/cifp/wp-content/uploads/sites/132/2026/09/2022-23-Trudeau-Foreign-Policy-Report-Card-1.pdf

The post 2022-23 Trudeau Foreign Policy Report Card appeared first on Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP).

Canada should re-examine U.S. relations, ‘pursue its own future’ in face of Trump’s pandemic response, say foreign policy and trade experts – The Hill Times

The post Advice Not Taken From 5 Years Ago appeared first on Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP).

U.S.-Russia Proxy War in Ukraine Is a Case of Deterrence Failure

decision to allow Ukraine to strike deep within Russia using advanced American missile technology is but the latest step in the ladder. Vladimir Putin has stated such actions would place Russia with NATO. Biden’s  risky decision is symptomatic of a larger set of problems related to deterrence failure and the absence of in a multipolar world. Adding to the complexity, , including its proposed deployment of advanced missile systems to Belarus, signals a significant escalation in technological capabilities that undermine traditional .

Deterrence has long been the cornerstone of international security. Yet, in a multipolar world, where power is fragmented and alliances shift unpredictably, maintaining its  effectiveness is increasingly complex and difficult. This does not mean that multipolarity and deterrence are incompatible. Rather new strategies of deterrence must be developed,  that are consistent with  today’s gray zone conflict environment characterised by

The foundational works of political scientists such as  and explain how in a multipolar system, power asymmetries and shifting alliances form and dissolve rapidly. These shifts create uncertainty about the strength and resolve of adversaries, making it harder to assess risks accurately. Stronger states are less deterred by weaker adversaries, further emboldening aggression. In addition, technological advancements like , including  the innovative and deadly , make threat escalation strategies even more tempting. Near-zero-miss technologies blur the lines between strategic doctrine, while emerging capabilities like (EMP) weapons and  pose challenges in terms of broader military strategy and tactics.

Alliance Entrapment and Absence of a Shared Strategy

In today’s , significant shifts in the balance of power seldom result from military conquest. Put differently, while major powers continue to rely heavily on their conventional armed forces, they often fall short of achieving their overarching geopolitical . Examples of these shortcomings are evident in instances such as the U.S. military intervention in in 2001, in 2003, and Libya in 2011, as well as Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine in 2022.

One of the difficulties in gauging U.S., NATO, and EU resolve in confronting Russia — which ultimately resulted in a move from a deterrence position, to , to a proxy war — lies in the and the that each member  in the North Atlantic alliance assigns to particular goals. Not to mention, their (un)willingness to bear and share in the and costs of a specific action (such as the continued arming of Ukraine) that they did not particularly choose.

A related impediment is simply the within any alliance coalition regarding the primary end goal and the actions that are to be prioritized. As the strongest member and leading party in the North Atlantic alliance, the United States believes that all other member states must follow its lead in opposing Russia, having very little regard for others’ . Other states, such as Poland and the UK, meanwhile, are far more hawkish than Washington, even courting with Russia — although for different reasons. Still others, like Turkey and Hungary, have chosen to pursue a more balanced and multi-aligned strategy so as to not unnecessarily antagonize Moscow. Through various provocations and escalatory tactics — often coordinated with Kyiv — the more bellicose states in the former camp have effectively the more reluctant nations in the latter group as well as those in the middle like Germany into a proxy war with Russia with no clear diplomatic solution in sight. In this way by more belligerent  NATO members has contributed  to the rapid escalation of the conflict both vertically in terms of intensity and horizontally in terms of geographic spread and across domains.

Bad Policy

To make matters worse, Washington’s Ukraine policy under President Biden has suffered from inconsistency and incoherence. Biden’s foreign policy team under former Hilary Clinton advisors Anthony Blinken, Jake Sullivan, and Toria Nuland came into office intent on against both Russia and China. With regard to Russia, these  resented how the Ukraine crisis was handled under  Presidents Obama and Trump. In line with Neoconservative Republicans like Lindsey Graham and Ted Cruz, not only did Blinken and company, view  tolerance for Russia’s pre-emptive takeover of Crimea as unacceptable,  they were also concerned about deeper economic between West-Central Europe (i.e. Germany) and Russia.

U.S. objection against Europe-Russia interdependence was most evident in the Biden administration’s stated goal of terminating Nord Stream II. Thus, even before Moscow’s “special military operation” against Kyiv in the winter of 2022, the Biden administration sought to Russia through increasing economic sanctions almost immediately after coming to power in 2020.

Coercive actions such as economic sanctions fall outside direct military confrontation. They constitute the “gray zone” of major power conflict. In gray zone conflicts, states rely on low-intensity — such as propaganda and information warfare, sanctions, use of ideological or identity-based  non-state actors, as well as cyber space and social media — to achieve . Weaponizing the gray zone can often lead to .

Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict

For example, in the Russia-Ukraine war, ethnic dynamics play a significant role in the conflict. Russia’s justification for its actions often centers on reclaiming territories like Crimea and the Donbas, where it and Russian-speaking populations. From Russia’s perspective, the risks of acting now are outweighed by the potential long-term consequences of inaction, such as permanently losing control over Crimea and the Donbas to Ukraine.  Over time, intensifying ethnic divisions in Ukraine, particularly in the Donbas region, became a in Russia’s decision to intervene. Moscow framed its actions as a to from alleged threats posed by far-right Ukrainian nationalists. However, this narrative served more as a strategic aims, including maintaining influence over Ukraine and countering its shift toward Western alliances. In this context, both Kyiv and Moscow saw war as a means to resolve the security dilemma created by Ukraine’s geopolitical realignment. For Russia, intervention offered a chance to secure its strategic objectives without needing prolonged military preparation, while a weak Ukraine sought to and resist Russian aggression.

Lure of Escalation

A key aspect of the breakdown in deterrence between Russia and the U.S. is the appeal of the logic of escalation to both sides. Although the threat of escalation and higher cost is supposed to motivate both sides to to military conflict and compromise at the negotiating table, both Moscow and Washington repeatedly find themselves in a game of chicken, trying to demonstrate their superior ability to tolerate the ever higher risks and costs of conflict.

As costly and problematic as this might be for each side, the outcome could be even worse as the process is not controlled and is mired with uncertainty. Indeed, the more escalatory spirals are repeated in an uncoordinated setting, the higher the probability of a disastrous outcome eventually occurring. Coordination and engagement regarding “red lines” are key to stable relations between rival powers. Failures of deterrence ultimately stem from failures in coordination and communication.

The change in U.S. policy under Biden to confront Russia through increasingly escalatory gray zone strategies was a major contributing factor to the Ukraine war. For example, in the lead-up to the Russian intervention in 2022, there were 3,000 close-contact between U.S. and Russian forces. These flashpoints, some of which were deliberately escalatory, created room for military accidents, miscalculations, and errors. If Russia’s responses were indeed based on crossed ‘red lines’, then the advanced military equipment and training supplied by the West only made Russia’s intervention in 2022 more likely.

Absence of Strategic Empathy

Another important cause of deterrence breakdown is the absence of strategic empathy. Strategic empathy is necessary to avoid or remedy basic errors in analyzing an adversary’s behavior. Misunderstandings, biases, and faulty assumptions can result in poor analysis leading to heightened tensions. offers a way to counter such missteps, making it crucial for accurately interpreting adversary actions and calibrating responses. Strategic empathy requires a cognitive shift: simulating or imagining another’s experience, mindset, and . Unfortunately, what has guided U.S. strategy on Russia,  so far, is driven by thinking. Indeed, the U.S. foreign policy establishment has committed attributing Russia’s behavior to , a and even Putin’s rather than to situational and geopolitical factors. As a result, Washington and its allies have systematically underestimated their own role in provoking a Russian response and the wider war that has ensued.

One critical conceptual shift that must occur within the transatlantic security community is the recognition that competing great powers like Russia are no longer adversaries that can be decisively defeated; instead, they must be constructively and . Such an understanding is crucial for avoiding the pitfalls , the  and that the policy of absolute victory entails. Deterrence, as a strategy, aims instead to dissuade adversaries from taking hostile actions by convincing them that the costs or consequences of such actions would outweigh any potential benefits. This is achieved through the credible threat of retaliation or punishment, rather than seeking their total destruction and elimination as geopolitical competitors through decisive victory.

Conclusion

In practical terms, policies that seek the total defeat of enemies typically not only demand the decisive and to attain specific objectives to undermine the adversary, they  also . Such strategies prioritize military preparedness, force modernization, and operational planning to ensure the capability to secure victory in conflict scenarios and the . But they come at a much higher , especially when involving nuclear powers.

While diplomacy may still play a role in these strategies, it often with the actual adversary and focuses instead on international and garnering . Not only does exclusion that rewards ideology and thinking,  it is also inherently risky and destabilizing. Furthermore, exclusion may not even be feasible and practical in today’s highly geopolitical, interest-based, and .

Conversely, policies centered on improving deterrence  strategies better match of a more polycentric and regional world by constant wars involving the U.S.. Traditional deterrence strategies prioritize  the  maintenance of a credible and strong military, having both  robust defensive and offensive capabilities. However, in today’s conflict environment deterrence must  equally prioritise diplomacy, negotiation, and the establishment of clear communication channels with rivals and adversaries to manage gray zone conflict effectively and to mitigate the risk of misperception or miscalculation.

emphasizes the complementary , seeking to harmonize rather than oppose these forces. Central to this shift is the process of weaning the U.S. and its allies off institutions  deeply rooted in  unrestrained and . This transformation requires fundamental changes in the mandates and purposes of core  —including diplomatic, foreign aid, intelligence, and defense departments—that have repeatedly demonstrated i  in foreign interventions  and war fighting .

David Carment  and  Dani Belo

The post U.S.-Russia Proxy War in Ukraine Is a Case of Deterrence Failure appeared first on Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP).

Foreign Interference in a Geopolitical Context PIFI Submission

The threat of foreign interference continues to grow and evolve as the geopolitical structure of the world changes. Canada is often targeted by adversaries, and allies, who seek to advance their interests through transnational means, such as mobilising diaspora groups and hybrid tactics. These actions are typically not considered a type of open warfare, but they are efforts to both influence and interfere in a country’s internal economic and political processes. As we know, democratic states, like Canada, cannot guarantee complete immunity from interference without becoming the enemies of their own open societies. To make open societies fully resistant to harmful influences would render them closed societies. At the same time, the risks that interference poses from both friend and foe should not be an excuse to foreclose on opportunities for growth and investment. Canada is, ultimately, a trading nation and, as a middle power, has a degree of agency that should be fully exploited to advance economic and political opportunities. The desire for a strong, secure Canada need not undermine the country’s competitiveness and productivity.

The post Foreign Interference in a Geopolitical Context: Transnational Linkages, Diaspora Mobilisation and Grey Zone Conflict appeared first on Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP).

Since its independence in 1960 the CAR has faced incredible instability with continual political upheavals, coups, and struggles for power. At the heart of the issue is a number of divisions in the country including political affiliation, religion, land, and ethnicity. These divisions have led to a multitude of armed groups within the CAR pursuing their own agendas. While the problems in the CAR are extremely complex, the Central African Republic Electoral Democracy Initiative (CAREDI) aims to monitor and secure the democratic process of voting for the CAR’s upcoming local elections, the first of their kind since 1988. This initiative could provide citizens with a safe democratic process while giving legitimacy to the election results, and mitigating violence. Subsequently providing citizens with legitimate local governance to work from the bottom up. Due to the mandate’s nature, the initiative will also leave the CAR with a greater capacity for local electoral monitoring in the future. While CAREDI will not solve the complex issues of the CAR, it will provide citizens with the opportunity to safely cast their vote for a legitimate local government. As a result, citizens of the CAR may finally have credible representation at the local level. This may incentivize local democratic, political, and civil society participation to address the nation’s issues.

CAREDI

The post Central African Republic Electoral Democracy Initiative (CAREDI) appeared first on Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP).

To be implemented over a minimum of two years, the Water Infrastructure and Education Program (WIEP) is purposed with providing access to potable water and education for water safety and water treatment to Haitians. The program is oriented towards providing water infrastructure that can withstand natural disasters, provides checks on the transitional government’s capacity to provide basic resources educations for the maintenance of sanitation services. This will reduce the effects of humanitarian crises, promote education in environmental issues, encourage transitional governance and promote economic development. The program will work in conjunction with the UNDP via NGOS for the provision, installation and maintenance of sustainable water, wastewater, and irrigation infrastructure. This work will be achieved through the Government of Canada’s partnership with the UNDP, Haiti’s transitional government and NGOs for reporting mechanisms and the provision of resources and education access.  WIEP Haiti Policy Brief

The post Haiti Water Infrastructure and Education Program (WIEP) appeared first on Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP).

Gang violence, fueled by corrupt and elite oligarchs has exacerbated the already declining
human development situation in Haiti with a great deal of Haitians now experiencing alarming levels
of food insecurity. Additionally, as gang violence expands from the occupied capital of Port-au-Prince
into neighbouring areas like Cité Soleil, many youths with no other viable opportunities are being
recruited and exploited by gang forces. The Haitian Intervention Program for Youth (H.I.P.Y) is a
project aimed to work with local NGOs within the Cité Soleil neighbourhood to strengthen food
security with gardening knowledge and skills production. This program will also create a youth
soccer league, aimed to deter youth away from the violence that surrounds them, and instead
provide safe and community-oriented environments. This project proposal will begin by addressing
the logistical description of the project, including stakeholders and project timeline, then will provide
a pre-project risk assessment before highlighting the monitoring process and concluding with a
summary of how the post-project impact will be measured. In collaboration with GAC and local
NGOs, this project hopes to address food insecurity while also providing opportunities for
disaffected youth amid a complex and dangerous conflict.

Haitian Intervention Program for Youth – HIPY

The post Haitian Intervention Program for Youth (HIPY) appeared first on Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP).

HOP aims to improve the security and social situation in Port-au-Prince through the development an
implementation of a community policing policy with the Haitian National Police (HNP). The community policing approach will contribute to moving past a system that relies heavily on punishment and force, which to date has proved ineffective, and will focus on collaborating with civil society and constructive problem-solving. Led by Global Affairs Canada (GAC), HOP has a budget of 20 million dollars (Canadian) and will provide comprehensive community policing training to 100 recruits and facilitate engaged dialogue between the police and the people of Port-au-Prince over two years.

Haitian Overhaul in Policing – HOP

The post HAITIAN OVERHAUL IN POLICING (HOP) appeared first on Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP).

Aid Effectiveness: Carment Samy

The objective of this paper is to focus on fragility research findings and examine what
works or does not work in development aid and development cooperation in fragile and conflict affected contexts. We draw on our own research findings as well as country-level studies. We examine questions of aid effectiveness in the context of supporting good governance in fragile states in the first part of the paper. We then consider the impact of COVID-19 and implications
for aid effectiveness in fragile states in the second part. In the third and final section we briefly
consider how the war in Ukraine is impacting fragile states and the long-term prospects for aid
effectiveness in an era of geopolitical rivalry and great power competition.

The post WIDER Working Paper 2023/8 Aid effectiveness in fragile and conflict-affected contexts Lessons from more than two decades of research appeared first on Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP).

Haiti Conflict Diagnostic – 2023

Haiti is facing multifaceted and serious challenges. Government institutions have ceased to
function effectively, and gangs, backed by the wealthy oligarchs, control nearly two-thirds of the
country. Frequent natural disasters further exacerbate the multitude of crises confronting Haiti.
While there is certainty about the severity of the situation, there are few actors with the
capacity and willingness to adequately address it. Many of the issue areas examined in this
diagnostic are closely interrelated to each other. In addition to data on the Country Indicators
for Foreign Policy’s (CIFP) nine main indicator clusters, this diagnostic draws on research from
other relevant sources where appropriate. Four of the nine indicator clusters are considered
high-risk factors that will increase the likelihood of further conflict. The effects of five of the
clusters are worsening and that of the rest are stable. The diagnostic projects a best, worst, and
most likely scenario in the next six months.

The post Haiti Conflict Diagnostic 2023 appeared first on Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP).