Traditionally, strategic stability was commonly understood to be when no major power perceived an incentive to initiate a first nuclear strike. Historically, during the Cold War, this condition rested on mutual vulnerability and was achieved through arms control and measure. However, this framework is being reshaped by the advent of digital capabilities.

Unlike the relatively static assumptions of mutual vulnerability in Cold War–era stability models, the digital era introduces fluid and adaptive threat environments, compresses decision-making time, and reduces predictability.

To read the full policy brief and the implications for Canadian strategic stability, our national strategic autonomy, and potential contributions to our alliance partners, click the Download button below.

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�䲹�Բ��岹’s national strategy is undergoing a fundamental transformation. Great power competition, technological change, and hybrid tactics have reshaped the nature of modern conflict, blurring the boundaries between domestic stability and external security. States today face pressure not only to deter conventional military threats but also to address challenges that primarily affect civilian societies. represents an attempt to strengthen national resilience by integrating investments in defence capacity, critical infrastructure, and domestic military industrial capability. Yet these measures unfold against a backdrop of worsening socioeconomic pressures at home, leaving the country exposed to domestic destabilization even as defence spending rises. The convergence of external threats and internal vulnerabilities reveals that national security can no longer be understood solely through the lens of military preparedness. National security today requires a hybrid-resilience approach, combining military readiness and social cohesion to address threats.

Strategic Context and Security Challenges

�䲹�Բ��岹’s outlines a strategic approach to increasing adept at dealing with amidst the . By integrating , , and , Canada is trying to become a more autonomous nation. Simultaneously, addressing Canadian domestic security necessities through investment and nation-building projects will help . With Canada joining the EU’s defence procurement initiative, , Canadian defence firms gain access to European joint procurement and finance mechanisms.

As the United States (US), �䲹�Բ��岹’s traditional security guarantor, increasingly focuses on the Indo-Pacific and signals a reduced willingness to underwrite transatlantic stability, Canada is . Yet contemporary risk environments are defined not only by but also by , including , , and . Addressing these threats requires a multidimensional security posture that integrates physical, technological, and societal components. The budget’s allocation toward , , and developing underscores a commitment to and strategic autonomy. Investments in advanced technologies such as , , and further demonstrate recognition that modern security extends beyond traditional military capability, encompassing both technological resilience and the protection of critical industrial and information networks.

However, amidst a growing “” dilemma, in which defence imperatives compete with mounting domestic socioeconomic pressures, Canadian security challenges are complex. Socioeconomic vulnerabilities, , , , and , interact with traditional and hybrid security threats, creating interdependent risks.��

CAF Readiness and Personnel Support

Critical to a hybrid-resilient approach is developing the strength and readiness of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). Addressing hard-security concerns requires not only modern capabilities but also ensuring that CAF personnel are supported, retained, and operationally effective. Retention is a significant concern, with of new members leaving service, highlighting the need for , , and an enhanced . The recent are a step in the right direction, but additional investments in housing, , and are essential. Equally important are mental-health services, which have been consistently and who face the cumulative stresses of operations, repeated deployments, and long-term service.

At the same time, �䲹�Բ��岹’s defence procurement system continues to face relating to personnel shortages and a multi-departmental model. While the Ministry of Public Services and Procurement invests in high-profile platforms such as and , – including , , and – receives insufficient attention from the federal government. The most recent audit by the (2025) found that as of March 31, 2024, many training areas had less gear than needed, while others did not have enough equipment to carry out training operations.

More transparent and accountable procurement processes are needed to ensure that frontline personnel have reliable, effective tools to perform their duties safely and efficiently. Strengthening both personnel support and procurement effectiveness not only enhances operational readiness but also integrates material and human resource stability into a broader national resilience framework, complementing community-level and social initiatives to counter hybrid threats.

Socioeconomic Pressures and Domestic Security Concerns

Although the federal budget , the and the limited attention to worsening social crises leave Canada vulnerable to further destabilisation, populism, and societal polarisation. For many young people facing , military service can appear to be one of the few . A recent analysis by highlights that �䲹�Բ��岹’s youth face some of the toughest labour-market conditions in decades, making enlistment in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) a possible remedy for the youth unemployment crisis. This pattern echoes the , which has long been criticised for disproportionately drawing in economically disadvantaged youth, effectively creating pathways into the armed forces driven less by choice and more by necessity.��

Such dynamics also raise serious domestic security concerns: far-right networks have, in documented cases, encouraged members to or sought contact with as a means of acquiring and . Compounding this trend is the in Canada- particularly common among young men- which increasingly identify as a potential gateway into broader extremist ideologies. Without sufficient attention to these online spaces, the risk posed by vulnerable youth becoming radicalised and incentivised to join the military becomes a serious concern for domestic security and the protection of liberal-democratic values.

Growing separatist movements, particularly in and , highlight regional discontent and political polarisation, which can interact with socioeconomic vulnerabilities and be exploited by both domestic and foreign actors seeking to exacerbate societal fractures. These dynamics intersect with broader socioeconomic pressures and are further amplified by hybrid threats and foreign interference, which serve to exploit domestic polarisation through strategies titled “”��
Integrating with defence and technological investments is central to a . International examples, such as , demonstrate how initiatives that strengthen , media literacy, and can meaningfully complement traditional security capabilities. For Canada, public-awareness efforts like the campaign, which brings together over fifty feminist organisations to advocate for , , and , help address the socioeconomic stresses and political grievances that make communities vulnerable to polarisation and manipulation.��

Additionally, coordinated programs commissioned by the federal government, such as the (CRF) and the (DCI), linking defence, industrial strategy, and social resilience not only enhance the country’s ability to detect, withstand, and recover from hybrid threats but also reinforce national cohesion. In this sense, investing in social stability is not an adjunct to national security but a foundational component of it: strengthening communities, reducing socioeconomic vulnerabilities, and empowering citizens collectively contribute to a more unified, resilient society capable of withstanding increasingly complex threat environments.

Towards a Hybrid-Resilient Canada

�䲹�Բ��岹’s security landscape in the twenty-first century is defined by the convergence of traditional military threats, hybrid challenges, and domestic vulnerabilities. As this analysis demonstrates, a comprehensive approach to national resilience cannot rely solely on modernising the Canadian Armed Forces or expanding technological and industrial capabilities. Socioeconomic pressures, including youth unemployment, housing insecurity, and political polarisation, interact with hybrid threats, creating opportunities for extremist mobilisation, disinformation, and foreign interference. Social spending is not a competing priority in an era of heightened geopolitical tension; it is a core element of national defence.

By investing in social programs, community resilience initiatives, and public-awareness campaigns like Demand Better, Canada addresses these underlying vulnerabilities while simultaneously strengthening civic trust, cohesion, and adaptability. When combined with targeted defence investments and technological modernisation, such measures create a multidimensional, hybrid-resilient framework capable of withstanding both internal and external pressures. Social spending and citizen support are not peripheral to national security; they are at the very heart of it. A Canada that invests in the well-being of its people is not only more equitable and inclusive but also more unified, adaptable, and resilient in the face of modern conflict.

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�䲹�Բ��岹’s history of nation-building has often unfolded at the intersection of infrastructure development and perceived security threats. From the transcontinental railway conceived in part to secure the young Dominion against American encroachment, to Cold War northern radar lines and continental defence networks, major national projects have frequently been justified not only as economic necessities but as strategic imperatives. As the elevates defence priorities and strategic infrastructure, particularly in the Arctic and across continental supply chains, it raises a familiar question and uncomfortable idea: does Canada only undertake ambitious infrastructure development when compelled by external threats? By revisiting the historical relationship between security threats and national project building, this article considers what this pattern reveals about �䲹�Բ��岹’s political past and the lessons it offers for contemporary policy and transatlantic comparative studies.

The Coastal Axis: CPR and Early Infrastructure

The Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) stands as a foundational example of this logic. Conceived amid and the risk that an unsettled West could drift economically and politically toward the United States (US), the CPR functioned as a strategic bulwark that anchored Canadian sovereignty across the continent. By enabling settlement, troop movement, and the extension of federal authority into the Prairies, most notably during the 1885 , the railway served not only as an economic artery but also as a mechanism for internal security and territorial consolidation. At the same time, it linked Canada more tightly to the British Empire’s , simultaneously reinforcing imperial strategy and the emerging Canadian . 
Much like the CPR, the Trans-Canada Highway and other Cold War-era infrastructure projects reveal continuity in �䲹�Բ��岹’s security-driven nation-building logic. Beyond facilitating civilian mobility and economic integration, the and northern air routes allowed for the rapid deployment of troops and equipment in response to potential Soviet threats and domestic emergencies. Similarly, the (DEW) Line established early-warning capabilities across the Arctic, asserting Canadian sovereignty in the North while contributing to continental defence under (North American Aerospace Defence Command). 
In both eras, the federal government prioritised projects that reinforced territorial integrity and strategic control over those motivated purely by domestic economic or social needs, demonstrating a persistent Canadian pattern: transformative infrastructure tends to be realised most decisively when framed as essential to national security.
These security-driven infrastructure projects also entrenched �䲹�Բ��岹’s strategic integration with the United States, marking a gradual. As the two countries emerged as close allies through the First and Second World Wars, Canadian security concerns shifted toward fortifying the North American continent, exporting its security logic into a shared framework institutionalised through NORAD. Cold War-era highways, ports, and northern transport corridors not only enhanced continental security but also. By embedding Canadian development within a North American strategic orbit, these projects created enduring dependencies, rendering �䲹�Բ��岹’s capacity to transport resources and sustain its economy increasingly contingent on US logistical systems and policy priorities.
This historical pattern offers a critical lens for interpreting the 2025 federal budget, which continues to and , while recalibrating American dependence. Through , , and , the government is reorienting Canada away from exclusive US dependence while maintaining continental interoperability. Central to this objective is the creation of the , which seeks to streamline approvals, coordinate federal oversight, and accelerate nationally controlled infrastructure and resource projects, thereby “untangling” �䲹�Բ��岹’s development pathways from excessive external dependency. At the same time, this recalibration foregrounds persistent questions about , underpinned by , and , regarding the and Arctic.

Analysis: Security, Trade, and Governance

Between 1885 and 1945, Canadian nation-building and infrastructure development followed a deliberate, security and export-driven logic. the sparsely settled Prairies to eastern markets while eastern manufacturing hubs processed raw materials for export to Britain and eventually the United States, reflecting the . Infrastructure projects were often , punctuated by accelerated development during the First and Second World Wars. in the Prairies were integral to this strategy, as European settlers were encouraged westward to solidify sovereignty and develop agricultural production, often displacing Indigenous communities. Across this period, infrastructure and population policies were from nation-building objectives, in which strategic, economic, and territorial imperatives drove the scope and pace of �䲹�Բ��岹’s development.
The 1970s illustrated the vulnerability inherent in �䲹�Բ��岹’s US-oriented economic integration. on key Canadian exports, including lumber, steel, and agricultural products, exposed the risks of over-reliance on a single partner. In response, Canada pursued “”, diversifying trade by building stronger ties with the European Economic Community (EEC), expanding exports, and investing in diplomatic and industrial capacity abroad. This episode illustrates a recurring tension in Canadian planning: infrastructure and resource networks often bind the country to dominant powers, but trade and security shocks push the government to seek alternative markets and greater autonomy, a tension that remains relevant when evaluating the 2025 budget and the conflation between nation-building and infrastructure projects, especially in the context of the current Canada-US relationship.

The Axial Shift: Arctic Expansion and Contemporary Policy

The 2025 federal budget continues this historical logic. The government is investing $1 billion over four years in an , supporting dual-use transport projects (airports, seaports, and all-season roads) that serve both civilian communities and the Canadian Armed Forces. A backed by $6.6 billion over five years aims to strengthen domestic defence manufacturing and reduce reliance on external suppliers. Investments in and reflect lessons from past vulnerabilities, seeking to ensure Canada can reach non-US markets while maintaining continental security. At the same time, hiring new Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) officers and deploying modern surveillance technology highlights an emphasis on border integrity, sovereignty, and alignment with .
However, these initiatives, in particular those related to transport infrastructure, carry serious trade-offs, particularly for �䲹�Բ��岹’s northern Indigenous populations. Historically neglected communities have endured profound infrastructure deficits. This includes a lack of reliable , , , and access to , contributing to devastating outcomes such as and other . Framing new infrastructure and connectivity projects primarily in terms of security and critical mineral extraction risks repeating patterns of utilitarian development: resources and logistics are prioritised for national and global strategic benefit, rather than meeting long-standing basic needs of Canadian citizens. 
Unlike provinces, whose powers are constitutionally entrenched, �䲹�Բ��岹’s northern territories derive their authority from federal statute, meaning their . The territory of Nunavut is a prime example of this, as its government operates with delegated authority, meaning Ottawa . While comprehensive land claim and self-government agreements, such as the and the , grant significant rights to Indigenous communities, these protections are rather than inherent under the Constitution. This distinction has important implications: Arctic projects framed primarily as security measures may proceed under federal authority, potentially overriding community priorities and reproducing historical patterns of federal control over resource frontiers.
Beyond Indigenous concerns, prioritising defence and security-linked infrastructure risks diverting funds from other social programs, and environmental : Arctic roads, ports, and extraction-linked infrastructure can accelerate , threaten , and . Enhanced border security and may further reinforce dependence on the United States, limiting true strategic autonomy. These tensions echo historical patterns: Canadian infrastructure, trade, and settlement have long sought to balance sovereignty, economic resilience, and security imperatives, often at the expense of social equity and environmental sustainability.

The Future of Security-Focused Nation-Building

�䲹�Բ��岹’s nation-building trajectory, from the CPR to Cold War highways, the DEW Line, and today’s Arctic investments, reveals a persistent intertwining of infrastructure, security, and sovereignty. The 2025 federal budget continues this logic, funnelling resources into projects meant to bolster resilience, protect supply chains, and advance �䲹�Բ��岹’s position within an increasingly competitive international landscape. Yet, as history consistently demonstrates, these initiatives carry significant trade-offs. Communities long excluded from meaningful infrastructure and basic services risk being once again overlooked as national strategy takes precedence. Through this historical lens, it becomes clear that �䲹�Բ��岹’s contemporary approach to nation-building remains a delicate balancing act: enhancing sovereignty and strategic autonomy while avoiding the reproduction of long-standing inequities in regions most affected by federal intervention.
Meeting these challenges will require embedding strategic ambition within governance practices that prioritise transparency, accountability, and genuine partnership. Sustaining good-faith relationships with Indigenous nations, particularly those in the North who bear the immediate consequences of security-framed development, is essential if Canada is to move beyond utilitarian conceptions of the Arctic. While recent developments, such as and , signal federal recognition of Indigenous self-determination, these statutory frameworks remain and , unlike constitutionally entrenched rights. Consequently, Indigenous control over northern resources and infrastructure is not fully secure, leaving communities potentially exposed to decisions driven by national or continental strategic priorities. Extending reconciliation into international circumpolar relations, such as structured nation-to-nation dialogue between Inuit and Sámi communities, would further demonstrate a commitment to Indigenous leadership in shaping the region’s future as Canada deepens strategic and security relationships with Arctic states such as , , and . By grounding national security policy in inclusive, community-informed frameworks, Canada can pursue the infrastructure and defence capabilities required for an uncertain geopolitical era while avoiding the reproduction of historical exclusions and marginalisation that have long defined national development.

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The return of war to Europe with Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has caused many North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members to re-evaluate and reflect upon their own practices of state sovereignty, defence, and foreign policy. Canada is no different in this regard; Russia’s invasion has indeed highlighted many vulnerabilities in �䲹�Բ��岹’s defence and security architecture, both pertaining to its NATO commitments in Europe and its ongoing presence in Arctic diplomacy. Projecting an image of Canada as a strong Ally associated with Europe has become a top priority for Prime Minister Mark Carney, particularly following the alienating comments and actions of United States (US) President Donald Trump. Canadian self-sufficiency, and security integration with Europe apart from the US, is vital in this changing geopolitical landscape. At the same time, asserting Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic is becoming incredibly important with the increased presence of Russian, Chinese, and American vessels.

As the severity of the security challenges that Canada faces become more apparent, so have the many institutional problems plaguing the Canadian military. �䲹�Բ��岹’s military is , is on a progressively unreliable US, and is subject to ongoing cultural reform attempts addressing . In finding solutions for �䲹�Բ��岹’s military problems, Canada should lean on and work with its European Allies – particularly those who share Arctic territory. Sustained Russian aggression and pressure from the US have made security self-sufficiency a high priority issue in Europe. Across Europe there has been a related for policies of mandatory national service, reflecting a change in security culture that, as an Ally, Canada will need to adapt to. For Canada to take itself seriously – and be taken seriously on the world stage – as an Arctic nation and a strong NATO Ally, it needs to make significant societal changes regarding the nature of national security.

This policy brief highlights how a system of national service inspired by the Scandinavian models could have the potential to both invigorate �䲹�Բ��岹’s military culture and redefine Canadians’ relationship with national defence. By shifting the understanding of national service away from traditional conflict-oriented military roles and towards a more varied and selective system, Canada could better address its vulnerabilities and strengthen its reputation both domestically and abroad. A shifting of focus of national service away from enforced combat-oriented roles, informed by the Scandinavian example, will also address a cultural scepticism of conscription that remains prevalent throughout Canada. The ongoing and contentious debates among other Canadian allies over alternative national service options highlight the challenging reality of political and cultural responses to such policies among civil society. In considering different models from which to take inspiration for such a system, the selective compulsory national service seen in Norway and Sweden stands out as the most applicable model for the Canadian context.

Models of National Service

While there are currently nine NATO members that enforce a system of mandatory national service, the examples of Nordic countries, encompassing Finland, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark (excluding the demilitarized Iceland), are particularly attractive to Canadian and due to similar liberal democratic political values, Arctic security concerns, and NATO membership. In fact, the Nordics represent : mandatory service, lottery-driven service, and selective compulsory service.

Mandatory service is seen in Finland as well as other NATO members such as Estonia, Greece, and Türkiye. This system of conscription – in which every male citizen is required to serve in some capacity – would be untenable in a Canadian context. For instance, Finland has a small population of approximately 5.5 million, and a much longer and more conflict-ridden relationship with its dominant neighbour, the Russian Federation. �䲹�Բ��岹’s geographic insulation, and its larger and more dispersed population of approximately 40 million, makes such a comprehensive conscription system considerably less attractive and less digestible practically or politically.

In Denmark, Latvia, and Lithuania, after mandatory written and health examinations citizens are subject to a lottery-driven conscription. Most position are filled by volunteers, so conscription is heavily limited. In the past decade, nearly of those undertaking military service in Denmark were volunteers. Conscripts are otherwise placed in the service of the Emergency Management Agency. However, there are two major reasons why this lottery-based system would be ill-advised for Canada. First, its random selection bears resemblance to the historic system used in the United States during the Vietnam War, which, as discussed below, carries a great degree of cultural influence. This would run the risk of stoking widespread negative reaction merely by association with the hegemonic military and cultural legacy and memory of the US (discussed further below). Secondly, the system of random selection designed primarily to boost the number of military recruits perpetuates an assumption of traditional conflict. It therefore distracts from the need to redefine defence responsibilities of the citizenry to include more than narrow militarised considerations. It may also inhibit the ability to reframe service as a means of providing training opportunities.

Norway and Sweden share a similar system of selective compulsory service, with Sweden taking influence from the pioneering Norwegian model. Norway, while nominally extending mandatory service to all citizens, has a highly competitive system that utilizes mental and physical assessments to select candidates. Sweden’s system of “” extends to all Swedish citizens (even abroad) and foreign residents of Sweden. It includes three types of duties: military service, civilian service, and general service obligations in the event of war. In both Norway and Sweden, conscription is determined by a set of questionnaires given to all 18-year-olds. In 2024, civilian service was enacted for the first time since the Cold War ended, incorporating training in emergency services for conscripts identifying as conscientious objectors. While similar in principle to Norway’s system, Sweden differs in its inclusion of mandatory civil service. Reintroduced in 2017, Swedish compulsory civil service provides training in emergency health and energy services.

The variations seen in Sweden and Norway thus serve as more applicable examples for Canadian consideration. While these Scandinavian countries have much smaller land masses and population sizes than Canada, their limited styles of conscription would fit within the Canadian context, particularly with an expanded acceptance of immediate security priorities. The Norway-Sweden system has been taken up by other Allies as a model already – namely Germany. Like Canada, Germany is a federal state, with a healthy amount of (which it abandoned in 2011) and a population much larger than the Scandinavian countries. In , the German cabinet passed a draft bill introducing a national service system that took direct inspiration from the Swedish example, with the major difference being that the new system would be voluntary (for now). Once implemented, the system will have all Germans turning 18 sent a questionnaire asking about their physical fitness and if they are interested in volunteering for the military. While the future success of the German policy is unclear, the adoption of a modified Norway-Sweden model of national service shows the system’s potential flexibility to meet the unique requirements of a particular country. It may also serve as an example on adapting the system to the context of a larger and more diverse state.

Contentious and Ongoing Debates amongst �䲹�Բ��岹’s Allies

In assessing the applicability of Scandinavian models of national service in addressing �䲹�Բ��岹’s military needs, the consideration of alternative models provides useful context. Mandatory national service options have already been debated by some of �䲹�Բ��岹’s closest Allies.

During the 2024 United Kingdom (UK) general election, the incumbent Conservative government a form of mandatory military or civilian service for all 18-year-olds. Denounced by critics as a misguided electioneering stunt, the proposal came from then-Prime Minister Rishi Sunak without the knowledge of some of his cabinet ministers. The announcement from an historically unpopular government, directly preceding an embarrassing election loss, made a out of national service in the UK. However, in June 2025 the Labour government that succeeded Sunak endorsed the consideration of a system of voluntary ‘military gap years’ for young people based on a model offered by the Australian Defence Force.

A similar attempt at volunteer national service is seen in France’s Service National Universel (). Targeted towards French citizens aged 15-17, SNU was explicitly designed as a method of civic education. The to include mandatory participation has been discussed since its creation in 2019. However, the feasibility of national service, personally championed by President Emmanuel Macron, is heavily debated even as a voluntary program. In , the French Senate voted to slash the SNU budget against Macron’s pleadings.

As these examples illustrate, issues of practical implementation can be of immense importance in the ensuing debate over national service models. Framing and messaging of national service in these debates is also critical. Communicating a logical reason for national service can be disrupted if the messaging is incompatible with the political and cultural realities of the country. A practical policy debate is hindered by the assumption of national service as an ad hoc response to military conflict threatening national existence. Under this assumption, any attempt to explore national service in a security context that is not characterised by imminant invasion is plagued by denunciation as an impractical infringement on civil liberties, as happened in the UK. However, the attempt to bypass controversy by framing national service as primarily a tool of civic education presents the issue of lacking urgency and thus decreasing the sense of priority, as has been seen in France and Australia. It is therefore important to reframe the debate to highlight the security rationale for national service that poses immediate threat without necessarily aligning a relation to combat.

Application to Canada – Immediate Threats and Challenges

A New Security Context: European Projection and Self-Sufficiency

Canada can no longer rely on the myth of its removal from immediate territorial threats. It is no longer, as once famously quipped, “a fire-proof house far from inflammable materials.” The idea that national service is only relevant in the immediate preparation for a war threatening the integrity of national territory is nullified by the existence of numerous present security threats, both stemming from environmental and geopolitical challenges. In the international political context of President Trump questioning Canadian security, �䲹�Բ��岹’s ability to project the image of a strong, independent military actor are vital for ensuring that it can secure its own borders. The Scandinavian models of self-sufficiency through mandatory national service can be used to address several of �䲹�Բ��岹’s immediate security challenges.

The Arctic

National service applied to the assertion of Arctic sovereignty may have the benefit of strengthening cultural awareness of �䲹�Բ��岹’s Arctic identity. It may also strengthen Canadian ties with its Nordic Allies through a shared approach to security, while lessening dependence on the US. Recent to strengthen Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic include $420 million to expand military operations in the region. Canada may also take note of Denmark’s recent actions. After President Trump made several threatening remarks about his desire for an American acquisition of Greenland, the Danish government made moves to increase its presence in the autonomous territory. admitting women into mandatory national service, increasing the period of service from 4 to 11 months, and raising the number of recruits from approximately 5,000 to 7,500 by 2033. Rather than a traditional military role, the possibilities for Arctic service could include community support, healthcare, and infrastructural maintenance roles.

Environmental Crises

With the increase of environmental crises, most visible through the in the number of wildfires across Canada every summer, there is a need to expand national security to address natural disasters. Aiding in environmental catastrophes such as wildfires, floods, or earthquakes has the potential to be a major focus of a civilian national service option in Canada. As an immediate security issue, such environmental crises may serve as a viable justification for national service in public opinion. There is precedent for conscription to fight wildfires in Canada. Under British Columbia’s (2004), the Crown has the power to “order a person who is 19 years of age or older to assist in fire control”. A Swedish-style compulsory civil service model, which provides to conscripts, would have potential applications in preparing individuals to assist during environmental crisis events, whether through fighting fires or aiding infrastructural maintenance or emergency response.

Military Culture

Cultural problems have plagued �䲹�Բ��岹’s military for years, with criticisms coming from both the and . While the Conservative party calls for the return of pride in the military, the Liberal government has spoken out about the need to address cultural issues of misogyny, racism, and political extremism. Either way, the political milieu has resulted in a drastic decrease in recruitment. The to both men and women in Norway (2013), Sweden (2017), and Denmark (2025) has triggered important cultural discussions in facilitating gender parity. In Denmark, the has been presented as a way to trigger the military to practically address documented problems of sexual harassment, assault, and discrimination against women while strengthening its capabilities and purpose. The pioneering move by Norway in instituting gender equality in conscription was as having triggered significant changes in many areas, including “leadership and organizational culture”. The policy was designed to increase the number of women in the military and remove the assumption that men have a higher suitability for military responsibilities. By providing a sense of duty, purpose, and responsibility, national service can provide a culture of confidence and equality to combat the presence of discriminatory behaviour in the military.

Assessment

The Scandinavian approach to national service is not solely associated with the immediate preparation for defensive war. It carries an encompassing view of national security that focuses on the prevention of conflict and the facilitation of citizen engagement and responsibility. The aggressive rhetoric from President Trump, the war in Ukraine, and the increasingly destructive environmental crises have been cited as reasons to consider the Nordic style of conscription by political commentators in both and publications. This conversation is important in reframing the general association of conscription with the immediate onset of nation-threatening conflict. Canada faces a variety of immediate and projected threats that can be addressed by a rationalized, skills-oriented, and limited system of national service as seen in Norway and Sweden. The Norway-Sweden model facilitates choice and conscientious objection while encouraging the responsibility of citizens to protect their country. However, the prospect of implementing a system of national service in Canada would require taking into account the variabilities of diverse political responses that could be expected to such a proposal.

Reframing Security and Addressing Potential Opposition

There are some notable political and cultural differences that would make a Canadian adoption of Scandinavian conscription policies a challenge. Some that the likelihood of Canadian implementation of mandatory national service policy remains low, both due to projected issues related to public opinion and constitutional challenges. A potential court challenge regarding civil liberties under could be a barrier to any national service legislation not related to an imminent threat to Canadian sovereignty. While the notwithstanding clause of the Charter could be used by parliament to advance a policy of national service against such challenges, such a move would inevitably prove . The current Liberal government’s desire to use of the notwithstanding clause makes any potential use against a civil liberties challenge unlikely. Additionally, public opinion challenges may stem from historic cultural influences related to the US, where there is a strong distrust of conscription associated with the experiences of the Vietnam War in the 1960s-70s. The legacy of �䲹�Բ��岹’s willingness to harbour over draft-age American men and women during the Vietnam War lends some credence to a potential distaste for mandatory service. While opposition to national service along libertarian lines has been , �䲹�Բ��岹’s own historical experience with anti-conscription riots in Quebec during the First World War serves as a more significant cultural influence. In modern circumstances, however, such concerns can be addressed by adapting a new conception of what mandatory national service entails, as inspired by the Norway-Sweden example.

The emphasis on a broad definition of security to encompass climate crisis preparedness, Arctic sovereignty, and other civil duties can serve to adapt the public assumption of the meaning of national service. An noted that, while mandatory service in the military remains a contentious issue among respondents – with 44% opposing and 43% supporting – other alternative service options were much more popular. Public health support service saw 74% support, while environmental support saw 73% support. The general sympathy towards national civilian service and the relative distaste for military service is in line with the historic association of military conscription with involuntary participation in far-flung conflict overseas (such as perceptions that imperialism was the motivating factor behind the First World War, or likewise the imperialist imagery associated with the Vietnam War by so-called ‘’).

In addition, national service can be highlighted as an important opportunity for investment in developing and applying the skills of young Canadians. The aforementioned poll by the recorded the popularity of this aspect of national service, showing that 82% of respondents thought mandatory civilian service would improve the personal development of young adults. The mandatory questionnaire system used in the Norway-Sweden model can be used to gauge skills, aptitude, and interest in order to provide training where needed and encourage healthy competition for placements. Such a policy could be incorporated into an expansion of existing components of the Canadian Armed Forces, such as the Canadian Rangers. As explored by Valeriia Gusieva, the Rangers already represent a bridge between Canadian defence priorities in the Arctic and the utilisation of unique cultural knowledge found among Indigenous communities. There is great potential in the Canadian Rangers as a way to align the development of �䲹�Բ��岹’s human potential with the assertion of its sovereignty and security.

There may be an inclination to avoid public stigma against conscription by implementing a voluntary national service system, which would align Canada with France, as well as the current debates in Germany and the UK. Such an option would be less effective in addressing Canadian defence needs or in advancing an association between Canadians and national security than the selective compulsory system seen in Norway and Sweden. The Norway-Sweden model, though officially mandatory, provides a level of flexibility that facilitates an essentially voluntary system which nonetheless communicates the imperative need for security awareness and preparedness. The voluntary system in France exists instead as a compromise paired with an official desire for expansion to compulsory service. As such, they remain vulnerable to the changing whims of the legislature. The mandatory nature of national service, paired with an allowance for effective decision-making on the part of those compelled to fill in the assessment questionnaire, is necessary in order to align the redefined security focus and cultural reforms with an appreciation of the longstanding traditions associated with the Canadian military.

Therefore, the implementation of national service in Canada, in aid of fulfilling its international obligations, NATO Alliance pressures, and strategic vulnerabilities, would be best aligned with a system inspired by the Norway-Sweden model. In redefining the popular image of national security to include the immediate yet non-conflict-oriented threats of climate disasters and Arctic sovereignty assertion, national service can be disassociated from traditional military conflict and instead integrated into the public image of civic responsibility.

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Summary

● Since 2022, the Arctic has evolved from a region of cooperation and to one of competition and division.

● Previously deemed ‘exceptional’ due to its collaborative status quo’s resilience against geopolitical changes, increased militarization and economic competition indicates an abandonment of this norm, along with decreased prioritization in environmental security, climate change, and scientific exchanges.

● These shifts further compound environmental and climate consequences – as militarization and economic development pose great risks to Arctic environmental security and temperatures.

● Policies from Russia (since 2022) and the United States (since January 2025) have pivoted towards economic development, along with a decrease in efforts to foster sustainable development. Russia has also included an explicit pillar of militarization to its main strategic priorities.

● Canada and other NATO countries have stated environmental and climate commitments in policy and have also increased militarization in their Arctic regions.

Background

Prior to 2022, the Arctic was governed in a spirit of cooperation in large part due to its unforgiving environmental conditions and longstanding culture of multilateralism between states, Inuit, and other Arctic Indigenous communities through institutions like the Arctic Council. This institution was used to foster sustainable development, reduce risks of environmental accidents, as well as environmental degradation. It functioned as a forum for the negotiation of Arctic agreements.

Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, increased militarization and attention has been devoted to the Arctic by both Russian and NATO-Arctic nations. In March 2022, the A7 members of the Arctic Council announced a diplomatic pause in protest of Russia’s invasion. Currently, Russia does not participate and has for the council. The region has been increasingly divided into , ruining decades of progress as well as sidelining Indigenous voices and cooperative initiatives. As a result, the region has shifted from a culture of cooperation to competition, leaving scientists isolated, and with fewer opportunities for bilateral, multilateral, and scientific collaboration in the name of protecting the Arctic’s future.

Rising global temperatures have led to an increase of melting ice in the Arctic, contributing to longer shipping seasons, increasing traffic in the region, and more opportunities for resource extraction, including mining of critical minerals and other sources of energy. These potential economic prospects are largely with the region’s unforgiving operational conditions and lack of infrastructure. Regardless, the Arctic is growing increasingly vulnerable to exploitation due to climate change and the fracturing of the Arctic status-quo. The latter has resulted in policy shifts from collaboration and prioritization – albeit, not equal across all states – of environmental security, to securitization and economic development.

Russian Arctic Policy/Strategy since 2022

Russia’s Arctic Strategy is centred around securitization and economic development, with little regard for environmental security or sustainability. In response to Western sanctions, Russia has framed economic development and defense in the Arctic as a tenet of national security, . In addition, NATO’s northern expansion, with Sweden and Finland becoming full-members, has aggravated Russia’s fear of encirclement, rooted in its view of the Arctic as ‘’. Increased militarization, such as the Safe Arctic 2025 Exercise, underscore Russia’s strategic priority for defense posturing in the Arctic.

NSR is a large tenet of Russian economic development in the Arctic, which provides faster shipping routes between Europe and Asia, most notably for Russian energy. Increased naval traffic in the Arctic region, compounded by a lack of coast guard and joint-surveillance cooperation initiatives, increases the risk of oil spills and shipping accidents. In addition, pollution and ecological damage are symptomatic of unsustainable development. Russia is expected to release a new soon, unveiling its updated development priorities.

NATO Countries and New Arctic Strategies

NATO’s northern expansion has led to increased militarization of the Nordic Arctic. NATO’s Arctic approach focuses largely on “”. After joining NATO, Sweden and Finland committed to its defense spending guidelines, resulting in . In addition, increasing from Russia have prompted further development of defense capabilities. Although NATO remains dedicated to environmental security protection, observers urge the organization to for the Arctic that considers its unique vulnerabilities, operational challenges, and various regarding climate change, including environmental and human security. Further policy development is needed to its Climate Change and Security Action Plan to the Arctic’s idiosyncrasies.

The balances sustainable development and security concerns, whilst maintaining a level of non-political cooperation. Though recent incursions on NATO countries’ and spaces, notably in , pose serious challenges for any prospect of Arctic cooperation with Russia. Denmark’s highlights its effort to bolster its presence and defense capabilities in the Arctic. Denmark has increased its militarization in Greenland since 2022, and most prominently since the start of Donald Trump’s second term, given the latter’s continued ontological threats.

(March, 2025) stresses close ties between Canada and the United States to “secure North American homeland”, as well as with its Nordic Allies. It will initiate “Arctic security dialogue” with “like-minded states”, further alluding to �䲹�Բ��岹’s recent shift towards ‘friendshoring’ in foreign policy, as well as increasing polarization among Arctic actors. Although Canada remains dedicated to its – which prioritizes the wellbeing of northern communities, development of Arctic research, and environmental security – its increase in Arctic securitization and economic development necessitates further policy adaptation to the changing geopolitical environment.

The second term of Donald Trump marks a major shift in the from one of prioritizing security, climate change, sustainable development, and international governance, to a more “business-like” strategy that prioritizes large-scale resource extraction in Alaska. President Trump’s tariffs and annexation threats to American Arctic Allies further allude to this major shift. In addition, the Trump Administration has rescinded the previous Administration’s restrictions on resource development in order to unleash “”, including new , and projects in previously protected parks and forests. In addition, climate research is being dismantled and the once central to American Arctic policy is now cut out. At the between Putin and Trump in August 2025, Putin alluded to further cooperation in the United States by making mention of the Arctic, though emphasizing more diplomatic and economic cooperation, not environmental.

Conclusion- Risks to Environmental Security and Climate Change

Increased militarization in the Arctic risks environmental consequences. Military training exercises can lead to in training areas, in addition to levels of noise-pollution that harm humans and wildlife. Militarization can also severely disrupt Indigenous livelihoods across the Arctic region, with communities like the and relying on a longstanding tradition of land-based sustenance.

Decreased research collaboration severely reduces scientists’ abilities to track changes in the Arctic climate and ecology. in June indicate that prior to 2022, bilateral cooperation allowed for standardization of data collection, optimization of research processes through pooling of resources and skills, as well as increased habitat conservation and better outcomes for wildlife, eventually leading to the adoption of international market standards and best management practices. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, these scientists have had virtually no communication, resulting in a massive knowledge gap in understanding Arctic changes, as well as a decline in trust. In addition, pressing security risks such as , affecting infrastructure, food security, and public health, are lacking in crucial data, rendering it unpredictable and difficult to manage.

This new status quo of polarization and militarization is chipping away at every avenue for bilateral cooperation, which has tangible effects on Arctic environmental security. The longstanding between Norway and Russia, dating back to 1976, had persevered through these geopolitical changes. It is now at risk due to a recent Russian ultimatum to Norway to close its economic zone to its vessels. This occurred in light of Norway’s sanctions against companies Norebo and Murman Seafood in July 2025. A breakdown of this agreement would increase risks of poaching and unsustainable fishing, as well as pose serious risks to the region’s ecosystem. Overall, these strategic shifts indicate an abandonment of the previous norm of collaboration in the Arctic, and the emerging norm of competition, polarization and militarization, all of which pose grave dangers to the natural world in the Arctic.

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On September 11th, Poland made headlines in its decision to close its border with Belarus over the Russian Zapad 2025 drills. The nuclear and missile drills, combined with the detection of Russian drones in Polish airspace, kept the border closed for almost two weeks, halting the critical Northern Corridor trade route between the EU and China, which had previously brought in 25 billion euros in 2024. The closure emphasizes the increasing insecurity surrounding trade since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Regional conflicts, along with logistical issues, including outdated infrastructure and corridor congestion, have amplified the need to protect or develop trade routes between China and Europe. China, as the largest exporter in the world, has been especially proactive in this space; however, looking at different trade route alternatives opens a new set of security and economic questions. This brief considers the role of the Northern Corridor as a critical point in the Chinese-European relationship, emerging alternatives, and the political implications if such alternatives are sought out by the partners.

The Northern Corridor

The border closure affected a critical point of the China-Europe Railway Express, a vital trade route for goods coming into Europe. , affecting major e-commerce companies such as Temu and Shein, who rely on smooth and rapid transitways for high-speed shipping of goods. The railway is a key part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, as well as the Northern Corridor trading route. , where they then change to a European rail gauge before continuing on with their journey.

The Northern Corridor, running through Russian and Belarusian territory, has been the primary route to export goods intercontinentally, as it remains a strong alternative to lengthy and expensive land and sea routes. However, Russian aggression and expansionism have created political, financial, and logistical difficulties. The route itself has become incredibly . Disruptions have affected the global trading economy, food supply chain, and economic health of individual countries. The damage done to the Northern Corridor has motivated China to reconsider its future trade movements and partnerships.

Emerging Alternatives

A popular alternative has been the , which would avoid Russia by going through Central Asia and into Europe via the Black Sea. However, the lack of infrastructure renders this initiative a work-in-progress. Furthermore, ongoing security issues in the Black Sea make merchant ships vulnerable to damage from mines and Russian attacks. Despite previously blocking TITR development, China has through the China Railway Container Transport Corporation. Other Central Asian and Black Sea states have also taken on However, many countries along this route are still susceptible to Russian influence and coercion, which could further stagnate development.

An even more attractive alternative for China and Russia has emerged through the Northern Sea Route (NSR). The NSR travels through the and reaches Europe through British ports. Previously unnavigable, the route is becoming a more viable option, though it also lacks substantial infrastructure. As a direct response to the closure of Poland’s borders, Chinese container line Sea Legend through the NSR on September 24th. This will test the efficacy of the journey, with the ship expected to reach Britain in 18 days. Since the route passes through Russian ports to reach Europe, it is unclear what geopolitical outcomes this will have due to the ongoing war.

What are the Political Implications of These Moves?

The development of both the TITR and NSR reflect changing geopolitical dynamics. Developing routes can be a space for new partnerships and prosperity – or problems. The TITR is a new place for modernization projects, where multiple countries can emerge as key enablers and/or investors. Countries like Türkiye, Romania, and China are all pushing to assert their positions. Shipping through the TITR is partially underway through land, rail, and sea; however, further development will be needed to establish its primacy.

The NSR emphasizes the growing geopolitical competition in the Arctic. Russian and Chinese development along this route will further secure economic interests and therefore influence within the region. For China, connections to the Arctic have critical gains as they pursue an active policy in the region, Russia has strongly supported China’s moves, and partnership in the NSR will deepen their collaboration. In the Northern Corridor, both countries used their partnership to dominate decisions around trade and development. Could the NSR be a new place to replicate this dynamic? This could have implications for the future of norms-setting and governance in the Arctic; however, it should be noted that the NSR has its own logistical handicaps, which could limit its impact.

For the time being, the Northern Corridor remains a major transitway. This means that global trade will continue to be insecure, so long as regional threats remain active. Back in Poland, the government reopened the border on September 24th for security and economic reasons. However,

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Different disciplines define the Arctic in different ways: oceanography, climate studies, geography, political science, cultural studies, and economics — all use different working definitions to explore research questions. Critical geographer Clause Dodds observes that many of these definitions change over time (Dodds and Nutall 2019). Moreover, in the Arctic, where temperature increase resulting from global warming is four times the global average, even the most empirically grounded delineations of the region, like tree cover, permafrost penetration, and the 10-degree Celsius July isotherm, lack permanence and reliability (Dodds and Nutall 2019). Critical geography accommodates these changes by conceiving geographic boundaries as functionally related to the discourses developed by and derivative of human actors and institutions. A static demarcation of the Arctic — dependent not on the changing ways in which it is discussed but on the ‘empirically grounded delineations’ found above — would introduce a disconnect between the object of study — themes relevant to foreign policy in the region —and the method used to compile the corpus of material used in its study.������

Dodds and Nutall outline five principal factors that hinder a straightforward delineation of the Arctic region: climate change, geopolitics, globalization, technology, and northern autonomy. They argue that “there is no one Arctic; instead, multiple Arctics collide, coexist, and conflict with one another,” and suggest that the Arctic should be defined in relation to the specific research questions being explored (Dodds and Nutall 2019, 37). Similarly, Nina Wormbs acknowledges that definitions of the Arctic, and historic trajectories of the region, ultimately come down to power; she uses the category of “Voices”— discourses produced by actors who articulate visions of the future and “do politics”— as part of her three-pronged approach in tracing the construction of Arctic spaces (Wormbs 2018, 3). In the view of critical geographer Doreen Massey, the construction of spatial identities and relations should be understood as an ongoing project at the nexus of countless relationships between participating agents (Massey 2009). The Arctic is a space constructed through the interweaving priorities of diverse Arctic stakeholders (Szczebrowicz 2025). 

The Arctic, for much of its recent history, has been perceived through the eyes of outsiders: decisionmakers in Ottawa, Washington, Moscow — the capitals of Arctic nations. According to E.C.H. Keskitalo, perceptions of the Arctic in Canada have long been dominated by a federal perspective (Keskitalo 2004). Oran Young suggests that this logic applies to the Arctic more broadly, as a region comprising the “remote portions of seven countries” (Young 2005, 9). Wojciech Szczerbowicz, writing in Polish Polar Review, draws on Iver Neumann’s area studies theorization of the discursive construction of Arctic spaces to examine competing interpretations of the region and the emergence of dominant – yet mutable – hegemonic narratives (Szczebrowicz 2025). The agents of this interpretive framework are the states and institutions that participate in the discursive construction of the region.  

In summary, critical geography examines how dominant understandings of space are shaped by power relations and human interactions. Discourse plays a central role in connecting distinct physical geographies and shaping perceptions of their interrelation. By foregrounding the interplay between discourse and the physical space it evokes, it is possible to reject rigid and static definitions of the Arctic. This allows for changing conceptualizations of space by positioning geography downstream of discursive norms; the ‘Arctic’ thus functions as a signifier for substantive policy concerns. 

This perspective is sensitive to the “Arctic” as a delineating concept in policy action rather than a set of physical spaces — regions (administrative, geographic, and otherwise), settlements (cities, towns, villages, and hamlets), geographic features (lakes, rivers, mountain ranges, islands). It also recognizes the Arctic as a space where decision-making capabilities are concentrated in national capitals. Relying on a preconceived list of search terms in carrying out media monitoring would likely shift the focus of data collection to a more localized perspective, likely patterned with an altogether different set of policy considerations. 

References:  

Dodds, Klaus, and Mark Nuttall. “Introduction: One Arctic, Many Arctics.” In The Arctic: What Everyone Needs to Know, 1–10. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019. 

Jamie Peck, Brett Christophers, Rebecca Lave, and Marion Werner. “Concepts of Space and Power in Theory and in Political Practice (2009).” In The Doreen Massey Reader, 321. Agenda Publishing, 2018. . 

Keskitalo, E. C. H. Negotiating the Arctic: The Construction of an International Region. New York; Routledge, 2004. 

Szczebrowicz, Wojciech. “Deconstruction of Political Core of the Region: Arctic Discourses in Tatters.” Polish Polar Research 46, no. 1 (2025): 17. .  

Wormbs, Nina. 2018. “Introduction: Back to the Futures of an Uncertain Arctic.” In Competing Arctic Futures: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, edited by Nina Wormbs, 1–18. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan. 

Young, Oran R. “Governing the Arctic: From Cold War Theater to Mosaic of Cooperation.” Global Governance 11, no. 1 (2005): 9–15. 01101002.

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Rooted in colonial ambitions and imperial revisionism, Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine aims to dismantle the rules-based international order that many have taken for granted since WW2’s conclusion in 1945. The Russian Federation’s primary ontological claim centres around the belief that Ukraine was the creation of Russia and therefore, has no legitimate right to exist or exercise sovereignty. This narrative is often accompanied by accusations of the suppression of Russian-speaking Ukrainians that need to allegedly be “rescued” from Western influence. While territorial conquest has been a key objective of the Russian invasion, a significant focus has also been placed on erasing Ukrainian cultural identity, language, and heritage. Previous analyses explored this cultural destruction and colonial legacy that the war in Ukraine continues to expose. Despite these justifications, the Russian military has faced fierce resistance from both the Ukrainian Armed Forces and ordinary civilians. The Kremlin’s original plan to seize Ukraine within days collapsed in the face of extraordinary Ukrainian bravery and resilience, both on the battlefield and in the informational space, where Russian propaganda aimed to sway international opinion and sow division within Ukraine itself. , launched with the support of the Office of the President of Ukraine, the Cabinet of Ministers, the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy, and the Ministry of Digital Transformation, amplified the message of courage and resilience as a national resource, one that Ukrainians draw from their ancestors in a generational struggle against Russian expansion.��

�䲹�Բ��岹’s most recent defence policy, , emphasizes national security and sovereignty as top priorities, particularly in relation to Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic and northern regions. Learning from Ukraine’s example, where national and cultural identity have served as strategic assets in strengthening military morale and national resilience, Canada should recognize Indigenous cultural knowledge and pride as vital components of its national security framework. Ukraine’s struggle to protect its national identity in the face of brutal Russian aggression resonates with the experiences of Indigenous peoples across Turtle Island, creating opportunities for solidarity and cultural diplomacy. While Canada has shown strong support for Ukraine’s resistance efforts, the government continues to overlook its responsibilities toward its own Indigenous population. This analysis will examine the role of Indigenous, particularly Inuit, communities in Canadian defence policy, with a focus on their involvement in the Canadian Rangers program. It will also explore the broader connection between cultural identity and national defence strategy, highlighting how cultural resilience can serve as a foundational pillar of security.  

Arctic Defence in a Changing Security Landscape and Canadian Rangers  

outlines the key security challenges facing �䲹�Բ��岹’s security landscape today. These include climate change, which is reshaping the Arctic landscape; rising global instability, particularly the return of war to Europe following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine; and the rapid advancement of technology, which is transforming the nature of warfare and understandings of security as we know it. While the Canadian government has recently taken steps to increase its NATO spending and strengthen partnerships with allies beyond NATO, Arctic defence remains a central pillar of its defence policy. Please refer to our earlier analyses to learn about New Defence Partnerships Beyond NATO and �䲹�Բ��岹’s evolving opportunities to contribute to European Security.  

When it comes to demonstrating the strength of the Canadian military in the Arctic, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) approximately 300 full-time personnel, alongside 1,700 Canadian Rangers. Additional personnel are regularly flown in for exercises designed to showcase operational capabilities such as surveillance and threat detection. , often referred to as the “eyes and ears of the North,” play a critical role in maintaining territorial integrity and security in the region, helping to reaffirm Canadian sovereignty.  

The Canadian Rangers, a subcomponent of the Canadian Army Reserve, serve only when placed on active duty or called upon during emergencies. T As many operations take place within and around Indigenous communities, nations, and territories, the Rangers’ engagement with traditional Indigenous knowledge and their deep connection to the land have proven critical over time. In addition to their operational duties, Rangers also train CAF personnel in survival skills and land-based knowledge, bridging military capabilities with Indigenous stewardship and expertise. As of November 2022, Indigenous peoples made up 2.9% of the overall CAF, while approximately 23% of Canadian Rangers self-identify as Indigenous.  

In March 2025, members of the CAF to conduct a training exercise simulating what a northern defense operation might look like in the event of an attack. The annual exercise took place near the Cree Nation of Chisasibi in Eeyou Istchee, with buildings belonging to the Nation used as headquarters. Harsh weather conditions, snow, and temperatures dropping far below zero mirrored typical Arctic environments and served as a realistic challenge for the soldiers. The proximity to the Indigenous community also played an important role. Canadian Rangers, some of whom are members of the local community, participated in the exercise and shared their traditional knowledge on survival techniques, such as how to build shelters using small trees and other natural materials.  

An essential step on the path toward reconciliation in Canada involves recognizing the distinct identities encompassed within the term “Indigenous communities,” which refers collectively to First Nations, Métis, and Inuit peoples. Each of these groups possesses unique cultural traditions, identities, knowledge systems, histories, and worldviews. While the Canadian federal government continues to work toward fulfilling the 94 Calls to Action outlined by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the persistent underrepresentation of Indigenous voices in policy-making processes remains a significant challenge. Historically, federal policy Inuit communities in efforts to assert Canadian sovereignty in the North. One notable example is the forced relocation of 17 Inuit families from Inukjuak, Northern Quebec, to remote High Arctic settlements in 1953 and 1955. These relocations were executed with little concern for the hardships imposed on the 92 individuals involved; instead, they were intended to bolster national sovereignty in the face of perceived Danish and American territorial claims, as well as to provide low-cost labor for RCMP and RCAF installations.  

In recent years, the federal government has highlighted initiatives like the Canadian Rangers as key examples of innovative Arctic defence strategies aimed at reinforcing Canadian sovereignty. During the 2025 federal election, support for the Canadian Rangers as a rare point of consensus among the Liberal, Conservative, and New Democratic parties. However, this emphasis on sovereignty-driven defence initiatives risks reinforcing a historical pattern wherein Indigenous participation is leveraged to advance national interests, while the distinct social, economic, and cultural priorities of Inuit communities may be overlooked, marginalized, or misunderstood. 

Language, Culture, and Security 

A notable example of a successful campaign that used culture as a unifying force and an effective tool for information dissemination, both domestically and internationally, is the , “What We Are Fighting For.” highlights the unique cultural and historical characteristics of each Ukrainian region through a series of 26 articles, available in both English and Ukrainian. Developed in collaboration with leading national historical institutions and experts, the campaign offers an in-depth exploration of the authentic and diverse history of Ukraine’s 24 regions, including Crimea. Many of these insights challenge long-standing Russian disinformation narratives, particularly those related to Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk. The campaign adopted the slogan, “We have 603,628 reasons for what we are fighting for”, a reference to the total area of independent Ukraine in square kilometers. This message reinforces the idea that, despite regional differences and distinct local traditions, Ukrainians remain united in their resistance to unjustified Russian aggression and territorial encroachment.  

While Ukraine has actively mobilized cultural identity and historical narrative as tools of national resilience and international communication, �䲹�Բ��岹’s engagement with Indigenous communities, particularly through programs like the Canadian Rangers, reveals a more complex relationship, shaped by a history of colonialism and ongoing challenges in fully recognizing and supporting Indigenous knowledge, language, and self-determination. The historical concept of the Canadian Rangers is rooted in the incorporation of the unique knowledge and perspectives of northern Indigenous communities to support efficient military operations, while also providing an opportunity for the northern Indigenous population to participate in the CAF and bring their community-first perspective into the equation. Traditional skills such as living off the land, along with holistic well-being, are central to Indigenous communities. In the case of Inuit communities, these include survival skills in harsh Arctic conditions, skills that, if not shared and practiced, could be at risk of being lost. Their celebration and sharing through joint military exercises point to the increasing recognition of the value of Indigenous traditional knowledge and the appreciation of their unique identity.  

Language plays a vital role in shaping any culture. This is evident among Ukrainians, who have made significant efforts to preserve and promote their language as a key marker of national identity, distinct from Russia. A similar commitment to language preservation can be seen in many Indigenous communities across Canada. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission highlighted how the residential school system sought to erase Indigenous identities by forbidding children from speaking their native languages, often punishing them for doing so.  

In their report , Lackenbauer and Kikkert emphasize the importance of language in both community-building and cultural preservation. They note how Ranger patrols have created opportunities for intergenerational learning, with young Rangers practicing and improving their Inuinnaqtun under the guidance of senior leaders. These leaders encourage youth to use traditional terms for place names and give commands in their native tongue, all while building confidence and strengthening cultural identity.  

While military strength is often measured in terms of equipment, technology, or the number of personnel, the cultural dimension of defence is frequently overlooked. Canada can learn from Ukraine’s example, where national identity and cultural heritage have been strategically mobilized to strengthen resistance and resilience. In particular, Canada has the opportunity to recognize and integrate the unique knowledge systems of Indigenous communities, such as the survival expertise of Inuit peoples in the Arctic, into its broader defence strategy. This approach not only enhances national security but also aligns with �䲹�Բ��岹’s commitments under the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s Calls to Action. Strengthening public awareness of the Canadian Rangers and their critical role in Arctic defence is essential, especially as global power dynamics shift and actors like Russia increasingly challenge the international rules-based order, including through heightened interest in the Arctic. By valuing Indigenous knowledge and fostering inclusive defence frameworks, Canada can build a more resilient and ethical approach to national security. 

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Russia’s war in Ukraine has fueled political radicalization in Latvia with far-reaching implications for national security. This policy brief examines how radical attitudes and behaviours have evolved in Latvia’s society – particularly online – under the influence of Russian propaganda, disinformation, and cyber operations since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022.

 Latvia, in response to Russia’s aggression and anxiety regarding its shared border, has embarked on a set of to secure national security and decouple from the Soviet past. These consisted of extensive , humanitarian, and to Ukraine, securing the national information space and shaping historical memory. The Latvian government has taken steps to prohibit and related online sites. and symbols have been removed from public places. While these efforts were done in the name of preserving Latvian sovereignty, they also , many of whom perceived this as an attempt to rewrite history.

Thus, Latvia faces a risk of radicalization among specific segments of its population as a direct and indirect consequence of Russia’s hybrid warfare. Hybrid threats have been systematically used to deepen societal cleavages and foment extremist sentiments. The Russian-speaking community (making up slightly more than one-third of Latvia’s population) is a target of Kremlin propaganda, wherein Latvia is framed as “Russophobic”, thus allowing Russia to spread its narratives among these populations.

This trend threatens Latvia’s internal security and has an added strategic security dimension as a polarized and unstable Latvia, a key NATO member, would benefit Russia and its efforts to undermine the solidarity of the NATO Alliance.

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The objective of this paper is to evaluate arguments for and against the realist approach to international relations commentary on the Arctic. The paper argues that the Arctic is a highly mutable space, characterized by a strong disconnect between perception and interpretation, on the one hand, and material reality, on the other. While novel approaches to realism in international relations (IR) theory, like neoclassical realism, offer ways of thinking about distortions to decision-making capabilities, they tend to neglect the ways in which Arctic dynamics are endowed with meaning through the interplay of strategic priorities operating outside of the region itself. Addressing this lacuna makes it possible to centre the role of perception; assess the co-creation of security dynamics; and address the subtle differences between the dominant realist perspective and a more pragmatic appreciation of the region’s security dynamics. 

During the Cold War, the Arctic represented a “buffer zone between… two superpower rivals” — a strategic concept that shaped high-level thinking regarding the risk of nuclear conflict between two hegemons of the bipolar world order (Østhagen 2020, 5). While both liberal and realist paradigms failed to anticipate the Cold War’s relatively peaceful end, they have nonetheless remained dominant lenses for understanding foreign policy and state behaviour, particularly as strategic interests in the Arctic have undergone a resurgence. The continued prominence of these frameworks underscores the enduring appeal of systemic explanations for state behaviour, even in the face of unpredictable geopolitical shifts.����

Throughout the 1990s, the formation of various supranational organizations — the Arctic Council (1996), the WWF Arctic program (1992), the Northern Forum (1991), and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (1993)�� —as well as the establishment of norms governing state actions — like the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which entered into force in 1994 — led scholars like Oran Young to observe a transformation in the Arctic and frame it as a “focal point for a range of initiatives involving transnational cooperation” (Young 2005, 9). Over time, these discursive spaces and practices, founded on the mutual commitment of participating members to common objectives, would become second nature (Young 2005, 9).��

 Today, the realist paradigm has once again become the preferred framework for understanding foreign policy and national security in the Arctic (Buchanan 2023). While Russia’s 2016 Foreign Policy Concept follows a “dual track” approach to the Arctic —peaceful and cooperative on one hand, zero-sum and realist on the other — Lieutenant General Rolf Frolland of the Norwegian Air Force points to the decision of Russian Chief of Defense Gerasimov in 2019 to launch the “active defense” concept — high readiness, mobility, strong coordination and massive firepower — in urging the Norwegian government to adopt an approach that is “realistic, pragmatic and aimed at ensuring hard security” (Frolland 2021). This self-perpetuating, securitizing cycle has led to the increasing militarization of the Arctic by Russia and NATO, hindering possibilities for cooperation in the region (Fakhoury 2023). 

According to Mariya Omelicheva, numerous scholars have analyzed the Arctic from the realist perspective, both through defensive realism — which perceives Russia as a status quo state reacting defensively to NATO’s eastern encroachment — and offensive realism — which, in the tradition of John J. Mearsheimer, sees Russia as a power maximizer driven to expand its regional dominance and secure a strategic advantage on the world stage (Omelicheva 2016; “The Kremlin’s Arctic Dreams” 2022). The media and popular writing on the subject have been dominated by the more sensationalist framing approaches of realist accounts (Knutsen and Pedersen 2024). 

With the longest Arctic coastline, sovereignty over half the region’s population, and a technological edge inherited from the Soviet Union, Russia stands as the undisputed hegemon in the Arctic (Charron, Plouffe, and Roussel 2012). Russia seeks to leverage its position in the Arctic as a pivot into a new world order (“The Kremlin’s Arctic Dreams” 2022). Arctic countries adopt standard responses prescribed by realist theory, including bandwagoning (joining the hegemon) or balancing (counterweighting the side of the hegemon) (Charron, Plouffe, and Roussel 2012).  

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has increased threat perception in the Arctic, serving as a key vector in the evolving security landscape of the region (Newcomer et al. 2022). Despite this, Elizabeth Buchanan argues that the Kremlin is interested in pursuing peaceful relations in the Arctic for strategic reasons (Buchanan 2023). Jonas Kjellén observes that Russia’s construction of built infrastructure along the latitudinal axis of its Northern Sea Route rather than the longitudinal axis of a nuclear strike, as during the Cold War, suggests economic rather than military motives for its Arctic frenzy (Kjellén 2022). Elina Brutschin and Samuel R. Schubert argue that the co-occurrence of military, extractive, and transportation infrastructure suggests that Russian military mobilization in the region can be explained by an upsurge in economic activity, itself the outcome of a warming climate (Brutschin and Schubert 2016). The Nitze School of Advanced International Studies has described Russia’s Arctic policy as a proactive response, which seeks to diminish the uncertainty of geo-strategic developments in the Arctic resulting from a changing climate (“The Kremlin’s Arctic Dreams” 2022).  

While realist frameworks help explain many key dynamics in the Arctic, they often underestimate the region’s symbolic and strategic fluidity, as well as its historical entanglement in broader international and security orders — thereby offering an overdetermined perspective on the options available to states in the region. The Arctic is not a fixed geopolitical arena, but a mutable space shaped by extra-regional priorities and strongly influenced by perceptions and interpretations of state behaviour. A more pragmatic approach would invite greater attention to the ways in which meaning is produced, contested, and leveraged in shaping the actions of states.��

References

Buchanan, Elizabeth. Red Arctic : Russian Strategy under Putin. Washington, D.C:��
Brookings Institution Press, 2023.��
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Brutschin, Elina, and Samuel R Schubert. “Icy Waters, Hot Tempers, and High Stakes: Geopolitics and Geoeconomics of the Arctic.” Energy Research & Social Science 16 (2016): 147–59. .��
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Implications for Canada.” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 18, no. 1 (2012): 38–50.��
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Fakhoury, Renato. “Polar Stars: Toward an Epistemological Understanding of Security��
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Kjellén, Jonas. “The Russian Northern Fleet and the (Re)Militarisation of the Arctic.” Arctic��
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