2023 conflicts, has accelerated an erosion of trust, prompting Armenia to reconsider its strategic orientation. Yet the legacy of Russian dominanceā€”embedded in institutions, security arrangements, and political cultureā€”complicates any attempt to reorient the countryā€™s foreign policy, leaving Armenia caught between historical dependency and a desire for genuine autonomy.

The post A Changing Landscape for Armenia-Russia Relations: A Colonial Legacy? appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

In August 2025, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the United States signed a three-way agreement to end the long-standing conflict between the two nations, built upon the preliminary agreements established between Armenia and Azerbaijan in March 2025. The prospective peace deal further includes a clause for the creation of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), a transport corridor through the Zangezur region. The TRIPP establishes a 99-year partnership granting the U.S. exclusive rights to develop transportation and energy infrastructure within Armenia’s Zangezur corridor to create a new Asia-Europe transit route that bypasses Russia and Iran.

To view the whole report, download the report below.

The post An Overview of the Washington Agreement for Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict Resolution appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

The Caspian and Black Sea regions hold significant geopolitical importance for Europe’s energy security, due to their strategic location, abundant resources, and critical role as transit corridors linking energy-producing areas with consumer markets. .  The significance of these regions also extends beyond energy and trade, encompassing economic potential and a strategic role in regional stability and broader security dynamics. Given their geopolitical and geostrategic value, ensuring the security of these regions has become a priority for external actors, often from geopolitically opposing sides. The regionsā€™ energy reserves, trade flows, and transportation infrastructure increasingly influence both regional and transregional stability and security frameworks. 

The post The Strategic Importance of the Caspian and Black Sea Regions for Europeā€™s Energy Security appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

Launched in September 2024, the Yerevan Dialogue (hereafter the Dialogue) is a pivotal initiative for Armenia’s regional geopolitical standing. Organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia in collaboration with the Observer Research Foundation, an Indian government-affiliated think tank, the Dialogue underscores the deepening partnership and growing diplomatic and military ties between India and Armenia.

The Yerevan Dialogue strategically aims to advertise Armenia as the South Caucasus’s sole liberal hub amidst democratic setbacks in Georgia and increasing authoritarianism in Azerbaijan. It is organized in part as a response to similar regional initiatives, such as the Baku Security Forum and, to a lesser extent, forums in Georgia. With the initiative, Armenia aims to become a vital junction connecting Central Asia, Europe, Russia, and the Middle East. Beyond fostering regional connectivity and trade, Armenia also seeks to be an influential actor in conflict resolution, demonstrating its commitment to peace in the South Caucasus.

The second iteration of the Yerevan Dialogue, held in May 2025, focused on critical contemporary issues including connectivity, artificial intelligence, climate, international law, and geopolitical challenges. This aligns the Yerevan Dialogue with other prominent regional summits like the Halifax Security Forum, the Munich Security Conference, and the Warsaw Security Forum. The discussions were geared towards South and Eastern Europe as well as India, and to a lesser extent the Middle East, including Iran. Minimal representation from Central Asia at the Dialogue underscored Baku’s dominant regional position and diplomatic strategic advantage.

This policy analysis explores the significance of the Yerevan Dialogue within the evolving South Caucasus landscape, with a particular focus on the draft peace agreement with Azerbaijan, Armeniaā€™s regional initiative ā€” the Crossroads of Peace, and more broadly on international law and norms in a changing world. It shows how Armenia is banking on the rising status of the South Caucasus as a in global trade and connectivity to increase its relevance in international affairs; however, its diplomatic successes are tempered by Azerbaijanā€™s dominant geopolitical and military position.

The post The Yerevan Dialogue: Armenia’s Geopolitical Strategy in the South Caucasus appeared first on Eastern European and Transatlantic Network.

saw Armenia and Azerbaijan announce a major step towards normalization, raising the prospect of a near-term peace agreement. However, these post-2023 negotiations present Armenia with stark choices: potentially sacrificing national identity, sovereignty, or international justice access. With the pre-2020 status quo no longer viable, Armenia must confront compromises largely dictated by Azerbaijan, raising the crucial question of what will be lost and whether national unity can be maintained.

This white paper analyzes how Armenia’s weak negotiating position, regional isolation, and limited leverage hinder its pursuit of a just and lasting peace. It explores the impact of power imbalances in conflict resolution, the influence of external actors or the lack thereof in post-conflict stabilization, the crucial role of social reconciliation given the absence of international justice, and unresolved human rights issues within the peace process. The paper argues that international justice will likely be sacrificed in this process, potentially deepening generational trauma in Armenia, and risk perpetuating regional violence. Ultimately, the paper concludes that preserving Armenia’s absolute sovereignty is a critical redline for ensuring the nation’s survival.

The Peace Process: How to Ensure a Fair Settlement Facing Asymmetry

Since 1994, multilateral diplomacyā€”primarily through the ā€”has failed to resolve the core issues of the region’s peace process. Weakened by escalating geopolitical rivalries and the influence of Russian imperialist policies in the former Soviet Union, the Minsk Group and the OSCEā€™s monitoring mission were unable to prevent outbreaks of violence between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This failure created an opportunity for °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š to expand its role in the conflict, providing political and military support to Azerbaijan and significantly shifting the balance of power.

Following the 2020 Second Karabakh War, multilateral efforts were largely supplanted by direct external mediation led by Russia, which yielded limited results. Although Moscow brokered a ceasefire and deployed a peacekeeping mission, it proved either unable or unwilling to prevent violations of Armeniaā€™s sovereignty in 2022. The war fundamentally shifted the balance of power in Azerbaijanā€™s favour, a dynamic further reinforced after the one-day war in 2023.

In September 2023, Azerbaijan launched a new military offensive to retake the breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh, mainly populated by ethnic Armenians. Although in violation of the 2020 ceasefire, the operation was designed to take over the region while Russia remained bogged down in Ukraine and mainly uninterested in fulfilling its mandate as peace guarantors of the 2020 accords. After a swift Azerbaijani military victory over Armenian separatist forces in Nagorno-Karabakh, ethnic Armenians fled, fearing for their lives. The scale and swiftness of this ethnic cleansing was reminiscent of what happened in former Yugoslavia in the 1990s.

Following Armeniaā€™s military defeat and the failed ceasefire brokered by Russia, °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±šā€™s growing influence, coupled with Azerbaijanā€™s military victory, marked the decline of multilateral diplomacy in the South Caucasus. As a result, , sidelining previous mediation efforts and moving away from Russiaā€™s self-interested approach to conflict resolution. 

The negotiation process has been skewed by Azerbaijan’s dominant position in the conflict, a lack of external constraints, and the absence of a mutually hurting stalemate. This concept, defined by Zartmann (1985), describes a situation where neither side believes it can win the war, and further conflict would be unbearably harmful to all involved. Baku’s control of most negotiation leverage has led to relative intransigence in accepting compromise and negotiating in good faith. While Armenia has shown willingness to compromise on some maximalist demands regarding the status of Karabakh and transitional justice, Azerbaijan’s willingness to make concessions remains less apparent.

The burden of peace largely falls on Armenia. The country faces a difficult balancing act: its limits its leverage at the negotiating table, while internal political dynamics constrain its ability to accept a settlement perceived as a national defeat. Moreover, the progress of direct negotiations between Armenia and °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š is contingent on the results of bilateral discussions between Armenia and Azerbaijan. °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š’s prioritization of its support for Azerbaijan outweighs its need for a bilateral agreement with Armenia.

Rather than repeating the mistakes made after the 2018 revolutionā€”when the government adopted a rigid stance and withdrew from the negotiation process (Grigoryan 2024)ā€”Armenia appears to have adopted a proactive approach. This means defining its core priorities and determining what it is willing to compromise in this short but critical window of opportunity to establish peace with Azerbaijan. However, an important level of uncertainty continues to surround Azerbaijanā€™s willingness to commit to the peace accord.

In this context, a peace agreement that imposes minimal concessions on Azerbaijanā€”without external enforcement mechanisms or meaningful diplomatic costsā€”could severely undermine Armeniaā€™s security, leaving it vulnerable to further coercion. Azerbaijanā€™s demands for directly challenge Armeniaā€™s sovereignty and could serve as a Trojan horse, increasing Armeniaā€™s vulnerability to Azerbaijanā€™s maximalist claims. Precedents for granting extraterritorial rights in post-conflict negotiations are extremely rare. The 1995 Dayton Accords included a territorial exchange to create the Goražde corridor, avoiding the need to grant extraterritorial rights. However, this exchange was part of a broader settlement based on territorial control established during the civil war. While Armenia has expressed willingness to honour its commitments under the 2020 ceasefire and has proposed a bilateral agreement on transportation through the Zangezur corridor, Azerbaijan has refused to grant reciprocal access to Nakhchivan. As a result, both sides have agreed to put negotiations over the corridor and its access on hold.

For some , the delay to sign a peace treaty even after Armeniaā€™s formal recognition of Azerbaijan territorial integrity underlines a careful approach seeking to avoid negative consequences of a premature peace treaty as observed with the Dayton and Minsk Accord. However, time does not play in Armeniaā€™s favour; it only worsens Armeniaā€™s bargaining position. While negotiating, Azerbaijan continues to implement a policy seeking to transform the Karabakh region and deconstruct previous as well as targeting its . It seeks to eliminate the option of a return to the status quo ante bellum and de facto prevent the return of refugees in the absence of a de jure option.

Peace Accord and Enforcement: The Imperative of a Reliable Guarantor

Negotiations where one side holds all the leverage often lead to a victorā€™s peace.  Without an external mediator or balancing force, the dominant party can push for maximalist and recurring demandsā€”a pattern Azerbaijan has followed since September 2023. Azerbaijanā€™s insistence that Armenia amend its constitution exemplifies this growing pressure.

Even in the context of a prospective peace accord, with no significant international or domestic pressure, Azerbaijan can escalate its demands on Armenia with minimal political repercussions. In asymmetric negotiations, the more dominant party is often incentivized to renege on agreements and push for further concessions (Fearon 1996). In a victorā€™s peace, where there is no external pressure to curb maximalist demands, one of the few restraining factors is the recognition that excessive demands could backfire in the long run or that a mutually beneficial economic arrangement offers a more sustainable alternative.

More than mediation, this peace process requires external guarantors. Guarantors typically engage in conflict resolution when they have strategic incentives or significant stakes in the outcome. At present, no strong external guarantor is pressuring Azerbaijan to uphold any potential settlement with Armenia. The issue at hand in the South Caucasus is not necessarily security guarantees, as in Ukraine, but rather assurances that any bilateral agreement will be upheld by both parties, preventing negotiated compromises from becoming leverage for further demands.

Relying solely on good faith and trust often leads to disappointment, as seen in many post-Soviet peace processes. As seen in the cases of the Minsk Process and the Accords, the absence of an external guarantor often benefits the stronger belligerent, allowing it to reshape the agreement, refuse to implement it, and escalate its demands while the weaker party bears the consequences.

Escalating demands from Ankara and Baku highlight that without a reliable enforcement mechanism, Armenia risks being in a weaker position if it proceeds with signing an agreement. exemplifies this risk. After the 2020 ceasefire, Azerbaijan imposed restrictions on the only road connecting Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh, citing security concerns over alleged arms transfers. This move directly violated the Russian-brokered peace agreement and further infringed on the rights of the Armenian minority. The blockade effectively starved the Armenian population, depriving them of essential resources and threatening their survival in Karabakh for several months. It underscores the dangers of asymmetrical power dynamics between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the absence of a credible international guarantor. Russia has failed to enforce the ceasefire or uphold the 2020 agreement, leaving power politics as the primary driver of bilateral negotiations.

Even in a victorious scenario, such as in the First Chechen War, the absence of international support can hinder the consolidation of peace. Despite achieving a decisive military victory against the Russian Federation in 1996 and holding free and fair presidential elections in 1997, Chechnya struggled to implement political reforms and state-building measures due to its international isolation. While Russia reneged on its commitments under the , the international community failed to impose sanctions on Moscow. This lack of external support contributed to the rise of warlordism and laid the groundwork for the Second Chechen War. The (EUMA) is a cautious first step, distancing external actors from purely geopolitical motives, unlike Russiaā€™s role in the 2000s and especially after 2020. However, the recent between the parties suggests a willingness to . Long-lasting peace in protracted ethnic conflicts, such as in Northern Ireland, hinge on legal commitments to renounce violence. Given the geopolitical tensions in the South Caucasus, strong legal commitments may be the only viable path to achieving sustainable peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Armeniaā€™s relative regional and international isolation heightens its vulnerability to Azerbaijanā€™s growing and maximalist demands, and the risk of Baku reneging on a peace treaty despite Armenia’s significant concessions.

Armenia at the Crossroads: Navigating Regional and Global Isolation

Russiaā€™s inaction to protect Armenia in 2020 and its subsequent inability to fulfill its mandate as a peace guarantor has led to Armeniaā€™s decision to sever its security ties with Russia and withdraw from the CSTO, ultimately creating an opportunity for Armenia to rethink its security strategy as a whole. Armeniaā€™s recent pivot to the West places it in a precarious position as it seeks to challenge the victorā€™s peace imposed by Azerbaijan and its Turkish ally. Although its current isolation is not a permanent state but rather a transitional phase, it has complicated Armeniaā€™s efforts to secure an international guarantor for a peace settlement.

In peace processes, isolation can be used to pressure states into renouncing revanchist demands, engaging in transitional justice, or joining negotiations as observersā€”such as Serbia in the early 2000s. However, Armenia’s situation is different. Its isolation benefits Azerbaijan, reinforcing its intransigent stance on peace, human rights, and Armenian sovereignty. Moreover, Armenia’s isolation encourages Azerbaijan’s territorial ambitions and reluctance to engage in a transitional justice process.

To mitigate its isolation, Armenia has leveraged its democratization process and pivot toward the EU as a signal of its intention to pursue strategic changes and its urgent need for international support in implementing the peace process. As Prime Minister framed it, peace and normalized relations with °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š and Azerbaijan are sine qua non conditions for a successful democratization process in Armenia. However, in the broader context of democratic backsliding in the United States, Pashinyanā€™s strategy of positioning Armenia as the new beacon of democracy in the South Caucasus could backfire in the coming years. He may ultimately face a difficult choice between aligning more closely with the EU or the U.S. in his bid for political backing. While democratic values present themselves as the moral choice, the more pressing survival imperative remains a firm and expedited commitment to a lasting peace settlement.

Armenia has also moved to strengthen its strategic partnerships, signing agreements with France in 2024 and with the United States and the Netherlands in 2025. France, in particular, has expanded its role in the South Caucasus, positioning itself as a key actor in providing Armenia with increased support and . At the same time, Armenia should avoid overestimating the impact of its recent weapons procurement from France and India as a means of altering the current status quo. Weapon systems remain mostly defensive and do not represent a game-changer in terms of military parity with Azerbaijan. Previous miscalculations before the 2020 war have demonstrated the risks of adopting a hardline approach to peace settlements.

Overall, Armenia remains in a precarious position, where a military solution to its predicament is not foreseeable, and limited foreign support hinders its ability to re-establish a balance of power in the negotiation process.

Pathways to Peace: Leveraging Economic and Political Incentives for Win-Win Solutions

With limited external constraints, Bakuā€™s uncompromising approach makes a balanced agreement increasingly difficult. The absence of a win-win peace scenario could become a source of future grievances, fueling deep-seated conflicts, as seen in the cases of Russiaā€™s in Chechnya and in Georgia. Sustainable peace, however, requires both sides to be willing to compromise rather than escalating their demands.

Conflict resolution experiences highlight the critical role of economic and political incentives in fostering peace (Mansfield and Snyder 1995). Achieving historical justice and addressing deep-seated tensions are essential for peace, but sustainable peace also requires that all parties see it as a preferable alternative to continued violenceā€”particularly in cases where local populations have been polarized and mobilized over long periods of time.

Win-win scenarios provide long-term solutions by fostering cooperation between warring factions. For such solutions to be viable, both sides must perceive the peace settlement as politically and economically beneficial for them rather than as a loss of something fundamental to their identity and interests. Shifting negotiations away from emotionally charged issues of identity, justice, and blame could create a more constructive path forward.

Economic cooperation, when framed as a fair and reciprocal partnership rather than a victory imposing dominance over the other, can serve as a foundation for trust-building and de-escalation. Additionally, emphasizing economic imperatives and tangible successes over nationalist narratives can help demobilize hardliners and foster a more pragmatic .

The post-1945 German-French reconciliation, the 1998 Belfast Agreement, and peace settlements in the former Yugoslavia underscore the powerful role of economic incentives in fostering reconciliation. In the latter case, a combination of Serbiaā€™s regional isolation and the European Unionā€™s (EU) integration incentives facilitated the implementation of transitional justice. These factors encouraged warring parties to seek compromises, leading Serbia to rebuild its relationships with Kosovo and Croatia. For instance, the EUā€™s requirement for full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) as a condition for accession played a crucial role in advancing the peace process. Each side recognized the necessity of setting aside historical grievances in pursuit of economic opportunities.

A mutually beneficial solution in the South Caucasus remains elusive. Few countries or international institutions currently possess the will to compel Azerbaijan to negotiate in good faith with Armenia. The European energy sector continues to rely on Azeri gas, often turning a blind eye to Bakuā€™s role in circumventing energy sanctions on Russia. Unlike other regional actors, Azerbaijan is not seeking EU integration and instead prioritizes its relationships with °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š and, more recently, Central Asia. The proposed by Armenia entitled the ā€œCrossroad of Peace,ā€ along with broader discussions on economic and logistical cooperation between Azerbaijan, °ÕĆ¼°ł°ģ¾±²ā±š, Armenia, and Iran, present the most significant opportunity for an economic-driven peace process in the region. In the current bargaining context, Armenia perceives itself as facing significant sacrifices. However, framing the Zangezur corridor within a broader vision of regional economic integrationā€”rather than as a unilateral lossā€”could help mitigate the perception of total defeat among the Armenian population.

Reframing the negotiation process around regional economic cooperation rather than the loss of Karabakh could help stabilize relations, despite decades of armed conflict. While the current outcome of recent wars is not what Armenia had hoped for, the country must navigate this suboptimal reality and focus on achievable, mutually beneficial goals. Concessions should not always be seen as historical defeats but rather as strategic steps toward a more stable and prosperous future.

The Peace Process and the Erosion of International Law

In March 2025, the two countries agreed to withdraw, dismiss, or settle their legal disputes in international courts, particularly at the International Court of Justice (ICJ). However, the agreement remains silent on alternative mechanisms for addressing international crimes committed over the past forty years of conflict. Nor does it provide a framework for societal reconciliationā€”a sine qua non for long-term peace.

Addressing international crimes committed by both sides over an extended period presents a significant challenge for peacebuilding and transitional justice. International justice and accountability for war crimes are often among the first concessions states make to secure a peace deal, as seen in Nicaragua, Cambodia, and Colombia. Conflict resolution literature suggests that while such compromises may facilitate agreements, they carry long-term consequences. For instance, blanket amnesties for crimes against humanity have shown limited effectiveness in sustaining lasting peace (Dancy 2018). The absence of transitional justice fosters generational trauma, erodes confidence in international law, and increases the likelihood of future conflicts. Addressing international crimes is therefore crucial to preventing cyclical violence, as demonstrated in Rwanda, Cambodia, and, to a lesser extent, the former Yugoslavia.

The ICJ is also currently reviewing potential war crimes committed during the 2020 War, including the destruction of Armenian cultural heritage as a possible crime against humanity, alongside a countersuit from Azerbaijan. However, Armeniaā€™s international legal has resigned amid the impending agreement with Azerbaijan. In the present case, the ICJ has explicitly stated that it will restrict its inquiry to incidents occurring after , affecting Azerbaijan’s willingness to engage with international justice

Armenia also joined the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2024, but the tribunal has yet to open an investigation into crimes committed in the recent conflicts. Largely due to a tacit agreement with Azerbaijan, has refrained from referring the 2023 one-day war, the blockade of the Lachin corridor, and the ongoing destruction of its cultural heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh to the ICC.

Since May 2022, Armenia has retroactively accepted the ICCā€™s jurisdiction, meaning crimes committed in Nagorno-Karabakh after that date could fall under its purview, provided certain legal conditions are met. Drawing a parallel to the procedure initiated regarding crimes against Rohingyas in in 2016 and 2017, the ICC could explore the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh despite the alleged crimes taking place within Azerbaijan’s internationally recognized borders. Even though Azerbaijan is not a party to the Rome Statute, ICC prosecutors could build a case by arguing that certain crimes, such as the deportations resulting in ethnic cleansing, had consequences that occurred within Armenia’s territory.

A growing opposition in Armenia and its diaspora has criticized the Armenian government for considering the withdrawal of its legal proceedings at the ICC and ICJ. Furthermore, in April 2024, an petitioned the ICC prosecutor to investigate potential crimes against humanity and acts of genocide committed in Karabakh. The claim of genocide has also been raised in policy circles, notably by a .

Unless the peace settlement ensures long-term stability and fosters a mutually beneficial partnership, sidelining justice may prove to be a short-term fix that exacerbates generational trauma and reignites tensions between the belligerents. Moreover, while the Armenian government and its negotiators may see the strategic value in compromising on international justice, such a decision risks further alienating the Armenian populationā€”potentially undermining the very peace process it seeks to uphold.

Crimes Against Humanity in Nagorno-Karabakh: The Imperative for Action

The political and social costs of abandoning these cases appear significantly higher than Armeniaā€™s formal recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh as sovereign Azerbaijani territoryā€”a move that aligns with international law and does not impact the right of refugees to return. As the ICJ and other tribunals prepare to deliver historic rulings on the crime of aggression and genocide in three major casesā€”South Africa v. Israel, Ukraine v. Russian Federation, and The Gambia v. Myanmar (with seven states intervening)ā€”Armeniaā€™s decision to abandon legal proceedings may prove to be a costly choice in the long run. 

Even if Armenia chooses not to pursue the case itself, ICC state parties such as Canada or France have the authority to refer the situation to the ICC prosecutor for investigation, as was done in Ukraine regarding war crimes committed by Russian Armed Forces. Furthermore, the ICC prosecutor can launch a proprio motu investigation if sufficient evidence exists that a crime under the courtā€™s jurisdiction has been committed. Moreover, the Statute of the International Court of Justice permits state parties, under specific conditions, to institute legal proceedings concerning crimes perpetrated in armed conflicts, as demonstrated by in relation to Israel’s conduct in Gaza.

For the moment, the international community has been cautious not to jeopardize the peace process by advocating for judicial accountability regarding crimes committed during the recent conflicts between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This restraint contrasts sharply with the approach taken in the case of Russiaā€™s war against Ukraine. The Armenian government and the international community must be mindful not to sacrifice justice and human rights in pursuit of a temporary peace with Azerbaijan.

The Unclear Path to Social Reconciliation: Navigating the Challenges

The current peace negotiations and the March 2025 preliminary announcement on normalization remain vague on reconciliation and accountability mechanisms. This silence raises concerns about an Azeri-imposed peace process that lacks a formal approach to addressing international crimes or, at the very least, establishing a path forward to confront their impact on both civil societies. Social reconciliation does not necessarily require the establishment of an international tribunal. While the two countries have agreed to abandon legal proceedings, this should not mean abandoning the principle of accountabilityā€”especially in the context of a victorā€™s peace. Creating the conditions for sustainable peace and successful conflict resolution requires addressing generational trauma, myths, and historical distortions that perpetuate cycles of hatred. A genuine peace process should prioritize tackling the root causes of violence rather than merely addressing its symptoms, which result from ongoing negative interactions between the belligerents.

In the context of the South Caucasus peace process, it is essential for each party to adopt an introspective and analytical approach to the international crimes committed since 1988. An unfortunate tendency in peace settlements is often to focus on the most recent crimes and limit the historical period covered by transitional justice or social reconciliation mechanisms (Schabas 2006). However, in the case of Armenia and Azerbaijan, such a narrow approach risks perpetuating a cycle of hatred and grievances. For that reason, alternative approaches to international courts can provide the necessary flexibility, as international courts often face temporal limitations regarding the scope of their investigations, which ultimately feed into the cycle of grievances between parties.

While accountability mechanisms such as international tribunals and truth commissions are not always universally accepted by all parties in a conflict, they play a crucial role in bringing closure to victims and laying the groundwork for a shared historical narrative. The ICTY has been instrumental in addressing crimes committed in Bosnia-Herzegovina, particularly the Srebrenica genocide, by providing both a legal and historical framework for prosecuting atrocities under international law. The recognition of Srebrenica as genocide is now firmly established in international legal jurisprudence. Although political actors in Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina continue to contest this legal interpretation, the ICTYā€™s rulings have significantly shaped the historical narrative that international institutions continue to build upon.

Due to Azerbaijan’s prioritization of a victor’s peace and Armenia’s weak negotiating position, the peace process is ill-equipped to address social reconciliation, especially given the dismissal of cases in international courts. This relative absence of a transitional justice process led by international institutions, accountability mechanisms or mutual consent to address human rights violations remains one of the most significant obstacles to lasting peace. Combined with Azerbaijan’s unreliability as a partner, this lack of foresight regarding reconciliation in the peace accord increases the risk of future armed conflict.

How Unresolved Human Rights Issues Imperil the Peace Process

As the peace process appears to have entered its final stage, many human rights violations remain unaddressed, undermining once again the prospects for a lasting peace accord. For example, the status of and the grim conditions they face in captivity underscore how much remains to be done to achieve reconciliation and foster a cooperative environment based on the standards of international law.

In addition to the status of prisoners of war, many legal questions on the right to return of Armenian refugees, and Armeniaā€™s cultural heritage remain unaddressed. Following its military victory, Azerbaijanā€™s lack of commitment to respecting fundamental principles of international human rights law in Nagorno-Karabakh casts a doubt on the sustainability of any peace accords.

Whereas the period between 1994 and 2023 was marked by a between self-determination and territorial integrity, enabling each party to invoke international lawt, he right of return represents an inalienable right, and the protection of cultural heritage constitutes a legal obligation for Azerbaijan. The affirming the right of safe return for Armenian refugees from the region ā€œin a safe, unimpeded, and expeditious manner.ā€

Despite the ICJā€™s ruling and the need for both sides to demonstrate a willingness to engage in good faith negotiations, Azerbaijan has effectively erased Armenian existence in Karabakh. The lack of a proactive approach to address the issue of lost properties and compensation further highlights Baku’s unwillingness to seriously consider its obligations under international law. On the contrary, Azerbaijan has introduced strategies to hinder or discourage the return of individuals including the destruction of Armenian cultural heritage.

Although it is not surprising that the right to a safe and sustainable return is not strictly enforced, what is striking is Azerbaijanā€™s ability to openly violate this right without facing any consequences. Warring parties are typically willing to recognize the right of return in peace settlements, while simultaneously creating conditions that prevent refugees from returning. For instance, the Dayton Accords, which aimed to address the aftermath of ethnic cleansing in and Croatia, established the framework for the right of return. However, the return of Serbs from Krajina and Bosnian Muslims from Eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina never materialized. Similarly, the issue of return for Palestinians following the Nakba highlights the difficulties in addressing the right to return during peace negotiations.

Reconciliation without a genuine process of return is likely to fail, leading to profound resentment as observed in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo in the 1990s and 2000s. As many Armenians point out, is seen as a sacred part of their homeland and cultural identity. In such an emotionally-charged context, a failure to facilitate return almost guarantees profound generational trauma. Future generations may adopt this trauma as a defining part of their collective identity. Historical narratives and conflict understandings become centered around this trauma, making healing and peacebuilding particularly difficult, as seen in the aftermath of the 1944 Chechen deportation.

Cultural Heritage in Artsakh: An Ongoing Crime

Since its full occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023, has destroyed entire villages, historical monuments, cemeteries, khachkars, churches, and other religious sites, as well as governmental and administrative buildings. So far, has provided one of the most comprehensive lists of such violations of international law through its interactive map and research report. These violations have continued throughout the negotiation process between the two countries, highlighting the difficulty of trusting Azerbaijan to uphold its commitments in any forthcoming peace settlement. They also underscore Azerbaijanā€™s disregard for its international obligations toward Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Although extensive cultural destruction is recognized as a crime against humanity under the Rome Statute, the Court would unfortunately not have jurisdiction on crimes committed in Azerbaijan. However, such crimes could be prosecuted under international jurisdiction as it was done for some crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in Syria.

More broadly, alongside the displacement of the Armenian population in September 2023, their inability to return to Nagorno-Karabakh, and the 10-month blockade of the Lachin Corridor, the destruction of Armenian cultural heritage in the region further reinforces claims of ethnic cleansingā€”a crime against humanityā€”committed by Azerbaijani forces. The destruction of Armenian cultural heritage in Azerbaijan could be used to support a legal argument of criminal intent behind the deportation.

While Armenia has the sovereign right to withdraw or refrain from pursuing international legal action against Azerbaijan, other countries are not bound by its decisions. On the contrary, international law may obligate them to explore alternative avenues for prosecuting such crimes. In this context, an international tribunalā€”or even a hybrid oneā€”could be instrumental in documenting and establishing the historical record of this latest phase of the conflict. Overall, this situation as a whole undermines the implementation of a peace settlement, perpetuating the violation of international human rights law by one of the parties. Azerbaijanā€™s actions in Nagorno-Karabakh after 2023 cast serious doubt on its reliability as a negotiating partner and its willingness to uphold its obligations after the signing of a peace treaty. This issue underscores the critical importance of legal guarantees, or a third-party state acting as a guarantor, as well as the role of international law in the settlement of the conflict.

Conclusion

This white paper highlights the significant challenges Armenia faces in asymmetrical peace negotiations with Azerbaijan, where Azerbaijan’s dominant position allows it to dictate terms. The paper contends that Armenia is forced to make a painful choice between its sovereignty, identity, security, and the pursuit of international justice. Even if Armenia decides to make considerable sacrifices to achieve a peace agreement, Azerbaijan’s adherence to treaty obligations remains questionable given Armenia’s current regional and international isolation and overall geopolitical vulnerability.

The potential sacrifices of Nagorno-Karabakh and the abandonment of legal proceedings regarding crimes committed after 2020 are major concessions Armenia should only make if Azerbaijan demonstrates a firm commitment to the peace accord. Without international guarantors or significant international pressure, it seems improbable that Azerbaijan will moderate its recurring and expanding demands.

In any case, the current peace process is unlikely to succeed unless it establishes mutually beneficial conditions, including a genuine societal reconciliation process and a win-win economic framework for peace. As long as Azerbaijan interprets the negotiation for the Zangezur corridor through a geopolitical lens, the current process is more likely to be a temporary truce before future conflict rather than a sustainable plan for peace.

Without concrete mechanisms for social reconciliation integrated into the peace process to effectively address deep-seated mistrust and generational trauma, and compounded by the largely political nature of international , the peace process risks further alienating the civilian population on both sides, reinforcing generational traumas, and ultimately fueling a new cycle of violence.

Given the continued obstruction of the Armenian right to return to Karabakh and the ongoing destruction of their historical heritage, it is understandable that the Armenian population will harbor resentment toward their government for what they perceive as sacrifices on deeply emotional issues, and further animosity toward Azerbaijan

Bibliography

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